Turning Away From Philosophy of Being

NON-PHILOSOPHY OF THE ONE
Turning away from Philosophy of Being
towards
Non-Philosophy: the intersubjectivity of Sophos, THE ONE and the Real Self.
And now for something completely different, unintended and without even trying to do or be that,
different that is (since very small my parents would say ‘why do you always have to be different’,
‘why do you always have to do something different, in a different way’ – well I suppose it does
reveal something…?)
Well, if Griezmann is not ‘disponible’, or another saviour, one must step up oneself, or find another
saviour, like Sophos….. ?
https://youtu.be/jXI4FXXIpmw
I wrote about this in a number of books and articles, for example about methods, techniques,
practices and methodology here:
https://www.academia.edu/30148411/Philosophy_methods_methodology as well as exploring and
illustrating the subject-matter of philosophizing here:
https://www.academia.edu/30194224/_Meta_Philosophy_searching_for_its_subject-matter_.docx
and in a number of books that can be seen here:
https://sites.google.com/site/philosophyphilosophizing/home, at amazon.com or here:
http://philpapers.org/profile/myworks.pl
Explorations, questions and searches not put down on paper are probably more important than the
ones mentioned above. These were occurrences for almost as long as I can remember. They took
many forms, endless questions about everything under the sun, unsatisfied with unexplained socio-
cultural institutions, communities, social relationships, social roles, behaviour, values, norms and
much more – I had to question them rather than merely submit to them or act in accordance with
them. Although I expressed these questions and queries about the status quo in many areas such as
sport, art, social sciences, endless reading and marginal groups and relationships I realized that they
form part of the philosophical discourse. Not the discourse that has become the expression of the
professionalization of philosophy the last few hundred years, but of the not-institutionalized practice
of original thinking, of creative philosophical thinking. As examples of the latter, Socrates, of course,
the pre-Socratics, Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Plotinus, writers on Mysticism such as Meister
Eckhart, van Ruysbroeck, John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, from Advaita,
Zen and other Buddhist schools, Wittgenstein, Hume, German Idealists, Rumi, novelists and poets,
Paul Klee and other visual artists and many names who form part of the seeking for the unity-
experience as explored in History of Mysticism (those who seek the unity experience, to become
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

ONE with THE ONE, Godhead, the one real Self, Buddha mind, Sophos, etc). History of
Mysticism *was first published by Atma Books in 1987, now and is a unique compendium of the
lives and teachings of the world's best known mystics. They are presented in chronological order,
and include representatives of every religious tradition, revealing the broad universality of genuine
religious experience. expanded and revised Thirtieth Anniversary edition is available as a free
downloadable PDF document on this website at my Downloads page. This book is fundamental for
seasoned scholars of philosophy and religion as well as anyone new to the study of Mysticism. Here
is a reproduction of the Table of Contents:
30th_anniv._of_history_of_mysticism__revised_2015_.pdf
Download File
 Contents
I. Mystics of The Ancient Past
Pre-history Of Mysticism
Vedic Hymnists
Early Egyptians
The Early Jews
Upanishadic Seers
Kapila
The Bhagavad Gita
The Taoist Sages
The Buddha
II. Mystics of The Greco-Roman Era
Thcratic Greeks
Socrates And His Successors
Zeno of Citium
Philo Judaeus
Jesus of Nazareth
Early Christians
The Gnostics
The Hermetics
Plotinus
III. Mystics of The Early Middle Ages
Pseudo-Dionysius
Narada
Patanjali
The Tantra
Shankara
Dattatreya
Milarepa

The Ch’an And Zen Buddhists
The Sufis
Al-Hallaj
IV. Mystics of The Late Middle Ages
Jewish Mysticism
Ibn Arabi
Iraqi
Rumi
Jnaneshvar
Medieval Christians
Meister Eckhart
Thomas á Kempis
V. Mystics of The Modern Era
Nicholas of Cusa
Juan de la Cruz (St. John of the Cross)
Kabir
Nanak
Dadu
Seventeenth And Eighteenth Century Mystics
Sri Ramakrishna
Ramana Maharshi
Swami Rama Tirtha
Twentieth Century Mystics
Conclusion
So much for my own wisdom- or unity –seeking and –experience. During which I learned many
things, that this seeking will not be taught in academic classes, that those who live OFF
philosophy and other socio-cultural practices (eg priests, religious, professors, etc of religion,
philosophy, sciences, arts, humanities, etc) do not form part of the seekers of this experience
and do not represent those who love ‘the one’ above all and who have realized the unity-
experience of the one. As illustrated by those included in the History of Mysticism and in other
books such as F C Happold’s https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Anthology-F-C-
Happold/dp/0140137467 . One of the first books I have ever read and never stopped reading
since. I include the image of the cover for several reasons, it sums up the book, the two types of
mysticism and of course look whose work it is!! Lol, of course, the one who many has said I must
be the reincarnation of?

Mysticism: A study and an Anthology’, he divides mysticism into 2 types:
1. The mysticism of love and union
2. The mysticism of knowledge and understanding
And see Religious Experiences - The Student Room
www.thestudentroom.co.uk/attachment.php?attachmentid=148137&d...
Happold's types of mysticism. Rather than develop a set of criteria to identify mystical
experiences, F.C. Happold developed a way in which people could think ...
I think these two types of mystics are not mutually exclusive and they perhaps form the two
poles of a continuum, with some mystics lying closer to the one pole than the other or others
may well be positioned somewhere in the middle revealing characteristics of both types. I
mention this as it seems to me, from self-knowledge and ‘introspection’ (ha ha) that I ‘suffer’
both types. My love for Sophos, need to question philosophically and living a philosophical life
appear to reveal the second type, although my intense love for Sophos, visual art, union with
The One, etc, are signs of the former. Enough, and far, far too much, of such personal aspects of
my ‘intellectual’ (or less pompous, my ‘thinking’) biography. It was not intended to reveal
something about myself or fulfil a need to share details concerning myself with others, but
merely to illustrate something about thinking (not thinking about) and living philosophically. And
thereby to reveal something about what philosophy, philosophizing is and is about.
It is against this background and in this context that the few things I do put on paper, such as the
exploration of philosophical approaches, methods (or ways) and subject-matter, and on canvas
(as my visual art explorations and expressions), should be viewed and interpreted. The above
answers the question ‘why philosophize’ and ‘why paint’, or rather ‘why I philosophize’ and ‘why
I paint’, night and day and almost 24/7. At some stage perhaps as an exploration of the one,
Sophos, etc and of the methods, road and ways to unity with the one, then after the unity-
experience with the one, Sophos, the one real self, etc, the nature of this experience and
expressing the nature of the one. In other words as the Muslim Sufis whose words are included
in Happold, put it: when I look inside my coat/cloak, it is only you I see, when ‘you’ knock on the
door and I open it to let you in, we say, ‘it is I and no longer you and I’. In short an expression of
the nature of Sophos, wisdom, the one, when one opens one’s mouth in a considered manner,
in language only lovers will recognize (not contrived, technical, professional terms borrowed
from others and an academic tradition, but in intimate sighs and simple ordinary, everyday

language), one talks as if the beloved, one expresses the mind, the characteristics, the mind set,
the reality, the cosmos, the universe and nature of the beloved, the one. The only one that is.
This is no longer mere talking about, but taking in the name of, like when the prophets from the
Old Testament spoke in the name of the one, spoke as if HASHEM, as if they are, at that moment
at least, Hashem-itself.
From the explorations of the subject-matter of the philosophical discourse we are able to
identify a number of things concerning the objects of philosophy and the changes that occurred
over time in the subject-matter of this discourse.
In the beginnings of the Western tradition of philosophy, the traditional genesis of this discipline
with the Pre-Socratics, few other disciplines and specialized discourses of these disciplines
existed. Those who were involved in this inter-subjective, socio-cultural practice at that time
explored phenomena that at later stages in the history of philosophy, became the objects of
study of disciplines that became differentiated in the scheme of things concerned with reality,
beings, humans, experience and perception of reality, consciousness, thinking, reflecting on all
these things, and other elements. Plato and Aristotle dealt with questions and phenomena that
today are the subject-matter of other disciplines for example physics, chemistry, astronomy,
astro-physics, theology, geography, geology, social sciences, humanities, aesthetics, the arts and
inter-disciplinary sciences such as cognitive sciences.
If philosophers are still concerned with the subject-matter of these disciplines then they will deal
with them as philosophy of, philosophy about such disciplines, their assumptions, theories,
methodologies, terms being developed, concepts etc. In other words philosophy has not quite
given up ownership of those domains that previously formed part of its discourse. Theoretical
Physics might suggest ontologies of the kind that previously were presented in the philosophical
discourse, but philosophers still cling to that discipline in an attempt to salvage and retain some
subject-matter from those discourses, now, all but lost for the socio-cultural practice of modern
philosophy.
Others employ and extend the intersubjective principles, assumptions, pre-suppositions, values,
norms, attitudes, rationale and other transcendentals of the philosophical discourse so that they
are able to remain involved in disciplines such as theology, logic, mathematics, ethics, law,
economics, sociology, psychology, the art, humanities, etc. So today we find a philosophy of
everything and anything, for example gender, ecology, risk, social theory, migrants, global
warming, virtual reality, social media, sex, government, the public (sphere), language, linguistics,
signs, and any idea that exist, or does not yet exist, in our conceptual system, life-worlds,
realities, thinking, dreaming, imagination, etc.
Let us refer to this as conceptual analysis, analysis, deconstruction, critical theory, post-
Kantianism, neo-Platonism, new-Hegelianisms, post-anarchism (the philosophical approach),
neo-Marxism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, cognitive science, cartographies of cognition, etc
so as to arrive at a whole array of approaches that will encompass every possible type of
language game, linguistic exploration and ‘analysis’ that could be done with ideas, concepts,
conceptual systems, their origins, transcendentals, aims, rational, functions, etc in this
Anthropocene(!!! Another latest fade and fashionable ‘term’, that is meant to be all-explanatory,
like cognitive, cognition and cognitive sciences once were meant to be)- centered, -originated,
-constituted and – maintained reality, realities, cosmos, universe/s, multiverse of ‘ours’. Yes, of

ours, as one thing has not changed much since the earliest Western philosophical birth pangs,
and probably since the first being resembling anything human walked upright, became
concscious, started to think and think about his existence and thinking – that one thing is, it is all
about ‘us’, us being the centre not only of our socio-culturally constituted realities and life-
worlds, but all existing, or not yet existing, possible reality/s, life-worlds and universes. Yes, it is
all about ‘us’ – human beings, homo sapiens sapiens – as far as the universe or multiverses,
infinity stretch, is, or is (not, ad infinitum.
No matter what clever new terms we contrive, whatever disciplines we devise, whatever socio-
cultural practices we execute, whatever institutions (or their norms, values, pre-suppositions,
assumptions and other transcendentals we un/intentionally support, maintain and adhere to, be
they fictional, reality, hyper-reality or virtual reality) – it is all about ‘us’, from us and for us. In
spite of minute, rebellious attempts to try and create an alternative to anthropocentrism, such
as those of object- oriented ontology, it remains with US, us who usurped and replaced ‘the
creator’, all creators , be they real or fictional, if they resemble us or not, if they are beings or
forces (such as those that caused the big bang, created and maintain the universe – or other
variations on that as imagined by the pre-Socratics, by primitive religions, folk beliefs, etc.
Is there an alternative to Anthropocene- and anthropo-centered consciousness, cognition,

thinking, frames of reference, perspectives, constitution of realities and life-worlds, approaches,
socio-cultural practices and intersubjectivity? Are we the only creators of transcendentals, our
‘constitution’ the constitution of all transcendentals as Kant and Hegel speculated and showed
us? Are human beings, our constitution, our motives, needs, values, attitudes and aims, be they
personal and subjective, or intersubjective and socio-culturally derived, based and maintained
(as critical theory and other sociologisms have shown us through their ‘scientific’ speculations,
descriptions, analyses and theorizing and want us to believe) the only possible one, the only
meaningful one?
Is it possible that, if someone were to be in union with ‘the beloved’ (of the Sufis), united with
Sophos, one/d with the buddhamind, realized the one, true self, if someone like that could
reveal something of an alternative to the restricted anthropo(cene?)-centered ‘philosophies’ we
deal in? If someone like that could identify, reveal and conceptual the transcendentals that
underlie and precede all our activities, including our fake, false and inauthentic, professional-
oriented philosophizing, could that someone present us with alternatives, for example more
authentic and relevant (constitutions of) life-worlds, realities, interpretations of understandings
of existence and realities? Activities and consciousness that have as transcendentals Sophos,
that have as rationale and purpose the realization of Sophos, and that have as values, norms and
intersubjectivity (and the creation, development and maintenance) Sophos? Living for and by
Sophos in the manner in which the ‘mystics’ revealed to us how they lived for and by (the values
and norms) of ‘the one’ ?
http://www.themysticsvision.com/uploads/1/3/9/2/13928072/plotinus_the_origin_of_wes-
tern_mysticism-rev._2012.pdfe Pre-So
vi
The Origin of Western Mysticism
CONTENTS

Preface............................................
..................................vii
Introduction .......................................
............................... 9
I. The One.................................
......................... ......... .........26
The One of Plotinus is synonymous with Brahman
of the Upanishads. It is also synonymous with the
Shiva of Shaivism, the Taoof Taoism, the Purusha
of the Bhagavad Gita, the Dharmakayaof the Buddhists, the
Haqqof Ibn Arabi, and the Gottheitof Meister
Eckhart. However, it is best to limit our comparisons; too
many would be tedious. We It may be termed "pure Consciousness," but even th
is is inaccurate as It is
Consciousness prior to the act of being conscious of anything. Even to say, "It is," is
misleading, since It is beyond Being; even the word, "prior," connotes causal or
temporal sequence, and It is beyond both Time and Causation. Nothing can be rightly
said of It, but we must settle upon a name in order
to speak of It, and so we may choose "Consciousness," "the Self," "The One," The First,"
or "The Good," despite their inadequacy.
The One, we must remember, is not something standing behind the manifold, as
a separate thing, but is the One by which, in which, and from which all that is manifest
exists
II. The Divine Mind.........................

.................................... 42
III. The Soul ................................
........................................... 54
IV. Providence...............................
........................................ 66
V. Free Will...............................
........................................... 86
VI. Beauty ..................................
......................................... 100
VII. Love ....................................
.......................................... 110
VIII. Purification ............................
...................................... 118
IX. The Return..............................
...................................... 126
X. Happiness ...............................
...................................... 140
XI. The Stars ...............................
........................................ 148
XII. Letter to Flaccus .......................
................................... 162
What are the values, rules, norms of the mystics of their beloved, the one? Wittgenstein said something like, that
what cannot be said should or can be shown. It seems to me that most things are shown by us, even if they appear to
be said. Even sentences in speech or writing present us with words that we imagine we understand, but we
‘understand’ merely something approximate from what is shown to us, even though we mistakenly think that we
become that what is said or written, that we grasped the meanings being said or shown as real, true
facts.
Experience Or Understanding?
seemed to some to imply that the nondual (advaita) Reality could be known through deliberate
intellectual enquiry.
This controversy may be easily resolved if we examine how the word, advaita, is commonly
used. It is a Sanskrit word, which, literally, means “not two”, but it is generally used to stand for

both “nonduality” and “nondualism”. To illustrate this, let us look at several official definitions
of the word: First definition, from the Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: “Advaita (Sanskrit:
Nondualism) Most influential school of Vedanta… etc.” Second definition, from the Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy: “advaita (Sanskrit, nonduality) The doctrine of the Vedantic school
associated with Shankara, that asserts the identity of Brahman and atman… etc.” And the third
definition, from the Oxford Dictionary of Asian Mythology: “Literally, ‘nondual’, advaita is the
Hindu term for the state of nondifferentiation that is Brahman or the absolute reality.”
When used with “Vedanta”, advaita refers to “the philosophy of Nondual Vedanta”, or, simply
“Nondualism”; it can also mean “Nonduality”, a synonym for the absolute reality, or Brahman.
So we have two meanings for the same word: nonduality and nondualism. The first is an
experiential state; the second is a philosophical position. Admittedly, Advaita (Nondualism), the
philosophical term, may indeed be understood; but Advaita, when we mean by it:
“nonduality”—the nondual reality, the thing in itself—, cannot be understood. It must be
experienced to be known.
Note: but surely if the ineffable One of the mystic has been experienced, those experienced can
be shown if not said? And they might be shown by art, visual art, poetry and in other ways, if
they cannot be rationally conceptualized?
That undifferentiated state where there is neither ‘I’ nor ‘Thou’ may be experienced in
transcendent vision, but it cannot be understood by the mind. The state in which there is
neither ‘now’ or ‘then’ may be experienced in transcendent vision, but it cannot be understood
by the mind. The state in which neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’ exists cannot be understood by the
mind. The mind and the language it uses is grounded in duality; duality is its mechanism, its
being. With what instrument would one understand nonduality? It cannot be understood by
the mind. However, Nonduality has been experienced by many throughout history—including
myself. Nonduality, therefore, is, by definition, a transcendent experience, a divine revelation,
beyond the temporal mind.
It must be reported, however, that the opinion that Advaita is unequivocally an understanding,
arrived at through reflection, and not a transcendent experience, has become a widely-held one
among some students of enlightenment centered in the U.K. On the Advaita.org website,
hosted by Dennis Waite, a questioner who “had a profound realization of the truth of advaita”
and then, after some months, no longer experienced it, was corrected by several different
disciples who set out to impress upon him the doctrine that advaita was not an experience, but
an understanding. (See www.advaita.org.uk/ Q.348 – Temporary Realization/, Posted on August
4, 2013).
Advaita (nondualism) is an understanding; advaita (nonduality) is definitely not a matter of

understanding; it is a matter of revelation. Ideas may be understood. Concepts may be
understood. We can understand the idea, the concept, of nondualism, but we cannot
understand nonduality. ‘Understanding’ is a subjective process of the mind. Those who have
obtained an intellectual understanding that the universe is an undivided unity, that there are not
two things (I and Thou, Spirit and Matter), but only one, have attained a wonderful
understanding, to be sure; but it cannot hold a candle to the experience of seeing that nondual
Reality through the eyes of eternity—even if in time our memory of the details of that vision
may fade.

Philosophers have attempted through the ages to ‘understand’ the nondual Reality, and in the
end have had to surrender and take their place among the many vanquished souls who have
followed the dead-end road of reason, and never reached their goal. For satisfaction does not
lie down that road. The intellect turns out to be an inappropriate and useless instrument in the
hunt for the knowledge of Reality, in the quest for the divine Self. Inevitably we must come to
the realization that the intellect is impotent to discover God (the non-dual Reality), or to
comprehend His ways. And with that realization comes also the sweet acceptance of the truth
that only He can reveal His immediate and all-embracing presence,..
http://www.themysticsvision.com/advaita-experience-or-understanding-8-24-2013.html
This illustrates what I mean by that what is said, the factual words and sentences, and the
understanding of them (by ‘the intellect’, that what we learned what those words mean)and
that what is shown and grasped as if some kind of experience.
Sir James Hopwood Jeans OM FRS[1] (11 September 1877 – 16 September 1946[2]) was an
English physicist, astronomer and mathematician. The stream of knowledge is heading
towards a non-mechanical reality; the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than
like a great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of
matter... we ought rather hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter.
— James Jeans in The Mysterious Universe, [14]
In an interview published in The Observer (London), when asked the question "Do you
believe that life on this planet is the result of some sort of accident, or do you believe that it is
a part of some great scheme?", he replied:
I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material
universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe... In
general the universe seems to me to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine. It
may well be, it seems to me, that each individual consciousness ought to be compared to a
brain-cell in a universal mind.
What remains is in any case very different from the full-blooded matter and the forbidding
materialism of the Victorian scientist. His objective and material universe is proved to consist
of little more than constructs of our own minds. To this extent, then, modern physics has
moved in the direction of philosophic idealism. Mind and matter, if not proved to be of
similar nature, are at least found to be ingredients of one single system. There is no longer
room for the kind of dualism which has haunted philosophy since the days of Descartes.
— James Jeans, addressing the British Association in 1934, recorded in Physics and Philosophy, [15]
Finite picture whose dimensions are a certain amount of space and a certain amount of time;
the protons and electrons are the streaks of paint which define the picture against its space-
time background. Traveling as far back in time as we can, brings us not to the creation of the
picture, but to its edge; the creation of the picture lies as much outside the picture as the artist

is outside his canvas. On this view, discussing the creation of the universe in terms of time
and space is like trying to discover the artist and the action of painting, by going to the edge
of the canvas. This brings us very near to those philosophical systems which regard the
universe as a thought in the mind of its Creator, thereby reducing all discussion of material
creation to futility.
— James Jeans in The Universe Around Us, [16]
 Milne, E. A. (1947). "James Hopwood Jeans. 1877-1946". Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal
Society. 5 (15): 573–570. doi:10.1098/rsbm.1947.0019.
 "England & Wales deaths 1837-2007 Transcription". Findmypast. Retrieved 2016-06-27.

(subscription required (help)). SEP 1946 5g 607 SURREY SE
 Jeans 1944, p. 137.
  Jeans 1981, p. 216.
 Jeans 1929, p. 317.
Here Jeans also refers to the differences between understanding and the other kind of ‘knowing’
referred to above as understanding/intellect and experience (a kind of pre-conceptual being one
with what is known, nonduality. More on this below -
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have all become somewhat accustomed to the picture of the world presented to us by
modern physics which asks us to accept that the world consists of either particles or of waves—
depending on how we decide to analyze it. Suffice it to say that, in some experiments the world
of both light and matter prove to be particulate; and in some experiments the world of both
light and matter prove to be wavular. This empirical ambiguity is so prevalent in the field of
physics that we now refer to the constituents of both light and matter as “wave-particles”, while
ignoring the clearly contradictory nature of the term and its meaning.
Reality, as we all know, is one; and yet it can appear to be divisible into individually distinct and
separate perceivable entities, or appear as waves on a single continuum in which there is no
separation between subject and object. Back in the 1930’s, many were pondering these two
‘versions’ of reality which physics had discovered were complementary but irreconcilable
descriptions of the reality we experience—among them the highly respected mathematician and
dabbler in physics, James Jeans (1877-1946). Jeans couldn’t help noting that these two
complementary versions of reality were radically dissimilar:
“When geography cannot combine all the qualities we want in a single map, it provides us with
more than one map. Theoretical physics has done the same, providing us with two maps which
are commonly known as the particle-picture and the wave-picture. It is perhaps better to speak
of these two pictures as the particle-parable and the wave-parable.
“The particle-parable, which was first in the field, told us that the material universe consists of
particles existing in space and time.
“…The wave-parable … does not describe the universe as a collection of particles but as a system
10

of waves. …[In this parable,] the universe is no longer a deluge of shot from a battery of
machine-guns, but a stormy sea with the sea taken away and only the abstract quality of
storminess left…” 1
“The old particle-picture which lay within the limits of space and time, broke matter up into a
crowd of distinct particles, and radiation into a shower of distinct photons. The newer and more
accurate wave-picture, which transcends the framework of space and time, recombines the
photons into a single beam of light, and the shower of parallel-moving electrons into a
continuous electric current. Atomicity and division into individual existences are fundamental in
the restricted space-time picture, but disappear in the wider, and as far as we know more
truthful, picture which transcends space and time. In this, atomicity is replaced by … 'holism':
the photons are no longer distinct individuals each going its own way, but members of a single
organization or whole― a beam of light.
“…And is it not conceivable that what is true of the objects perceived may be true also of the
perceiving minds? When we view ourselves in space and time we are quite obviously distinct
individuals; when we pass beyond space and time we may perhaps form ingredients of a
continuous stream of life.” 2
It suddenly struck me, in reading this description of the Wavular version of reality, that this is a
description of ‘the mystical experience’ that occurred to me in my cabin in the woods in 1966. 3
I had experienced a shift in consciousness from what I regarded as the ‘normal’ version of
reality into another, unfamiliar, version of reality. But what does that even mean? What is
‘another version of reality’? Is there more than one reality? You see, there has been no
vocabulary other than that of religion with which to describe the Nondual reality in which one
finds oneself in this so-called ‘mystical’ experience—until now. Perhaps we must look to the
vocabulary of the physicists to comprehend and explain it!
http://www.themysticsvision.com/the-coincidence-of-science-and-mysticism-10-17-2013.html
Compare his notions of The Particulate (Dualist) Version of Reality and The Wavular (Nondual)
Version of Reality .
1. Here, each perceiving subject and each perceived object possesses a unique identity, each
individual subject or object being distinct from any other.
2. Here, every perceiving subject and perceived object consists of smaller units, referred to, in
sequence, as molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles.
3. Here, the consciousness of each subject perceives, in addition to the subject-object duality,
a self-created duality of values, emotions, qualities, consisting of pairs, such as like-dislike,
happy-sad, pleased-displeased, etc.
4. Here, both subjective and objective events occur within the parameters of time and space.
Within these parameters, each perceiving subject (soul?) is born, matures, and eventually dies
(perhaps to reincarnate at a later time).
5. Here, the struggle for individual existence sets creature against creature according to the
diversity of self-interest and motive.
11

1. Here, only one limitless continuum of Consciousness exists, containing within It all
phenomena, including one’s own body, consisting of waves in the continuum.
2. Here, all wavular phenomena consist of and are manifestations of the one continuum,
having no distinct identity of their own.
3. Here, consciousness experiences itself as the one continuum. There is only the One, with no
division anywhere.
4. Here, what is experienced is one’s eternal Self. Time and space do not exist. All that occurs
is the correlation and natural evolution of the waves of the one integrated continuum.
5. Here, all the wavular phenomena move together of one accord, one harmony, one purpose.
In 1966, when I was sitting in my cabin before the fire in the stove, I was experiencing ‘reality’,
as all of us normally do, from the perspective of a distinct individual existing within the
phenomenal universe of time and space. But, following my prayer, I entered into a ‘mystical’
experience. When my mind entered into that unfamiliar realm of awareness, I was suddenly
seeing from the perspective of the one eternal consciousness from whom the world of time and
space is projected and sustained. There was no difference between that one eternal
consciousness and I. And there was no difference between the world and I. One consciousness
pervaded and constituted all. It was clear to me then, and remains clear to me now, that the
ability to make that shift in awareness does not lie within my control. And for that reason, I am
compelled to regard its occurrence as a matter of Grace. Nonetheless, I believe that we are
endowed with the ability to either cooperate with that grace or to turn our backs on it.
…The recognition that the mystical experience provides experiential confirmation of the
scientific theory of an underlying wave-based reality signals the long-awaited and undeniable
coincidence of science and mysticism in our time. ….
Not only is wave-particle duality a recognized property of light (electromagnetic radiation),

quantum theory implies that “wave-particle duality is a property of all matter; the electron,
which we think of as a particle, is really a quantum bundle of an ‘electron-field’ which acts with
wave-like properties.” 4 However, we humans regularly perceive our macroscopic world (which
is made up of the microscopic world) not as Wavular (Nondual), but as Particulate (Dualistic).
Yet these two perspectives (or ‘parables’) are vastly dissimilar.
As anyone can see, neither of these two quite different ‘versions’ of the one reality are remotely
similar to the other, though they are complementary versions of the same reality. How can this
be? Most of us experience the Particulate (Dualist) version of reality everyday. It is our ‘normal’
view of the world. But, few of us, it seems, actually experience the “Spiritual” or Wavular
(Nondual) version even for a few minutes of a lifetime. Nevertheless, it appears that these two
‘versions’ of reality are not entirely independent, though one exists in time and space, and the
other in eternity. Amazingly, they exist together, overlapping, as it were, one projected upon
the other.
.. The wave-theory of the scientists has been around since the late nineteenth century. Mystical
experience and Wave Theory have just never been associated together before. But today marks
a momentous occasion. The recognition that the mystical experience provides experiential
12

confirmation of the scientific theory of an underlying wave-based reality signals the long-
awaited and undeniable coincidence of science and mysticism in our time. …
Not only is wave-particle duality a recognized property of light (electromagnetic radiation),

quantum theory implies that “wave-particle duality is a property of all matter; the electron,
which we think of as a particle, is really a quantum bundle of an ‘electron-field’ which acts with
wave-like properties.” 4 However, we humans regularly perceive our macroscopic world (which
is made up of the microscopic world) not as Wavular (Nondual), but as Particulate (Dualistic).
Yet these two perspectives (or ‘parables’) are vastly dissimilar.
As anyone can see, neither of these two quite different ‘versions’ of the one reality are remotely
similar to the other, though they are complementary versions of the same reality. How can this
be? Most of us experience the Particulate (Dualist) version of reality everyday. It is our ‘normal’
view of the world. But, few of us, it seems, actually experience the “Spiritual” or Wavular
(Nondual) version even for a few minutes of a lifetime. Nevertheless, it appears that these two
‘versions’ of reality are not entirely independent, though one exists in time and space, and the
other in eternity. Amazingly, they exist together, overlapping, as it were, one projected upon
the other.
The Wavular (Nondual) version of reality is absolute; it exists noumenally, but not
phenomenally; that is, it can be seen in inner vision by the higher mind, but does not appear as a
physical reality. “Physical” requires time and space; and that’s where the Particle-version of
reality exists. The two versions of reality exist as exclusive, yet complementary realms, or
perspectives. The Wave-version of reality can be discovered as operative in the Particle-version;
but the Particle-version of reality is ultimately illusory, being identical to the Vedantic concept of
‘Maya’, an appearance.
Some mystics, including myself, have experienced for themselves, in inner vision, that the nature
of reality is wavular, and that one eternal continuum of Consciousness and Bliss is all that is.
How, then, do we get from there to the ‘particulate’ reality that we all normally experience in
the framework of time and space? Is it possible that this Particulate reality is a construct of the
perspectives of our individual minds?
What is this indescribable continuum of Consciousness― this wavy ocean of reality? It is the
universal Mind that encompasses and includes everything, including each of ‘our’ individual
minds? We are in it and part of it; we and everything in the universe flow along in its tides and
evolve according to its whims. It is the manifest Divinity. It is God’s lila, His play!
But the real unanswerable question is ‘whence comes this Particulate world that we
experience?’ If the Nondual, Wavular, vision of reality is the correct one, whence comes this
Dualistic, Particulate, vision of reality that is ubiquitously present to each of us throughout our
lives? Is it a result of human perception only? And if it is a product of our own perception, is it
ego-generated? In other words, is the Nondual ‘ocean’ of reality overlayed by a projected
‘reality’ produced by the sense of ‘I’—which then necessitates ‘not-I’ (or ‘the other’), and hence
a multitude of pairs of subjects and objects? Or is our delusion a universal one, created by God?
In my own experience, these two ‘frames of reality’, the Particulate and the Wavular, the Dualist
and the Nondualist, are wholly differentiated perspectives that almost seem to be separate
realms: One, the Particulate, is our normal, personal, ‘Technicolor’, world of subject-object
13

perception and interior mind-born qualities and values. The second, the Wavular, is a non-
personal, transcendent, awareness from a perspective beyond time and space, which is identical
with an eternal and undivided Consciousness that spreads as waves to include all existence. 5
The Wavular, Nondual, reality is absolute; but the Particulate, Dualist, reality is a product of the
individual mind. It is initiated, I believe, by the arising of the sense of ‘I’: that which we refer to
as “the ego”.
Let us examine the evidence: the creation of all the pairs of opposites (dualities) occurs in the
individual mind, and is personally unique for each individual. Each mentally constructed value is
created from the unique perspective of each ‘I’: I-other, here-there, now-then, night-day,
pleasant-unpleasant, like-dislike, good-bad, beautiful-ugly, etc. One thing is essential to the
creation of each of these dualities: the ego, the I. Without the ‘I’, they have no footing in this
world.
But, as we all know, that ego is a false sense of identity. It vanishes when the real I, the one
Consciousness, the absolute Self, is revealed. That absolute Self is experienced in the awareness
of the Wavular (Nondual) reality when, by divine grace, one is lifted above the individually-
created Particulate perspective to that of the divine Mind. There, all is one Self. But how can we
reach that ethereal vision? First, know that your current Dualist perspective is false, and begin
behaving in such a way to bring about the transformation of your perspective from that of your
individual self to that of the One. I know well that it is not an easy task, and one that will require
long effort; but you can begin simply by treating everyone with love.
The brilliant physicist, David Bohm (1917-1992) regarded these two ‘realms’, the Wavular and
the Particulate, as the “Implicate Order” and the “Explicate Order” respectively. Here is an
explication of Bohm’s vision by Michael Talbot:
“Bohm …posits that we can look at reality as if it consists of two levels. He calls the level we
inhabit—where things like electrons, toaster ovens, and human beings appear to be separate
from one another—the explicate order. The level of subatomic reality—where things cease to
have separate location, quantum interconnectedness reigns, and all things become a seamless
and unbroken whole—he calls the implicate order.
As we have seen, because everything in the universe is ultimately constituted out of things that
exist at this unbroken level, the apparent separateness of objects at our own level of existence is
also an illusion. …Because we are constituted out of the nonlocal level, Bohm feels it is
ultimately meaningless to speak about consciousness as having a specific location. It may
manifest inside our heads while we function in life, but the true home of consciousness is in the
implicate, says Bohm. Thus, consciousness, the great ocean of consciousness that has divided
itself up into all human beings, also exists in all things. Despite its apparent inanimate nature, in
its own way a rock is also permeated with consciousness So are grains of sand, ocean waves,
and stars.”
(from Michael Talbot, Mysticism And The New Physics, New York, Penguin Group, 1993; p. 158
[originally published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981].)
We internalized the institutionalized ‘mind’ of the explicate order, we come to believe that this
is what normal experience is like, that it is normal to perceive, live in, experience and interact
14

with this type of constituted reality. The type of intersubjectivity we become and then are part
of is ascribes to this kind of reality, thinking, perception, experience and consciousness. The
intersubjectivity of the implicate order, of nonduality of wavular theory is not available to us, so
we do not internalize it, its values, attitudes, norms and practice.
The explicate or institutionalized intersubjectivity we internalize and employ to constitute our

selves, our realities and existence are as follows – of the The Particulate (Dualist) Version of
Reality
1. Here, each perceiving subject and each perceived object possesses a unique identity, each
individual subject or object being distinct from any other.
2. Here, every perceiving subject and perceived object consists of smaller units, referred to, in
sequence, as molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles.
3. Here, the consciousness of each subject perceives, in addition to the subject-object duality,
a self-created duality of values, emotions, qualities, consisting of pairs, such as like-dislike,
happy-sad, pleased-displeased, etc.
4. Here, both subjective and objective events occur within the parameters of time and space.
Within these parameters, each perceiving subject (soul?) is born, matures, and eventually dies
(perhaps to reincarnate at a later time).
5. Here, the struggle for individual existence sets creature against creature according to the
diversity of self-interest and motive.
The self, consciousness, existences a, realities and life-worlds of the ‘mystics’ are of this The
Wavular (Nondual) Version of Reality kind and almost Vedaita kind – this is where we come
from and this is where we going after departure, as described and experience by those who have
passed on from this existence to so-called after-life.
1. Here, only one limitless continuum of Consciousness exists, containing within It all
phenomena, including one’s own body, consisting of waves in the continuum.
2. Here, all wavular phenomena consist of and are manifestations of the one continuum,
having no distinct identity of their own.
3. Here, consciousness experiences itself as the one continuum. There is only the One, with no
division anywhere.
4. Here, what is experienced is one’s eternal Self. Time and space do not exist. All that occurs
is the correlation and natural evolution of the waves of the one integrated continuum.
5. Here, all the wavular phenomena move together of one accord, one harmony, one purpose.
15

Concerning the origin of the universe in terms of this explicate (scientific big-bang theories) and
in terms of the implicate perspective (religious interpretations) see this article
http://www.themysticsvision.com/how-science-got-it-all-wrong-6-23-2014.html
Science and Gnosis on the origin of the universe and other things –
Gnosis is possible only with the elimination of the ego-mechanism by which a person’s
awareness is limited to that of a separate individual identity. This ego-mechanism is a subtle
mental obscuration that structures a false identification with the biological and psychological
processes of individuation. Thus, instead of being aware of the real I-identity that is universal
Consciousness, one is restricted to a false artificial identification with the individual’s biological
and psychological processes. The eternal Consciousness which is essentially one thereby
becomes perceived in the awareness of the individual as a separate ‘me-identity’. However, this
ego-mechanism, present in all beings, may be dispelled by an interior revelation that we can
only regard as ‘divine Grace’. It is a sudden interior illumination that reveals to the human
awareness the one eternal Consciousness, which is the origin and substratum of all individuated
consciousness.
Both the word, 'science'—from the Latin scientia, and the word, gnosis—from the ancient Greek,
mean “to know”, but the knowledge is of two kinds. Each kind of knowledge has a long and well
documented history: Science has developed over the centuries through the positing of rational
theories and the rigorous accumulation of physical data, modifying its position as reason,
observation and data dictate. Gnosis is also based on experience, but it is experience that is
extra-sensual, supra-rational, and wholly subjective, or personal. Science is confirmed by
evidence derived from empirical observation; gnosis is confirmed by evidence derived from
introspective revelation. Science pertains to knowledge of the gross, material world; gnosis
pertains to knowledge of the subtle, spiritual foundation of the world.
In recent years, after this article was originally written in 2006, I have speculated in various
writings that the divine breath of the Creator became manifest in time and space as a burst of
high frequency electromagnetic radiation—at levels of intensity in the gamma range or above—
which scientists refer to as ‘the Big Bang’. This theory seems to me a likely one—much more
likely than the materialist theories of contemporary science—and is explained at length and in
detail in several of my later articles and book publications, including 'The Phenomenon of Light',
'How God Made The World', 'Recent Theological Developments', and 'First Light'--each of which
may be found on the Menu at my website: www.themysticsvision.weebly.com.
http://www.themysticsvision.com/science-and-gnosis-orig-2006-rev-10-14-14.html
The Problem of Consciousness

Steve Dzemidzenka
dissertation on The Problem of Consciousness which offers a highly intelligent summation of the
most pressing problems confronting the paradigm of materialistic science today, along with an
astute presentation of the radical solution to these problems
Our Mathematical Universe And The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Copyright © 2014 by Steve Dzemidzenka
In this new ontological paradigm, Consciousness is fundamentally the only thing that exists. Our
individual consciousness exists only because reality itself is Consciousness. What we call ‘the
16

external universe’ is just the holographic matrix/sense data projected into our awareness. The
matrix itself is computed by Cosmic Consciousness according to the algorithms and equations of
the Grand Mathematical Structure.
Max Planck: “I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as a derivative of

consciousness.”
John Wheeler: “I suggest that we may never understand this strange thing, the quantum, until
we understand how information may underlie reality. Information may not be just what we
‘learn’ about the world. It may be what ‘makes’ the world.”
Ken Wilber in his book, The Eye of Spirit: “From De Broglie’s assertion that mechanism demands
a mysticism to Einstein’s Spinozist pantheism, from Schrodinger’s Vedanta idealism to
Heisenberg’s Platonist archetypes: these pioneering physicists were united in the belief that the
universe simply does not make sense and cannot satisfactorily be explained, without the
inclusion in some profound way, of consciousness itself. And using words that few of these
pioneering physicists would object to, James Jeans pointed out that it looks more and more
certain that the only way to explain the universe is to maintain that it exists in the mind of some
eternal spirit.”
James Jeans: “I am inclined to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that
the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material
universe… The universe seems to me to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine. It
may well be, it seems to me, that each individual consciousness ought to be compared to a cell
in a universal mind.”
George Wald: “Mind, rather than emerging as a late outgrowth in the evolution of life, has
existed always as the matrix, the source and condition of physical reality—the stuff of which
physical reality is composed is mind-stuff. What we recognize as the material universe, the
universe of space and time and elementary particles and energies, is then an avatar, the
materialization of primal mind. In that sense there is no waiting for consciousness to arise. It is
there always”.
Scientific materialism is a philosophical opinion that is closely associated with science. It grew up
alongside science, and many people have a hard time distinguishing it from science. But it is not
science. It is merely a philosophical opinion. But it is one that leads to incomprehensible
conceptual difficulties in the understanding of the universe― especially the hard problem of
consciousness and the phenomena of subjective experience.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness

In the beautiful words of David Chalmers, “Consciousness poses the most baffling problem in
science. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is
nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation
in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the
explanations always seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to believe that the
problem is intractable, and that no good explanation can be given.”
Let’s start with giving a rough definition of what we mean by consciousness here. Consciousness
is something that has a capacity for subjective experience. I am not going to define it further by
trying to define what subjective experience is. It would be a waste of time as we all already know
intuitively what it is. When you notice that you feel sad or excited, angry or scared, feel desire,
see colors, hear sounds, taste flavors, feel solidity of touch, when you notice your own thinking
17

and awareness of abstract concepts – you notice your own subjective experience. Its existence is
fundamentally the only undeniable fact that each one of us knows for oneself. The question is
‘what in our universe of elementary particles accounts for the existence of
consciousness/subjective experience?’
It’s not that we lack some futuristic technology to probe into a brain. The problem goes so much
deeper – it is more than impossible – it is inconceivable how subjective experience can possibly
arise in a ‘sea’ of elementary particles doing their mindless thing.
The Cartesian dualism between Matter and Consciousness has plagued science from the
beginning. No one has a clue how to resolve it. Literally all attempts to approach the problem
have been shown to be utterly unsatisfactory. The main reason for that is the unbridgeable
conceptual chasm between the categories of matter/energy and consciousness/subjective
experience. These two phenomena are fundamentally of a different type, and expressing one in
terms of another is called ‘category mistake’.
It’s been assumed by scientists of a materialistic bent that this dualism must be resolved in
physical terms – meaning that it’s assumed that matter is at the very bottom of the ontological
hierarchy, that matter is fundamental and is the substratum of everything that exists—that
literally everything is made up of Matter and can be explained in terms of Matter, its measurable
parameters and its behavior. In other words, it can be explained in terms of mass, charge, spin,
speed, and motion. There is essentially nothing else in the conceptual apparatus of materialism
that could be invoked to account for the phenomena of consciousness/ subjective experience.
So how do we find a way out of this cognitive dissonance? The hope of those stuck in the
materialist/physicalist camp is that somehow arranging zillions of these elementary particles into
some kind of elaborate networked configuration in space will give rise to subjective experience –
that somehow, as if by magic, the phenomenon of consciousness will emerge out of the spatial
organization of purely physical entities. After all, the neural network of brain matter is in essence
nothing more than a certain arrangement of interacting particles in space. There is really
nothing else to it on the fundamental level. Is there room for subjective experience in this
picture? No. From the materialist/physicalist perspective, the source of subjective experience is
completely incomprehensible.
Some philosophers like Willard Quine and Daniel Dennett got so desperate that they started
insisting on an even more incomprehensible solution: that subjective experience is just an
illusion and really does not exist at all.
Some insist that consciousness is mere information processing and integration, but somehow
they fail to realize that, even though consciousness has characteristics of information
processing/integration and of intelligence, and these characteristics can be simulated in a
computer (aka artificial intelligence), these characteristics only abstract certain aspects of
consciousness while forgetting about the experience itself, which is really the key characteristic.
Christof Koch said, “You can simulate weather in a computer, but it will never be ‘wet’.”
Similarly, you can simulate intelligence in a computer, but it will never be conscious.
The materialist/physicalist approach to consciousness raises many questions; for instance,

consider the example of the experience of vision: Thermonuclear reactions in the Sun produce
18

photons – carrier particles of electromagnetic energy. The photons propagate towards earth and
eventually hit optic nerves in our eyes. The optic nerve, in response, generates electrical signals
that travel further along the neural pathways of the brain. Neural cells in the brain get excited
and start firing more electrical impulses. This entire cascade of electrical activity is a purely
physical phenomenon, and, despite being undoubtedly difficult to trace and decode in detail in a
lab, represents absolutely no fundamental conceptual problem. But suddenly, as if by magic, in
the midst of this purely physical phenomena, arises the subjective experience of, let’s say,
redness – in other words, the perception, awareness, and experience of color. Who/what is
experiencing this? The brain and neural cells? The chemical and electrical activity? It’s utterly
incomprehensible.
It’s plainly obvious that neither the neural cells of the brain nor the electrochemical
reactions/interactions between them experiences anything in themselves. We must assume that
they are only communicating information about what to experience to some other entity― an
independent entity that is capable of experiencing in a fundamental and irreducible way. In
other words, an entity that is, in itself, actually capable of a subjective experience. One such
entity—in fact, the only entity that is fundamentally capable of subjective experience―is called
consciousness. The question then becomes ‘How can we explain how the neural cells of the
physical brain can even interact with this independent and immaterial consciousness?’ This is
called the problem of interaction and it’s resolved below.
In order for us to see the light at the end of the tunnel, we need to start with re-stating that
matter/energy and consciousness/subjective experience are fundamentally of a different type –
of different categories. In order for us to make sense of how one interacts with another, we
must admit that both must be of the same type – of the same category; otherwise we are stuck
in an irreconcilable conceptual chasm.
We have two alternatives here: either both are of a material/physical type made of the stuff of
matter/energy or both are of some intangible/immaterial type since consciousness seems to be
immaterial. At this point, we don’t know which alternative is true, but we do know that the
materialistic alternative, which in essence is trying to reduce consciousness to physical terms,
leads us to incomprehensible conceptual difficulties and even forces some to completely deny
the existence of the subjective experience altogether, treating it as a mere illusion.. So, let’s see
where the other alternative leads us, and let us judge the tree by its fruits.
We know that consciousness/subjective experience is immaterial. But how can matter/energy

be immaterial as well? Isn’t that just another incomprehensible idea? At first glance, it seems to
be. After all, we believe we look into the outside world and feel its solidity. But the image of the
outside world and the feeling of solidity as well as all other sensations of it are just that –
immaterial sensations inside your consciousness, sense data. Even the materialists agree that we
don’t see the outside world itself; we only see our sense data. The presence of this sense data in
our awareness does not at all mean that it is produced by a material universe – it only means
that it is produced by something. And here comes a very elegant solution which has become
possible to conceive only recently thanks to some new developments in physics and computer
science: Modern physics is highly mathematical. In fact, at the level of subatomic particles –
which is literally all that’s currently believed to exist – it’s pure math. Can it be that what we call
‘the material universe’ is really nothing more than an immaterial mathematical structure? Can it
be that our sense data is produced according to this mathematical structure?
19

It’s not merely my idea that the universe is mathematical; there are some Nobel level theoretical
physicists saying exactly that: “it from bit” in the words of John Wheeler. For example: Max
Tegmark, in his book, Our Mathematical Universe, comes to the conclusion that: “Math does a
decent job inspiring wonder among physicists about why it works so well.” The answer isn’t
obvious, but he thinks he knows why: “It’s because reality is math”. Seth Lloyd proposes that the
universe itself is a quantum computer (computing the mathematical structure of physical laws).
Paul Dirac says, “God is a mathematician of a very high order and He used advanced
mathematics in constructing the universe.” Galileo Galilei declared that “The book of nature is
written in the language of mathematics.”
Please realize that the existence of the universe is not denied. What is meant here is that it’s not
material, but mathematical; and this mathematical structure representing the universe is an
elaborate system of abstract equations and algorithms according to which our sense data (the
holographic matrix) is produced. In other words, the universe is a mathematical simulation.
But the question is, ‘where does this mathematical structure exist?’ If we cannot imagine where
it can possibly exist, it means that we are stuck in another incomprehensible pit. After all, it’s
very hard to imagine that a mathematical structure exists by itself in some kind of void.
Moreover, there must be something that computes it because we do know that the universe is
dynamic and not static. Fortunately, the answer is easy.
From our own subjective experience, we know that all abstract concepts, including
mathematical ones, exist in our individual consciousness. If we re-interpret the entire physical
universe as The Grand Mathematical Structure, then this structure must also exist in some kind
of consciousness – not in our individual consciousness, but in a Consciousness external to ours.
Cosmic Consciousness?
This Cosmic Consciousness literally thinks (more precisely, computes) The Grand Mathematical
Structure into existence at this very moment. The results of this computation are input into our
individual consciousness as colors of a 3D image, sounds, smells, flavors, sensations of solidity,
temperature, pleasure/pain, and all other sense data. You can also think of the totality of sense
data as a virtual matrix (yes, just like in The Matrix movie) – a matrix that we naively mistake for
the external ‘material’ world around us – only instead of machines, as in the movie, there is
Cosmic Consciousness. In the plainest language, the external ‘material’ universe is simply the
thoughts of Cosmic Consciousness projected into our awareness as sense data. As Plato
famously stated in his Allegory of The Cave, we only observe the shadows of reality. In other
words, we only observe sense data (shadows) projected onto our limited consciousness
according to The Grand Mathematical Structure (abstract Platonist forms).
Instead of the physical universe, there is Cosmic Consciousness out there; thus it’s no wonder
that our individual consciousness exists. And obviously, since it’s consciousness here and there –
inside and outside, both have no trouble interacting with each other.
In this new ontological paradigm, Consciousness is fundamentally the only thing that exists.
Everything else that exists exists inside Consciousness either as an individual consciousness or as
information/experience/sense data – absolutely without any physicality. Our individual
consciousness exists only because reality itself is Consciousness. What we call ‘the external
20

universe’ is just the holographic matrix/sense data projected into our awareness. The matrix
itself is computed by Cosmic Consciousness according to the algorithms and equations of the
Grand Mathematical Structure.
Cartesian dualism is completely resolved in a worldview in which, both on the inside and on the
outside, there is nothing but consciousness. Both are of the same immaterial type/category and
thus both have no trouble interacting with each other: both interact by exchanging information
(which is immaterial as well) and not by exchanging physical particles of energy as in the
materialistic view. The information is translated into sense data/subjective experiences, and
specifies how our individual consciousness is changed to produce experience.
This, no doubt, sounds fantastical (though not so much to philosophers of an Eastern mindset),
but it fits very nicely and is infinitely more comprehensible than trying to explain how
consciousness/subjective experience arises in a swirl of elementary particles doing their
mindless thing. I am afraid we are literally forced by reason to accept this idealistic worldview.
Here, we should apply Sherlock Holmes’s dictum: “When you have excluded the impossible,
whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”.
There can be no question on which side of this debate modern physics falls!
Let’s review the most obvious implications of this new ontology, which is literally forced upon us by
the necessity to explain the existence of consciousness/subjective experience:
1. It resolves the Cartesian dualism and the problem of interaction.
2. It resolves the hard problem of consciousness. It turns out that if consciousness is assumed to be
fundamental, the problem is not hard at all. In the words of Donald Hoffman: “If you want to solve
the mind-body problem you can take the physical as given and explain the genesis of conscious
experience, or take conscious experience as given and explain the genesis of the physical. Explaining
the genesis of conscious experience from the physical has proved, so far, intractable. Explaining the
genesis of the physical from conscious experience has proved quite feasible”. The key to the latter,
as I have described, is realizing that matter/energy and consciousness/subjective experience MUST
be of the same type/category: either both are material/physical (which proved intractable and
incomprehensible) or both are immaterial (proved extremely productive). Otherwise, there is no
conceptual bridge to link them and conceive even in principle how one can interact with another .
3. It provides the ontological framework for the resolution of the duality of particles/waves in
Quantum Mechanics. There are no particles or waves in the mind of Cosmic Consciousness; there
are only the equations of The Grand Mathematical Structure. According to the current formulations,
these are equations of the wave function. At the point of observation, the equations are computed
and the results are translated into our sense data.
4. It resolves the quantum entanglement mystery – “spooky action at a distance”. When two
photons become entangled, regardless of how far they travel away from each other, they still keep
an informational link to each other; i.e., measuring the spin of one photon instantly results in the
opposite spin for another, despite the fact that many light years might be separating them,
obviously violating ‘the speed of light’ limit. That’s a great mystery in current physics; but it is
resolved in the new paradigm, in which all that exists inside the Grand Mathematical Structure is an
21

equation that describes this system of entangled photons. There is no need to communicate
anything across light years as the information about spins is simply embedded as variables in the
equation itself. When the spin of one photon is measured by us, the equation is computed by
Cosmic Consciousness. The result includes the spins for both photons. They are determined at
exactly the same time.
5. It explains the nature of space. There is no ‘space’ inside Cosmic Consciousness. There is only The
Grand Mathematical Structure computed by it. This mathematical structure includes primitive
numeric variables like mass, charge, spin, distance, time interval, speed, etc – all integrated into
abstract geometry. Space itself is an abstraction in that abstract geometry.
6. It explains what space is expanding into. Astronomical observations show that the universe is
expanding – more precisely, the space itself is expanding. The question of course is what is it
expanding into? Is there more space beyond? That would mean that space is infinite – something
that physics absolutely cannot accept, as it insists at all costs that the universe is a finite system. It’s
a great mystery. In the new paradigm, space itself is simply abstract geometry of The Grand
Mathematical Structure. There is nothing that is expanding into anything – only variables in the
equations of The Grand Mathematical Structure change their values.
7. It explains what space curves into. The general relativity theory showed that space is curved
around mass, but what exactly does space curve into? Space needs another dimension to do this. If
space is simply abstract geometry of The Grand Mathematical Structure, this problem resolves itself.
8. It explains why multi-dimensional formulations like those in string theory do not present a
fundamental problem. Even though our sense data seems to be 3-dimensional, we are not forced to
insist that The Grand Mathematical Structure itself is formulated in and is limited to 3 dimensional
geometry. For example, a wave-system of electrons does not exist in 3-dimensional or 10-
dimensional space – it exists as a formula/equation in the mind of Cosmic Consciousness. The
equation is computed and the result of the computation is translated into our 3D sense data. This
also means that the holographic principle can work for our universe, as it shows that the three
dimensions of reality we observe may in fact be a two-dimensional information structure “painted”
on some sort of cosmological surface. It’s all hard to imagine, but if the reality is The Grand
Mathematical Structure, than it’s easy to see how the mathematical formalism of the holographic
principle can literally describe our universe.
9. It explains the nature of the substance of elementary particles. There is no physicality/material

substance in the mind that is Cosmic Consciousness; there are no electrons, quarks, atoms, etc. –
there are only numeric variables like mass, charge, spin, distance, etc. These are variables in the
equations of the Grand Mathematical Structure. In other words, if we wish to speak in terms of
Objects/Properties, there are indeed properties, but no objects. There is no substance out of which
objects are made.
10. It explains why math is so good at describing our universe and why the physical laws that we
discover are mathematical. Cosmic Consciousness is the best mathematician in existence; It
designed The Grand Mathematical Structure. When physicists discover mathematical equations that
describe the universe, they literally discover equations that correspond to those in the mind of
Cosmic Consciousness. We are not completely there yet; all the equations we have discovered so far
are approximations at this point. But we will get there some day and we will know exactly what the
22

Grand Mathematical Structure is.
11. It explains the complete discretization of the universe. Imagine a thought experiment where we
use a hypothetical microscope capable of magnifying matter without any (uncertainty) constrains.
With every jump of magnification, The Grand Mathematical Structure needs to be computed to
produce new sense data. If matter were continuous there would be an infinite number of
magnification jumps possible – a situation akin to Zeno’s paradoxes, so the computation process
that Cosmic Consciousness would have to do, would be infinite. For the computation to be finite, it
must be done in discrete blocks. Moreover, the precision of the computation must always be the
same. The level of discreteness and precision is probably specified by Planck’s constant, Planck’s
length, Planck’s time, etc. There is a minimal mass and a minimal amount of energy. The geometry of
space time is discrete/pixilated; i.e., there is minimal length, area, and volume. This is in complete
agreement with Quantum physics. Quantum means discreet. Discretization of The Grand
Mathematical Structure is the mechanism to deal with computational infinities.
12. It explains where consciousness comes from. Our individual consciousness exists only because
Consciousness itself is what the ultimate reality is. We are just ripples in the infinite ocean of Cosmic
Consciousness. Metaphorically, the best way to visualize the relationship between Cosmic
Consciousness and our individual consciousness is by imagining an ocean. The ocean itself is Cosmic
Consciousness, but each individual wave in the ocean is our individual consciousness. Both are
inseparable – just as each wave is a part of the entire ocean, though it is at the same time a distinctly
identified entity within the ocean.
13. It resolves the fine-tuned universe problem. By recent calculations, the probability of ending up
with a universe such as ours is practically nil. There have been multiple parameters identified that—
to an extremely high level of precision—must be exactly what they are for the universe to allow the
existence of stars, stable atoms, and life. Isn’t it highly ironic that we live in a universe that we
observe to be a statistical improbability of the multitude of “cosmic coincidences”! But, if there is an
entity that is conscious and which computes The Grand Mathematical Structure into our sense data,
then this entity must have designed it. And if that is so, then the fine-tuned universe problem simply
falls away.
14. It resolves the problem of free will and purpose in universe. In the traditional materialistic
universe, there is no purpose in the impersonal ‘ocean’ of elementary particles doing their mindless
thing. But, if the universe is designed, it’s designed for a purpose. The purpose of human life must
obviously be aligned with the purpose of its Creator. But it’s a question for free will to decide on
that. Free will in itself is an inherent and irreducible capacity of intellect, which is itself an inherent
and irreducible capacity of human consciousness. In the animal consciousness, these capacities
appear to be negligible or completely zero.
15. It explains the nature and function of the brain. The human brain is simply an algorithm (in The
Grand Mathematical Structure) that processes information and gives instructions to our individual
consciousness about what and how to experience. By finding the right triggers, it’s possible to
instruct our consciousness to experience (or not to experience) all kinds of things – e.g. psychedelic
substances, anesthesia, etc. Another function of this algorithm is to filter out information. Clearly,
there is so much more happening in The Grand Mathematical Structure than what our consciousness
is instructed to experience. It should be possible in principle to find ways to tweak a brain to filter
out information.
23

16. It explains why there will never be a Turing machine (aka a binary/quantum computer) capable
of consciousness/ subjective experience. Even a human brain cannot produce consciousness; it only
imprints on and gives instructions to an entity that is fundamentally capable of subjective
experience. Such an independent entity is called consciousness. Intelligence is not consciousness;
it’s only one aspect that characterizes it – experience being the main one. A computer can only
simulate intelligence – thanks to some smart algorithms; but fundamentally, all there is is just a flow
of electrons and voltage states (computed according to Boolean logic in the case of a binary
computer and the logic of superpositions in the case of a quantum computer). In other words, there
are just ones and zeros in a logical pattern. What is possible, however, is to integrate computers into
a brain and influence consciousness through it. This actually has already been demonstrated.
17. It explains the nature of mystical experience. Cosmic Consciousness can literally flow into an
individual consciousness and become its subjective experience. Needless to say, all boundaries are
dissolved in that state and there is simply an awareness of cosmic oneness and the most perfect
state of consciousness.
It must be said, however, that, while all of this is completely consistent with the scientific evidence,
none of it is testable and provable in the strict (experimental) sense, as this entire subject is what’s
called a meta subject – as in metaphysics. But it’s obvious that the materialistic paradigm is exactly
of the same nature as well; it too is completely untestable and unprovable, and in addition, it is
completely incomprehensible.
Truly, all we know is our own sense-data on top of which we layer an elaborate system of
abstractions (language). What lies behind the sense-data – the physical universe or Cosmic
Consciousness– is not accessible to scientific inquiry in the strict (experimental) sense. Physics
operates solely inside the realm of the sense-data in the sense that constructions and conclusions of
our intellect are compared against experimental data – which is nothing more than sense-data. But if
we want to go further, we have no means to compare constructions and conclusions of our intellect
against what lies behind the sense-data. Only pure reason not backed by experimental data (or
mystical experience) can take us there.
It would seem that as long as pure reason actually solves problems in a manner that is both self
consistent within itself and consistent with the conclusions of experimental physics, we are
completely justified to accept it as our belief system. The alternative is a forever unresolved tangle
of incomprehensible conceptual difficulties. Here, it’s really not a question of rebuttal – both
paradigms are equally irrefutable in a strict sense, and by standards generally accepted and
practiced in the physical sciences. Here, it’s a question of which paradigm has a better explanatory
power and the one with a greater power should be chosen.
So if the idealistic paradigm is not testable and provable in the strict sense, do we need to bother?
The answer and the choice is strictly yours. However, if you do decide it’s not worth anything, you
must also admit that sticking habitually to the materialistic paradigm, from the perspective of formal
proof, is not only equally unjustified for the same reasons as above, but is actually counter
productive and, at this point – after several millennia of intellectually struggling to think in terms of
the materialistic paradigm – even dumb, as it only leads to an incomprehensible conceptual chasm
with no hope of resolution, as the history has shown.
24

So the choice is yours: either stay agnostic, waiting for a resolution which will literally never come if
you insist on strict formal experimental proof, or simply pick a side. By picking the idealistic side,
many of the immense conceptual difficulties are resolved – while at the same time incorporating and
even elevating math and mathematical physics into the tools by means of which we truly discover
the content of the mind of God. For me, the choice is easy. The age of materialism is overdue to be
overthrown once and for all. Enjoy!
P.S.
I am not theistic at all in the traditional sense, but needless to say, Cosmic Consciousness is of course
instantly identified with God (God The Father in Christian terms – not God The Son). Cosmic
Consciousness is fundamentally the only ‘thing’ that exists – thus It is omnipresent, because
everything else exists inside It. For this very reason, It’s omniscient; Its thoughts constitute The
Grand Mathematical Structure. It’s omnipotent – because by changing Its thoughts, It changes the
universe. The act of designing and thinking The Grand Mathematical Structure into existence is an
act of love. Cosmic Consciousness is infinite, but It divided a finite part of Itself into distinct entities –
us. Thus we are created in the image of God.
Ironically, I’m reminded of a great quote from Robert Jastrow’s “God and the Astronomers”: “For
the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad dream. He
has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest peak; and as he pulls
himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of mystics who have been sitting there for
centuries”.
* * *
The latter reminds one of the famous story of the Journey of the Birds. The
Conference of Birds: the Sufi's journey to God: Farid ud-Din Attar ...
https://www.amazon.com/Conference-Birds-Sufis-journey-God/dp/1908388072
Written in 1177, 'The Conference of Birds' is a Muslim mystical allegory dealing with the struggles
and ordeals a soul must face to achieve enlightenment. The Conference of the Birds or Speech of the
Birds, is a long and celebrated Sufi poem of approximately 4500 lines written in Persian by the poet
Farid ud-Din Attar, who is commonly known as Attar of Nishapur. Wikipedia
Originally published: 1177
Author: Attar of Nishapur
Genre: Epic poetry
Characters: Simurgh, Chamberlain, peacock, parrot, Duck, Partridge, Owl, hoopoe, Sparrow,
nightingale, Heron, Falcon, Dove
Written in 1177, 'The Conference of Birds' is a Muslim mystical allegory dealing with the struggles
and ordeals a soul must face to achieve enlightenment. One thousand birds assemble to hear the
Hoopoe bird (a spiritual master) who describes how they must seek the Simurgh, their true King.
Many give excuses: they are happy with love or treasure, or fame, or any number of other worldly
delights, and do not see the need for an arduous adventure in search of a semi-mythical sovereign.
But the journey begins, leading the avian pilgrims through seven valleys where the travelers
confront their own individual limitations and fears. Only 30 birds complete the journey, and discover
25

that they themselves are the Simurgh they have sought. As with all truly mystical literature, 'The
Conference of Birds' teaches that the aim of the quest is the discovery of the Divine within.
http://www.themysticsvision.com/where-consciousness-comes-from-2008-revised-12-10-14.html
Where Consciousness Comes From

http://www.themysticsvision.com/how-do-we-know-2008.html
http://www.themysticsvision.com/uploads/1/3/9/2/13928072/mysticism_and_science_-_a_call_for
_reconciliation.pdf
5
CONTENTS
Preface
7
Introduction
9
1. The Experience of The Self
16
2. On Learned Ignorance
25
3. The Uncertain Science
33
4. The Implicate Order
40
5. The Interconnectedness of All Things
47
6. The Constancy of The Whole
55
7. The Unity of God
61
8. The Eternal Return
68
9. Consciousness
76
10. The Soul
85
11. The Logos
95
12. Toward A Synthesis Of Science And Gnosis
104
Epilogue
111
Notes
115
Bibliography
117
About The Author
119
http://www.themysticsvision.com/uploads/1/3/9/2/13928072/the_supreme_self.pdf
vii
CONTENTS
Preface.......................
.......................
..........ix
PART ONE
:
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SELF
1. The Awakening...................................
.............. 3
2. The Common Vision ...............................
......... 9
3. Enlightenment...................................
.............. 18
4. The Kingdom of God..............................
........ 33
5. Encounter With The Guru .........................
..... 38
6. The Wave And The Ocean ..........................
26

... 43
PART TWO
:
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF
1. Vedanta.........................................
.................. 49
2. Sankhya.........................................
.................. 57
3. Taoism ..........................................
.................. 60
4. Buddhism........................................
................ 66
5. Shaivism ........................................
................. 70
6
Judaism ..........................................
................. 75
7. Christianity ....................................
................. 81
8. Islam ...........................................
.................... 86
PART THREE:
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF
1. Science And Gnosis..............................
.......... 93
2. Consciousness...................................
............ 108
3. Mind............................................
.................. 111
viii
CONTENTS
(Continued)
4. Soul............................................
................... 116
5. The Problem of Evil .............................
........ 120
6. Personality .....................................
............... 123
7. The Celestial Dynamics Of Grace................ 1
26
8. Freedom Or Determinism? .........................
.. 135
PART FOUR:
THE WORSHIP OF THE SELF
1. The Appearance of Duality.......................
.... 145
2. The Ultimate Unity..............................
......... 160
3. Devotion And Grace..............................
....... 164
Appendix...........................................
...................... 172
About The Author...................................
................ 185
Notes .............................................
......................... 186
Bibliography.......................................
..................... 190
http://www.themysticsvision.com/uploads/1/3/9/2/13928072/mysticism_and_science_-_a_call_for_reconciliation.pdf
This great culmination of the desire for knowing can only be described by the mystic, but a reasoned explanation
of the various mechanisms that are involved in the unfolding of this complex universe must be left to the scientist.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-experience/
Religious experiences can be characterized generally as experiences that seem to the

person having them to be of some objective reality and to have some religious import.
That reality can be an individual, a state of affairs, a fact, or even an absence, depending on
the religious tradition the experience is a part of. A wide variety of kinds of experience fall
27

under the general rubric of religious experience. The concept is vague, and the multiplicity
of kinds of experiences that fall under it makes it difficult to capture in any general
account. Part of that vagueness comes from the term ‘religion,’ which is difficult to define in
any way that does not either rule out institutions that clearly are religions, or include terms
that can only be understood in the light of a prior understanding of what religions are.
Nevertheless, we can make some progress in elucidating the concept by distinguishing it
from distinct but related concepts.
First, religious experience is to be distinguished from religious feelings, in the same way that
experience in general is to be distinguished from feelings in general. A feeling of elation, for
example, even if it occurs in a religious context, does not count in itself as a religious
experience, even if the subject later comes to think that the feeling was caused by some
objective reality of religious significance. An analogy with sense experience is helpful here.
If a subject feels a general feeling of happiness, not on account of anything in particular, and
later comes to believe the feeling was caused by the presence of a particular person, that fact
does not transform the feeling of happiness into a perception of the person. Just as a mental
event, to be a perception of an object, must in some sense seem to be an experience of that
object, a religiously oriented mental event, to be a religious experience, must in some way
seem to be an experience of a religiously significant reality. So, although religious feelings
may be involved in many, or even most, religious experiences, they are not the same thing.
Discussions of religious experience in terms of feelings, like Schleiermacher's (1998)
“feeling of absolute dependence,” or Otto's (1923) feeling of the numinous, were
important early contributions to theorizing about religious experience, but some have
since then argued (see Gellman 2001 and Alston 1991, for example) that religious
affective states are not all there is to religious experience. To account for the experiences
qua experiences, we must go beyond subjective feelings.
Religious experience is also to be distinguished from mystical experience. Although there

is obviously a close connection between the two, and mystical experiences are religious
experiences, not all religious experiences qualify as mystical. The word ‘mysticism’ has
been understood in many different ways. James (1902) took mysticism to necessarily
involve ineffability, which would rule out many cases commonly understood to be
mystical. Alston (1991) adopted the term grudgingly as the best of a bad lot and gave it
a semi-technical meaning. But in its common, non-technical sense, mysticism is a specific
religious system or practice, deliberately undertaken in order to come to some realization or
insight, to come to unity with the divine, or to experience the ultimate reality directly. At the
very least, religious experiences form a broader category; many religious experiences come
unbidden, not as the result of some deliberate practice.
Many have thought that there is some special problem with religious language, that it can't
be meaningful in the same way that ordinary language is. The Logical Positivists claimed
that language is meaningful only insofar as it is moored in our experiences of the physical
world. Since we can't account for religious language by linking it to experiences of the
physical world, such language is meaningless. Even though religious claims look in every
way like ordinary assertions about the world, their lack of empirical consequences makes
them meaningless. The principle of verification went through many formulations as it faced
criticism. But if it is understood as a claim about meaning in ordinary language, it seems to
be self-undermining, since there is no empirical way to verify it. Eventually, that approach to
language fell out of favor, but some still use a modified, weaker version to criticize religious
language. For example, Antony Flew (Flew and MacIntyre, 1955) relies on a principle to
28

the effect that if a claim is not falsifiable, it is somehow illegitimate. Martin (1990) and
Nielsen (1985) invoke a principle that combines verifiability and falsifiability; to be
meaningful, a claim must be one or the other. It is not clear that even these modifed and
weakened versions of the verification principle entirely escape self-undermining. Even if they
do, they seem to take other kinds of language with them—like moral language, talk about the
future or past, and talk about the contents of others' minds — that we might be loathe to lose.
Moreover, to deny the meaningfulness of religious-experience claims on the grounds that it is
not moored in experience begs the question, in that it assumes that religious experiences are
not real experiences.
Another possibility is to allow that religious claims are meaningful, but they are not true
or false, because they should not be understood as assertions. Braithwaite (1970), for
example, understands religious claims to be expressions of commitments to sets of values. On
such a view, what appears to be a claim about a religious experience is not in fact a claim at
all. It might be that some set of mental events, with which the experience itself can be
identified, would be the ground and prompting of the claim, but it would not properly be
what the claim is about.
A second challenge to religious-experience claims comes from Wittgensteinian accounts

of language. Wittgenstein (1978) muses at some length on the differences between how
ordinary language is used, and how religious language is used. Others (see Phillips 1970,
for example), following Wittgenstein, have tried to give an explanation of the strangeness of
religious language by invoking the idea of a language-game. Each language-game has its own
rules, including its own procedures for verification. As a result, it is a mistake to treat it like
ordinary language, expecting evidence in the ordinary sense, in the same way that it would be
a mistake to ask for the evidence for a joke. “I saw God” should not be treated in the same
way as “I saw Elvis.” Some even go so far as to say the religious language-game is isolated
from other practices, such that it would be a mistake to derive any claims about history,
geography, or cosmology from them, never mind demand the same kind of evidence for
them. On this view, religious experiences should not be treated as comparable to sense
experiences, but that does not entail that they are not important, nor that they are not in some
sense veridical, in that they could still be avenues for important insights about reality. Such a
view can be attributed to D. Z. Phillips (1970).
While this may account for some of the unusual aspects of religious language, it certainly
does not capture what many religious people think about the claims they make. As
creationism illustrates, many religious folk think it is perfectly permissible to draw empirical
conclusions from religious doctrine. Hindus and Buddhists for many centuries thought there
was a literal Mount Meru in the middle of the (flat, disc-shaped) world. It would be very odd
if “The Buddha attained enlightenment under the bo tree” had to be given a very different
treatment from “The Buddha ate rice under the bo tree” because the first is a religious claim
and the second is an ordinary empirical claim. There are certainly entailment relations
between religious and non-religious claims, too: “Jesus died for my sins” straightforwardly
entails “Jesus died.”
Epistemological Issues
29

Since the subjects of religious experiences tend to take them to be real experiences of
some external reality, we may ask what reason there is to think they are right. That is to
say, do religious experiences amount to good reasons for religious belief? One answer to
that question is what is often called the Argument from Religious Experience: Religious
experiences are in all relevant respects like sensory experiences; sensory experiences are
excellent grounds for beliefs about the physical world; so religious experiences are
excellent grounds for religious beliefs. This argument, or one very like it, can be found in
Swinburne (1979), Alston (1991), Plantinga (1981, 2000), and others. Critics of this
approach generally find ways in which religious experiences are different from sensory
experiences, and argue that those differences are enough to undermine the evidential value of
the experiences. Swinburne (1979) invokes what he calls the “Principle of Credulity,”
according to which one is justified in believing that what seems to one to be present actually
is present, unless some appropriate defeater is operative. He then discusses a variety of
circumstances that would be defeaters in the ordinary sensory case, and argues that those
defeaters do not obtain, or not always, in the case of religious experience. To reject his
argument, one would have to show that religious experience is unlike sensory experience in
that in the religious case, one or more of the defeaters always obtains. Anyone who accepts
the principle has excellent reason to accept the deliverances of religious experience, unless he
or she believes that defeaters always, or almost always, obtain.
Plantinga offers a different kind of argument. According to Cartesian-style

foundationalism, in order to count as justified, a belief must either be grounded in other
justified beliefs, or derive its justification from some special status, like infallibility,
incorrigibility, or indubitability. There is a parallel view about knowledge. Plantinga
(1981) argued that such a foundationalism is inconsistent with holding one's own ordinary
beliefs about the world to be justified (or knowledge), because our ordinary beliefs derived
from sense-experience aren't derived from anything infallible, indubitable, or incorrigible. In
fact, we typically treat them as foundational, in need of no further justification. If we hold
sensory beliefs to be properly basic, then we have to hold similarly formed religious beliefs,
formed on experiences of God manifesting himself to a believer (Plantinga calls them ‘M-
beliefs’), as properly basic. He proposed that human beings have a faculty—what John
Calvin called the ‘sensus divinitatis’—that allows them to be aware of God's actions or
dispositions with respect to them. If beliefs formed by sense-experience can be properly
basic, then beliefs formed by this faculty cannot, in any principled way, be denied that same
status. His developed theory of warrant (2000) implies that, if the beliefs are true, then they
are warranted. One cannot attack claims of religious experience without first addressing the
question as to whether the religious claims are true. He admits that, since there are people in
other religious traditions who have based beliefs about religious matters on similar purported
manifestations, they may be able to make the same argument about their own religious
experiences.
Alston develops a general theory of doxastic practices (constellations of belief-forming

mechanisms, together with characteristic background assumptions and sets of
defeaters), gives an account of what it is to rationally engage in such a practice, and then
argues that at least the practice of forming beliefs on the basis of Christian religious
experiences fulfills those requirements. If we think of the broad doxastic practices we
currently employ, we see that some of them can be justified by the use of other practices. The
practice of science, for example, reduces mostly to the practices of sense-perception,
deductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning (memory and testimony also make
contributions, of course). The justificatory status the practice gives to its product beliefs
30

derives from those more basic practices. Most, however, cannot be so reduced. How are they
justified, then? It seems that they cannot be justified non-circularly, that is, without the use of
premises derived from the practices themselves. Our only justification for continuing to trust
these practices is that they are firmly established, interwoven with other practices and
projects of ours, and have “stood the test of time” by producing mostly consistent sets of
beliefs. They produce a sufficiently consistent set of beliefs if they don't produce massive,
unavoidable contradictions on central matters, either internally, or with the outputs of other
equally well-established practices. If that's all there is to be said about our ordinary practices,
then we ought to extend the same status to other practices that have the same features. He
then argues that the Christian practice of belief-formation on the basis of religious experience
does have those features. Like Plantinga, he admits that such an argument might be equally
available to other religious practices; it all depends on whether the practice in question
generates massive and unavoidable contradictions, on central matters, either internally, or
with other equally well-established practices. To undermine this argument, one would have to
show either that Alston's criteria for rationality of a practice are too permissive, or that
religious practices never escape massive contradictions.
Both Plantinga's and Alston's defense of the epistemic value of religious experiences
turn crucially on some degree of similarity with sense-experience. But they are not
simple arguments from analogy; not just any similarities will do to make the positive
argument, and not just any dissimilarities will do to defeat the argument. The similarities or
dissimilarities need to be epistemologically relevant. It is not enough, for example, to show
that religious experiences do not typically allow for independent public verification, unless
one wants to give up on other perfectly respectable practices, like rational intuition, that also
lack that feature.
The two most important defeaters on the table for claims of the epistemic authority of
religious experience are the fact of religious diversity, and the availability of naturalistic
explanations for religious experiences. Religious diversity is a prima facie defeater for
the veridicality of religious experiences in the same way that wildly conflicting eyewitness
reports undermine each other. If the reports are at all similar, then it may be reasonable to
conclude that there is some truth to the testimony, at least in broad outline. But if two
eyewitness reports disagree on the most basic facts about what happened, then it seems that
neither gives you good grounds for any beliefs about what happened. It certainly seems that
the contents of religious-experience reports are radically different from one another. Some
subjects of religious experiences report experience of nothingness as the ultimate reality,
some a vast impersonal consciousness in which we all participate, some an infinitely perfect,
personal creator. To maintain that one's own religious experiences are veridical, one
would have to a) find some common core to all these experiences, such that in spite of
differences of detail, they could reasonably be construed as experiences of the same
reality, or b) insist that one's own experiences are veridical, and that therefore those of
other traditions are not veridical. The first is difficult to manage, in the face of the manifest
differences across religions. Nevertheless, John Hick (1989) develops a view of that kind,
making use of a Kantian two-worlds epistemology. It is only as plausible as the Kantian
framework itself is. Alston (1991) and Plantinga (2000) develop the second kind of answer.
The general strategy is to argue that, from within a tradition, a person acquires
epistemic resources not available to those outside the tradition, just as travelling to the
heart of a jungle allows one to see things that those who have not made the journey can't see.
As a result, even if people in other traditions can make the same argument, it is still
31

reasonable to say that some are right and the others are wrong. The things that justify my
beliefs still justify them, even if you have comparable resources justifying a contrary view.
Naturalistic explanations for religious experiences are thought to undermine their

epistemic value because, if the naturalistic explanation is sufficient to explain the
experience, we have no grounds for positing anything beyond that naturalistic cause.
Freud (1927) and Marx (1876/1977) are frequently held up as offering such explanations.
Freud claims that religious experiences can be adequately explained by psychological
mechanisms having their root in early childhood experience and psychodynamic tensions.
Marx similarly attributes religious belief in general to materialistic economic forces. Both
claim that, since the hidden psychological or economic explanations are sufficient to explain
the origins of religious belief, there is no need to suppose, in addition, that the beliefs are
true. Freud's theory of religion has few adherents, even among the psychoanalytically
inclined, and Marx's view likewise has all but been abandoned, but that is not to say that
something in the neighborhood might not be true. More recently, neurological explanations
of religious experience have been put forward as reasons to deny the veridicality of the
experiences. Events in the brain that occur during meditative states and other religious
experiences are very similar to events that happen during certain kinds of seizures, or with
certain kinds of mental disorders, and can also be induced with drugs. Therefore, it is argued,
there is nothing more to religious experiences than what happens in seizures, mental
disorders, or drug experiences. Some who are studying the neurological basis of religious
experience do not infer that they are not veridical (see, e.g., d'Aquili and Newberg
1999), but many do. Boyer (2001), for example, titles his book Religion Explained: the
Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, at least implying that no other explanation is
needed.
There are general problems with all kinds of naturalistic explanations as defeaters. First
of all, as Gellman (2001) points out, most such explanations (like the psychoanalytic and
socio-political ones) are put forward as hypotheses, not as established facts. The
proponent assumes that the experiences are not veridical, then casts around for an
explanation. This is not true of the neurological explanations, but they face another kind
of weakness noted by Ellwood (1999): every experience, whatever its source, is
accompanied by a corresponding neurological state. To argue that the experience is
illusory because there is a corresponding brain state is fallacious. The same reasoning
would lead us to conclude that sensory experiences are illusory, since in each sensory
experience, there is some corresponding neurological state that is just like the state that
occurs in the corresponding hallucination. The proponent of the naturalistic explanation as a
defeater owes us some reason to believe that his or her argument is not just another skeptical
argument from the veil of perception.
One further epistemological worry accompanies religious experience. James claimed

that, while mystical experiences proved authoritative grounds for belief in the person
experiencing them, they cannot give grounds for a person to whom the experience is
reported. In other words, my experience is evidence for me, but not for you. This claim can
be understood in a variety of ways, depending on the kind of normativity that attaches to the
purported evidential relation. Some (see Oakes 1976, for example) have claimed that
religious experiences epistemically can necessitate belief; that is, anyone who has the
experience and doesn't form the corresponding belief is making an epistemic mistake,
much like a person who, in normal conditions, refuses to believe his or her eyes. More
commonly, defenders of the epistemic value of religious experience claim that the
32

experiences make it epistemically permissible to form the belief, but you may also be
justified in not forming the belief. The testimony of other people about what they have
experienced is much the same. In some cases, a person would be unjustified in rejecting the
testimony of others, and in other cases, one would be justified in accepting it, but need not
accept it. This leaves us with three possibilities, on the assumption that the subject of the
experience is justified in forming a religious belief on the basis of his or her experience,
and that he or she tells someone else about it:1)the testimony might provide compelling
evidence for the hearer, such that he or she would be unjustified in rejecting the claim;2) the
testimony might provide non-compelling justification for the hearer to accept the claim; 3)or
the testimony might fail to provide any kind of grounds for the hearer to accept the claim.
When a subject makes a claim on the basis of an ordinary experience, it might fall into any
one of these three categories, depending on the claim's content and the epistemic situation of
the hearer. The most natural thing to say about religious experience claims is that they work
the same way (on the assumption that they give the subject of the experience, who is making
the claim, any justification for his or her beliefs). James, and some others after him, claim
that testimony about religious experiences cannot fall under either of the first two categories.
If that's true, it must be because of something special about the nature of the experiences. If
we assume that the experiences cannot be shown a priori to be defective somehow, and that
religious language is intelligible—and if we do not make these assumptions, then the
question of religious testimony doesn't even arise—then it must be because the evidential
value of the experience is so small that it cannot survive transmission to another person; that
is, it must be that in the ordinary act of reporting an experience to someone else, there is
some defeater at work that is always stronger than whatever evidential force the experience
itself has. While there are important differences between ordinary sense-experience and
religious experience (clarity of the experience, amount of information it contains, presence of
competing explanations, and the like), it is not clear whether the differences are great enough
to disqualify religious testimony always and everywhere.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_experience
A religious experience (sometimes known as a spiritual experience, sacred experience, or

mystical experience) is a subjective experience which is interpreted within a religious
framework.[1] The concept originated in the 19th century, as a defense against the growing
rationalism of Western society.[2] William James popularised the concept.[2]
Many religious and mystical traditions see religious experiences (particularly that knowledge
which comes with them) as revelations caused by divine agency rather than ordinary natural
processes. They are considered real encounters with God or gods, or real contact with higher-
order realities of which humans are not ordinarily aware.[3]
Skeptics may hold that religious experience is an evolved feature of the human brain
amenable to normal scientific study.[note 1] The commonalities and differences between
religious experiences across different cultures have enabled scholars to categorize them for
academic study.[4]
Definitions
 1.1 William James
33

 1.2 Norman Habel
 1.3 Richard Swinburne
 1.4 Rudolf Ott
 Perennial philosoph
Main article: Perennial philosophy
Academic discussion
Proponents
The idea of a perennial philosophy, sometimes called perennialism, is a key area of debate in
the academic discussion of mystical experience. Writers such as WT Stace, Huston Smith,
and Robert Forman argue that there are core similarities to mystical experience across
religions, cultures and eras.[60]
For Stace the universality of this core experience is a necessary, although not sufficient,
condition for one to be able to trust the cognitive content of any religious experience. Karen
Armstrong's writings on the universality of a golden rule can also be seen as a form of
perennial philosophy.[61]
Perennial philosophy and religious pluralism
Main article: Religious pluralism
Religious pluralism holds that various world religions are limited by their distinctive
historical and cultural contexts and thus there is no single, true religion. There are only many
equally valid religions. Each religion is a direct result of humanity's attempt to grasp and
understand the incomprehensible divine reality. Therefore, each religion has an authentic but
ultimately inadequate perception of divine reality, producing a partial understanding of the
universal truth, which requires syncretism to achieve a complete understanding as well as a
path towards salvation or spiritual enlightenment.[62]
Although perennial philosophy also holds that there is no single true religion, it differs when
discussing divine reality. Perennial philosophy states that the divine reality is what allows the
universal truth to be understood.[63] Each religion provides its own interpretation of the
universal truth, based on its historical and cultural context. Therefore, each religion provides
everything required to observe the divine reality and achieve a state in which one will be able
to confirm the universal truth and achieve salvation or spiritual enlightenment.
According to the Perennial Philosophy the mystical experiences in all religions are essentially
the same. It supposes that many, if not all of the world's great religions, have arisen around
the teachings of mystics, including Buddha, Jesus, Lao Tze, and Krishna. It also sees most
religious traditions describing fundamental mystical experience, at least esoterically. A major
proponent in the 20th century was Aldous Huxley, who "was heavily influenced in his
description by Vivekananda's neo-Vedanta and the idiosyncratic version of Zen exported to
the west by D.T. Suzuki. Both of these thinkers expounded their versions of the perennialist
thesis",[13] which they originally received from western thinkers and theologians.
34

Transcendentalism was an early 19th-century liberal Protestant movement, which was rooted in
English and German Romanticism, the Biblical criticism of Herder and Schleiermacher, and the
skepticism of Hume.[web 1] The Transcendentalists emphasised an intuitive, experiential approach of
religion.[web 2] Following Schleiermacher,[15] an individual's intuition of truth was taken as the
criterion for truth.[web 2] In the late 18th and early 19th century, the first translations of Hindu texts
appeared, which were also read by the Transcendentalists, and influenced their thinking.[web 2] They
also endorsed universalist and Unitarianist ideas, leading to Unitarian Universalism, the idea that
there must be truth in other religions as well, since a loving God would redeem all living beings, not
just Christians
Neurophysiology
 7.1 Psychiatry
 7.2 Neuroscience
o 7.2.1 Neurology
o 7.2.2 Neurotheology
 Neurotheology, also known as biotheology or spiritual neuroscience,[71] is the study
of correlations of neural phenomena with subjective experiences of spirituality and
hypotheses to explain these phenomena. Proponents of neurotheology claim that there
is a neurological and evolutionary basis for subjective experiences traditionally
categorized as spiritual or religious.[72]
 According to the neurotheologist Andrew B. Newberg, neurological processes which
are driven by the repetitive, rhythmic stimulation which is typical of human ritual, and
which contribute to the delivery of transcendental feelings of connection to a
universal unity.[clarification needed] They posit, however, that physical stimulation alone is
not sufficient to generate transcendental unitive experiences. For this to occur they
say there must be a blending of the rhythmic stimulation with ideas. Once this occurs
"...ritual turns a meaningful idea into a visceral experience."[73] Moreover, they say
that humans are compelled to act out myths by the biological operations of the brain
due to what they call the "inbuilt tendency of the brain to turn thoughts into actions"
o
o 7.2.3 Studies of the brain and religious experience
http://staff.kings.edu/davidjohnson/Religious%20Experience%20Can't%20Justify%20Religous%20Belief%20v1.pdf
http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.co.za/2010/01/religious-experience-part-1-argument-vs.html
The material contained herein presents no speculative philosophy; it

offers no metaphysical hypothesis. Rather, it is the collected legacy of
those who have experienced, first-hand, the unitive Truth underlying all
existence.This is noordinary history of people, places and events; it is the secret history of
man’s perennial journey on the ultimate Quest, where all the travelers,
arriving from widely diverse paths, arrive at the self-same unitive Truth.
Mysticism is that point of view which claims as its basis an intimate
35

knowledge of the one source and substratum of all existence, a
knowledge, which is obtained through a revelatory experience during a
rare moment of clarity in contemplation.When we study the many speculative philosophies
and religious creedswhich men have espoused, we must wonder at the amazing diversity of
opinions expressed regarding the nature of reality; but when we examine
the testimonies of the mystics of past and present, we are struck by the
unanimity of agreement between them all.“I have known
that spirit,” said Svetasvatara, “who is infinite and in all, who is everone,
beyond time.”1 “He can be seen indivisible in the silence of
contemplation,” said the author of the Mundaka Upanishad. 2 “There a
man possesses everything; for he is one with the ONE.” 3
About five hundred years later, another, a young prince named
Siddhartha, who was to become known as the Buddha, the enlightened
one, sat communing inwardly in the forest, when suddenly, as though a
veil had been lifted, his mind became infinite and all-encompassing: “I
have seen the Truth!” he exclaimed; “I am the Father of the world,
sprung from myself!”4
And again, after the passage of another fivehundred years, another young man, a Jew,
named Jesus, of Nazareth, satin a solitary place among the desert cliffs of Galilee,
communing inwardly, when suddenly he realized that the Father in heaven to whom
he had been praying was his very own Self; that he was, himself, the sole
Spirit pervading the universe; “I and the Father are one!” he declared
they had realized the truth of man and the universe, that they had known their own Self, and
known it to be the All, the Eternal. And throughout succeeding ages, these announcements
were echoed by others who had experienced the same realization: “I am
the Truth!” exclaimed the Muslim, al-Hallaj; “My Me is God, nor do I
recognize any other Me except my God Himself,” said the Christian
saint, Catherine of Genoa. And Rumi, Jnaneshvar, Milarepa, Kabir and
Basho from the East, and Eckhart, Boehme and Emerson from the West,
said the same.
These assertions by the great mystics of the world were not made as
mere philosophical speculations; they were based on experience an
experience so convincing, so real, that all those to whom it has occurred
testify unanimously that it is the unmistakable realization of the ultimate
Truth of existence.
In this experience, called samadhi by the Hindus, nirvana by the Buddhists, fana by the
Muslims, and “the mystic union” by Christians, the consciousness of the individual suddenly
becomes the consciousness of the entire vast universe. All previous sense of duality is
swallowed up in an awareness of indivisible unity. The man who previously regarded himself
as an individualized soul, encumbered with sins and inhabiting a body, now realizes that he
is, truly, the one Consciousness; that it is he, himself, who is manifesting as all souls and
all bodies, while yet remaining completely unaffected by the unfolding
drama of the multiform universe.
Even if, before, as a soul, he sought union with his God, now, there is no
longer a soul/God relationship. He, himself, he now realizes, is the one
36

Existence in whom there is neither a soul nor a God, but only the one
Self, within whom this “imaginary” relationship of soul and God
manifested. For him, there is no more relationship, but only the eternal
and all-inclusive I AM. Not surprisingly, this illuminating knowledge of
an underlying ‘I’ that is the Soul of the entire universe has a profoundly
transformative effect upon the mind of those who have experienced it.
If we can believe these men, it is this experience of unity, which is the
ultimate goal of all knowledge, of all worldly endeavor; the summit of
human attainment, which all men, knowingly or unknowingly, pursue.
The reason for the similarity of view among the various primitive cultures is that the
Reality, which their pictorial symbols are contrived to represent, is the
common and universal Reality experienced in the mystical vision, a
Reality that is the same for all who “see”………it never dawning on them that the direct
knowledge of the one Absolute and Its projection of the universe is an
actual experience common to all seers of all times.
In this “vision” or “union,” the mind is somehow privileged to
experience itself as the eternal Consciousness from which the entire
universe is projected. It knows itself as the unchanging Ground, or
Absolute, and the world as Its own projected Thought or Ideation. The
individual who contacts, through prayer or deep meditation, that
universal Consciousness, experiences It as his (or her) own identity. He
(or she) realizes, in those few moments, that he (or she) is indeed nothing
else but that one Being manifest in a singular individual form; and that
all this universe is the manifestation of that one Being, flowing forth
from It as a wave of love streams out from a loving heart.
One who has known It sees clearly that this mystically experienced
Reality has two distinct aspects; It is the pure, eternal One, beyond
motion or change; and It is also the world-Thought, which emanates
from It,
So difficult is this two-in-One to speak of—since It cannot be spoken of

without differentiating the two aspects, and making It appear to be two
when It is always One—that the ancient seers tended to characterize the
two aspects as male and female complements. In their attempts to
explain this ineluctable duality-in-Unity, the seers of early cultures relied
upon pictorial symbols—such as the yin-yang symbol of the Chinese, or
depicted the projection of the world of matter upon the Absolute in
anthropomorphic or animistic images. In nearly every such instance, the
unmanifested Absolute was depicted as Male, and Its projected image-
Power, co-existent with It, was regarded as Female. He is the Father-
God, the eternal One, the ultimate Source and Controller; but She, His
inherent Mind is the Creatrix, the Mother-Power from whom all creation
flows.
When we delve even further backward, into the upper Paleolithic era (ca.
37

35,000-9,000 B.C.E.), we find it difficult to imagine how one might have
communicated mystical experience in that time, long ago, even to one’s
peers, considering the limited language skills of the peoples of that time.
some nameless mystic told his comrades of his experience of
the great Unity. And, for century after century, that tale was passed
down orally as an authentic description of the origin and beginning of all
things; until, around 700 B.C.E., it finally appeared in written form as an
allegorical tale, or myth, of creation. Here is that tale as it appears in the
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad:
In the beginning, there was only the Self. ... He reflected, and saw that there was nothing but Himself,
whereupon heexclaimed, “I am” (Aham). Ever since, He has been known
within as “I.” Even now, when announcing oneself, one says, A distorted version of this tale shows
up a few centuries later in Plato’s
Symposium, 3 where Aristophanes recounts the legend of the original
androgynous creature who was both male and female rolled in one, and
who was then divided into two by Zeus as a means of checking its
power. But Plato’s version is without the profound allegorical meaning
of the original myth as retold in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Let me
attempt to explain:
In the One, there is no form, no experience at all. There is no vision, and
no knowledge. For, in order for there to be experience, there has to be
two: the experiencer and the experienced. For vision, there has to be a
seer and a seen; for knowledge, there must be a knower and a known, a
subject and an object. For any of these things to be, the One must “I am ...,” and then gives the
other name that one bears.pretend to be two, must create within Itself the semblance of
duality. If there is only a seer and no seen, there can be no vision. And if there is
only a seen and no seer, again, vision cannot be.
Figuratively speaking, the One is lonely being alone; so It creates
(images forth) a second, in order to experience (enjoy) Itself. This is the
primal division, the primary creation: it is an apparent bifurcation of the
one Consciousness into subject and object, seer and seen. In all
existence, there are only these two—and they are really both the One.
This Self-division of the One into subject and object is the primal
dichotomy alluded to in this allegory. The subject is, in actuality, the
One; the object is, in actuality, the One. That One is, naturally, beyond
gender; but, in Its (pretended) roles as subject and object, It becomes the
male principle and the female principle.
This same bifurcation is continued throughout creation; the subject and
object, as male and female, become the multitude of living forms, and
through delighting in each other, continue to recreate themselves. This is
the allegory of the cow and the bull, the mare and the stallion, the jenny
and the jack-ass. “Then he realizes, ‘all this is myself!’” This is the
wondrous knowledge that comes to man when he knows and understands
his own true nature and the nature of all ‘objective’ reality. He is,
indeed, the one Self of all, who lives within his own creation,
experiencing the play of duality, while remaining the forever-undivided
One.
38

In the mystical experience of unity, there is seen, of course, neither male
nor female. The One, which contains in Itself all pairs of opposites, is
Itself beyond gender. However, It is apprehended under two different
aspects: It is the transcendent, quiescent Consciousness, beyond the
manifestation of time and space; and It is the Creative Force, which
cyclically manifests and de-manifests the entire universe. And it is
evident that, in almost every early culture, these two aspects have been
commonly represented in word and picture by those who have
apprehended them both, as the Father-God and the Mother-Goddess
These two symbols of the primary duality-in-Unity…
It has long been recognized as a fact of mystical psychology that, as a
man comes to know God in the unitive vision, he knows in that some
moment, his own true Self. This intriguing fact is expressed most
succinctly in a passage from the ancient Indian epic, the Ramayana; in it,
Rama, who represents the Godhead incarnate, asks his servant,
Hanuman, “How do you regard me?” And Hanuman replies:
dehabhavena daso’smi
jivabhavena twadamshakah
atmabhave twamevaham
(When I identify with the body, I am Thy servant;
When I identify with the soul, I am a part of Thee;
But when I identify with the Self, I am truly Thee.) 1
These three attitudes represent progressively subtler stages of selfidentification:
from the identification with the body, to identification with
the soul, until, finally, one comes to know the Divine, and thereby one’s
eternal Self. While each of these three relational attitudes finds
expression as the prevailing attitude within various individual religious
traditions, they are essentially representative of the viewpoint from these
different stages of self-awareness.
Of Pythagoras’ personal life and authentic teachings little is known for
certain …….
Pythagoras seems to have introduced to the Western mind a truly
Monistic philosophy, and in particular, the concept of a Unity (Monad)
self-divided into a higher, eternal principle, characterized as Male, and a
lower, creative principle, characterized as Female. Says Hippolytus, in
his Refutation of All Heresies:
Pythagoras declared the originating principle of the
universe to be the unbegotten Monad and the
generated duad ... And he says that the Monad is the
Father of the duad, and the duad the Mother of all
things that are begotten. ...For the duad is generated
from the Monad, according to Pythagoras; and the
Monad is Male and primary, but the duad is Female
[and secondary]. 1
He stated further that the creation produced by the duad, or “Mother,”
consisted of two kinds, or levels; one, the physical level, which includes
the “material” world, and the other, a subtle, or psychic, level which
includes all the individualized souls, various spirits, and mental realms.
39

Plato, in his Phaedo, states as a Pythagorean doctrine that the soul is but
temporarily encased in the body, and transmigrates from birth to birth in
this world, which is not its true and final home. For Pythagoras,
contemplation of the Eternal was man’s highest calling. When asked,
“What are men born for?” he replied, “To gaze on the heavens.”
According to him, when the soul is perfected, purified from its
subjugation to the material body, there would be no further need of
rebirth. Thus, it appears that the philosophy of Pythagoras, if not entirely
derived from Indian sources, was certainly in perfect agreement with that
of the Upanishadic seers.
The Pythagoreans formed a widespread and influential religious cult…
Hertaclitus…His book, On Nature, was written in brief epigrammatic statements about
the one Reality, which few could understand. According to his
biographer, he deliberately made it obscure so that none but adepts
should approach it. But there were some who understood, and called it
“a guide of conduct, the keel of the whole world, for one and all alike.”
One appreciative
scholar of the time wrote about Heraclitus’ book: “Do not be in too great
a hurry to get to the end of this book by Heraclitus the Ephesian. The
path is hard to travel; gloom is there and darkness devoid of light. But if
an initiate by your guide, the path shines brighter than sunlight.”
In a time of polytheism and superstition, Heraclitus’ writings were
unique. He assumed, as most philosophers of his time assumed, that the
natural world consisted of unoriginated matter that predated its divine
ordering matter which Hesiod had described as the primal Chaos and
that this matter of which the universe consisted was then rearranged and
set in order in a designed manner by the all-pervading Thought or
Intelligence of God. That Divine, all-pervading formative Intelligence,
Heraclitus called “Logos,” a common Greek word used variously to
mean “thought,” “reason,” “idea,” or “theory.” What he intended by this
term becomes clear when we examine the philosophy of Heraclitus, not
as a rational construction, but as an attempt to explain what he had
experienced in the mystical vision of Unity. The “Logos” represented
that Divine principle of Intelligence or Soul revealed in the mystical
vision as the all-pervading Consciousness by which the physical world is
invisibly ordered and governed…
Heraclitus tried to explain that the manifest universe is permeated by the
Thought (Logos) of the one Mind; and for that reason, the entire universe
is a conscious manifestation of the one Divine Consciousness. Man
himself, as a soul, is a manifestation of the Logos, and, for that reason,
can discover the Logos within himself. The Logos is his source, his
ruler; in fact, his very being. And, says Heraclitus, it is only through the
conquest of egotistical pride, and dedication to the one Self in the silence
of contemplation, that one is able to know that “hidden Unity.”
Following is a reconstruction of Heraclitus’ thought, based on existing
fragments from his book, On Nature :
40

I have explained the Logos, but men are always incapable of
understanding it, both before they have heard it, and after.
For, though all things come into being in accordance with the
Logos, when men hear it explained—how all things are made
of it, and how each thing is separated from another according
to its nature—they seem unable to comprehend it. The
majority of men are as unaware of what they are doing after
they wake from sleep as they are when asleep. 6
... Everyone is ruled by the Logos, which is common to all;
yet, though the Logos is universal, the majority of men live as
if they had an identity peculiar to themselves. 7 ... Even when
they hear of the Logos, they do not understand it, and even
after they have learnt something of it, they cannot
comprehend; yet they regard themselves as wise. 8
Those who believe themselves wise regard as real only the
appearance of things, but these fashioners of falsehood will
have their reward. 9 Though men are inseparable from the
Logos, yet they are separated in it; and though they encounter
it daily, they are alienated from it. 10 What intelligence or
understanding do they have? They believe the popular
orators, and are guided by the opinions of the populace; they
do not understand that the majority of men are fools, and the
wise few. 11
Of all the wise philosophers whose discourses I have heard, I
have not found any who have realized the one Intelligence,………..
The mystical philosophy of unity had been thoroughly expounded

and re-expounded by the Roman Stoics, and the unitive vision had also
been well represented by the Brahmin and Buddhist emissaries living in
Greece, Rome and Alexandria. But, while it is one thing to hear of and
understand the unity of all existence, it is quite another to actually realize
it in oneself. The former is the province of the philosophers and
theologians; the latter is the province of the From that time forward, Jesus was inspired with
a new delight in God,
and a fervent desire to draw near to Him and to know Him within
himself. And he felt a great need to be alone in order to focus all his
mind on the Lord who had so bountifully graced him with vision and
inward joy. So he took himself into the solitude of the desert wilderness
outside the city. Filled with certainty that God was drawing him to yet
clearer vision, he swept away all concern for his own bodily welfare and
went alone into the rocky wastelands, to pray and to seek the clear vision
of God within himself.
During one star-filled night, deeply drawn into a silent prayer of longing,
Jesus suddenly became awake to a clear, still awareness; his mind was
lifted beyond itself into a pure, eternal, Consciousness. His mind had
become one with the Mind of the universe. In that exalted awareness,
there was no longer a Jesus and his God, but a one, all-pervading, Reality
which had no division in it at all. He had entered what he was later to
call, “the kingdom of God,” and knew himself as the one Being existing
41

in all. He knew the unsurpassably joyful truth that he was, and had
always been, the one Existence that lives in every single form on this….
By morning, Jesus had come back to his limited self, but the knowledge
of his infinite and eternal Self still flooded his mind, and he bathed in the
intoxicating afterglow of that knowledge. He had been released of every
delusion, fear, and source of pain that man is subject to in this world.
To be able to understand the meaning of the concepts here expressed and what the entire
piece tries to express and communicate we employ our intersubjectively created,
institutionalized and internalized conceptual means. This intersubjectivity is usually of a
dualistic kind with ideas of subject-vs object, etc, based on, employing and transmitting
dualistic notions, principles and underlying assumptions. Have we ever considered the
creation and employment of an intersubjectivity based on non-dual notions, not of the
subject vs object dichotomy, but one based on Sophos, unity with the one, the one real self,
etc?
We perceive, experience, think, reflect, understand and communicate in terms of a frame of
reference of dualism, for example subject vs object. Is it not possible to imagine and devise
and then philosophize in terms of a non-dual intersubjectivity, and intersubjectivity that does
not accept and convey dualistic notions such as subject, object, etc? But an intersubjectivity
of a non-dual nature such as a), b) the one real self, c) of unity, and d) the one, pure
consciousness or absolute awareness. Is it not possible to develop and constitute a frame of
reference of this kind of intersubjectivity? A point of reference that does not constitute,
assume and proceed in terms of subject vs object and other dualistic notions. The above
presented us with examples of non-dual notions based on principles and assumptions of
unity with the one, experience as if one is the one real self, god, etc. We will now look at
more examples of this kind from the history of mysticism a link to the download of which
was given above.
The Christian community had, among its more vocal proponents, a
number of learned philosophers and theologians during this time,
including Justin Martyr (d. ca. 165 C.E.), Clement of Alexandria (d. ca.
215 C.E.), and Origen (182-251 C.E.), all genuinely devout and earnest
men. They seem not to have been mystics, however; they had not,
themselves experienced God directly, but were interested primarily in
rationalizing the Christian tenet of the divine authority of Jesus. Being
well learned also in the philosophical tradition of the Greeks, they were
at pains as well to explain their theology in terms recognizable to the
“pagan” world. As a means of accomplishing this, they adopted the
Greek concept of the Logos, and asserted that Jesus was none other than
the divine Logos of God.
Let us look for a moment at the progression of ideas and events, which
led to the wholehearted adoption of this conception by the Christian
Church. The idea first appears in the opening paragraph of the Fourth
Gospel written about sixty years after the death of Jesus by the evangelist
known only as John. John undoubtedly had some familiarity with the
42

concept of the Logos, probably from Philo, and perhaps from Stoic
sources as well. He began his Gospel with these words:
In the beginning was the Logos; the Logos was with God,
and the Logos was God. ...All things were made by the Logos;
without him nothing was made. It was by him that all things
came into existence.
... What came about in him [the Logos] was life, and the life
was the light [of God] in man. The life shines in the darkness
[of world-manifestation], but the darkness did not understand
it. 31
All this is in keeping with the mystical perception of duality-in-Unity
enunciated by mystics of every time and place. John then goes on to
assert that the Logos became Jesus of Nazareth:
And the Logos became flesh and lived among us ...as the onlybegotten
son of his father.
32
This statement, that the Logos became flesh in the person of Jesus, is
also inarguable, as it is the Logos, the creative Intelligence of God,
which has become flesh in the person of every creature on earth; and the
phrase, “only-begotten son” is a designation for the Logos which goes
back to Philo. But John seems to imply that Jesus was more than simply
another manifestation of the Logos, that he was, indeed, the creative
Intelligence itself. It was this very suggestion, which gave immediate
rise to a widespread movement among 2nd century Christians to regard
Jesus as a special and unique manifestation of God, through whom the
very Godhead lived and acted upon earth for the upliftment of humanity.
But let us take a moment to recall the meaning of the term “Logos,” as it
had been traditionally used up to that time.
Note: here we have an example of the one, the logos, sohpos, the one real self, of unity in
embodied form.
The Logos, as we have stated before, is the Absolute in Its immanent
aspect, the Divine Intelligence or Consciousness that pervades the
material world of form. These two, the transcendent One and Its
immanent presence are one and inseparable, just as a mind and its
thought are one and inseparable. Thus, Nature is formed and ruled by
God’s Thought, or Logos, and is replete with Divinity, is nothing but
Divinity; and is as much one and synonymous with God as the radiance
of the Sun is with the Sun itself. The term, “Logos,” had long been
understood in this way, and it was in this way that it was understood and
explained by Christians as well, such as Athenasius, Patriarch of
Alexandria (293-372 C.E.):
Was God, who IS, ever without the Logos? Was He, who is
light, ever without radiance? ...God is, eternally; then, since
the Father always is, His radiance also exists eternally; and
that is His Logos.
33
... For, as the light [of the Sun] illumines all things within its
43

radiance, and without that radiance nothing would be.. Athenagorus (2nd century C.E.), who wrote
an Apology of Christianity
to the Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, also asserted the eternal
coexistence and oneness of God, the Father, and His Power of worldemanation
(the Logos), which he calls “the Son”:
If ... you ask what is meant by the Son, I will state briefly that he
is the first product of the Father, not as having been brought into
existence (for from the beginning, God, who is the eternal Mind
has the Logos in Himself, being from eternity instinct with
Logos); but inasmuch as the Logos came forth to be the Idea and
energizing power of all material things.35
Tertullian (150-225 C.E.), another of the early Church Fathers, expressed
the same idea in more simplified terms:
The Spirit is the substance of the Logos, and the Logos is the
activity of the Spirit; the two are a Unity (unum). 36
and so on and so on.
These remarks by the early Church Fathers are identical with the
declarations of all the mystics who have, over the centuries, described
their experience of the two complementary aspects of Reality. But they
went on, from this conventional observation, to formulate a rather
startling tenet of faith: that the Logos, the very stream of God’s
Intelligence pervading the universe, took on a personality of its own, and
lived on planet earth as the man known as Jesus of Nazareth. Here is
how this idea was expressed by one of the most influential of the early
Church Fathers, Ireneus, the bishop of Lyons (ca. 130-200 C.E.):
The Logos existed in the beginning with God, and through
him all things were made. He was always present with the
human race, and in the last times, according to the time
appointed by the Father, he has been united with his own
handiwork and become man, capable of suffering. ... He was
incarnate and made man; and then he summed up in himself
the long line of the human race, procuring for us a
comprehensive salvation, that we might recover in him what
in Adam we had lost, the state of being in the image and
likeness of God. 37
At a later date, Athenasius, the Patriarch of Alexandria, added some
clarifying remarks to that, in order to explain how the Logos could be
working entirely through the person of Jesus while at the same time
manifesting the entire universe:
The Logos was not confined solely within [Jesus’] body; nor
was he there and nowhere else; he did not activate that body
and leave the universe emptied of his activity and guidance.
Here is the supreme marvel. He was the Logos and nothing
contained him; rather he himself contained all things. He is the
whole creation, yet in his essential being he is distinct from it
all, while he is in all things in the activities of his power,
ordering all things, extending over all things his universal
providence, quickening each and every thing at once,
containing the universe and not contained by…
44

note – with these ideas in mind let us now move on through history.
We come across the gnostics,for example the Thomas Christians,
who considered themselves as the true believers in the real Jesus.
I am not interested in the details of what the Gnostics, Thomas Christians

And other groups believed concerning Jesus as the incarnate one, and I
am more interested in looking at the experience of their unity with the one
of a few other mystics. The reason for this interest is because I wish to try and identify
notions that could assist us to develop the intersubjectivity of ‘sophos, unity, the one real
self, etc’.
The perennial philosophy, which began in Greece with Heraclitus,
Pythagoras, and Socrates, became, in the Rome of the first few centuries
of the Current Era, a full-fledged religious tradition. This “religion” had
no ecclesiastical organization, or zealous proselytizers; yet it produced
some of the most devoutly religious literature created during those times.
It had not the fervent appeal of Christianity’s proclaimed “Savior,” nor
the long heritage of divine appointment claimed in Jewish historicoreligious
narratives; but was rather a sane and sober religion of simple
devotion to the one Divine Principle, which was both transcendent to and
immanent in all His creation.
It was the hallmark of these “pagan” religionists to view all earlier
mythical and cultic religious manifestations as so many figurative
expressions of the one perennial urge toward Divinity, so many poetical
renderings of the one common Truth. This broadly tolerant and
conciliatory view was best expressed by the historian, Plutarch (ca. 100
C.E.), who said:
There is one divine Mind, which keeps the universe in order,
and one providence, which governs it. The names given to
this supreme God differ; he is worshipped in different ways in
different religions; the religious symbols used in them vary,
and their qualities are different; sometimes they are rather
vague, and sometimes more distinct. 1
A contemporary of Plutarch, and one of the most exemplary
representatives of the perennial philosophy in 1st century Rome, was the
freed-slave, Epictetus (50-120 C.E.), who is usually regarded as a Stoic
but who was equally inspired by Socrates whom he held as his model.
Despite his devout and holy views, however, it is difficult to find any
explicit references to the mystical “vision” of God in his Discourses; his
preeminent concern, like Socrates’, was to guide men to the awareness of
the Divinity within them through the development of virtue, right
understanding, and spiritual strength.
Plotinus taught his philosophy in Rome.
His lectures were free and open to the public, and he lived solely on the
favors of his wealthy students and patrons. He taught from his own
mystical experience, but he framed his thoughts often in terms familiar to
students of Plato; and for that reason he became labeled in much later
times as “the founder of Neoplatonism.” This is an unfortunate
misnomer, however, for it tends to detract from the fact that Plotinus’
45

message was founded, not so much on any one tradition, but on his own
personal realizations.
Plotinus, like Socrates, had attained the realization of the absolute
Reality, and was solely intent on expressing what he had directly
perceived in the “vision” of Unity. Yet, since he and Socrates had
experienced a common unitive Reality, it is only natural that Plotinus
would utilize familiar terms, which had been used previously in the
Socratic dialogues of Plato. It should be remembered that the mystic
writes in order to put into rational verbal form what he has experienced,
and he utilizes the verbal symbols and terms of preceding mystics, not in
a dogmatic fashion, but solely in order to draw upon familiar
terminologies to make clear his own vision, and to show its consistency
with the vision of those who preceded him.
Plotinus’ philosophy of Unity is identical to the Upanishadic philosophy
also, yet, though he was no doubt familiar with Indian thought, it would
be a mistake to infer therefore that he borrowed his own philosophy from
those sources. For it is only natural and to be expected that one person,
having experienced the Unity, will describe It in terms similar or
identical to another who has experienced It. For Plotinus, philosophy
was not a mere game of ideas put forward as a convincing hypothesis; he
had experienced, through contemplation, the ultimate unitive Truth, and
spoke from his experience in order to explain It to others. We need not,
therefore, be astonished that his words agree with those of all others who
have experienced that same interior revelation.
Note: the development of intersubjectivity based on unity, Sophos, the logos, etc.
Plotinus found corroboration for his philosophy, not only in the
utterances of Socrates and the Upanishadic seers, but in the writings of a
number of other ancient philosophers as well. In his classes, his students
were required to read the commentaries of Severus, Cronius, Numenius,
Caius and Atticus, as well as the works of Aspasius, Alexander of
Aphrodisias, and Adrastus. Said Plotinus, “We must believe that some
of the ancient and blessed philosophers also discovered the Truth; and it
is only natural to inquire who of them found It, and how we may obtain a
knowledge of It.” 3
In the first ten years of his life in Rome, Plotinus wrote nothing, but by
the time Porphyry had become his follower in 263 C.E., he had
completed twenty-one treatises. In answer to the questions of his later
students, he wrote thirty-three more, which were circulated without titles
among his closest followers. And, after Plotinus’ death, Porphyry
gathered these fifty-four treatises together into a book of six sections,
containing nine treatises each; hence the title, Enneads (“Nines”), by
which Plotinus’ book is known.
In his meetings with his friends and students, Plotinus would explain in
an imaginative and compelling manner the truths of the spiritual life.
Says Porphyry: “When he was speaking, the light of his intellect visibly
illumined his face; always of winning presence, he then appeared of still
46

greater beauty; a slight moisture gathered on his forehead, and he
radiated benignity.”4 “Plotinus,” said Porphyry, “lived at once within
himself and for others; from his interior attention he never relaxed unless
in sleep. And even that he kept light by often touching not so much as a
piece of bread and by constantly concentrating upon the thought within.5
...He was gentle, and always at the call of those having the slightest
acquaintance with him. After spending twenty-six years at Rome, acting,
too, as arbiter in many differences, he had never made an enemy of any..
...Once There, she will trade for This nothing the universe
holds—no, not the entire heavens; for there is nothing higher
than This, nothing more holy; above This there is nowhere to
go. All else, however lofty, lies on the downward path; she
knows that This was the object of her quest, that there is
nothing higher. 32
...Without that vision, the soul is unillumined; but illumined
thereby, it has attained what it sought. And this is the true
Goal set before the soul: to receive that light, to see the
Supreme by the Supreme; ...for That by which the illumination
comes is That which is to be seen, just as we do not see the
Sun by any other light than its own.
How is this to be accomplished?
Let all else go! 33
This is Plotinus’ final word on the means to the attainment of that
supernal vision: “Let all else go!”
note: including and especially all notions and believes based on

the dualist intersubjectivity!
Whether we call this by the name of
“dedication,” “devotion,” “purity of heart,” “singleness of mind,”
“renunciation,” or “detachment,” it is the word of all the seers of God in
response to the question, “How is It attained?” But who can let all else
go? How does one find the courage to turn away from the world to focus
all one’s attention on the divine Source within? It cannot even be
attempted unless one is inspired from within by His grace. For it is that
One Himself who puts such a desire into the heart; it is He who attracts
like a magnet the soul to its own awakening, to contemplation, just as it
is He who reveals Himself as the one Soul of all…
The declarations of the mystics differ from the exclusively philosophical
and theological reasonings of such intellectuals in that they are derived
solely from direct experience, and are put forward as a means of
expressing the truths realized in that experience rather than as
speculations based on authority or reason. And since it is only the very
few who reach to the height of direct experience of God, the mystical
writings which appear in the early Middle Ages are also very few.
One of the best examples of genuine mystical thought produced during
this time is found in a series of writings which came to light in the early
6th century, and which produced a great effect on all subsequent
Christian theology. This collection of writings was attributed to
47

Dionysius, the Areopagite, a figure who is mentioned only briefly in the
New Testament book, Acts of the Apostles (17:32), as a follower of Paul
in Athens. This collection consists of four treatises: The Divine Names,
Mystical Theology, The Celestial Hierarchy, and The Ecclesiastical
Hierarchy, along with several letters addressed to various Apostolic
figures. All were regarded, up until the 16th century, as genuine and
authoritative,
It was determined in the 16th century, however, and corroborated by
scholars of later centuries, that these writings could not possibly have
been by Dionysius of the 1st century, owing to their use of terms which
came into prominent usage only much later, and were therefore spurious.
It is now supposed that they were written at some time around the end of
the 5th century, perhaps by a Syrian monk who had some familiarity
with the Neoplatonic tradition through Proclus (410-485), and who, no
doubt, chose to use the name of an Apostolic figure as a means of
assuring permanence to his work. To Christians, the fact that it was not
Dionysius, the Areopagite, who wrote these mystical works, might
present a serious impediment to considering their author a genuine
representative of Christian mysticism; nonetheless, regardless of who the
author really was, he not only greatly influenced Christian thought for
over a thousand years, but he was and remains an able spokesman for the
perennial philosophy of mysticism.
It was the intention of the author calling himself Dionysius, the
Areopagite, to explain, as best he could, the nature of the transcendent
Reality which he had experienced, and which the Greek philosophers
called “Being,” or “the Good,” and which the Jews called “Yahveh.”
That God could not be seen as an object of perception by the eyes, and
could not be known by the intellect, the author—whom we shall call
Dionysius for convenience sake—firmly maintained. However, he
explained, God could be experienced in rapt contemplation when the
mind transcended all perceptions of images and all knowledge as we
commonly know it, and entered into a perfect union with God,
participating in His being, and knowing through His knowing:
He is superessentially exalted above created things, and
reveals Himself in His naked Truth to those alone who pass
beyond all that is pure or impure, and ascend above the
topmost altitudes of holy things, and who, leaving behind
them all divine light and sound and heavenly utterances,
plunge into the Darkness where truly dwells, as the Oracles
declare, that ONE who is beyond all. 1
That divine Darkness is the unapproachable light in which
God dwells. Into this Darkness, rendered invisible by its own
excessive brilliance and unapproachable by the intensity of its
…..
Note: I merely mention these quotes concerning Psudo-Dionysus to
Show more of the development of the non-dual intersubjectivity, based on
Sophos, the one real self, etc and not to give contents to the believes
of that intersubjectivity.
48

There was really little to choose between the two, Toaism and Buddhism
however; for, while the Taoist and Buddhist terminologies were
different, the realization of Truth which each taught was, of course, the
same. In every mystical tradition, the ultimate goal is the attainment of
enlightenment, the direct perception of the one Reality. In ancient India,
this realization was called nirvana, or samadhi; when Buddhism was
transplanted in China, this supramental experience was called, in
Chinese, chien-hsing, and as Buddhism became established in Japan in
later centuries, this experience was called kensho or satori. The words
and the languages are different, but the experience is the same.
This experience of enlightenment, of the absolute, quiescent, Source of
all existence, is described by one Chinese Buddhist in this way:
In learning to be a Buddha, and in seeking the essence of the
teaching of our school, man should purify his mind and allow
his spirit to penetrate the depths. Thus he will be able to
wander silently within himself during contemplation, and he
will see the Origin of all things, obscured by nothing.
...His mind becomes boundless and formless, …allilluminating
and bright, like moonlight pervading the
darkness. During that absolute moment, the mind experiences
illumination without darkness, clarity without stain. It
becomes what it really is, absolutely tranquil, absolutely
illuminating. Though this all-pervading Mind is tranquil, the
world of cause and effect does not cease; though It illumines
the world, the world is but Its reflection. It is pure Light and
perfect Quiescence, which continues through endless time. It
is motionless, and free from all activity; It is silent, and selfaware.
...That brilliant Light permeates every corner of the
world. It is This we should become aware of and know.
Similarly, in every mystical tradition, the means to the realization of
Reality is the same; it is an inturning of the mind in search of its root, its
source; we call this process “meditation.” In India, the Sanskrit word for
meditation is dhyana; in China, it is ch’an, and in Japan, it is zen. Ch’an,
or Zen, then, is nothing but the practice of meditation toward the
attainment of enlightenment. Enlightenment is the only goal of Zen; and
it is meditation, or contemplation, alone which leads to it. For this
reason, all the Ch’an and Zen masters incessantly point all sincere
seekers of enlightenment to the meditative life.
Note: above we saw about the development of intersubjectivity of the one or the real self in
Zen, below we will see how it developed in Islam as Sufism.
The religion of Islam was founded in Arabia by Muhammed (d. 632),

whose book, the Quran or Koran, constitutes the final authority and
credo for all who claim Islam as their religion. Though Muhammed
claimed that the book was inspired by God, whom he calls Allah, it
contains much that is derived from ancient Jewish and Christian sources.
49

Muhammed set forth in the Quran, by the use of many anecdotes and
commentaries, a number of moral precepts and social laws, which did
much to transform a diversified group of lawless nomadic tribes into a
united God-fearing nation. And while the Quran is essentially a book of
moral principle and faith, it contains many statements by Muhammed,
which may be interpreted as mystical in nature.
Following upon the death of Muhammed, a number of devout mystics
belonging to the Islamic faith appeared throughout the Middle East,
spreading from Arabia to Egypt, Iraq, Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan.
They came to be known as Sufis, from the word for “wool”—apparently
because of the woolen garments worn by these gnostics to set them apart
as “knowers” of God. While the mainstream faithful of Islam were
busily engaged in the spread of their religion through territorial conquest
during the 8th and 9th centuries, the Sufis were teaching the pure love of
God, and living an ascetic life aimed at realizing Him in the depths of
their souls.
All were great lovers of God,
and each of them greatly influenced the mystical mood of their time.
Their love of God took the form of a one-pointed yearning for union with
Him, for the “vision of His Face”; and their writings often resembled the
arduous outpourings of a lover to his beloved.
For the Sufis, the path of love is the Way by which the soul makes the
involute journey to the awareness of her own true identity. And the
prayerful songs of love sung by the Sufis are the expressions of the
soul’s yearning to return in awareness to her eternal Source and Ground.
She searches inwardly for her pristine state, her Beloved, her Lord; and
subdues herself, dissolving herself, as it were, by reducing her own being
to her pristine simplicity and ultimate non-being.
Note: is this not what happens when through Socratic dialogue or analysis
of language use dissolves away misleading use of language and we are left with
more meaningful concepts and conceptual practice?
She renounces all regard for herself, divests herself of all fascination with manifested
phenomena, both inner and outer; and, drawn by a one-pointed love and
desire for God, is brought at last to silence. Then the illusory duality of
soul and God is no more; the awareness of the one Self dawns with
supreme clarity, knowing who It has always been, knowing Its eternal
freedom and joy.
Such a description of the soul’s inner “pilgrimage” makes it appear a
simple and clear-cut process, but it is the most difficult accomplishment
that can be performed, for the ego-soul does not die without a fight. It
wages a tireless and bitter warfare against its own attraction to God, and
fights with all the fury and panic of a drowning man struggling to sustain
his existence; it incessantly asserts its love of the manifested world and
life, and restlessly strives to create a diversion from its path toward God.
Torn in two directions, the soul suffers, on the one hand, the agonies of
50

annihilation, and on the other, the painful prolonging of its failure to
reach its avowed Goal. Only when it comes at last, by the grace of God,
to that point where it surrenders all other objectives for God alone does it
become capable of reaching its cherished Goal; divinely inspired by the
desire for God alone, it makes that leap into the consciousness of
universal Being.
In the writings of the early Sufis, and in particular, those of Dhu’n-Nun,
this path of divine love for God, culminating in vision, or gnosis, is
charted as a path (tariq) marked by several distinct advances, or stations.
The actual journey along the spiritual path begins with the station of
Repentence (tauba).
The next station is that of Faith, or Surrender To God (tawakkul). The
mental agitation resulting from fear for one’s own welfare, which may
afflict the novice when he chooses to give all his thought to God, is
dispelled by the calm remembrance that it is He who has called the soul
to Him, and that He will nourish and provide for the body as well.
Surrendering all thoughts of his own bodily welfare, he gives everything
into the hands of God,
The next station is that of Patient Endurance (sabr), a great necessity for
the soul called to the contemplation of God. Calm acceptance of the
rigors of such a life is necessary to the stability of the soul, which must
pass through many ordeals, and many temptations that arise in the mind.
Next, and allied with Patient Endurance, is Joy In Affliction (rida).
When the soul is free to focus its attention on God, it enjoys an inner
bliss, which cannot be dislodged by any outward occurrence, no matter
how unpleasant.
“The Dark Night Of The Soul”; the Sufis call it gabd. This is a state of
dryness and emptiness, when the soul, struggling to become completely
selfless, egoless, has not yet reached the ultimate degree of extinction,
and suffers the heavy sense of death, with no light of superconscious life
yet visible. It is a dry, awful, sense of one’s own nothingness, one’s own
emptiness, which may be likened to the darkness experienced while
going through a dark tunnel when the light at the other end cannot yet be
seen. The ego-self is withered, dried-up, and all but gone; but the greater
Selfhood has not yet revealed Itself
Then comes the revelation of Love and Spiritual Knowledge (mahabba
and ma’rifa). The soul awakens to an incredibly clear awareness that
embraces both divine Love and Knowledge. It is an inner realization by
the soul that the God it sought is all-inclusive Love, and the soul
experiences that Love within itself. It knows that This is the sustaining
Power and guide of all its life.
It is this love longing which leads to the station of Annihilation (fana).
This is the profoundly transformative experience previously referred to
as nirvana, samadhi, or “the vision of God.” For, at the moment the ego
is extinguished, the eternal and all pervasive “I” is realized. It is an
experience that overturns all previous conceptions of God and the soul.
51

Scholars may imagine that a Buddhist experiences one thing, a Vedantist
another, and so forth; but one who has experienced It, whether a Sufi,
Christian or Hindu, knows that It is the final Truth, the only One. There
are not different Unitys, one for each sect or denomination; there is only
one One, and it is That which is experienced by Christians, Buddhists,
Hindus and Sufis alike. It should be obvious that, if there is such a thing
as Unity, and if It can be experienced, then the experience must be the
same for all; since Unity, by its very definition, by its very nature, is one.
So what if that One is called by different names in different lands! In
every place and in every generation, new terms are ever being invented
in the hope of elucidating the knowledge of Unity.
Said al-Hallaj:
I am He whom I love, and He whom I love is I; we are two
spirits dwelling in one body. If you see me, you see Him; and
if you see Him, you see us both. 1
These words of his were very similar to those of Jesus, who had
experienced the same revelation; and they met with a similar response.
By the late Medieval period (11th-14th centuries), the philosophers and
theologians of the Western world had become increasingly aware of the
long tradition of mystical philosophy dating from the early Greeks and
Neoplatonists.
Solomon Ibn Gabirol (ca. 1021-1058 or 1070) was born in Malaga, in
southern Spain, reared and educated in Saragossa, and began composing
religious poems at the age of sixteen. He wrote his philosophical works
in Arabic, but his poems, of which he wrote over three hundred, were
written in Hebrew. Some of these poems are still part of the liturgy of
the Spanish Jews. His main philosophical work is The Fountain Of Life,
but he wrote, in addition, two ethical treatises, The Improvement Of The
Qualities Of The Soul, and The Choice Of Pearls, along with a book on
the Divine Will, which is lost.
In its Latin form, this work greatly influenced such Christian theologians
as Albertus Magnus, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinus, and Duns Scotus,
all of whom quoted it freely. And it was not until the 19th century that a
Jewish scholar, Solomon Munk, discovered that the translation of Ibn
Gabirol’s work, from Arabic to Hebrew, which had been made by Shem
Tob Falquera (1225-1290) under the Hebrew title, Mekor Hayim, was
identical to the work Christians called Fons Vitae. Thus it was
discovered that the Muslim, Avicebron or Avicebrol, was none other
than the Jewish philosopher, Solomon Ibn Gabirol.
Ibn Gabirol, following after the fashion of Aristotle and Plotinus, with
whom he was familiar through Arabic translations, tried his hand at such
a systematic presentation, and made a remarkable effort, offering many
clarifying conceptualizations. Yet, for all his genius and skill, in addition
to his apparent first-hand knowledge, his great work, The Fountain Of
Life, remains a dry and tedious work, holding little appeal for the modern
mind. It is an unhappy fact that any attempt to explain the emanation of
the world from God must prove futile and unrewarding, no matter how
52

clearly and unmistakably one has “seen” it in the mystical experience.
See how many have vainly tried to do so, utilizing such words as
“Logos,” “Prakrti,” “Will,” “Shakti,” and so many others, to signify the
ineffable Power of God by which He casts forth this world-image from
Himself, remaining all the while entirely unaltered, eternally and
indivisibly One
To those who have “seen” God, His projection of the universe from
Himself is a clear and obvious fact; but to those who have not, the notion
that the spirit of God somehow permeates the mutable universe must
seem an impossible contradiction.
One can scarcely speak of Medieval Jewish mysticism without making
some mention of the separate and unique phenomenon of the Kabbala, a
word that simply means “the tradition.” Kabbala stands for a peculiar
movement of Jewish esotericism, which arose in the 12th century,
making use of mystical thought to elaborate a system of secret
symbolism, much as the Pythagoreans had done much earlier.
It was Moses de Leon, in his pseudepigraphic work, the “Splendor”
(Zohar), who carried on the formulations of Isaac the Blind, explaining
in a similar fashion the manifestation of the world from the En Sof.
Moses de Leon, a Castilian Kabbalist, wrote the Zohar around 1280, but
presented it as an ancient tract from the hand of a member of the circle of
Simeon bar Yohai, a revered figure of the Talmudic literature, who lived
in the 2nd century C.E. Under this pretence, it managed to have a wide
circulation and influence during medieval times. De Leon went to great
lengths to portray the Zohar as a work of the 2nd century by writing
much of it in the Aramaic language, and by extolling its authenticity in
his other writings. So successful was he in his forgery that it was not
until recent times (the 19th century) that the fraud was discovered; up to
that time, the Zohar was regarded by many devout Jews as possessing an
authority equivalent to that of the Talmudic scriptures.
In the first chapter of the Zohar, the Biblical description of Creation in
the book of Genesis is reformulated to comply with the mystically
perceived projection or emanation of the phenomenal universe from the
Absolute, the En Sof:
In the beginning, when the Will of the King began to take
effect, He impressed His signs into the heavenly sphere.
Within the Most Hidden, the Infinite (En Sof), a dark flame
issued forth, like a fog forming in the Unformed.
This rather fanciful description is, of course, in keeping with the general
scheme of creation put forward by the philosophers of the so-called
“Neoplatonic” tradition, including Ibn Gabirol. But, from this point on,
the Zohar reveals itself as a Midrash, or commentary, upon the tales of
the Jewish Torah, inventing tales of its own to elucidate the teachings of
the ancient prophets
While the Zohar and Judaism in general
recognizes that “God Almighty is all one without separation,” and that
the Father and the Mother “never separate and never leave each other,
53

but are [always] together in complete union,” the Shekinah, as human
soul, is recognized to be separated in effect from its Eternal Source by
ignorance, and yet capable of conscious reunification with God through
mystical ascension, thus coming to know through direct experience the
Oneness of the soul with God. The purpose of a man’s life therefore is to
accomplish the Yihud (unification) of the Shekinah and the Holy One;
i.e., the union of the soul with God.
In 1244, Jalaluddin Rumi met Shams Tabriz in the streets of Konya, and was
drawn by him to the fervent life of mystical love. His relation to Tabriz
was like that of a loving disciple to his Guru or Pir. Jalaluddin
transferred all his ardent devotion to Shams, as only a spiritual lover can
do, seeing him as the Divine manifest in his life for the sake of providing
him with companionship with God. However, Rumi’s sons and other
family members were so jealous and outraged by the hold that Shams
had on Jalaluddin’s affections that they murdered Shams and threw his
body in a well. At least, so the story goes. Rumi filled the void in his
life by writing a book of poems of love and longing, called Divan-i
Shams Tabriz, sometimes addressing them to Shams, and sometimes
identifying with him.
His verses are full of the imagery of love, but it is the love of the soul for
God. Rumi is the epitome of the mystical lover; but he also knew the
“union” with his Beloved, and speaks with rare beauty of this mysterious
“marriage” of the soul and God.
While Thomas Aquinus was still teaching in Paris, Johannes Eckhart
(1260-1328) was born in the village of Hochheim in Germany, and
entered the Dominican monastery at Erfurt, near his village, at around
fifteen years of age. There he learned Latin, logic, and rhetoric. In those
days, a novice served a one-year novitiate, followed by two years of
studying the Divine Office and the Constitutions of the Order; then there
were five years of philosophy and finally three years of theology.
Meister Eckhart had attained great position in the Church and had
acquired great learning; but he was also a man of great devotion. One
night, while intently praying to his invisible Lord, his mind, suddenly
made clear and bright through his one-pointed attention, became
perfectly still; and in that stillness, the truth of his own and all being
became perfectly clear and evident to his mind’s eye. He realized, in this
still, luminous clarity, that his own mind, which moments ago searched
the darkness for its God, was, in fact, itself the one Reality. It had
created, by its sense of “I” and “Thou,” a duality where none in fact
existed. And as the light of his mind grew more steady, he became more
and more aware of his true nature as the one eternal Consciousness
whose light fills the universe and who is the true identity of all living
beings.
In this experience of unity which Christians call “the vision of God,”
there is no longer a veiling sense of duality; for when the “I” discovers
that the “Thou” it sought is itself, then all duality vanishes, as a dream
54

vanishes when a man awakes from sleep. When that pure and eternal “I”
is known, It is the one who knows; there is no other. When It is known,
It is known as the true Self, which has always been the Self, despite all
previous misconceptions one might have had as to one’s identity. Then
it is realized that this one Self is the only conscious “I” of all beings, and
that it is this one Self also who is projecting all this world of forms.
Truly, there is no one here but that one Self. When He awakens us, then
we realize this. First, He calls us, by causing us to become aware of His
presence within us; then we are drawn to seek Him in prayer and
contemplation. Like a flame within, He draws us to Himself, our Self,
by an inwardly inspired love and desire. When we are purely and singly
focused on Him, when the mind is stilled and clear, we awake to who we
have always been, and know our eternal Identity.
Eckhart, like the ancient Upanishadic rishis, like the Buddha and Jesus
and all other true mystics, had seen the ineluctable Truth of all existence,
had become enlightened. But how was he to speak of it? It was so high
above the understanding of ordinary men and women that they would
surely become frightened and confused on hearing of it, and even the
wisest would surely misinterpret it!
But the difficulties facing Eckhart were two-fold; he had not only the
natural obstacle presented by the inability of language to describe the
indescribable; but there was also the stone-wall of Christian doctrine that
he had sworn to defend, and which, now, if he were to speak faithfully of
the truth, he should have to demolish. To be sure, the Truth he had
known and of which he was eager to speak was the same Truth which
Jesus had seen and of which he had spoken. But the real purport of
Jesus’ teachings regarding his identity with “the Father” had been
construed over the centuries as a doctrine relating to him alone and not
applicable to all men; and so, ironically, when Meister Eckhart began
reiterating the message of Jesus regarding the identity of the human soul
and God, his message was received with horror, and regarded by all
orthodox Christians as heretical and blasphemous.
Eckhart,
like all others who have “seen” the Truth, recognized that the divine
Consciousness at once transcends and pervades the universe. It is both
the absolute, transcendent Godhead and the projecting Power, the
Creator. Yet there is no actual division between these two aspects; for it
is that same one Consciousness that appears as all existence.
But who can tell of this knowledge?
That
one eternal Consciousness is beyond time, beyond the universe of
phenomena; yet from It, like a thought or projected image, the world
shines, like a magic-show. This world-image is projected and withdrawn
in a recurrent cycle, and while it is distinguishable from the eternal
Consciousness Itself, still, it is not different from the eternal
Consciousness—as a thought is not different from the consciousness
55

from which it emanates.
Meister Eckhart, in his Sermon, made the distinction between these two
aspects of the One by using the two terms, “Godhead” (Gottheit)
and ”God” (Gott), to represent these two aspects respectively. By
“Godhead,” he meant, of course, that transcendent, absolute, Silence
which is forever unchanging, unmoving; and by “God” he meant the
Creator, that aspect of the Divine which, like an effusive mind,
continually projects the phenomenal universe.
God and the Godhead are as different from each other as
heaven and earth... Creatures speak of God — but why do
they not mention the Godhead? Because there is only unity in
the Godhead and there is nothing to talk about. God acts.The
Godhead does not. ...The difference between God and the
Godhead is the difference between action and non-action. 5
The eternal “Godhead” is man’s true Being, the conscious Self from
which the creative-aspect, “God,” shines forth. “My real being,” says
Eckhart, “is above God, if we take ‘God’ to be the beginning of all
created things. ... I [the eternal Godhead] am unborn, and in my unborn
aspect I can never die. In my unborn aspect, I have been eternally, and
am now, and shall eternally remain.”6 That unborn aspect, the Godhead,
is experienced when, in contemplation, one enters into that Silence which
exists as the Source and Ground of the mind’s creative effusion.
Eckhart, having broken through into that Silence, spoke of his own
experience of the unborn Self:
In that breaking-through, when I come to be free of my own
will and of God’s will and of all His works and of God
Himself, then I am above all created things, and I am neither
God nor creature, but I am what I was and what I shall remain,
now and eternally. 7
It is worth repeating that this description of a unitive Reality, consisting
of an eternal and unchanging aspect and a creative aspect, which
manifests itself as the phenomenal world, is not the mere product of a
speculative theology; for Eckhart, as for all who have “seen” it, it is a
directly perceived fact. To those who have “seen” the Truth, such
descriptions as Eckhart offers of It seem perfectly simple and obvious;
yet to those who have not, it seems all a muddle. When Eckhart spoke of
these matters to the simple peasants in his Sunday Sermon, he closed by
saying to the congregation, “Whoever does not understand what I have
said, let him not burden his heart with it; for as long as a man is not equal
to this truth, he will not understand these words, for this is a truth beyond
speculation that has come immediately from the heart of God.”
Following the death of Meister Eckhart, many of those illumined by the
knowledge of the Self took a lesson from Eckhart’s condemnation, and
were careful to avoid offending the “guardians of the faith”; but there
were a few who, inspired by Eckhart’s words and his example, found the
courage to speak of their own experience of the unitive Self. Among
these, was one of Eckhart’s faithful disciples, John Tauler (1300-1361),
56

who, like Eckhart, was a member of the Dominican Order.
The Blessed Henry Suso (1296-1381) was another of Eckhart’s disciples
and defenders; and another, the Blessed Jan Ruysbroeck (1293-1381),
was a Flemish citizen who, inspired to lead the contemplative life,
formed a monastic community at Groenendael, under the rule of the
Canons Regular of Saint Augustine.
One of Ruysbroeck’s confreres at Groenendael was a man by the name
of Gerhart Groot (1340-1384), who later formed another contemplative
community at Deventer, called “The Brethren of The Common Life.”
He, like Ruysbroeck, Suso and Tauler, had become entirely disenchanted
with the theological hair-splitting of the Scholastics and wished to return
the emphasis of the Christian faith to the holy life of devotion, and away
from the preoccupation with philosophical and theological formulations,
which had been the trend since Thomas Aquinas flourished at Paris.
There, to Deventer, in 1376,
came a young man named Thomas Haemerlein from Kempen on the
Rhine, who was to become one of the most beloved and influential saints
of all time, known to the world as Thomas a Kempis.
In his solitary nights, Thomas wrote down his interior meditations,
prayers, and counsels, and these pure outflowings of God’s activity in
him were eventually collected in the form of a small book for the
spiritual benefit of those novices in his charge. In a very short time after
his death, however, this little book became frequently copied and widely
circulated, not only among ecclesiastics, but among the lay populace as
well; and was immediately received throughout Christiandom as a
supremely holy book of spiritual guidance. As the earliest Latin
manuscripts of this book were untitled, for purposes of identification it
was circulated under the title, Musica Ecclesiastica, or “Music of The
Church”; but later copiers, forming a title for it from the first few words
of the opening chapter, called it, De Imitatio Christi, or “Of The
Imitation Of Christ.” It is by that title that it is known to us today.
The 16th century Spaniard, Juan de la Cruz (1542-1591), known to
English-speaking people as John of the Cross, spoke with such simple
clarity and poetic beauty on the path of devotion, and with such
psychological subtlety on the mental stages leading to “union,” that all
others who have spoken of these matters seem, in comparison to him,
like babbling and stammering infants. Had he lived and written in our
own day, still the lucidity of his spiritual vision would be a matter for
wonder; the fact that he lived and wrote in the 16th century, in an age of
great narrow-mindedness and religious oppression, is nothing short of
miraculous.
If Thomas a Kempis was the epitome of the Christian bhakta in the 15th
century, Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) was that century’s representative
jnani. But these two were not so far apart in thought as they might at
first appear; in fact, one may find stated in Thomas a Kempis’ writings
the same perennial philosophy found in Nicholas’ and vice versa.
57

Thomas a Kempis, however, was very much a figure of the Middle Ages,
while Nicholas, though outlived by Thomas, is generally regarded as a
transitionary figure, with one foot in the Middle Ages and one in the
Renaissance era. This is due primarily to the scope of Nicholas’
interests, which led him into scientific, social, and political concerns as
well as strictly mystical ones. He was born Nicholas Krebs at Cues (Cusa) on the Moselle river
in the
Rhineland to a well-to-do barge captain, in 1401. Like Thomas a
Kempis, twenty years before him, Nicholas went as a young boy to the
Brethren of The Common Life at Deventer to receive his early education.
At the age of sixteen, he entered the University of Heidelberg, and then
transferred to the University of Padua, where he studied Canon law, the
sciences, mathematics, and Greek. He received his degree at the age of
twenty-two, and thereafter decided to enter the priesthood. Nicholas
studied theology at Cologne, as did Eckhart, and in 1426 became
secretary to the Cardinal legate, Giordano Orsini, becoming ordained as a
priest in 1430.
It would seem that around this time Nicholas collected and read a great
number of classic philosophical and mystical works, including those of
Plato, Eriugena, Dionysius the Areopagite, and especially Meister
Eckhart. Sometime around his twenty-eighth year, he must have
experienced “the vision of God” of which he was later to write so
lucidly. But, in the years that followed, Nicholas became caught up in
the politics of the Church and the ongoing disputes between the Church
and the state, thus beginning the career of reform and reconciliation,
which lasted, throughout his life. In 1440, during a respite from his political labors,
Nicholas wrote his best known philosophical work, De docta ignorantia,
“On Learned Ignorance.”
Nicholas wrote his little book, De visio Dei, “On The Vision Of God,” in 1453.
This was also the Nicholas was a prolific writer on the theme of mystical vision; in 1450
he had written his beautiful dialogue, De sapienta, “On Wisdom,” and in
his later years, De possest (1460), De non aliud (1462), and De
venatione sapientia (1463), an autobiographical recounting of his search
for wisdom. His primary and overriding interest was in explaining
mystical theology in accordance with his own mystical experience, but
he was also aware of the great need to combine with the devotional life a
love and respect for scientific knowledge in order to forge a unified and
rational comprehension of reality, extending from God to all creation.
He had a natural bent toward mathematics, and used many similies and
analogies from that discipline to illustrate his meaning in many of his
theological works. In addition, he wrote a number of purely mathematic
and scientific treatises advocating a more experimental approach to
knowledge of the natural world. Among these are Raparatio calendari
(1436), his treatment of the reform of the calendar; De quadratura circuli
(1452), and De staticis experimentis (1453). In addition to his
remarkable knowledge of mathematics, geometry and physical science,
58

he was also well versed in Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Arabic. No
wonder, with all his vast learning and indefatigable energy,year that he wrote his dialogue
concerning the universal tolerance of all religions, De pace fidei,
in which he asserted that “all religion[s] and the
worship of God, in all men endowed with the spirit, are fundamentally
one and the same, despite the diversity of their rites.”
Thomas a Kempis had felt it irrelevant to

speak of the experience of unity; instead, he concentrated upon exhorting
his charges to make those preparations which would enable them to
experience it for themselves. Nicholas, on the other hand, had but little
to say about the path, and felt a necessity to underscore the truths learned
in that experience. There is not a mystic who ever lived who did not
declare emphatically and often that one cannot possibly know God
through the rational intellect, yet Nicholas of Cusa made this fact the
object of an entire book, and brought the point home in a forceful and
definitive manner to minds which, theretofore, had been unwilling to
hear the message. Because so many of his time were involved in the
futile exercise of dialectics, he felt called upon to make clear that no
amount of reasoning, no amount of intellectual effort, could reveal That
which was beyond the reach of words and intellectual conceptions. This
he did in a book entitled, On Learned Ignorance.
In this book, he pointed out to the dialecticians that all their metaphysical
and theological learning was, in fact, nothing more than ignorance; and
that, when they reached that understanding which allowed them to
acknowledge that all their learning had only brought them, and could
only bring them, to know that they did not know, then they will have
reached that state of “learned ignorance” wherefrom they could truly
begin to embark on their spiritual journey to true knowledge. “Reason,”
said Nicholas,
strives for knowledge and yet this natural striving is not
adequate to the knowledge of the Essence of God, but only to
the knowledge that God ...is beyond all conception knowledge. 2
In each generation, the story of the
vision of Truth is retold, even by those who recognize the futility of such
telling. “These secret things ought not to be revealed to everyone, because when
they are made known they appear to many as absurdities.” 1
He knew well the futility of words to explain what can only be known
through experience; and yet he spoke all the same. For what else is one
to do, unless he abandon humanity altogether and play the fool?
...That wisdom (which all men by their very nature desire to
know and consequently seek after with such great affection of
mind) is known in no other way than that it is higher than all
knowledge and utterly unknowable and unspeakable in all
language. It is unintelligible to all understanding,
immeasurable by all measure, improportion-able by every
proportion, incomparable by all comparison, infigurable by all
59

figuration, unformable by all formation, ...unimaginable by all
imagination,... inapprehensible in all apprehension and
unaffirmable in all affirmation, undeniable in all negation,
indoubtable in all doubt, inopinionable in all opinion; and
because in all speech it is inexpressable, there can be no limit
to the means of expressing it, being incognitable in all
cognition... 3
But this declaration of the inability of the rational intellect to know God
is not the end but the beginning of Nicholas’ message, as it is of all
mystics from the authors of the Upanishads forward. “The Reality,” says
Nicholas,
which is the truth of all beings, is unattainable in its purity;
all philosophers have sought it, none has found it, as it is; and
the more profoundly learned in this ignorance, the more we
shall approach Truth itself. 4
Those who think that wisdom is nothing other than that which
is comprehensible by the understanding, that happiness is
nothing else than what they can attain, are quite far from the
true eternal and infinite wisdom. 5
...The highest wisdom consists in this, to know ... how That
which is unattainable [by the intellect] may be reached or
attained in a manner beyond [intellectual] attainment. 6
Much of On Learned Ignorance and The Vision Of God as well is
devoted to proving by rational argument that God is quite beyond
rational comprehension. Nicholas does this by showing that God is
infinite, and therefore beyond all finite predications; and that God is the
“coincidence of opposites” (coincidentia oppositorum) and is therefore
beyond all thought or expression, which, by its very nature, is based on
either a positive or negative assertion. Nicholas arrived at this
understanding, however, not through logic or ratiocination, but through
direct experience of God.
This “coincidence of opposites” is the very nature of the mystical
experience. As one enters into the awareness of unity, one directly
perceives that all dualities are produced by the separative mind (or ego).
As that veil of false ego is dissolved, the duality of “I” and “Thou”
disappears; the fluctuating mind is stilled, and enters into a Stillness
beyond the opposites of motion and stillness. As this occurs, one realizes
that all that stood as a barrier to this Unity, is constructed of polarities.
For example, the activity of love necessitates its opposite, hatred; the
recognition of beauty necessitates the recognition of ugliness; the love of
knowledge begets a hatred for ignorance; our love of the true necessitates
the arising of repulsion for what is false; even our love of and desire for
God’s vision necessitates the despising of all that obscures it. Thus we
invent good and evil, likes and dislikes; we see movement and rest, and
all the other pairs of opposites, which go to make up our perception of
our separate reality.
But, in the Unity-awareness, which is the absolute Ground of all
existence, these opposites do not exist. As Nicholas says:
60

Because He is Himself the absolute Ground, in which all
contrariety (alteritas) is unity, and all diversity is identity, that
which we understand as diversity cannot exist in God. 7 ...Just
as contrariety in unity is without contrariety because it is
unity, even so, in infinity, contradiction is without
contradiction, because it is infinity. Infinity is simplicity
itself; contradiction cannot exist without a contrary. 8
...O Lord, my God, ... I see Thee to be Infinity Itself,
wherefore nothing is alien to Thee, nothing differing from
Thee, nothing opposed to Thee. For the Infinite allows no
otherness from Itself, since, being Infinity, nothing exists
outside It: absolute Infinity includes and contains all things. 9
In that Infinity, or Unity, the world-appearance is experienced as a cyclic
evolution and involution, or “explication” and “complication,” as
Nicholas puts it. Yet this primary dual motion of explication and
contraction, this recurring projection and withdrawal of the world appearance,
is reconciled or resolved in the primal Unity, which is
beyond all such opposites. It is unchanging, as It contains both
explication and contraction. The alternating explication and contraction
goes on—as a man’s breath goes on; but the One in whom this occurs
remains the same Unity—as a man remains the same whether breathing
out or breathing in. That Unity is a “One,” not set over against a second,
but a “One” which encompasses all duality within Itself. This is the
simple Truth known by all who have risen to that unitive Awareness
which is the coincidence of all opposites.
Nicholas, having experienced that Unity-awareness, wherein all dualities
cease to be, sees this coincidence of opposites as a sort of threshold, or
wall, separating mortal awareness from God-awareness; he calls it “the
wall of Paradise”:
I have learnt that the place wherein Thou art found unveiled is
girt round with the coincidence of contradictories, and this is
the wall of Paradise wherein Thou dost abide. ...Thus ‘tis
beyond the coincidence of contradictories that Thou mayest be
seen, and nowhere this side thereof. 10 ...O God almighty,
Thou dwellest within the wall of Paradise, and this wall is
that coincidence where later is one with earlier, where the end
is one with the beginning, where Alpha and Omega are one.11
All these polarities cease to be in the mystical “vision.” There is no
longer an “I” and a “Thou,” no longer a universe and a God, no longer a
separation between motion and rest, order and chaos, sound and silence.
That One is utter Unity, and It is oneself, one’s only real, eternal, Self.
And the whole charade of polar opposites in comparison to that eternally
undivided Self is but a misty phantasy, as little affecting that Self as a
flimsy daydream. In that experience of Unity, a man realizes that That is
always and eternally his only Identity, despite the film of separate ego
and separate thought, which closes back in upon him, like moss on the
water, obscuring that pure Awareness. For he has seen in that Awareness
that this One is the only one anywhere; that that one Consciousness,
61

which is who he is eternally, is the source and manifestation of all that is.
Naturally, the separative mind, which exists and functions only as a
producer of opposites, can scarcely be expected to fathom That which is
beyond all opposites. Thought is made of opposites, and therefore
cannot be expected to conceive of That which produces it. It is only
when the mind, having become stilled and concentrated, rises to the
awareness of its own Ground and Source that this “coincidence of
opposites” occurs. One may practice this concentration through the
means of meditation or prayer, but one does not always succeed; it
occurs, in fact, but rarely. To anyone practicing this concentrated
transcendence of the ego-mind, it quickly becomes evident that it cannot
be done simply by one’s own efforts. There must be a “coincidence” as
well of love and grace, which comes in its own time. It is “set,” as it
were, in the universal Will, and arises in its own due time during the
ordered unfolding of the universe.
We can only become aware of that grace as it increases in us. A strong
resolve arises in us to know God; our love for Him increases within us
beyond what we have experienced before, and we sense a nearness, a
proximity, which we long to close. It draws us like a magnet, increasing
within us Its own desire, until at last in a moment of yearning prayer, the
veil is drawn aside, the wall of contraries is passed, and the Unity dawns
within. This uncommon drawing-power experienced within is known as
“grace.” Everyone who has ever entered that Unity-awareness has
acknowledged its agency, and his own impotency without it.
When grace begins to be active within, the understanding becomes
quickened and illumined, and the heart becomes filled with a tender love
and yearning for God. The mind cannot bear to think of anything but
God, and it turns away from all mental apparitions to focus singly on its
Lord.
Of his own mystical experience, Nicholas is typically silent in most of
his written works; but, in The Vision Of God, written for the monks of
Tegernsee, he does reveal something of his own vision. Here, he speaks
of how the “Face of God” may be seen beyond the veil of all appearances
and all faces:
Thou hast at times appeared unto me, Lord, not as one to be
seen of any creature, but as the hidden, infinite, God. 16
...In all faces is seen the Face of faces, veiled, and obscured,
although it is not seen unveiled until a man enters, beyond all
faces, into a certain secret and mystic silence where there is
no knowledge or concept of a face. This mist, cloud, darkness
or ignorance into which he that seeks Thy face enters when he
goes beyond all knowledge or concept, is a state beneath
which Thy face cannot be seen except veiled; but that
darkness reveals Thy face to be there, beyond all veils. 17
...Thou dost ravish me above myself that I may foresee the
glorious place whereunto Thou callest me. ...Thou grantest me
to behold the treasury of riches, of life, of joy, of beauty. ...
Thou keepest nothing secret. 18
62

...I behold Thee, O Lord my God, in a kind of mental trance, 19
...Thus, while I am borne to loftiest heights, I behold Thee as
Infinity... 20 ...And when I behold Thee as absolute Infinity, to
whom is befitting neither the name of creating Creator nor of
creatable Creator—then indeed I begin to behold Thee
unveiled, and to enter into the garden of delights! 21
...[In that vision] nothing is seen other than Thyself, [for
Thou] art Thyself the object of Thyself (for Thou seest,
and art That which is seen, and art the sight as well)... 22
It is there, in that mystical experience of infinite Unity that one beholds
the wondrous and paradoxical nature of an unchangeable and immutable
One, which appears as the changeable and mutable world of multiplicity.
In wonder at this ineffable paradox, Nicholas exclaims:
O God, ...[Thou dost] seem subject to mutability, since Thou
dost never desert Thy creatures, which are subject to
mutability; ...but, because Thou art the absolute Good, Thou
art not changeable, and dost not follow what is mutable. O the
unplumbed depths of Thee, my God, who art not separate
from Thy creatures, and art nonetheless beyond them! 23
Like all others who have experienced God, and faced this conceptual
paradox, Nicholas finds it necessary, in order to explain the nature of an
unchangeable and constant Unity which appears as a changeable and
inconstant world-manifestation, to conceptually divide the one Reality
into categorically separate persona. He frames his conception in terms
identical to those used by the early Christians, Gnostics and Hermeticists.
God, he says, in His absolute and invariable Unity, is “the Father”; in His
mysterious creative Power of world-manifestation, He is “the Son,” or
“the Word”; and in His perceptible manifestation as the multiple forms
of the world, He is “the Holy Spirit.” Nicholas is always quick to remind
us that these three are always one, and are divided conceptually only in
order to make clear the various modes, or aspects, of the One.
As “the Father,” God is the absolute Unity, Infinity, Eternity. The
creative Power of God Nicholas explains as that potency within the
Father “wherewith all things are produced from non-being to being.” If
God, the unchanging Unity, be called “the Father,” then, says Nicholas,
His Power of manifestation is “the Son”:
He is God the Father whom we might also call “One” or
“Unity,” because He necessitates being out of what did not
exist (through His omnipotence) ... This [omnipotent Power
of His] is the Word, the Wisdom, the Son of the Father; and
we may regard Him as co-equal to the One or Unity. 24
And the Power or Energy which is manifested by the Word, or Son, and
which forms all things, is “the Holy Spirit.” It is the Word that is, itself,
manifest as the world, but to differentiate the cause, or Creator, from the
effect, or the created, he uses these two terms. Thus, these three—
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—are but names for God, His Power of
Manifestation, and the world-appearance which is the product of that
Power. They are one in essence, but three when categorized according to
63

their different characteristics.
Thus the Essence is triune, and yet there are not three essences
therein, since It is most simple. The plurality of these three is
both plurality and unity, and their unity is both unity and
plurality. 25
Nicholas always stresses the essential unity of these three aspects of
Reality, rather than their apparent plurality. For his purpose is to show
that the world is nothing but the Word, and the Word is nothing but God;
and that, therefore, the world is nothing but God. “What is the world,”
asks Nicholas, “but the manifestation of the invisible God?” 26
This threefold categorization of Reality is, of course a formulation
common to all mystics of all traditions. In the Vedantic terminology, for
example, these three are Brahman, Maya, and Jagat; in the Shaivite
terminology, Shiva, Shakti, and samsara; for the Buddhists,
Dharmakaya, Purvapranidhanabala, and samsara; and so on. Nicholas’
vision is, in all respects, common to all who, through inner vision, have
seen the Truth of existence and attempted to explain it in a way
comprehensible to the intellect. But this is not a mere theological
formula to be learned and mouthed by school children. It is to be
experienced in that inner vision wherein God as man awakens to his
divine Ground and eternal Identity through a loving regard, as that of a
son to his father, or an ardent lover to her beloved.
Man is at once the Essence and the appearance; both God and His
Thought-image. When he rises in awareness beyond the appearances of
the Thought-image, he knows his eternal Identity—as a man, waking
from a dream, realizes he is not just the dream-image within a dream, but
the dreamer; or as an image in a mirror might behold him who is the
source, or original, of the image. “When anyone looks into this mirror of
Eternity,” says Nicholas,
what he sees is not the figure, but the Truth, whereof the
beholder himself is a figure. Wherefore, in Thee, my God,
the figure is [really] the Truth, and the Exemplar of all things
that exist. 27
...I am a living shadow and Thou the Truth... Wherefore, my
God, Thou art alike shadow and Truth; Thou art alike the
image and the Exemplar of myself and all men. 28
In his little book, De sapientia, “On Wisdom,” which is a dialogue
between a teacher and his student, Nicholas expresses most beautifully
the difference between that knowledge attainable through intellectual
learning, and that direct knowledge of God which is “wisdom”; and he
exhorts his readers to pass beyond a mere intellectual understanding to
that wisdom attainable only in the vision of God, through love and grace:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Juan de Yepes y Alvarez on June 24, 1542, at Fontiveros, a
small village about twenty-four miles northwest of Avila in the district of
Old Castille. In 1567, at the age of twenty-five, he was ordained.
64

It was just at this time that Juan met the nun, Mother Teresa de Jesus,
who was then a woman past fifty years of age, and who was later to be
recognized as a saint, and known to the world as Teresa of Avila.
The Carmelites traced their ancestry to a group of anchorites who dwelt
on Mount Carmel in Palestine in ancient times, and who adopted in the
12th century the strict Rule of Saint Albert, the Latin Patriarch of
Jerusalem, which placed special emphasis on poverty, strict enclosure,
fasting and prayer. By the mid-thirteenth century, this Rule was relaxed,
and again made even milder in the mid-fifteenth century by order of
Pope Eugenius IV. In 1562, Teresa of Avila founded the Discalced
Carmelites, calling for a return to the primitive Rule, a return to the
original ideals of the strictly contemplative life.
The strict tenets of Teresa’s new Order were solely directed toward the
reformation of the heart, in order that it might receive the grace of divine
love, and toward the focusing of the heart’s intent on the pursuit of the
holy union of the soul with the Divine. Thus, they called for very little
of outward works or preaching, but focused entirely on a life of interior
recollection and prayer, and a singular devotion to God alone, to the
exclusion of all else.
Juan was thereupon found guilty of rebellion and contumacy, and
condemned to an unspecified term of imprisonment. He was thrown into
a closet six feet by ten feet, which had served as a privy to an adjoining
guest-chamber. This was in December of 1557. His home for the next
nine months was this small stone privy-closet, lit only by a small hole at
the top.
It was during this nine months in his tiny cell that Juan wrote down, on
scraps of paper given to him by a sympathetic jailer, the verses which
were to comprise his most famous and exquisite poetry on the “dark
night” of the soul, and its union with its Lord. It was there, in this most
wretched physical state, that his mind, freed from all but God, his only
solace, experienced that illumination which he calls the “divine
marriage” of the soul and God.
Juan’s prose works, each corresponding to one of his short poems, are
The Ascent of Mount Carmel, The Dark Night (which was intended as
part of The Ascent), The Spiritual Canticle, and The Living Flame Of
Love. The path he expounds in these works is not, in the least way,
different from that shown by the devotional saints of all religious
traditions; his distinction lies, rather, in the keen clarity of his perception
of the progressive psychological stages along the way, and the amazingly
lucid and convincing way in which he describes these stations. Anyone
who has traveled the path of divine love—whether Hindu, Jew, Buddhist
or Sufi—must stand in awe, and thrill with delight, before these written
works of Fray Juan de la Cruz; for no more true and perfect description
of the mystical path of devotion could ever be imagined.
The goal of the mystic is Truth,
God, the Highest—in short, the ultimate perfection and beatitude. For
65

the lover, all this is summed as “union with the Beloved.” To be united
with God is to be dis-united with the separative ego; to see the one Self is
to become blind to the desires and appetites of the individual self. The
knowledge, pleasure, and enjoyment of God is obtained internally and
not externally; and therefore the knowledge, pleasure and enjoyment of
the phenomenal world is not included in it.
….those who look to the Eternal, the Absolute, do so only
by looking away from the transient, the phenomenal; and those who look
to the transient, phenomenal world necessarily look away from the
Eternal. Make no mistake: though these two are undoubtedly
complementary aspects of the same one Reality, they are, to the vision,
mutually exclusive. Juan expresses this fact in this way:
The high things of God are foolishness and madness to man...
Hence the wise men of God and the wise men of the world are
foolish in the eyes of each other, for to the one group, the
wisdom and knowledge of God is imperceivable, and to the
other, the knowledge of the world is imperceivable. Wherefore
the knowledge of the world is ignorance to the knowledge of
God, and the knowledge of God is ignorance to the knowledge
of the world. 2
The wisdom of God lies in a direction opposite to the wisdom of the
world, but to the normally active and outgoing mind, such a 180˚ turnaround
is as difficult as holding back a raging river or a dozen wild
horses. To Juan, this total denial of the outgoing tendencies of the mind
and will is like a “dark night” for the soul. And in his poem, called The
Dark Night, he tells of the journey of the soul to union with God in
allegorical terms, describing a midnight rendezvous of a lover with her
beloved. In his commentary on this poem, he explains that he describes
this journey as taking place on a dark night because, in setting out on this
journey, the soul must be emptied of all appetite or desire for what
belongs to the phenomenal world; and this, to the soul, is like darkness.
Secondly, the path itself is dark, as it may not be negotiated by the light
of the reasoning intellect, but in the darkness of faith alone. Thirdly,
says Juan, God, Himself, the Objective and End of the journey, is
profound darkness to the mind and senses accustomed to the light of the
world.
In addition to the renunciation of the appetites, there is yet another,
complementary, ingredient in the successful attainment of union with
God; and that is grace. Grace is, of course, ever-present, and is the hand
that upholds an aspirant every step of the way; but the grace of divine
love, the grace of extreme longing for God, is a very special and highly
significant grace. The desire for God, says Juan, “is the preparation for
union with Him. ... If a person is seeking God, his Beloved is seeking
him much more. And if a soul directs to God its loving desires, God
sends forth His fragrance by which He draws it and makes it run after
Him.”8 And yet this love is an afflictive and joyless love, until it is
consummated; for, though it enters sweetly, it brings the soul near to
66

death before its work is done.
Yet, as the soul draws nearer to God, through this infused flame of love,
its suffering grows even more intense as it longs solely for the
consummation of that love, in the perfect meeting with the Beloved.
Brought, by grace, to utter humility and nothingness, it is prepared to
make that final ascent.
In the 20th Century there were an exceptional few Christian writers, even during those awful
war years, who advanced the call to mystical knowledge, such as Evelyn
Underhill (1875-1941), Dean Inge (1860-1954) and Thomas Merton
(1915-1968).
It was not until the 1950’s, however, that the new availability of
inexpensive paperback volumes served to familiarize an increasing
segment of the public with the past mystics of every religious tradition.
The works of D.T. Suzuki, R.H. Blyth, Christmas Humphries, Philip
Kapleau and other Buddhist scholars created a great deal of interest in
Zen Buddhism; and the publication of ancient Sufi works translated by
A.J. Arberry and R.A. Nicholson brought about an increased familiarity
with that tradition as well. By the 1960’s, a large-scale Renaissance of
mysticism had surfaced in the West. During that decade, hundreds of
scholarly works and translations of mystical literature were published in
Europe and America, and thousands of eager young minds were
awakened to the life of devotion and meditation on the Self.
As mentioned previously at the beginning of the numerous quotes on the insights, teachings and lives
of these mystics, the above are from The History of Mysticism (30th edition) by Swami Abhayananda.
(Stan Trout)
The History of Mysticism: The Unchanging Testament Paperback –

October, 2002 by Swami Abhayananda .
Also see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/
 1. Mystical Experience
 2. Categories of Mystical Experiences
 3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience
 4. Perennialism
 5. Pure Conscious Events (PCEs)
 6. Constructivism
 7. Inherentists vs. Attributionists
 8. Epistemology: The Doxastic Practice Approach and the Argument from Experience
 9. Mysticism, Religious Experience, and Gender
 Bibliography
Many important books listed
67

 Academic Tools
 Other Internet Resources
 Related Entries
Underhill, Evelyn, 1945, Mysticism, A study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual
Consciousness, London: Methuen.
http://www.sacred-texts.com/myst/myst/myst23.htm
Mysticism, by Evelyn Underhill, [1911], at sacred-texts.com
Essential reading – the article linked above.
http://www.sacred-texts.com/myst/index.htm
Bibliography
http://www.sacred-texts.com/myst/myst/myst24.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mysticism
 Etymology
 2 Definitions
 2.1 Mystical experience and union with the Divine or Absolute

 2.2 Religious ecstasies and interpretative context
 2.3 Intuitive insight and enlightenment
 2.4 Spiritual life and re-formation
 3 History of the term
 3.1 Early Christianity

 3.2 Medieval meaning
 3.3 Early modern meaning
 3.4 Contemporary meaning
 4 Scholarly approaches of mystical experience
 4.1 Mystical experiences

 4.2 Perennialism versus constructionism
 4.3 Contextualism and attribution theory
 4.4 Neurological research
 4.5 Mysticism and morality
 5 Forms of mysticism
 5.1 Shamanism
 5.2 Western mysticism
o 5.2.1 Mystery religions
o 5.2.2 Christian mysticism
o 5.2.3 Western esotericism and modern spirituality
68

 5.3 Jewish mysticism
 5.4 Islamic mysticism
 5.5 Indian religions
o 5.5.1 Hinduism
o 5.5.2 Tantra
o 5.5.3 Sant-tradition and Sikhism
 5.6 Buddhism
 5.7 Taoism
 5.8 The Secularization of Mysticism
 6 See also
 7 Notes
 8 References
 9 Sources
 9.1 Published sources

 9.2 Web-sources
 10 Further reading
 11 External links
Are there characteristics we can identify in the descriptions of the cases of religious experience and
mystical experience we have quoted? Are any of them philosophically relevant? Do they reveal
certain values, norms, attitudes, aims and other aspects of a shared intersubjectivity? Is this a
specialized type of intersubjectivity? Are there different types of intersubjectivity, for example in
different countries, cultures, communities, groups, disciplines and socio-cultural practices?
a) Intersubjectivity emphasizes that shared cognition and consensus is essential in shaping our
ideas and relations. Language, quintessentially, is viewed as communal rather than private.
Therefore, it is problematic to view the individual as partaking in a private world, one whose
meaning is defined apart from any other subjects. But in our shared divergence from a
commonly understood experience, these private worlds of semi-solipsism naturally emerge.
Intersubjectivity is a term used in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology to

represent the psychological relation between people. It is usually used in contrast to solipsistic
individual experience, emphasizing our inherently social being
b) In philosophy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity
 Definition
 2 In psychoanalysis
69

 3 In philosophy
In the debate between cognitive individualism and cognitive universalism, some aspects of thinking
are neither solely personal nor fully universal. Cognitive sociology proponents argue for
intersubjectivity—an intermediate perspective of social cognition that provides a balanced view
between personal and universal views of our social cognition. This approach suggests that, instead
of being individual or universal thinkers, human beings subscribe to "thought communities"—
communities of differing beliefs. Thought community examples include churches, professions,
scientific beliefs, generations, nations, and political movements.[11] This perspective explains why
each individual thinks differently from each another (individualism): person A may choose to adhere
to expiry dates on foods, but person B may believe that expiry dates are only guidelines and it is still
safe to eat the food days past the expiry date. But not all human beings think the same way
(universalism).
 3.1 Phenomenology
 4 In psychology
 5 In child development
 5.1 Across cultures
 6 See also
 7 References
 8.1 Psychoanalysis
 8.2 Philosophy
Intersubjectivity and philosophy:
 Jean-Paul Sartre
 Martin Buber
 Gabriel Marcel
 Dialogue
 Edmund Husserl
 Phenomenology
 Eviatar Zerubavel
 Emmanuel Levinas

Psychoanalysis
 Brandchaft, Doctors & Sorter (2010). Toward an Emancipatory Psychoanalysis. Routledge:

New York.
 Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J. B. (1974). The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Edited by W. W.
Norton & Company, ISBN 0-393-01105-4
70

 Orange, Atwood & Stolorow (1997). Working Intersubjectively. The Analytic Press: Hillsdale,
NJ.
 Stolorow, R. D., Atwood, G. E., & Orange, D. M. (2002). Worlds of Experience: Interweaving
Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.
 Stolorow & Atwood (1992). Contexts of Being. The Analytic Press: Hillsdale, NJ.
 Stolorow, Brandchaft & Atwood (1987). Psychoanalytic Treatment: An Intersubjective
Approach. The Analytic Press:Hillsdale, NJ.
Philosophy
 Edmund Husserl Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1905-
1920
1928
1935
 Edmund Husserl Cartesian Meditations, Edited by S. Strasser, 1950. ISBN 978-90-247-0068-4
 Critique of intersubjectivity Article by Mats Winther
 Edmund Husserl: Empathy, intersubjectivity and lifeworld, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
Contemporarily, intersubjectivity is a major topic in both the analytic and the continental
traditions of philosophy. Intersubjectivity is considered crucial not only at the relational level
but also at the epistemological and even metaphysical levels. For example, intersubjectivity is
postulated as playing a role in establishing the truth of propositions, and constituting the so-
called objectivity of objects.
A central concern in consciousness studies of the past 50 years is the so-called problem of
other minds, which asks how we can justify our belief that people have minds much like our
own and predict others' mind-states and behavior, as our experience shows we often can.[10]
Contemporary philosophical theories of intersubjectivity need to address the problem of other
minds.
In the debate between cognitive individualism and cognitive universalism, some aspects of
thinking are neither solely personal nor fully universal. Cognitive sociology proponents argue
for intersubjectivity—an intermediate perspective of social cognition that provides a balanced
view between personal and universal views of our social cognition. This approach suggests
that, instead of being individual or universal thinkers, human beings subscribe to "thought
communities"—communities of differing beliefs. Thought community examples include
churches, professions, scientific beliefs, generations, nations, and political movements.[11]
This perspective explains why each individual thinks differently from each another
(individualism): person A may choose to adhere to expiry dates on foods, but person B may
believe that expiry dates are only guidelines and it is still safe to eat the food days past the
expiry date. But not all human beings think the same way (universalism).
Intersubjectivity argues that each thought community shares social experiences that are
different from the social experiences of other thought communities, creating differing beliefs
among people who subscribe to different thought communities. These experiences transcend
71

our subjectivity, which explains why they can be shared by the entire thought community.[12]
Proponents of intersubjectivity support the view that individual beliefs are often the result of
thought community beliefs, not just personal experiences or universal and objective human
beliefs. Beliefs are recast in terms of standards, which are set by thought communities.
http://study.com/academy/lesson/intersubjectivity-definition-examples.html
http://www.owenkelly.net/2439/intersubjectivity-a-working-definition/
http://www.center4familydevelop.com/Intersubjectivity.pdf
http://mmmi.robinfaichney.org/intersub.html
http://www.kheper.net/topics/intersubjectivity/definitions.html
 Intersubjectivity-1 (standard definition): consensual validation between independent subjects via

exchange of signals. I call this semiotic intersubjectivity
 Intersubjectivity-2 (weak-experiential definition): "mutual engagement and participation between

independent subjects, which directly conditions their respective experience." The term "weak
experiential" is misleading here, I prefer to say psychological intersubjectivity
 Intersubjectivity-3 (strong-experiential definition): "mutual co-arising and engagement

of interdependent subjects, or 'intersubjects' which creates their respective experience."
This is better defined as ontological or metaphysical intersubjectivity, for example
Whitehead's Process Philosophy and Co-Creation
de Quincey is highly critical of Ken Wilber, another philosopher of intersubjectivity, both

regarding his excessively intellectual edifice and his more limited idea of intersubjectivity as
limited to his Lower Left quadrant (= Intersubjectivity-1 and 2). However according to
Sean Esbjorn-Hargens he oversimplifies and misrepresents Wilber. Wilber clearly is a very
difficult and cantankerous author to understand, and I don't want to enter into this particular
argument. But Esbjorn-Hargens, who does a good job in his co-authored book Integral
Ecology of making Wilber more understandable, argues that Wilber's definition is rather
more nuanced. Because I'm interested in trying to find as many definitions as possible, I'll
quote Esbjorn-Hargens here, along with some comments:
Wilber uses the same term, "intersubjectivity," to refer to at least five different dimensions of
intersubjectivity. Thus, when approaching Wilber on the topic of intersubjectivity one needs
to be sensitive to the context, which is often the only indicator of which type of
intersubjectivity is being explained. Though this presentation doesn't afford the space for a
thorough explanation of these dimensions, let me briefly introduce them with terms I have
generated:
1. Intersubjectivity-as-spirit: the transcendental quality of all relationships that allows for

any dimension of intersubjectivity to manifest. The only reason that two subjectivities can
touch simultaneously (co-presence) is that they are ultimately only one Subject. [MAK:
Intersubjectivity as nonduality - this can be added to de Quincey's list, as Intersubjectivity-
4.]
72

2. Intersubjectivity-as-context: the context created by multiple intersubjective structures (i.e.,
meshworks) which are constitutive of the subject and create the space in which both
subjects and objects arise (e.g., physical laws, morphic fields, linguistic, moral, cultural,
biological, and aesthetic structures). These cultural contexts, backgrounds, and practices are
nondiscursive and inaccessible via direct experience. [MAK: This category would seem to
combine de Quincey's ontological intersubjectivity (Intersubjectivity-3) with Wilber's
standard Intersubjectivity as Lower Left quadrant]
3. Intersubjectivity-as-resonance: the occurrence of "mutual recognition" and "mutual

understanding" between two holons of similar depth. Within this dimension there are
Worldspaces and Worldviews.
 Worldspaces: ontological resonance between two subjects who share emergent domains
(e.g., physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual). Here, mutual recognition is simple co-
presence prior to reflection (precognitive). [MAK: Wilber's latest work rejects ontology,
hence this category cannot be distinguished from the next, unless it's by quadrant]
 Worldviews: epistemological resonance between two subjects who share a level of
psychological development (e.g., archaic, magic, mythic, rational, and centauric). Here
mutual understanding is co-presence via cognition, which complexifies with development.
This is the cognitive component of a shared worldspace. [MAK: perhaps these two categories
could be called Intersubjectivity-1 1/2, or psychosocial intersubjectivity]
4. Intersubjectivity-as-relationship: the way we identify with and have relationship with

other subjects and objects. Within this dimension there are at least three types of
relationships.
 It-It relationships: an objective subject in relation with an objective object.

 I-It relationships: a subject in relationship with an object (or a subject seen as an object).
 I-I relationships: a subject in relationship with a subject. This last subdivision has two general
forms, either solidarity or difference. [MAK: This is all about perspectives, which is very big in
Wilber's post-metaphysics. Wilber only has three main perspectives, with otehrs being
convoluted meta-views ("I know that you know that I know"...), whereas I have postulated
further perspectives of nonduality and beyond. In any case, all these Wilberian perspectives
can be pretty much reduced to subsets of Intersubjectivity-1 and 2]
o Relationship-as-solidarity: relating to another subject because they mirror your
values, ethnicity, gender, or nationality etc.
o Relationship-as-difference: relating to another subject as a subject despite the fact
that they are different from you in important ways. ( MAK: These two sub-categories
can be considered variants of Intersubjectivity-1]
It is also helpful to keep in mind a related quality to intersubjectivity, namely:
5. Intersubjectivity-as-phenomenology: the felt-experience of different dimensions of

intersubjectivity, including: spirit, resonance, and relationships. Note that intersubjectivity-
as-context is not available as "felt-experience" by its very nature of constituting the subject
prior to experience. [MAK: This category seems to combine Intersubjectivity-1
(phenomenology) and 3 (process philosophy)]
I have to admit, this Wilber stuff gives me a huge headache. In comparison, de Quincey (who
is also quite tecyhnical) is simplicity itself! It is easy to understand why it is so difficult to
73

criticise Wilber, one is confronted with a convoluted labyrinth. As for myself, I prefer to
make esoteric and metaphysical ideas as simple as possible
At best Wilber adds one new category, possibly two. A further dimension of
Intersubjectivity, curiously not mentioned by Wilber in view of hsi Mahayana Buddhist
leanings, is Tu-shun's non-obstruction of Shih against Shih . "Indra's Net"
Therefore the following dimensions of Intersubjectivity, from the most trivial to the most
profound, can be listed:
 semiotic intersubjectivity
 psychosocial intersubjectivity
 psychological intersubjectivity
 metaphysical intersubjectivity
 nondual intersubjectivity
 Indra's Net
http://www.kheper.net/topics/intersubjectivity/index.html
Welcome to the Kheper website. The word Kheper means evolution,

metamorphosis, transformation, coming into being.
http://www.kheper.net/topics/index.html
http://www.kheper.net/topics/philosophy/index.html
http://www.kheper.net/topics/intersubjectivity/index.html
I first encountered the idea of Intersubjectivity in the work of Ken Wilber, although it seems
it originally developed in psychology and phenomenology. The concept has however been
developed in much greater detail by Transpersonal Psychologist Christian de Quincey (who
is also critical of Wilber's interpretations)
As I further developed my own Integral Philosophy (inspired in part by Wilber;'s work, but
also realising the deficiencies of his methodology), I began to realise that Intersubjectivity
(by which is meant Intersubjectivity-2 and 3 in the above definitions) was actually something
quite important. For example, I realised its connection with Martin Buber's I-Thou
relationship and with sentientism and constructing a universal ethical system that goes
beyond anthropocentricism to include not just eco-spirituality but love of animals (and indeed
of all sentient beings) as well.
It also occured to me that every interaction we have with the world, whether on the gross
physical or the subtle/auric level, and whether with inanimate (inconscient) objects, nature,
non-human animals, humans, devas, or any other being, is intersubjective and participatory
in some way, and ideally can aid in transforming the world
74

Intersubjectivity, occurs whenever the individual consciousness interacts with or
contacts other subjective or objective persons, beings or things beyond its own
boundaries. There is then the option of dualistic ego/shadow-projection, in which case the
Other is interpreted only through the distorting veils of one's own lower-astral generated
delusion, or else egoic and narcissism is transcended in favour of degrees of empathic
expansion, including selfless identification and sympathetic joy and compassion with other
human beings, non-human animals, the environment, or physical and non-physical sentient
beings as a whole.
http://sociologyindex.com/intersubjectivity.htm
Intersubjectivity is shared understanding that helps us relate one situation to

another. Sociologists who reject the assumption of the objective nature of social reality
and focus on the subjective experience of actors have to avoid reducing the world only to
personal experience. Intersubjectivity that aims at fusion with the other is too narrow to
account for the constitution of subjectivity and subjectivism.
Through intersubjectivity ordinary people as well as sociologists assume that if

another stood in their shoes they would see the same things. We all make our
subjective experience available and understandable to others. What might constitute
intersubjective relations during infancy and early childhood remains a puzzle within and
beyond psychology.
Intersubjectivity implies that students are tasked with discovering how to build
knowledge and instructors are tasked with guiding students in these processes. The
inference to other minds by analogy with one's own is unconvincing, yet all our social
interaction assume we can identify others' belief and intentions.
Patterns of Intersubjectivity in the Constitution of Subjectivity: Dimensions of

Otherness
Nelson Ernesto Coelho, Jr., Luís Claudio Figueiredo
Four matrices are described through references to their proponents: (a) trans-subjective
intersubjectivity (Martin Heidegger); (b) traumatic intersubjectivity (Emmanuel Levinas);
(c) interpersonal intersubjectivity (George Herbert Mead); and (d) intrapsychic
intersubjectivity (Sigmund Freud). Intersubjective dimensions are understood as
indicating dimensions of otherness.
Constitution of the Self: Intersubjectivity and Dialogicality

Ivana Marková, University of Stirling, Scotland, UK - Culture & Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 3,
249-259 (2003)
The polysemic nature of intersubjectivity stems not only from diverse pursuits and goals
but also from different ontologies of intersubjectivity.
Intersubjectivity and Temporal Reference in Television Commentary

Stephanie Marriott - Time & Society, Vol. 4, No. 3, 345-364 (1995)
Television commentary gives rise to an electronically mediated intersubjectivity.
The Achievement of Intersubjectivity through Embodied Completions: A Study

of Interactions Between First and Second Language Speakers - Junko Mori,
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Makoto Hayashi, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Applied Linguistics 2006
27(2).
The coordination of vocal and non-vocal resources that are brought to bear on the
achievement of intersubjectivity.
75

Reconciling communicative action with recognition
thickening the ‘inter’ of intersubjectivity
Eva Erman, Department of Political Science
The symmetry implied by social contract theory and so-called Golden Rule thinking is
anchored to a Cartesian subject–object world and is not equipped to address recognition.
Feeling Gender Speak - Intersubjectivity and Fieldwork Practice with Women

Who Prostitute in Lima, Peru
Lorraine Nencel, De Vrije Universiteit
This article discusses a dimension of fieldwork methodology often overlooked. The
discovery brought several epistemological principles into question pertaining to power
and intersubjectivity subscribed to in a feminist or critical anthropology.
The ontological co-emergence of 'self and other' in Japanese philosophy

Yoko Arisaka, Philosophy Department
Abstract: The issues regarding intersubjectivity have been central topics in modern
Japanese philosophy. Watsuji's phenomenology deals more directly with the topic of
intersubjectivity.
The Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity as alterology. emergent theories and

wisdom traditions in the light of genetic phenomenology
Natalie Depraz, College International de Philosophie
Abstract: The relevance of Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity for contemporary
empirical research and for ancestral wisdom. Two main Husserlian discoveries that
subjectivity is from the very beginning intersubjectivity and infants, animals, the insane
and aliens are subjects in a full sense as they are right from the beginning already
intersubjective subjects.
The practice of mind. Theory, simulation or primary interaction?

Shaun Gallagher, Department of Philosophy, Canisius College, Buffalo.
Abstract: That theory of mind is our primary and pervasive means for understanding
other persons, go beyond the scientific empirical evidence and phenomenological
evidence.
Burnout and intersubjectivity: A psychoanalytical study from a Lacanian

perspective
Stijn Vanheule, An Lievrouw, Paul Verhaeghe, Ghent University, Belgium
Human Relations, Vol. 56, No. 3, 321-338 (2003)
On the basis of qualitative research data we investigate to what extent Lacan's model of
intersubjectivity helps us to understand the burnout process. Outlining intersubjectivity
through the dialectical master and slave relationship and the difference between
imaginary and symbolic interactions.
The 'shared manifold' hypothesis. From mirror neurons to empathy

Vittorio Gallese, Istituto di Fisiologia Umana.
Abstracts: This account of intersubjectivity based on the findings of neuroscientific
investigation will be discussed in relation with a classical tenet of phenomenological
sociology.
Understanding the representational mind. A prerequisite for intersubjectivity

proper
Iso Kern, Institute of Philosophy, Eduard Marbach, Institute of Philosophy, University of
Bern.
Abstracts: The study of intersubjectivity is closely tied to questions of the
representational mind. It focuses on developmental studies of children's understanding

of the human mind.
A Philosopher Manqué? Simone de Beauvoir, Moral Values and 'The Useless

Mouths'
Elizabeth Stanley, University of Manchester, UK
European Journal of Women's Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 201-220 (2001)
Les Bouches inutiles and the Useless Mouths, to examine ideas about morality, ethics
and intersubjectivity expressed within it.
Scandalous ethics. Infinite presence with suffering

Annabella Pitkin, Barnard College, Columbia University, 3009 Broadway, New York, NY
10027, USA
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pp. 231-46
Abstracts: Buddhist and Jewish thinkers say scandalous things on purpose.Scandalous
things are said in order to cause a breaking-open in the consciousness of the hearer and
practitioner, which produces compassion, transformation, and liberation.
Matrix and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenological Aspects of Group Analysis

Hans W. Cohn, School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, Regent's College, London
Group Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 4, 481-486 (1993)
A move from an extreme subjectivism to a complete dismissal of the subject. Matrix and
intersubjectivity are the relevant fields of experience.
Encounters with animal minds

Barbara Smuts, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 525 East University,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1109, USA
Abstracts: Explores the kinds of relationships that can develop between human and
nonhuman animals. How Safi and I co-create systems of communication and emotional
expression that permit deep 'intersubjectivity.'
Empathy and consciousness

Evan Thompson, Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North
York, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada
Abstracts: That Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of
self and other and is inherently intersubjective.
Holding in Mind: Intersubjectivity, Subject Relations and the Group

Phil Schulte, NHS psychotherapy service in Bexley, Kent
Group Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 4, 531-544 (2000)
Intersubjectivity is emerging as a key concept in psychoanalysis. The intersubjective
perspective stands in contrast to classical psychoanalytic theorizing.
Intersubjectivity in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism

B. Alan Wallace, Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa
Barbara, CA 93106-3130, USA
Abstracts: Buddhist concepts of intersubjectivity like the meditative practice of dream
yoga is shown to have deep implications regarding the nature of intersubjectivity.
The Politics of Problems: Intersubjectivity in Defining Powerful Others

Sue Jones, University of Bath
Human Relations, Vol. 37, No. 11, 881-894 (1984)
How persons in organizations, tackling what they define as complex problems, define
others as significant in terms of their perceived power.
77

Beyond empathy. Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity
Dan Zahavi, Danish Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities, Vimmelskaftet 41A, 2,
DK-1161 Copenhagen K, Denmark
Abstracts: The phenomenologists argue that a treatment of intersubjectivity requires a
simultaneous analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and world.
From intersubjectivity to intercorporeality: contributions of a phenomenological

philosophy to the psychological study of alterity. - COELHO JUNIOR, Nelson
Ernesto.
Abstract: Philosophical questioning of intersubjectivity in the phenomenological theories
of Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty.
Paths of intersubjectivity: Ferenczi, Bion, Matte-Blanco. Psicol. USP, 1999, vol.10,

no.1, p.141-155. ISSN 0103-6564. GERBER, Ignácio
Abstract: Intersubjectivity is pertinent to the freudian concept of Psychoanalysis. It was
Ferenczi, the pioneer in the investigations of emotions.
Sequentiality as a problem and resource for intersubjectivity in aphasic

conversation: analysis and implications for therapy - Wilkinson R.
Source: Aphasiology, Volume 13, Numbers 4-5, 1 April 1999, pp. 327-343(17)
Abstract: Investigations of non-aphasic conversation have displayed the importance of
sequentiality in the meaning and understanding of utterances in conversation.
The Intersubjectivity of Interaction

John W. Du Bois, University of California, Santa Barbara
Why is it necessary to integrate intersubjectivity into any understanding of language and
social life? How does intersubjectivity relate to stance?
Labour and Intersubjectivity: Notes on the Natural Law of Copyright

ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, University of Toronto - Faculty of Law
Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum Paper No. 01-06 and U of Toronto, Public Law Research
Paper No. 01-06
Abstract: A theoretical approach to copyright law centred on authorial right and capable
of accounting for the public interest in access to intellectual creations. The paper offers a
rights-based interpretation of the idea-expression-dichotomy inspired by Kant's theory of
property.
Grounding Signs of Culture: Primary Intersubjectivity in Social Semiosis

Stephen J. Cowley, Sheshni Moodley, Agnese Fiori-Cowley, Social Sciences and
Humanities, University of Bradford, UK, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South
Africa
Mind, Culture, and Activity 2004, Vol. 11, No. 2, Pages 109-132.
Abstract: The article examines how infants are first permeated by culture. Building on
Thibault (2000), semiogenesis is traced to the joint activity of primary intersubjectivity.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF

PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY - Carol Weaver
ABSTRACT: After exploring the concept of projective identification and the claims from
various contemporary psychoanalysts the paper explores the philosophical concept of
intersubjectivity.
Considering the nature of intersubjectivity within professional nursing

Wanda Pierson
Abstract: This article examines some of the notions of intersubjectivity and proposes an
alternative understanding.
78

Communication Media and Intersubjectivity in Small Groups
Shaila Miranda, University of Oklahoma
Robert P. Bostrom, University of Georgia
Leslie Jordan Albert, University of Oklahoma
ABSTRACT:Signification, comprehension, and emotional contagion. Results indicate that
the effects of CMC on all three processes were negative and that signification and
comprehension had positive effects on the intersubjective social construction of meaning.
Between Subjects: Shared Meanings of Intersubjectivity.

Authors: Leadbeater, Bonnie J.
Abstract: This review of the theoretical foundations of intersubjectivity argues that the
problem lies in the developmental starting points of the theories.
Holding in Mind: Intersubjectivity, Subject Relations and the Group

Phil Schulte, NHS psychotherapy service in Bexley, Kent
The intersubjective perspective stands in contrast to classical psychoanalytic theorizing.
Perverse Ethics - The Body, Gender and Intersubjectivity

Lara Merlin, Rutgers University - Feminist Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, 165-178 (2003)
The violence of Western culture derives from a particular gendered fantasy of bodily
organization. By re-imagining the body, it becomes possible, not to avoid loss, but rather
to alter its meaning.
Critique of Intersubjectivity
Abstract: The article investigates the philosophical and psychological notion of
intersubjectivity.
Bayesian Intersubjectivity and Quantum Theory

Pérez-Suárez, Marcos; Santos, David J.
Abstract: Frequentism and Bayesian theory are discussed together with the replacement
of frequentist objectivity for Bayesian intersubjectivity.
http://mlwi.magix.net/intersubj.htm
Abstract
The article investigates the philosophical/psychological notion of intersubjectivity and argues

that our subjective involvement in each other, especially the psychoanalytic relation between
analyst and analysand, ought to be regarded as an involvement on the unconscious level. The
diverse notions of a joint conscious creation, or joint narrative, implying a relative merger of
our conscious personalities, are harmful and will not invoke a wholesome form of subjective
engagement.
Keywords: intersubjectivity, Ogden, relational field, the analytic third, narrative.
Conclusion
I contend that there are two kinds of intersubjectivity: (1) the unsound ‘merger theories’ and
(2) the sound version where the ‘intersubjective co-creation’ takes place autonomously in the
unconscious, (? Or as values, norms, etc?) supported by an ego that allows for autonomy by
defining itself against both ‘inner otherness’ and ‘outer otherness’. It implies that the
unconscious is acknowledged as a comparably autonomous ‘inner other’, rather than a
passive storage space for repressions or introjected object-relations.
79

The realm of unconscious co-creation can be viewed as a greenhouse, which must be
carefully maintained over a long time. If a seed is buried in the earth then we have to leave it
there. One can’t simply tear it up, lay it on the table, saying, “this is what I find in the
unconscious”. This will only destroy the burgeoning plant. Instead one must water it
modestly. When it begins to sprout, it should be exposed to a little sunlight (=conscious
recognition), but not too much.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#EmpIntLif
 7. Empathy, intersubjectivity and lifeworld
One of the main themes of transcendental phenomenology is intersubjectivity. Among other

things, it is discussed in considerable detail in the 5th of the Cartesian Meditations and in the
manuscripts published in vol. XIII-XV of Husserliana. (A particularly important critique of
Husserl's view on intersubjectivity from a sociological viewpoint is found in Schütz 1966.)
According to Husserl, intersubjective experience plays a fundamental role in our constitution

of both ourselves as objectively existing subjects, other experiencing subjects, and the
objective spatio-temporal world. Transcendental phenomenology attempts to reconstruct the
rational structures underlying—and making possible—these constitutive achievements.
From a first-person point of view, intersubjectivity comes in when we undergo acts of

empathy. Intersubjective experience is empathic experience; it occurs in the course of our
conscious attribution of intentional acts to other subjects, in the course of which we put
ourselves into the other one's shoes. In order to study this kind of experience from the
phenomenological attitude, we must bracket our belief in the existence of the respective
target of our act-ascription qua experiencing subject and ask ourselves which of our further
beliefs justify that existence-belief as well as our act-ascription. It is these further beliefs that
make up the rational structure underlying our intersubjective experience. Since it takes
phenomenological investigation to lay bare these beliefs, they must be first and foremost
unconscious when we experience the world in the natural attitude.
Among the fundamental beliefs thus uncovered by Husserl is the belief (or expectation) that a
being that looks and behaves more or less like myself, i.e., displays traits more or less
familiar from my own case, will generally perceive things from an egocentric viewpoint
similar to my own (“here”, “over there”, “to my left”, “in front of me”, etc.), in the sense that
I would roughly look upon things the way he does if I were in his shoes and perceived them
from his perspective. This belief allows me to ascribe intentional acts to others immediately
or “appresentatively”, i.e., without having to draw an inference, say, by analogy with my own
case. So the belief in question must lie quite at the bedrock of my belief-system. It forms a
part of the already pregiven (and generally unreflected) intentional background, or
“lifeworld” (cf. Crisis), against which my practice of act-ascription and all constitutive
achievements based upon that practice make sense in the first place, and in terms of which
they get their ultimate justification.
Husserl's notion of lifeworld is a difficult (and at the same time important) one. It can roughly
be thought of in two different (but arguably compatible) ways: (1) in terms of belief and (2)
in terms of something like socially, culturally or evolutionarily established (but nevertheless
abstract) sense or meaning.
80

(1) If we restrict ourselves to a single subject of experience, the lifeworld can be looked upon
as the rational structure underlying his (or her) “natural attitude”. That is to say: a given
subject's lifeworld consists of the beliefs against which his everyday attitude towards himself,
the objective world and others receive their ultimate justification. (However, in principle not
even beliefs forming part of a subject's lifeworld are immune to revision. Hence, Husserl
must not be regarded as an epistemological foundationalist; see Føllesdal 1988.)
(2a) If we consider a single community of subjects, their common lifeworld, or “homeworld”,

can be looked upon, by first approximation, as the system of senses or meanings constituting
their common language, or “form of life” (Wittgenstein), given that they conceive of the
world and themselves in the categories provided by this language.
(2b) If we consider subjects belonging to different communities, we can look upon their
common lifeworld as the general framework, or “a priori structure”, of senses or meanings
that allows for the mutual translation of their respective languages (with their different
associated “homeworlds”) into one another.
The term “lifeworld” thus denotes the way the members of one or more social groups
(cultures, linguistic communities) use to structure the world into objects (Husserliana, vol.
VI, pp. 126–138, 140–145). The respective lifeworld is claimed to “predelineate” a “world-
horizon” of potential future experiences that are to be (more or less) expected for a given
group member at a given time, under various conditions, where the resulting sequences of
anticipated experiences can be looked upon as corresponding to different “possible worlds
and environments” (Husserliana, vol. III/1, p. 100). These expectations follow typical
patterns, as the lifeworld is fixed by a system of (first and foremost implicit) intersubjective
standards, or conventions, that determine what counts as “normal” or “standard” observation
under “normal” conditions (Husserliana, vol. XV, pp. 135 ff, 142) and thus as a source of
epistemic justification. Some of these standards are restricted to a particular culture or
“homeworld” (Husserliana, vol. XV, pp. 141 f, 227–236), whereas others determine a
“general structure” that is “a priori” in being “unconditionally valid for all subjects”, defining
“that on which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc., agree in spite of all
relativity” (Husserliana, vol. VI, p. 142). Husserl quotes universally accepted facts about
“spatial shape, motion, sense-quality” as well as our prescientific notions of
“spatiotemporality”, “body” and “causality” as examples (ibid.). These conceptions
determine the general structure of all particular thing-concepts that are such that any creature
sharing the essential structures of intentional consciousness will be capable of forming and
grasping them, respectively, under different lifeworldly conditions.
The notion of lifeworld was already introduced in the posthumously published second
volume of Ideas, under the heading of “Umwelt”, to be translated as “surrounding world” or
“environment”. Husserl there characterizes the environment as a world of entities that are
“meaningful” to us in that they exercise “motivating” force on us and present themselves to
us under egocentric aspects. Any subject taking the “personalistic attitude” builds the center
of an environment containing such objects. The personalistic attitude is “the attitude we are
always in when we live with one another, talk to one another, shake hands with one another
in greeting, or are related to one another in love and aversion, in disposition and action, in
discourse and discussion” (Husserliana, vol. IV, p. 183; Husserl 1989, p. 192). The central
notion of Husserl's “Umweltanalyse” is the concept of motivation, whose application he
explains as follows: “how did I hit upon that, what brought me to it? That questions like these
can be raised characterizes all motivation in general” (Husserliana, vol. IV, p. 222; Husserl
81

1989, p. 234, with translation change). The entities exercising motivating force on us owe
their corresponding “meaning” or significance to certain forms of intentional consciousness
and intersubjective processes. Thus, to quote one of Husserl's examples, “I see coal as
heating material; I recognize it and recognize it as useful and as used for heating, as
appropriate for and as destined to produce warmth. [...] I can use [a combustible object] as
fuel; it has value for me as a possible source of heat. That is, it has value for me with respect
to the fact that with it I can produce the heating of a room and thereby pleasant sensations of
warmth for myself and others. [...] Others also apprehend it in the same way, and it acquires
an intersubjective use-value and in a social context is appreciated and is valuable as serving
such and such a purpose, as useful to man, etc.” (Husserliana, vol. IV, pp. 186f; Husserl
1989, pp. 196f).
On Husserl's view, it is precisely this “subjective-relative lifeworld”, or environment, that

provides the “grounding soil” of the more objective world of science (Husserliana, vol. VI, p.
134), in the twofold sense that (i) scientific conceptions owe their (sub-)propositional content
and thus their reference to reality to the prescientific notions they are supposed to
“naturalize” and that, consequently, (ii) when things get into flux in science, when a crisis
occurs, all that is left to appeal to in order to defend new scientific approaches against their
rivals is the prescientific lifeworld, as manifested in our according intuitive acceptances (for
references cf. Føllesdal 1990a, pp. 139 f). This view offers an alternative to the “naturalistic”
stance taken by many analytic philosophers today.
One of the constitutive achievements based upon my lifeworldly determined practice of act-
ascription is my self-image as a full-fledged person existing as a psycho-physical element of
the objective, spatio-temporal order. This self-image can be justified by what Edith Stein, in a
PhD thesis on empathy supervised by Husserl (Stein 1917), has labelled as iterated empathy,
where I put myself into the other subject's shoes, i.e., (consciously) simulate him, under the
aspect that he (or she) in turn puts himself into my shoes. In this way, I can figure out that in
order for the other subject to be able to ascribe intentional acts to me, he has to identify me
bodily, as a flesh-and-blood human being, with its egocentric viewpoint necessarily differing
from his own. This brings home to me that my egocentric perspective is just one among
many, and that from all foreign perspectives I appear as a physical object among others in a
spatio-temporal world. So the following criterion of subject-identity at a given time applies
both to myself and to others: one human living body, one experiencing subject. However,
Husserl does not at all want to deny that we also ascribe experiences, even intentional ones,
to non-human animals. This becomes the more difficult and problematic, though, the less
bodily and behavioural similarity obtains between them and ourselves.
Before finally turning to the question of what “objectivity” amounts to in this connection, let
us notice that in Husserl's eyes something like empathy also forms the basis of both our
practical, aesthetical and moral evaluations and of what might be called intercultural
understanding, i.e., the constitution of a “foreign world” against the background of one's own
“homeworld”, i.e., one's own familiar (but, again, generally unreflected) cultural heritage (cf.
Husserliana, vol. XV). Husserl studied many of these phenomena in detail, and he even
outlined the beginnings of a phenomenological ethics and value theory (cf. Husserliana, vol.
XXVIII, XXXVII). In this context, he formulates a “categorical imperative” that makes
recourse to the notion of lifeworld, or environment, as follows: Always act in such a way that
your action contributes as well as possible to the best (the most valuable) you recognize
yourself to be able to achieve in your life, given your individual abilities and environment
(cf. Husserliana, vol. XXXVII, pp. 251 ff). Note that on Husserl's view the will of a free
82

agent, capable of following this imperative, is always already embedded in a “volitional
context” predelineating the open “future horizon” of a “full individual life” that the agent is
currently able to lead (Husserliana, vol. XXXVII, p. 252), thus qualifying as a dynamic
intentional structure.
 8. The intersubjective constitution of objectivity and the case for “transcendental idealism”
Even the objective spatio-temporal world, which represents a significant part of our everyday
lifeworld, is constituted intersubjectively, says Husserl. (The same holds true for its spatio-
temporal framework, consisting of objective time and space.) How so? Husserl starts (again,
from a first-person viewpoint) from a “solipsistic” abstraction of the notion of a spatio-
temporal object which differs from that notion in that it does not presuppose that any other
subject can observe such an object from his (or her) own perspective. His question is what
justifies us (i.e., each of us for him- or herself) in the assumption of an objective reality
consisting of such objects, given only this “solipsistic” conception of a spatio-temporal thing
(or event) as our starting point. On Husserl's view, “the crucial further step” in order to
answer this question consists in disclosing the dimension that opens up when the epistemic
justification, or “motivation”, of intersubjective experience, or empathy, is additionally taken
into account and made explicit (Husserliana, vol. VII, p. 435).
Roughly, his argument goes as follows. In order for me to be able to put myself into someone
else's shoes and simulate his (or her) perspective upon his surrounding spatio-temporal world,
I cannot but assume that this world coincides with my own, at least to a large extent; although
the aspects under which the other subject represents the world must be different, as they
depend on his own egocentric viewpoint. Hence, I must presuppose that the spatio-temporal
objects forming my own world exist independently of my subjective perspective and the
particular experiences I perform; they must, in other words, be conceived of as part of an
objective reality. This result fits in well with—in fact, it serves to explain—Husserl's view,
already stressed in Ideas, that perceptual objects are “transcendent” in that at any given
moment they display an inexhaustive number of unperceived (and largely even unexpected)
features, only some of which will become manifest—will be intuitively presented—in the
further course of observation.
However, according to Husserl this does not mean that the objective world thus constituted in
intersubjective experience is to be regarded as completely independent of the aspects under
which we represent the world. For on his view another condition for the possibility of
intersubjective experience is precisely the assumption that by and large the other subject
structures the world into objects in the same style I myself do. It is partly for this reason that
Husserl can be said to adhere to a version of both “realism” and “idealism” at the same time.
Another, related, reason is that Husserl's argument for realism is developed in a context in
which he defends what he refers to as "transcendental idealism" (a terminological choice he
would later regret; see Føllesdal 1990a, 128). During the years in which his transcendental
phenomenology took shape, he developed a number of "proofs" of this position, most of
which are based upon his conception of a "real possibility" regarding cognition or the
acquisition of knowledge. By a "real possibility", Husserl understands a possibility that is
such that "something—more or less— 'speaks in favour of it'" (Hua XX/1, p. 178). Real
possibilities are, in other words, conceived of as more or less (rationally) motivated
83

possibilities; and Husserl understands motivation in such a way that it is always someone
who is motivated a certain way (cf. Hua IV, p. 222). This is why Husserl subscribes to the
following dependency thesis: The real possibility to acquire (empirical) knowledge regarding
a contingent object A (possible world, individual thing, state of affairs involving such thing;
cf. Hua XXXVI, pp. 139f) "requires" an "epistemic subject", which "either experiences A, or
acquires knowledge regarding A on the basis of experience, or else has the practical
possibility (or the practical ability) to experience A and acquire knowlede regarding it" (Hua
XXXVI, p. 139). Husserl also adheres to the following correlation thesis with regard to
empirical reality and real epistemic possibility: If a contingent object A is real (really exists),
then the real (as opposed to the merely logical) possibility obtains to acquire knowledge
regarding A (cf. Hua XXXVI, p. 138, l. 35-36). From these two propositions—the
dependency and the correlation thesis—he derives the conclusion that the existence of a
contingent object A requires "the necessary co-existence of a subject either acquiring
knowledge" regarding A "or having the ability to do so" (Hua XXXVI, pp. 139f). This is
nothing but "[t]he thesis of transcendental idealism [...]: A nature without co-existing subjects
of possible experience regarding it is unthinkable; possible subjects of experience are not
enough" (Hua XXXVI, p. 156).
Husserl seems to regard real possibilities as epistemic dispositions (habitualities), or abilities,

that require an actual "substrate" (cf. Hua XXXVI, p. 139). At the same time, he stresses that
"surely no human being and no animal" must exist in the actual world (adding that their non-
existence would however already result in a "change of the world") (cf. Hua XXXVI, p. 121).
One way to make sense of this would be to weaken the dependency thesis, and the
requirement of an actual substrate, and to merely require what might be called real higher-
order possibilities—possibilities for acquiring epistemic dispositions in counterfactual (or
actual) cases where epistemic subjects would be co-existing—that may remain unactualized
but could be actualized by someone properly taking into account a multitude of individual
epistemic perspectives, by means of intersubjective experience. But even under this
reconstruction there remains a sense in which the criteria of real possibility and reality
constitution, and the corresponding structure of the real world, are dependent on a "pure
Ego", on Husserl's view: What counts as a real possibility, or as epistemically justified, is
dependent on the phenomenological subjects reflecting about such counterfactual cases in the
methodological context of the transcendental reduction and the results they arrive at in this
context.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#Bib
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#SecLit
https://benjamins.com/#catalog/books/celcr.12/main
The Shared Mind

Perspectives on intersubjectivity
Edited by Jordan Zlatev, Timothy P. Racine, Chris Sinha and Esa Itkonen
Lund University / Simon Fraser University / University of Turku
The cognitive and language sciences are increasingly oriented towards the social dimension of
human cognition and communication. The hitherto dominant approach in modern cognitive science
has viewed “social cognition” through the prism of the traditional philosophical puzzle of how
84

individuals solve the problem of understanding Other Minds. The Shared Mind challenges the
conventional “theory of mind” approach, proposing that the human mind is fundamentally based
on intersubjectivity: the sharing of affective, conative, intentional and cognitive states and
processes between a plurality of subjects. The socially shared, intersubjective foundation of the
human mind is manifest in the structure of early interaction and communication, imitation,
gestural communication and the normative and argumentative nature of language. In this path
breaking volume, leading researchers from psychology, linguistics, philosophy and primatology offer
complementary perspectives on the role of intersubjectivity in the context of human development,
comparative cognition and evolution, and language and linguistic theory.
The cognitive and language sciences are increasingly oriented towards the social dimension of human cognition
and communication. The hitherto dominant approach in modern cognitive science has viewed “social cognition”
through the prism of the traditional philosophical puzzle of how individuals solve the problem of understanding
Other Minds. The Shared Mind challenges the conventional “theory of mind” approach, proposing that the
human mind is fundamentally based on intersubjectivity: the sharing of affective, conative, intentional and
cognitive states and processes between a plurality of subjects. The socially shared, intersubjective foundation of
the human mind is manifest in the structure of early i The Shared Mind
Table of Contents
Foreword. Shared minds and the science of fiction: Why theories will differ
vii – xiii
Colwyn Trevarthen
1. Intersubjectivity: What makes us human?

1 – 14
Jordan Zlatev, Timothy P. Racine, Chris Sinha and Esa Itkonen
Part I. Development
2. Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice

17 – 38
Shaun Gallagher and Daniel D. Hutto
3. The neuroscience of social understanding

39 – 66
John Barresi and Chris Moore
4. Engaging, sharing, knowing: Some lessons from research in autism

67 – 88
R. Peter Hobson and Jessica A. Hobson
5. Coming to agreement: Object use by infants and adults

89 – 114
Cintia Rodríguez and Christiane Moro
6. The role of intersubjectivity in the development of intentional communication 115 –

Ingar Brinck 140
85

7. Sharing mental states: Causal and definitional issues in intersubjectivity 141 –
Noah Susswein and Timothy P. Racine 162
Part II. Evolution
8. Evidence for intentional and referential communication in great apes? 165 –

Simone Pika 186
9. The heterochronic origins of explicit reference 187 –

David A. Leavens, William D. Hopkins and Kim A. Bard 214
10. The co-evolution of intersubjectivity and bodily mimesis 215 –

Jordan Zlatev 244
11. First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind 245 –

Daniel D. Hutto 276
Part III. Language
12. The central role of normativity in language and linguistics 279 –

Esa Itkonen 305
13. Intersubjectivity in the architecture of language system 307 –

Arie Verhagen 331
14. Intersubjectivity in interpreted interactions: The interpreter's role in co-constructing

meaning 333 –
355
Terry Janzen and Barbara Shaffer
15. Language and the signifying object: From convention to imagination 357 –
Chris Sinha and Cintia Rodríguez 378
379 –
Author index
382
383 –
Subject index
391
The Shared Mind

Subjects
Consciousness Research
Consciousness research
86

Linguistics
Cognition and language
Cognitive linguistics
Evolution of language
Psycholinguistics
Psychology
Cognitive psychology
Main BISAC Subject LAN009000: LANGUAGE ARTS & DISCIPLINES / Linguistics / General
Main BIC Subject CFD: Psycholinguistics
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number 2008015388
http://cap.sagepub.com/content/9/3/193.abstract
Constitution of Subjectivity: Dimensions of Otherness

1. Nelson Ernesto Coelho Jr.
1. University of São Paulo, Brazil, patnelco@uol.com.br
1. Luís Claudio Figueiredo
1. University of São Paulo, Brazil, lclaudio@netpoint.com.br

Abstract
This article presents a new characterization of the concept and experience of intersubjectivity
based on four matrices that we see as organizing and elucidating different dimensions of
otherness. The four matrices are described through key references to their proponents in the
fields of philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis: (1) trans-subjective intersubjectivity
(Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty); (2) traumatic intersubjectivity (Levinas); (3)
interpersonal intersubjectivity (Mead); and (4) intrapsychic intersubjectivity (Freud, Klein,
Fairbairn, Winnicott). These intersubjective dimensions are understood as indicating
dimensions of otherness that never occupy the field of human experience in a pure, exclusive
form. The four matrices proposed need to be seen as simultaneous elements in the different
processes of the constitution and development of subjectivity.
 G.H. Mead and knowing how to act: Practical meaning, routine interaction, and the theory
of interobjectivity Theory & Psychology October 1, 2012 22: 556-571
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 Interobjectivity: Representations and artefacts in Cultural Psychology Culture & Psychology
December 1, 2010 16: 451-463
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
87

 'Why Sally Never Calls Bobby "I" ' Revisited: an Alternative Perspective on Language and
Early Self Development Culture & Psychology June 1, 2004 10: 223-238
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 Supplementarity and Surplus: Moving between the Dimensions of Otherness Culture &
Psychology September 1, 2003 9: 209-220
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 Orientation to the Setting: Discursively Accomplished Intersubjectivity Culture & Psychology
September 1, 2003 9: 233-248
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 Participant Perception of Others' Acts: Virtual Otherness in Infants and Adults Culture &
Psychology September 1, 2003 9: 261-276
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 Why does Sally never Call Bobby `I'? Culture & Psychology September 1, 2003 9: 287-297
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 Interobjectivity and Culture Culture & Psychology September 1, 2003 9: 221-232
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 Constitution of the Self: Intersubjectivity and Dialogicality Culture & Psychology September
1, 2003 9: 249-259
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
 On the Varieties of Intersubjective Experience Culture & Psychology September 1, 2003 9:
277-286
o Abstract
o Full Text (PDF)
http://cognet.mit.edu/topics/351
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4614-6086-2_9182
Intersubjectivity, a term originally coined by the philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938),

is most simply stated as the interchange of thoughts and feelings, both conscious and
unconscious, between two persons or “subjects,” as facilitated by empathy. To understand
intersubjectivity, it is necessary first to define the term subjectivity – i.e., the perception or
experience of reality from within one’s own perspective (both conscious and unconscious)
and necessarily limited by the boundary or horizon of one’s own worldview. The term
intersubjectivity has several usages in the social sciences (such as cognitive agreement
between individuals or groups or, on the contrary, relating simultaneously to others out of
two diverging subjective perspectives, as in the acts of lying or presenting oneself somewhat
differently in different social situations); however, its deepest and most complex usage is
related to the postmodern philosophical concept of constructivism or, in social psychology,
soc ...
88

http://phenomenologyblog.com/?p=712
Ferrarello: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Lifeworld
Intersubjectivity can be described as a relationship between me and an other. The

peculiarity of this relationship lies in the fact that the other is not alien to me, but is
“within me” in a way that his or her “otherness” can be investigated beginning with the
way in which that “otherness” is imminent in my ego. The other’s otherness is present
to me “in person,” in Husserl’s terms.
For philosophy the problem is this: how can I give an account of something if it is completely
outside of and transcends my own nature? A phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity,
founded upon the recognition of the imminence of “otherness” offers a solution to the
problematic of the transcendence of objectivity. How can the other be present in my lived-
world? How can the world be an objective world though we are different living subjects?
How can we live in a society of shared values?
These questions can be answered through the use of the phenomenological method. Husserl
framed these questions as belonging to a “’sociological’ transcendental philosophy” (Husserl,
1968, p. 539) or a “transcendental sociology” (Husserl, 1966, p. 220). Husserl’s
phenomenological investigations of the lived-experience of a subject frame the subject as a
transcendental intersubjective unit. In contrast to the word transcendence, transcendental
refers to the essential nature of the subject.
We can inquire into this nature beginning with world as it is imminent in a subject’s
experience. For example if I want to look into my lived experience of thinking about
something, I can first take a specific lived experience of mine in which I am thinking about
my friend Anna; then I can analyze this lived experience phenomenologically in order to
explain its essential structure (philosophically). This kind of phenomenological method will
be particularly attentive to the presence of the other in my lived experience—in other words,
to reflect carefully on the way in which the other is present to me. In fact, when I think about
Anna, my thinking can be affected by multiple contexts—for example, the judgments of the
others about Anna or myself, or the education I received, which shapes my way of perceiving
and thinking about others. My lived experience will be not only mine, meaning it is never a
purely solitary experience, it always implicitly participates in intersubjectivity because it will
be the outcome of an embodied, social and “en-worlded “experience. In that sense
phenomenological method has an access to the other’s “otherness” from inside; it digs into
the lived-experience of the subject in order to describe how the transcendent world appears to
us.
The volumes of Husserliana which we can read to gain a detailed idea of Husserl’s views on
this issue are: the Fifth Cartesian Meditation (Husserl, 1982), which sends us to Volume 8
(First Philosophy, Second Part & other important additions) and the Volumes from 13-15 of
the Husserliana (Husserl, 1973a-c), which are especially dedicated to intersubjectivity.
The sources Husserl borrowed to develop his theory of intersubjectivity are especially
indebted to Brentano (1973), Stein (1989) and Fink (1995). From Brentano he took the theory
89

of intentionality to explain the subject-object relationship and from Stein the notion of
empathy to clarify the manner in which we perceive otherness.
In what follows, I will focus firstly on the notion of intentionality, secondly on the
constitution of otherness and its objectivity, thirdly on the idea of ego and its life-world.
Intentionality or Living the Outside World
Franz Brentano
Generally speaking, intentionality is a term that dates back to the scholasticism of St.
Anselm. For Anselm (c. 1033-1109), intentionality denotes the difference between the
objects that exist in human understanding, and those that actually exist in the physical world.
From an etymological point of view, intentionality comes from Latin intendere, in English ‘to
point to’ or ‘aim at’. Brentano (1838 –1917) took this term and adapted it for his psychology
to describe the relationship between mental phenomena and physical objects. In fact for
Brentano intentionality was considered the hallmark of psychological phenomena. What is
remarkable to notice here is the continuity and the break between Husserl and Brentano’s
theories of intentionality. Both philosophers used this theory to explain the structure of
mental phenomena and pure consciousness, but they construed it differently.
As mentioned, for Brentano intentionality indicates the central property of every mental
phenomenon in reference to its content: conscious acts “intend” extra-mental objects. In
Brentano’s Psychology from Empirical Standpoint the author explains his viewpoint with the
following words:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called
the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be
understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon
includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In
presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (1973, p. 101)
The overall aim of Brentano’s book was to establish the philosophical foundations of
psychology as a science. Psychology represents a science whose data come from experience
and introspection – hence Brentano envisions psychology from an empirical standpoint.
Brentano thought that if psychology was to be established as a science, there had to be a
criterion that distinguishes its subject matter from the subject matter of physical (or natural)
science. The intentional relationship was the main feature of any psychological experience
and it clarifies how an object is intended by a psychological subject. Though Brentano did
90

not address the issue of intersubjective intentional experience, his theory is also useful in
explaining that class of lived experiences.
Edmund Husserl
Husserl borrowed Brentano’s notion of intentionality and interpreted it from a subject-

directed perspective. For Husserl intentionality is not the intentional in-existence of the
object within the consciousness; instead, it describes the relationship of a subject to the
objects of consciousness. Despite the similarities between Husserl and Brentano concerning
the role played by the intentional essence as a key to explain the general structure of
subjective lived experience, Husserl partly moves away from the definition of intentionality
provided by his master. While Brentano considers intentionality as a hallmark of
psychological objects, Husserl defines it as a characteristic of the manner in which subjects
intend objectivities. For this reason Husserl calls intentional acts “objectifying acts,” because
they are able to objectify or present objects to the subject within consciousness (Husserl,
1970, 314). In the case of a melody, for example, to intend it means the melody must be
present to me. For Husserl every intentional act is objectifying because it makes an object
present for consciousness. Intersubjective intentionality is a kind of intentionality in which
another person is made present to me within my lived experience thanks to a specific kind
intentional essence that I am going to address next.
Generally speaking, Husserl claims that the “intentional essence is made up of the two
aspects of matter and quality” (1970, p. 251). Quality is the way in which a content is given
to consciousness, and matter corresponds to the content of the act. “Quality (…) has guided
us since we formed the Idea of matter – while the same object remains differently present to
consciousness. One may think, e.g., of equivalent positing presentations, which point by way
of differing matters to the same object” (Husserl, 1970, p. 52). Indeed we might evaluate,
love or just perceive the same matter once it is given us, in consciousness, by a presentation.
Within intersubjective intentionality the other is perceived in the form of empathy. The
quality by which I can form in my mind the idea of otherness is that of feeling myself ‘in the
shoes’ of the other (en-paschein – “to feel in”). In the next paragraph I will describe the
process of empathizing, phenomenologically.
Empathy and the Experience of the Otherness
While intentionality describes the conscious relatedness of the subject and the world,
empathy helps us to understand – in everyday language – how I can put myself “in the shoes”
of someone else. In particular, I want to focus on a key term in Stein’s doctoral thesis on
empathy supervised by Husserl (Stein, 1989): iterated empathy. This term concept enables us
to give an account of the sense of the other’s experience as somehow my own. In
91

phenomenological terms, how is it possible for me to ascribe the intentional acts of another
person to myself—as if I were living the other’s intentional acts?
According to Husserl, the steps describing my

contact with the lived-experience of the other are the following: I live the world, for the most
part, within a natural attitude. In this attitude I do not experience myself as a solipsistic, self-
contained unit, but rather as a part of a community where others are continually in touch with
and affecting my lived-experience and shaping the way I am aware not only of others but of
myself. For this reason I undergo a process that Husserl calls communarization
(Vergemeinschaftung) whereby the second ego—the ego of another person—appears to my
first primordial ego as similar to mine. In the process of communarization I realize that I am
a community of persons though I am just me along with my own lived-experience
(Erlebnisse). To put in act this process I engage in what Husserl calls analogical
apprehension whereby the other, who is present (Paarung) to me as a fellow human being is
mirrored in my experience, meaning that I can perceive the other because he is similar and
dissimilar to me. Moreover, I recognize the truthfulness of my perceptions of the other person
thanks to their changes and possibilities. In fact, Husserl speaks of a harmonious synthesis
(Einstimmigkeitssynthese), a synthesis by which I can confirm or deny the always changing
presentations I can have of the other. Now, let us explain all these steps in more detail.
Husserl writes: “the other man is constitutionally the intrinsically first man” (Husserl 1982 §
55, p. 124). In fact when I perceive another person, the other is genetically constituted in the
midst of my own, flowing experience within the natural attitude, which means that my
perception of the other is not posited “before” or “after” my self-presence, but it blossoms as
a natural experience alongside my self-presence. In my own simple living and perceiving,
the other appears as natural part of my being-in-the world: one could almost say, as a
companion. Perhaps for this reason Husserl describes the relation using the term “pairing”
(Paarung), which I will address below. This very first experience is called by Husserl
“communarization (Vergemeinschaftung)” to indicate this originary mode of living in which
no ego (not even myself) remains absolutely singular.
In this monadological intersubjectivity “the second ego [the other] is not simply there, and
strictly given to himself; rather is he constituted as ‘alter ego’ – the ego indicated as one
moment by this expression being I myself in my owness” (Husserl 1982 § 44, p. 94). The
other appears via a pairing (Paarung), that is via its external presence as an animate organism
(Leib) that is similar to mine. When I perceive this organism analogous to me, I live an
analogical apprehension that enables me to recognize myself as a human being partaking in a
humanity that is shared with others. “The analogy is not in full force and effect (voll); it is an
indication, not an anticipation (Vorgriff) that could become a seizure of the self (Selbstgriff)”
(Husserl 1972, p. 87).
92

In this analogical apprehension the other lives within my lived-experience as a ‘mirroring’
(Spiegelung) of my own self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self and
yet again not an analogue in the usual sense” (Husserl 1982 § 44, p. 94). Therefore the ego
and the alter ego are always – and necessarily – given in a primal “pairing”, as the
(transcendental) condition of any analogical apprehension and any later mirroring of the
other. Thus the mirroring we speak of is not the static re-presentation of my own solitary self,
duplicated or projected, so to speak, on the passive screen of the other: rather, this mirroring
is a simultaneous opening to similarity and difference in the midst of interrelatedness and
commonality. Intersubjectivity is no mere opening to a discrete other or a recognition of
myself in isolation; rather, as Khosrokhavar (2001) has written, intersubjectivity is the ego’s
opening to the world of others, as such.
“The experienced animate organism (Leib) of another continues to prove itself as actually
(wirklich) an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious “behavior”
(Gebaren). Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something
psychic appresentatively) must present (auftreten) itself fulfillingly in original experience,
and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase”. (Husserl 1982
§ 52, p. 114 sq.)
Another key word to describe the intersubjective community is

“harmonious synthesis” (Einstimmigkeitssynthese). This concept, borrowed from Brentano’s
inner perception, describes the intersubjective constitution of otherness, which is
accompanied by a feeling of consistency. Via this kind of synthesis I can be sure that what I
perceive in the world genuinely corresponds to what is there. In fact, this synthesis is the
foundation of my ability to recognize whether or not there is consistency within my
perceptions, in the midst of the dynamic flow of my conscious acts and other’s movements in
everyday experience. For example, if I see a dog crossing the street and suddenly I hear the
dog meowing, there is an immediate disjuncture among my perceptions that conveys to me
that I misperceived the identity of the animal! There is something in my synthesis that does
not match my earlier apprehension—exemplifying the way in which perception is always
engaged in self-correction.
“Everything [is] alien (as long as it remains within the apprehended horizon of concreteness
that necessarily goes with it). [It] centers in an apprehended Ego who is not I myself but,
relative to me, a modificatum: another Ego” (Husserl 1982§ 52, pp. 115-6). I perceive the
otherness only when I appresent it to my ego, that is when I intend it by an epistemological
intentional act. “The identity-sense of ‘my’ primordial Nature and the presentiated other
primordial Nature is necessarily produced by the appresentation and the unity that it, as
appresentation, necessarily has with the presentation cofunctioning for it this appresentation
by virtue of which an Other and, consequently, his concrete ego are there for me in the first
place. Quite rightly, therefore, we speak of perceiving someone else arid then of perceiving
the Objective world, perceiving that the other Ego and I are looking at the same world, and so
93

forth though this perceiving goes on exclusively within the sphere of my ownness” (Husserl
1982 § 55, pp. 123-4).
Therefore the objective world and mutual existence of the others can be attained by virtue of
this harmonious confirmation of apperceptive constitution. I intend the other within a specific
horizon of functionings and peculiarities but these presentations have to be continuously
confirmed or corrected in the flow of my new, intersubjective experiences of it. In this way,
apperception is in a continuous, open-ended process of adjustment and correction.
Harmoniousness is also preserved by virtue of “a recasting of apperceptions through
distinguishing between normality and abnormalities (as modifications thereof), or by virtue
of the constitution of new unities throughout the changes involved in abnormalities” (Husserl
1982 § 55, 125 sq.) The mutual relations characterizing each member of the monadological
community involve an “objectivating equalization” (Gleichstellung) (Husserliana 1982 § 56,
p. 129) of the existence of the ego and the others “I, the ego, have the world starting from a
performance (Leistung), in which […] constitute myself, as well as my horizon of others and,
at the same time (in eins damit), the homogeneous community of ‘us’ (Wir-Gemeinschaft) ;
this constitution is not a constitution of the world, but an actualization which could be
designated as “monadization of the ‘ego’ – as actualization of personal monadization, of
monadical pluralization” (Husserliana VI, 417).
Intersubjective Reduction and Lifeworld
At the end of the fourth text in Husserliana XV Husserl writes “starting from
intersubjectivity, it is possible to establish the intersubjective reduction by placing between
brackets the world in itself and thus achieving the reduction to the universe of the
intersubjective that includes in itself all that is individually subjective” (1973c, 69; Husserl
1972, 188 sq., p. 272). The very first beginning of a phenomenological intersubjective
analysis is given by reduction. The reduction designates the inquirer’s passage from a natural
attitude, in which the subject naively participates in the world, to a phenomenological
attitude, in which the subject reflects upon what he already lived and is living in order to
discern the essence of a lived-experience (Erlebnisse).
In § 44 of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl explains reduction as a ‘primordial’ act of

putting out of play any constitutive function of intentionality not as reported by another
subjectivity but in reference to the “primordial sphere” of the inquirer’s ego, in its irreducible
immanence, that is, to the intentional sphere – actual and potential – in which the inquirer’s
ego is constituted in its “peculiar ownness” (eigen). This reduction is different from the
classical phenomenological reduction. While the latter brings us back to the constitutive
transcendental subjectivity, the former (that implies the latter) should be understood as a
“dismantling reduction” (Abbaureduktion) that aims at revealing the original sense of the
inquirer’s ego as such—that is, to witness the phenomenon of I-ness.
In fact, the ego that stands out to the inquirer by means of this reduction is an Ur-ich, a
primordial ego (Husserliana VI, p. 188). “In my spiritual ownness, I am nevertheless the
identical Ego-pole of my manifold ‘pure’ subjective processes, those of my passive and
active intentionality, and the pole of all the habitualities instituted or to be instituted by those
processes” (Husserl 1982 § 44, p. 98).
94

According to Husserl’s phenomenological
theory every ego seems to live many lives at once; or put differently, to exemplify multiple
modes of being-an-I simultaneously. The ego can be said to live at least three lives at the
same time: an immanent, transcendental and intersubjective life. In the first one the ego lives
according to the natural attitude thanks to which it acquires sense data. Through employing
the reduction, it puts in bracket all that does not belong to its own intentional life to recover
habitualities and sedimentations constituted as “abiding convictions” (bleibende
Überzeugungen), which determine the Self as a concrete egoic pole and the “transcendent
objects” (given either actually or potentially). Finally the intersubjective ego is the ego given
after the reduction. In this life the ego discovers itself not as a solipsistic unit or a monad but
as an intersubjective unit. All that belongs to its lived-experience is mingled with and
inextricable from the lived-experiences of others. Thus, the second transcendental ego is only
a limited aspect—one might almost say a profile—of the third, transcendental intersubjective
ego, but at the same time the former grounds (fundiert) the latter.
The relation between the transcendental ego and other egos is also strengthened by the
apperception of the world (Weltapperzeption). In fact the transcendental ego constitutes the
world as a phenomenon thanks to its intentional activity. Since the transcendental ego is
fundamentally one with the intersubjective and immanent ego, the constitution of the world is
an intersubjective constitution in which the world is always intrinsically a lifeworld shared by
an intersubjective community. It itself is a part of the explication of the intentional
components (Bestände) implicit in the fact of the experiential world that exists for us.
(Husserl 1982 § 49, p. 108).
In the first volume of Ideas Husserl had already introduced this concept under the heading of
Umwelt to mean a surrounding natural world, and it is only after writing the Cartesian
Meditation and most of all in the Crisis that Husserl elaborates a proper “Umweltanalyse” to
explicate the idea of an objective world shared within the intersubjective life of a living
community. (Husserliana, vol. IV, p. 222; Husserl 1989, p. 234). To explain the layers of this
lifeworld (Lebenswelt), Husserl gives the following example:
“I see coal as heating material; I recognize it and recognize it as useful and as used for
heating, as appropriate for and as destined to produce warmth. […] I can use [a combustible
object] as fuel; it has value for me as a possible source of heat. That is, it has value for me
with respect to the fact that with it I can produce the heating of a room and thereby pleasant
sensations of warmth for myself and others. […] Others also apprehend it in the same way,
and it acquires an intersubjective use-value and in a social context is appreciated and is
valuable as serving such and such a purpose, as useful to man, etc.” (Husserl, 1976, pp.
186f.).
95

Our world is a “subjective-relative lifeworld”. We cannot even conceive something that
transcends us in a strict sense—because that “something,” if it could not be shared with a real
or potential “we,” could not be grasped by consciousness in the first place. In other words,
we would not be capable of intending it—in the simplest terms, we would not be able to
speak about it. Our intended world is the “grounding soil” within which a more objective (or
better, intersubjective) world of community and science is co-constituted (Husserl, 1976, p.
134). This is the only soil within which we simultaneously discover and shape our multi-
tiered, intersubjective life.
References
Bernet, R. 1994. An Intentionality without Subject or Object?, Man and World 27 (3), 231-
255.
Brentano, F. 1874. Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint, Rancurello, Terrell, and
McAlister (trs.) 1973. London: Routledge. (Original: Brentano, F. 1874. Psychologie von
einem empirischen Standpunkt, Leipzig.)
Brentano, F. 1952. The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, E. Hughes Schneewind (ed.),
London: Routledge London, 1973 ( Original: Brentano, F. 1952. Grundlegung und Aufbau
der Ethik, Meiner Felix Verlag).
Caston, V. 2002. Aristotle on Consciousness, Mind 111, 751-815.
Crowell, S. 2005. Undergoing: Phenomenology, Value, Theory and Nihilism. Husserl:

Critical Essays 5 Horizons: Lifeword, Ethics, History and Metaphysics, 112-124.
Drummond, J. J. 1995. Moral Objectivity: Husserl’s Sentiment of the Understanding.

Husserl Studies 12, 165-183
Drummond, J. 2006. Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach. Husserl

Studies 22, 1-27.
Fink, E. 1933-34. Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of

Method. Edited by R. Bruzina, Indiana University Press, 1995.
Husserl, E. 1900, 1901, 1913 & 1921. Logical investigations, 2 vols. Edited by J. N. Findlay,
New York: Routledge, 1970.
Husserl, E. 1918-26. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und

Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918-1926. [Analyses of passive synthesis. From lectures and
research manuscripts, 1918-1926]. Edited by Margot Fleischer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1966.
Husserl, E. 1922, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological

philosophy, third book: phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences, F. Kersten (ed.),
The Hague/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.
96

Husserl, E. 1925, Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester. 1925.
[Phenomenological psychology. Lectures from the summer semester. 1925]. Edited by Walter
Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1968.
Husserl, E. 1936, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. [The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy. An introduction to phenomenology].
Edited by Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
Husserl, E. 1911-21, Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1911-21 [Essays and Lectures. 1911-1921].
Edited by Thomas Nenon und Hans Rainer Sepp, 1987.
Husserl, E. 1905-20, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass.
Erster Teil. 1905-1920. [On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate.
Part 1. 1905-1920]. Edited by Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973a.
Husserl, E. 1921-28, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texteaus dem Nachlass.

Zweiter Teil. 1921-28. [On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate.
Second part. 1921-28]. Edited by Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973b.
Husserl, E. 1929-35, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass.
Dritter Teil. [On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate. Third part.
1929-35]. Edited by Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973c.
Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorion

Cairns. Seventh impression. The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982.
Khosrokhavar, F. 2001. L’instance du sacre: Essay de foundation des sciences sociales.

Paris: Les Editions du Cerf.
Kriegel, U. 2003. Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an

Argument. Canandian Journal of Philosophy 33, 103-132.
McIntyre, R. Smith, D. W. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality. A study of Mind, Meaning and
Language, Dordrecht and London.
Moran, D. 1996. Brentano’s Thesis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary

70, 1-27.
Morrison, J. C. 1970. Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality, Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 31, 27-46.
Rollinger, R. D. 1999. Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano,

Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Smith, Q. 1976. Husserl and the Inner Structure of Feeling-Acts. Research in Phenomenology
6 (1), 84-104.
Stein, E. 1917. On the Problem of Empathy. Washington: ICS Publications, 1989.
97

Photo credits
Friends shadows photo credit: Pink Sherbet Photography via photo pin cc
Strange cat photo credit: Noelas via photo pin cc
Brikis photo credit: oranges and lemons via photo pin cc
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/viewArticle/19/41
Volume 6, No. 3, Art. 32 – September 2005
Analysing Discourse. An Approach From the Sociology of Knowledge
Reiner Keller
Abstract: The contribution outlines a research programme which I have coined the "sociology
of knowledge approach to discourse" (Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse). This approach
to discourse integrates important insights of FOUCAULT's theory of discourse into the
interpretative paradigm in the social sciences, especially the "German" approach of
hermeneutic sociology of knowledge (Hermeneutische Wissenssoziologie). Accordingly, in
this approach discourses are considered as "structured and structuring structures" which
shape social practices of enunciation. Unlike some Foucauldian approaches, this form of
discourse analysis recognises the importance of socially constituted actors in the social
production and circulation of knowledge. Furthermore, it combines research questions related
to the concept of "discourse" with the methodical toolbox of qualitative social research.
Going beyond questions of language in use, "the sociology of knowledge approach to
discourse" (Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse) addresses sociological interests, the
analyses of social relations and politics of knowledge as well as the discursive construction of
reality as an empirical ("material") process. For empirical research on discourse the approach
proposes the use of analytical concepts from the sociology of knowledge tradition, such as
interpretative schemes or frames (Deutungsmuster), "classifications", "phenomenal structure"
(Phänomenstruktur), "narrative structure", "dispositif" etc., and the use of the methodological
strategies of "grounded theory".
Key words: sociology of knowledge, discourse, politics of knowledge, symbolic

interactionism, frame, classification, narrative structure, grounded theory, Foucault, Berger,
Luckmann
Table of Contents
1. Discourse and the Sociology of Knowledge
2. The Research Programme of Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse
3. Methods and Practice of Discourse Research
4. Conclusion: Beginnings
98

http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Dialogue%20as%20Discourse%20and%20Interac-
tion.pdf
Symbolic Interactionism: The Role of Language in The Formation of Discourse and Self
https://www.academia.edu/3877767/Symbolic_Interactionism_The_Role_of_Language_in_T
he_Formation_of_Discourse_and_Self
Towards an embodied science of intersubjectivity: Widening the scope ...
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=2889195295
Ezequiel Di Paolo, ‎Hanne De Jaegher - 2015 - ‎Psychology
This has been called “primary intersubjectivity. ... Advocators of the phenomenologically based
interactionist theory usually draw a distinction between two ...
The Political Philosophy of Intersubjectivity and the Logic of Discourse
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1010798510130
This paper is concerned with the competing and complimentary relationships between
intersubjectivity and discursive logic. It contends that the ultimate failure of Husserlian
phenomenology is a testament to the dilemma of subjectivist philosophy. Indeed, political
philosophy requires a paradigm-shift from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. With this in mind,
this paper examines the classical encounter between morality and ethical life in connection
with discursive ethics. While it argues that Habermas still retains a strong residue of
subjectivist philosophy, it attempts to clarify the discursive analysis of Foucault and probes
into its applicability to practical philosophy.
Robert Boyce Brandom (born March 13, 1950)[1] is an American philosopher who teaches
at the University of Pittsburgh. He works primarily in philosophy of language, philosophy of
mind and philosophical logic, and his work manifests both systematic and historical interests
in these topics. His work has presented "arguably the first fully systematic and technically
rigorous attempt to explain the meaning of linguistic items in terms of their socially norm-
governed use ('meaning as use', to cite the Wittgensteinian slogan), thereby also giving a non-
representationalist account of the intentionality of thought and the rationality of action as
well."[2]
Brandom is broadly considered to be part of the American pragmatist tradition in philosophy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Brandom
https://www.academia.edu/1057316/Criticism_and_normativity._Brandom_and_Habermas_b
etween_Kant_and_Hegel
99

On Normative Pragmatics: A Comparison Between Brandom and
Habermas
Raffaela Giovagnoli
Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
Vol. 20, No. 3 (2001), pp. 51-68
Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts:

A Reply to Habermas*
Robert Brandom
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/46245956/1468-0378.0011520160605-32
020-
1gylqli.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1480774634&Sig-
nature=JGIORNIIoAJQ88KV8KctE%2BEGaEs%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%
3B%20filename%3DFacts_norms_and_normative_facts_A_reply.pdf
I greatly appreciate Jürgen Habermas’ generous interest in and engagement with

the approach to discursive practice detailed in
Making It Explicit
. His account of the
basic methodological commitments and motivations, and of the central moves that
structure the project is a masterful combination of compression and fidelity to the
spirit of the enterprise. He ends his summary with an understandable expression
of skepticism about the final success of the account of the objectivity of concepts
(and so of the norms of speech, thought, and belief they articulate), against the
background of the social practical account of language use that supplies its raw
materials. The story about objectivity depends on the intricate interaction of three
dimensions: the distinction of social perspective between attributing and under-
taking a commitment, which is made explicit in
de re
ascriptions of propositional
attitudes, the distinction of deontic status between commitment and entitlement,
and the role of perception and action in confronting practitioners with material
incompatible commitments.
From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom's Pragmatic Philosophy of

Language
Authors
 Jürgen Habermas
https://roughtheory.org/2007/10/29/habermas-and-brandom-facts-and-norms/
100

Habermas’ interest in Brandom can be seen as an extension of his engagement with the
Anglo-American pragmatist tradition, which began in the 70’s, and forms a cornerstone of his
own magnus opus, The Theory of Communicative Action. Two distinct strains of this tradition
concern Habermas: on the one hand, linguistic pragmatics, through the work of J L Austin
and John Searle; and on the other, the philosophical pragmatism which runs through, most
explicitly, James, Dewey and Rorty, but which can also be found in Wittgenstein, Quine and
Davidson. It is therefore not surprising that he would be particularly interested in a major
work which in part aims to marry together the two. Brandom summarises the project of
Making it Explicit in a precis to a volume of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
dedicated to that work:
The book is an attempt to explain the meanings of linguistic expressions in terms of their use.
The explanatory strategy is to begin with an account of social practices, to identify the
particular structure they must exhibit in order to qualify as specifically linguistic practices,
and then to consider what different sorts of semantic contents those practices can confer on
states, performances, and expressions caught up in them in suitable ways. The result is a kind
of conceptual role semantics that is at once firmly rooted in actual practices of producing
and consuming speech acts, and sufficiently finely articulated to make clear how those
practices are capable of conferring a rich variety of kinds of content. [my emphases in bold]
https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cult/CultGlyn.htm
Identity, Intersubjectivity and Communicative Action

Simon Glynn
Florida Atlantic University
glynn@fau.edu
ABSTRACT: Traditionally, attempts to verify communications between individuals and

cultures appeal to 'public' objects, essential structures of experience, or universal reason.
Contemporary continental philosophy demonstrates that not only such appeals, but
fortuitously also the very conception of isolated individuals and cultures whose
communication such appeals were designed to insure, are problematic. Indeed we encounter
and understand ourselves, and are also originally constituted, in relation to others. In view of
this the traditional problem of communication is inverted and becomes that of how we are
sufficiently differentiated from one another such that communication might appear
problematic.
On the nature and role of intersubjectivity in communication

http://cogprints.org/6159/
101

We outline a theory of human agency and communication and discuss the role that the capability to
share (that is, intersubjectivity) plays in it. All the notions discussed are cast in a mentalistic and
radically constructivist framework. We also introduce and discuss the relevant literature.
https://www.academia.edu/887480/Intersubjectivity_and_intentional_communication
Intersubjectivity and intentional communication
http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/lab/Three%20Levels%20of%20Intersub-
jectivity%20in%20Early%20Development.pdf
THREE LEVELS OF
INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN
EARLY DEVELOPMENT
PHILIPPE ROCHAT
1
, CLÁUDIA PASSOS
-
FERREIRA
2
The sense of shared values is a specific aspect to human sociality. It originates
from reciprocal social exchanges that include imitation, empathy, but
also negotiation from which meanings, values and norms are eventually
constructed with others. Research suggests that this process starts from
birth via imitation and mirroring processthat are important foundations
of sociality providing a basic sense of social connectedness and mutual
acknowledgement with others. From the second month, mirroring, imitative
and other contagious responses are by passed. Neonatal imitation gives way to first
signs of reciprocation (primary intersubjectivity), and
joint attention in reference to objects (secondary intersubjectivity). We
review this development and propose a third level of intersubjectivity,
that is the emergence of values that are jointlyrepresented and negotiated
with others, as well as the development of an ethical stance accompanying
emerging theories of mind from about 4 years of age. We propose that
tertiary intersubjectivity is an ontogenetically new process of value negotiation
and mutual recognition that are the cardinal trademarks of
human sociality
http://ilabs.washington.edu/meltzoff/pdf/98M&M_InfantIntersubjectivity.pdf
102

Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Modern Philosophy and
Psychoanalysis
In this wide-ranging study of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, Roger Frie develops a critical account
of recent conceptions of the subject in philosophy and pdychoanalytic theory. Using a line of analysis
strongly grounded in the European tradition, Frie examines the complex relationship between the
theories of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, language and love in the work of a diverse body of
philosophers and psychoanalyists. He provides lucid interpretations of the work of Sartre,
Binswanger, Lacan, Habermas, Heidegger, Freud and others. Because it integrates perspectives from
continental philosophy, analytical philosophy, and psychoanalytic theory, this book will appeal to a
wide audience in the areas of philosophy, history of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and social theory.
10
Against the background of our survey of intersubjectivity we might have ideas for the
construction of a framework by means of which we could begin to map and thus systematise a
diversity of positions for interpreting it. Regardless if it is interactionist, dialogical
intersubjectivism or discursive, discourse intersubjectivity. From our second-order or meta
position reflecting on the nature of the intersubjectivity (types?) of mystics we can typify them as
more or lesser cognitivist, more naturalist or idealist, more or less neurological etc. However such
notions form part of cerebral disciplines obsessed with cartographies, models, systems and
theories. We will have to look for aspects and notions of intersubjectivity that are meaningful,
relevant and functional viewed from the perspective of pure and absolute consciousness, or
nondualism, or the one real self, or the One and the all, or Sophos. These approaches and points
of view have very different concerns than those of intellectual disciplines and will perceive and
classify intersubjectivity in different terms, according to different values.
What is the nature of intersubjectivity that has a principles Sophos, the one, the real self, pure
consciousness, absolute awareness, nonduality, and other ideals of mystics. What are the values
of these principles, what is the purpose, the aims and attitudes these ideas express? What are the
norms and standards of intersubjectivity of Sophos, the one, pure consciousness etc? We would
have to consider attitudes such as love, compassion, humility, altruism, etc. With these conditions
and principles in mind we will be able to identify relevant characteristics of the intersubjectivity
of mystics.
We need to keep in mind all the time our purpose, our rationale and goals when we explore the
intersubjectivity of mystics, a special kind of intersubjectivity that is based on agreements about
the one goal to realize and the one statae to maintain, namely unity with the one, Sophos, the real
self or the execution or being of absolute, pure consciousness.
There probably will be a difference between the intersubjectivity of those mystics on the way,
following the path, the method and those that have arrived, that have realized unity with the one,
the all, Sophos, pure consciousness, the one real self. In the case of the latter we will probably
describe something like the characteristics of Eckhart’s Gotttheit or Godhead, the Sufi Beloved,
the one in union with the one real self of Vedanta, etc, while in the case of the former, those still
on the way, we will probably explore characteristics of god the father, son and spirit, or whatever
terms are more meaningful for mystics of other, or no, religion.
103

I suggested a few factors how intersubjectivity of everyday existence, interactionist and
dialogical situations as well as specialized discourses and their practices are maintained, eg
through values, principles, norms and other explications of underlying, usually implicit and
unstated transcendental. But how does intersubjectivity, both general, less informed,
unspecialized and uneducated as well as more educated, informed forms and specialized kinds of
intersubjectivity of scientific, art, social sciences, humanities originate? This question could take
us back to investigating consciousness (human and animal), its origin and nature as it will form
one of the building blocks and pre-conditions of intersubjectivity. One sees all sorts of
discussions, especially in sociology, concerning intersubjectivity, discourse, interaction, dialogue
etc, but such discussions are based on numerous assumptions. One for example is consciousness,
it is taken for granted by such discussions. It is pointless arguing about first, second, third
persons, the public and their roles in the origin, development, maintenance and modification or
transformation of intersubjectivity if assumptions on which such explorations are made, are not
investigated. Consciousness of those individuals or groups involved is one of those factors.
Consciousness might be differentiated, developed and become more specialized during the
development of intersubjectivity, but for there to be intersubjectivity (or the traditional subject)
there needs to be consciousness.
Consciousness has been mentioned in the exploration of the searches of mystics and pure
consciousness of the one and the one real self was one way in which the goal of the mystic was
conceptualized. To realize, acquire, become, be and exist as this pure consciousness of the one,
the beloved, god was one way of talking about and reflecting on the outcome or final product of
the mystic path. This mystic path is that of a conscious being and not that of a rock, a plant or
animals other than humans and to be able to conceive of and tread such a path consciousness is
required. Questions concerning the nature of the intersubjectivity of the mystic discourse can be
asked, for example where do mystics, who are always described as isolated individuals,
sometimes with guides or teachers, encounter and internalize the intersubjectivity the employ for
their mystical experiences and for the ideas they use to think and talk about it and express their
mystical paths and experiences. Where did John of the Cross obtain the words he uses to express
his mystical poems? Did he employ words from other contexts and discourses? Is that how it
functions, mystics employ already existing notions from other areas of their lives, in new ways,
to express and convey their new, mystical experiences and insights?
Is the consciousness of the mystic seeker transformed and developed during his seeking, by his
walking of the path (the way or method) and by him undergoing mystical experiences? What would
be the characteristics of the ‘normal'’ consciousness before this transformation and which aspects
(levels, structures, dimensions, functions...) of consciousness will be so transformed and which will
remain unaltered. Remember we referred to the mystic type of consciousness as pure consciousness
or awareness. By this we intend to typify it as nondual (no subject vs object distinction, no subject vs
subject distinction - all ‘subjects and objects' in the mystic vision, the bird’s eye view or the God-
vision are one or united or forming a unity in union), not functioning in terms of subject(centered)
and object-dualism or separation (being opposed to or ontologically separate from its objects of
perception and experience or subject-matter), not anthropo-centered (as objected to by for example
object-oriented ontology), unconcerned if it operates in the anthropocene or any other, space (time
and place) is no concern of it. Thus it will ‘operate or ‘be' (regardless of place, say on earth or
anywhere else in the multiverse) the same (ídentical, if it has any identity as it, like the godhead is
beyond categories such as existence and non-existence, identity, self - being the one, real non/Self)’.
It ‘is' without values (as if it were to have values, that selected values will exclude its opposing
non/values), no attitudes, no norms, no motives, no principles, no transcendentals (such as space,
104

time, frames of reference - for experience, understanding, thinking, reflection, expressiopn,
communication, etc) being all and none of these things simultaneaously.
These are a few clues concerning the nature or non-nature of pure consciousness of the Beloved, the
Godhead or the One, the one Real Self (all that what is, and not is). It probably shares certain non-
characteristics of Heidegger’s (depiction of) the Being of all beings, that is beyond being. The
mystic’s (probably heightened but still) ordinary awareness is said to be gradually or suddenly
transformed, eg according to two schools in Zen and other approaches.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_experience
A religious experience (sometimes known as a spiritual experience, sacred experience, or

mystical experience) is a subjective experience which is interpreted within a religious
framework.[1] The concept originated in the 19th century, as a defense against the growing
rationalism of Western society.[2] William James popularised the concept.[2]
Many religious and mystical traditions see religious experiences (particularly that knowledge
which comes with them) as revelations caused by divine agency rather than ordinary natural
processes. They are considered real encounters with God or gods, or real contact with higher-
order realities of which humans are not ordinarily aware.[3]
Skeptics may hold that religious experience is an evolved feature of the human brain
amenable to normal scientific study.[note 1] The commonalities and differences between
religious experiences across different cultures have enabled scholars to categorize them for
academic study.[4]
Definitions
 1.1 William James
Psychologist and Philosopher William James described four characteristics of mystical

experience in The Varieties of Religious Experience. According to James, such an experience
is:
 Transient — the experience is temporary; the individual soon returns to a "normal" frame of
mind. It is outside our normal perception of space and time.
 Ineffable — the experience cannot be adequately put into words.
 Noetic — the individual feels that he or she has learned something valuable from the
experience. Gives us knowledge that is normally hidden from human understanding.
 Passive — the experience happens to the individual, largely without conscious control.
Although there are activities, such as meditation (see below), that can make religious
experience more likely, it is not something that can be turned on and off at will.

 1.2 Norman Habel
Norman Habel defines religious experiences as the structured way in which a believer enters
into a relationship with, or gains an awareness of, the sacred within the context of a particular
religious tradition (Habel, O'Donoghue and Maddox: 1993). Religious experiences are by
their very nature preternatural; that is, out of the ordinary or beyond the natural order of
things. They may be difficult to distinguish observationally from psychopathological states
such as psychoses or other forms of altered awareness (Charlesworth: 1988). Not all
105

preternatural experiences are considered to be religious experiences. Following Habel's
definition, psychopathological states or drug-induced states of awareness are not considered
to be religious experiences because they are mostly not performed within the context of a
particular religious tradition.
Moore and Habel identify two classes of religious experiences: the immediate and the
mediated religious experience (Moore and Habel: 1982).
 Mediated — In the mediated experience, the believer experiences the sacred through
mediators such as rituals, special persons, religious groups, totemic objects or the natural
world (Habel et al.: 1993).
 Immediate — The immediate experience comes to the believer without any intervening
agency or mediator. The deity or divine is experienced directly

 1.3 Richard Swinburne
In his book Faith and Reason, the philosopher Richard Swinburne formulated five categories
into which all religious experiences fall:
 Public — a believer 'sees God's hand at work', whereas other explanations are possible e.g.
looking at a beautiful sunset
 Public — an unusual event that breaches natural law e.g. walking on water
 Private — describable using normal language e.g. Jacob's vision of a ladder
 Private — indescribable using normal language, usually a mystical experience e.g. "white did
not cease to be white, nor black cease to be black, but black became white and white
became black."
 Private — a non-specific, general feeling of God working in one's life.
Swinburne also suggested two principles for the assessment of religious experiences:
 Principle of Credulity — with the absence of any reason to disbelieve it, one should accept
what appears to be true e.g. if one sees someone walking on water, one should believe that
it is occurring.
 Principle of Testimony — with the absence of any reason to disbelieve them, one should
accept that eyewitnesses or believers are telling the truth when they testify about religious
experiences.

 1.4 Rudolf Otto
The German thinker Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) argues that there is one common factor to all
religious experience, independent of the cultural background. In his book The Idea of the
Holy (1923) he identifies this factor as the numinous. The "numinous" experience has two
aspects:
 mysterium tremendum, which is the tendency to invoke fear and trembling;

 mysterium fascinans, the tendency to attract, fascinate and compel.
The numinous experience also has a personal quality to it, in that the person feels to be in
communion with a holy other. Otto sees the numinous as the only possible religious
experience. He states: "There is no religion in which it [the numinous] does not live as the
106

real innermost core and without it no religion would be worthy of the name" (Otto: 1972).
Otto does not take any other kind of religious experience such as ecstasy and enthusiasm
seriously and is of the opinion that they belong to the 'vestibule of religion'.
 Ecstasy — In ecstasy the believer is understood to have a soul or spirit which can
leave the body. In ecstasy the focus is on the soul leaving the body and to experience
transcendental realities. This type of religious experience is characteristic for the
shaman.
 Enthusiasm — In enthusiasm — or possession — God is understood to be outside,
other than or beyond the believer. A sacred power, being or will enters the body or
mind of an individual and possesses it. A person capable of being possessed is
sometimes called a medium. The deity, spirit or power uses such a person to
communicate to the immanent world. Lewis argues that ecstasy and possession are
basically one and the same experience, ecstasy being merely one form which
possession may take. The outward manifestation of the phenomenon is the same in
that shamans appear to be possessed by spirits, act as their mediums, and even though
they claim to have mastery over them, can lose that mastery (Lewis: 1986).
 Mystical experience — Mystical experiences are in many ways the opposite of
numinous experiences. In the mystical experience, all 'otherness' disappear and
the believer becomes one with the transcendent. The believer discovers that he or
she is not distinct from the cosmos, the deity or the other reality, but one with it.
Zaehner has identified two distinctively different mystical experiences: natural and
religious mystical experiences (Charlesworth: 1988). Natural mystical experiences
are, for example, experiences of the 'deeper self' or experiences of oneness with
nature. Zaehner argues that the experiences typical of 'natural mysticism' are quite
different from the experiences typical of religious mysticism (Charlesworth: 1988).
Natural mystical experiences are not considered to be religious experiences because
they are not linked to a particular tradition, but natural mystical experiences are
spiritual experiences that can have a profound effect on the individual.
 Spiritual awakening — A spiritual awakening usually involves a realization or
opening to a sacred dimension of reality and may or may not be a religious
experience. Often a spiritual awakening has lasting effects upon one's life. The term
"spiritual awakening" may be used to refer to any of a wide range of experiences
including being born again, near-death experiences, and mystical experiences such as
liberation and enlightenment.
 Psychedelic drugs
 7 Neurophysiology
 7.1 Psychiatry
 7.2 Neuroscience
o 7.2.1 Neurology
o 7.2.2 Neurotheology
o 7.2.3 Studies of the brain and religious experience

https://www.redditch.tgacademy.org.uk/files/2016/02/Religious-Experience-revision-guide.pdf
107

What is Religious Experience?
•
The term
‘religious experience’
can conjure up a wide and diverse series of
images.
•
We might assume that it can mean anything from saying a prayer, to
attending a
service at a place of worship, to ‘hearing the voice of God’.
•
However, our understanding of the term is important
in investigating the concept.
Definition of Religious Experience
•
A religious experience is a non-
empirical
occurrence, and may be perceived as
supernatural.
•
It can be described as a ‘mental event’ which is undergone by an
individual, and
of which that person is aware.
•
Such an experience can be spontaneous, or it may be
brought about as a result of
intensive training and self-discipline.
•
Recipients of religious experiences usually say that what has happened to
them
has ‘drawn them into’ a deeper knowledge or awareness of God.
•
It is very important to remember that the experience itself is not a
substitute for
the Divine, but a vehicle that is used to bring people closer to the Divine.
•
The experience that each individual has is absolutely unique and cannot be
shared
with anyone.
•
108

Finally,
genuine
religious experiences see to be encouraging; they
do not
condemn the individual, but help them to live a better life, or help others,
for
example.
The Types of Religious Experience
3
•
Richard Swinburne talks of there being five different types of religious
experience.
•
The first two are within the 'public' realm, and the next three within the
'private'.
3
•
Richard Swinburne talks of there being five different types of religious
experience.
•
The first two are within the 'public' realm, and the next three within the
'private'.
.
Characteristics of Religious Experiences
Mystical experiences
•
Mystical experiences are experiences where the recipient feels a sense of
‘union’
with the Divine.
•
Mysticism involves the spiritual recognition of truths beyond normal
understanding.
William James
•
William James is, arguably, the most famous commentator on religious
experience.
•
James was an American doctor (Harvard graduate), not a theologian.
•
He had a deep interest in philosophy, and an equally profound interest and
109

specialism in psychology.
9
•
His famous work The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) was
originally a
series of lectures (The Gifford Lectures) given at
Edinburgh University at the
beginning of the 20thcentury.
William James’ four characteristics of mystical experiences
•
James recognised that the term ‘mystical’ is used in a wide variety of
contexts,
but suggested that using it to refer to a person was has had a religious
experience
is too ambiguous.
•
Therefore, in his book ‘The Varieties of Religious
Experience’, he offers four
characteristics which he claims will enable us to identify mystical
experiences:
Ineffability
•
The experience of God goes far beyond the human powers of description.
•
The person feels like they are unable to describe the experience or not do it
justice.
•
St Teresa of Avila states, ‘I wish I could give a description of at least the
smallest
part of what I have learned, but, when I try to discover a way of doing so, I
find it
impossible ...’
Noetic
•
The person receives knowledge of the divine which is not otherwise
available.
•
The experience is therefore a direct revelation from God.
Transient
•
110

Religious experiences are described as transient which means they are n
not
permanent.
•
A transient appearance may appear to last for a long period of time
whereas it
may have actually been very short.
•
The effects of the transient experience are however
, long lasting and involve a
changed view of the universe.
Passive
•
Religious experiences were found to be passive, which means the person
was not in control of what happened to them.
•
Instead the experience just happens and is from God
.
•
James saw this as evidence that a religious experience can be explained by
saying a person willed it.
10
F C Happold -Types of mysticism
•
F C Happold tried to provide some sort of context in which to think about
and
discuss mystical experiences.
•
In
Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology
(1963), he suggests that we can divide
mysticism into two types:
1.
The mysticism of love and union
2.
The mysticism of knowledge and understanding.
•
This is the longing to escape from loneliness and the feeling of being
‘separate’.
111

•
Happold believes that there are two urges that govern all of us.
•
The first is to be an individual.
•
The second is to be accepted in some way.
•
These two urges are constantly in conflict with one
another.
•
Happold believes that these urges have their origin
in the fact that we are in some
way sharers in what we could call ‘the Divine Life’
.
•
This suggests that, despite our need to be individuals, we are always trying
to get
back to God – hence the desire to be part of something bigger than
ourselves.
10
F C Happold -Types of mysticism
•
F C Happold tried to provide some sort of context i
n which to think about and
discuss mystical experiences.
•
In
Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology
(1963), he suggests that we can divide
mysticism into two types:
1.
2.
The mysticism of knowledge and understanding.
•
This is the longing to escape from loneliness and the feeling of being
‘separate’.
•
112

Happold believes that there are two urges that govern all of us.
•
The first is to be an individual.
•
The second is to be accepted in some way.
•
These two urges are constantly in conflict with one
another.
•
Happold believes that these urges have their origin
in the fact that we are in some
way sharers in what we could call ‘the Divine Life’
.
•
This suggests that, despite our need to be individuals, we are always trying
to get
back to God – hence the desire to be part of something bigger than
ourselves.
The mysticism of knowledge and understanding
•
Happold says that people have another ‘urge’ which
is in all of us.
•
We need to try to find out the ‘secret of the universe’ (‘the meaning of
life’, in
other words).
•
Importantly, he says that we do not seek this in sections, but want to know
‘the
whole story’, as it were.
•
The way that we can look for answers to such an ultimate question is
through
experience of God.
Aspects of mystical experience
•
Further to his separation of mystical experience in
to two types, Happold says that

there are three aspects of mystical experience:
113

1.
Soul-mysticism
2.
Nature-mysticism
3.
God-mysticism
SOUL MYSTICISM
11
•
Mystical experiences in this context is the idea of
finding the soul and, therefore,
complete self-fulfilment.
•
This form of mysticism does not deal with the God of classical theism,
although it
does relate to certain Buddhist and Hindu philosophers.
Nature-mysticism
•
Nature-mysticism is found in the belief that God is
immanent.
•
He is everywhere, and can therefore be ‘united with
’ in many aspects of nature.
God-mysticism
•
God-mysticism is the idea that humans want to return to God.
•
There are suggestions that mystical union with God
requires the human soul to
become like God
14
•
The cause of the experiences which people seem to have and are
undoubtedly
affected by is real; if that cause is believed to be God, then God exists.
•
This does not prove the God of classical theism, but just God in the sense
of the
source of the religious experience.
•
114

Finally, James noted that things that are true tend
to lead to ‘consistency, stability
and flowing human intercourse’.
•
Put another way, if something is real and true it is likely to improve a
person’s
life, whereas that which is false is more likely to
restrict and damage a person’s
life.
•
Significantly, James noted that those who claimed to have had religious
experiences seemed to be generally more fulfilled and purposeful in their
understanding of the world and their place in it, than those who subscribed
to
atheist theories.
The challenges to religious experience from philosophy
Can the finite experience the infinite?
•
The problem arises of how you can distinguish God from other possible
objects
of experience.
•
E.g. God is said to be the Creator – how would you
recognise that attribute?
15
•
God is also said to be omnipresent, infinite, omnipotent and eternal –
but how,
simply by virtue of an awareness of an object of experience, can
anything be
recognised to be that?
•
To recognise omniscience, you would have to be omniscient yourself!
•
It takes one to know one!!
•
God has no body, he is not material, yet is said to
be one being.
•
115

Therefore an encounter with God is radically different from an
encounter with a
person.
•
According to the Bible, God is not a person, e.g. ‘
God is Love’.
•
How can we experience God if God is not material?
•
People argue that just as you can encounter a table
, you can also encounter God,
but the two are very different.
•
E.g. God is not material, nor does he have a definite location.
•
Also, claims can be checked of encounters with objects, but when the
object is
God, they are not verifiable.
Direct experience of God is impossible.
•
We interpret every experience in ways we understand
.
•
It could be argued that the religious person interprets experience according
to a
religious framework of life, whilst the atheist interprets it as purely natural
events.
•
The finite cannot experience the infinite – so we cannot experience
God.
15
•
God is also said to be omnipresent, infinite, omnipotent and eternal – but
how,
simply by virtue of an awareness of an object of experience, can anything
be
recognised to be that?
•
To recognise omniscience, you would have to be omniscient yourself!
•
116

It takes one to know one!!
•
God has no body, he is not material, yet is said to
be one being.
•
Therefore an encounter with God is radically different from an encounter
with a
person.
•
According to the Bible, God is not a person, e.g. ‘
God is Love’.
•
How can we experience God if God is not material?
•
, you can also encounter God,
but the two are very different.
•
E.g. God is not material, nor does he have a definite location.
•
Also, claims can be checked of encounters with objects, but when the
object is
God, they are not verifiable.
•
Direct experience of God is impossible.
•
We interpret every experience in ways we understand
.
•
It could be argued that the religious person interprets experience according
to a
religious framework of life, whilst the atheist interprets it as purely natural
events.
•
The finite cannot experience the infinite – so we cannot experience God.
Problems of verifying religious experience
•
Individuals rather than groups undergo religious experiences.
•
As a result, we only have one person’s testimony as
117

to what has happened.
•
E.g. St Bernadette testified that the Virgin Mary had spoken to her.
•
Witnesses to the experience stated that they did not see or hear the Virgin
Mary
and only saw Bernadette talking to an ‘unseen’ some
one.
•
Religious experience is very like emotion – it is a
personal response, which
means that any form of empirical testing is useless
Religious experiences are regarded as subjective be
cause no objective criteria can
be applied to them in order to judge to their merit
, authenticity or anything else.
•
A subjective experience cannot be offered as ‘scientific’; that is, as
empirical or
intellectual proof.
•
This is basically because experiences happen to people, and will always be
open
to interpretation.
•
It would appear that those who encounter these experiences portray the
Being
revealed to them quite differently.
•
In some cases it is clearly the God of their respective faith.
•
In other cases it would appear to be a deity quite
distinct from the God of formal
or organised religion.
•
For some, it is simply the force of nature.
•
How can we then verify the authenticity if the experiences are so different?
•
118

In many cases, drugs or alcohol can produce very similar effects to a
religious
experience.
•
In The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) James refers to
experiments
using nitrous oxide and anaesthetics.
•
He suggests that, when mixed sufficiently with air,
these substances ‘stimulate
the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree’.
•
If this is the case can we rely on people’s accounts?
The challenge to religious experience from science

Page 16 to 19
Sigmund Freud
17
•
More particularly, he believed that they were projections of the ultimate,
oldest and most profound ideas that people had.
•
For example, if someone claimed to have experienced
the suffering of Jesus, a
religious person may accept this.
•
Freud, on the other hand, would claim that the recipient of this experience
was
simply projecting his or her ultimate beliefs about
suffering, helplessness and
separation, along with salvation, hope and desire t
o be reunited with one’s parent
(in this case portrayed as God.)
•
Freud refers to religion and religious experience a
s a mass delusion or paranoid
wish-fulfilment.
•
In turning away from reality and putting a wishful
reality in its place the person
makes use of magical thinking.
119

•
In some ways this brings religion closer to science
.
•
Freud had often said that paranoid delusions are like philosophical systems
or scientific theories - they are all trying to make sense of the world, and
our place in it.
V S Ramachandran
•
Ramachandran is a neurologist
He carried out extensive research related to temporal lobe epilepsy from
which he has concluded that there is important evidence linking the
temporal lobes to religious experience
So what we suggested was, there are certain circuits within the temporal
lobes which have been selectively activated. Their activity is
selectively heightened in these patients,
and somehow the activity of these specific neural circuits is more
conducive to religious
belief and mystical belief. It makes them more prone to religious belief.
V S Ramachandran, God on the Brian, BBC Horizon programme, 2003
Ramachandran is not unwilling to accept that it may
be that God exists and has
placed the temporal lobe within the brain as a means of communication
with
humans.
What is beyond doubt is that the origins of religion are even more complex
than had been
thought. The science of neurotheology has revealed
that it is too simplistic to see
religion as either spiritually inspired or the result of social conditioning.
What it shows
is that for some reason our brains have developed specific structures that
help us believe
in God. Remarkably it seems whether God exists or
not, the way our brains have
developed, we will go on believing.
V S Ramachandran, God on the Brian, BBC Horizon programme, 2003
Michael Persinger
•
120

Michael Persinger is a cognitive neuroscience researcher who agrees that
the
temporal lobes have a significant role in religious
experiences, and argues that
religious experiences are no more than the brain responding to external
stimuli.
•
Persinger claims that by stimulating the temporal lobes with a unique
machine he
can artificially induce in almost anyone a moment that feels just like a
genuine
religious experience.
•
Persinger has developed a helmet which produced weak magnetic fields
across
the hemispheres of the brain, specifically the temporal lobe.
•
Over 900 people who have taken part in the experiments claim to have had
some
for of ‘religious’ experienced.
•
It is thought that this happens because when under
the influence of the helmet, the
brain is deprived of the self-stimulation and sensory input that is required
for it to
define itself as being distinct from the rest of the world; the brain
‘defaults’ to a
sense of infinity.
19
•
This sense of self expands to fill whatever the bra
in can sense, and what it senses
is the world, so the experience of the self simply
expands to fill the perception of
the world itself.
•
One experiences becoming ‘one with the universe.’
•
However, as soon as the electromagnetic field is turned off then the
experiences cease.
121

•
Persinger has been able to reproduce this by electrically suppressing
activity in
the superior parietal lobe using his helmet.
•
When he performed this experiment on Tibetan monks
and the Franciscan nun,
they all reported that the experiment was identical
to what they experience in their
own meditative practice.
19
•
This sense of self expands to fill whatever the bra
in can sense, and what it senses
is the world, so the experience of the self simply
expands to fill the perception of
the world itself.
•
One experiences becoming ‘one with the universe.’
•
However, as soon as the electromagnetic field is turned off then the
experiences
cease.
•
Persinger has been able to reproduce this by electrically suppressing
activity in
the superior parietal lobe using his helmet.
•
When he performed this experiment on Tibetan monks
and the Franciscan nun,
they all reported that the experiment was identical
to what they experience in their
own meditative practice.
Can religious experience show that God probably exists?
Page 19
20
mistaken.
William James observes that religious experiences
tend to have a profound effect on the lives of
people and even whole societies, implying that
122

such effects cannot reasonably be attributed to
hallucinations.
Instead, it is much more reasonable
to believe that a real God is responsible for
religious experiences than to attribute the profound
effects of those experiences to a mere imaginary
being.
James also argues that all normal persons have
religious experience and, since experience is the
final arbiter of truth, then God — as the object of
religious experiences — must be accepted as
factually true.
There are a countless number of people throughout
the world claiming to have had a religious
experience. For many, the sheer amount of
testimony is proof that God is responsible for the
experience and therefore probably exists.
cannot corroborate the account so cannot accept if
it is true.
In many cases, drugs or alcohol can produce very
similar effects to a religious experience. We also
have physiological problems such as temporal lobe
epilepsy. Therefore, it is difficult to prove the
source of the experience to be God.
,
you can also encounter God, but the two are very
different. E.g. God is not material, nor does he
have a definite location. Also, claims can be
checked of encounters with objects, but when the
object is God, they are not verifiable.
Is it necessary to have a religious experience in order to be able to
understand what
a religious experience is?
Page 20
How successful are the challenges to religious experience from philosophy
and science? Page 21
Conclusion page 28
•
123

The key advantage to the religious experience argument for the existence
of God
is that it relates to people in a much more direct
way than some of the other
traditional families of arguments.
•
The approach is much more accessible and, to a degree, understandable.
•
The key disadvantage is that we are dealing with something akin to
emotion, not
something empirical and verifiable.
•
Perhaps the most persuasive element of the entire approach is Swinburne’s
insistence that while it may be possible to isolate
each element of ‘proof’ offered
and find problems with it, such elements have far greater cumulative
worth.
•
Atheist philosopher Anthony Flew who was keen to dismiss the
cumulative
approach, said: ‘If one leaky bucket will not hold
water that is no reason to think that ten can.’
•
Caroline Franks Davis agreed, but pointed out that
it may be possible to arrange the buckets inside each other so that the holes
do not overlap.
•
In other words, while individual arguments regarding religious experience
may be
flawed, it is possible to take elements from each and to end up with a fairly
powerful argument for God’s existence.
•
It is perhaps appropriate to conclude that the argument is probably of value
to the non-believer only in as much as it points to another area of human
life that might involve a divine being.
•
There is no clear answer to the question of whetherone can demonstrate
God’s existence as a result of religious experience.
124

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_experience#Integrating_reli-
gious_experience
Several psychologists have proposed models in which religious experiences are part of a
process of transformation of the self.
Carl Jung's work on himself and his patients convinced him that life has a spiritual purpose
beyond material goals. Our main task, he believed, is to discover and fulfil our deep innate
potential, much as the acorn contains the potential to become the oak, or the caterpillar to
become the butterfly. Based on his study of Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Gnosticism,
Taoism, and other traditions, Jung perceived that this journey of transformation is at the
mystical heart of all religions. It is a journey to meet the self and at the same time to meet
the Divine. Unlike Sigmund Freud, Jung thought spiritual experience was essential to our
well-being.[82]
The notion of the numinous was an important concept in the writings of Carl Jung. Jung
regarded numinous experiences as fundamental to an understanding of the individuation
process because of their association with experiences of synchronicity in which the presence
of archetypes is felt.[83][84]
McNamara proposes that religious experiences may help in "decentering" the self, and
transform it into an integral self which is closer to an ideal self.[85]
Transpersonal psychology is a school of psychology that studies the transpersonal, self-

transcendent or spiritual aspects of the human experience. The Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology describes transpersonal psychology as "the study of humanity’s highest potential,
and with the recognition, understanding, and realization of unitive, spiritual, and
transcendent states of consciousness" (Lajoie and Shapiro, 1992:91). Issues considered in
transpersonal psychology include spiritual self-development, peak experiences, mystical
experiences, systemic trance and other metaphysical experiences of living.
mys·ti·cism
ˈmistəˌsizəm/
noun
noun: mysticism
1. 1.
belief that union with or absorption into the Deity or the absolute, or the spiritual
apprehension of knowledge inaccessible to the intellect, may be attained through
contemplation and self-surrender.
2. 2.
125

belief characterized by self-delusion or dreamy confusion of thought, especially
when based on the assumption of occult qualities or mysterious agencies.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mysticism
Mysticism is popularly known as becoming one with God or the Absolute…
Contents
 1 Etymology
 2 Definitions
o 2.1 Mystical experience and union with the Divine or Absolute
 Mysticism is popularly known as union with God or the Absolute.[10][11] In the 13th
century the term unio mystica came to be used to refer to the "spiritual marriage," the
ecstasy, or rapture, that was experienced when prayer was used "to contemplate both
God’s omnipresence in the world and God in his essence."[web 1] In the 19th century,
under the influence of Romanticism, this "union" was interpreted as a "religious
experience," which provides certainty about God or a transcendental reality.[web 1] An
influential proponent of this understanding was William James (1842-1910), who
stated that "in mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we become
aware of our oneness."[12] William James popularized this use of the term "religious
experience"[note 1] in his The Varieties of Religious Experience,[14][15][web 2] contributing
to the interpretation of mysticism as a distinctive experience, comparable to sensory
experiences.[16][web 2] Religious experiences belonged to the "personal religion,"[17]
which he considered to be "more fundamental than either theology or
ecclesiasticism".[17] He gave a Perennialist interpretation to religious experience,
stating that this kind of experience is ultimately uniform in various traditions.[note 2]
 McGinn notes that the term unio mystica, although it has Christian origins, is
primarily a modern expression.[18] McGinn argues that "presence" is more accurate
than "union", since not all mystics spoke of union with God, and since many visions
and miracles were not necessarily related to union. He also argues that we should
speak of "consciousness" of God's presence, rather than of "experience", since
mystical activity is not simply about the sensation of God as an external object, but
more broadly about "new ways of knowing and loving based on states of awareness in
which God becomes present in our inner acts."[19]
 However, the idea of "union" does not work in all contexts. For example, in Advaita
Vedanta, there is only one reality (Brahman) and therefore nothing other reality to
unite with it—Brahman in each person (atman) has always in fact been identical to
Brahman all along. Dan Merkur also notes that union with God or the Absolute is a
too limited definition, since there are also traditions which aim not at a sense of unity,
but of nothingness, such as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Meister Eckhart.[web
1] According to Merkur, Kabbala and Buddhism also emphasize nothingness.[web 1]
Blakemore and Jennett note that "definitions of mysticism [...] are often imprecise."
They further note that this kind of interpretation and definition is a recent
development which has become the standard definition and understanding
o
o 2.2 Religious ecstasies and interpretative context
o 2.3 Intuitive insight and enlightenment
126

o 2.4 Spiritual life and re-formation
o Other authors point out that mysticism involves more than "mystical experience."
According to Gellmann, the ultimate goal of mysticism is human transformation, not
just experiencing mystical or visionary states.[web 2][note 11][note 12] According to McGinn,
personal transformation is the essential criterium to determine the authenticity of
Christian mysticism.[19][note 13]
 3 History of the term
o 3.1 Early Christianity
o 3.2 Medieval meaning
o 3.3 Early modern meaning
o 3.4 Contemporary meaning
 The 19th century saw a growing emphasis on individual experience, as a defense
against the growing rationalism of western society.[15][web 1] The meaning of mysticism
was considerably narrowed:[web 1]
 The competition between the perspectives of theology and science resulted in a
compromise in which most varieties of what had traditionally been called mysticism
were dismissed as merely psychological phenomena and only one variety, which
aimed at union with the Absolute, the Infinite, or God—and thereby the perception of
its essential unity or oneness—was claimed to be genuinely mystical. The historical
evidence, however, does not support such a narrow conception of mysticism.[web 1]
 Under the influence of Perennialism, which was popularised in both the west and the
east by Unitarianism, Transcendentalists and Theosophy, mysticism has been applied
to a broad spectrum of religious traditions, in which all sorts of esotericism and
religious traditions and practices are joined together.[37][38][15] The term mysticism was
extended to comparable phenomena in non-Christian religions,[web 1] where it
influenced Hindu and Buddhist responses to colonialism, resulting in Neo-Vedanta
and Buddhist modernism.[38][39]
 In the contemporary usage "mysticism" has become an umbrella term for all sorts of
non-rational world views.[40] William Harmless even states that mysticism has become
"a catch-all for religious weirdness".[41] Within the academic study of religion the
apparent "unambiguous commonality" has become "opaque and controversial".[30]
The term "mysticism" is being used in different ways in different traditions.[30] Some
call to attention the conflation of mysticism and linked terms, such as spirituality and
esotericism, and point at the differences between various traditions.[42]
o
 4 Scholarly approaches of mystical experience
o 4.1 Mystical experiences
o 4.2 Perennialism versus constructionism
Perennialism versus constructionism
The term "mystical experience" evolved as a distinctive concept since the 19th century,
laying sole emphasis on the experiential aspect, be it spontaneous or induced by human
behavior. Perennialists regard those various experiences traditions as pointing to one
universal transcendental reality, for which those experiences offer the proof. In this approach,
mystical experiences are privatised, separated from the context in which they emerge.[43]
Well-known representatives are William James, R.C. Zaehner, William Stace and Robert
Forman.[44] The perennial position is "largely dismissed by scholars",[5] but "has lost none of
its popularity."[45]
127

In contrast, for the past decades most scholars have favored a constructionist approach, which
states that mystical experiences are fully constructed by the ideas, symbols and practices that
mystics are familiar with.[44] Critics of the term "religious experience" note that the notion of
"religious experience" or "mystical experience" as marking insight into religious truth is a
modern development,[46] and contemporary researchers of mysticism note that mystical
experiences are shaped by the concepts "which the mystic brings to, and which shape, his
experience".[47] What is being experienced is being determined by the expectations and the
conceptual background of the mystic.[48]
Richard Jones draws a distinction between "anticonstructivism" and "perennialism":

constructivism can rejected with respect to a certain class of mystical experiences without
ascribing to a perennialist philosophy on the relation of mystical doctrines.[49] One can reject
constructivism without claiming that mystical experiences reveal a cross-cultural "perennial
truth". For example, a Christian can reject both constructivism and perennialism in arguing
that there is a union with God free of cultural construction. Constructivism versus
anticonstructivism is a matter of the nature of mystical experiences while perennialism is a
matter of mystical traditions and the doctrines they espouse.
o
o 4.3 Contextualism and attribution theory
o The contextual approach has become the common approach.[43] Contextualism takes
into account the historical and cultural context of mystical experiences.[43] The
attribution approach views "mystical experience" as non-ordinary states of
consciousness which are explained in a religious framework.[23] According to
Proudfoot, mystics unconsciously merely attribute a doctrinal content to ordinary
experiences. That is, mystics project cognitive content onto otherwise ordinary
experiences having a strong emotional impact.[50][23] This approach has been further
elaborated by Ann Taves, in her Religious Experience Reconsidered. She incorporates
both neurological and cultural approaches in the study of mystical experience.
o 4.4 Neurological research
 Neurological research takes an empirical approach, relating mystical experiences to
neurological processes.[51] This leads to a central philosophical issue: does the
identification of neural triggers or neural correlates of mystical experiences prove that
mystical experiences are no more than brain events or does it merely identify the
brain activity occurring during a genuine cognitive event? The most common
positions are that neurology reduces mystical experiences or that neurology is neutral
to the issue of mystical cognitivity.[52]
 Interest in mystical experiences and psychedelic drugs has also recently seen a
resurgence.[53]
 The temporal lobe seems to be involved in mystical experiences,[web 8][54] and in the
change in personality that may result from such experiences.[web 8] It generates the
feeling of "I," and gives a feeling of familiarity or strangeness to the perceptions of
the senses.[web 8] There is a long-standing notion that epilepsy and religion are
linked,[55] and some religious figures may have had temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE).[web
8][56][57][55]
 The anterior insula may be involved in ineffability, a strong feeling of certainty which
cannot be expressed in words, which is a common quality in mystical experiences.
According to Picard, this feeling of certainty may be caused by a dysfunction of the
anterior insula, a part of the brain which is involved in interoception, self-reflection,
128

and in avoiding uncertainty about the internal representations of the world by
"anticipation of resolution of uncertainty or risk".[58][note 14]
o
o 4.5 Mysticism and morality
 5 Forms of mysticism
o 5.1 Shamanism
o 5.2 Western mysticism
5.2.1 Mystery religions
5.2.2 Christian mysticism
5.2.3 Western esotericism and modern spirituality
o 5.3 Jewish mysticism
o 5.4 Islamic mysticism
o 5.5 Indian religions
5.5.1 Hinduism
5.5.2 Tantra
5.5.3 Sant-tradition and Sikhism
o 5.6 Buddhism
o 5.7 Taoism
o 5.8 The Secularization of Mysticism
 6 See also
 7 Notes
 8 References
 9 Sources
o 9.1 Published sources
o 9.2 Web-sources
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henology
Areas of inquiry
Henology stands in contradistinction to several other philosophical disciplines. The term

"henology" refers to the discipline that centers around The One, as in the philosophies of
Plato and Plotinus. It is sometimes used in contradistinction to disciplines that treats Being as
its starting point (as in Aristotle and Avicenna) and also to those that seek to understand
Knowledge and Truth (as in Kant and Descartes).[3]
See also
 Absolute (philosophy)
 Deleuzian metaphysics
 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
 "God above God" in the philosophy of Paul Tillich
 Henosis, union with what is fundamental in reality
 Monad (philosophy)
 Non-philosophy
 Non-philosophy (French: non-philosophie) is a concept developed by French philosopher
François Laruelle (formerly of the Collège international de philosophie and the University of
Paris X: Nanterre).
129

 Laruelle argues that all forms of philosophy (from ancient philosophy to analytic
philosophy to deconstruction and so on) are structured around a prior decision, and
remain constitutively blind to this decision. The 'decision' that Laruelle is concerned
with here is the dialectical splitting of the world in order to grasp the world
philosophically. Examples from the history of philosophy include Immanuel Kant's
distinction between the synthesis of manifold impressions and the faculties of the
understanding; Martin Heidegger's split between the ontic and the ontological; and
Jacques Derrida's notion of différance/presence. The reason Laruelle finds this
decision interesting and problematic is because the decision itself cannot be grasped
(philosophically grasped, that is) without introducing some further scission.
 Laruelle further argues that the decisional structure of philosophy can only be grasped
non-philosophically. In this sense, non-philosophy is a science of philosophy. Non-
philosophy is not metaphilosophy because, as Laruelle scholar Ray Brassier notes,
"philosophy is already metaphilosophical through its constitutive reflexivity".[1]
Brassier also defines non-philosophy as the "theoretical practice of philosophy
proceeding by way of transcendental axioms and producing theorems which are
philosophically uninterpretable".[1] The reason why the axioms and theorems of non-
philosophy are philosophically uninterpretable is because, as explained, philosophy
cannot grasp its decisional structure in the way that non-philosophy can.
 Laruelle's non-philosophy, he claims, should be considered to philosophy what non-
Euclidean geometry is to the work of Euclid. It stands in particular opposition to
philosophical heirs of Jacques Lacan such as Alain Badiou.

 The One in Plotinus
 Univocity of being
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/
The term ‘mysticism,’ comes from the Greek μυω, meaning “to conceal.” In the Hellenistic
world, ‘mystical’ referred to “secret” religious rituals. In early Christianity the term came to
refer to “hidden” allegorical interpretations of Scriptures and to hidden presences, such as
that of Jesus at the Eucharist. Only later did the term begin to denote “mystical theology,”
which included direct experience of the divine (See Bouyer, 1981). Typically, mystics,
theistic or not, see their mystical experience as part of a larger undertaking aimed at human
transformation (See, for example, Teresa of Avila, Life, Chapter 19) and not as the terminus
of their efforts. Thus, in general, ‘mysticism’ would best be thought of as a constellation of
distinctive practices, discourses, texts, institutions, traditions, and experiences aimed at
human transformation, variously defined in different traditions.
Under the influence of William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience, heavily
centered on people's conversion experiences, most philosophers' interest in mysticism has
been in distinctive, allegedly knowledge-granting “mystical experiences.” Philosophers have
focused on such topics as the classification of mystical experiences, their nature in different
religions and mystical traditions, to what extent mystical experiences are conditioned by a
mystic's language and culture, and whether mystical experiences furnish evidence for the
truth of their contents. Some philosophers have begun to question the emphasis on experience
in favor of examining the entire mystical complex (See Jantzen, 1994 and 1995, and section 9
below, and Turner, 1996). Since this article pertains to mysticism and philosophy, it will
concentrate chiefly on topics philosophers have discussed concerning mystical experience.
130

 1. Mystical Experience
 Because of its variable meanings, even in serious treatments, any definition of
‘mystical experience’ must be at least partly stipulative. Two, related, senses of
‘mystical experience’ will be presented, one in a wide definition reflecting a more
general usage, and the second in a narrow definition suiting more specialized
treatments of mysticism in philosophy.
 1.1 The Wide Sense of ‘Mystical Experience’
In the wide sense, let us say that a ‘mystical experience,’ is:
A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual experience granting

acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense
perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection.
We can further define the terms used in the definition, as follows:
1. The inclusion of ‘purportedly’ is to allow the definition to be accepted without

acknowledging that mystics ever really do experience realities or states of affairs in
the way described.
2. A ‘super sense-perceptual experience’ includes perception-like content of a kind not
appropriate to sense perception, somatosensory modalities (including the means for
sensing pain and body temperature, and internally sensing body, limb, organ, and
visceral positions and states), or standard introspection. Some mystics have referred to
a “spiritual” sense, corresponding to the perceptual senses, appropriate to a non-
physical realm. A super sense-perceptual mode of experience may accompany sense
perception (see on “extrovertive” experience, Section 2.1). For example, a person can
have a super sense-perceptual experience while watching a setting sun. The inclusion
of the supersensory mode is what makes the experience mystical.
3. A ‘sub sense-perceptual experience’ is either devoid of phenomenological content
altogether, or nearly so (see the notion of “pure conscious events,” in Sections 5 and
6), or consists of phenomenological content appropriate to sense perception, but
lacking in the conceptualization typical of attentive sense perception (see below on
“unconstructed experiences”).
4. ‘Acquaintance’ of realities means the subject is aware of the presence of (one or
more) realities.
5. ‘States of affairs’ includes, for example, the impermanence of all reality and that God
is the ground of the self. ‘Acquaintance’ of states of affairs can come in two forms. In
one, a subject is aware of the presence of (one or more) realities on which (one or
more) states of affairs supervene. An example would be an awareness of God (a
reality) affording an awareness of one's utter dependence on God (a state of affairs).
In its second form, ‘acquaintance’ of states of affairs involves an insight directly,
without supervening on acquaintance, of any reality. An example would be coming to
“see” the impermanence of all that exists following an experience that eliminates all
phenomenological content.
It is not part of the definition that necessarily at the time of the experience the subject could
tell herself, as it were, what realities or state of affairs were then being disclosed to her. The
realization may arise following the experience.
131

Mystical experience is alleged to be “noetic,” involving knowledge of what a subject
apprehends (see James, 1958). To what extent this knowledge is alleged to come from the
experience alone will be discussed below (Section 8.5).
Many Buddhist traditions, however, make no claim for an experience of a supersensory reality. Some
cultivate instead an experience of “unconstructed awareness,” involving an awareness of the world
on an absolutely or relatively non-conceptual level (see Griffiths, 1993). The unconstructed
experience is thought to grant insight, such as into the impermanent nature of all things. Buddhists
refer to an experience of tathata or the “thisness” of reality, accessible only by the absence of
ordinary sense-perceptual cognition. These Buddhist experiences are sub sense-perceptual, and
mystical, since thisness is claimed to be inaccessible to ordinary sense perception and the awareness
of it to provide knowledge about the true nature of reality.
1.2 The Narrow Sense of ‘Mystical Experience’
In the narrow sense, more common among philosophers, ‘mystical experience’ refers to a
sub-class of mystical experience in the wide sense. Specifically it refers to:
A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual unitive experience granting

acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense-
perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection.
A unitive experience involves a phenomenological de-emphasis, blurring, or eradication of

multiplicity, where the cognitive significance of the experience is deemed to lie precisely in
that phenomenological feature. Examples are experiences of the oneness of all of nature,
“union” with God, as in Christian mysticism, (see section 2.2.1), the Hindu experience that
Atman is Brahman (that the self/soul is identical with the eternal, absolute being), the
Buddhist unconstructed experience, and “monistic” experiences, devoid of all multiplicity.
(On “unitive” experiences see Smart 1958 and 1978, and Wainwright, 1981, Chapter One.)
Excluded from the narrow definition, though present in the wide one, are, for example, a
dualistic experience of God, where subject and God remain strictly distinct, a Jewish
kabbalistic experience of a single supernal sefirah, and shamanistic experiences of spirits.
These are not mystical in the narrow sense, because not unitive experiences.
 2. Categories of Mystical Experiences
2.1 Extrovertive and Introvertive
2.2 Theistic and non-theistic
2.2.1 Union with God
“Union” with God signifies a rich family of experiences rather than a single experience.
“Union” involves a falling away of the separation between a person and God, short of
identity. Christian mystics have variously described union with the Divine. This includes
Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) describing unification as “mutuality of love,” Henry Suso
(1295–1366) likening union with God to a drop of water falling into wine, taking on the taste
and color of the wine (Suso, 1953, p. 185), and Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293–1381) describing
132

union as “iron within the fire and the fire within the iron” (see Pike, 1992, Chapter 2).
Generally, medieval Christian mysticism had at least three stages, variously described, in the
union-consciousness: quiet, essentially a prelude to the union with God, full union, and
rapture, the latter involving a feeling of being “carried away” beyond oneself (see Pike, 1992,
Chapter 1).
2.2.2 Identity with God
Theistic mystics sometimes speak as though they have a consciousness of being fully
absorbed into or even identical with God. Examples are the Islamic Sufi mystic al-Husayn al-
Hallaj (858-922) proclaiming, “I am God” (see Schimmel, 1975, Chapter 2), and the Jewish
kabbalist, Isaac of Acre (b. 1291?), who wrote of the soul being absorbed into God “as a jug
of water into a running well.” (see Idel, 1988, p. 67.) Also, the Hasidic master, R. Shneur
Zalman of Liady (1745–1812) wrote of a person as a drop of water in the ocean of the
Infinite with an illusory sense of individual “dropness.” And, the (heretical) Christian mystic,
Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–1327/8) made what looked very much like identity-declarations
(see McGinn, 2001 and Smith, 1997). It is still controversial, however, as to when such
declarations are to be taken as identity assertions, with pantheistic or acosmic intentions, and
when they are perhaps hyperbolic variations on descriptions of union-type experiences.
In theurgic (from the Greek theourgia) mysticism a mystic intends to activate the divine in
the mystical experience. (See Shaw, 1995, p. 4.) Thus, a Christian mystic who intends to
activate God's grace, is involved in theurgy. Nonetheless, while typically theistic mystics
claim experience of God's activity, many do not claim this to result from their own
endeavors, while others refrain from declaring the activation of the divine as the purpose of
their mystical life. So they are not involved in theurgic activity.
The Jewish kabbalah is the most prominent form of alleged theurgic mysticism. In it, the
mystic aims to bring about a modification in the inner life of the Godhead (see Idel, 1988).
However, it is questionable whether in its theurgic forms kabbalah is mysticism, even on the
wide definition of mysticism, although it is clearly mysticism with regard to its teaching of
union with the Godhead and the Einsof, or Infinite.
Apophatic mysticism (from the Greek, “apophasis,” meaning negation or “saying away”) is
contrasted with kataphatic mysticism (from the Greek, “kataphasis,” meaning affirmation or
“saying with”). Apophatic mysticism, put roughly, claims that nothing can be said of objects
or states of affairs which the mystic experiences. These are absolutely indescribable, or
“ineffable.” Kataphatic mysticism does make claims about what the mystic experiences.
An example of apophatic mysticism is in the classical Tao text, Tao Te Ching, attributed to
Lao Tsu (6th century B.C.E.), which begins with the words, “Even the finest teaching is not
the Tao itself. Even the finest name is insufficient to define it. Without words, the Tao can be
experienced, and without a name, it can be known.” (Lao Tsu, 1984).
In contrast, with this understanding of kataphatic and apophatic, Fr. Thomas Keating has
argued that Christian mysticism strongly endorses God's being unknowable
133

 3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience
 4. Perennialism
 Various philosophers, sometimes dubbed “perennialists,” have attempted to identify
common mystical experiences across cultures and traditions (for the term
‘perennialism,’ see Huxley, 1945). Walter Stace's perennialist position has generated
much discussion (Stace, 1960, 1961). Stace proposes two mystical experiences found
“in all cultures, religions, periods, and social conditions.” He identifies a universal
extrovertive experience that “looks outward through the senses” to apprehend the One
or the Oneness of all in or through the multiplicity of the world, apprehending the
“One” as an inner life or consciousness of the world. The Oneness is experienced as a
sacred objective reality, in a feeling of “bliss” and “joy.” Stace's universal
extrovertive experience (or the experienced reality, it is not always clear which) is
paradoxical, and possibly ineffable (Stace, 1961, 79).
 Secondly, Stace identifies a universal, “monistic,” introvertive experience that “looks
inward into the mind,” to achieve “pure consciousness,” that is, an experience
phenomenologically not of anything (Stace, 1961, 86). Stace calls this a “unitary
consciousness.” Some have called this a “Pure Conscious Event” or “PCE” (Forman,
1993b and 1999. See section 6 below). A PCE consists of an “emptying out” by a
subject of all experiential content and phenomenological qualities, including
concepts, thoughts, sense perception, and sensuous images. The subject allegedly
remains with “pure” wakeful consciousness. Like his extrovertive experience, Stace's
universal introvertive experience involves a blissful sense of sacred objectivity, and is
paradoxical and possibly ineffable. Stace considers the universal introvertive
experience to be a ripening of mystical awareness beyond the halfway house of the
universal extrovertive consciousness.

 5. Pure Conscious Events (PCEs)
Pure Conscious Events (PCEs)
5.1 The Defenders of Pure Conscious Events
 Much philosophical disagreement has taken place over questions concerning PCEs, allegedly
an “emptying out” by a subject of all experiential content and phenomenological qualities,
including concepts, thoughts, sense perception, and sensuous images. Do such events ever
really occur, and if they do, how significant are they in mysticism?
 6. Constructivism
 7. Inherentists vs. Attributionists
 “Inherentists” believe that there are experiences that are inherently religious or mystical.
These experiences come with their religious or mystical content built in as would redness be
built in to a sense experience. Rudolf Otto was an inherentist. Attributionists believe that
there are no inherently religious or mystical experiences. There are only experiences
“deemed religious.” Among their ranks is to be counted William James. A leading
attributionist, Ann Taves, contends that first people or groups will have experiences of what
strikes them as being “special.” Only then, depending on various factors they will attribute a
religious or mystical meaning to them. (Taves, 2009) Taves is thus as much an anti-
constructivist as she is anti-inherentist. The constructivist sees religious or mystical
experiences to be constituted from the very start by cultural conditioning. The attributionist
denies this, in favor of a tiered or “block-building” approach from experiencing something
“special” to a religious or mystical conclusion.
134

 ‘Constructivism’ underscores the conceptual “construction” of mystical experience. Let us
call ‘soft constructivism’ the view that there is no mystical experience without at least some
concepts, provided by one's cultural conditioning, concepts being what “construct” an
experience. Let us call ‘hard constructivism’ the view that a mystic's specific cultural
background massively constructs — determines, shapes, or influences — the nature of
mystical experiences (See Hollenback, 1996, Jones, 1909, Introduction, and Katz, 1978 and
1983). On the assumption that mystical traditions are widely divergent, hard constructivism
entails the denial of perennialism. Soft constructivism is strictly consistent with
perennialism, however, since consistent with there being some trans-cultural mystical
experience involving concepts common across mystical traditions. Both hard and soft
constructivist arguments have been mobilized against the existence of PCEs.
 8. Epistemology: The Doxastic Practice Approach and the Argument from Experience
 9. Mysticism, Religious Experience, and Gender
 Bibliography
 Academic Tools
 Related Entries
con·scious·ness
ˈkän(t)SHəsnəs/
noun
noun: consciousness
1. the state of being awake and aware of one's surroundings.
"she failed to regain consciousness and died two days later"
o the awareness or perception of something by a person.
plural noun: consciousnesses
"her acute consciousness of Mike's presence"
o the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world.
"consciousness emerges from the operations of the brain"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness
Consciousness is the state or quality of awareness, or, of being aware of an external object or
something within oneself.[1][2] It has been defined as: sentience, awareness, subjectivity, the
ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive
control system of the mind.[3] Despite the difficulty in definition, many philosophers believe
that there is a broadly shared underlying intuition about what consciousness is.[4] As Max
Velmans and Susan Schneider wrote in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness:
"Anything that we are aware of at a given moment forms part of our consciousness, making
conscious experience at once the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives."[5]
135

Thanks to recent developments in technology, consciousness has become a significant topic of
research in psychology, Linguistics, neuropsychology and neuroscience within the past few decades.
The primary focus is on understanding what it means biologically and psychologically for information
to be present in consciousness—that is, on determining the neural and psychological correlates of
consciousness. The majority of experimental studies assess consciousness by asking human subjects
for a verbal report of their experiences (e.g., "tell me if you notice anything when I do this"). Issues
of interest include phenomena such as subliminal perception, blindsight, denial of impairment, and
altered states of consciousness produced by alcohol and other drugs, or spiritual or meditative
techniques.
 3 Philosophy of mind
 3.1 The coherence of the concept

 3.2 Types of consciousness
 Many philosophers have argued that consciousness is a unitary concept that is
understood intuitively by the majority of people in spite of the difficulty in defining
it.[23] Others, though, have argued that the level of disagreement about the meaning of
the word indicates that it either means different things to different people (for
instance, the objective versus subjective aspects of consciousness), or else is an
umbrella term encompassing a variety of distinct meanings with no simple element in
common.[25]
 Ned Block proposed a distinction between two types of consciousness that he called
phenomenal (P-consciousness) and access (A-consciousness).[26] P-consciousness,
according to Block, is simply raw experience: it is moving, colored forms, sounds,
sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies' and responses at the center. These
experiences, considered independently of any impact on behavior, are called qualia.
A-consciousness, on the other hand, is the phenomenon whereby information in our
minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when
we perceive, information about what we perceive is access conscious; when we
introspect, information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we remember,
information about the past is access conscious, and so on. Although some
philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have disputed the validity of this distinction,[27]
others have broadly accepted it. David Chalmers has argued that A-consciousness can
in principle be understood in mechanistic terms, but that understanding P-
consciousness is much more challenging: he calls this the hard problem of
consciousness.[28]
 Some philosophers believe that Block's two types of consciousness are not the end of
the story. William Lycan, for example, argued in his book Consciousness and
Experience that at least eight clearly distinct types of consciousness can be identified
(organism consciousness; control consciousness; consciousness of; state/event
consciousness; reportability; introspective consciousness; subjective consciousness;
self-consciousness)—and that even this list omits several more obscure forms.[29]
 There is also debate over whether or not a-consciousness and p-consciousness always
co-exist or if they can exist separately. Although p-consciousness without a-
consciousness is more widely accepted, there have been some hypothetical examples
of A without P. Block for instance suggests the case of a “zombie” that is
computationally identical to a person but without any subjectivity. However, he
remains somewhat skeptical concluding "I don’t know whether there are any actual
cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness, but I hope I have illustrated their
conceptual possibility." [30]
136


 3.3 Forms of consciousness
While philosophers tend to focus on types of consciousness that occur 'in the mind', in other
disciplines such as sociology the emphasis is on the practical meaning of consciousness. In
this vein, it is possible to identify four forms of consciousness:[31]
 Sensory experience, "the phenomenal sense that something exists in relation to, or has an
impact on, a person". The concept of ‘affect’ attests to this kind of consciousness, as does
‘sense data' "
 Practical consciousness, or "knowing how to do things, knowing how to ‘go on’. As writers as
different as Wittgenstein and Marx have elaborated, it is "basic to human engagement"
 Reflective consciousness, "the modality in which people reflect upon the first two forms. It is
the stuff of ordinary philosophy and day-to-day thinking about what has been done and
what is to be done"
 Reflexive consciousness, or "reflecting on the basis of reflection, and interrogating the
nature of knowing in the context of the constitutive conditions of being".

 3.4 Mind–body problem
 3.5 Problem of other minds
 3.6 Animal consciousness
 3.7 Artifact consciousness
 4 Scientific study
 4.1 Measurement
 4.2 Neural correlates
 4.3 Biological function and evolution
 4.4 States of consciousness
 4.5 Phenomenology
 5 Medical aspects
 5.1 Assessment
 5.2 Disorders of consciousness
 5.3 Anosognosia
http://www.iep.utm.edu/consciou/
When I am in a conscious mental state, there is something it is like for me to be in that state
from the subjective or first-person point of view. But how are we to understand this? For
instance, how is the conscious mental state related to the body? Can consciousness be
explained in terms of brain activity? What makes a mental state be a conscious mental
state? The problem of consciousness is arguably the most central issue in current philosophy
of mind and is also importantly related to major traditional topics in metaphysics, such as
the possibility of immortality and the belief in free will. This article focuses on Western
theories and conceptions of consciousness, especially as found in contemporary analytic
philosophy of mind.
The two broad, traditional and competing theories of mind are dualism and materialism (or
physicalism).
137

Some philosophers attempt to explain consciousness directly in neurophysiological or
physical terms, while others offer cognitive theories of consciousness whereby conscious
mental states are reduced to some kind of representational relation between mental
states and the world. There are a number of such representational theories of
consciousness currently on the market, including higher-order theories which hold that what
makes a mental state conscious is that the subject is aware of it in some sense. The
relationship between consciousness and science is also central in much current theorizing on
this topic: How does the brain “bind together” various sensory inputs to produce a unified
subjective experience? What are the neural correlates of consciousness? What can be
learned from abnormal psychology which might help us to understand normal
consciousness? To what extent are animal minds different from human minds? Could an
appropriately programmed machine be conscious?
Table of Contents
1. Terminological Matters: Various Concepts of Consciousness

2. Some History on the Topic
3. The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Materialism vs. Dualism
1. Dualism: General Support and Related Issues
1. Substance Dualism and Objections
2. Other Forms of Dualism
2. Materialism: General Support
1. Objection 1: The Explanatory Gap and The Hard Problem
2. Objection 2: The Knowledge Argument
3. Objection 3: Mysterianism
4. Objection 4: Zombies
5. Varieties of Materialism
4. Specific Theories of Consciousness
1. Neural Theories
2. Representational Theories of Consciousness
1. First-Order Representationalism
2. Higher-Order Representationalism
3. Hybrid Representational Accounts
3. Other Cognitive Theories
4. Quantum Approaches
5. Consciousness and Science: Key Issues
1. The Unity of Consciousness/The Binding Problem
2. Conscious experience seems to be “unified” in an important sense; this crucial
feature of consciousness played an important role in the philosophy of Kant who
argued that unified conscious experience must be the product of the (presupposed)
synthesizing work of the mind. Getting clear about exactly what is meant by the
“unity of consciousness” and explaining how the brain achieves such unity has
become a central topic in the study of consciousness. There are many different
senses of “unity” (see Tye 2003; Bayne and Chalmers 2003, Dainton 2000, 2008,
Bayne 2010), but perhaps most common is the notion that, from the first-person
point of view, we experience the world in an integrated way and as a single
phenomenal field of experience. (For an important anthology on the subject, see
Cleeremans 2003.) However, when one looks at how the brain processes
information, one only sees discrete regions of the cortex processing separate
aspects of perceptual objects. Even different aspects of the same object, such as its
color and shape, are processed in different parts of the brain. Given that there is no
138

“Cartesian theater” in the brain where all this information comes together, the
problem arises as to just how the resulting conscious experience is unified. What
mechanisms allow us to experience the world in such a unified way? What happens
when this unity breaks down, as in various pathological cases? The “problem of
integrating the information processed by different regions of the brain is known as
the binding problem”
3. The Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs)
4. As was seen earlier in discussing neural theories of consciousness (section 4a), the
search for the so-called “neural correlates of consciousness” (NCCs) is a major
preoccupation of philosophers and scientists alike (Metzinger 2000). Narrowing
down the precise brain property responsible for consciousness is a different and far
more difficult enterprise than merely holding a generic belief in some form of
materialism. One leading candidate is offered by Francis Crick and Christof Koch
1990 (see also Crick 1994, Koch 2004). The basic idea is that mental states become
conscious when large numbers of neurons all fire in synchrony with one another
(oscillations within the 35-75 hertz range or 35-75 cycles per second). Currently, one
method used is simply to study some aspect of neural functioning with sophisticated
detecting equipments (such as MRIs and PET scans) and then correlate it with first-
person reports of conscious experience. Another method is to study the difference
in brain activity between those under anaesthesia and those not under any such
influence
5. Philosophical Psychopathology
6. Animal and Machine Consciousness
7. References and Further Reading
http://www.livescience.com/47096-theories-seek-to-explain-consciousness.html
Cogito ergo sum
Not an easy concept to define, consciousness has been described as the state of being awake
and aware of what is happening around you, and of having a sense of self. [Top 10 Mysteries
of the Mind]
The 17th century French philosopher René Descartes proposed the notion of "cogito ergo
sum" ("I think, therefore I am"), the idea that the mere act of thinking about one's existence
proves there is someone there to do the thinking.
Descartes also believed the mind was separate from the material body — a concept known as
mind-body duality — and that these realms interact in the brain's pineal gland. Scientists now
reject the latter idea, but some thinkers still support the notion that the mind is somehow
removed from the physical world.
But while philosophical approaches can be useful, they do not constitute testable theories of
consciousness, scientists say.
"The only thing you know is, 'I am conscious.' Any theory has to start with that," said
Christof Koch, a neuroscientist and the chief scientific officer at the Allen Institute for
Neuroscience in Seattle.
Correlates of consciousness
139

In the last few decades, neuroscientists have begun to attack the problem of understanding
consciousness from an evidence-based perspective. Many researchers have sought to discover
specific neurons or behaviors that are linked to conscious experiences.
Recently, researchers discovered a brain area that acts as a kind of on-off switch for the brain.
When they electrically stimulated this region, called the claustrum, the patient became
unconscious instantly. In fact, Koch and Francis Crick, the molecular biologist who famously
helped discover the double-helix structure of DNA, had previously hypothesized that this
region might integrate information across different parts of the brain, like the conductor of a
symphony.
But looking for neural or behavioral connections to consciousness isn't enough, Koch said.
For example, such connections don't explain why the cerebellum, the part of the brain at the
back of the skull that coordinates muscle activity, doesn't give rise to consciousness, while
the cerebral cortex (the brain's outermost layer) does. This is the case even though the
cerebellum contains more neurons than the cerebral cortex.
Nor do these studies explain how to tell whether consciousness is present, such as in brain-
damaged patients, other animals or even computers. [Super-Intelligent Machines: 7 Robotic
Futures]
Neuroscience needs a theory of consciousness that explains what the phenomenon is and
what kinds of entities possess it, Koch said. And currently, only two theories exist that the
neuroscience community takes seriously, he said.
Integrated information
Neuroscientist Giulio Tononi of the University of Wisconsin-Madison developed one of the

most promising theories for consciousness, known as integrated information theory.
Understanding how the material brain produces subjective experiences, such as the color
green or the sound of ocean waves, is what Australian philosopher David Chalmers calls the
"hard problem" of consciousness. Traditionally, scientists have tried to solve this problem
with a bottom-up approach. As Koch put it, "You take a piece of the brain and try to press the
juice of consciousness out of [it]." But this is almost impossible, he said.
In contrast, integrated information theory starts with consciousness itself, and tries to work
backward to understand the physical processes that give rise to the phenomenon, said Koch,
who has worked with Tononi on the theory.
The basic idea is that conscious experience represents the integration of a wide variety of
information, and that this experience is irreducible. This means that when you open your eyes
(assuming you have normal vision), you can't simply choose to see everything in black and
white, or to see only the left side of your field of view.
Instead, your brain seamlessly weaves together a complex web of information from sensory
systems and cognitive processes. Several studies have shown that you can measure the extent
of integration using brain stimulation and recording techniques.
140

The integrated information theory assigns a numerical value, "phi," to the degree of
irreducibility. If phi is zero, the system is reducible to its individual parts, but if phi is large,
the system is more than just the sum of its parts.
This system explains how consciousness can exist to varying degrees among humans and
other animals. The theory incorporates some elements of panpsychism, the philosophy that
the mind is not only present in humans, but in all things.
An interesting corollary of integrated information theory is that no computer simulation, no

matter how faithfully it replicates a human mind, could ever become conscious. Koch put it
this way: "You can simulate weather in a computer, but it will never be 'wet.'"
Global workspace
Another promising theory suggests that consciousness works a bit like computer memory,
which can call up and retain an experience even after it has passed.
Bernard Baars, a neuroscientist at the Neurosciences Institute in La Jolla, California,

developed the theory, which is known as the global workspace theory. This idea is based on
an old concept from artificial intelligence called the blackboard, a memory bank that different
computer programs could access.
Anything from the appearance of a person's face to a memory of childhood can be loaded into
the brain's blackboard, where it can be sent to other brain areas that will process it.
According to Baars' theory, the act of broadcasting information around the brain from this
memory bank is what represents consciousness.
The global workspace theory and integrated information theories are not mutually exclusive,
Koch said. The first tries to explain in practical terms whether something is conscious or not,
while the latter seeks to explain how consciousness works more broadly.
"At this point, both could be true.
Consciousness is pliable and therefore lends itself to be transformed.
Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence, embracing

philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/
 1. History
 2. Methods
 3. Representation and Computation
 4. Theoretical Approaches
o 4.1 Formal logic
o 4.2 Rules
o 4.3 Concepts
o 4.4 Analogies
o 4.5 Images
o 4.6 Connectionism
141

Connectionist networks consisting of simple nodes and links are very useful for
understanding psychological processes that involve parallel constraint satisfaction. Such
processes include aspects of vision, decision making, explanation selection, and meaning
making in language comprehension. Connectionist models can simulate learning by methods
that include Hebbian learning and backpropagation. The explanatory schema for the
connectionist approach is:
Explanation target:
 Why do people have a particular kind of intelligent behavior?
Explanatory pattern:
 People have representations that involve simple processing units linked to

each other by excitatory and inhibitory connections.
 People have processes that spread activation between the units via their
connections, as well as processes for modifying the connections.
 Applying spreading activation and learning to the units produces the behavior
o
o 4.7 Theoretical neuroscience
o Theoretical neuroscience is the attempt to develop mathematical and
computational theories and models of the structures and processes of the brains of
humans and other animals. It differs from connectionism in trying to be more
biologically accurate by modeling the behavior of large numbers of realistic neurons
organized into functionally significant brain areas.
o 4.8 Bayesian
 5. Philosophical Relevance
 Some philosophy, in particular naturalistic philosophy of mind, is part of cognitive science.
But the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science is relevant to philosophy in several ways.
First, the psychological, computational, and other results of cognitive science investigations
have important potential applications to traditional philosophical problems in epistemology,
metaphysics, and ethics. Second, cognitive science can serve as an object of philosophical
critique, particularly concerning the central assumption that thinking is representational and
computational. Third and more constructively, cognitive science can be taken as an object of
investigation in the philosophy of science, generating reflections on the methodology and
presuppositions of the enterprise.
o 5.1 Philosophical Applications
 Innateness. To what extent is knowledge innate or acquired by experience? Is human
behavior shaped primarily by nature or nurture?
 Language of thought. Does the human brain operate with a language-like code or with a
more general connectionist architecture? What is the relation between symbolic cognitive
models using rules and concepts and sub-symbolic models using neural networks?
 Mental imagery. Do human minds think with visual and other kinds of imagery, or only with
language-like representations?
 Folk psychology. Does a person's everyday understanding of other people consist of having a
theory of mind, or of merely being able to simulate them?
 Meaning. How do mental representations acquire meaning or mental content? To what
extent does the meaning of a representation depend on its relation to other
representations, its relation to the world, and its relation to a community of thinkers?
142

 Mind-brain identity. Are mental states brain states? Or can they be multiply realized by
other material states? What is the relation between psychology and neuroscience? Is
materialism true?
 Free will. Is human action free or merely caused by brain events?
 Moral psychology. How do minds/brains make ethical judgments?
 The meaning of life. How can minds construed naturalistically as brains find value and
meaning?
 Emotions. What are emotions, and what role do they play in thinking?
 Mental illness. What are mental illnesses, and how are psychological and neural processes
relevant to their explanation and treatment?
 Appearance and reality. How do minds/brains form and evaluate representations of the
external world?
 Social science. How do explanations of the operations of minds interact with explanations of
the operations of groups and societies?
Additional philosophical problems arise from examining the presuppositions of current

approaches to cognitive science
o
o 5.2 Critique of Cognitive Science
The claim that human minds work by representation and computation is an empirical
conjecture and might be wrong. Although the computational-representational approach to
cognitive science has been successful in explaining many aspects of human problem solving,
learning, and language use, some philosophical critics have claimed that this approach is
fundamentally mistaken. Critics of cognitive science have offered such challenges as:
1. The emotion challenge: Cognitive science neglects the important role of emotions in human
thinking.
2. The consciousness challenge: Cognitive science ignores the importance of consciousness in
human thinking.
3. The world challenge: Cognitive science disregards the significant role of physical
environments in human thinking, which is embedded in and extended into the world.
4. The body challenge: Cognitive science neglects the contribution of embodiment to human
thought and action.
5. The dynamical systems challenge: The mind is a dynamical system, not a computational
system.
6. The social challenge: Human thought is inherently social in ways that cognitive science
ignores.
7. The mathematics challenge: Mathematical results show that human thinking cannot be
computational in the standard sense, so the brain must operate differently, perhaps as a
quantum computer.
The first five challenges are increasingly addressed by advances that explain emotions,
consciousness, action, and embodiment in terms of neural mechanisms. The social challenge
is being met by the development of computational models of interacting agents. The
mathematics challenge is based on misunderstanding of Gödel's theorem and on exaggeration
of the relevance of quantum theory to neural processes.
o
o 5.3 Philosophy of Cognitive Science
143

 Cognitive science raises many interesting methodological questions that are worthy of
investigation by philosophers of science. What is the nature of representation? What
role do computational models play in the development of cognitive theories? What is
the relation among apparently competing accounts of mind involving symbolic
processing, neural networks, and dynamical systems? What is the relation among the
various fields of cognitive science such as psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience?
Are psychological phenomena subject to reductionist explanations via neuroscience?
Are levels of explanation best characterized in terms of ontological levels (molecular,
neural, psychological, social) or methodological ones (computational, algorithmic,
physical)?
 The increasing prominence of neural explanations in cognitive, social, developmental,
and clinical psychology raises important philosophical questions about explanation
and reduction. Anti-reductionism, according to which psychological explanations are
completely independent of neurological ones, is becoming increasingly implausible,
but it remains controversial to what extent psychology can be reduced to neuroscience
and molecular biology
o
 Bibliography
 Academic Tools
 Artificial Intelligence on the Web
 Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science
 Cognitive Science Dictionary, University of Alberta
 Cognitive Science Society
 Computational Epistemology Lab at the University of Waterloo
 Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind
 Glossary of Cognitive Science
 http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/courses/Phil256/glossary.htm
 Mind and Brain News from Science Daily
 More specific Cognitive Science links

 Related Entries
 http://www.bcp.psych.ualberta.ca/%7emike/Pearl_Street/Dictionary/dictionary.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science
 Principles
 1.1 Levels of analysis
A central tenet of cognitive science is that a complete understanding of the mind/brain cannot be
attained by studying only a single level. An example would be the problem of remembering a phone
number and recalling it later. One approach to understanding this process would be to study
behavior through direct observation, or naturalistic observation. A person could be presented with a
phone number and be asked to recall it after some delay of time. Then, the accuracy of the response
could be measured. Another approach to measure cognitive ability would be to study the firings of
individual neurons while a person is trying to remember the phone number. Neither of these
experiments on its own would fully explain how the process of remembering a phone number
works. Even if the technology to map out every neuron in the brain in real-time were available, and
it were known when each neuron was firing, it would still be impossible to know how a particular
144

firing of neurons translates into the observed behavior. Thus, an understanding of how these two
levels relate to each other is imperative. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human
Experience says, “the new sciences of the mind need to enlarge their horizon to encompass both
lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience.”[4]
This can be provided by a functional level account of the process. Studying a particular phenomenon
from multiple levels creates a better understanding of the processes that occur in the brain to give
rise to a particular behavior. Marr[5] gave a famous description of three levels of analysis:
 the computational theory, specifying the goals of the computation;

 representation and algorithms, giving a representation of the inputs and outputs and the
algorithms which transform one into the other; and
 the hardware implementation, how algorithm and representation may be physically realized.

 1.2 Interdisciplinary nature
 Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field with contributors from various fields,
including psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy of mind, computer
science, anthropology, sociology, and biology. Cognitive scientists work collectively
in hope of understanding the mind and its interactions with the surrounding world
much like other sciences do. The field regards itself as compatible with the physical
sciences and uses the scientific method as well as simulation or modeling, often
comparing the output of models with aspects of human cognition. Similarly to the
field of psychology, there is some doubt whether there is a unified cognitive science,
which have led some researchers to prefer 'cognitive sciences' in plural.[6]
 Many, but not all, who consider themselves cognitive scientists hold a functionalist
view of the mind—the view that mental states and processes should be explained by
their function - what they do. According to the multiple realizability account of
functionalism, even non-human systems such as robots and computers can be ascribed
as having cognition.

 1.3 Cognitive science: the term
 2 Scope
 2.1 Artificial intelligence

 2.2 Attention
 2.3 Knowledge and processing of language
 2.4 Learning and development
 2.5 Memory
 2.6 Perception and action
 2.7 Consciousness
http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/
http://www.themysticsvision.com/science-and-gnosis-orig-2006-rev-10-14-14.html
I.
145

Both the word, 'science'—from the Latin scientia, and the word, gnosis—from the
ancient Greek, mean “to know”, but the knowledge is of two kinds. Each kind of
knowledge has a long and well documented history: Science has developed over the
centuries through the positing of rational theories and the rigorous accumulation of
physical data, modifying its position as reason, observation and data dictate. Gnosis is
also based on experience, but it is experience that is extra-sensual, supra-rational, and
wholly subjective, or personal. Science is confirmed by evidence derived from
empirical observation; gnosis is confirmed by evidence derived from introspective
revelation. Science pertains to knowledge of the gross, material world; gnosis pertains
to knowledge of the subtle, spiritual foundation of the world.
Scientists, for example, have determined, through theory, reason, and observation,
that the universe of time and space began as an immense burst of high-frequency
energy, referred to as “the Big Bang”. Scientists have determined over the past
century or so that at some point, about 14 billion years ago, an enormous amount of
energy suddenly appeared, expanding and transforming into mass-bearing particles,
that collectively formed our phenomenal universe. Those scientists have even
determined the temperatures and rate of acceleration of this energy in the first few
seconds and minutes of its release, and have cataloged the material particles which
were created as this energy cooled and solidified. They are also convinced that, prior
to this “big bang”, nothing else existed—not space, not time, not matter; but only this
concentrated (electromagnetic) energy in a potential and pre-material state. It was
only as these highly-energized wave/particles of light interacted and collided, that
they were transformed into material wave/particles, which then became the
fundamental components of the universe.
Physicists and cosmologists have further determined that, approximately ten billion
years after the ‘Big Bang’ (four and a half billion years ago), remnants of an
exploding star, or supernova, within this expanding universe, condensed into our solar
system; and that sometime during the next few hundred million years, single-celled
organisms bearing a molecule called DNA emerged on planet Earth; that these
microbes then evolved, resulting in a prodigious display of living creatures, including
Homo sapiens, who emerged fairly recently, that is to say, in the last 200,000 to
150,000 years.
To this broad scientific theory gnostics (mystics) have no objection, as it is consistent

with the knowledge obtained through gnosis. But it doesn’t go far enough if we are
interested in knowing the true beginning; i.e., where did this initial energy
Gnosis is possible only with the elimination of the ego-mechanism by which a

person’s awareness is limited to that of a separate individual identity. This ego-
mechanism is a subtle mental obscuration that structures a false identification with the
biological and psychological processes of individuation. Thus, instead of being
aware of the real I-identity that is universal Consciousness, one is restricted to a false
artificial identification with the individual’s biological and psychological processes.
The eternal Consciousness which is essentially one thereby becomes perceived in the
awareness of the individual as a separate ‘me-identity’. However, this ego-
mechanism, present in all beings, may be dispelled by an interior revelation that we
can only regard as ‘divine Grace’. It is a sudden interior illumination that reveals to
the human awareness the one eternal Consciousness, which is the origin and
146

substratum of all individuated consciousness.
I.
This ‘mystical’ experience of expanded awareness has occurred in numerous

individuals throughout history. Some of the best known in the Western world
are Jesus, the Buddha, Plotinus, Meister Eckhart and John of the Cross; but
there are many more. They have described this experience of the revelation
of the one eternal Consciousness variously as “the union with God”, “the
extinction of the ego (nirvana, samadhi)”, “enlightenment”, “entering the
kingdom of God”, or the “mystic marriage of the soul and God.” However,
all these experiences are synonymous and identical. The evidence for the
occurrence of such a transcendence of the ego and the subsequent emergence
into the awareness of and universal identity with the eternal Consciousness is
overwhelming. It seems to me it is time for science to acknowledge the
existence of such “revealed” knowledge, and to accord it the status of gnosis,
while attempting to reconcile its own findings with the view of reality put
forward by the gnostics.
How can the revelations of Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, John of the Cross, and others
in the Western mystical tradition simply be ignored? These few have been greatly
multiplied and fortified by the addition to our knowledge of the lives and teachings
of the great mystics of the Eastern traditions. Have they not all taught of the
noumenal Source? And have not all, after their linguistic differences were
accounted for, presented identical accounts?
These two camps, science and gnosis, have vied with one another over the
centuries for the mind of the populace.
http://www.themysticsvision.com/consciousness-and-matter-posted-1-04-
15.html
Another way of referring to these two fronts is as the realm of Consciousness
(Mind), and the realm of Matter. And so, if we are to give a full picture of our
experience of reality, we must give an account of both its mental and its physical
aspects. The mental aspect of our reality, or consciousness, is experienced as
wavular; the physical, or material aspect of reality is experienced primarily as
particulate. But, since Consciousness is the source and creator of Matter, every
distinct particle of Matter also contains Consciousness; and so Matter is both
wavular and particulate, as is the Light from which Matter is made. There is one all-
pervasive Consciousness, and the consciousness of every distinct individual is
included in and partakes of it…….
These waves of thought on the ocean of Consciousness produce duality, but
Consciousness Itself, like an ocean, has no contrary to Itself, no opposite; It is the
one substratum, the boundless and undivided ocean of Consciousness, and has no
duality in It.
This is the realization of the one eternal ocean of Consciousness, That which has
been called ‘God’, ‘the Absolute’, ‘the Unchanging Ground’, ‘the divine Self’. When
it is known, It is known to be the ultimate Reality, the final irrefutable answer to the
question, ‘Who am I?’. Anyone who has experienced the divine Self in this way will
tell you that the experience at its peak does not last forever; but it is certainly
transformative and lasting in its joyous certainty.
http://www.themysticsvision.com/the-wonderful-enigma-of-being-posted-12-
147

5-14.html
To physicists studying the submicroscopic quantum reality in the early part of the
twentieth century, it became apparent that one cannot separate existence
(ontology) from knowing (epistemology), for the only means by which to agree
among ourselves as to what exists is our sense experience of it. So, for physicists,
existence is integrally tied up with knowing—i.e., observing.
…. Quantum physics has effectively replaced the notion of being or existing
(ontology) by that of knowing (epistemology).
For quite a long time now, the question of whether or not there is a universal reality
independent of conscious observation has been seriously asked, not only by
physicists, but by philosophers and metaphysicians as well. Is there really a world
out there or does it exist only in our consciousness of it?
http://www.themysticsvision.com/where-consciousness-comes-from-2008-
revised-12-10-14.html
And since consciousness appears to be primary to thought or mind, various
branches of science have focused on discovering the origin of consciousness. At
first glance, the circumstantial evidence for the appearance of consciousness in
simple life-forms would seem to imply the existence of consciousness going back to
the earliest Paleolithic times, at least. However, some contemporary
neurobiologists have reached the conclusion that consciousness only came into
existence with the advanced evolution of biological forms and is a product (an
epiphenomenon) of complex neural activity in the brain; and that, being a
manifestation of a material process, consciousness itself is nothing more than a
material phenomenon.
There are others, however, who assert the primacy of Consciousness as the source
and substance of the universal creative energy of which the entire universe of
matter (including brains) is constituted. The strong inferential evidence of an
intelligent source for the origin of the cosmos would seem to imply that
consciousness prefigured even the Big Bang. This position goes back thousands of
years, and is reflected in the various religious views of the origin of the cosmos by a
conscious Creator, and in the Platonist philosophical tradition as well. That position
was later reiterated in the philosophical view of René Descartes (1596-1650), who
asserted that mind (spirit) and matter were two separate kinds of existents
comprising man—both emanating from God (the divine Mind), but with differing
characteristics. This was the basis of the well known philosophy of Cartesian
dualism, which holds that these two categories are inviolably separate and distinct
entities: one, the Divine uncreated part of man (the mind or spirit); the other, the
divinely created form-manifesting part (the body). Though this philosophy offered
no essential modification to earlier Platonist thought, it was the product of a careful
rational introspection that proved appealing and persuasive to many of its time.
In describing the origin of the cosmos, today’s materialist scientists start with the
assumption of the a priori existence of a material object called a ‘singularity’, in
which an infinitely dense mass of plasmic energy became somehow crammed into
an infinitesimally minute speck of potentiality. Then, due to some random
quantum fluctuations, that mass burst its bounds, exploding outwardly to become
the expanding universe of space, time, matter and invisible forces. This is the
theoretical picture that current science paints. Scientists of a materialist bent do
not even question what produced this singularity; i.e., why there is something
rather than nothing, and how it happened to be. Furthermore, these
materialistically inclined scientists are placed by this theory in the uncomfortable
position of being required to explain how conscious life emerged or evolved from
148

the cooled remains of this boiling soup of inanimate primal plasmic energy.
Today, in the early part of this twenty-first century, despite the implausibility of
their theory of the origin of the universe, scientists—Physicists, Cosmologists, and
Neurophysicists—are busily pursuing the assumption that consciousness somehow
arose a few million years ago as an ‘epiphenomenon’ of the self-organizing activity
of brain cells and neurons; i.e., consciousness just popped out of biological tissue by
some as yet unknown process of spontaneous manifestation, and is basically a
phenomenon arising from the neurological activity of biological matter. Here is a
statement of that theory by John Searle, a well known contemporary professor of
philosophy, who states that
"Consciousness is a biological feature of the human and certain animal brains. It is

caused by neurological processes and is as much a part of the natural biological
order as any other biological feature." ¹
Others, more cautious, say merely that
"Consciousness indubitably exists, and it is connected to the brain in some

intelligible way, but the nature of this connection necessarily eludes
us." ²
Another says:
"I doubt we will ever be able to show that consciousness is a

logically necessary accompaniment to any material process,
however complex. The most that we can ever hope to show is that,
empirically, processes of a certain kind and complexity appear to have
it." ³
Nonetheless, over the years leading up to the present, little progress has been
made in the attempt to formulate a detailed and satisfactory theory of the material
origin of consciousness. In the beginning of a recent book of memoirs (2006) by
Nobel prize-winning Neurobiologist, Erich Kandel, a hopeful and promising picture
of future progress is offered:
"The new biology of mind …posits that consciousness is a biological process that will
eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by
interacting populations of nerve cells. … The new science of mind attempts to
penetrate the mystery of consciousness, including the ultimate mystery: how each
person’s brain creates the consciousness of a unique self and the sense of free will.
"⁴
But then, in the latter part of the book, he admits that
"Understanding Consciousness is by far the most challenging task confronting

science. …Some scientists and philosophers of mind continue to find consciousness
so inscrutable that they fear it can never be explained in physical terms." ⁵
"What we do not understand is ‘the hard problem’ of consciousness—the mystery

of how neural activity gives rise to subjective experience." ⁶ "…Biological science
149

can readily explain how the properties of a particular type of matter arise from the
objective properties of the molecules of which it is made. What science lacks are
rules for explaining how subjective properties (consciousness) arise from the
properties of objects (interconnected nerve cells)." ⁷
11
Now we need to apply all these ideas, notions, insights to
a) the development of
b) the nature of
1) mystic’s intersubjectivity
2) PURE consciousness (after the coordination or synthesis!! of the transformation of normal

awareness/consciousness into pure awareness/consciousness) differentiation
-----------------------------------------------------
Note
1) that all these thoughts are not expressions of (concrete, first-order nature and operation of)
mystical consciousness, awareness and intersubjectivity, but merely attempts to think about and
reflect on these things, to express and talk about them (from a second-order or meta-position) . But
in the end we must be and remain aware of the fact that Pure Awareness or Consciousness, like the
Godhead, the One, the one Real Self, the Beloved, etc will always be ineffable (in words and
concepts). ‘It' might be (possible to allow ‘it' to be) directly expressed in music, visual art, fiction,
poetry, movement, performance, film, in virtual reality?
2) What we are asking for in the last sentence is in fact: what is it like in concrete, first-order ‘to be'
(exist as if, as it does not exist or has no existence, not existence or any other category can be
projected on it) Pure Consciousness or to be as if Pure Awareness, the One, the one real self, sophos,
etc. And, what could be the nature of the intersubjectivity of (as contained in, like everything that
are contained in) of the Beloved and Pure Consciousness? Because it is only one, not two and
therefore cannot be a gathering or group of persons so as to form or have or reveal intersubjectivity,
norms of ‘behaviour or thinking' , values, attitudes, motives, etc. ‘It' is complete, not lacking
anything, nothing can be added to or subtracted from it, it does not require anything, so it has no
wishes, no motives, no choices between alternatives, it is fulfilled, fulfilment, the absolute, both the
zero and omega point at once, all finitude and infinity simultaneously, everywhere and nowhere, it is
and not is both this and that...
150

151

152

Turning Away From Philosophy of Being

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Turning Away From Philosophy of Being

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NON-PHILOSOPHY OF THE ONE

Turning away from Philosophy of Being

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

I. Mystics of The Ancient Past

II. Mystics of The Greco-Roman Era

III. Mystics of The Early Middle Ages

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

IV. Mystics of The Late Middle Ages

V. Mystics of The Modern Era

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

And see Religious Experiences - The Student Room

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Is there an alternative to Anthropocene- and anthropo-centered consciousness, cognition,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

II. The Divine Mind.........................

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Advaita (nondualism) is an understanding; advaita (nonduality) is definitely not a matter of

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

— James Jeans in The Mysterious Universe, [14]

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

— James Jeans in The Universe Around Us, [16]

 "England & Wales deaths 1837-2007 Transcription". Findmypast. Retrieved 2016-06-27.

 Jeans 1944, p. 137.

  Jeans 1981, p. 216.

 Jeans 1929, p. 317.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Not only is wave-particle duality a recognized property of light (electromagnetic radiation),

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Not only is wave-particle duality a recognized property of light (electromagnetic radiation),

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

The explicate or institutionalized intersubjectivity we internalize and employ to constitute our

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

The Problem of Consciousness

Our Mathematical Universe And The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Max Planck: “I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as a derivative of

The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

The materialist/physicalist approach to consciousness raises many questions; for instance,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

We know that consciousness/subjective experience is immaterial. But how can matter/energy

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

1. It resolves the Cartesian dualism and the problem of interaction.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

9. It explains the nature of the substance of elementary particles. There is no physicality/material

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Originally published: 1177

Author: Attar of Nishapur

Genre: Epic poetry

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Where Consciousness Comes From

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Religious experiences can be characterized generally as experiences that seem to the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

Religious experience is also to be distinguished from mystical experience. Although there

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957

A second challenge to religious-experience claims comes from Wittgensteinian accounts

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900957