Chaim Fershtman

American Economic Association
Taboos and Identity: Considering the Unthinkable

Author(s): Chaim Fershtman, Uri Gneezy and Moshe Hoffman
Source: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May 2011), pp. 139-164
Published by: American Economic Association
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American
EconomieJournal:Microeconomics
3 (May2011): 139-164
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.2.139
Taboos and Identity:

Consideringthe Unthinkable1
ByChaimFershtman,Uri Gneezy, and Moshe Hoffman*
A taboo is an "unthinkable" action.Even the thoughtof violat-

a punishment.
ing a taboo triggers Weconsidera modelin which
taboosare partofthedefinitionofone's identity.
Deliberatingover
breakingthetaboochangestheindividual'schoiceset,andprovides
informationonpossibleprivatebenefits.
Thestrength ofthetaboois
determined bythenumberofindividuals thatobeyit.Weanalyzethe
relationship and taboos' strength.
betweensocial heterogeneity We
thenexaminesocietiesin whichindividualschoose amongseveral
identities
characterized
bydifferenttaboos.Wecharacterize thecon-
society.{JELZ 13)
ditionsthatgiverisetoa multi-identity
behavioris notgovernedonlyby rationaldecisionmaking.Societies

oftenhave sharedvaluesand standards of acceptablebehaviorthatmembers
of thesocietyare encouragedto follow.A cultureor a societyguidesthebehavior
and thethoughts oftheirmembersby agreeduponexpectations and rules.The list
ofbehavioralguidelinesis typically referredto as social normsand taboos.These
normsandtabooshavea hugeeffect on ourlives.The waywe behave,dress,eat,and
drive,as wellas oursex life,areall governed bythenormsandtaboosofthesociet-
ies we belongto.Whilethereis an extensive literature
on socialnorms,tabooswere
mainlydiscussedby anthropologists thathavedocumented and analyzedtaboosin
different(typically
exotic) societies.1
The termtaboois ofPolynesianorigin(thewords"tabu"or"tapu"intheTongan
language)and was introduced to theEnglishlanguageonlyin theeighteenth cen-
tury. -
The originalPolynesiantermhas a specificreligiousassociation see also the
famousbookTotemand Taboo(SigmundFreud1955).2AccordingtoEncyclopedia
Britannica,taboois definedas "theprohibition ofan actionbasedon thebeliefthat
suchbehaviouris eithertoo sacredand consecrated or too dangerousand accursed
forordinary individualstoundertake."
* Fershtman:The EitanBerglasSchool of Economics,Tel AvivUniversity, Tel Aviv69978, Israeland CEPR

Gneezy:RadySchoolofManagement,
(e-mail:fersht@post.tau.ac.il); University ofCalifornia,
San Diego,La Jolla,
CA 92093-0553(e-mail:ugneezy@ucsd.edu);Hoffman: RadySchool of Management, University of California,
San Diego,La Jolla,CA 92093-0553(e-mail:mhoffman@chicagobooth.edu).
ŤTo comment on thisarticleintheonlinediscussionforum, ortoviewadditionalmaterials,visitthearticlepage
at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php
?doi= 10.1257/mic.3.2.
139.
1See for
exampleEdnaUllmann-Margalit (1977), GeorgeA. Akerlof(1980), JonElster(1989), HaroldL. Cole,
GeorgeJ.Mailath,andAndrewPostlewaite(1992, 1998),MichaelHechterand Karl-Dieter Opp (2001), Cristina
Bicchieri(2005) andH. PeytonYoung(2008).
2When
SigmundFreudfirst introduces
theterm"taboo"in SectionII ofthebook,he claimsthatitsmeaningis
identicalto theterm"Sacer"byRomans,and"Kadesh"byHebrews(Jews).
139
140 AMERICANECONOMIC JOURNAL:MICROECONOMICS MAY2011
Taboos mayincluderestrictions on sexualactivitieslike incest,animal-human

sex,necrophilia, and adult-child sex. Othertaboosrelateto dietaryrestrictions like
Halal and kosherdietsforMuslimsand Jewishpeople,eatingbeefby Hindus,or
cannibalism in mostsocieties.3Taboos can be repugnant and appallingactionsor
behaviorwhichincludesthedisplayof some bodilyfunctions.4 Almostall these
taboosarenotuniversal and,accordingtoFreud,incestis probablytheonlyuniver-
sal taboo.
Anotherimportant set of taboosinvolves"tabootradeoffs" thatcan entailput-
a
ting monetary value on "sacred" values likelife,love,friendship,orreligion.For
examplebeingasked to estimatethemonetary worthof one's children, of one's
loyalty to his friends or country is considered by mostpeople morally offensive,
and as a violationof a taboo(see Alan Page Fiskeand PhilipE. Tetlock1997 and
Tetlocketal.2000).
The listoftaboosandtheirimportance maychangeovertime.Some taboosmay
weakenorevendisappear, whileothersmaybecomestronger andmoredominant.5
Forexample,childinsurance andlifeinsurance werefora longtimetaboosandthen
becameacceptable(see VivianaA. Zelizer 1978, 1981).6Tradesof humanorgans
are stilla tabooin mostsocieties,butsomeformsoftradebecameacceptable(see
AlvinE. Roth2007). Thereareevenclaimsthatthefamousincesttaboosaredisap-
pearingincomplexsocieties(see YéhudiCohen1978andDavid H. Spain 1988).
Thereare variousexplanations fortheoriginof taboos.The typicalanthropo-
logicalargument is thatthe origin taboosis culturalexperience.
of The alternative
is
explanation psychoanalytical, the
emphasizing strong subconscious prohibitions
thatpass through generations (see Freud1955). Butwhatis thedifference between
taboosand socialnorms?One interpretation is thattaboosare strongsocialnorms;
normswhichare sufficiently strongthatmaybe viewedas sacred.Everytimean
individual'sbehaviordivergesfroma norm,thisact impactson theothermem-
bersof society, whothenpunishthedeviantindividual(see forexampleGeorgeA.
Akerlof1976,1980;Cole,Mailath,andPostlewaite1998;andYoung2008). Taboos
can therefore be viewedas strongsocial normsthatare supported by severesocial
sanctions.
Butthereis an additionalaspectoftaboosthatmaydistinguish themfromsocial
norms.Taboosaresometimes referred to as doingthe"unthinkable." Eventhinking
aboutviolatinga taboo is problematic. The sanctionsassociatedpertainnotjust
to thebehaviorthatcontradicts thetaboo,butalso merelythinking or considering
sucha behavior. Underthisinterpretation, a taboois a formof"thought police"that
not
governs just human behavior, but also its thoughts.7 or
Thinking considering
incest,necrophilia, orcannibalism is a violationoftherelevant taboos.Tetlocketal.
3Fora moredetailedlistsee thevalue"taboo"inWikipedia.

Some of therepugnance and appallingactionsare culturallyspecificand maychangeovertime.For many
examples anddiscussionsee Jonathan Haidtet al. (1997) andRoth(2007).
5See also Chambers
(1960).
6See ourdiscussionon this
examplein SectionII.
In somecases, considering an actionalso requiresan action.For example,theactionor cheatingon one s
spouse. The actionitselfis viewedby some as a violationof a norm,or a taboo,and therefore punishable.
Consideringsuchan actionmaybe theinvolvedregistering toa datingservice,orcheckingotheroptions.Typically
suchan act,evenwithout thecheatingitself,wouldbe viewedbysomeas punishable.
VOL 3 NO. 2 FERSHTMANETAL : TABOOS,IDENTITIES 141
(2000) considered tabootradeoffs intermsof"ThePsychology oftheUnthinkable!'

The conceptof tabootradeoffs focusesindeedon thementalexerciseof thinking,
and noton theactionitself."People rejectcertaincomparisons because theyfeel
thatseriouslyconsidering therelevanttradeoffs would undercuttheirselfimage
andsocialidentities as moralbeings,"(see also, FiskeandTetlock1997,256). The
emphasisin taboo-tradeoffs is aboutconsidering thetradeoffs betweensacredval-
ues andmonetary gains and not about carrying out these tradeoffs.
The economicconsequenceofnotbeingable to consideran actis thata taboois
a constraint on one's choiceset.One needsto consideran actin orderto determine
theexactcostsandbenefits itprovides.Considering an act,underthisinterpretation,
is viewedas acquiringtheoptiontocarryoutthisact.Whenthereareno constraints
aboutthoughts, theseoptionsare costless.But whenthereare taboosthatprohibit
andpenalizecertainconsiderations, acquiringan optionforcertainactionsbecomes
costly(see Roland Bénabou and Jean Tiróleforthcoming fora similarinterpretation
oftaboos)8.
Taboosareenforced by socialpunishment. The mostfamiliar social punishment
involvestheattitudes and reactionsof othermembersof society.9For suchsocial
punishment to be effective, behaviormustbe observable.Buthowcan someonebe
punishedforhaving"dirty" thoughts? Thoughtsarenotobservable.Butsocialpun-
ishment can also be self-inflicted (see also,BénabouandTiróle2004). Whentalking
abouttaboos-tradeoffs Joseph claimsthat,"Itdiminishes
Raz as a
one's potentiality
humanbeingto puta valueon one's friendship in termsof improvedlivingcondi-
tions,"Raz (1986, 22). Similarly, FiskeandTetlock(1997) claimthat"to attacha
monetary value to one's friendship or one's childrenorone's loyaltyto one's coun-
try,is to disqualify one from certain social roles.People feelthatmakingsuchan
evaluation demonstrates that one is not a truefriend,orparent, orcitizen,"Fiskeand
Tetlock(1997,256). Taboosarean important partofanysocialidentity10. Adopting
an identity impliesaccepting the taboos and the social norms associated withthis
identity.The desire to maintain an identity and to view oneself as a moral personas
defined byone's identity is an important consideration thatdefinestheself-inflicted
costofthinking aboutviolatinga taboo.11
Whatis the advantageof usingtaboosratherthansocial normsto regulatea
certainbehavior?In orderto answerthisquestion,consider,forexample,a situ-
ationthatoccursonlywitha verysmallprobability, butin thissituationa certain
behavioror actionentailshighprivatebenefit. Assumenowthatsocietywishesto
curbsucha behavior.Social normsthatpenalizeonlytheactionsmaybe ineffective
8Ifan actis itis notnecessarily thecase thattheactofthinking abouttheactis itselfunthinkable.

unthinkable,
Forexample,supposethereaderfoundouthis friendwas considering committing incest.The readermightrecog-
nizethisto be disgusting. However,thereaderis notdisgusting forhavingcometo suchrecognition, eventhough
thereaderhas thought abouttheact of thinking aboutincest.In fact,it seemsthepermissibility
of meta-thinking
is a necessary component forthefunctioning oftaboos.How else wouldwe be able to sanctionothersforthinking
abouttheunthinkable? How else couldwe educateourchildrenwhattaboosoursocietyupholds?
Sometimesthesocial punishment itselfis costlyand in orderto enforceit punishingbecomesalso a social
normimplying thatindividualswho are notpunishing forcertainbehaviorwouldbe punishment themselvesfor
violationofthesocialnorm(see Akerlof1976).
10See AkerlofandRachelE. Kranton(2000) fora discussionofsocial identity.
11As Haidtet al.
(1997) and Daniel M.T. Fessierand Carlos David Navarrete(2003) argue,thesecostsmay
involvenegativeemotionssuchas fearordisgust.
as deterrence as theyrequireharshpunishments. The highprivate benefits

shouldbe
balancedwithseveresocial sanctionsin orderto detersucha behavior.But social
sanctionshave a limit(see Cole, Mailath,and Postlewaite1998).12On theother
hand,taboosthatpenalizeformerelyconsidering a deviationmayimposea much
lowerpenaltythatis nonetheless sufficientto deterindividuals fromthinking about
theoptiontodeviate.To illustrate thisstructure,considerthetabooagainstcannibal-
ism.Whensomeoneis starving, theprivate benefit ofdeviating fromthistaboomay
be large.Thustheonlywaytodetersucha behavioris toimposea tabooprohibiting
individuals evento considersuchan act.
Some taboosareprohibited underthelaw,andtransgressions maylead to severe
For
punishment. example, there are laws against trade in human organs;thereare
laws againstunderagesex, pornography, etc. In some countries, thereare laws
againsthomosexuality, and,inothers, dietary restrictionsarealso enforced bylaw.13
Clearlysometaboosarealso regulated byreligiouspractices.14 Generallyspeaking,
ineverysocietytherearethreetypesofincentives thatgovernindividuals' behavior:
private rewards such as anymonetary incentives; social incentives such as norms,
taboos,social prestige;and legal incentives thatenforcecertaintypesof behavior
andpenalizedeviations. Clearly,thereareactivities whicharebothtabooandillegal.
Whatdetermines theexactmixofthesetypesofincentives, andwhythismixis dif-
ferent in different societies,is one oftheimportant questionsin thesocialsciences.
Whatotheradvantagemaysocietyobtainfromtaboos?One explanation is that
sometimes thoughts, per se, create negative externalities. Taboos-tradeoffs provide
examplesforsuch externalities. Makingthe tradeoff evaluationsundermine the
meaningoffriendship, love,loyalty, familyties,etc.Buttaboosmayprovideother
of
types public benefit to a society. example,a tabooagainstcannibalism
For would
guarantee safety and the functioning of the society in case of a severe famine.Haidt
et al. (1997) discuss the role of dietaryrestrictions as part of a society'shealthcon-
sideration. This roleof dietarytaboosis emphasizedby thefactthatmanyof the
dietary taboos are contamination sensitive.15A dietarytaboo,like kosherrestric-
tionsforJewishpeople,has facilitated isolationand survivalof thegroupculture
(seeYuriSlezkine2004). A tabooprohibiting a directpayment forhumanorgansfor
transplanting maybenefit a societyby eliminating incentives forexploiting people
andviolentharvesting ofhumanorgans.
Taboos have an important aspectof social interaction. The strength of a taboo
is affected by thepercentage of individualswho deviate,or thinkaboutdeviating,
fromthetaboo(see FessierandNavarrete 2003; fora similarargument withrespect
to social customs,see Akerlof1980 and David Romer1984). We do notspecify
the underlying social interaction processthatestablishesthisrelationship. It is
12In
addition, manyharshsanctionsandpenalties.
itis notclearthatwe enjoylivingin a societythatprescribes
3Forexample,itis notlegalto sellhorsemeatin California, whilein someEuropeancountiesthereareshops
thatspecializein suchmeat.
Someactivities maybecometabooas a reflection (forexample,alcoholconsump-
ofthereligiousprohibition
tionin Islamiccountries).
For example,kosherrestrictions implynotjust thatone cannoteat porkor seafood,buteveryfoodthat
touchesnon-kosher foodbecomesnonkosher.Thesetypesofrulesemphasisthe"contamination effect."
VOL 3 NO. 2 FERSHTMANETAL: TABOOS,IDENTITIES 143
possiblethatwithsomeprobability individuals'thoughts are transparent.16

Or that
thestrength ofthetaboois determined by social interaction amongindividuals that
mayexpress theiropinionsand those thatconsider deviating from a taboocontribute
toitsweakening.
We presenta simplemodelthatformalizes theroleoftaboosin societiesandthe
waythey affect behavior,thoughts, and the choice ofidentity. We startbyconsider-
a
ing society in which there is one taboo. Behaving in a manner thatviolatesthe
The
taboois costly. severity of the is
punishmentpositively relatedto thestrengthof
thetaboo.Individuals maydiffer withrespecttotheirsocialconcernsandthesever-
itythat they associate withsocial punishment.17 We assumethattherearestochastic
potential private benefitsfrom deviatingfrom the taboo.Considering sucha devia-
tionis a learning processbywhichan individualbecomesawareofhisownprivate
benefit. Deviationfroma taboois possibleonlyafteran individualhas completed
thislearning process.On theotherhand,thestrength ofthetaboois determined by
thepercentage ofindividualsthatfollowit.We assumethatthepublicbenefit froma
tabooandtheseverity ofthesocialpunishment dependson thetaboo'sstrength. We
definea stabletabooanddiscussitsproperties.
Societiesmaydiffer intheirlevelofsocialheterogeneity. One aspectofsuchhet-
erogeneity is thedistribution
ofattitudes towardsocialnormsandsocialpunishment
amongindividuals. Anotheraspectis therangeofdifferent identitiesandtaboos,and
thepossiblecoexistenceofmultipleidentities. We first considerheterogeneity with
respect to social preferences,and discuss the effect of such heterogeneity the
on
strength ofthetaboo.We thenconsidera societyin whichtherearetwocompeting
identities.Individuals needfirst tochoosewhichidentity toadopt,andthenwhether
are
they going to followthe taboo prescribed by thisidentity. Allowingindividuals
tochooseidentities definesan evolutionary processwithrespectto identities. Some
identitiesmaydisappearwhileothersmayflourish whenmoreindividuals chooseto
adoptthem.We specifytheconditions thatgiveriseto a multiple-identity society,
andinvestigate itsstructure.
I. Taboos and Identities
We startouranalysisby consideringa societywithone taboo.The strength of

thistaboodeterminestheseverityofthesocial punishment imposedon peoplethat
deviatefromthetaboo. On theotherhand,the strength of thetaboo is endoge-
nouslydetermined by thecollectivebehaviorof themembersof the society.We
thenextendouranalysisandconsidera societywithdifferent each char-
identities,
acterizedbya different The stablesystemofidentities
setoftaboos.18 andtaboosis
jointlydeterminedby individuals'
choice of and
identity theirdecisionsregarding
thetaboostheyviolate.
16In some an actmayrequireengaginginan actualsearch,whichis notsimplya mentaltask,

cases,considering
butinvolvesfact-findingthatis partlyobservable.
17For evidenceon individualvariations to emotionsof fearand disgustin reactionto taboo
in susceptibility
see FessierandNavarrete
stimuli, (2003).
0We
ignoresocial normsand identify a societyonlybythelistoftaboositimposes.Clearlya moreextended
analysisshouldincludebothnormsandtaboos.
A. StableTaboos
Considera societywithone taboo.We normalizethesize ofthepopulation to 1,

andassumethatindividuals areheterogeneous withrespecttotheirsocialconcerns.
We denotean individual'stypeas ф. An individualoftypeф = 0 is notconcerned
witheitherhisidentity northesocialimplications ofhisactions.A higherф implies
highersocialconcerns. We letthedistribution ofф be G(0), withф e [ф9ф].
Not all thetaboosare of thesame strength. We denotethestrength of a taboo
by Г, and assume thatT is commonly accepted and known by all members of the
society.The meaningof havinga stronger taboo relatesprimarilyto thecost of
breaking the taboo.For example, in most incest
societies taboosare "stronger" than
dietarytaboos, and thisfactis recognizedby all membersof thesociety.We assume
thatthereis a socialcostofdeviating, orjustconsideringa deviation,froma taboo.
Thesecostsareincreasing withthestrength ofthetabooand theindividual'stype,
let
ф. Specifically,
• С(ф9Т) - be thecostassociatedwithconsideringa deviationfromthetaboo
• D(0, T) - be thecostassociatedwithdeviating
fromthetaboo,
whereС(ф, T) and£>(</>, T) areincreasing inbotharguments.

A taboo has a meaningonlyif thereare potentialprivatebenefitsattachedto
deviatingfromit.Thereis no tabooagainsteatingsand,buttherearetaboosagainst
eatingbeef,pork,seafood,or humanflesh.The privatebenefitsmaymaterialize
onlyin some specialcircumstances. A starving personmaybenefitfromeatinga
certaintypeoffoodagainstwhichthereis a taboo.We therefore assumethatpeople
may sometimes obtain private benefits from deviating from the taboo.However,
thesebenefits are notapparentwithoutindividualsfirstconsidering thedeviation.
This"consideration process"is also a learningprocessbywhichtheprivate benefits
ofdeviationarerevealed.
An individual whoconsidersviolatinga taboowillobservetherealization ofhis
ownprivate benefitsfromsucha deviation. The privatebenefit, denotedbyè, is pri-
vatelyobserved. The distributionof b, givenbyF(b)9 is identicalforall individuals.19
Afterobserving therealizationof his privatebenefits, an individualmaydecide
whetherhe/shewishesto deviatefromthe taboo. But thisdeviationis costly.
Therefore, deviationfromthetaboowilloccuronlywhentherealizedbenefits are
greaterthan thecosts ofdeviation, i.e., whenever b > и(ф9 Т).
Considering deviatingfroma taboois similartobuyingan option - theoptionto
deviatefroma taboowhenever sucha deviationis beneficial. In ordertoobtainsuch
an option,theindividualpaystheconsideration costsС(ф9 Т). The individualthen
observesa realizationoftherandombenefit b and,givenhis/her type,he/shedecides
whether to deviateornot.The valueofsuchan optionforan individual oftypeф is
denotedbyV(F(b), ф, Г). An individual willconsiderdeviating fromthetabooonly
19 In termsofourmodel,suchheterogene-
benefits.
Clearlytheremightbe heterogeneity
withrespecttoprivate
itywill tabooswhicharekeptbypartofthepopulation
also generate andviolatedbyothers.
VOL 3 NO. 2 FERSHTMANET AL: TABOOS,IDENTITIES 145
whenthevalueofthisoptionis greater thanthecostofacquiringit,whichis thecost

ofconsidering violationofthetaboo,i.e.,wheneverV(F(b)9 ф, T) > С(ф, 71)20.
Clearly,some individualswho deviatefroma taboo regretdoingso. Whenan
individualdecideson deviation,thecost of considering a deviation,С(ф, Г), is a
sunkcost.Thus,whenever T) > b > D(0, T)9 theindividualwill
С(ф, T) + D(</>,
deviatefromthetaboobutregret thefactthatdeviationwas evenconsidered.
We assumethatthestrength ofthetaboois endogenously determined bytheper-
of
centage people thatfollowit.21When people deviatefrom a taboo, whenthey
or
considersucha deviation, theyindirectlyweakenthetaboo.We do notmodelthe
underlying social interaction
process,but we simplyassumethatthestrength of a
taboois a decreasingfunctionofthepercentage ofindividualsthatviolateit.Letting
• Nc- be thepercentage
ofpeoplethatconsiderdeviatingfromthetaboo.
• Nd- be thepercentage
ofpeoplethatactuallydeviatefromthetaboo.
We let thestrength of thetaboobe T(NC9Nd) whereГ(-,) is decliningin both

arguments. Consider, forexample,a tabooagainstorgantransplants. Whenindivid-
uals observesuchtransplants theyrealizethatthose individualsthat haveviolated
thetaboowillnot"punish"them.Atthesametime,otherindividuals thatkeepobey-
ingthetaboowillviewsuchviolationless extremely, as theyrealizehowcommon
violationsare. The effectof Nc on thestrength of thetaboo is morecomplex,as
thoughts arenot directlyobservable.Butthe social processthatwe have
interaction
in mindassumesthatpeopletalkwithone another, occasionallysharesecretsand
thoughts,and that while are
thoughts kept secreton the level,thefactthat
individual
many individualsconsider from
deviating a prescribed behavioror a tabooaffectthe
collectivestrengthofthetaboo.22
Individualsinthissocietybenefitfromhavinga taboo.The taboomaybe viewed
as a publicgood thatall individualsenjoy.We denotethesebenefitsas E(T) and
assumethatitis increasing withthestrength ofthetaboo,andthatall theindividuals
in thesocietyenjoyitregardless oftheirownbehavior.
An exampleof suchcollectivebenefits can be somebiologicaladvantagesfrom
different of sexualbehavior,like incest.Anotherexampleis thetaboo
restrictions
againstcannibalismthatguaranteesto membersof the societythatin diretimes
whenthereis a famine,theywill enjoysomelevel of security thatmayguarantee
thatthesocietywill continueto function. Anotherexampleis dietaryrestrictions,
likeeatingkosherfood,whichis partof theJewishidentity. The strengthof this
taboochangedovertime,as therearenowmoreindividuals thathave a Jewishiden-
titybutdo notobeythistaboo.One privatebenefit fromdeviatingfromthistaboo
is thepossibility
to socializewithpeoplethathaveotheridentities, anddo notobey
20The factthatindividualsareable to costlesslycalculatewhether or notitis worthbuyingthisoptionrestson

theassumption thatitis permissibleto thinkaboutthinking abouta taboo.Likewise,thisassumption is necessary
forus to permitpunishment, of oneselfor another,without violatingthetaboo.See footnote3 fora discussionof
thisassumption.
21Foran see also FessierandNavarrete
anthropologicalaspectofthisproperty, (2003).
22 it is enoughto assumethatthoughts are revealedwithsome (small) probability,and individuals
Formally,
mayinferfromthisthegeneralattitude inthepopulation regarding suchconsiderations.
thekosherdietary In a timewhensocializationis an important

restrictions.23 aspect
ofdailylifeandprovideshighprivate thereis no surprise
benefits, thatmoreJewish
peopledeviatefromthistaboo.Such a behaviorweakensthetaboo.On theother
hand,therestriction on socializationwithindividuals outsidethegroupis also part
ofthepublicbenefits entailedbythetaboo,as ithelpsto support theJewishidentity
without assimilationintoothergroups(see Slezkine2004). Similarlogicappliesfor
taboosagainstalcoholand coffee(forexample,taboosamongMormons),which
limitstheirabilityto socializewithmembers ofothergroups.
Societiesmaykeeptaboosevenwhentheycease to provideanysocialbenefits.
In thesecases,thetaboosarestrongly embeddedintoidentity, andbecomesymbolic
evenwithout providing anybenefits to membersof thesociety,i.e.,E(T) = 0. For
example,Haidtet al. (1997) discusstheroleofdifferent restrictions
dietary as part
of society'shealth consideration.Those healthconsiderationswere relevantat the
timetheywereformed, butceasedtobe relevant today.Theirmainclaimis thatthe
indicationfortherelationship betweendietarytaboos,and healthconsiderations,
is the"contamination aspect"of mostof thedietaryrestrictions. Acceptablefood
ceases tobe acceptable,evenifitbriefly contactedunacceptablefood.
Givenourframework, a taboois characterized by thetriple{T*,N& N^} such
that
• (TÌ) - T* = T(N*C, N*D)is thestrengthofthetabooas definedbythenumber

ofindividuals thatdo notviolateit.
• (77) - N*c= # {ф' V(F(b), Ф,Т*)> С(ф, Т*)} is thepercentage of individ-
uals forwhomthevalue of theoptionof deviatingfromthetaboois greater
thanthecostofconsidering sucha deviationgiventhatthestrengthofthetaboo
isT*.
• (73) -N*D = -
Í {ФтшГ)>с(Фг)} i1 F(D^ Т*)))8(Ф) аф is thepercent-
age ofindividuals thatactuallydeviatefromthetaboo.Theseindividuals have
considereddeviationand realizeda privatebenefitthatis above theircostof
i.e.,b > D(</>9
deviation, T*).
ofa taboo,we definea dynamicadjustment

In ordertoconsiderthestability pro-
fromany(Nlc,NlD),thecorresponding
cess as follows:Starting of
strength thetaboo
is Tx= T(Nlc,NlD).GivenГ1,we can findthenumberof individuals thatconsider
deviationfromthetaboo,Nc(Tl),andthosewhoactuallydeviate,ND(Tl). The start-
ingpointin theseconditeration wouldbe (N2aN2D)= (Nc(Tl)y ND(T1)). We can
nowdefineT2 = T{N2C, Np)ãs the at theseconditeration.
taboo'sstrength Forthis
T2 we can definethenumberofindividuals thatviolatethetaboo.We can proceed
in thesame mannerto definethedynamicadjustment sequence{Tk(Nc~l9Np'i);
(Nk¿Tk-l),NkD(Tk-1))}.
23Notethat thetypeof foodthatonescan eat butalso theplaces

obeyingkosherdietarydoes notjustrestrict
toa dinnerata houseofa friend
thathecaneat.One cannotbe invited ora colleaguethatdoesnotfollowthekosher
dietary (unlesshe/shecomesanddoes noteat- whichmaybe viewedas impolite).One cannotgo for
restrictions
a drinkwithfriends,
norhavedinnerin a restaurant,
unlessitis a kosherrestaurant,
etc.
VOL.3 NO. 2 FERSHTMANETAL: TABOOS,IDENTITIES 147
DEFINITION 1: A StableTaboo is a taboo thatis characterized

by {T' N*c,N*D}
whichsatisfies(П)-(ГЗ) and has thefollowingproperty:For every(NOND) in
the e-neighborhood of (N^Np), the dynamicadjustment process convergesto
Maintaining a taboo impliesthatpeople will nottakecertainactionsthatmay

benefitthem.The social costof a taboo,denotedby SC(T), is theexpectedunex-
forthoseindividuals
ploitedbenefits whodo notconsiderdeviationplusthepositive
benefitsforegoneby thosewhoconsiderdeviationbutdo notdeviatewhenever the
benefitsfromdeviationaresmallerthanthecost.
B. TheChoiceofIdentity
Choosingan identity is nota simpleprocess.Thereare different aspectsof the

identity that cannotbe at
changed all, and they are determined uponbirthor at a
youngage.24But peoplehave a choice,at leaston some aspectsof theiridentity.
Peopleleavetheirsociety, immigrate, changefaithorgender, or adoptdifferent sets
of values.Individualsof different the
typescompare expected benefitsfrom each
identity giventhedifferent taboosandtheirstrength.
For illustration,considerthe discussionon the assimilationof immigrants.
Immigrants may choose tokeeptheirownoriginalidentity withthe"traditional" set
ofvalues,orto adopta newidentity whichincludesnotjustdailybehaviorbutalso
theirreference group,thesetofvalues,andthewayone defineshimself.
To formalizethisprocessconsidera set{Ib...Jn} of n possibleidentities. Each
identity is characterizedby a differentsetoftaboos with different and
strength pub-
lic benefits.Each identity j has kjtaboosand we let Ty= (Thp...,Tkjj)be a vector
ofa taboo'sstrength in identity j anddenoteT = (Tb Tn).Let Е^(Т^) be thepublic
benefit forpeopleofidentity j fromhavingtheir/'thtabooat strength We
levelTiyj.
let E,<T,.)= (EUj(TUj),...,EkjJ(TkjJ) and E(T) = (EX(T,),..., En(Tn)). The costs
of violatinga taboo,considering sucha violationand thestochastic privatebenefit
fromsucha violationareas describedin SectionI. Whenan individualchoosesan
identityIj he getsthepublicbenefit XIi Е^(Т^) andthenhe needstodecidewhether
he is goingto considerviolatingsomeofthetaboos.
systemwithrespectto{/b...,/„}is
DEFINITION 2: A StableIdentity
'
(i) T*- Afullspecification
ofthetaboos strengths.
(ii) А*(ф'Т*): [ф,ф] - > {/b...,/„} is an assignmentof individualsto different

identities
given theirtypeф and the taboos'strengthsT*.
| T*j)are thepercentageofindividuals
(iii) N*(ij | T*j)andN*d(iJ j that
ofidentity
considera deviationand {respectively)actuallydeviatefromtabooi.
24 thatare not
are all examplesof elementsof theidentity
and sometimesnationality
Gender,caste,family,
chosen,andcannotbe changedeasily.
Suchthat
• No individualwould like to switchhis identity;the assignmentfunction

А*(ф| T*) describestheoptimalidentity choiceofall typesofindividuals.
• = - thestrengthof each taboois determined
t*j T(N*c(iJ'T*j),NÌ(iJ'T*j))
by thepercentage of individuals thatconsiderviolatingit and thosethatactu-
allychooseto violateit.
• N*c(iJ| T*j) andN*d(iJ withoptimalbehaviorofindividuals
' ТЦ) is consistent
as specified in SectionI.
• The taboosystemis stable.
Remark:
(i) Oursetupassumesa freemobility betweenidentitieswithoutanyrestriction.

however,theremightbe switching
In reality, costs.These switchingcosts
maydepend on thesize oftheidentity the
group, listoftaboos,their
strength
andthesocialtypeofeach individual.
(ii) We assumea completeseperability betweentaboos; the strength of each

taboo and thepublicbenefitsit generatesdo notdependon othertaboos.
But theremightbe some interdependence betweendifferent taboos.It is
possible that the of
strength one taboo is affectedby the strengthof other
taboosthatare partof thesame identity. thecostof deviating
In particular
fromone taboo may dependson the strength of othertaboos.Moreover,
it is possiblethatsome taboos are sharedby different and the
identities,
behaviorsofthemembersof all theseidentities affectthestrengthofthese
taboos.
(iii) Whenan identity bya longlistoftaboosthenitis possiblethatthe

is defined
costofdeviating fromone ofthemis notveryhighas thedeviator maintains
mostof thecharacteristics We thusmayhavea limiton
of his/heridentity.
theeffectivenessof taboos.Havingtoo manytaboosmayreducetheeffec-
tivenessofeach one ofthem.
Comingback to our exampleon the choice of identityby immigrants, the

framework thatwe presentallows fora deeperanalysisof theinterdependence
betweenculturalassimilationand the strength of theold traditionaltaboos and
norms, as well as thecharacteristics
of the otheravailable For
identities. example,
whentheadoptionof thenew identity is done by individualswithlowerф, then
theindividualswhowillkeeptheold identity willhavehighersocial concernand
will tendto keep thetaboosprescribed by the Consequently,
originalidentity. as
a resultof such an assimilationprocess,thetaboos of theimmigrants' original
identitybecomesstronger. Clearlythisprocessdependson thecharacteristics of
thetwocompeting identities.
The assimilationprocessofMexicanimmigrants into
theUS wouldhavedifferent thantheassimilation
characteristics ofAmericans into
a Chinesesociety.
II. StableTaboosandPrivateBenefits
In thissection,we considera simpleversionof theabove modelwhichallows

us toderivesomeanalyticresults.We willexplainthebasic intuition
ofourresults,
whichwillalso holdfora moregeneralsetup.
A. A SimpleSetup
• С(ф, T) = ХТфis thecostofconsidering deviationfroma taboo.

• D(0, T) = 6Тф is thecostofdeviating froma taboo;6 > A > 0.
• T(Nc,Nd)= ac(l - Nc) + ad(l - Nd) is the strength of the taboo, where
ad > ac.
• о(ф) = thedistribution of typesin thepopulation,assumedto be uniformly
distributed
on [0, 1].
• The benefitfromdeviatingfromthe taboo is b withprobability q and 0
otherwise.
• The publicbenefits ofdeviationareE(T) - ET.
В. StableTaboos
Considerthebehaviorof an individualof type0, whobelongsto a societythat

maintains a tabooof strength T. If theindividualhas alreadyconsideredviolating
thetaboo,he willviolateitwhenever thebenefit
ofdoingso is greaterthanи(ф9 Г),
i.e., whenever >
b 6Тф. The costof considering deviationis ХТф. If an individual
does notplan to deviatefromthetaboo upon obtaininga positiverealizationof
hisprivatebenefit, thereis no reasonforhimto considersuchan option.Thus,the
value of theoptionto deviatefromthetaboo is V(F(b), ф, T) = q[b - 6Тф].An
individualwillconsiderdeviating fromthetabooonlywhenthevalueoftheoption
ф, is
V(F(b)9 Т) greater than the cost ofdeviation,i.e.,whenever
(1) q[b - 6Тф] > ХТф.
Sincethecostofconsidering a deviation,
as well as thecostofdeviationitself,are
increasingin ф, thereis a thresholdфс(Т,b, q) suchthatonlyindividualsof type
Ф ^ ФС{Т,b, q) willconsiderdeviating.Using(1), фс is definedas follows:
(2) «7;M)smin{_¿_,1}.
The strengthof thetaboois endogenously determinedby theproportion of the
populationthatconsidersbreakingit and thosethatactuallybreakit.Lettingфс be
theproportionofindividualsthatconsiderbreakingthetaboo,thenqфc willbe the
150 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2011
1 l Stable
j
I Stable /taboo
ч
[pLc + OLd) '^ taboo № + ЗД v i /
т* >Ц^ -,*./ЫГ Unstable
ТГ-/< Цг !~& Ц ^'~Фс

Фс
(А) (В) (С)
Figure I. Stable and Unstable Taboos in the Simple Setting
ofindividuals
proportion thatactuallybreakit.25Т(фс),thestrength
ofthetaboo,is
givenby:
(3) Т{фс) = ac(l - фс) + ad{' - дфс) = (ac + ad) - (ac + qad)</>c.
An individualoftypeф = 0 willalwaysconsiderdeviating fromthetaboo,since

shedoes notsuffer fromanycostsassociatedwithviolating(or considering violat-
ing) thetaboo.The presenceof individualsof thistypeimpliesa settingin which
thereis alwayssomeproportion ofthepopulation thatviolatesthetaboo.26
Our definitionof a taboo is therefore a couple (T, фс) thatsatisfiesequations
(2) and (3). We depictthesetwo conditionsin a (T x фс) space (see Figure1).
Condition(2) describesthepercentage of individualswho considerdeviationas a
function of T (thetaboo's strength) whichis convexlydeclining;whilecondition
(3) describesthestrengthofthetabooas a function ofthepercentage ofpeoplethat
considerdeviation,фС9 which is a line.
linearlydeclining
Threepossiblescenariosaredepictedin Figure1:
Case (A): Whenthereis no intersection betweenconditions (2) and (3), theonly

stablesolutionis (ф* = 1), i.e.,a taboothatall individuals
considerdeviating from.
Notethatwe do notcharacterize thissituationas "no taboo."It is possibleto have
an identitywitha taboothatis sufficiently weak,suchthatall individuals consider
breaking but
it, yet wouldfeel uncomfortable doing so.
Case (B): Thereis onlyone intersectionbetweenconditions(2) and (3). This

denoted
point, as is
(Г*, </>*), a stable In termsof the dynamicadjust-
taboo.27
mentprocess,the curvedline describesthe adjustment functionф[{Т*~х) while
thestraightline describesТ'ф*~х). Supposethatat periodt, ф[> ф*с.Usingthe
25Since
proportionq of the individuals thatconsider deviating actually deviate (afterobserving a positive pri-
vate benefitrealization), we get thatNd = дфс.
гь Wheneverthereare fixedcosts of deviation
(independentof thetype) or when thedistributionof ф is such that
Ф > 0min> 0, we may obtain stable taboos thatno one considers violating.
Observe thatthe point фс = 1 is not a stable taboo in this case.
processwe can defineТп1(ф[) to obtainф**2(Т*+1(ф'с))

dynamicadjustment < ф[,
withtheadjustment
processconvergingto (Г*, ф*).
Case (C): Therearetwointersections betweenconditions(2) and (3). The inter-

sectionon thelefthas thesamepropertiesas theintersection in case (B) andthere-
foredefinesa stabletaboo;thesecondintersection is nota stabletaboo.The point
фс = 1 has thesamepropertiesas describedin case (A) anddefinesa secondstable
taboo.
ofGreaterPrivateBenefits
C. TheEffect on Taboos
Taboos changeovertime- some becomestronger whileothersdisappear.Part

of thisprocessis clearlya resultof social and demographic changes.But taboos
may also change as a result of changesin the of
distribution privatebenefits.New
inventions and ideas,as well as new opportunities, maylead to different distribu-
tionsof privatebenefits. Havinga higherb affects theincentives availableto indi-
vidualsshouldtheydeviatefromthetaboo.Such deviationsimplya weakertaboo,
whichin turnencouragesfurther deviations.
The effect ofa higherb is describedinFigure2. Changingb does notaffect con-
dition(3), as itdescribesthestrength ofthetabooas a function ofindividual behav-
ior.Condition(2) describestheincentives to deviateas a function of thetaboo's
strength.These incentives increasewith the privatebenefits
gained from deviation.
A higherb impliesthattheintersection pointsbetweenthetwocurvesshiftto the
right,which implies a weaker taboo as more peopleconsiderdeviation.
Weakening the taboo is notnecessarilya continuousprocess.Thereis a critical
levelofè, denotedas ¿,such thatwhenever b > b, condition(2) willbe abovecon-
dition(3). The criticalb is givenby
+ + qS)
(4) ¿ = (ac ad)''
4q(ac + qad)
Thispointalso definestheweakesttaboothatmaystillhold:
(c' T* = Oic + OLd. л* = <*с + &d

'?) L > Фс -¿Г, "Г Г-
2
9
2(ac + qad)
Clearly,thenecessaryconditionforsuch discontinuityis thatф* < 1, which

will be satisfiedwheneverq > (ad - ac)/2ad. When q is below thislevel,the
adjustment of thetaboo'sstrength
is continuous
untilthetabooslowlydisappears.
We concludethefollowing:
PROPOSITION 1: A higherb (potentialprivatebenefit)impliesan erosionofthe

taboo'sstrength,
withmorepeoplethatconsiderdeviating fromthetaboo(a higher
фс). Theprocessof taboo erosionis notnecessarily Whenq > (ad -
continuous.
ac)/2ad,a smallincreasein b above b eradicatesthetabooand inducesall mem-
bersofsocietytoconsiderdeviation.
V ' Initial
Ь
у
(ас + ad) Y' ' increaseinb
Slight
ToЦг^Л
у j^^sã^^ ***•••..., Largeincreaseinb
Figure2. Effectof Increasingb on Stable Taboos
PROOF:
See AppendixA.
An interestingexampleofthiseffect is childlifeinsurance.In 1875,forthefirst

timein theUS, Prudential LifeInsurancebeganinsuring thelifeofchildren under
10.In 1879,twomorecompanies, Metropolitan LifeandJohnHancock,begansell-
ingchildlifeinsurance. The newbusinesswas a hugesuccess.In 1896,about1.5
millionchildrenwereinsured,and by theend of 1902 about3 millionchildren
wereinsured(see Zelizer 1978 and 1981 fora discussionof thiscase). The com-
monpracticewas suchthat,for3 centsa week,it was possibleto buya coverage
of $10 fora one-year-old child.The coveragewas higherforolderchildren. Child
lifeinsurancewas (and stillis) mostlyunpublicizedand unadvertised. One may
wonderwhyitis so difficult to findinformation on sucha practice.Insurancecom-
paniestypically use extensivemarketing topushotherinsurance products, including
regularlife insurance, butthey avoid anyadvertising forchild lifeinsurance.The
reasonis thatchildlifeinsuranceviolatesa taboo of puttingmonetary value on
one's children.The objectionto sucha violationis surveyedinZelizer(1981), who
startsherarticleby quotingnewspapers fromthatperiod,whichwrote"No manly
manandno womanlywomanshouldbe readyto saythattheirinfants havepecuni-
ary value." this
Interestingly, taboo has been strengtheningover the years.Thiswas
theoutcomeof severaleffects. Most importantly, the"benefits" fromsuchinsur-
ancedeclinedas childmortality dramatically declined.Thisis equivalent toa reduc-
tionofb in ourmodel.But as theabovetwopapersreported, a culturalprocessof
"sacralization"ofchildren'slivesimpliesthatthetabooagainstputting a monetary
valueon children's lifebecamestronger. Consequently, fewerandfewerindividuals
use childlifeinsurance.28
28Notethatifthe in the
problemwas onlya declineofchildmortality, thenit wouldhaveonlybeenreflected
premiums forsuchinsurance. Anyempiricalstudythatattempts to studytheearlydaysof lifeinsurance,and in
particularchildlifeinsurance,
shouldintegrate themarket andsocial aspectsoftheproblem, andthefactthatsuch
an insurancewas violatinga taboo.Whileinformation on pricesand quantities
are observable,
usingthefactthat
agentswhosoldchildinsurance visitedclientsin theirhomescan tracetheeffectofsocialinteraction
on individu-
als' insurancedecisions.
Anotherexampleis the debateregardingcommercialsurrogatemotherhood.

See ElizabethAnderson(1993, 2000) fora criticalviewon "contract pregnancy,"
and thewayit commodities childrenand women.The claimis thatsuchcontract
pregnancy replacesparentalnormswithregardto rightsand custodyof children
withmarketnorms.This is a typicaltaboo trade-off argument(see Fiske and
Tetlock1997). But thetechnologicaladvancethatmade thisproceduresaferand
moresuccessful,anditsrelativepopularity, haveweakenedthistabooandencour-
aged a debateregardingtheeffectof commercialsurrogatemotherhood on the
commodification of childrenand women(see H. V. McLachlanand J.K. Swales
2000).
In somecases, a changein thetaboo's strength is notreversible. In case (c), in
Figure1, thereare two stabletaboos.It is possiblethat,at thestarting point,the
society is in the intersection
point on theleft.
When the benefits
private increase,
thesocietyshiftstotherightintersection point. But ifthe privatebenefitsgo down
in
again,to the same initialpoint,the societystays therightintersection point.
To illustrate thisscenario,letus thinkaboutthecase in whichkidneytransplants
becomeeasierand safer,and thustheprivatevalue of tradein kidneysbecomes
sufficiently highso thatmanypeople deviatefromthe taboo againsttradingin
kidneys(or otherhumanorgans).Suppose now that,due to some technological
breakthrough, itbecomeseasy to transplant kidneys.As a resultof such
artificial
a technology, theprivatebenefitfromtradingin kidneysdeclines,butwe do not
expectthatthetabooagainstkidneytradewillreturn to itsoriginalstrength level.
III. Social Heterogeneity

and Taboos
Do theeffectiveness of taboos dependon social homogeneity? Some societ-

ies are moreheterogeneousthanothers.Heterogeneity can be withrespectto
the distribution of privatebenefits,or in the effectivenessof social costs and
punishment. The questionis whetherit is easier to maintaina stronger taboo in
homogeneousorheterogeneous societies?In orderto examinetheeffectofsocial
we
heterogeneity, compare two societies,holdingconstantthe average social
type individuals, changingthehomogeneity
of but withrespectto individuals'
social concern.
Considerour benchmark model,butnow assumethatthetypeф is uniformly
distributedover[/¿,1 - /¿],with0 < /л< Vi.Changing¡i does notchangetheaver-
age typein thesociety.A higher/ximpliesa morehomogeneoussociety.We can
thusinterpretfias thedegreeofpopulation When/¿= 0we areback
heterogeneity.
withourbenchmark case; whenfi = Viwe havea homogeneoussocietyin which
all individualsareofthesametype.
In orderto examinetheeffect of¡i on thetaboo'sstrength,
letus examinecondi-
tions(2) and (3). Condition(2) is derivedfromtheindividual'scost-benefit
consid-
erations,whichdependon histypebutnoton thedistribution oftypes.Therefore:
(2') фс= - /¿}.

min{max|^^^rvAl
Condition(3) definesthestrength of thetabooas a function

of thepercentage
of peoplethatmaintainit; thusit dependson Ncand Nd,whichare givennowby:
Nc = (фс - /i)/(l - 2fi);Nd = q(4>c- /i)/(l - 2/i).Thenewcondition(3) isas
follows:
Giventheseconditions
we can concludethefollowing:
PROPOSITION 2: For low levelsof b, increasingthe level of homogeneity

will
cause thestabletabootoweaken,withmorepeopleconsidering Forhigh
deviation.
levelsofb,morehomogeneity causes thestabletabootostrengthen,witha smaller
percentageofthepopulationconsideringdeviation
fromthetaboo.
PROOF:
See AppendixВ .
Proposition 2 impliesthatwhenthereis a higherprivatebenefit b and a strong

taboothatmostpeoplefollow,makingthesocietymoreheterogeneous withrespect
to social concernswill weakenthetaboo and inducemoreindividualsto deviate
fromit.Butwhentheprivatebenefits arelow,thetaboois weakandkeptonlybya
minority ofthepopulation, thenmakingthesocietymoreheterogeneous willresult
ina strongertabooas therewillbe moreindividuals withhighersocialconcernsthat
willkeepthetaboo.
To understand thedrivingforceof theaboveresultnotethatincreasing thehet-
erogeneity in our analysis is done by performing a mean preserving spreadof the
distributionof types.The changesinducedby sucha spreadis analyzedby inves-
tigatingconditions (2') and (3') thatdetermined thestabletaboo.Condition(2') is
unaffected by changesin ц as itreflects theindividuals'behaviorand thisis nota
function ofthedistribution oftypes.Now notethatwhenb is highandthemajority
of individualsfollowthetaboo (i.e., фс < 0.5) thenif we increase/i,makingthe
societymorehomogenous, butkeepingthebehaviorof each typeunchangedthen
therewouldbe moreindividualsthatwill followthetaboo.This is because as a
resultofa higher'i therewouldbe fewerindividuals on thelefttailofthedistribu-
tionandthesearetheindividuals thatactuallyviolatethetaboo.Consequently, the
taboobecomesstronger. Therefore, following an increaseof//,atthe pointфс condi-
tion(3') wouldbe abovecondition (2') reflectingthestrongertaboo.Nowfollowing
thedynamics assumedinourmodel(see also Figure1), thesocietywouldconverge
to a new stronger stabletaboo,withmoreindividualsfollowingit.A similarintu-
itionholdsforlowerlevelsofb.
VOL.3 NO. 2 FERSHTMANETAL: TABOOS,IDENTITIES 155
IV. Choosingan Identity:The CoexistenceofMultipleIdentities
Peoplemaychoosetheiridentity.29 The choiceofidentitydefinesa dynamicpro-

cess bywhichsomeidentities becomemorewidespread, as moreindividuals adopt
them,whileothersdisappear.This createsa setupin whichwe can endogenizethe
conceptofidentity, as someidentities do notsurvivethecompetition anddisappear.
We considera simplescenariothatwouldclarifyand demonstrate theendog-
enousshapingof identities. In thissetup,thereare onlytwocompetingidentities
denotedas A andB.30Each identity has onlyone taboo.The strength of thetaboo
is endogenously determined in each identityby thepercentage of individualsthat
deviate, or considerdeviation,from thattaboo.Hence,there is no influenceacross
identitiesregarding thestrength of thetaboos.Each individualneedsto choosean
identitytobelongto,andwhether he wouldconsiderdeviating from, thetabooasso-
ciatedwiththisidentity.
We further assumethatthetaboo's externality functionis identicalin thetwo
identities, =
i.e.,EA(TA) EB(TB).Hence,thepublicbenefits fromthetaboosareonly
a function ofthestrength ofthetaboo.31Thus,thetwoidentities andtaboosareiden-
ticalex ante,andthequestionis whether populationdynamicsmayresultin ex post
asymmetric identities.
A stableidentitysystemwithtwoidentities hasbeendefinedas (see Definition 2)
КПП), Such that:(i) the
А'ф'ГА,П), [N;(n),N;(n);N*d(T*A),N*d(rB)}}.
strengthofeach taboois determined by thepercentage ofindividuals thatconsider
violatingitand thosethatactuallychooseto violateit,(ii) given(TA9T*B), no indi-
vidualwouldliketo switchhisidentity;(iii) thenumber of individuals
that consider
a deviationandactuallydeviatefromeachtaboois consistent withoptimalbehavior
by individuals.
Since we assumethatthetwo taboosare associatedwiththe same externality
function, one possiblestableidentity
systemis whenthedistribution of typesis
identicalin thetwoidentities,
whichimpliesthatthestrength ofthetaboosis iden-
ticaland individualsare indifferent
betweenthetwoidentities. The questionis if,
despitetheassumedex antesymmetry, it is possibleto havetwodifferent typesof
identitieswithdifferent
distribution
oftypesanddifferent strengthoftaboos.
Anindividual oftypeф whoadoptsan identity k9k= {A,5}, inwhichthestrength
ofthetaboois Tkhas theoptionofnotconsidering violatingthetabooortoconsider
suchan act.The utilityforsuchan individual fromadoptingidentity к is:
(6) ик(Тьф)= Мах{ад;ад + qb - (А + д6)Ткф}к= А,В.
29
Clearly,thereare aspectsof our identity whichare beyondour controland determined uponbirthintoa
specificfamily, tribe,religion, orgender.Butthereareotheraspectsofidentity
nationality, whichpeoplechoose.
JUAswe laterprovein our framework, it is impossibleto have a stabletaboo systemwithmorethantwo
identities.
Clearly,in a moregeneralsetup,we mayassumedifferent externalityfunctions.But sincetheexternality
function is totallyexogenousto ourmodel,we assumethatitis identicalin bothsocietiesin orderto havea setup
in whichthechoiceof individuals willbe determined solelyon theirtype,and on thebehaviorof otherpeoplein
thetwogroups.
• j ч,
Figure3. Utilities in a Two-IdentitySociety
Individualsoftypeф willchooseidentity Л if,andonlyif,UA(TA, ф) > UB(TB, ф).

Assumenow,without thatTB> TA.Sincethetwotabooshavethe
loss ofgenerality,
sameexternality function, TB> TAimpliesthatE(TB) > E(TA).Notethatan indi-
vidualoftypeф = 0 is unaffected by socialpunishment, andtherefore willchoose
identityВ and consider deviatingfrom itstaboo.
Thepossibility ofchoosingan identity impliesthatall theindividualswhochoose
identityA wouldconsiderdeviatingfromits taboo.To see this,consideran indi-
vidualwhochoseidentity A, butwithout considering deviating fromitstaboo.This
individualdoes not sufferany social punishment, butdoes enjoytheexternality
associatedwiththetaboo.SinceE(TB) > E(TA),thisindividualwouldbe betteroff
belonging toidentity B. Thus,all theindividualsbelonging toidentityA wouldcon-
siderdeviating fromitstaboo.32
In Figure3, we showtheutilitiesarisingfromchoosingidentities A andS as a
function of typeф. The horizontal partof thegraphpresentsthechoiceof obey-
ing the taboo and enjoying thebenefitsETh whereasthedecliningpartis theutil-
ityenjoyedby individuals who the
adopt identity butalso considerdeviating from
thetaboo.Note thatbecause TB> TA,UB is steeperthanUAsinceETB + qb -
(Л + до)Твф declinesfasterwithф thandoes ETA+ qb - (A + q8)Tjrf>.
thetypeequilibriathatcan emergein thissociety.WhenTAis
Figure3 illustrates
low,
sufficiently such thatUAlies fullybelow UB,thenall individuals preferiden-
tity5, whichwillbecometheonlyidentity in thesociety.Otherwise a two-identity
societywillemerge,tobe characterized bytwoparameters, ф andф*.Identity В will
consistoftypesф < ф, whochooseidentity В butalso considerdeviating fromits
taboo;and typesф > ф*,whochooseidentity В butwithout consideringdeviation
fromthetaboo.Identity < <
A wouldconsistof typesф ф ф*9who all consider
deviationfromitstaboo.
The two-identitysocietythushas thefollowing interesting Thereis one
structure:
relativelyhomogeneous that the
group adopts identity with the weakertaboo. These
32Thisresultis sensitive
toourspecificsetup.Ifwe changetheexternality the
ortheotherprimitives,
function,
societyin whichthereis a mixture
modelcan generatea multi-identity whofollowor deviatefrom
ofindividuals
thetabooinbothidentities.
individualshavemoderate socialconcerns, and theyall considerdeviating fromthe

taboo.The secondgroup,thatadoptstheidentity withthestronger taboo,is hetero-
geneous withrespectto their
socialconcerns. It consists
oftwo sub-groups. One sub-
is
group comprised of individualswithlow social concernswho consider deviating
fromthetaboo,whiletheothersub-group consistsof individualswithstrongsocial
concerns whoindeedadoptthestrong taboowithout considering
deviating fromit.
Assumenowthatwe havethreeidentities {A,Z?,C} such thatTA < T*B< T*c.
We can repeatourpreviousanalysis to claim in
that, identityA, all individualscon-
siderdeviationfromthetaboo.If somedo notconsiderdeviation, thentheyarebet-
teroffbelongingtoidentities В or С We can repeatthesameargument withrespect
totheindividuals thatbelongtoidentityB: Iftheydo notconsiderdeviation fromthe
taboo,theyarebetteroffbelongingto identity C. Hence,identitiesA andВ consist
onlyofindividuals thatconsiderdeviation.In consequence,thetaboohas thesame
strength in bothgroups,i.e., T*A= T*B,and theidentities do notdifferfromone
another. We can thusconcludethefollowing:
PROPOSITION 3: Whenthereis onlyone taboo and identities onlyin the

differ
associated
strength withthistaboothen:
(i) A two-identitysocietyis stable.A multi-identity

societywithmorethantwo
identities
is notstable.
(ii) In a societywithtwoidentities,theindividualswhoadopttheidentity with

theweakertaboowillalwaysconsiderdeviating fromit.The with
identity the
stronger taboo is more heterogeneousand is adoptedby twosubgroupsof
individuals.Individualsoftypeф < ф considerdeviatingfromthetabooand
individualsoftypeф > ф*do notconsidersucha deviation.
Clearly,whenwe allowformorecomplexidentities withseveral,possiblydiffer-

enttaboosandnorms, we mayhavea stablesocietywithseveralidentities. However,
evenin thiscase, our structureimposes a constraintand provides insightson the
characteristics
ofthetypesofidentities thatcan coexist,andthetypeofindividuals
thatwilladoptthoseidentities.
Proposition3 considersthe individuals'choice of identitywhen the taboos'
strengthsareexogenously given.The nextstepis torelatethestrength ofthetaboos
totheindividuals'choices,as wellas toidentify theconditionsunderwhichwe may
havea stablesocietywithtwocompeting identities.
When ф* = 1, all individualsconsiderdeviationfrombothidentities, which
impliesthatthe taboos are of thesame strength.Thus, a two-identitysocietymay
existonlyif ф* < 1. The criticallevel ф* can be derivedfromtheindifference of
oftypeф* betweenbelongingto identity
an individual A andconsidering deviating
fromits taboo and belongingto identity В withoutconsidering such a deviation.
Thus,thefirstcondition fora two-identity societyis:
d' л* ETa ~ ETb + 4b ^ л

(A + qò)TA
whichimpliesthefollowing
restrictions
on theparameters:
(8) qb < ETB - ETA + (A + q8)TA.
The second conditionis thatthe line UA(TA, ф) will not lie entirelybelow
UB(TB,ф). In otherwords,thereexistsa typeф forwhichUA(TA, ф) > UB(TB,ф).
Thiscondition willbe satisfied
whenUA(TA9 ф) > ETB.To identify typeф, notethat
thistypeis indifferent
betweenidentities
A andB, andno matter whathischoiceis,
he wouldconsiderdeviating fromthetaboo.The typeф indifference condition
is:
(9) ETA + qb - (A + qS)Tj = ETB + qb - (A + qS)TB&
whichyields:
ETb - ET* К
(10)
1 j Ф=
ф -
=
+
(A qS)[TB TA] +
(X qSy
InsertingthisvalueintoUA(TA,ф) impliesthatUA(TA,ф) = qb; hence,thesecond
requirementforhavinga stableidentity
societywithtwodifferentidentities
is that
> the
qb ETB.Consequently, necessary condition
for a stabletwo-identity
society
is,then,
(11) ETB < qb < ETB - ETA+ (Л + qS)TA.
A necessaryconditionfor(11) is thatЛ + qô > E, whichholdswhenpublicben-

efitsarenottoohighandtheexpectedpunishment fromdeviationis nottoolow.But
notethatTAandTBareendogenously determined,so thequestion Is therea range
is:
ofparameters forwhichcondition(11) is satisfied,
withTAand TBconsistent with
theindividuals'behaviorand TB> Гл?
PROPOSITION 4: A stablesocietywithtwodifferent and taboosofdiffer-

identities,
entstrength,ispossibleevenwhenthetwoidentities andtaboosareexanteidentical
A necessarycondition forhavingsucha two-identity societyis thatA + qô > E. If
thiscondition is satisfied,
thenforeveryq thereis a rangeofprivaterewardsb such
thatTB> TA,condition (1 1) is satisfied,
and TAas wellas TBare consistentwiththe
'
individualsbehavior.
PROOF:
See AppendixС
Our setupin thissectionassumesthatthetwoidentities are ex antesymmetric.

Thereis onlyonetabooineachsociety. Thereis thesamedistribution ofprivateben-
the
efits, same term
externality andthesame function thatdeterminesthe of
strength
thetabooandthecostofdeviating. The focusofouranalysiswas to showthateven
in sucha case thesocietymayendup withtwodifferent ex post.Butthe
identities,
dynamics definedby this setupcan be applied to a more generalsettingin which
thereareseveralidentitieswithdifferentlistsoftaboosofdifferent characteristics.
Goingback to our exampleon theassimilation of immigrants, theanalysisof

suchassimilation cannotbe confined onlytobehavior,choiceofwork,oreducation.
Ifwe wishtoexaminetheassimilation ofTurkishimmigrants in Germany, Mexican
immigrants in the US, or Russian in
immigrants Israel, the primarymeaningof
assimilationis theidentitythoseimmigrants adopt,thewaytheyviewthemselves,
andthedifferent taboosand normsofbehaviortheyviewas relevant. On theother
the
hand, immigrants' behaviorshapes own
their identity modifies
traditional and
theirnormsand taboos.33Forexample,usingthestructure ourmodel,it is pos-
of
sible thattheimmigrant community wouldbe dividedsuch thatindividualswith
low socialconcernswouldadoptthenewlocal identity, whileindividuals withhigh
socialconcernwouldmaintain thetraditional
identity.
Consequently, the individuals
thatmaintain theoriginalidentityhavehighersocialconcerns, anda higherpercent-
age of theseindividualswould follow thetraditional
rulesand taboos,whichwould
makethesetaboosevenstronger. Thatis,theresultofthedynamicsocialadjustment
is thatthetaboosin theimmigrant community becomestronger (at leastforthose
thatmaintain theoriginalidentity)thanthesametaboosin theoriginalcountry.
V. ConcludingRemarks
Economicsis mostlyaboutactions.Our actionsdetermine ourwealth,ourcon-

sumption, etc.
education, Thoughts are not part of the standard economicsetting.
We maybe affected byactionsofotherindividuals, butwe arenot affectedbytheir
thoughts.One exceptionis theboundedcognitiveabilitiesliterature thatconsiders
therelationship betweencognitivebounds,includinga boundon thecomplexity
ofourthinking abilities,andtheactionsthatwe choose.A secondexceptionis the
on psychological
literature games,whichassumethatintentions matterandplayer's
emotions, likesurprise ordisappointment, affect hispayoffs (see John Geanakoplos,
David Pearce,andEnnioStacchetti 1989,andMatthewRabin1993).
Butthoughts areveryimportant tous. We enjoycertainthoughts. We areafraidof
otherthoughts andtryto suppressthem.We careaboutthethoughts and thebeliefs
ofourfriends andcolleagues.Sometimes thoughts are more important thanactions.
Incorporatingthoughts into thestandardmodel is nota simple task.Thoughts arenot
necessarilyobservable and,moreimportantly, we havelimited controlofourthoughts.
Talkingabouttaboosis talkingabouttheunthinkable. Usingrationalterminol-
ogyto discussthepossibility of thinkingabouteatinghumanflashis nota simple
and
task, mayrepel some ofthereaders.In oursociety,one does notneedtojustify
or explainthetabooofnoteating(or thinking abouteating)humanflesh.It is sup-
posedtobe obvious- as partofourcharacterization as humanbeings.Thesetaboos
may be obvious under regular circumstances.But a societyneedsalso to ask itself
whatwillhappenin special(smallprobability) circumstances inwhichthedilemma
of violatinga taboo is real and practical.It seems thatour possiblebehaviorin
33Whileidentities
observed,it can be a partof a survey.Violationof some tabooscan be
cannotbe directly
observed(likeclothing,
directly marriage,
intergroup choiceof work,etc). Otherscan be derivedfromsocial sur-
veys.The UN EconomicandSocial Surveyasksindividuals, in different theirsocial
societies,questionsregarding
concerns, andviewsregarding
identity, socialaspectsofthesocietiestheylivein.One can also trytobuild
different
a dataseton thebehaviorandidentity
ofdifferent
immigration groups.
thesespecialcircumstances
is partofthedefinition
ofwhomwe areandwhatis our
identity.
AppendixA: Proof of Proposition 1
The conditions thatgiverisetothethreecases: Equations(2) and(3) yielda qua-
draticequation:(ac + qad)(X + qS)</>l- (ac + Oid)(X+ qS)</>c+ qb = 0.
We defineA = -
(ac + ad)2(X+ qS)2 4(ac + qad){' + qS)qb
WhenД < 0, we arein case (A).
WhenA = 0, condition(3) is tangent to condition(4).
WhenA > 0, cases (B) and (C) arise:Therearetwosolutionsforthequadratic
equation-
(qc + ad)(X+ qö)±JK '

942
2(ac + qad)(X+ qõ)
whereфС2> фСг
Whenфс2> 1 we areincase (B), andwhenфСг< 1 we areincase (C). Usingan
upperboundforA^tispossibletoshowthat^c, > 0,фС2< ((ac + ad)/(ac + qad)).
Conditionson theparameters: We defineb = (ac + ad)' (X + qô)/4q(ac + qad),
therefore b - b => A = 0. Thus,forb > b,we havecase (A), andforb < b we are
in case (B) or (C). A distinction
betweencases (B) and (C) is achievedbylooking
at thevalueof фСг,as statedabove.A sufficientconditioncouldbe derived:We are
in case (B) whenфСг> 1,whichis ensuredby:
Since ad > ac, we can see thatforsmallvalues of q, we have one stabletaboo

(caseB).
AppendixB: Proof of Proposition2 (Heterogeneity of Types):
Equations(2;) and (3') yieldthefollowing

quadraticequation:
{ac + qad)(X + д6)ф2с- (Л + qõ)[{ac + ad)(ì - 2ц) + ц(ас + qad)^c

+ qb(ì - Iß) = 0.
Define:
Д' = (A + qô)2[(ac + ad){' - 2/x)+ /х(ас+ qad)f

- 4(ac + qad)(X + qS)qb{' - 2ц).
Д = Д'/(А + qS) = (A + qô)[(ac + ad)(l - 2ц) + /л(ас+ qad)}2

- 4(ас + qad)qb{' - 2/x)
M = (A + qö)[(ac + ad)(l - 2ц) + ц(ас + qad)}.
Solvingtheabovequadraticequationyieldsthat:
(Л + qS)[(ae + ad){' - 2ц) + ц{ас + qad)' ± УД7

***
2(ac + qad)(X + qS)
'
2(ac + qad)(X + qS)
To examinehowchangesin/xaffect
thetaboo,we examinethefollowing
derivatives:
Ш = -(A + qS)[ac + (2 - q)ad] < 0, and
= 2(X + qS)[(ac + ad)2(4ß - 2)

^
+ («с + oidi{oic+ 9^)(1 - 4/x)+ /x(ac+
^ad)2]
+ Sqb(ac + qad).
Define:
b=
(A + ^)[(ac + adf{2 - 4/x)+ (ac + arf)(ac+ gad)(4^ - 1) - ц{ас + qadf'
4q(ac + qad)
b > b ^ÇÛL > 0
b < ¿ ^ ф- < o.
a/i
We nowexaminetheeffectsofchangesin thedegreeofhomogeneity
ц on theper-
of
centage deviation
fromthetaboo:
ф 2(ac + ^)(А + <?¿) lö/x 2v/A7
=
-(v/Ã7^ + (2 - q)ad] + (A + ^)[(ac + a,)2(2 - 4/i)
+ (<*c+ ad)(ac + <7<*d)(V- 1) - М(«с + ?a¿)2]
- 4qb(ac+
qad))/2(ac+ qad)^Ã'.
Define:
b = - 4/¿)+ (ac + ad)(ac + qad){A^ - 1)

((Л + qô)[(ac + ad)'2
- /i(ac + qad)2] - л/К'[ас + (2 -
q)ad])/4q{ac + qad).
We see thatfor:
O/l
b>b=>^<0. O/l
Thus,fora smalllevel of &, raisingthedegreeof homogeneity /i will cause the

stabletabooto be weaker,withmorepeopleconsidering deviation.Forhighlevels
ofb9morehomogeneity causes thestabletabooto be stronger,witha smallerper-
centageofthepopulation consideringdeviationfromthetaboo.
Notealso thatb < b. Thus,we haveseveralpossibledomainswithrespecttothe
valueofb andtheinitialstateofthetaboo.
Startwithcase A (in Figure1), suchthatin effect
thereis no taboo:
• b > b: Increasing/xcouldinducetabooformation.
• b < b < b: Increasingfiwillnevercreatea taboo.On theotherhand,lower-
ing/icouldinducetabooformation. Ifa taboois formed
inthisdomain,further
lowering/iwouldweakenthistaboo.
• b < b: Increasing/xwillnevercreatea taboo.Lowering/icouldinducetaboo
formation.Ifa taboois formed,
lowering /ifurther
wouldstrengthen
thistaboo.
Now assumethatwe arein case В orС (Figure1), in whichthereis an effective

taboo:
• b > b: Increasing
/istrengthensthetaboo.
• b < b < b: Increasing thetaboobutcan also inducea switchto
'i strengthens
case A.
• b < b: Increasing
/iweakensthetabooandcouldalso inducea switchto case
A. Lowering/istrengthens thetaboobutdoes notinducea switchtocase A.
AppendixC: Proof of Proposition4
Equation(11) statesthenecessarycondition
fora two-identity
society.Thiscon-
ditionrequiresthat
(Al) ETB < qb < ETB - ETA+ (A + q8)TA.
A necessarycondition for(Al) tobe satisfied is thatЛ + qS > E.

Yet,a taboo'sstrengthin ourmodelis endogenously determinedby thepercent-
of
age people who consider
deviating fromthe respective taboo.
in groupA considerdeviatingfromthe
First,letus findTA.Since all individuals
taboo,N* = 1,whichimpliesthatNd = qN^ = q, andtherefore:
TA = ac(l - N*) + ad{' - N$ = ad{' - q).
The percentage
ofindividuals fromthetabooin groupВ
whoconsiderdeviating
is:
(A2'
{ } c =
мв Ф = ^
l-ф'+ф (A + qS)TA- qb + ETB
ofthetaboois definedby
The strength
(A3) TB = (ac + ad) - (ac + qad)NBc.
SubstitutingforAff, we derivea quadraticequation,whichwe can solveforTB.

We nowneedto establishthatTB> TA.Usingtheaboveterms, thisrequiresthat
ac + ad - (ptc+ qoid)Nc> ad - qad' collectingterms,thisconditionis equiva-
lenttorequiring that(ac+ qad)(l - Nç) > 0. Thiscondition is satisfied
onlywhen
<
Nç 1, which is guaranteed by condition(Al). But condition (Al) does nothold
forall combinations ofq andb. SolvingforTBand inserting in (Al) yieldsthefol-
lowing condition:
(qc + ad)E + gb- ad(l - q)(X + qS) + y/Ã <
< ad{' - q)(' + qõ-E)
(ac + ad)E + gb- ad(l - q)(X + go) + y/K

+
2
NotethatwheneverA + qö > E, theright-hand is greater

side of thisinequality
the
than left-hand side. Thus,foreveryq thatsatisfiesЛ + qS > £, we can find
and we obtaina non-
a rangeof valuesof b forwhichcondition(Al) is satisfied,
redundanttwo-identitysociety.
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American Economic Association

Taboos and Identity: Considering the Unthinkable

Taboos and Identity:

A taboo is an "unthinkable" action.Even the thoughtof violat-

behavioris notgovernedonlyby rationaldecisionmaking.Societies

* Fershtman:The EitanBerglasSchool of Economics,Tel AvivUniversity, Tel Aviv69978, Israeland CEPR

Taboos mayincluderestrictions on sexualactivitieslike incest,animal-human

3Fora moredetailedlistsee thevalue"taboo"inWikipedia.

(2000) considered tabootradeoffs intermsof"ThePsychology oftheUnthinkable!'

8Ifan actis itis notnecessarily thecase thattheactofthinking abouttheactis itselfunthinkable.

as deterrence as theyrequireharshpunishments. The highprivate benefits

possiblethatwithsomeprobability individuals'thoughts are transparent.16

I. Taboos and Identities

We startouranalysisby consideringa societywithone taboo.The strength of

16In some an actmayrequireengaginginan actualsearch,whichis notsimplya mentaltask,

Considera societywithone taboo.We normalizethesize ofthepopulation to 1,

whereС(ф, T) and£>(</>, T) areincreasing inbotharguments.

whenthevalueofthisoptionis greater thanthecostofacquiringit,whichis thecost

We let thestrength of thetaboobe T(NC9Nd) whereГ(-,) is decliningin both

20The factthatindividualsareable to costlesslycalculatewhether or notitis worthbuyingthisoptionrestson

thekosherdietary In a timewhensocializationis an important

• (TÌ) - T* = T(N*C, N*D)is thestrengthofthetabooas definedbythenumber

ofa taboo,we definea dynamicadjustment

23Notethat thetypeof foodthatonescan eat butalso theplaces

DEFINITION 1: A StableTaboo is a taboo thatis characterized

Maintaining a taboo impliesthatpeople will nottakecertainactionsthatmay

Choosingan identity is nota simpleprocess.Thereare different aspectsof the

(ii) А*(ф'Т*): [ф,ф] - > {/b...,/„} is an assignmentof individualsto different

• No individualwould like to switchhis identity;the assignmentfunction

(i) Oursetupassumesa freemobility betweenidentitieswithoutanyrestriction.

(ii) We assumea completeseperability betweentaboos; the strength of each

(iii) Whenan identity bya longlistoftaboosthenitis possiblethatthe

Comingback to our exampleon the choice of identityby immigrants, the

In thissection,we considera simpleversionof theabove modelwhichallows

• С(ф, T) = ХТфis thecostofconsidering deviationfroma taboo.

Considerthebehaviorof an individualof type0, whobelongsto a societythat

(1) q[b - 6Тф] > ХТф.

ТГ-/< Цг !~& Ц ^'~Фс

Figure I. Stable and Unstable Taboos in the Simple Setting

An individualoftypeф = 0 willalwaysconsiderdeviating fromthetaboo,since

Case (A): Whenthereis no intersection betweenconditions (2) and (3), theonly

Case (B): Thereis onlyone intersectionbetweenconditions(2) and (3). This

processwe can defineТп1(ф[) to obtainф**2(Т*+1(ф'с))

Case (C): Therearetwointersections betweenconditions(2) and (3). The inter-

Taboos changeovertime- some becomestronger whileothersdisappear.Part

(c' T* = Oic + OLd. л* = <*с + &d

Clearly,thenecessaryconditionforsuch discontinuityis thatф* < 1, which

PROPOSITION 1: A higherb (potentialprivatebenefit)impliesan erosionofthe

Figure2. Effectof Increasingb on Stable Taboos

An interestingexampleofthiseffect is childlifeinsurance.In 1875,forthefirst

Anotherexampleis the debateregardingcommercialsurrogatemotherhood.

III. Social Heterogeneity

Do theeffectiveness of taboos dependon social homogeneity? Some societ-

(2') фс= - /¿}.

Condition(3) definesthestrength of thetabooas a function

PROPOSITION 2: For low levelsof b, increasingthe level of homogeneity

Proposition 2 impliesthatwhenthereis a higherprivatebenefit b and a strong

IV. Choosingan Identity:The CoexistenceofMultipleIdentities

• (TÌ) - T* = T(NC, ND)is thestrengthofthetabooas definedbythenumber

(ii) А(ф'Т): [ф,ф] - > {/b...,/„} is an assignmentof individualsto different

+ (<c+ ad)(ac + <7<d)(V- 1) - М(«с + ?a¿)2]