03 OS Enduring State Accepted

ORE Open Research Exeter
TITLE
The Enduring State: An analysis of governance making in three mining conﬂicts
AUTHORS
Maher, R; Valenzuela, F; Boehm, SG
JOURNAL
Organization Studies
DEPOSITED IN ORE
23 January 2019
This version available at
http://hdl.handle.net/10871/35566
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Organization Studies
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The Enduring State: An analysis of governance making in

three mining conflicts
Journal: Organization Studies
Manuscript ID OS-17-0158.R4
Manuscript Type: Special Issue on Government and the Governance of Business Conduct
Governance < Theoretical Perspectives, Chile, Corporate social

responsibility, CSR, corporate social performance, CSP, corporate
Keywords:
citizenship < Topics, State, Extractive industries, governmentality,
resistance
This article investigates the profound ambiguity of the state in the

organization of contemporary business-society relations. On the one
Abstract: hand, there has been a decisive shift from government to governance,
encouraging private actors, such as corporations, communities and
NGOs, to address social and environmental concerns themselves, i.e.
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/orgstudies
Page 1 of 64 Organization Studies
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without the state’s involvement. On the other hand, however, the
4 continued importance and relevance of the organized state is difficult to
5 ignore. In this article we examine the role of the state in three cases of
6 mining conflicts in Chile, one of the most important mining countries in
7 the world. Through longitudinal, qualitative research of conflictive mining
8 governance relations between state organizations, large corporations and
9 local communities, we show that the modes of influence conducted by
the Chilean state oscillate between direct, central steering (‘cathedral’)
10
and indirect, dispersed vouching (‘bazaar’). Elaborating on Foucault’s
11 concept of governmentality, we offer a hybrid theory of state
12 organization, where the dematerialization of the state’s responsibility is
13 seen not as the norm but rather as a particular mode of governance that
14 sits alongside the underestimated, yet enduring, material involvement of
15 the state.
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Organization Studies Page 2 of 64
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2 The Enduring State:
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4 An analysis of governance making in three mining conflicts
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11 Abstract
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This article investigates the profound ambiguity of the state in the organization of contemporary
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16 business-society relations. On the one hand, there has been a decisive shift from government to
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18 governance, encouraging private actors, such as corporations, communities and NGOs, to address
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social and environmental concerns themselves, i.e. without the state’s involvement. On the other
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23 hand, however, the continued importance and relevance of the organized state is difficult to ignore.
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25 In this article we examine the role of the state in three cases of mining conflicts in Chile, one of the
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27 most important mining countries in the world. Through longitudinal, qualitative research of
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30 conflictive mining governance relations between state organizations, large corporations and local
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32 communities, we show that the modes of influence conducted by the Chilean state oscillate between
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34 direct, central steering (‘cathedral’) and indirect, dispersed vouching (‘bazaar’). Elaborating on
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Foucault’s concept of governmentality, we offer a hybrid theory of state organization, where the
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39 dematerialization of the state’s responsibility is seen not as the norm but rather as a particular mode
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41 of governance that sits alongside the underestimated, yet enduring, material involvement of the state.
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48 Introduction
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53 The role of the state in contemporary organized society is profoundly ambiguous. On the one hand,
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55 it is very much visible and present, acting continuously, shaping and steering societies legally,
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57 politically and economically. Who, in times of Trump and the Chinese Communist Party, can deny
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60 1
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2 the power governments, state institutions and their leaders have in organizing the everyday lives of
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4 their countryfolk and beyond (Fukuyama, 2017; Xing & Christensen, 2016)? On the other hand,
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7 however, the state is also opaque and absent, often denying responsibility and lacking capacity - and
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9 some would say increasingly so (Abbott & Snidal, 2010). The state often now takes a backseat, it is
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11 argued (Knudsen and Moon, 2017), as private actors, especially corporations and civil society
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organizations, are called upon to address societal, economic and environmental problems themselves.
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18 Governance can be best understood as a particular mode of arranging the steering of society, one
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which ensures an alternative to traditional governmental jurisdiction, involving a range of private
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23 stakeholders who interact with each other in markets and networks (Rhodes, 2007). Such a transition,
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25 from government to governance (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), has brought to our attention the
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27 rapidly rising complexities of the private sphere, where a multitude of enterprising, civil and
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30 community actors engage each other in search of consensual solutions to socio-economic and
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32 environmental problems in the context of a highly globalized economy (Abbott & Snidal, 2010).
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Chief amongst these emerging governance forms and practices has been Corporate Social
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39 Responsibility (CSR). Seemingly excluding state organizations, a variety of different CSR

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41 approaches have emerged, from setting up market-based standards to self-governance processes,
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which have been widely studied in organization studies (OS) (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006;
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46 Moon et al., 2011; Rasche et al., 2013). Their importance has led to a normative call for a ‘political
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48 CSR’ approach, arguing for an unequivocal political perspective of the corporation and the business
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50 conduct of its agents with multiple stakeholders (Mason and Simmons, 2014; Scherer and Palazzo,
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53 2011; Wettstein, 2009). Yet, in the political CSR literature the role of the state has not been
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55 sufficiently understood (Gond et al., 2011; Knudsen and Moon, 2017; Bo et al., 2018), and hence
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57 there have been calls within OS for a renewed problematization of the state in CSR and governance
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2 regimes (Whelan, 2012; Djelic and Etchanchu, 2015; Schrempf-Stirling, 2016). Most of these calls
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4 have focused on highlighting the continued importance and relevance of the state in organizing
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7 business-society relations. However, we argue that the profound ambiguity of the organized state in
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9 times of governance has yet to be fully understood.
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This article hence aims to understand, both theoretically and empirically, how governance itself is
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16 governed. Put differently, following Foucault’s critique of contemporary government (Lemke, 2007),
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18 we need to question how the ‘conduct of business conduct’ is enabled, and how the state is currently
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re-organizing its governmental authority. To do this, we pay attention to the emergence of singular
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23 modes of state organization and self-organization, which can influence the making of governance by
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25 implementing power and agency reflexively in relation to a complex network of actors and rules
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27 (Jessop, 2007). Drawing from a particular Foucauldian line of thought in OS (Vallentin & Murillo,
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30 2011), we propose that such an approach requires both a discursive and material reading (Jessop,
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32 2007; Sum, 2009) that can lead to understanding the organization of the state amidst governance as a
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34 distributed process of power making across society, producing a variety of materialized and de-
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materialized effects (Djelic and Etchanchu, 2015).
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41 Empirically, this paper explores the enduring role of the state through an analysis of three governance
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conflicts in Chile. We present longitudinal, micro-level data, showing how the mining companies’
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46 extractive projects have been governed within a complex web of relations of power. We identify five
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48 different modes of influence, running across our three cases, namely: deployment of CSR initiatives,
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50 mobilization of resistance, division of resistance, prescription by the state, and nexus between state
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53 and enterprise. In line with Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006), we show the roles governance actors
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55 (state, mining companies, NGOs and communities) play in the new governance regime, producing an
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57 ambiguous mishmash of materialized and de-materialized presence of the state. Borrowing the
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2 concept of ‘hybrid cathedral-bazaar’ governance from Boelens et al. (2015), we show how the five
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4 modes of influence enact an intricate relation between the direct and material nature of state
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7 responsibility (‘cathedral’ mode) and indirect and dematerialized forms of state responsibility
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9 (‘bazaar’ mode). We argue that these different modes of influence assemble into a general,
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11 multifaceted ‘governmentality’ where the state organizes its own dispersion to ensure its enduring
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governing capacity.
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(Re)encountering the organized state: From governance to governmentality
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25 In OS and the wider social sciences, a decisive shift from the notion of government to that of
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27 governance has taken place over the past half century. It is one that has emerged in response to
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30 numerous political, economic and cultural developments and crises that have played out on a global
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32 stage (Miller & Rose, 1990; Barry et al., 1993), signaling a diminishing role of the state and a shift
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34 of power towards private actors in contemporary political economies (Rhodes, 2007). Yet, following
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Arellano et al. (2006), perhaps this move towards governance and the, often uncritical, assumption of
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39 the reduced power of the state has been premature and misguided; for them, the state has never really
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41 gone away. Indeed, since the 1950s there has been a longstanding concern in OS about the rationality
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behind the control-based, rule-bound, hierarchical functioning of the state (Weber, 2009; Warwick et
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46 al., 1975; Bendix, 194; Hall, 1962, Blau, 1968) along with its theoretical and moral setup (Udy, 1959;
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48 Heady, 1959; see also du Gay, 2000). Even during the ‘linguistic’ and ‘systemic’ post-Weberian turns
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50 in the 1970s-1980s, the notion of the organized state managed to retain its protagonism. While its
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53 shapes, roles and practices have undoubtedly changed, the state should be understood as persisting,
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55 enduring and powerful actor. There is hence a need for a renewed focus of OS scholars on
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57 understanding and conceptualizing the organization of the state (Whelan, 2012; Djelic and Etchanchu,
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2 2015; Schrempf-Stirling, 2016).
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7 In recent decades, interest in the organization of the state has endured, yet its focus has veered
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9 dramatically towards post-bureaucratic reforms, aiming at enabling and expanding governance
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11 networks. This is where stakeholders - involving both state and private, non-state actors - engage
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reciprocally, exchanging resources and political views, so that effective governance mechanisms can
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16 be set up (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Rhodes, 2007). Such governance efforts are mobilized as
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18 enterprising initiatives both within and beyond the state, calling for the empowering of free
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networking individuals, the flexibilization of hierarchical power structures and the conduction of a
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23 constant process of identity work by ‘post-bureaucrats’, beyond the auspices of traditional statecraft
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25 and governmental authority (Heydebrand, 1989; Johnson et al., 2009; see also Stokes & Clegg, 2002;
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27 Thomas & Davies, 200; Deacon, 1998; Rose & Miller, 1992)
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32 The abovementioned inquiries coincide with efforts to introduce the normative (mostly Habermasian)
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34 notion of ‘political CSR’ (PCSR), which can be said to represent the ideal culmination of the
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governance era (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Moon et al., 2011; Rasche et al., 2013). From a
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39 normative standpoint, advocates of PCSR have made the case that governance can foster a fairer,
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41 democratic, self-regulatory interaction rationale between (self-organizing) stakeholders, in the face
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of social inequality, globalization and environmental degradation (Mason and Simmons, 2014;
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46 Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Wettstein, 2009). In this way, the idea of a ‘governance without
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48 government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992) has been furnished with narratives of the ethical and
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50 political. Private actors are portrayed as having an increased sensitivity and effectiveness in guiding
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53 problem-solving processes in the socio-political sphere towards win-win outcomes - for instance, by
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55 offering benefits to communities in exchange for a social license to operate (e.g. O’Faircheallaigh,
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57 2013), surpassing a state apparatus that has been deemed passive and rather obsolete (Gemmill &
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2 Bamidele-Izu, 2002; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007), especially in the so-called Global South (Morgan
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4 et al., 2016).
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9 While some calls have been made to expand the theoretical base of PCSR (Mäkinen & Kourula;
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11 2012), recognizing the state as a noteworthy actor (Whelen, 2015; Frynas & Stephens, 2015),
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emerging PCSR approaches often overlook crucial issues related to the state’s sustained organized
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16 agency. One of these relates to the asymmetries between powerful corporations and those
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18 stakeholders directly affected by business conduct (Banerjee, 2017). Empirical research (e.g. Moog
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et al., 2015; Coleman, 2013; Himley, 2014; Li, 2016; Maher, 2018; Bo et al., 2018) has indicated
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23 that, despite their normative coherence, it seems only an ineffective and simulated governance - or,
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25 as Walters calls it, ‘anti-politics’ (2004, p. 33) - is generated when the dialogical and deliberative
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27 potential of those who defend public interests via enterprise strategies is undermined because of their
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30 managerial dependency on more operationally capable, and thus, more powerful corporations (see
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32 Moog et al., 2015; Lemke, 2007). Another, even more significant issue relates to the underestimation
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34 of the state’s actual influence, because of PCSR’s normative bias and alignment with an ‘ideal future’,
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in detriment of a historical assessment of the state’s material organization and actual influence (Gond
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39 et al., 2011). The ‘dematerialization of responsibility’ that takes place when value-laden discourses
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41 distract the public from the inherently active link between the enduring state and corporations in the
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face of ‘governance gaps’ is at stake here (Djelic and Etchanchu, 2015). How then to elucidate the
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46 operational and moral frontiers between governmental agency(ies) and governance networks, which
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48 have become ambiguous and blurry?
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53 Our contention is that Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 2008; Vallentin & Murillo,
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55 2011; Lemke, 2007) allows conceiving the state as operating beyond predefined regulatory,
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57 disciplinary roles, producing the discursive and material conditions for self-regulatory governance.
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2 Here, it is important, first, to distinguish a practical, material dimension, where the state is involved
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4 in legally sanctioning and technologically enabling the activity of a milieu of private counterparts.
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7 Second, there is a discursive dimension where the state serves as placeholder for a variety of
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9 narratives and values dwelling on the bureaucratic virtues of legitimacy, control and authority, which,
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11 if absent, would render the idea of governance meaningless. As Lemke points out (2007, p. 54),
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Foucault’s reading of the state strives to bring back ‘an analytics of government’ that ‘does not start
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16 from the assumption that there is an external relationship between government and its objects’.
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18 Instead, it recognizes the state to be ‘actively involved in constituting agents, identities and interests’;
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the state’s power is both productive and historical, as well as a political process in its own right, rather
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23 than merely produced and adhered to specific institutions or polities (Foucault, 2008; Enroth, 2014;
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25 Jessop, 2007). In this sense, the state can be conceived as active, yet not always in a direct way (by
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27 steering socio-political affairs from the top). It can also act indirectly by organizing and dispensing,
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30 what Foucault called, the ‘conduct of (business) conduct’ (Vallentin and Murillo, 2011). From this
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32 point of view, despite of its multiple, diffused embodiments, the state is considered to be constructive
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34 of even the most private-driven, ‘post-government’ governance arrangements (Lemke, 2007).
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39 It is precisely such recognition of ‘diffusion’ that can help us understand and tackle the problem of
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41 the ‘dematerialization of responsibility’ (Djelic and Etchanchu, 2015 p.657) in a constructive way.
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With Foucault, the organization of the state vis-à-vis governance can be analyzed in terms of ‘govern-
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46 mentality’, rather than government; as a diffused, post-disciplinary power-making dynamic,
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48 productive of the interests or ‘mentalities’ of all agencies/agents and capacities to influence, whether
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50 state, community or corporate bound. This notion of governmentality, which is articulated through
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53 symbolic discourses and material practices (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2015; Jessop, 2007; Sum, 2009),
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55 such as policy, law, enterprise and everyday life (Vallentin & Murillo, 2015; Jones, 2012), can help
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57 us account for the emergence of corporate-led self-regulation, which is inextricably bound to the
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2 elusiveness of a stable place for statecraft and the diffusion of the state’s agency (Jessop, 2007). One
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4 should be aware, however, of those voices who ‘invoke a nostalgic image of the nation state as an
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7 actor defending public interests against powerful economic actors’, taking ‘for granted the separation
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9 of state and market’ (Lemke, 2007: 56). We can see this ‘nostalgia’ towards a pre-globalization
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11 imaginary of an autonomous, ‘muscular’ state particularly in the context of the Global South, which
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has been colonized by this neoliberal logic of individualization and dispersion further and for longer
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16 than most other regions in the world (Connell and Dados, 2014).
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In the current context of global corporate capitalism, the state enacts its influence mostly through its
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23 capacity to trigger, arrange and conduct meanings assigned to diverse technologies of power, objects
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25 of governance, governmental projects and modes of political calculation (Jessop, 2007). The state can
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27 thus be seen as dispersedly grounded in a multitude of material and semiotic elements and especially
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30 in the subjectivity of mediating stakeholders, experts and citizens who are proud to engage freely and
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32 committedly in dealing with ‘governance gaps’. As Foucault puts it, ‘the state is nothing more than
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34 the mobile effect of a regime of multiple [liberal] governmentalities’ (2008, p. 77). Based on these
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premises, it would seem clear that the state would play an active role in the present, not just through
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39 the promotion of particular governance and self-regulatory practices, but also through the
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41 dissemination of diverse discourses that assign positive meanings to the self-organized overcoming
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of (potential) socio-environmental harms, encouraging the commitment of stakeholders towards
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46 governance (Boelens et al,. 2015). Elaborating critically on the work of those who have prophesied
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48 the ‘return of the state’ in a ‘post-neoliberal’ Latin America (and the Global South) (e.g. Grugel &
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50 Riggirozzi, 2012), we propose that a foucauldian reading can reveal how contemporary governance
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53 crises within a deregulated, enterprise-driven society turn most severe precisely when the state
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55 actively organizes the passivity and diffusion of its capacity to intervene over the ‘public interest’
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57 (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005).
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4 We will now explore and analyze such dynamics of governance making by discussing three cases of
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7 mining conflicts in Chile. By drawing on Foucault (2008), we will seek to demonstrate how the state
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9 is always present, intervening in an indirect way through diffusely conducting the entrepreneurial
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11 governmentality of non-state actors, even if (and precisely because) it appears not to.
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18 Methodology
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23 Considering the exploratory nature of the research focus and the discursive and material orientation
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25 of our theoretical framework, our empirical study investigates three contested cases of governance
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27 making in Chile, involving communities, corporations and state actors. The empirical field research
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30 took place in Río Jorquera between 2009-2012, in Huasco Valley between 2011-2017, and in
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32 Caimanes between 2012-2017. Our main methodological approach was guided by the general
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34 conventions of researching and writing case studies, as proposed by Hays (2004) and Stake (2013).
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39 The focus on governmentality emerged after visiting these three communities several times and
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41 triangulating the data with a variety of different documentary and other secondary sources (Stake,
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2013) over the course of eight years (2009-2017). In line with a Foucauldian approach, triangulation
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46 here should be understood as studying social relations of power and influence as a distributed and
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48 dispersed set of discourses and practices (Lemke, 2007; Vallentin & Murillo, 2011). This entails
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50 studying influences from the bottom-up, so to say; that is, how they permeate throughout society and
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53 are co-produced through complex and changing relationships. Thus, studying the historical context is
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55 also an important aspect for us to consider, taking into account archival documents and videos in
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57 order to get a wider picture of historical relationships (Jessop, 2007). We believe this is precisely
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2 what research on governmentality should primarily endorse: a grounded accounting of emerging
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4 patterns of reality construction, at both semiotic/symbolic and material/practical levels.
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9 The field research was undertaken in three mining-affected communities. Table 1 highlights the
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11 enduring state by demonstrating the critical incidents when the Chilean State granted environmental
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licences to the respective companies as well as when it revoked these same licences. Table 2 (see
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16 appendix) provides an overview of the three cases in terms of the respective conflicts, mining projects,
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18 roles of different actors and CSR arrangements. The data analysis also required substantial amounts
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of archival data analysis of mostly publicly available documents and video reports. In total we
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23 examined 44 documents and 18 videos, totaling 430 minutes. More specifically, for Huasco Valley
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25 we analyzed 18 documents and four videos; for Caimanes 16 documents and 12 videos and for Río
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27 Jorquera 10 documents and one video. A list of secondary sources (videos, reports and articles) can
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30 be requested from the first author by request. Table 3 (see appendix) provides details pertaining to
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32 the field research and interviewees. Table 4 (see appendix) provides background contextual
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34 information of the three cases.
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39 We chose to research these communities as the lead author had direct access to community leaders,
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41 elected officials, company officials and state authorities. We also made use of publicly available
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sources such as video documentaries and media reports. As Table 2 shows (see appendix), the lead
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46 author visited Río Jorquera and Caimanes four times and the Huasco Valley on two occasions. We
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48 also conducted desktop research periodically on the three cases between 2009 and 2017, focusing on
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50 perceptions of governance, role of the state and any significant instances of trying to explain
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53 community positions of conflict or good relations with the nearby mining projects.
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57 In our collection of data, we combined case study fieldwork with desktop/secondary research. The
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2 fieldwork included semi-structured and informal opportunistic interviews with community residents,
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4 mining company executives, local government representatives, state prosecutors, civil society actors
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7 and independent experts. Background research around the mining company’s community relations
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9 was conducted using diverse documentary and press sources, in order to prepare and contextualize
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11 the interview process. Most of the interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed in their
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original language. For the interviews we were not able to audio record, upon the preference of
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16 interviewees the lead author took notes throughout the conversation, which were then typed up within
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18 24 hours. The interviewees’ names have all been anonymized for confidentiality purposes.
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23 Once transcribed, the lead author began to conduct initial thematic coding, which he shared with key
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25 interviewees from the different case studies so as to validate his interpretations. Later on, co-authors
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27 coded a sample of the transcripts, reaching a level of 80% inter-coder reliability on the first order
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30 concepts. The first level of coding of the interviews was done separately for each case, generally
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32 following the critical incident analysis technique as set out in Hays (2004). This exercise generated a
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34 total of 138 first order codes of a more descriptive nature. Further analysis led to aggregating
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categories into themes based on similarities and differences (see Figure 1). Table 5 (see appendix)
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39 provides a list of first order concepts categorized by the five second order themes, all supported by
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41 examples of raw data. We were then able to construct narratives that reflected interviewees’
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experiences of each theme.
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48 We justify the use of the three mining cases as each one has experienced a different outcome with
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50 regards to the deployment of CSR and the role of the state. Similar approaches of using more than
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53 single case studies for analyzing mining-community conflicts have been employed by Bebbington et
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55 al. (2008) who contrast two cases from Peru and Ecuador to demonstrate how in Ecuador community
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57 resistance can prevail over mining projects. In a similar vein, Özen and Özen (2017) compare and
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60 11
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2 contrast two gold mining-community cases in Turkey to explain why resistance triumphed in one
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4 case and failed at the other. We argue that our three cases also contain different narratives, appropriate
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7 for subsequent theorization.
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Insert Table 1 about here
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Three Mining Conflicts in Chile
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25 In this section, we describe governance engagements held between private actors, governmental
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27 institutions and local communities in the context of the mining industry in northern Chile. In
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30 particular, we account for the interaction between forms of business conduct, administrative-
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32 bureaucratic sanctioning and activism, invoked and deployed by these three actors across three
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34 different cases of mining operations, which we have labelled ‘Huasco Valley’, ‘Caimanes’ and ‘Río
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Jorquera’ (See Table 4 in the appendix for contextual background of the three cases). Following the
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39 conceptualization of Lukes (2005), the governance engagements we are interested in can be described
40
41 as complex processes of influence, in which actors invest in, or become the object of, discursive (i.e.
42
43
symbolic-rhetoric and practical) strategies, aiming at generating and/or consolidating a position of
44
45
46 power in relation to other actors.
47
48
49
50 We identify five different modes of influence, running across all three cases, as shown in Figure 1.
51
52
53 First, ‘deployment of CSR initiatives’ encompasses communications and practices that seek to solve
54
55 mining conflicts by creating a consensus between actors. Second, ‘mobilization of resistance’ points
56
57 to how stakeholders and the general public are alerted about the dangers and unfairness associated
58
59
60 12
1
2 with the advancement of mining operations. Third, ‘division of resistance’ refers to the effort of
3
4 diminishing the coherence of discourses against the advancement of mining operations, while, at the
5
6
7 same time, promoting a consensus of the value of mining. Fourth, ‘prescription by the state’ alludes
8
9 to the way in which the state’s prescriptive capacity is invoked, demanded and/or carried out by
10
11 diverse actors, including the state’s own organizations. Finally, ‘nexus between state and enterprise’
12
13
14
refers to the communications and practices, sometimes carried out in secretive fashion away from the
15
16 view of the public, that aim at situating government as supportive of, or closely aligned with,
17
18 enterprise initiatives. In what follows we will further characterize these modes of influence, by
19
20
providing details of key events, testimonies and observations, including some quotes for the purpose
21
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22
23 of illustration.
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25
26
27 --------------------------------------------
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30 Insert Figure 1 about here
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32 --------------------------------------------
33
34
35
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37 Mode of influence 1: Deployment of CSR Initiatives
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39 CSR initiatives were deployed by the mining companies in all three cases from the beginning of the
40
41 conflicts to the present day. CSR was widely used as a key communication tool, aiming to build good
42
43
community relations and highlighting the benefits of mining. In 2014, 15 out of 22 neighbourhood
44
45
46 associations in Alto del Carmen in the Huasco Valley voted for having dialogue with Barrick Gold,
47
48 which led to selected community leaders engaging regularly in meetings with company executives to
49
50 discuss impacts of the mine and exchange technical data. Barrick’s community relations employees
51
52
53 have participated in more than 1,000 community meetings during that time, including a
54
55 comprehensive door-to-door education campaign (Barrickbeyondborders, 2017). In the other cases,
56
57 too, similar CSR communication techniques were used, including distributing pamphlets among
58
59
60 13
1
2 community members in Caimanes, which highlighted the benefits and safety features of the dam
3
4 (OLCA, 2004), and a sustainability workshop conducted by the mining company in Río Jorquera in
5
6
7 2009.
8
9
10
11 Yet, CSR communications also extended to sharing cultural identifications. Barrick even invested in
12
13
14
the publication of a book called Diaguita whose main message was that the Diaguita people are
15
16 historically a mining people in the Huasco Valley, delegitimizing detractors’ claims about mining not
17
18 being compatible with the rural, agricultural identity of the valley. Other similar instances were found
19
20
in the case of Caimanes (a non-indigenous community), where Pelambres funded the construction of
21
Fo
22
23 a ‘medialuna’ (a crescent-shaped corral used for rodeos), and in the case of Rio Jorquera, where
24
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25 Kinross Gold invested in the devising of an ‘ethno-mapping study’ with the assistance of the
26
27 community to identify areas of special interest (Kinross, 2017).
28
ee
29
30
31
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32 These efforts to appropriate cultural representations were appreciated by some community members
33
34 but also bitterly criticized by others. An interviewee at Caimanes, for instance, affirmed that the
35
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36
37
medialuna did not represent their culture or identity: “they built a medialuna for us! They think we
38
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39 are “huasos” but huasos are from south of Santiago; we are in the north! That is offensive and an
40
41 insult! We don’t do rodeos here” (Interviewee, Caimanes community). Meanwhile, in the case of
42
43
Huasco Valley, local organizations raised their voice against the inadequacy of initiatives aiming at
44
45
46 cultural promotion:
47
48 “They [Barrick] ….they have raised false community leaders, and they have brought
49
50 professionals to teach the Huascoaltinos about our own culture. What right do you have
51
52
53 to come to teach us about our own traditions? What right do you have to manipulate our
54
55 traditions, inventing costumes, dances, forms of weaving and pottery that are not our
56
57 own?” (Statement of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos Indigenous and Agricultural
58
59
60 14
1
2 Community, Chile, Protest Barrick, 2010)
3
4
5
6
7 At Río Jorquera, Kinross has implemented a range of sustainability and ethno/eco-tourism projects
8
9 in dialogue with the local Colla people, also reaching an agreement over access to their land. The
10
11 company also donated fences and paid for health insurance subsidies and modest college scholarships
12
13
14
to some Colla residents, as well as offering competency-building courses, such as cake baking. Some
15
16 of these efforts have been received skeptically by the community, who felt that their main grievances
17
18 concerning the dust, spills and accidents caused by mining traffic on the road had not been addressed.
19
20
When asked about his views of the CSR initiatives, the Colla leader said: “They take with one hand
21
Fo
22
23 and give with another” (Interviewee, Community leader of Río Jorquera).
24
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25
26
27 The data indicates that CSR initiatives across all three cases also revolved around the theme of
28
ee
29
30 ‘conflict resolution’, aiming to reach and legitimize settlements between companies and communities
31
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32 that would keep business going within a more welcoming, friendlier environment:
33
34 “We were bored and tired of always being in conflict with the community over so many years,
35
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36
37
and the community was also bored and tired of this. We realized we had to change the way we
38
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39 related to one another. Our relationship played out in the courts of law and that’s not
40
41 sustainable for anybody. Its exhausting for everyone!” (Interviewee, Pelambres Management).
42
43
44
45
46 A similar strategy was followed by Kinross Maricunga in Rio Jorquera, which, in 2005 and amended
47
48 in 2008, agreed a Protocol with the local community, setting the governance structure of their
49
50 relationship (Interviewee, CSR official at Kinross). This consisted mainly of a Dialogue Table that
51
52
53 was to serve as an instance for the mutual cooperation between Kinross and the Colla community,
54
55 guiding assistance in areas of education, health and entrepreneurship.
56
57
58
59
60 15
1
2 Mode of influence 2: Mobilization of resistance
3
4 Despite the various CSR initiatives, resistance against the mining companies has been mobilized at
5
6
7 various levels. Community leaders from the Huasco Valley told us similar stories about the
8
9 beginnings of the local resistance movement, which was instigated in 2000 by the parish church, a
10
11 nun and a national environmental justice NGO – OLCA. After charismatic community leader ‘Lucho’
12
13
14
read the Environmental Impact Assessment report to the community, a local nun took charge of
15
16 assembling the people to devise a resistance effort. Afterwards ‘Lucho’ went to the Chilean capital
17
18 of Santiago to visit OLCA, which agreed to seconde one of their staff members to the community to
19
20
raise awareness around environmental impacts by sharing the testimonies of invited Canadian
21
Fo
22
23 speakers and showing relevant films (Interviewees local residents, Huasco Valley). Also, as seen in
24
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25 many documents by filmmakers, journalists and researchers, church representatives began to hold
26
27 Sunday Mass by the local river, as part of an effort to assign symbolic value to the water sources
28
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30 threatened by the mining operations of Barrick.
31
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32
33
34 In Caimanes the resistance began in 2008 when elected leaders of the defence committee decided to
35
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36
37
take a much more aggressive campaign against Pelambres. This included filming video
38
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39 documentaries, holding street protests, roadblocks, and the hanging of anti-Pelambres street signs and
40
41 black flags at homes. In late 2010, twelve community members barricaded themselves into a local
42
43
school and went on hunger strike for 81 days in demand for the relocation of the whole Caimanes
44
45
46 village or the demolition of the tailings dam. Five years later, further resistance emerged when a large
47
48 group, led by the Defence Committee, blocked the access road to the mine. This protest, which went
49
50 on for 76 days, was an expression of grievance, pointing to the fact that nothing had happened two
51
52
53 months after a supreme court ruling, ordering Pelambres to demolish the tailings dam (Interviewees,
54
55 various community members and video documentaries).
56
57
58
59
60 16
1
2 In Rio Jorquera, too, resistance was very active, especially in the early years. Roadblocks, and later
3
4 on legal channels, had been used by the Colla community since 2004 to protest against the spills,
5
6
7 accidents and dust caused by mining related traffic. When we asked Colla leaders if they could choose
8
9 between a life with the mining companies and their CSR initiatives and one without any mining
10
11 operations and the significant CSR investments the response was an unequivocal and immediate
12
13
14
preference for life without mining and CSR (Interviewees, Colla Community leaders).
15
16
17
18 The data shows that resistance was also mobilized at a more institutional level. At Río Jorquera, the
19
20
Colla complaint of dust plumes caused by mining related vehicles was investigated by COREMA, a
21
Fo
22
23 regional environmental authority, which found insufficient evidence to support the claims (Various
24
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25 interviews with community, authorities and Kinross). It is important to note that in all cases the
26
27 resistance actions became more institutionalized as lawyers became involved. In Río Jorquera, the
28
ee
29
30 community were joined by a woman lawyer who, in 2009, managed to take Kinross to court over the
31
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32 road issue. At the Huasco Valley, between 2012 and 2017, there were multiple legal challenges by
33
34 community groups backed by NGOs and lawyers with the aim of stopping the mining operations by
35
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36
37
Barrick. The Defence Committee at Caimanes also decided upon a legal approach in 2008 when
38
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39 hiring Ossa and company lawyers on a ‘no win no fee’ basis. However, Pelambres also reacted
40
41 institutionally in 2012 when the company decided to counter sue Defence Committee leader Flores
42
43
and his lawyers, a case the company lost in 2013 (Press reports).
44
45
46
47
48 Resistance also expanded on to an international scene in various ways. Demonstrations against the
49
50 Pascua Lama mine were held in London, Cambridge and Barcelona in 2006. In the case of Huasco
51
52
53 Valley, a local indigenous leader travelled to Toronto, invited by Canadian NGO ‘Protest Barrick’,
54
55 to give talks and presentations at universities, rallies and at Barrick Gold’s Annual General Meeting
56
57 (AGM) in Toronto. A small community from Huascoaltino also had its case against Barrick accepted
58
59
60 17
1
2 at the Interamerican Commission for Human Rights (ProtestBarrick, 2010). After Barrick’s
3
4 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreement with the Huasco Valley community, Canada’s
5
6
7 largest anti-mining NGO published a report de-legitimizing the process of arriving at the agreement
8
9 (MiningWatch Canada and OLCA, 2015). In similar fashion, two of the hunger strikers at Caimanes
10
11 were invited to France by the French government and the Mitterand Foundation to receive honorary
12
13
14
medals for their bravery in defending their territory and water (Interviewees and Press reports). Since
15
16 2013, London Mining Network has been engaging in civil disobedience via protests outside
17
18 Antofagasta Minerals (the owners of Pelambres) AGM in London. Finally, the Colla community of
19
20
Río Jorquera have been recognized by UNESCO in 2010 and have consequently drawn from this fact
21
Fo
22
23 to defend their position against large mining companies.
24
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25
26
27 Mode of influence 3: Division of resistance
28
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30 In contrast to the mobilization of resistance we observed, the data across the cases indicates
31
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32 widespread efforts by mining companies to enact the division of resisting communities, ultimately
33
34 leading to the latter’s splits. It is important to note that the data is here showing something different
35
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36
37
than CSR, as the mode of influence at play does not rely on the capacity to benefit or repair but rather
38
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39 on the capacity to instigate an internal conflict among resisting factions. Specifically, the data
40
41 indicates two distinct ways through which the division of resistance has been enacted.
42
43
44
45
46 First, efforts to divide resistance revolved around targeted incentives that were offered to resisting
47
48 actors. Barrick Gold, for example, decided in 2008 to invest in one of their then main critical
49
50 opponents, the Water Vigilance Board, which has been considered as one of the critical events that
51
52
53 weakened the local resistance to the mining project. The Board, made up of mainly large, wealthy
54
55 farmers who had been opposed to Pascua Lama due to the impacts on their grape crops, agreed not to
56
57 oppose the project upon receiving US$65 million. Similar efforts were observed in the case of
58
59
60 18
1
2 Caimanes. In 2003, Pelambres invited those community residents who were in favour of the company,
3
4 including those who had received CSR benefits, in order to show that the company enjoyed local
5
6
7 support, while, in fact, a large proportion of the community opposed the mining project (OLCA,
8
9 2004).
10
11
12
13
14
Second, offerings of targeted incentives led resistors to face the dilemma of having to decide whether
15
16 to persist in their disruptive activities or to try to settle with the companies. An example stems from
17
18 2014 when a video was published, showing a local female leader in the village of Perales at Huasco
19
20
Valley shouting at other community members on the day of the vote on the matter of a MoU with
21
Fo
22
23 Barrick. The woman, who is in favour of signing the MoU, irately accuses a young man of being an
24
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25 activist and terrorist who does not allow the local “humble” people to sign the MoU. She repeatedly
26
27 asks who funds him. The video also shows a male local resident who seems to be denied entrance to
28
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29
30 the meeting because he asks too many questions. This man, together with a local councilor, claim the
31
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32 woman is there to coerce the local residents to sign the MoU with Barrick and that she does not let
33
34 the residents think freely (Convenio entre Diaguitas y Barrick Gold, 2014).
35
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36
37
38
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39 At Caimanes, diverse efforts to divide resistance were observed led by the mining company, aimed
40
41 at taking advantage of deepening rifts in the allegiances between neighbours and family members.
42
43
This was evident in the result of a referendum devised by the company in 2015, in which the
44
45
46 community had to decide whether or not to seek a settlement. We found instances of families being
47
48 torn apart because one member voted ‘yes’ while others voted ‘no’, sometimes even leading to
49
50 evictions from family homes. This sense of inner division kept growing following the referendum, as
51
52
53 the lawyers of the Caimanes Defence Committee, who had once defeated the company in 2014 at the
54
55 supreme court, decided to engage in dialogue with Pelambres and ended up being paid approximately
56
57 US$4.6m (after the community voted in favour of a settlement with the company was confirmed). As
58
59
60 19
1
2 one community member explained emotionally:
3
4 “Now many siblings no longer speak to one another, those who voted for the money do
5
6
7 not look at us in the eye anymore, I don’t know why, I haven’t done anything to them
8
9 …On top of that my kids and I were evicted from the house I was renting because the
10
11 landlord said he can’t rent out to a traitor like me ... Now I’m here in this wooden shack
12
13
14
without windows.” (Interviewee, member of Caimanes Defence Committee)
15
16
17
18 Mode of influence 4: Prescription by the state
19
20
The data indicates distinct efforts by actors across three cases to invoke and/or implement the capacity
21
Fo
22
23 of state organizations to intervene directly - that is, prescriptively - over conflicts about mining
24
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25 operations and matters of governance around them. Here, the data reveals two levels at which the
26
27 state’s prescriptive influence is deployed, namely, the executive, governmental level, and the judicial
28
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30 level.
31
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32
33
34 Interventions by the executive branch of the state were identified in all three cases. These revolved,
35
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36
37
in the first instance, around issues of legal compliance and infringement of policy instruments, such
38
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39 as the Environmental Impact Assessment report.

40
41
42
43
For example, At Río Jorquera in September of 2013, the SMA (environmental regulatory government
44
45
46 agency), issued a ‘notice of violation’ to Kinross, related to deviations from the permitted
47
48 configurations of the Maricunga mine camp, fining the company $4.6 million. Kinross appealed the
49
50 sanction to no avail (Kinross, 2017). Later, in March 2016, after conducting another site visit, the
51
52
53 SMA ordered the closure of Kinross’ mine due to the drying up of at least 70 hectares of wetlands
54
55 between the Negro Francisco and Santa Rosa lakes, which they blamed on the Maricunga gold mining
56
57 project (SMA, 2016). Then a resolution was implemented, seeking the closure of Maricunga’s water
58
59
60 20
1
2 pumping wells based on allegations of irreparable harm and imminent risk to the Valle Ancho
3
4 wetland, located approximately 7 kilometers from Kinross’ groundwater wells (SMA website, 2017).
5
6
7 Meanwhile, in the case of Caimanes the Chilean Water Authority, an administrative agency at central
8
9 government, ruled to authorize the necessary water permits needed for the El Mauro tailings dam.
10
11 The dam would contain 1.7 billion tonnes of toxic mining waste and destroy 140 archeological sites
12
13
14
(OLCA, 2004). Related to this, it is worth noting that in 2012 the Minister of Health brought a group
15
16 of journalists to Caimanes so they could report his drinking of a glass full of water sourced locally.
17
18 The Minister began to be heckled right after this gesture was captured and left the scene swiftly (Chile
19
20
se moviliza, video documentary, 2013).
21
Fo
22
23
24
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25 Yet, efforts to implement the intervention of the executive branch of the state also involved the use
26
27 of force via police action. For example, at Caimanes the police broke up a roadblock with the use of
28
ee
29
30 riot control gear, and then demolished the campsite in March 2015, on day 76 of protest. The
31
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32 roadblock was organized in protest of the absence of any action after the supreme court ruling in
33
34 October in 2014 requesting Pelambres to disassemble the El Mauro tailings dam. Members of the
35
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36
37
community told us that such intervention was really a form of protecting the interests of the company
38
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39 instead of complying with the court order of dismantling the El Mauro dam (Interviewees Caimanes
40
41 community).
42
43
44
45
46 Interventions by the judicial branch of the state were also identified. In the case of Caimanes, judicial
47
48 influence over the years can be seen as active, yet full of oscillations and contradictions. At first, in
49
50 2006, the Regional Court of Appeals prohibited the construction of the tailings dam, following the
51
52
53 submission of several legal challenges by the community. However, in 2008 the courts re-approved
54
55 the permits for the construction of the El Mauro tailings dam (Chile se moviliza, video documentary,
56
57 2013). In 2013, again the state acted judicially to curtail the reputation and progress of mining
58
59
60 21
1
2 operations, as the Tribunal of Ovalle court found the leader of the Caimanes Defence Committee
3
4 (Cristián Flores) and the lawyers who counselled him (the Ossa firm) not guilty of illicit collusion,
5
6
7 following an accusation by Pelambres. In October 2014, the Supreme Court of Los Vilos ordered
8
9 Pelambres to demolish its El Mauro tailings dam, deeming it a danger for mankind (El Mercurio,
10
11 2013). However, the state went back to acting judicially in support of mining operations, as in August
12
13
14
of 2016 when the La Serena Court of Appeals reversed the decision after seeing evidence of CSR and
15
16 an agreement with the community between Pelambres and Caimanes (Two interviewees,
17
18 Management officials Pelambres and Court of Appeals, La Serena ruling document).
19
20
21
Fo
22
23 Mode of influence 5: Nexus between state and enterprise
24
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25 This mode of influence emerges when the actual or potential interventions of state and enterprise
26
27 actors are represented as compatible. Here, again, actors can be observed invoking or demanding the
28
ee
29
30 active involvement of the state. Previously, we have noted how corporations have relied legally and
31
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32 politically on statecraft to license mining operations; here, however, the focus is placed on indirect
33
34 relations between the state and other actors, particularly in those through which the support for the
35
ev
36
37
actions is generated. In this sense, we contend influence can be observed as reliant on a verifiable
38
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39 nexus between state and enterprise. The data indicates two levels at which this nexus is established,
40
41 namely, communications/public relations and strategy/policy making.
42
43
44
45
46 A background nexus between state and enterprise, in terms of communications/public relations, can
47
48 be appreciated as early as 1996, when the Chilean and Argentine states agreed to declare the
49
50 borderline territory at the top of the Andes as ‘bi-nominal’. This was done in anticipation of future
51
52
53 mega mining activity by Barrick Gold (La Nación, 1996). In 2009, the regional director of the Chilean
54
55 Water Authority, a central government agency, declared in an interview with the authors that “out of
56
57 all the many mining companies here, I think Kinross’ self-monitoring, reporting and conduct on water
58
59
60 22
1
2 usage is exemplary” (Region III, DGA regional Director). Similarly, in the context of mining at
3
4 Huasco Valley, Salinas (2007) accounts for the public interventions of Member of Parliament Jaime
5
6
7 Mulet, who, in 2004, declared his delight at seeing Barrick’s decision to go ahead with the Pascua
8
9 Lama mining project. Equally, in 2006, the Chilean government’s official spokesman, Osvaldo
10
11 Puccio, declared the country was the ‘overall winner’ with Barrick’s actions.
12
13
14
15
16 Meetings were also held at the Ministry of Public Works, between government officials, Kinross Gold
17
18 executives and community leaders, to discuss conflicts over road related grievances, such as dust and
19
20
accidents to Colla livestock (Observant participation in meetings by authors, 2009). In the case of
21
Fo
22
23 Caimanes, Adriana Hoffman, the then head of environmental authorities, organized an unprecedented
24
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25 visit to the community along with a group of politicians in 2001, in which she publicly addressed the
26
27 conflict, calling for more dialogue between mining company and community (OLCA, 2004).
28
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29
30 According to Kinross’ head of CSR in Chile, the relationship with the Colla community constitutes a
31
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32 ‘best practice’ example, due to the efficacy of the governance arrangement that involved the Ministry
33
34 of Public Works in generating benefits for parties involved (Interviewee, Kinross Management
35
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36
37
official).
38
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39
40
41 Communicational legitimation as a means to portray state and enterprise interests as compatible can
42
43
also be appreciated in efforts to censor. This was identified in the case of Caimanes where the state-
44
45
46 owned television network edited the content of a documentary in which critical remarks were made
47
48 about the El Mauro dam and Pelambres. In the televised version multiple references to “the situation”
49
50 and “drought” made by well-known rap star DJ Mendez during his visit to Caimanes were shown,
51
52
53 whilst critical views, which linked water shortages to the company, were removed. Community
54
55 residents confirmed that their consistent mentioning of Pelambres to DJ Mendez during recording of
56
57 the documentary had been edited out, including the helicopter visit he made over the tailings dam
58
59
60 23
1
2 (TVN documentary, 2012 and various community interviewees).
3
4
5
6
7 Finally, in the context of Caimanes, the articulation of nexus between state and enterprise in terms of
8
9 policy/strategy making can be appreciated in all its subtlety, as an indirect and rather intricate effort.
10
11 Here, the local community resisting the mining project appeared to be perplexed at how the judicial
12
13
14
decision of 2014 to remove the tailings dam had been followed 14 months later by a business-as-
15
16 usual stance by the company, which continued to operate as if nothing had happened. At this point,
17
18 crucially, the community was offered a referendum to decide about the future of the tailings dam in
19
20
the area, which, despite having been organized by the mining company, was staged as an official
21
Fo
22
23 democratic electionary event, as if organized by the state. Furthermore, the company then used the
24
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25 pro-mining result of this pseudo-electoral process as evidence within judicial dealings with the state,
26
27 in order to overturn decisions against its tailings dam. This series of events indicate the state’s
28
ee
29
30 complicity in enterprising this scheme. Not only the state was keen to admit the results of a corporate-
31
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32 run referendum into the judicial process, and remained passive while the pseudo-electoral process in
33
34 the name of government was taking place. It was also keen to re-engage executively with the
35
ev
36
37
company, after the pathway for settlement had been legitimized as a result of the referendum. As a
38
iew
39 former resistance leader at Caimanes explains:

40
41 “This is all the capitalist state’s fault, they put that piece of trash there (referring to the dam)
42
43
and then left us alone, to fight the company alone, the state loves private companies coming
44
45
46 in. We…fought the company alone and got the agreement for ourselves, and now the state
47
48 wants to come in and be in the first row ready to cut the ribbon for the new projects we get!”
49
50
51
52
53
54
55 Discussion
56
57
58
59
60 24
1
2 The above findings have led us to appreciate how the making of governance between conflicting
3
4 actors - corporations, communities and the state - unfolds densely yet dispersedly, through the
5
6
7 establishment of ‘new polycentric forms of social organization and mobilization’ (Boelens et al.,
8
9 2015, p. 281). Rather than relying on a singular logic of resolution, the exchange between
10
11 stakeholders - both large and small - appear to hinge on diverse modes of influence, which are
12
13
14
deployed during practical interplay in the field. In light of our data analysis, influence can be
15
16 understood as the capacity to exert power in interactive fashion, by invoking and enacting discourses
17
18 on private interests, regulatory authority and technical knowledge.
19
20
21
Fo
22
23 Yet, what seems to matter most with regards to the making of governance in our three cases are the
24
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25 differing ways in which influence is enabled; or in Foucauldian terms, the ways in which conduct is
26
27 conducted. What is, analytically speaking, at stake are the overarching logics that grant coherence to
28
ee
29
30 the autonomous efforts that hold sway over governance processes, taking place at heterogenous
31
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32 centres of conflict (Lemke, 2007). Across the cases - Huasco Valley, Caimanes, and Río Jorquera -
33
34 we have found five such modes of enabling influence: 1) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); 2)
35
ev
36
37
mobilization of resistance; 3) division of resistance; 4) prescription by the state; and 5) nexus between
38
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39 state and enterprise. These modes represent distinct and complementary approaches to the making of
40
41 governance, portraying, as a whole, the multifaceted character of stakeholder engagement in the
42
43
resolution of problems and the crafting of agreements. Overall, following Foucault (2008), they show
44
45
46 how the power to govern is to be read ‘productively’, beyond the logic of authority/compliance:
47
48 governance is actively ‘produced’ only when key actors manage to legitimize their actions, practically
49
50 and symbolically, as influential, in relation to the interests, expectations and actions of others.
51
52
53
54
55 By foregrounding the crucial role that the enabling of influence plays in governance making, we are
56
57 able to witness the diffusion of the state’s agency and its ambiguous presence as both a mediator and
58
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60 25
1
2 regulator amidst corporations, communities and the general public. Confirming the views of several
3
4 OS scholars (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Rhodes, 2007), our study shows how the organization of
5
6
7 the state seems to have veered committedly towards a post-bureaucratic, post-disciplinary logic for
8
9 (reciprocal) co-governing between stakeholders. Our data often seems to corroborate that the state
10
11 appears to have withdrawn almost completely from the scene of governance so that a looser, less
12
13
14
direct, approach to the policing and resolution of conflicts can be enacted. In the literature, such shift
15
16 has been associated with the emergence of a ‘bazaar’ type of governance, meaning a situated
17
18 interaction where courses of action are negotiated, not through the coercive force of hierarchic
19
20
authority - what has been called ‘cathedral’ governance - but through the reciprocal, rather diffused
21
Fo
22
23 definition of value(s), meaning(s) and networked allegiances (Demil & Lecocq, 2006; Depledge &
24
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25 Dodds, 2017; Boelens et al., 2015).

26
27
28
ee
29
30 Notwithstanding, what we see in our cases of mining conflicts in Chile goes well beyond the
31
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32 characteristics of ‘bazaar’ governance, which has also been identified as ‘private regulation’ (Rhodes,
33
34 2007; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Our data clearly shows that the Chilean state is present.
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ev
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37
That is, we identify different levels of state organization and involvement in the complex web through
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39 which state, enterprise and community actors attempt to (co-)establish grounds for influencing their
40
41 counterparts. So, the state seems to have retained some of its (‘cathedral’) capacity to influence
42
43
directly, unilaterally and visibly by relying on legal and administrative mechanisms available; for
44
45
46 instance, through judicial ruling, contractual overwatching and the command of security forces at the
47
48 mining sites. At the same time, however, the small influence that the state has been able to preserve
49
50 seems, ultimately, to support the consolidation of a mining governance ‘bazaar’, where a multitude
51
52
53 of micro and macro exchanges between corporations and community actors are deployed, on the
54
55 grounds of highly deregulated land/transport rights, social services and cultural heritages. Although
56
57 noticeable at times, the state’s influence proves too timid and dispersed, as control over these crucial
58
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60 26
1
2 socio-economic matters is surrendered to the reciprocal influencing between private interests either
3
4 partially (i.e. through enabling state-enterprise ‘nexus’) or completely (i.e. through deploying, and
5
6
7 resisting, CSR initiatives).
8
9
10
11 While several scholars would consider these findings to indicate the unequivocal irrelevance and even
12
13
14
the obsolescence of the state as a relevant player in the multi-stakeholder scene of governance
15
16 (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), a careful reading of the data allows us to
17
18 appreciate how, despite the diffusing of its visible agency, the state is, in fact, never absent. Delving
19
20
deeper into Foucault’s definition of the contemporary state as ‘nothing more than the mobile effect
21
Fo
22
23 of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ (Foucault, 2008: 77), our analysis has led us to interpret
24
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25 two crucial features of state organization. First, we see statecraft as a contingently enacted, multi-
26
27 layered technology of administration, which can either be invoked and mobilized or, instead, be
28
ee
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30 disregarded by actors depending on their stakes or ‘mentalities’ regarding governance affairs and the
31
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32 circumstances of particular conflicts. Second, we appreciate how, rather than vanishing from the
33
34 reality of governance-making, the institutionality of the state emerges in truly dynamic, dispersed and
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36
37
indirect fashion. That is, the state, understood as ‘governmentality(ies)’, is about the configuring of a
38
iew
39 particular mode of agency, which oscillates between active, direct involvement and passive, indirect
40
41 vouching of the agency of others - often in implicit, overt ways.
42
43
44
45
46 Accordingly, elaborating on Djelic & Etchanchu’s (2015) recent insights on governance and the
47
48 history of neoliberal governmentality, we interpret our data in terms of the ‘materialization’ and
49
50 ‘dematerialization’ of the state’s responsibility over discourses and practices of governance. In line
51
52
53 with Foucault’s project, this represents an attempt to transcend dichotomies, such as regulation-
54
55 deregulation or government-governance, in search of a deeper account of how the state is organized
56
57 (and organizes itself) not only to govern but also to produce, historically, the conditions for
58
59
60 27
1
2 governance to take place. By looking at diverse modes through which influence is enabled - what
3
4 Foucault called ‘governmentality’ or the the ‘conduct of conduct’ - we can discern the way in which
5
6
7 ‘self-government and the will to self-determination is always already prefigured by “regimes of truth”
8
9 which shape and guide such behaviour’ (Garland, 1999, p. 29). In this case, these ‘regimes’ not only
10
11 concern the truth of an active, direct invoking of state intervention in social life by the governed, but
12
13
14
also the truth of ‘freedom’ during highly deregulated ‘bazaar’ governance-making engagements: the
15
16 indirect, implicit appeal to legal-administrative guarantees and infrastructures that make stakeholder
17
18 subjectivity and private interests possible in the scene of governance (Jessop, 2007). We realize it is
19
20
with and not without the state’s remaining ‘cathedral’ rooting that the freedom to govern is realized.
21
Fo
22
23 This means that governance exchanges between private interests do not surpass but rather reproduce
24
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25 and disperse the state’s historical discourses on the forceful need to govern (Vallentin & Murillo,
26
27 2011). What is really at stake, we then infer, are the specific configurations of what Boelens et al.
28
ee
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30 (2015) have called a ‘hybrid cathedral-bazaar’ governance; Figure 2 below depicts such a continuum:
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32
33
34 --------------------------------------------
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36
37
Insert Figure 2 about here
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iew
39 --------------------------------------------
40
41
42
43
When seen as part of a relational system, the modes of influence can be seen as particular arrays of
44
45
46 ‘governmentalities’, that is, shared representations of actors about the conditions for the
47
48 accomplishment of governance making, registered at both discursive-symbolic and material-practical
49
50 levels. Crucially, these ‘governmentalities’ oscillate between ‘materialized’ and ‘dematerialized’
51
52
53 forms of state responsibility (see Figure 2). Different modes of securing and deploying influence can
54
55 be perceived across the three cases observed, ranging from the rigorous implementation of regulatory
56
57 and policing statecraft, on behalf of traditional ‘cathedral’ government authority, which we have
58
59
60 28
1
2 equated to state prescription (mode of influence 4), to the devising of autonomist, private initiatives
3
4 within a ‘bazaar’ framework, which we have equated to CSR (mode of influence 1). These poles
5
6
7 represent stereotypical cases of governmentalities, in which the construal of the state’s duly
8
9 involvement, or lack thereof, is depicted most purely and schematically.
10
11
12
13
14
On the one hand, the state comes to be construed as committedly ‘material’ in its prescriptive
15
16 involvement over public affairs (mode of influence 4). The data shows how, in the face of conflict
17
18 between corporations and communities, the state is organized locally and nationally to carry out a
19
20
responsive and rather paternalistic governmental overwatch, capable of informing not only direct
21
Fo
22
23 regulation in the form of sanctions but also concrete actions at ground level, such as the mobilization
24
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25 of police forces. Notably, the state is here organized as an accountable presence, actively involved in
26
27 the steering of private initiative(s) and perceived as causally and morally responsible for the effects
28
ee
29
30 of such intervention.
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32
33
34 On the other hand, in the case of CSR (mode of influence 1), the state is construed as completely
35
ev
36
37
‘dematerialized’, with its discursive and practical presence reduced to mere ‘virtual’ concerns and
38
iew
39 objects, and its authority reduced to an elusive, if not outright absent, locus of responsibility(ies)
40
41 (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2015). Notable images of such ‘dematerialization’ are found in CSR initiatives
42
43
aimed at ‘facilitating’ the re-construction of local, indigenous cultures by communities, and at
44
45
46 ‘supplementing’ the development of social services and essential infrastructure. The most remarkable
47
48 in these instances, the data shows, is the naturalized fashion in which issues that have been historically
49
50 paramount for state administrations, such as the constitutional recognition of the identity of
51
52
53 indigenous identity and the continued provision of welfare, have been ‘dissolved’ into events/
54
55 artifacts of vague significance. Books on indigenous heritage and fences and other forms of small-
56
57 scale infrastructure, for instance, have supposedly come to accomplish what the nation-state once
58
59
60 29
1
2 managed to organize. Yet, they can only do so in a blatantly nonspecific, indeterminate manner. A
3
4 sustained addressing of indigenous culture is replaced by brief publication, while a commitment to
5
6
7 dealing with social needs is replaced by the offering of ‘solutions’ whose effective implementation
8
9 and evaluation no particular corporate actor or ‘shareholder’ will assume full responsibility for. What
10
11 these CSR images show, in the context of conflicts around mining projects, is the hollowing out of
12
13
14
the state’s agency, up to the point of ‘dematerializing’ its relevance in the governance of public affairs.
15
16
17
18 Our data analysis has led us to conclude that the remaining arrays of ‘governmentalities’ (modes of
19
20
influence 2, 3 and 5) can be situated along the continuum between poles of ‘materialization/
21
Fo
22
23 dematerialization’ of the state’s responsibility, understood as expressing varying degrees of active
24
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25 state involvement in governance making. Overall, we come to realize the enduring role the state plays
26
27 in governance making. Even in the case of CSR, the data indicates, references to public interests
28
ee
29
30 under the tutelage of state administration, such as culture and commons, cannot help but to be
31
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32 articulated, revealing the ‘background function’ the state provides for the interaction between
33
34 stakeholders. Hence, the state’s agency is more or less materialized in all modes of influence,
35
ev
36
37
demonstrating the polycentric, multifaceted character of its organization. In some cases, statecraft is
38
iew
39 directly invoked and wielded as a concrete tool, while in others the concerns and attributions of the
40
41 state remain a ‘virtual’ reference at a discursive level. Yet, the state’s agency proves essential in the
42
43
practical and symbolic enabling of influence around mining conflicts and a steady, enduring staple in
44
45
46 the conduct of governance conduct.
47
48
49
50 We believe this not only debunks simplistic claims story about ‘statelessness’ in the long history of
51
52
53 business-society relations, but also illustrates exaggerated assumptions about the waning of state
54
55 authority in our current landscape of neoliberal governance (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2015). Our study
56
57 of the varied ‘governmentalities’ in which the Chilean neoliberal state is implicated during the making
58
59
60 30
1
2 of governance, shows how ‘virtual’ and ‘dematerialized’ forms of state responsibility do not exclude
3
4 but actually coalesce with the ‘materialized’ involvements that the state has traditionally embodied.
5
6
7 It can thus be inferred that contemporary forms of state organization are not so much about dismissing
8
9 and discarding authority as they are about diffusing it amidst a number of actors willing to
10
11 subjectively interpret (i.e. ‘mentalize’) and act upon the need to govern, all the while retaining a
12
13
14
minimal ‘background capacity’ to guarantee the conditions for such free exchange to occur.
15
16
17
18 Boelens et al.’s concept of a ‘hybrid cathedral-bazaar’ governance (2015) signals this new generalized
19
20
yet customized ‘governmentality’, accounting for the irresolvable tension between market-based
21
Fo
22
23 governance and what could be called the ‘governance of governance’, which state organization
24
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25 accomplishes, practically and symbolically, in dispersed fashion. In Figure 3 below, we have used
26
27 Boelens et al.’s concept to finally locate the specific relations between business, community and state
28
ee
29
30 actors we have interpreted in our analysis of data across three cases, showing the specific ways in
31
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32 which modes of influence enact ‘cathedral’ and ‘bazaar’ logics or ‘mentalities’ of governance.
33
34 Crucially, such schematic rendition allows appreciating at a glance how different modes of influence
35
ev
36
37
come together as a whole to establish a general, multifaceted ‘governmentality’ where the state
38
iew
39 organizes its own dispersion in order to endure. Figure 3 can thus be read as a map, showing the
40
41 specific junctures at which the ‘materialization’ or ‘dematerialization’ of the state’s responsibility
42
43
take form (see Figure 2). Consequently, it can also be read as a guide for agents such as community
44
45
46 leaders and state officials, who are often severely disempowered in relation to corporate actors, to
47
48 identify the ambiguous boundaries between ‘bazaar’-compatible (i.e. dematerialized) and ‘cathedral’-
49
50 compatible (i.e. materialized) modes of influence. Hopefully, this could lead to a more effective
51
52
53 seizing of both the resources and gaps in state organization, leading to a fairer and more inclusive
54
55 conduct of governance.
56
57
58
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60 31
1
2 --------------------------------------------
3
4 Insert Figure 3 about here
5
6
7 --------------------------------------------
8
9
10
11 Conclusion
12
13
14
15
16 In this article we address the profound ambiguity of the Chilean state in its influence over the
17
18 governance of mining industry. We have shown that the governance of the Chilean mining industry
19
20
is dispersed, involving a range of state, corporate and community actors. In particular, Foucault’s
21
Fo
22
23 notion of governmentality (Foucault, 2008; Vallentin & Murillo, 2011; Lemke, 2007) has led us to
24
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25 conceptualize the role of the organized state as being neither the steerer of socio-economic affairs,
26
27 nor a diminished figure in a ‘post-national constellation’, but the vehicle for the ‘conduct of business
28
ee
29
30 conduct’, within the era of governance (Enroth, 2014). Moving beyond normative and state-less
31
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32 PCSR assumptions about communicative rationality(ies) at the political level (Scherer and Palazzo,
33
34 2011), we call for the material embodiments of governmentality to be studied further. In particular,
35
ev
36
37
following Boelens et al.’s lead (2015), research should explore: first, how the ‘polycentric’
38
iew
39 organization of the state blurs the practical and discursive dichotomy between ‘cathedral’ institutions
40
41 of state regulation and fragmented ‘bazaar’ exchanges between private enterprising actors; and
42
43
second, how PCSR strategies are less about filling governance gaps vis-à-vis a waning state (Scherer
44
45
46 & Palazzo, 2011) and more about private actors establishing a sufficiently stable mode of influencing,
47
48 in direct response to the influence they attribute to state actors, often operating ‘behind the scenes’
49
50 (Moog et al., 2015; Coleman, 2013; Himley, 2014; Li, 2016; Maher, 2018).
51
52
53
54
55 In relation to the OS field, our analysis has led us to agree, first and foremost , with calls to empirically
56
57 explore the role of the state in private governance regimes (e.g. Gond et al., 2011; Schrempf-Stirling,
58
59
60 32
1
2 2016) Particularly, the discursive and material realities of governance relations, here exemplified in
3
4 the economic, cultural and environmental impacts of mining endeavours, must be addressed. Second,
5
6
7 we conclude that it is of utmost importance to assume the state not as a conceptual ‘add-on’ to
8
9 governance-making but as a complex social relation or ‘governmentality’, which unfolds historically
10
11 and territorially within a widespread neoliberal political economy, involving not one but multiple
12
13
14
actors with diverse stakes (Jessop, 2007; Lemke, 2007; du Gay, 2000; Vallentin & Murillo, 2011).
15
16 Third, our analysis of three cases in Chile reveals that the state has not disappeared but turned
17
18 ambiguous and dispersed, becoming a ‘polycentric hybrid’ between ‘cathedral’ and ‘bazaar’. While
19
20
demanding the withdrawal of governmental control and regulation (Nem Singh, 2012; Undurraga,
21
Fo
22
23 2015), the state demonstrates an economic, political and legal-bureaucratic involvement in the
24
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25 regulation of mining vis-à-vis the people and the environment, through both the materialization and
26
27 the dematerialization of its responsibility (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2015). Overall, we have shown, both
28
ee
29
30 empirically and theoretically, that the state endures, making its presence felt in a variety of ways. As
31
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32 Nettl wisely affirmed of the state, as early as 1968: “it retains a skeletal and ghostly existence, largely
33
34 because, for all the changes in emphasis and interests of research, the thing exists and no amount of
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36
37
conceptual restructuring can dissolve it’ (1968: 559). OS scholars and governance-makers would do
38
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39 well recognizing its importance and further analyzing its contemporary organization.
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41
42
43
44
45
46 References
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46 Chile. Journal of Developing Societies, 28(2), 229-256.
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1
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3 Appendix
4
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6
--------------------------------------------
7
8
9 Insert Table 2 about here
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11 --------------------------------------------
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Insert Table 4 about here
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32 --------------------------------------------
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36 --------------------------------------------
37
38
iew
39
40 Archival Data References
41 State Sources
42
43 Environmental Tribunal - Tribunal llevó a cabo audiencia en tres reclamaciones contra el
44
45 Comité de Ministros por proceso de revisión de la RCA del proyecto de modificación de
46 Pascua Lama. 25th July, 2017 http://www.tribunalambiental.cl/audiencia-r-143-144-
47
48 145-2017/ (Accessed 9th October, 2017).
49
Environmental Impact Assessment - Pascua Lama
50
51 http://seia.sea.gob.cl/seia-
52
53 web/ficha/fichaPrincipal.php?modo=ficha&id_expediente=1048260 (accessed 23rd
54 March, 2017)
55
56 Environmental Tribunal - Tribunal Ambiental de Santiago autorizó nueva clausura parcial del
57
sector de pozos de extracción de agua de Minera Maricunga en Atacama. 29th June,
58
59 2016
60
1
2
3 http://www.tribunalambiental.cl/tribunal-ambiental-de-santiago-autorizo-nueva-
4
5 clausura-parcial-del-sector-de-pozos-de-extraccion-de-agua-de-minera-maricunga-en-
6
atacama/ (Accessed 16th October, 2017).
7
8 Environmental Tribunal - Tribunal Ambiental rechazó solicitud de la SMA para decretar nueva
9
10 clausura de los pozos de agua de Minera Maricunga. 15th July, 2016
11 http://www.tribunalambiental.cl/tribunal-ambiental-rechazo-solicitud-de-la-sma-para-
12
13 decretar-nueva-clausura-de-los-pozos-de-agua-de-minera-maricunga/ (Accessed 16th
14
15 October, 2017).
16 Poder Judicial - Corte de Apelaciones de la Serena rechaza denuncia de “obra ruinosa” contra
17
18 minera Los Pelambres
19
http://www.pjud.cl/documents/396543/0/TRANQUE+EL+MAURO+OBRA+NUEVA+SU
20
21 PREMA.pdf/cb5eeaf8-6634-478e-8123-b6db6469f73f (Accessed 10th October, 2017)
Fo
22
23 Poder Judicial - Juzgado de los Vilos ordena demolición de muro de contención del tranque de
24 el Mauro. 25th March, 2015
rP
25
26 http://www.pjud.cl/documents/396729/0/LOS+VILOS+EL+MAURO+DEMOLICION.pdf
27
/6ccda201-8e07-4cd9-bb34-a3f12df4ea45 (Accessed 10th October, 2017)
28
ee
29 Poder Judicial - Corte de Apelaciones de la Serena rechaza denuncia de “obra ruinosa” contra
30
31 minera Los Pelambres. 22nd April, 2015
rR
32 http://www.pjud.cl/documents/396588/0/Rol+N+946-2014+Civil+.pdf/34368e27-
33
34 f095-4e34-b604-3e7c07586c9c (Accessed 10th October, 2017).
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iew
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41
42 http://www.sma.gob.cl/index.php/noticias/comunicados/660-sma-sanciona-a-minera-
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44 maricunga-por-dano-ambiental-irreparable-en-sitio-ramsar-de-la-region-de-atacama
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47 SMA - SMA formula cargos contra Pascua Lama por incumplimientos a su RCA. 27th March,
48
2013. http://www.sma.gob.cl/index.php/noticias/comunicados/222-superintendencia-
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52 resolucion-de-calificacion-ambiental (Accessed 16th October, 2017)
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55 May, 2013 http://www.sma.gob.cl/index.php/noticias/comunicados/241-sma-
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sanciona-a-pascua-lama-por-incumplimientos-a-su-rca (Accessed 16th October, 2017)
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58 Tribunal Ambiental ordena a la SMA rehacer resolución sancionatoria a Pascua Lama. 3rd
59
60 March, 2014
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2
3 http://www.tribunalambiental.cl/tribunal-ambiental-ordena-a-la-sma-rehacer-
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5 resolucion-sancionatoria-a-pascua-lama/ (Accessed 15th October, 2017).
6
7
8
9
10 Press/Media/Civil Society sources
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13 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/174387-menem-y-frei-firman-el-protocolo-de-los-hielos
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15 (Accessed 18th October, 2017)
16 Total rechazo a proyecto Pascua Lama en encuesta
17
18 http://chanarcillo.cl/notas_ver.php?idnota=1243 (Accessed 11th February, 2017)
19
Bachelet asiste hoy a cena auspiciada por Barrick Gold en Nueva York. 23rd September 2009
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21 http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2009/09/23/bachelet-asiste-hoy-a-cena-
Fo
22
23 auspiciada-por-barrick-gold-en-nueva-york/ (Accessed 18th October, 2017)
24 Vecinos del Valle del Huasco en alerta por reunion de Bachelet con Barrick Gold en Canadá. 6th
rP
25
26 June, 2017
27
http://www.elciudadano.cl/medio-ambiente/vecinos-del-valle-del-huasco-en-alerta-
28
ee
29 por-reunion-de-bachelet-con-barrick-gold-en-canada/06/12/ (Accessed 18th October,

30
31 2017)
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32 “Behind Barrick's Pascua-Lama meltdown in the Atacama”, report in Globe and Mail newspaper
33
34 desert”
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ev
36
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/high-and-
37 dry/article18134225/?page=all (accessed 10th April, 2017).
38
iew
39 “Corte Suprema invalida autorización de cierre temporal de Pascua Lama” Diario Financiero
40 (2014)
41
42 https://www.df.cl/noticias/empresas/mineria/corte-suprema-invalida-autorizacion-
43
44 de-cierre-temporal-de-pascua-lama/2017-03-13/211219.html (accessed 23rd January,
45 2017)
46
47 Coordinadora por la defensa del agua y la vida (2010) “Pascua Lama: Barrick destruye glaciares
48
y usurpa territorios ancestrales”
49
50 http://www.derechoalagua.cl/mapa-de-conflictos/pascua-lama-barrick-destruye-
51
52 glaciares-y-usurpa-territorios-ancestrales/ (accessed 4th May, 2017)
53 Barrick Gold reaches initial deal with Chilean Indians who opposed Pascua-Lama mine in Andes
54
55 (2014)
56
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/28/barrick-gold-reaches-initial-deal-with-
57
58 chilean-indians-who-opposed-pascua-lama.html (accessed 4th May, 2017)
59
60 Chile Transparente - Proceso de diálogo, participación y consulta 2015 -
1
2
3 http://www.chiletransparente.cl/proceso-de-dialogo-participacion-y-consulta-2015/
4
5 (accessed 19th July, 2017)
6
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7
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9
10 el-tranque-el-mauro-1603876 (accessed 20th July, 2017)
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14
15 minera-los-pelambres-1601623 (accessed 20th July, 2017)
16 Comunidad de Caimanes rechaza dictamen que anula derrumbe de Tranque El Mauro (2016)
17
18 http://radio.uchile.cl/2016/08/09/comunidad-de-caimanes-rechaza-dictamen-que-
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anula-derrumbe-de-tranque-el-mauro/ (accessed 19th July, 2017)
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21 Caimanes gana: Tranque El Mauro debe ser demolido (2015)
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22
23 http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/2015/03/09/caimanes-anota-devastador-fallo-judicial-
24 tranque-el-mauro-debe-ser-demolido-partir-de-manana/ (accessed 20th July, 2017)
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25
26 Minera del Grupo Luksic llega a un acuerdo con Caimanes y pone fin a una década de conflictos
27
(2016)
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ee
29 http://www.elmostrador.cl/mercados/2016/05/18/minera-del-grupo-luksic-llega-a-
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31 un-acuerdo-con-caimanes-y-pone-fin-a-una-decada-de-conflictos/ (accessed 20th July,
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32 2017)
33
34 Conflicto en Caimanes: Ordenan demolición total del tranque de Minera Los Pelambres (2015)
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ev
36
http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2015/03/09/707166/juez-ordena-
37 demolicion-total-del-tranque-de-minera-los-pelambres-y-empresa-apelara.html
38
iew
39 (accessed 21st July, 2017)

40 What is Antofagasta hiding from its investors? (2016)
41
42 https://newint.org/blog/2016/05/17/what-is-antofagasta-hiding (accessed 22nd July,
43
44 2017)
45 Acuerdo entre Los Pelambres y Caimanes contempla 3.100 millones para abogados y fondo
46
47 extra si es que extiende la vida útil del Tranque El Mauro
48
http://www.theclinic.cl/2016/08/17/acuerdo-entre-los-pelambres-y-caimanes-
49
50 contempla-3-100-millones-para-abogados-y-posibilidad-de-extender-el-tranque-el-
51
52 mauro/ (accessed 21st July, 2017)
53 SMA sancionó a minera Maricunga con multa de US$ 4,5 millones: 11th February, 2014:
54
55 http://www.latercera.com/noticia/sma-sanciono-a-minera-maricunga-con-multa-de-
56
us-45-millones/ (Accessed 15th October, 2017)
57
58 Kinross Gold halts Maricunga mine in Chile, lays off 300 workers. 26th August, 2016:
59
60 http://www.mining.com/kinross-gold-halts-maricunga-mine-in-chile-lays-off-300-
1
2
3 workers/ (Accessed 15th October, 2017)
4
5 Maricunga: Kinross evalúa detener actividad minera. 10th May, 2016:
6
https://www.df.cl/noticias/empresas/energia/maricunga-kinross-evalua-detener-
7
8 actividad-minera/2016-05-10/204905.html (accessed 9th July, 2017)
9
10 UNESCO – Colla del Río Jorquera y sus Afluentes
11 https://www.ecured.cu/Comunidad_Colla_del_R%C3%ADo_Jorquera_y_sus_Afluentes
12
13 Videos
14
15 “Proceso de Trabajo del Pueblo Diaguita (Valle del Huasco)”
16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzaZTjoQ8pM&t=1604s 65 minutes (accessed
17
18 10th May, 2017)
19
PASCUA LAMA: El Llanto de la Montaña
20
21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZ1dVHHv52k&t=316s 120 minutes (accessed
Fo
22
23 11th May, 2017)
24 Sed de Oro: Pascua Lama. 75 minutes
rP
25
26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=__gLi277sb4 (accessed 11th May, 2017)
27
Convenio entre Diaguitas y Barrick Gold. 8 minutes
28
ee
29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxtnKvkG-C4 (accessed 12th May, 2017)

30
31 Caimanes: Stolen Water (2015)
rR
32 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-C0WoKV_pg (60 minutes) (accessed 11th May,

33
34 2017)
35
ev
36
Continentes - Caimanes, una condena a muerte (2017)
37 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6mKot-zSGg (25 minutes) (accessed 4th May,
38
iew
39 2017)
40 Chile se Moviliza - Caimanes (2013) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-3azQ1nkGg (61
41
42 minutes) (accessed 11th May, 2017)
43
44 La lucha de Caimanes La Izquierda Diario Chile (2015)
45 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFN7KKt0MHc (9 minutes) (accessed 4th May,
46
47 2017)
48
CAIMANES, el pueblo que se enfrento al poder de Luksic (2015)
49
50 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y59o_PMIFOE&t=14s (13 minutes) (accessed 5th
51
52 May, 2017)
53 Environmental Hazards in Chile’s Mines (2016)
54
55 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdOLzB7rouE (9 minutes) (accessed 22nd
56
October, 2017)
57
58 Minera de Luksic permea estado de derecho en Chile (2013)
59
60 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NRnBoxt24tw&t=22s (9 minutes) (accessed 22nd
1
2
3 October, 2017)
4
5 La abogada Sandra Dagnino explica la realidad del pueblo de Caimanes (2015)
6
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yj8QMhpx90o&t=618s (16 minutes) (accessed
7
8 22nd October, 2017)
9
10 Toma ruta El Mauro (2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMTKt0ohjmA (8 minutes)
11 (accessed 22nd October, 2017)
12
13 Tesoro Humano Vivo 2010 Comunidad Colla Río Jorquera y sus Afluentes
14
15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdMHtlKhj9o (2 minutes) (accessed 18th August,
16 2017)
17
18
19
Corporate Sources
20
21 Local Supplier Development Program in action: Creating economic opportunities. 29th October,
Fo
22
23 2008.
24 http://barrickbeyondborders.com/mining/2008/10/local-supplier-development-
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26 program-in-action-creating-economic-opportunities/ (accessed 22nd December, 2016)
27
Getting it right: A look at the mine approval process. 23rd January, 2012
28
ee
29 http://barrickbeyondborders.com/mining/2012/01/getting-it-right-a-look-at-the-
30
31 mine-approval-process/ (accessed 25th March, 2017)
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32 A Special Report on Pascua Lama: 18th September, 2009.

33
34 http://barrickbeyondborders.com/mining/2009/09/a-special-report-on-pascua-lama/
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(accessed 25th March, 2017)
37 Barrick leading the way in innovative water management. 13th January, 2012
38
iew
39 http://barrickbeyondborders.com/environment/2012/01/barrick-leading-the-way-in-
40 innovative-water-management/ (accessed 25th March, 2017)
41
42 Communities express support for Pascua-Lama Project (2007)
43
44 http://barrick.q4cdn.com/808035602/files/pascua-lama/Communities-express-
45 support-for-Pascua-Lama-Project.pdf (accessed 5th May, 2017)
46
47 Pelambres Proceso Participativo Caimanes
48
http://pelambres.samara.cl/comunidad-proceso-participativo-caimanes.html (accessed
49
50 23rd July, 2017)
51
52 Corte de Apelaciones de La Serena revoca orden de demolición del tranque de relaves El
53 Mauro https://web.pelambres.cl/pdfs/Comunicado-fallo-favorable-080816.pdf
54
55 (accessed 21st July, 2017)
56
Antofagasta Minerals Sustainability report (2016)
57
58 http://www.antofagasta.co.uk/media/3251/antofagasta-minerals-sustainability-
59
60 report-2016.pdf (accessed 25th July, 2017)
1
2
3 Timeline – Proceso de Participación
4
5 http://pelambres.samara.cl/pdfs/lineadetiempo-proceso-participativo-caimanes-
6
30.08.16.pdf (accessed 25th July, 2017)
7
8 Kinross Announces Operational Updates at Bald Mountain, Tasiast and Maricunga. 25th August,
9
10 2016:
11 http://www.kinross.com/news-and-investors/news-releases/press-release-
12
13 details/2016/Kinross-Announces-Operational-Updates-at-Bald-Mountain-Tasiast-and-
14
15 Maricunga/default.aspx (accessed 3rd July, 2017)
16 Ponen en marcha nivelación de estudios y talleres de oficio para comunidades collas en
17
18 cordillera. 20th March, 2017:
19
http://www.kinrosschile.cl/2017/03/20/ponen-en-marcha-nivelacion-de-estudios-y-
20
21 talleres-de-oficio-para-comunidades-collas-en-cordillera/ (accessed 25th July, 2017)
Fo
22
23 In the Community: Chile
24 http://takingresponsibility2011.kinross.com/in-the-community/practices/working-
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26 with-indigenous-people/chile/ (accessed 20th July, 2017)
27
Videos
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ee
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30
31 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BS-DIBcwWdo (2 minutes) (accessed 3rd
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32 July, 2017)
33
34 Acuerdo Caimanes y Minera Los Pelambres | Antofagasta Minerals. 18th May, 2016.
35
ev
36
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKlPlwsab48 (3 minutes)
37 Vecinos de Caimanes se reúnen con Gerente General de Los Pelambres para revisar avances
38
iew
39 del acuerdo. 1st June, 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVpxKhhHG8w (4

40 minutes)
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Figure 1 – Coding Structure
1 Aggregate
2 First order concepts Second order themes dimension
3
4 -Local investment by companies
5 (water, housing, infrastructure,
6 education, culture)
-Intensification of community
7 dialogue
8 -Hiring of NGOs and mediators to
help facilitate and legitimize dialogue
9 with community (Huasco Valley and
Deployment of
10 Caimanes)
CSR Activities
11 -Company-Community Agreements
(compensation, development funds,
12 relations)
13 -Company-State-Community
meetings for conflict resolution (Río
14 Jorquera)
15 -Pelambres uses community dialogue
and agreement for overturning
16 Supreme Court order
17
18 -Local awareness of mining project,
Fo
19 communication and mobilization of

20 community
-Impacts to water sources that
21 affects local farming livelihoods and
22 culture
rP
-Internationalization of resistance
23 movements Mobilization of
24 -Multiple video documentaries of Resistance
resistance (Huasco Valley and
25 Caimanes)
ee
26 -Unified local resistance to mines

27 -Roadblocks and marches by
community
28 -Hunger strike at Caimanes
rR
29 -De-legitimizing of company-
community dialogue (Huasco Valley
30 and Caimanes)
31 -Legal action against companies
Govern-
32
ev
mentality
33 -Partnering with most powerful
34 opposition actors
-Showing local support for mine
35 -Intensification of internal conflict Division of
iew
36 and divisions Resistance

-Local community leaders promote
37 mine
38
39 -Corporate-State
- nexus-in legally
40 dividing the community (Huasco
Valley)
41 -Fines, sanctions and mine closure by
42 state Prescription by
-Approval of environmental/water
43 permits
the State
44 -Monitoring by state
45 -Court orders in favour/against
companies
46
47 -Chilean Presidents award
48 Rockerfeller and vice versa over
years (Huasco Valley)
49 -Bi-nominal territory (Huasco Valley)
50 -Company meets with President of
51 Chile (Huasco Valley and Caimanes)
-Companies meet privately with
52 authorities and ministers
53 - Partnerships with state for CSR Nexus between
-State authorities and Pelambres State & enterprise
54 began community participation
55 together 2003
- Company-State-Community
56 meetings for conflict resolution (Río
57 Jorquera)
58 -Legally dividing community together
with local government (Huasco
59 Valley)
60
Figure 2 – The governmentality continuum
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
For
11
12
13
Materialization Dematerialization
of state Pe of state
14
Governmentality
er R
15
16
17
responsibility = responsibility =
evi
18
19
20
direct, central indirect, dispersed
State State- Division of Mobili- Deploy-
ew
21
22
23
24
steering = Prescrip- Business resistance zation of ment vouching =
25
26 the ‘cathedral’ tion Nexus resistance of CSR the ‘bazaar’
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
40
41
Figure 3 – Modes of influence between main governmentality actors
1
2
3
4
5
state
6
7
8
9
10
For
11
12
13 the
Pee
14
15 ‘cathedral’
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16
17
evi
18
19
20 governmentality
ew
21
22
23
24
25
26 the ‘bazaar’
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
business Deployment of CSR community
34
35
36
Division of resistance
37
38
39 Mobilization of resistance
40
41
1
2
3 Table 1 – Critical events for legal licence between the Chilean state and the mining
4
5
corporations
6
7 Huasco Valley Caimanes Río Jorquera
8 Obtaining of legal 2001 - Barrick Gold 2004 - Pelambres 1994 - The Maricunga
9 licences and received its received its mine received its
10 permits from state environmental licence environmental licence environmental licence
11
from national from regional state from regional state
12
13 authorities in 2001 authorities authorities
14 and subsequently (COREMA). (COREMA) in 1994.
15 again in 2006 for a In 1996 Kinross Gold
16 larger project. became 50% owner of
17 the mine.
18 In 2007 Kinross Gold
19
bought the remaining
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20
21 50% to complete its
22 full ownership of the
23 mine.
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24 Attempts by state The national In 2006 Court of During 2016

25 to revoke legal environmental Appeals of Santiago environmental
26
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licences regulators (SMA) ruled in favour of regulators (SMA) and

27
28 ordered a temporary community opposition the Environmental
29 shutdown of the mine thus blocking the Tribunal ordered the
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30 in June 2013, on the construction of the closure of the mine

31 grounds of poor dam. after conducting site
32 environmental Supreme Court of Los inspections.
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33 management at the Vilos ordered the

34
35
mine. demolition of El
36 After further site Mauro dam in October
iew
37 inspections the SMA 2014 and March 2015.

38 ordered the
39 permanent closure of
40 the mine in January
41 2018.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
1
2
3
4
5 Table 2 – Overview of three Chilean mining cases
6
7
9 US$8.5bn US$600mn US$300m
Financial value
10
11 of mining
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12
13 project
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14
15 Description of Barrick Gold – Largest Gold Pelambres owned by Antofagasta Kinross Gold – World’s 4th largest
16 Minerals – Listed on the London Stock
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mining mining company in the world Gold mining company from Canada.
17
18 company and from Canada hoping to operate Exchange. Approximately 40 indigenous Colla
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19
20 community their Pascua Lama gold mine. Caimanes – small isolated rural village community families residing along
21
ev
22
of 1500, where a substantial number of the mountainous road up to the mine.
23 Huasco Valley - Rural and residents provide services to nearby
iew
24
25 farming, mainly indigenous mining projects.
26
27 (Diaguita) community of around
28
5,000 inhabitants. Divided into
29
30 35 formal neighbourhood
31
32 associations.
33
34 Description of High level of conflict. Majority High level of conflict. Low-Medium level of conflict.
35 conflict and of community is against large-
36
37 community scale mining in the valley.
38
39 resistance to However, they are divided
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
1
2
3
4
5 mining between whether to enter
6
7 projects. negotiations to establish a form
8 of private governance and
9
10 whether to resist all forms of
11
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12 dialogue as a means of rejecting
13
the mining project outright.
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14
15 Role of key SMA SMA SMA
16
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17 state actors: In May 2013 ordered its closure In March 2014 ordered Pelambres to In March 2016 SMA ordered the
18
closure of Kinross Gold’s mine due
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19 Environmental and issued a fine of US$16m pay a fine of around US$2m due to
20
regulators – after failing to comply with the incompliance with the EIA. to the drying up of at least 70
21
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22 (SMA); conditions stipulated from the hectares of wetlands.
23
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24 Environmental EIA. Environmental Tribunal
25
26 Tribunal. Ordered SMA to recalculate the fine Environmental Tribunal
27 In June 2015 the SMA rejected after a complaint lodged by the The environmental courts authorized
28
29 Barrick Gold’s plan of mining company. the SMA to close down the
30
31 compliance Maricunga mine for 25 days.
32
33
Supreme Court of Chile, Los Vilos
34 In January 2018 the SMA In October 2014 ordered Pelambres to In October 2018 the courts reiterated
35
36 ordered for the permanent demolish the El Mauro tailings dam. their decision to restrict all access to
37
38 closure of the mine after
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
1
2
3
4
5 persistent environmental Court of Appeals in La Serena the water wells effectively
6
7 mismanagement by Barrick. In August 2016 revoked the previous terminating Maricunga’s operations.
8 order by the supreme court of Los Vilos
9
10 Environmental Tribunal in favour of Pelambres to continue
11
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12 In March 2014 the tribunal operating its tailings dam under the
13
ordered the SMA to reduce the condition it complies with the
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14
15 fines. agreement it reached with the majority
16
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17 of the community.
18
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19 In March 2015 the tribunal
20
rejected claims by the
21
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22 community and NGO that the
23
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24 Pascua Lama mine was
25
26 negatively impacting the
27 glaciers.
28
29
30
31 In October 2018 the tribunal
32
reiterated the SMA’s decision to
33
34 shutdown the mine due to
35
36 Barrick’s lack of monitoring
37
38 glaciers.
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
1
2
3
4
5 Private Extensive political CSR In 2015 Pelambres joined forces with the The relationship is governed by a
6
7 governance initiatives with community and community’s lawyers by offering over private governance agreement
8 arrangements local/regional government. US$4m if they could convince the between mining company and
9
10 between mining majority of locals to accept an agreement community that sets out the terms of
11
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12 company and In May 2014, obtained two- via a series of public dialogues over four their relationship
13
community thirds of local neighbourhood months. This process culminated in a
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14
15 association signatures for a referendum held by the company that
16
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17 MoU, a form of private asked local residents if they wanted to
18
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19 governance between Barrick receive compensation of approximately
20
Gold and community. The MoU €35,000 per family on the condition that
21
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22 finished by end of 2015. they cease all future legal actions against
23
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24 the company.
25
26
27 The agreement included mitigation
28
29 measures regarding the concerns of
30
31 pollution to local water sources by the
32
dam as well as a €8m community
33
34 development fund.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
1
2
3
4
5 Pelambres did not achieve the required
6
7 70% during the referendum, however,
8 the lawyers and leaders visited families
9
10 at their homes requesting their
11
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12 signatures. Eventually over 80% signed
13
in favour of the agreement and
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14
15 Pelambres won its court appeal.
16
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17 Private Had the “Atacama Pelambres has funded several local After tripartite dialogue between
18
Commitment” partnership with
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19 governance infrastructure projects in Caimanes via mining company, community and
20
arrangements the regional Chilean State the local government such as the government Ministry of Public
21
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22 between mining authorities and NGOs. sewage infrastructure, a local football Works in 2009-10 the company
23
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24 company and Alleged close relationship with field/club and school. agreed to pave the road.
25
26 state actors local government, according to
27 community leaders. Lead on well-renowned ‘Somos
28
29 Choapa’ regional development initiative
30
31 with local governments closer to the
32
33
mine (not in Caimanes). Alleged close
34 relationship with local government,
35
36 according to community leaders.
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
1
2 Table 3 – Sources and details of field research data
3
4
Huasco Valley Caimanes Río Jorquera
5
6 Inter- Two visits in October 2012 Four visits in October 2012, Four visits in January and
7 views and September 2017. April and December 2016 August 2009, January 2010
8 Visited several villages (Alto and September 2017. and October 2012.
9 del Carmen, Chiriguento, Interview with company Interview with company
10 Chanchoquin, El Transito officials in September 2017. officials in January, August
11 and El Perral. Accompanied to local 2009; January 2010; and
12
Participated in village hall leaders from Caimanes September 2017.
13
meeting and local municipal Defence Committee who Visits to the mine site and to
14
15 election debates. were collecting signatures Colla community houses
16 door to door from along road to mine.
Held focus group with 12 neighbours to present a
17
18
elderly residents at social court order. Four repeat local community
19 club. Total of 31 individual interviewees.
Interviewees. Visited 40 households and
20 held brief interviews with Six mining company
21 Semi structured and officials.
adult members.
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22 informal interviews with:

23 10 interviewees (from a Four local government
20 local community officials (ranging from
24 residents (from a variety of variety of positions
positions of praise to neutral
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25
positions regarding the mine regarding the mine from
26 participating in towards the company).
from participating in
27 CSR/dialogue initiatives to One local journalist and
28 CSR/dialogue initiatives to
absolute opposition to the radio presenter (critical
ee
29 absolute opposition to
mine). company). towards mining).
30
31 One local clergyman (vocal One community defence
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32 opponent of mine). lawyer.

33 One national and one
34 Four neighbourhood
association leaders (two in international NGO activist
35
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favour of dialogue and two opposed to the company and

36
37 opposed to the mine). tailings dam.
38 Three interviews with
iew
Three public sector officials

39 Pelambres management
in the valley. Three national
40 officials.
41 NGO activists. One
42 lawyer/mediator (hired by
43 Barrick Gold to work as
44 mediator during dialogue
45 process in 2015).
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
1
2
3 Table 4 - Contextual background of Chilean political economy, mining and three case study communities
4
5
6 Chilean political economical context
7 The modern-day Chilean market economy has been coined as the ‘Chilean miracle’ by prominent international economists, such
8 as Friedman and Hayek (Farrant et al, 2012). The economists are referring to the period in which the military junta, led by
9
10
General Pinochet, ruled Chile from 1973 by way of a coup d’ état until 1990. The military regime was highly influenced by
11 neoliberal market ideas stemming from the Chicago School of Economics, (Silva, 1991). The military regime was determined to
Fo
12 reverse the state-led reforms, put in place by the socialist president Allende prior to the coup d’ état, via the implementation of
13 strongly neoliberal policies, which were institutionalized in the rewritten 1980 Constitution (Budds, 2004). Chile has always been
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14
highly reliant on mining for its economy, which accounts for 10.1% of its GDP today (Sernageomin, 2017).
15
16
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18  The Pascua Lama project is owned by  Pelambres is owned by Antofagasta  The Colla of Río Jorquera are
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19
Barrick Gold headquartered in Minerals, listed on the FTSE 100 a small group of 88 people, or
20
21 Canada, the largest gold miner in the London Stock Exchange and owned by 35 - 40 families, living
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22 world. Chile’s wealthiest businessman, scattered across a
23  Pascua Lama spans the border Andronico Luksic. mountainous valley road that
iew
24  El Mauro tailings dam holds 2060 connects northern Chile with
between Chile and Argentina and
25
26 has been described as the “Barrick million tons of water and mining waste Argentina from the small
27 Republic.” and is 367m high. town of Tierra Amarrilla.
28  This part of the Atacama Desert has  Caimanes is a small rural community  Kinross Gold’s Maricunga
29 been largely unscathed by large located in a remote and isolated mine is located just before
30
31
scale mining activity compared to valley, 250 km north of the capital the border crossing to
32 further north. Santiago. Argentina at around 4500m
33  The community works mostly on  Caimanes lies in the fertile Valley of altitude.
34 their own smallholder farms or on Pupío, most of the community grow  The Colla community
35
the large grape farms thereby crops or work within the Pelambres President explained, they still
36
37 increasing their dependence on the mine’s supply chain. continue to follow their
38 fresh water that runs down from the  Public infrastructure is very basic. transhumance custom where
39 mountain glaciers.  Since 2001 plans to build ‘El Mauro’, they herd their livestock
40 (mainly sheep) from one
41
just 8km from Caimanes led to
42
43
44
46
47
1
2
3
 Most of the community is against resistance, conflict and community grazing ground to another,
4
5 large-scale mining due to their divisions. from lowlands to highlands,
6 reliance on the freshwater that flows  The main community concerns revolve with the changing of seasons.
7 down from where Pascua Lama mine around the risk of the dam collapsing  The Colla as a people have
8 would operate. in an earthquake, water pollution and also received recognition by
9
10  The strongest community opposition depletion of local water supplies. The United Nations
11 to the mine took place between  Underground water flows were Educational, Scientific and
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12 2000 – 2006 around the time when diverted to construct the dam, leading Cultural Organization
13 the multinational was proceeding to an 80% loss of water in the valley. (UNESCO) as a ‘Living Human
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14
15
with the Environmental Impact  It has meant the local community Treasure’ in September
16 Assessment (EIA) and other legal cannot drink the tap water due to 2012, being the only
ee
17 permits. harmful toxins from the dam as indigenous group in Chile to
18  After the Chilean authorities demonstrated by scientific tests by the receive such
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19 acknowledgement.
approved the mine in 2006, the Chilean College of Physicians.
20
21 company engaged in an intense  This has been denied by Pelambres  Overall, the Colla community
ev
22 political CSR strategy in the and blamed on a drought in the region. repeatedly expressed their
23 community and government.  Since 2006 a large community group great satisfaction and desire
iew
24  By 2012 a large part of the to live in peace and harmony
has resisted via a combination of legal
25
26 community felt hopelessness at the challenges, street protests, hunger with pachamama or nature,
27 prospect of mine operating in the strike and media campaigns including just as they had done for so
28 valley, which led to internal video documentaries. many years and generations.
29 divisions.  In October 2014 the community The Colla community
30
31
 By January 2018 the SMA requested lawyers won a court ruling ordering consider the land where they
32 the mine be shutdown permanently. the demolition of the dam. live as their territory even
33  However, the company together with though legally the land
34 community lawyers managed to belongs to the Chilean State.
35
36
convince the majority of locals to
37 endorse an agreement on benefits and
38 development in 2016.
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
1
2
3 References
4
5
6 Budds, J. (2004). Power, nature and neoliberalism: the political ecology of water in Chile. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography,
7 25(3), 322-342.
8
9
Farrant, A., McPhail, E., & Berger, S. (2012). Preventing the “Abuses” of Democracy: Hayek, the “Military Usurper” and Transitional
10
11 Dictatorship in Chile?. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 71(3), 513-538.
Fo
12
13 Silva, P. (1991). Technocrats and Politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks. Journal of Latin American Studies,
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14 23(2), 385-410.
15
16
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17 Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería (SERNAGEOMIN). (2017). Anuario de la Minería de Chile. Servicio Nacional de Geología y
18 Minería, 274 p. Santiago http://www.sernageomin.cl/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Anuario_2017.pdf (accessed 24th March, 2018)
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20
21
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22
23
iew
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
1
2
3 Table 5 - Examples of first order codes
4
5
6 Huasco Valley
7 Deployment of CSR Initiatives
8 -CSR investment on local housing and education - Barrick spent US$16m on with local and regional government to co-fund
housing and education in the region under the "Atacama commitment" (Barrickbeyondborders website, 2006).
9 -Contributing to local development – “Barrick agreed to pay US$60 million or US$3 million a year over 20 years to a group of
10 wealthy local farmers - the River Huasco Vigilance Board to monitor water quality and supply. It had also provided 150 isolated
11 homes with internet and phone access as well as having spent US$16m on local purchasing by 2007” (Barrickbeyondborders
website, 2006).
12 -Barrick funding legal fees for residents indigenous status – “Barrick opportunely detected that there was a process of reclaiming
13 (indigenous) the rights for the Diaguita people, and what they did was to intervene early in the process” (Interviewee, Head of
14 Environmental NGO).
-Barrick Gold funding a new perspective of local community's history and identity – “..they were creating and shaping their own
15 “Diaguitas” and representation of the culture” (Interviewee, Community)
16 -Barrick Gold publishes book on local community's history and identity - Company published its book called "Diaguita" written by
17 hired anthropologist which contains the main message that the Diaguita people are essentially a mining people in the Huasco
18 Valley and that agriculture is somewhat new a livelihood for them. (Barrickbeyondborders website, 2009).
-Intensification of community dialogue – “the company held disclosure meetings, held a door-to-door meetings campaign that
19 reached 40% of the homes in the Huasco region, mounted television, radio and billboard campaigns..”. (McCormick and Smith,
Fo
20 2014).
21 -Community monitoring of water - Barrick Gold announced there would be a community water monitoring programme for local
residents to independently test the water quality themselves. In 2012 reported on experience in El Corral neighbourhood.
22 (Barrickbeyondborders website, 2012).
23
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-Contributing to local development - Barrick reported that via the Water Vigilence Board fund they had invested US$15m in
24 improving water supply to the local community mainly by paving the water canals. Also that it had spent US$70m on improving
local road. That it had provided 150 isolated homes with internet and phone access. To date, the fund has invested $15 million in
25 various infrastructure projects. (Barrickbeyondborders website, 2012).
26
ee
-Signing of MoU with local community -“Barrick Gold said Wednesday that it has reached a preliminary deal with a Chilean
27 indigenous group that it hopes will eventually open the way to restarting its Pascua-Lama mine high in the Andes. The world's
28 biggest gold producer said the memorandum of understanding was worked out with 15 Diaguita communities, which are just
downstream from the mine straddling the Argentina-Chile border.” (Fox News, 2014).
29
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31 -Local awareness of mining project, communication and mobilization of community Local community leader Lucho reads the
Environmental Impact Assessment report by Barrick to mine for gold in the valley at the top of the mountains in 2000. He is
32 shocked and tells a local nun from India about the story, she then together with an NGO mobilize the local community (Told by
ev
33 three different community interviewees).

34 -Local mobilization - Between 2000 – 2005 there was united community mobilization led by local parish church (nun and priest)
35 local environmentalist and national environmental NGO OLCA - protest marches, events etc against Barrick.. (Various video and
media/press reports).
36
iew
-Unified opposition to the mine – “Total rejection” Regional newspaper headline from 2005 reporting on 97% voting against the
37 Pascua Lama mine (Diario El Chañarcillo , 2005)
38 -Anti-Pascua Lama campaign internationalized – Huascoaltinos community leader frequently attends Barrick Gold AGMs in
Toronto and other meetings and protests in Canada to tell his community's side of the story, whereas according to the leader Barrick
39 Gold was taking other Diaguita's and showcasing them at events as "genuine Diaguita leaders from the Huasco Valley.
40 Huascoaltinos also have their case against Barrick Gold accepted at the Interemerican Commission for Human Rights
41 (ProtestBarrick website, 2010)
-Threat to livelihoods - “Water is life! Without water we can’t continue to grow the sweetest grapes for export, or avocados,
42 watermelons and other crops.” (Community interviewee)
43 -Community complaints of river pollution - video images of truck crashing into river containing human excrement from workers at
44 Pascua Lama, poor quality melon crops and murky dark river water. (Pascua Lama, El llanto de la montaña, video, 2015)
-De-legitimize the MoU for Due Diligence process - “A Problematic Process: The Memorandum of Understanding between
45
Barrick Gold and Diaguita Communities of Chile” (Publication by MiningWatch Canada and OLCA, 2015)
46 -Multiple legal challenges to Barrick Gold by community groups – between 2012 and 2017 there have been legal challenges by
47 community groups backed by NGOs and lawyers that aim to stop operations by Barrick Gold at Pascua Lama on environmental
48 grounds.
49 Division of resistance
50 -BG Partnership with wealthiest local opposition group of farmers – “Barrick signed an agreement with the Huasco Valley Water
51 Users Cooperative to create an environmental compensation fund that will provide $3 million annually over 20 years to build new
52 water infrastructure in cooperation with local government and farmers in the valley.” (Barrickbeyondborders website, 2012)
-Barrick publishes letter of support by six neighbourhood associations – “we have decided to raise our voices, tired of listening to
53 our fellow countrymen who have no knowledge of our reality and, above all, to foreigners who are speaking about our problems.
54 We are tired of seeing how the Church is being used to transmit their lies.... We have been part of a stagnating city, detained, with
55 no future. We have witnessed how hundreds of people, strangers to our reality and living conditions come here to protest against
the Pascua Lama Project, defending personal interests of people who have come here escaping the big cities, wanting to make of
56
57
58
59
1
2
3
this land, the land of their dreams, with no progress, no development, no technology and no growth….We have been able to
4 confirm that the company is a serious and responsible company, not only socially but environmentally as well. (Barrick website,
5 2007)
6 -Process of signing MoU - “Barrick allegedly gave him a truck and a salary with the expectation that he would get people in the
community to sign the agreement.” (Wiebe, 2015, p.11)
7 -Intensification of internal conflict and division of resistance - Video footage of woman community leader shouting at other
8 community members at neighbourhood centre on day of signing for MoU with Barrick Gold. The woman, in favour of signing the
9 MoU irately tells a young man he an activist and terrorist who will not allow the humble people to sign the MoU. Another local
resident and councilor say the woman was there to oblige the local residents to sign the MoU with Barrick. (Convenio entre
10
Diaguitas y Barrick Gold, video, 2014).
11
12 Prescription by the State
13 -Corporate-State nexus in legally dividing the community - Communities in Huasco Valley legally divided and turned into urban
neighbourhoods by local government who’s elected Mayor since 2004 is a former secretary of Barrick Gold. (Community
14 interviewees).
15 -Approval of environmental permits - Government passed EIA (with 400 conditions) and prohibiting removal of glaciers
16 (Environmental Impact Assessment report, 2006; and Barrickbeyondborders website, 2006).
17 -State sanctions and fines mine – Chilean environmental regulators find irregularities with the storage of chemicals at the minesite
and order the temporary suspension of the mine and fine Barrick Gold a historical record of US$16m. (Various press reports, 2013
18 and interviewees).
19
Fo
20 Nexus between State and Enterprise
21 -Bi-nominal territory - Bi-nominal territory for Barrick Gold created by President Frei (Chile) and Menem (Argentina) 1997. (La
Nación newspaper, 1996).
22 -“Barrick Republic” – “soon, within the company, they were calling the mountaintop concession The Barrick Republic.” (Nolen,
23
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2014 in Globe and Mail newspaper)
24 -Monitoring by state water regulators - Reports by State Water Authorities (DGA in Spanish) confirm the loss of 50-70% of the
Toro 1 and 2 glaciers (DGA, 2010)
25 -CSR in partnership with the state aimed at the community - Barrick Gold partnered with local and regional government to co-fund
26
ee
housing and education in the region under the "Atacama commitment" (Barrickbeoyondborders, 2009).
27 -President of Chile dines with Barrick Gold - While the Chilean water authorities were approving Barrick's final water permit,
President Bachelet of Chile and Kirscher of Argentina were at a dinner at the Rockefeller foundation co-sponsored by Barrick Gold
28 in New York (El Mostrador newspaper, 2009).
29 -State facilitation for Pascua Lama project to continue on life support - Environmental courts reject the claims made by the anti-
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30 Barrick Gold groups and the courts. The mine remains suspended until the time of publication of this article
31 -President of Chile meets with Barrick Gold CEO - Again in 2017 President Bachelet met with Barrick Gold’s CEO in Canada. (El
Ciudadano, 2017).
32
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33
34
35
36
iew
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
1
2
3 Caimanes
4
-Corporate communications to community about benefits of dam - Pelambres began distributing pamphlets in Caimanes about the
6 safety and economical benefits of the tailings dam (OLCA, 2004).
7 -Pelambres hires consensus building NGO - Pelambres hires Casa de la Paz, a well known Chilean NGO for data collection in
8 Caimanes about the community. This NGO focuses on creating consensus and agreements between companies and communities.
The opposition group rejected their presence (OLCA, 2004).
9 -Pelambres and landowner Victor Ugarte with lawyers agreed on financial settlement – In 2007 Pelambres agreed on financial out
10 of court settlement with Victor Ugarte and his lawyer for US$23m (Interviews with various community members and video
11 documentaries).
-Pelambres approaches community lawyers to begin talks on ending conflict - In April 2015 Pelambres initiates meetings with
12 Caimanes lawyers to plan strategy for engagement and agreement to end conflict with community. This included agreeing to pay
13 the lawyers US$4.6m (Interviews with various community members and Official Agreement document, 2015).
14 -Community engagement/Dialogue with Facilitator and Transparency International - Pelambres begins assemblies with community
from August to December, 2015 together with former community defence lawyers leading sessions as well as psychology
15 university professor to facilitate and Chile Transparency NGO as observer. (Interviews with various community members, with
16 management officials from Pelambres, Director of Chile Transparente and psychologist facilitator).
17 -Court of appeals sides with Pelambres after using referendum result to support its appeal case - In August 2016 Pelambres won its
18 appeal at Court of La Serena meaning they no longer needed to demolish the dam after showing the courts evidence of high levels
of local community support and the signed Agreement they now had with the community. (Interview with management officials
19 from Pelambres and Pelambres website, 2017)
Fo
20 Company-Community Agreement formalized - In November 2016 the Agreement in formalized between community and
21 Pelambres. Key messages repeated by community leader who negotiates with company is "this will bring the 15 year conflict to an
end and give us a dignified compensation” (Interview with Community Leader negotiating with Pelambres and Pelambres website,
22 2017).
23
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25 -First meetings between state, company and community with protests – In 2000 Environmental authorities facilitated first meeting
between Pelambres and community to discuss impacts of El Mauro dam. 80 local community residents gathered to protest against
26
ee
the plans (OLCA, 2004)

27 -Local authorities and community against manifest dam - Street protests with Mayor and Governor rejecting El Mauro Dam.
28 Referendum held on the siting of Pelambres’ tailings dam and 97% voted against it (OLCA, 2004)
-Road blocks by community – First of many roadblocks from end of 2000 in protest at Pelambres and its tailings dam (OLCA,
29
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2004).
30 -Community protests at dialogue meetings are ignored – In 2003 Community opposition groups went to protest outside all
31 participation instances however, this is ignored by press and authorities who claimed the dialogue was a success (OLCA, 2004).
-New community resistance group with lawyers formed – In 2008 Cristian Flores a very vocal local community member sets up
32 new community resistance group "Caimanes Defence Committee" using money from the donation by Ugarte and around US$6000
ev
33 from new lawyers Ossa and company (OLCA, 2004).

34 -Direct action against Pelambres - Cristian Flores with his co-leaders use a more mediatic and aggressive campaign to resist
35 including many video documentaries, streets protests, roadblocks, anti-Pelambres street signs and black flags at homes. (Interviews
with various community members).
36
iew
-Pelambres sues community leader - Pelambres sues Cristian Flores for leading protests against company (Press reports)
37 -Hunger strike by community resistance – In late 2010 12 Community opposition group members barricaded themselves into local
38 school for 81 days from September to go on hunger strike. Christian Flores remained outside as the spokesperson (Interviews with
various community members and video documentaries).
39 - Hunger strikers awarded by French government - Two hunger strikers are invited to France by the French government and NGO
40 Mitterand to receive honorary medals for their bravery in defending their territory and water (Press reports)
41 -UK NGO protests at Pelambres' AGM - UK NGO London Mining Network holds first protest against London-listed Pelambres
and questions company about environmental and social impacts at Caimanes at its AGM in London in May 2013.
42 -Road block by community resistance for weeks - Two months after the supreme court ruling that ordered Pelambres to demolish
43 the tailings dam nothing had happened so the Defence Committee blocked the access road to the mine with community members
44 camping outside and taking shifts to be there and cook for 76 days from December 2014 to February 2015 (Interviews with various
45 community members and video documentaries).
47 -Start of weakening and division strategy – in 2003 Pelambres was bringing community residents in favour of the company, who
48 had received benefits to community participation meetings with environmental authorities to show local support (OLCA, 2004).
-First protests and counter protests to Pelambres – on the day of the visit by Corema the Chilean regional environmental authorities
49 the No.4 neighbourhood association together with activists were protesting against the company, while neighbourhood association
50 No.5 was standing together with the company (OLCA, 2004).
51 -Promise by Victor Ugarte to share US$1m with Caimanes - Victor Ugarte promised Pelambres he would share US$5m with the
52 local community. In fact, he shared only with those who supported him and the amount was dependent on the level of support they
gave him. (Chile se moviliza video and Interviews in community).
53 -Caimanes defence resists compensation payout – Caimanes defence committee in 2012 legally stopped any payment from Victor
54 Ugarte to any community members, saying the compensation should be shared equally. Led to further internal conflict in
55 Caimanes. (Interviews with various community members).
-New community divisions due to new lawyers and former community leader – in April 2015 lawyers and former Caimanes
56
57
58
59
1
2
3
defence committee leader announce their intention to enter into dialogue with Pelambres for compensation. Remaining Caimanes
4 defence committee members and supporters are outraged at this betrayal as they have the legal court decision in their favour that
5 opposes Pelambres (Interviews with various community members).
6 -Intensification of internal community conflicts – After the Pelambres held referendum there were further community divisions, in-
fighting amongst families, neighbours and friends. Families divided because one member voted yes when others voted no. Example
7 of young mother being evicted from her home for not having voted in favour of agreement with company. Community leader now
8 leading negotiation with Pelambres was former Caimanes defence committee leader who led the roadblock the previous year.
9 (Interviews with various community members; and Caimanes, una condena a muerte, 2015 video).
10
Prescription by State
11 -Authorization by state water authorities - Authorization by DGA (Chilean Water Authorities) for El Mauro tailings dam. The dam
12 would contain 1.7 billion tonnes of toxic mining waste and destroy 140 archeological sites (OLCA, 2004).
13 -Court stops construction of dam - Court of appeals prohibits the construction of the tailings dam in 2006 after community legal
challenge (Chile se moviliza, video documentary, 2012).
14 -Minister of Health drinks Caimanes water on television - The Minister of Health for Chile arrived to Caimanes with national news
15 reporters and cameras to state the water is fine. He drinks a glass of Caimanes water live on air and leaves immediately in his car in
16 the midst of being heckled by locals (Chile se moviliza, video documentary, 2013).
17 -Courts re-approve dam construction - Courts now re-approved the permits for the construction EL Mauro tailings dam in 2008
(Chile se moviliza, video documentary, 2013).
18 -Resistance leader and lawyers found not guilty against Pelambres - The Tribunal of Ovalle court found Cristián Flores and the
19 Ossa lawyers as not guilty of illicit collusion as being sued by Pelambres - this led to huge celebrations in the community resistance
Fo
20 (Video report, 2013).
-Pelambres fined - Pelambres fined US$3m for noncompliance with environmental regulations for the El Mauro dam (El Mercurio
21 newspaper, 2013).
22 -Court ruled against El Mauro dam - In October 2014 supreme court ordered Pelambres to demolish tailings dam citing it as a
23
rP
danger for mankind (El Mercurio newspaper, 2013).
-Armed forces intervene and break up community roadblock and campsite - The police and armed police forces regularly visited
24 the campsite and make roadblocks of their own between the different community groups cutting off their access and
25 communication. On day 76 arrive with riot gear and tear down the campsite. The community protesters alleged that the police and
26 state only seem to be working for the benefit and protection of the company. Instead of complying with the court ruling of
ee
dismantling the El Mauro dam (Various community interviewees).

27
29 -State environmental authorities recommend more dialogue - Adriana Hoffman head of environmental authorities visited the
rR
30 Caimanes area with senators and other politicians calling for more dialogue between company and community (OLCA, 2004).
-Private meeting with state authorities to manage community – Pelambres held private meeting with regional environmental
31 authorities to discuss creating a new neighbourhood association in Caimanes with whom they could create "easier agreements"
32 (OLCA, 2004).
ev
33 -State and Pelambres facilitate community participation – State authorities and Pelambres began community participation (OLCA,
34 2004).
-Pelambres meets privately with Minister of Interior - Weeks after the court of appeals stopped the construction Jean Paul Lukcic
35 CEO of Pelambres had a private meeting with the Minister of Interior at the government palace, which was reported by mainstream
36
iew
press (La Tercera newspaper and Chile se moviliza video documentary, 2013).
37 -National TV station tv documentary about Caimanes omits references to dam and impact on water - National television report
broadcast about the plight of Los Caimanes’ "drought". All references to the El Mauro dam and Pelambres were edited out. In the
38 original report community members repeatedly referred to El Mauro dam being the cause of their scarce water supplies (TVN
39 documentary, 2012 and various community interviewees).
40 -Funding of local government by Pelambres criticized – Investigative journalism story by Ciper finds that Pelambres has donated
over US$10m to local governments in the region of Caimanes between 2010-16, a practice questioned by the Chilean state
41 comptroller (Ciper newspaper, 2017).
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
1
2
3 Río Jorquera
4
-Mine desire for CSR – In 2004 Maricunga conducts study to identify Colla sustainability projects in Rio Jorquera (Interview with
6 management at Kinross)
7 -First company-community agreement - Maricunga and Colla Rio Jorquera agree to “first generation” Protocol (Interview with
8 management at Kinross).
-Second company-community agreement - Kinross Gold and Colla Rio Jorquera agree to “second generation” Protocol (Interview
9 with management at Kinross).
10 -Company-State-Community meetings for conflict resolution - Kinross, Colla and Ministry of Public Works (MOP) have tri-partite
11 meetings to discuss conflict over road issues such as dust and accidents to Colla livestock (Observant participation in meetings by
lead author, 2009)
12 -CSR from Kinross - Sustainability Workshop with stakeholders in Tierra Amarilla (Kinross website, 2017).
13 -New agreement on road with community - New agreement re: C-611 road maintenance is reached between Kinross – CONADI
14 (State indigenous organism) and Colla (Kinross website, 2017).
-Kinross come to final agreement over grievances with Colla community including fees - Kinross Maricunga claims it reached an
15 agreement with Colla over al past historical issues and over access to the road and an electricity transmission line through their
16 territory. This included easement and land use fees, strengthening of programs within the 2008 framework agreement, and
17 formalization of the environment monitoring program (Interviews with Kinross management and Kinross website, 2017).
18 -Company-State-Community meetings for conflict resolution - Kinross Maricunga continues to hold regular meetings with Colla
together with CONADI between 2012-2014.
19
Fo
21 -Roadblock by community - Colla community make first roadblock against mine due to impact from dust and traffic to their grape
farms (Interview with community leader)
22
-Complaint dismissed by environmental authorities - Colla complaint of Kinross road dust investigated by Regional Environmental
23
rP
authorities COREMA, found insufficient evidence. (Various interviews with community, authorities and Kinross).
24 -Community wish for Kinross to leave - Indigenous community representatives tell lead author in 2009 they would prefer if mine
25 was not on their territory and forgo any CSR benefits (Interviewees with community representatives).
-Community take Kinross to court - Colla community and lawyer take Kinross to court over road impacts issue in 2009 (Interviews
26
ee
with community leaders, 2010).

27
29 N/A
rR
30
Prescription by State
31 -Complaint dismissed by environmental authorities - Environmental authorities Corema say Colla complaints about road are
32 unsubstantiated (SMA website, 2017)
ev
33 -Chilean state fines Kinross over water usage violations at wetlands - In September of 2013, the Superintendencia del Medio
Ambiente (SMA) issued a Notice of Violation to Kinross, for certain violations related to deviations from the permitted
34 configurations of the Maricunga mine’s camp. The SMA fined Kinross US$4.6 million in relation to the violation. Kinross
35 appealed the sanction to no avail (Kinross website, 2017)
36
iew
-Chilean state including CONAF fines Kinross over water usage violations at wetlands - In May 2015, the SMA issued a
37 Resolution alleging that the Maricunga mine’s groundwater pumping irreparably harmed the Pantanillo wetland and other area
wetlands (SMA and Kinross websites, 2017).
38 -Chilean state fines Kinross over water usage violations at wetlands - In March, 2016, the SMA issued a resolution seeking closure
39 of Maricunga’s water pumping wells alleging irreparable harm and imminent risk to the Valle Ancho wetland, located
40 approximately 7 kilometers from Kinross’ groundwater wells (SMA and Kinross websites, 2017).
- Chilean state demands suspension of mining - In June, 2016, the SMA issued a revised resolution amending the initial sanction
41 which, would require Kinross to effectively cease operations and close the mine for at least the duration of proceedings (SMA and
42 Kinross websites, 2017).
43 -State regulators visit minesite and wetlands - In December 2016 ministers from the Environmental Tribunal visited the Maricunga
and Wetland sites to continue their investigations (whilst Maricunga remains closed) (SMA and Kinross websites, 2017).
44
46 -Award by CONAF to Kinross - Kinross Maricunga recognized for continued support in preserving High Andes environment by
47 CONAF (Chilean national parks authority) (Kinross Gold website, 2017)
-Kinross exemplary according to state authority - Water Authorities (DGA) representative from region tells lead author Maricinga
48 conduct self-monitoring and seem to be exemplary compared to other mining companies in region (Interview with DGA regional
49 Director, 2009)
50 -Company-State-Community meetings for conflict resolution - Kinross Maricunga together with the Highways department of the
Ministry of Public Works (MOP) and CONADI invested US$6m on a new road after consistent complaints by the Colla
51 community due to dust and accidents to their animals (Kinross Gold website, 2017).
52 -Kinross - CONAF agreement continues - Kinross maintained financial support to CONAF (National Forestry Protection agency)
53 to monitor impact to wetlands at the parque nacional nevado tres Cruces a protected RAMSAR site as Marcunga is located 8km
54 from there. Park and wetlands have flamengos, vicuña and very fragile interconnected ecosystem dependent on water (Kinross
Gold website, 2017).
55
56
57
58
59

03 OS Enduring State Accepted

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The Enduring State: An analysis of governance making in

Journal: Organization Studies

Governance < Theoretical Perspectives, Chile, Corporate social

This article investigates the profound ambiguity of the state in the

39 Responsibility (CSR). Seemingly excluding state organizations, a variety of different CSR

39 as the Environmental Impact Assessment report.

39 former resistance leader at Caimanes explains:

25 Dodds, 2017; Boelens et al., 2015).

25 Blau, P. M. (1968). The hierarchy of authority in organizations. American Journal of Sociology,

32 earth industry: China’s passive revolution. Organization Studies.

39 making. Geoforum. 64, 281-291.

25 York: Palgrave Macmillan

39 Kinderman, D. (2012). ‘Free us up so we can be responsible!’ The co-evolution of corporate social

32 Governance. In Crouch, C. & MacLean, C. (Eds.) The Responsible Corporation in a Global

25 democracy. Journal of Management Studies, 48(4), 899–931.

32 management. Organization, 9(2), 225-247.

29 por-reunion-de-bachelet-con-barrick-gold-en-canada/06/12/ (Accessed 18th October,

39 (accessed 21st July, 2017)

29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxtnKvkG-C4 (accessed 12th May, 2017)

32 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-C0WoKV_pg (60 minutes) (accessed 11th May,

32 A Special Report on Pascua Lama: 18th September, 2009.

29 Proceso Participativo Caimanes | Antofagasta Minerals. 28th October, 2015.

39 del acuerdo. 1st June, 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVpxKhhHG8w (4

19 communication and mobilization of

26 -Unified local resistance to mines

36 and divisions Resistance

24 Attempts by state The national In 2006 Court of During 2016

licences regulators (SMA) ruled in favour of regulators (SMA) and

30 in June 2013, on the construction of the closure of the mine

33 management at the Vilos ordered the

37 inspections the SMA 2014 and March 2015.

22 informal interviews with:

32 opponent of mine). lawyer.

favour of dialogue and two opposed to the company and

Three public sector officials

33 three different community interviewees).

the plans (OLCA, 2004)

33 from new lawyers Ossa and company (OLCA, 2004).

dismantling the El Mauro dam (Various community interviewees).

with community leaders, 2010).

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