Marrying Your Daughter to Her Rapist

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Marrying Your Daughter

to Her Rapist

A Test Case in Dealing with Morally Problematic Biblical Laws

Rabbi Dr. Zev Farber

How Are We To Understand Torah?

Must the Torah’s laws be perfect as they are, or can they be understood as reflecting
biblical society with the understanding that it can adapt as society develops? The Torah
contains a number of laws that fly in the face of modern ethical notions. In certain ways, this
is similar to the question of science and Torah, where many admit that the Torah expresses
notions of the universe that contradict modern science. Although a significant number of
people in the Orthodox world have made peace with the fact that the Torah speaks in the
language of its times when it comes to science,[1] the question is all the more pressing
when it comes to ethics, especially for people who find themselves inhabiting both the
Torah and modern worlds.

The following are a few examples of ethically problematic laws.

According to the Torah:

Certain enemies of Israel, like the seven Canaanite nations or the Amalekites must
be slaughtered, man, woman and child (Deut 20:16-18, 25:19). In other words, the
Torah commands their genocide, an act that any ethical person today must abhor.

A son who is a glutton and a drunk, and who speaks rudely to his parents should be
stoned to death (Deut 21:18-21). No one nowadays could possibly advocate for such
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 a punishment.

Anyone who worships idols (Deut 13:7-12), or practices any form of witchcraft or
sorcery (Exod 22:17; Lev 20:27) must be put to death. Entire cities that worship idols
must be destroyed entirely (Deut 13:13-19). In modern times, freedom of religion is
one of our most sacred principles, and witch hunting is synonymous with barbaric
and primitive behavior. In the U.S., we remember the Salem witch trials with shame.

Chazal’s Response
The above problems were dealt with by the Rabbis in a way that softens the moral
problems. For example, the genocide laws are understood to be only relevant to the
nations specified in the Torah, which no longer existed by the rabbinic period. Furthermore,
the Rabbis claim that after King Sennacherib of Assyria conquered the Levant (in the late
eighth century BCE), he mixed up all the nations so much that all discriminatory laws that
once applied to any nation (including Moabites, Ammonites, Edomites, Egyptians, etc.) are
now defunct (m. Yadayim 4:4; t. Kiddushin 5:4; b. Berachot 28a).

The rabbis make it impossible to execute a rebellious child by requiring the child to
consume impossible amounts of food and drink in a short period in order to be defined as a
glutton or drunk (m. Sanhedrin 8:2). As if that weren’t enough, they put the nail in the coffin
by reading the words “our voice” (Deut 21:20), which is part of the parents’ accusation
against their son (“he doesn’t listen to our voice”), to mean that the mother and father both
have the exact same voice (b. Sanhedrin 71a).

The rabbis also make the issue of killing people for idolatry or witchcraft into a non-issue in
a few ways. First, without a sanhedrin, there is no capital punishment. Second, the
extremely strict rules surrounding witness testimony that the Rabbis invoke make a
conviction virtually impossible. Finally, the Rabbis say that the desire to commit idolatry has
been eradicated from the world (b. Sanhedrin 64a; b Yoma 69b; Song of Songs Rabbah
7:8).

While Chazal tempered the laws and used various maneuvers in avoiding any untoward
consequences of the laws existing on the books, they don’t deal with the intent and the
meaning of the laws that go to the heart of the ethical problems. In other words, Chazal
avoided the problem by reinterpreting the laws and presenting their interpretation as the
Torah’s original intent. This does not solve the problem for those of us who believe that
laws developed over time, and that the rabbinic interpretation is anachronistic. Thus, we
have little choice but to try to uncover the moral underpinnings of the Torah’s legislation
and deal honestly with its limitations. How are we to do this?

The Wave Theory

Can the Torah be a source of morality, even one touched by the divine, while still containing
laws that are decidedly unethical? Many great Torah scholars and ethicists have dealt with
the above problem, and I surveyed some of the responses in part 4 of my TABS essay,
“Torah Min HaShamayim: A Guide to the Four Questions.” One response that I found
particularly meaningful, and has helped me begin to craft my own response comes from
Professor Tamar Ross, who describes what she calls “cumulative revelation.”

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In my understanding of Ross’ work, cumulative revelation means that God begins the
revelation at the point where the people and prophets can understand it, but the ideas
become refined and adapted over time as God “reveals Torah” to the Jews on a continuing
basis. Furthermore, Ross’ concept of revelation is not an active communication process
like speaking, but refers to a more abstract connection between the divine and human
“minds.”[2]

One essential point that undergirds Ross’ approach is that we cannot expect even a
“revealed” text to reflect a perfect conception of morality. By its very nature, a meeting of
minds is limited by the parameters of the minds involved. Thus, even a great person from
the past must be understood in his or her historical context.

In thinking about these problems, I have tried to build on Ross’ work, using what I have
dubbed “Wave Theory,” a preliminary version of which I describe in part 4 of my “Avraham
Avinu is my Father” essay. In that piece, I argue that revelation derives from the channeling
of the divine through human conduits, and that the revelation must be understood by
placing it in the context of the historical reality of the ancient world that produced it.

In order to understand the message behind a given law and what it is trying to accomplish,
we must understand how any given law or ideal functioned in any given society, in our
case, ancient Israel. When we understand this, we can “subtract” the societal elements to
see the ideas in their relative purity and reapply them to our times. In other words, the
ideals of the Torah flow from biblical times to the present, but the application and context
are continually shifting (hence the wave imagery).

Test Case: The Law of the Rapist

To illustrate this approach I would like to highlight one brief example: the law regarding a
man who rapes a young maiden (Deut. 22:28-29):

‫שׁר‬
ֶ ‫מצָא ִאישׁ נער ]ַנֲעָרה[ ְבתוָּלה ֲא‬ ְ ִ‫כח ִכּי י‬ If a man comes upon a virgin who is not engaged and he seizes
‫ כט‬.‫מצָאוּ‬ ְ ‫מּהּ וְִנ‬
ָ ‫שַׁכב ִע‬ָ ְ‫שׂהּ ו‬
ָ ‫תָפ‬
ְ ‫שׂה וּ‬ ָ ‫אָר‬ֹ ‫ֹלא‬ her and lies with her, and they are discovered, the man who lay
‫מּהּ ַלֲאִבי הנער‬ ָ ‫שֵּׁכב ִע‬
ֹ ‫תן ָהִאישׁ ַה‬ ַ ‫וְָנ‬ with her shall pay the girl’s father fifty [shekels of] silver, and she
‫שּׁה‬ָ ‫תְהיֶה ְלִא‬ ִ ‫שּׁים ָכֶּסף וְלוֹ‬ ִ‫מ‬ִ ‫]ַהַנֲּעָרה[ ֲח‬ shall be his wife. Because he has violated her, he can never
.‫מיו‬
ָ ָ‫שְׁלָּחהּ ָכּל י‬ ַ ‫שׁר ִעָנּהּ ֹלא יוַּכל‬ ֶ ‫תַּחת ֲא‬ ַ have the right to divorce her (NJPS).

The punishment of the rapist consists of paying the father 50 shekels and marrying the
deflowered maiden with no option for divorce. The Torah does not discuss any other
options for this girl’s future; she appears to have no independence and no voice in the
matter. Nowhere does the Torah factor in the invasion of her intimacy, her privacy, and her
sense of bodily integrity, nor does it discuss whether she would want to marry her rapist.
The Torah seems mostly concerned about the financial loss to the father, and secondarily
about the financial/marital future of the girl. From a modern point of view, this law seems to
be premised on an objectification of girls/women and their sexuality.

Static or Evolving?
The above point highlights one of the most significant problems with the “dictation model”
of the Torah, which comes with the implied corollary that if God said it the message must
be static and timeless. In other words, if one posits that that the Torah is meant to be

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understood as God’s dictation to the prophet word for word,[3] then it is very difficult to
explain how a law that seems so limited in its ethical vision could have been enunciated by
the divine lips (so to speak).

But if, as Ross and others have argued, we assume that prophecy is not meant to be
understood as a verbal revelation from God to the prophet, but—to use my language—as a
tapping into the divine flow, then understanding the historical and intellectual context of the
author/prophet is vital. Once we admit that any divine message is refracted through a
human perspective, then by definition, the divine message will be incomplete and subject to
the perspectives and comprehension of the prophet. (In fact, even the direct dictation
model can offer a cumulative revelation approach. God had to communicate with people
where they were and based on their frame of reference and what was possible in their
moral and religious imagination. The Torah does not outlaw slavery, but few of us would
believe today that God would approve of the institution. This is similar to what Rambam
says regarding sacrifices.)[4]

Thus, as we attempt to understand the law of the rapist, we must factor historical context
into the equation. Deuteronomy certainly understood that rape was a crime, but how
it understood that crime differs from how we understand it; Deuteronomy cannot reasonably
be expected to work towards correcting problems it did not perceive.[5]

The Historical Context of the Rape Laws

Israelite/Judahite society in the biblical period was both patriarchal (I use the term
descriptively) and agrarian, as were virtually all Levantine societies in this period. The
economy was based on ownership of land, and the landowners were virtually all men.
Women, unless they had no male relatives, were subordinate to the family patriarch,
whether this was her husband or her father, and subject to his decisions.[6] In such a
society, a woman survived by being the wife of a landowner. Marriage would have been
arranged by the girl’s father to a man who could pay the bride-price and, thus, had a good
chance of being able to support his daughter. The father would have expected the
payment, which was a hefty sum, but would only be paid if the father successfully guarded
his daughter’s virginity, saving it for her future groom.

Thus, to turn to our case, having (forcefully) taken the young girl’s virginity, the rapist
effectively leaves her without a future and puts her father in a complicated position of both
losing the brideprice he expected and having to support his daughter for an unknown
amount of time in the future, perhaps permanently, or marrying her off to a less financially
stable man who may not be able to support her. If the father could not do this, or died
before she could find a husband, depending on the wealth or generosity of her brothers,
such a girl was at risk of future poverty or a life of prostitution. Understanding this, the
Torah tries to solve the problems. The father receives the expected payment and the girl
receives her husband with a guarantee of lifetime support.

The Middle Assyrian Laws

Deuteronomy’s solution to the problem is a variation on what seems to be the standard

Ancient Near Eastern solution. For example, here is what the Middle Assyrian laws (late 2 nd
millennium BCE) say about the same case (#55):
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If a man forcibly seizes and rapes a maiden who is residing in her father’s house, …the
father of the maiden shall take the wife of the fornicator of the maiden and hand her over to
be raped; he shall not return her to her husband, but he shall take (and keep?) her; the
father shall give his daughter who is the victim of fornication into the protection of the
household of her fornicator. If he (the fornicator) has no wife, the fornicator shall give
“triple” the silver as the value of the maiden to her father; her fornicator shall marry her; he
shall not (reject?) her. If the father does not desire it so, he shall receive “triple” silver for
the maiden, and he shall give his daughter to whomever he chooses.[7]

Admittedly there are a number of differences in the details of the punishment in MAL and in
Deuteronomy, and important connections with a similar law in Exodus (the seduction of the
unbetrothed maiden). I will not go into detailed comparisons here, as was done well by Eve
Levavi Feinstein in her TABS essay, “The Rape of the Unbetrothed Virgin in Torah and
Assyrian Law: A Comparative Analysis.” Nonetheless, the overall similarity between the
Deuteronomic law and the Assyrian law show that they come from the same milieu.[8] In the
Ancient Near East, the daughter’s status was a financial asset for a father, and her rape is
analyzed primarily from this perspective. Furthermore, in both societies, the primary
problem posed by the rape was not the damage to the girl’s psyche or mental health, but
the economic and social danger that the loss of virginity poses. Thus, both laws come up
with the same “elegant solution”; she marries the rapist.

Note: The Comparative Fallacy

If the Torah’s solution is essentially the same as that of other Ancient Near Eastern laws,
doesn’t that undo the claim that the Torah is something special or important, touched by the
divine? I don’t think so. Most ethical codes forbid murder, forbid theft, assault, rape, etc.,
and we don’t ask why the Torah needed to reiterate them. Similarly, most ethical codes
have rules about judges, evidence, witnesses, and penalties for wrongdoing. If a given
Deuteronomic law is comparable to the best of the laws in ancient times, this is hardly a
criticism.[9]

The Rabbinic Understanding of the Law

If the law as it appears in Deuteronomy works only in a particular historical context (ancient
Israelite agrarian culture) and from a particular social vantage point (patriarchy), is there
anything that the law can teach us nowadays? Before trying to answer this question, it is
worth taking a look at a historical midpoint between biblical and modern times, Rabbinic
times.

The rabbis also lived in a patriarchal culture, but it was less agrarian and more heavily
mercantile. There were more things that a woman could do to support herself and the social
and financial danger posed by the rape was somewhat less. Whether this was the reason
for the Rabbis’ adjustment to the law or whether the reason was more purely ethical in
nature I can’t say, but the rabbis did add one crucial adjustment.

According to the rabbis, the girl only marries her rapist if she wishes to; in other words, the
decision is up to her and not (only) her father (b. Ketubot 39b). This fits in with Chazal’s
marital ethic in general, since they forbade a father from marrying his daughter to anyone
unless she says, “I want to marry that man” (b. Kiddushin 41a). The Rabbis also add a
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requirement for the rapist to pay her for the embarrassment (‫)בושה‬, the damage to her
reputation (‫ )פגם‬and pain and suffering (‫)צער‬, above and beyond the payment of the fine
(‫ )קנס‬of fifty shekels to her father (b. Ketubot 40b).

Thus the Rabbis dealt with the problems in their own way, by reinterpreting the law to
include elements that temper what appears as callous treatment of the girl. The marriage is
now up to her, and she receives a payment for her suffering and humiliation over and
above the payment that will go to her father for what would have been a major financial
setback.

What Can We Learn from this Law in Modern Times?

In our society, the mere suggestion that the girl marry her rapist is inconceivable. Our
society’s concern for the woman is not about financial or social consequences but about the
effect on her emotional health (a subject rarely, if ever, discussed in the Bible). The pain
and fear that the girl/woman suffers at the time are only one element; there are long term
emotional and psychological effects that last well past the time of the rape and its
aftermath.

So, what can we learn from the law in Deuteronomy that might be relevant to our social
context? One theme that undergirds the Torah’s message is protecting the vulnerable girl.
Although it is true that the Torah emphasizes the father’s financial loss, taken in context,
the Torah’s protection of the girl is quite strong. According to the Torah, the rapist must
marry and, therefore, support the girl for his entire life with no option of divorce, taking away
a prerogative that elsewhere seems to be the husband’s alone.

If we are to abstract the ethical notion of this rule, it is that society must protect its women
from being victims of unwanted sexual activity, and try to correct any damage done to them
if such a thing occurs. Sadly, even in our modern feminist society, rape and exploitation of
women remains a serious and all too common occurrence.

Applying the Torah’s rule to a modern context, I would argue that the man must pay for
whatever physical and psychological treatment the woman requires and that there should
be no time limit for this punishment, just as there was no time when the rapist-husband was
permitted to abandon his wife. In other words, translating the Torah’s legislation to our
times: What does the rapist have to do/pay in order to make restitution for the crime?
Whatever it takes.[10]

Conclusion
I am not certain that the lessons I draw are the correct ones, and there are surely others to
be learned. Nevertheless, I believe that approaching the Torah’s laws as cumulative
revelation or divine flow—as opposed to a static and timeless divine dictation—go a long
way towards helping us reclaim the ethical core of the biblical texts when confronted by
morally problematic laws.

For those of us who wish to stay part of the world of meaningful Torah study and
observance while remaining true to modern ethical sensibilities, contextualizing the moral
message seems essential. Doing so allows us to bring the original message of the Torah
into modern times, so that the divine voice can speak and inspire us today. This way, we
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can study the Torah using modern tools to uncover ethical and religious insights, without
compromising either the integrity of our tradition or, worst of all, our moral integrity as
human beings.

___________________

Rabbi Dr. Zev Farber is a fellow at Project TABS – TheTorah.com. He

holds an M.A. from Hebrew University in Jewish History (biblical period)
and a Ph.D. from Emory University in Jewish Religious Cultures. In
addition to academic training, Zev holds ordination (yoreh yoreh) and
advanced ordination (yadin yadin) from Yeshivat Chovevei
Torah (YCT) Rabbinical School. Zev’s edited volumes on brain death and
organ donation areforthcoming from Koren and his book on Joshua in reception history is
forthcoming in De Gruyter’s BZAW series.

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[1] For example, see R. Dr. David Tzvi Hoffmann’s gloss on Genesis 1:9 (p. 31 in the
Hebrew edition).

[2] See her discussion in part 19 of her TABS essay, “Orthodoxy and the Challenge of
Biblical Criticism.“ See also her interview for the Kavvanah website. See also her
application of these views to the question of ethics in the Torah in her book, Expanding the
Palace of Torah (Brandeis, 2004), which deals with the place of women in the Torah and
Judaism.

[3] For other critiques of the dictation model, see the TABS essays “Making Sense of the
Revelation at Sinai: Revisiting Maimonides’ Eighth Principle of Faith” by Prof. Sam
Fleischacker, “I shall Fear God Alone and not Show Favor in Torah: A Conceptual
Foundation for Wrestling with Biblical Criticism”by R. David Bigman, and “‘The Lord Spoke
to Moses’ – Does God Speak?” by Dr. Baruch Schwartz.

[4] I discuss this approach in part four of “Torah Min HaShamayim: A Guide to the Four
Questions.”

[5] The fact that the law reflects a patriarchal society that both objectifies the girl and makes
her decisions for her is clear, but is this a fair critique? After all, the Torah is not creating a
chauvinistic society, but it is itself a product of such a society. Stating that a premodern law
code is patriarchal is to judge it by anachronistic standards.

[6] A piece like this is not the place for a detailed study of Israelite society. For some
studies on the topic, see: J. David Schloen, The House of the Father as Fact and Symbol:
Patrimonialism in Ugarit and the Ancient Near East (Studies in the Archaeology and History
of the Levant, 2; Eisenbrauns, 2001); Avraham Faust, The Archaeology of Israelite Society
in Iron Age II (Eisenbrauns, 2012); Hanoch Raviv, The Elders in Ancient Israel: A Study of
a Biblical Institution (Magnes, 1992); Roland De Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and
Institutions (Eerdmans, 1997 [original French, 1958]). For study specifically about the
dowry and bride price, see Tracy Maria Lemos, Marriage Gifts and Social Change in
Ancient Palestine: 1200 BCE to 200 CE (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

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[7] Here is the full text:

If a man forcibly seizes and rapes a maiden who is residing in her father’s house, […] who
is not betrothed (?), whose [womb?] is not opened, who is not married, and against whose
father’s house there is no outstanding claim–whether within the city or in the countryside or
at night, whether in the main thoroughfare, or in a granary, or during the city festival—the
father of the maiden shall take the wife of the fornicator of the maiden and hand her over to
be raped; he shall not return her to her husband, but he shall take (and keep?) her; the
father shall give his daughter who is the victim of fornication into the protection of the
household of her fornicator. If he (the fornicator) has no wife, the fornicator shall give
“triple” the silver as the value of the maiden to her father; her fornicator shall marry her; he
shall not (reject?) her. If the father does not desire it so, he shall receive “triple” silver for
the maiden, and he shall give his daughter to whomever he chooses.

Translated by Martha T. Roth, in Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (SBL
Writings from the Ancient World Series; SBL, 1995). Note: In Luckenbill’s translation this is
law #54.

[8] Levavi Feinstein does note that Deuteronomy leaves out any possibility of retaliation by
raping the rapist’s wife, an important difference that demonstrates that Deuteronomy does
not see women as men’s chattel in all ways.

[9] The value of the Torah, in my opinion, is intrinsic not comparative. In other words, our
job is to try to understand the laws of the Torah and what they were meant to accomplish,
not to try to prove that a given law was better than any alternatives that may have existed.
Comparative study is important because it allows modern readers access to the world in
which the Torah was written and its laws practiced. Sometimes there are differences with
contemporary alternatives, sometimes similarities. These should be studied, of course, but
not as an attempt at triumphalism, to prove the Torah is “better,” but as a way of better
understanding the Torah and what its authors were trying to accomplish.

[10] Within reason and ethical boundaries, of course.

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