Developing Thought and Feeling 2021

3 Developing Thought and Feeling
What is exemplary in Aristotle is his grasp of the truth that morality comes
in a sequence of stages with both cognitive and emotional dimensions.
(Burnyeat 1980, 70–71)
How to become a good person is a notorious crux of Aristotelian

scholarship. While Aristotle is widely believed to give an expansive
account of moral education in his Nicomachean Ethics, his discussion
is actually quite truncated and cryptic. He begins book 2 with the
following claims: “Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly (to
pleion) by teaching (didaskalia); that is why it needs experience and
time. Virtue of character results from habit (ethos)” (EN II 1 1103a15–
17). At the end of the previous book, Aristotle classifies wisdom
(sophia), comprehension (sunesis), and thoughtfulness (phronēsis) as
virtues of thought, belonging to the part of the soul that “has thought,”
and virtues of character, for example, generosity and temperance, as
belonging to the part of the soul that is responsive to thought.
Since it is possible to be good at mathematics without experience or
time, Aristotle must have thoughtfulness in mind as the virtue of
thought in question and not wisdom (EN VI 8 1142a11–20). On
a cursory reading, Aristotle seems to be implying that thoughtfulness,
as one of the virtues of thought, and virtue of character arise in different
ways, or even that the development of the latter precedes the former.
Aristotle’s use of the term “mostly” implies that virtue of thought arises
not just from teaching because it also requires virtue of character, but
this is compatible with virtue of character being acquired first (Burnet
1900, 74). However, as Burnyeat notes, “What is exemplary in
Aristotle is his grasp of the truth that morality comes in a sequence of
stages with both cognitive and emotional dimensions” (Burnyeat 1980,
70–71).1 There is not an emotional stage followed by a cognitive stage,
1
Unfortunately, he takes back this comment in the second part of his article.
42
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3 Developing Thought and Feeling 43
as described in the Magna Moralia,2 but an integrated process, by

which the learner comes to have both virtue of character and practical
wisdom.3 As Aristotle says, actions should accord with correct thought
(orthos logos) (EN II 2 1103b31–34) and, as we later discover, correct
thought is thoughtfulness (EN VI 13 1144b27–28).4
The foregoing may require clarification. The idea that there is
a sequence of stages with both cognitive and emotive dimensions
does not imply that a baby is born with full-blown rationality.
However, that does not mean that the baby is unable to develop
emotional and rational responses at the same time. Even a nine-
month-old baby exhibits feelings, though not in adult form, as
I explain in section 4 below, and the baby may well exhibit certain
forms of reasoning even before being able to speak, for example, “If
I pretend I cannot crawl, my parents will pick me up.” Even if the
reasoning part of the soul is not fully developed in an infant, this does
not mean that it does not develop at the same time as the emotions.
3.1 What Is Habituation? A Preliminary Discussion

A clue that habituation (ethismos) itself is not just a nonrational pro-
cedure appears in the very first part of the chapter (EN II 1), where
Aristotle compares becoming ethically virtuous with learning a skill
like building or playing the harp.5 Just as we become builders by
building and harpists by playing the harp, so we become just by
doing just actions and brave by doing brave actions. Furthermore,
2
“It is not reason which is the origin (archē) of virtue, but the feelings. For first of
all there must arise (as does arise) a nonrational impulse (hormē) towards the fine
(to kalon), and then reason must give its vote and verdict. This is seen in the case
of children and other nonrational beings. For in these [presumably children],
there are at first nonrational impulses of the feelings towards the fine, but later
reason supervenes and by its approving vote makes them do fine actions” (MM II
3 1206b20–26). Gavin Lawrence gives a convincing gradualist account of
growing-up, but then lapses into talk of “proto-character” where our appetitive
and emotional side is trained and we learn “to control our natural appetites and
emotions” (Lawrence 2011, 279, his emphasis). Kraut (2012, 539) distinguishes
a stage of habituation followed by the development of reason.
3
Cf. Sorabji (1973–4, 212–213) and, in the most detail, Sherman (1989 especially
157–199).
4
Correct feelings and virtues of thought also develop together in musical
education, as we shall see in Chapter 7, especially Section 7.5
5
I do not mean to imply that a rational procedure would have to be theoretical.
44 Aristotle on Thought and Feeling
playing the harp well makes us good harpists and building well makes
us good builders, whereas playing the harp or building badly makes us
bad harpists or bad builders. Otherwise, Aristotle adds, no teacher
would be needed. This final comment suggests that being taught and
becoming habituated are not separate processes and that therefore
practice and the thinking that goes into practicing a skill are not
separate stages of becoming a skilled builder or harpist. They need to
develop together. The same should be true of learning to be an ethically
good person.
Becoming a good harpist is not just repeating the same actions again
and again. Repeating a series of notes with one’s hands in the wrong
place will not help in learning to play a chord. Paying attention to
where one’s hands are, thinking about where to position them, chan-
ging the position of one’s hand, and listening carefully to the notes will
be more useful in advancing learning. If a teacher is there to direct one’s
attention to the salient features, so much the better. Of course, learning
how to play a chord is far from being able to play a whole piece, much
less a whole repertoire. The learner must learn how to acquire these
skills gradually. In a nutshell, skills differ from routines, as Julia Annas
has pointed out.6 To take a modern example, a routine of brushing
ones teeth involves brushing ones teeth in exactly the same way at the
same times every day, not in different ways to suit different occasions.
One can learn a routine by learning to do the same thing in the same
way. The skill of playing the harp is different: It involves learning to do
different things to suit different pieces of music. That adaptability
requires thinking. One needs to aim at certain goals and work out
how to achieve them. In other words, deliberation and deliberative
desire (to be explained more fully in the following chapter on choice)
are needed. Often, it may also be helpful to imagine how things will go
in advance before one starts to play.
If one practices badly, one will become a bad builder or harpist. In
practicing badly, one will receive immediate feedback, and not just
from a teacher. For example, if a builder makes a serious mistake, the
house will fall down. There is an objective aspect to learning a skill.
However, there is an important disanalogy between learning to be
good and learning a skill. Learning a skill involves learning to do
various things and does not require a virtuous character. To gain
6
See Annas (2011, 12–15); Kraut (2012, 538).
a virtuous character one must develop a disposition (hexis) to be well

off in relation to the feelings (EN II 5). It may seem obscure how
practicing actions can or will develop a disposition relating to feelings,
or what this can mean. Indeed, it is unclear precisely how virtue of
character is related to feelings at all. I shall begin with two influential
possibilities that are presented by Kosman and by Joachim.
3.2 The Dispute between Kosman and Joachim

In his classic paper, “Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in
Aristotle’s Ethics,” Aryeh Kosman distinguishes two possibilities. On
the one hand, Aristotle could mean that the virtuous person is disposed
to act correctly in the light of whatever feelings he has. This is how
Kosman understands Joachim’s comment, “In the development of the
orectic soul there is a hexis when the soul echei pōs (viz. eu ē kakōs)
pros ta pathē: i.e., when a permanent attitude towards his emotions
(towards any disturbances of the orectic self) has been reached – an
attitude which expresses itself in actions which are either the right or
the wrong responses to such disturbances” (Joachim 1951, 85, quoted
by Kosman 1980, 108). (As we saw in Chapter 1, the orectic self is the
part of the nonrational psyche that has desires and feelings.) This
quotation suggests that it does not matter what feelings the good
person has, so long as she has the correct attitude toward them and
acts in the right way.
On the other hand, Aristotle could mean that it does matter what
feelings the virtuous person has. According to Kosman, the virtuous
person is disposed to act correctly and to feel correctly as well. As
Kosman puts it, “Aristotle’s moral theory must be seen as a theory
not only of how to act well but also of how to feel well” (Kosman 1980,
105). He also writes, “Aristotle’s more detailed discussions of the
virtues makes it clear that it is with respect to how one feels and not
simply how one acts in light of one’s feelings that one’s said to be
virtuous” (Kosman 1980, 108).7 He goes on to explain that there is
a connection, though defeasible, between the correct feelings and the
correct actions – “Fearing is related to fleeing, desiring to reaching for,
7
This is still a point of contention. Christine Korsgaard (2009, 101) argues that
“emotional responses may be subject to evaluation in terms of moral standards,
but they cannot, in the same sense as actions, be right or wrong.”
anger to striking out at, in no accidental way” (Kosman 1980, 109) –

and that the actualization of a virtue consists of a characteristic set of
feelings and a characteristic set of actions.
Kosman is right to think that Aristotle’s view that the good person
should have the appropriate feelings at the appropriate times in the
appropriate way and so forth, means that the virtuous person is dis-
posed both to act and to feel correctly, but the relationship between the
two needs further clarification. The brave person fears but does not flee,
the mild person may be angry but does not lash out, to apply Kosman’s
examples.
But now Kosman raises a new problem. Pace the ancient Greek
commentator Aspasius, who thinks that Aristotle’s mention of feelings
is a slip of the stylus, Aristotle suggests that actions and feelings are
voluntary (EN III 1 1109b30–32), but how are feelings voluntary?
Kosman considers this problem. His response is that “Acts are chosen,
virtues and feelings follow in their wake” (Kosman 1980, 112), but
how is this supposed to occur?
Joachim himself tries to capture the relationship between actions and
feelings by comparing good actions and good (or beautiful) statues. In
good statues the materials, the marble, bronze or whatever, are used
well. In the case of actions it is the feelings that are used correctly. The
right amount of feeling is embodied in the right way in the good action
(Joachim 1951, 86, 88). Since the details are obscure, it is not clear
whether Joachim thinks that any feelings can be embodied in the
correct actions, as the quotation from Kosman suggested. Joachim
invokes Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean to explain which feelings
would be appropriate.
I accept both Kosman’s view that the good Aristotelian has the right
actions and feelings and Joachim’s view that actions somehow embody
feelings. However, I hope to clarify how actions and feelings go
together to explain (a) why a particular feeling can lead to desires for
contrary actions and (b) how feelings do not just pop into existence
after one does particular actions.
3.3 Acting with Feeling in Situations Characterized

by the Feelings they Provoke
Certainly, the virtuous person must have the correct feelings in the
correct way at the correct time and so forth, but the link between
feelings and action and thinking needs to be spelled out in order to

show how the learner develops the correct feelings, action, and think-
ing. Any account of Aristotle on becoming good must be speculative to
a certain extent, but the best way to explain what is happening may be
by using adverbial expressions. Thus the learner comes to be disposed
to act with feeling, feel with thought, and think with feeling, and all at
the same time.
This picture solves a major puzzle about how a person practicing
certain actions habituates the feelings. Previous scholars have tried to
explain this phenomenon by enlisting modern psychologists who
argue, for example, that smiling a lot will make one feel cheerful.8 If
action is acting with feeling, however, what the learner is habituated to
do is to act with feeling, not to act in a certain way and then expect the
feelings to fall into line.9
This suggestion accords with how Aristotle describes the situations
that prompt habituation in Nicomachean Ethics II 2. There, Aristotle
describes ethical habituation as occurring in situations that are fright-
ening or in situations that concern appetites and anger, not situations
that would be salient for learning a skill like house-building or playing
the harp. It is significant that the situations themselves are described in
terms of feelings.10
3.4 Becoming Good

It is not clear how early habituation starts. Let us assume that according
to Aristotle everyone is born with the capacities to have the feelings
Aristotle lists in the Nicomachean Ethics. Infants may have the physio-
logical disturbances that are the basis of the feelings, and things may
strike them a certain way, but with phantasia that has no definite shape.
(A very young infant will not have the linguistic or conceptual skills to
form any clear impressions.) According to Aristotle, all the feelings
listed in the Nicomachean Ethics can be directed at the right or wrong
8
See, for example, Sherman (1997, 83–84), although she points out the
deficiencies of such an account from an Aristotelian point of view.
9
Here I do not mean to suggest that feelings can never precede actions, I merely
want to defuse the problem of how doing certain actions could make one feel
a certain way.
10
Virtues that do not have specific feelings mentioned in Aristotle’s discussion
relate to feelings no less than do the others. That is because Aristotle has
a holistic account of virtue.
objects, can be had at the right or wrong times and so forth. According
to the Rhetoric, memory and hope will affect the phantasia of these
feelings, so, to take the example of fear, the child can learn when fear is
appropriate, what should be feared and so on. This is an objective
account of fear. The child can see from experience when the fear is
warranted and when it is not. Not only will she come to have fear
appropriately, but presumably the phantasia of some imminent danger
will also develop accordingly. It will come to strike her that there is
danger when there is. Her fear will be rational. It is important that the
phantasia is about the here and now. As we saw in Chapter 2, indexical
insight is all important. But indexical insight is also required for the
person with thoughtfulness. Developing feelings at the appropriate
time, toward the appropriate things, and so forth is developing one’s
practical thinking at the same time.
Let this suffice as a sketch of the development of phantasia. What
about the development of desires involved in the feelings? As we saw
in Chapter 2, according to Aristotle’s de Anima, desire is the form of
a feeling and so is essential to it, but the Rhetoric rarely provides
examples of particular desires. My conclusion was that while desire is
essential to a feeling it is indeterminate. Listening to an orator tell
a story or watching a play, the audience has feelings but desiring to
help, flee, and so forth would be inappropriate. That is not to deny
that the feelings provide the energy to stay to listen or to vote in
someone’s favor as a result. Therefore, having feelings in the appro-
priate way ought to include channeling the motivation from the
feeling into an appropriate desire to do the appropriate thing or not
do what is inappropriate, but that may depend on the circumstances.
One can always think of the case of drama as the null case where no
desire for any ensuing action is appropriate, save perhaps applauding
the performers. According to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean the
virtuous person has the correct feelings at the correct time in the
correct way and so forth. Therefore, one cannot develop the correct
desires and feelings without at the same time developing virtue of
character.
According to Aristotle, then, one’s feelings – including phantasiai
(impressions) and desires – and actions must all be habituated at the
same time to form virtues of character. At the same time one should be
developing practical thought. Here are some examples of how this
might work with particular feelings, particular virtues of character,
and particular virtues of thought. (I leave the discussion of the role of

pleasure in becoming good to Chapter 7.)
First, a comment on Aristotle’s own procedure. In the opening
chapters of Nicomachean Ethics II, Aristotle begins his discussion by
describing how one attains virtue of character (EN II 1–4) and only
then says what virtue of character is (EN II 5–6). The procedure turns
the Socratic method on its head. Socrates says that it is impossible to
say whether or how one can learn to be virtuous before knowing what
virtue is (e.g., Meno 71B). Now, Aristotle’s discussion about how to
become virtuous in those early chapters is precisely what shows that
virtue of character cannot be capacities for feelings or mere feelings. If it
were, we could be born good and not have to engage in habituation.
According to Aristotle, we are not good by nature or contrary to
nature, but we have the potential to become good. Therefore, the
virtues are dispositions in relation to the feelings which need to be
developed. The feelings are neutral, as explained in Chapter 2.
However, Aristotle notably does not introduce any particular virtues
of character by explaining how we attain them. Nor does he discuss the
virtues of thought in this context, except to say that he will discuss
thoughtfulness later. In providing a fuller discussion than Aristotle
does about becoming ethically good, I am following Aristotle’s own
method, even though he does not proceed with it himself.
Suppose we start with the capacity for feelings, especially those
highlighted in the previous chapter: fear, sympathy, anger, and emula-
tion. As we saw, one would not expect a young infant to have the
impressions (phantasia) associated with such feelings when experi-
enced at an older age. For example, it may not strike an infant that he
is being disrespected, although he might feel angry at being neglected.
Again, a young infant is not yet going to be angry about slights or
injustices to the polis, but he is developing the right feelings. Similarly,
a young child may feel emulation towards an older sibling, but only
later come to appreciate the goods he is emulating. Sympathy, as
described in the Rhetoric, concerns pain in another that is unworthy
or undeserved (anaxios): “Sympathy (eleos) may be defined as a certain
feeling of pain destructive and painful, which is undeserved (anaxios)
and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours,
and moreover to befall us soon” (Rh. II 8 1385b13–16). A very young
child would not have a robust sense of worth, although recent studies
have shown that toddlers do have a sense of fairness, an attitude that
meshes with the Aristotelian particular virtue of justice concerning fair

distribution of goods. The process of directing the feelings at the correct
objects at the correct times and so forth is part of habituation.
Now, it is true that Aristotle mentions feelings specifically only when
he discusses certain virtues of character. Bravery relates to fear and
confidence, calmness to anger, and temperance to appetites relating to
particular pleasures of touch and taste. However, the above discussion
shows that it would be wrong to think that the feelings only contribute
positively to these virtues of character and not to all the other virtues of
character and to the virtues of practical thought of the good
Aristotelian person. For example, in developing the feeling of emula-
tion, perhaps for parents and other relatives (classified as friends by
Aristotle, for example, in EN VIII 12), the child must also be develop-
ing comprehension (sunesis), the virtue of thought that relates to
understanding correctly what others have to say and being able to
assess their advice.11
Virtues of character and ways of thinking should develop together.
As the child develops sympathy for the correct people in the appropri-
ate circumstances and in the correct way, he will also develop what
Aristotle calls “sympathetic consideration” (Broadie and Rowe’s
[2002] insightful translation of “suggnōmē”), an appreciation for
when actions are voluntary or involuntary and when they deserve
sympathetic consideration (EN III). Aristotle says, “Virtue, then, is
about feelings and actions. They receive praise or blame if they are
voluntary but sympathetic consideration and sometimes even sym-
pathy, if they are involuntary” (EN III 1 1109b30–32). According to
Aristotle, involuntary bad actions are those that come about by force or
actions done out of ignorance of the relevant particulars of the situation
(with the proviso that the doer regrets what he has done). Presumably,
these types of actions would be due to bad luck that the person does not
deserve, and so would warrant sympathy as described in the Rhetoric.
Sympathetic consideration is also important in the virtue of calmness.
In developing the virtue of calmness, not only must the learner habitu-
ate his anger, but he must also be habituated so as to be prone to
sympathetic consideration (suggnōmonikos) (EN IV 5 1126a2–3).
11
As we shall see, sunesis, defined in the Magna Moralia as concerning trivial
matters (MM I 34 1197b11–17), is a different phenomenon from that described
in the Nicomachean Ethics.
As the learner realizes that what should be done in this and other
cases depends on particular circumstances that may not be able to be
captured in an overly general formula, he will develop decency or fair-
mindedness (epieikeia), which Aristotle says is a superior form of
justice.12 It is the mentality that imbues Aristotle’s doctrine of the
mean according to which one should always act and feel as is appropri-
ate in the circumstances. The fully developed fair-minded person will
understand that the laws of the land, written in strictly universal form,
will not always be just if applied literally. The fair-minded person will
go by the spirit of the law, and note any mitigating circumstances (EN
V 10).13 “Mitigating circumstances” is perhaps a misleading phrase in
English. The fair-minded person does not first apply the law as it stands
and then consider what are mitigating circumstances, she grasps what
is just in the situation. The learner develops his feelings and thinking at
the same time.
Not only is thinking intertwined with feelings, but the feelings are
also intertwined with each other.14 As discussed in Chapter 2, while
fear is not essential to sympathy, Aristotle says that we sympathize with
others for what we fear for ourselves and vice versa. Our feelings
regarding ourselves help us imagine how others are feeling so that we
feel sympathy for them. As we shall see in Chapter 7, musical education
helps us develop these feelings appropriately too.
The mentalities of sympathetic consideration (suggnōmē) and
decency or fair-mindedness (epieikeia) contribute to the discernment
or consideration (gnōmē) that goes with the virtue of thought that is
thoughtfulness. (“Consideration” is the translation of Irwin [1999]
and [2019]). “Discernment” has been used for the Athenian jurors’
oath as explained below.) Indeed, Aristotle says that consideration,
comprehension (sunesis), thoughtfulness, and understanding (nous)
tend to the same point (EN VI 11 1143a25). Thoughtfulness is
described as a disposition related to what is good and bad for human
beings (EN VI 5 1140b4–6) and one that requires all the virtues of
character (EN VI 13 1144b30–45a2).
12
“Epieikeia” is often also translated as “equity,” for example, Nussbaum (1993)
and Brunschwig (1996).
13
On the pros and cons of changing the actual laws of the land, see Pol. II 8
1268b22–1269a28.
14
Cf. Sherman (1997, 65) “many emotions might more usefully be thought of as
complex systems of emotions. ”
Thoughtfulness grows as the feelings are cultivated in relation to

virtues of character. Presumably, as the impressions (phantasiai) in the
feelings develop, the child will at the same time gain a thoughtful
appreciation of the goods and bads involved and what aims are
worth achieving in action.15 Feedback from the world regarding her
actions will also show what is really good and bad. Aristotle says that
“it is the mark of the person with thoughtfulness to deliberate about
things that are good and beneficial for himself . . . in relation to living
well in general” (EN VI 5 1140a25–30). He concludes that thoughtful-
ness “is a practical disposition involving thought (logos) about what is
good and bad for human beings” (EN VI 5 1140b4–6). Wishing for
such goods contributes to the good person’s choice (prohairesis),
a combination of thought and desire, where the thinking involves
deliberation (related to goods) and desire includes wishing for what is
really good as well as the appropriate feelings, as I argue in Chapter 4.
Aristotle states that choice seems to be “most proper (oikeiotaton) to
virtue and to distinguish characters (ta ēthē) from one another better
than actions do” (EN III 1 1111b5–6). Now, it is possible to have the
correct choice but to lack thoughtfulness and full virtue of character,
when habituation is incomplete.16 In such a case, thinking and feeling
become out of kilter as I explain in Chapter 5. However, the choice of
the person with full-blooded thoughtfulness will include the correct
feelings so that in the fully good person excellent thinking, desiring,
feeling, and action all coalesce.
3.5 Oneself, Others, and the Polis

According to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, each virtue comes
between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. For example,
generosity comes between stinginess and wastefulness, calmness
between inirascibility and irascibility. The relationship between the
good person and others is enshrined in the particular virtues. The
excess vices, for example, vanity, boastfulness, and irascibility are
especially harmful to others, whereas the deficiency vices, pusillanim-
ity, self-deprecation, and inirascibility are especially self-destructive,
15
On the idea that in learning we adopt as our own psychological goals things that
in themselves have the character of a goal, see Lorenz (2015, especially 599).
16
I do not mean that this is a stage that all learners must go through. See section
3.8.
but both sets of vices may be harmful to oneself and to others. The
Aristotelian good person treats himself and others appropriately.
Therefore exercising the virtues of character is good for the agent and
for others also. One cannot achieve one’s own good by undermining
the good of others.17
I wish to suggest that, for Aristotle, correct habituation does not just
start with what is good for oneself and then later incorporate what is
good for others.18 Practicing generous, just, or friendly actions is to
practice actions that are good for others from the start. By correct
habituation one comes to have the correct views of one’s own abilities
and of the needs of others. Therefore, according to Aristotle, know-
ledge of one’s own abilities does not come from introspection, but by
seeing the results of one’s interaction with others and the world.19
Many of the virtues can be practiced in early years. However, one
will only be able to take part in the political life of the polis when one is
older. Further habituation and experience may be necessary so that one
can apply the nameless virtues of calmness, friendliness, truthfulness,
wit, and the virtue concerned with honor on a small scale to diplomacy,
and the virtues of thought such as comprehension and consideration to
participation in the assembly and the law-courts.20 Comprehension,
which, as we have seen, enables one to comprehend what someone else
is saying and to understand their advice, is especially useful in the
assembly. Consideration or discernment (gnōmē), which would have
been familiar to Aristotle’s readers from the Athenian jurors’ oath,
refers to deciding what is just using one’s own discernment. As
Demosthenes says to the jury, “Bear this is mind, too, gentlemen of
the jury, you must also consider well and carefully that you have
entered court today sworn to judge in accordance with the laws . . .
and of those matters on which the law is silent, to decide by your own
most just discernment (gnōmē(i) tē(i) dikaiotatē(i) krinein)”
(Demosthenes, Against Leptines 118). Similarly, Aristotle comments:
“Another objection: whatever it seems the law cannot determine
17
According to Kraut’s taxonomy (Kraut 1989, 78–86), Aristotle’s good person is
a benign egoist, on my interpretation. See too Gottlieb (1996).
18
On one interpretation of Stoic oikeiōsis, the Stoics’ account of moral
development, there is a problem about how the child switches her care from
herself to others.
19
On Aristotle on self-knowledge, see Gottlieb (2020).
20
See Mark Gifford (1995) and Stewart (1892, 86–94).
neither would a human being be able to discern. Yet the law, having
provided its citizens with an appropriate education, turns all else over
to office-holders to judge and administer, by their own most just
discernment (tēi dikaiotatēi gnōmēi krinein)” (Pol. III 16 1287a23–27).
Consideration or discernment is a virtue of thought related to
decency or fair-mindedness (epieikeia) and sympathetic consideration
(suggnōmē). As Stewart aptly puts it,
Suggnōmē means properly “thinking and feeling with others” . . . The
suggnōmōn is the man of social sympathy, who enters into the thoughts
and feelings of others, and especially is ready to make allowance for their
difficulties in his formal or informal verdicts – who in short gives judgment
(gnōmē) in their favour (sun) when a rigid interpretation of the law would
warrant an unfavourable judgment. (Stewart 1892, Vol. I, 88)
Sympathetic consideration is therefore fully developed when used in

public as well as private life.
Aristotle explains the relationship between the virtues of thought as
follows:
The <disposition> called consideration, according to which we say people are
sympathetically considerate and have consideration is the correct judgment
(krisis) of the decent person. For we say that the decent person more than any
other is liable to be sympathetically considerate, and it is decent to have
sympathetic consideration about some things. Sympathetic consideration is
correct critical consideration of what is decent. (EN VI 11 1143a19–24)
Aristotle goes on to argue that all these states tend to the same point (eis
tauton teinousai) – consideration, comprehension, thoughtfulness, and
understanding (presumably of the practical kind) (EN VI 11 1143a25).
He also notes that someone who is able to judge (kritikos) about the
things that concern the thoughtful person is comprehending, and has
good or sympathetic consideration (is eugnōmōn or suggnōmon) (EN
VI 11 1143a29–31). Indeed, it may be that all these virtues of thought
combine to form thoughtfulness, just as knowledge (epistēmē) and
understanding (nous of the theoretical kind) together form theoretical
wisdom (sophia), according to Aristotle.
All of these virtues develop gradually along with the virtues of
character, especially the nameless virtues. If the virtue of calmness is
connected with sympathetic consideration and the virtue of sympa-
thetic consideration is connected with decency or fair-mindedness, as
I have suggested, together they are essential to statecraft. The ancient

historian Thucydides complains that in the Peloponnesian War the
Athenians lacked the decency or fair-mindedness to retain the alle-
giance of their allies, whereas the Spartan general Brasidas who pos-
sessed calmness was able to keep the Spartan allies on his side.21 It is to
Aristotle’s credit that his account covers personal and political action.
3.6 Becoming Bad

As one would expect, Aristotle thinks that wrong habituation will
produce a bad character. Acting and feeling incorrectly in situations
that call for certain feelings will produce a disposition to have and act
with the wrong feelings. As Aristotle says:
For by acting in our transactions with other human beings, some become
just, and some unjust. By acting in frightening circumstances, and by becom-
ing habituated to be fearful or confident, some become brave and others
cowardly. The same is true in situations involving appetites and anger. Some
become temperate and calm, others intemperate and irascible, some conduct-
ing themselves in the same situations in one way, others in another. (EN II 1
1103b14–20)
We have seen that in congenial circumstances, the learner will receive

the correct feedback from the world and from other people, but what if
circumstances are not congenial? If one consistently develops the
wrong type of mentality, uncongenial to the virtues described accord-
ing the doctrine of the mean, one will develop the cluster of vices that
are termed excessive or deficient. If one goes wrong in a random
fashion, one will develop vices that straddle both sides, for example
rash-cowardice (EN III 7 1115b30–16a7). (I discuss these two types of
bad person in greater detail in Chapter 6.) In the Politics, Aristotle
points out that, among other things, being poor may lead one to petty
crime and being rich may lead one to crimes of hubris (Pol. IV 11
1295b9–11).22 In general, if one’s friends and family are bad role
models and circumstances are such that there is no positive feedback
from acting well, or if there is positive feedback from other people and
the world for acting badly, it looks as if habituation will not lead to the
virtues. More importantly, what are we to say about those in society
21 22
See Romilly (1974, 99–100). See Gottlieb (2018b).
who are unable to develop the Aristotelian virtues of the free man, since
they are women or slaves?
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not pay much attention to
the impact of adverse circumstances, except to note that we are in some
sense a co-cause of our character (sunaitioi pōs autoi esmen) (EN III 5
1114b23). While this claim may ultimately prove to be a red herring
regarding my interpretation of Aristotelian habituation, I shall never-
theless provide the following digression.
3.6.1 A Digression on Character and Voluntary Action

An important account of this dark saying, that we are in some sense
a co-cause of our character, is provided by Susan Sauvé Meyer (2012),
who quotes a passage from the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics to
argue that there are two stages of habituation, the first in which the
child is solely under the care of parents and educators and the next
where she is on her own developing virtue or vice:
Nurture and ways of spending one’s time (epitēdeumata) must be com-
manded by the laws, for things will not be painful once they have become
ingrained in one’s character (sunēthē). But it is presumably not sufficient for
people to receive proper nurture and care when they are young. Rather even
once they are mature (andrōthentes) they must spend their time on (epi-
tēdeuein) them and become habituated to them. Concerning these things,
and in general concerning the whole of life, we would need laws. (EN
X 1179b34–1180a4) tr. Meyer (2012, 124)
According to Meyer, since we are not responsible for the first stage of
our habituation, but we are responsible for the second, we are in some
sense “co-causes” of our character. While this is a reasonable view to
hold, there are two difficulties with this as an interpretation of the
Aristotelian passage. First, it is succeeded by the following remark:
“For the masses are persuaded by necessity (anagkē) rather than by
thought (logō), and by penalties rather than by the beautiful” (EN X 9
1880a4–5). This suggests that the laws are needed in adulthood not for
those who have had a good upbringing in their youth, and now need the
laws to continue, but for those who are incapable of developing the
proper motives of the good person and so need the laws to keep them in
line. This casts doubt on the two-stage version of learning in order to be
good. Second, it is unclear why the bad person, on Meyer’s account,
would be “ignorant of the universal” (what virtuous people in general

should do), as Aristotle claims, since it would have been pointed out to
her in earlier education.
Whatever the truth of Meyer’s interpretation of this passage, accord-
ing to Susan Sauvé Meyer, in the chapter where Aristotle says that we
are in some sense co-causes of our characters, he is only interested in
cases where a person has had a good upbringing throughout her
childhood. On Meyer’s view, Aristotle has nothing to say about cases
where a child may have had a bad upbringing in her childhood and ends
up being a bad (or good) person. Would such a person still be a co-
cause of her character?
For an answer to this question we need to take a closer look at
Nicomachean Ethics III 5, the passage that contains Aristotle’s obscure
claim that we are in some sense co-causes of our character. It is
a striking passage and, perhaps significantly, has no parallel in the
Eudemian Ethics. As Meyer argues, a central aim of Aristotle in this
chapter is to refute Socrates’ view that no one errs voluntarily (Meyer
2012, 145, for example).23
The chapter begins as follows:
Since the end is the object of wish, and we deliberate and choose what
contributes to the end, the actions concerned with what contributes to the
end are in accord with choice and are voluntary. The activities of the virtues
are about these things. Hence virtue is also up to us, and similarly, vice. For
when acting is up to us, so is not acting, and when no is up to us, so is yes. And
so if acting, when it is beautiful, is up to us, not acting, when it is ugly, is also
up to us. But if doing, and likewise not doing, beautiful or ugly actions is up
to us, and this is what it is to be a good or bad person (touto d’ēn to agathois
kai kakois einai), being decent of base is up to us . . . Vice (mochthēria) is
voluntary. (EN III 5 1113b2–16)
The argument of the first paragraph of the chapter is notoriously

unclear, and has been deemed fallacious (Ackrill 1978). It is unclear
how the fact that virtuous and vicious actions are voluntary shows that
the dispositions of virtue and vice are so too. Perhaps it would be more
charitable to understand the opening paragraph as a statement of
23
Rachana Kamtekar (2019) argues that Aristotle’s target is Plato’s Laws, rather
than the Socrates of the Apology and other Platonic dialogues. It is unclear why
these must be mutually exclusive, especially since Plato resurrects the Socratic
paradox in the Laws.
Aristotle’s anti-Socratic theses that virtuous and vicious actions, and

virtue and vice are up to us.
One might think that if something is “up to us” it must be possible
for us to do otherwise, but this idea is foreign to Aristotle’s own theory.
Consider two claims that Aristotle makes in his discussion of voluntary
action: (1) that in the case where a storm forces one to throw cargo
overboard, the action counts as voluntary, and (2) that even if one
cannot change one’s character, the actions done out of one’s character
are voluntary.24 From a commonsense point of view it may seem that
throwing the cargo overboard was not up to the agent: He had no
choice. Similarly, if one’s good or bad character makes it almost
impossible to act differently from how one does in fact act, it may
seem that it is not possible for someone who has developed a good or
bad character to act differently. Compare Martin Luther’s “Here
I stand. I can do no other.”
Aristotle’s view is rather that if the origin of the action is in oneself
(one is not a passive subject as in the case where the wind blows one
away), and one knows the relevant particulars of the situation, the act is
voluntary, whether or not one could have acted differently from
a commonsense point of view. What Aristotle must mean by his claim
that if acting is up to us, so is not acting, is that if the one type of action
is voluntary, so is the other type of action. If one’s good actions are up
to us, so are one’s bad actions, whether or not one could have acted
differently at the time.
Be that as it may, in the rest of the chapter Aristotle argues that since
what we do in habituation is up to us and voluntary, the resulting
disposition of virtue or vice is equally voluntary. Aristotle is ambivalent
about whether we have to know what the result of our activities will be
in order to be responsible (aitioi) for the good or bad disposition they
produce (EN III 5 1114a4). At one point, he says that only an insensible
person would not know that (Meyer takes this to mean someone who
has already had the right childhood upbringing). But at the end of the
chapter he seems to suggest that this is not a requirement:
24
How incurable the bad person is according to Aristotle is unclear. Aristotle says
that a person who is unjust cannot be just by merely wishing it (EN III 5
1114a13–14), but that does not mean that rehabituation or rehabilitation is not
possible. See Anton (2006) on the possibility of rehabilitation.
Both actions and dispositions are not voluntary in the same way. For we are
in control of actions from the beginning to the end, when we know the
particulars. With dispositions, however, we are in control of the beginning
but do not know, any more than with sicknesses, what the cumulative effect
of particular actions will be. Nevertheless, since it was up to us to exercise
either this way or not this way, dispositions are voluntary. (EN III 5
1114b30–1115a3)
This makes a difference to whether someone’s ethical dispositions

are voluntary. On the former account, if one develops a certain charac-
ter without knowing that this will be the result of one’s present actions,
then the resulting ethical disposition will not be voluntary, any more
than one’s backache will be voluntary if one voluntarily hit a golf club
a certain way over and over again, being unaware of the cumulative
effect of so doing. On the latter account, one’s disposition will be
voluntary, whether one knew the cumulative effect of one’s actions or
not.
3.6.2 The Condition of Women and Slaves

What should Aristotle say about those in his favored society who
cannot develop the Aristotelian virtues, for example women, artisans,
and those who are enslaved? (Here I am referring to people who are
brought up as slaves, not those who were free and were then enslaved.)
What he actually says is that they cannot develop the virtues of a free
man because they lack the requisite mental capacities, a view based
more on prejudice than observation, although Aristotle is not unaware
of arguments contrary to his views in the case of slaves (Pol. I 5–6).
Mariska Leunissen argues that according to Aristotle women in
particular cannot become virtuous because of their physiology.25 If
this is so, Aristotle is inconsistent. According to him, women’s cold
blood makes them unsuitable for virtue, but he also argues that hot-
blooded male babies need to be acclimatized to the cold. Again, he says
that women are oversensitive to pain, even though the ancient Greeks
were well aware of how much women endure in childbirth. Aristotle’s
account of “natural slaves” and women is false, but if he had realized
that the traits they develop are due to circumstances and habituation,
25
See Leunissen (2017) and Gottlieb (2018).
just like everyone else, he would have been able to account for their
situation too.
It is possible to reconstruct the way in which we should understand
the character of women and slaves in ancient Greece and in other
societies where their development is stymied. It seems that in those
societies they have been habituated to develop what would be vices in
a free man, for example, pusillanimity, inirascibility, self-deprecation,
and so forth.26 On the other hand, upper-class women in ancient
Greece did manage household estates and give instructions to others
to carry out their deliberations, for example. I think we must conclude
that they were not irrational in developing the traits they did, as the best
they could do in their situation. Habituation is powerful, though,
affecting both thinking and feeling as I explained above, and so they
may also have developed patterns of thought about their own abilities
and self-worth which were detrimental to themselves. This is not to say
that they could not have had an inkling that things had gone awry. The
world and others in their situation may give feedback at odds with
society’s views. Resistance is also possible. Slaves in anti-bellum
America, for example, were often chastised as lazy and stupid, even
though they may have been acting accordingly in order to undermine
their masters’ goals. Such types of actions are voluntary, just as much as
obedient types of actions. I think that we should say, as Aristotle would
if he grasped the truth here, that the acts of women and enslaved people
and their dispositions are voluntary on both of Aristotle’s accounts of
developing voluntary dispositions, on pain of treating them as wholly
passive victims who do not know the cumulative effect of their actions.
What though of Aristotle’s view that we cannot voluntarily suffer
injustice (EN V 9)? Here Aristotle explains that doing injustice must be
against the wish of the victim and so suffering injustice must be the
same. However, according to Aristotle, no one wishes what he does not
think is excellent and so no one wishes to suffer injustice. Women and
slaves clearly suffered injustice and so could not be acting voluntarily
and so could not be praised nor blamed. If this makes Aristotle’s
conclusions ambivalent when it comes to voluntary action, that is
perhaps because women and slaves may be living in what Claudia
26
Sometimes Aristotle assumes that different qualities are virtues relative to
women and slaves (e.g., Pol. I 13 1260a24–1260a33). I explain how this is
inconsistent with Aristotle’s own doctrine of the mean in Gottlieb (2009,
31–32).
Card, following Primo Levi, terms “gray zones,” areas where the
attribution of moral responsibility to people becomes murky at best,
and where we may have to give a verdict based on the particulars of the
situation (Card 2002, 211–235). However, it in no way detracts from
Aristotle’s view of the importance of habituation.
3.7 Becoming Half-Bad and the Example of Neoptolemus

According to Aristotle, as we shall see in the following chapter, there is
a bridge between feelings and the virtues of character and thought in
the good person, namely choice (prohairesis). However, there are
different forms of choice, one of which belongs to the good person,
one of which can belong to the bad person, and one to the person who is
only half-bad. The “half-bad” person can have the correct choice but
act incorrectly because of an appetite that is at odds with the person’s
choice and wish. Such a condition is called akratic. A person may also
have an appetite at odds with her wish, but do the correct act. Such an
action is enkratic.
Some have argued that akrasia and enkrateia are half-way houses to
becoming good, that every learner must pass through an akratic and/or
enkratic phase before becoming good.27 Aristotle provides no reason
why one’s choice must necessarily get ahead of one’s feelings before
they can be integrated, but it is certainly possible that one might achieve
this condition on the way to being good, or that this may be the furthest
one can go in one’s ethical development.
In his account of akrasia (EN VII 3 and 9), Aristotle discusses
Neoptolemus, a character in Sophocles’ Philoctetes who is tricked
into joining Odysseus’s conspiracy to get Philoctetes to give up the
bow that is needed to save Troy. Neoptolemus first of all does what
Odysseus says, but later he has a change of heart. (The case of
Neoptolemus is only analogous to strict akrasia because it is not
restricted to the sphere of temperance.) Aristotle denies that this change
of heart constitutes akrasia. I shall argue that that is because
Neoptolemus was akratic in the first place, when he was persuaded
by Odysseus to deceive Philoctetes. Just as in the case of becoming fully
bad, it is possible for someone to suffer akrasia under someone else’s
27
Cooper (2009) argues against this idea. Tieleman (2009, 175) claims that self-
control is a “semi-virtue, typical of someone progressing toward virtue.”
bad influence. However, it is also possible to recover from such akrasia,

as does Neoptolemus. This is not to deny that Neoptolemus does not
have a way to go before becoming a fully good person, but nevertheless
if one is even partly habituated on the right track, one can improve in
the right direction.28
3.8 How Important is Shame as a Stage in Moral

Development?
It is often argued that shame marks an important stage in the develop-
ment of virtue of character. The idea seems to stem from the final book
of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he suggests that the many
obey fear rather than shame (aidōs), avoiding what is base because of
prospective penalties and not because it is ugly (EN X 9 1179b11–14).
This may suggest that shame is a good feeling for youngsters, preceding
thoughtfulness. Burnyeat calls it the “semi-virtue of the learner”
(Burnyeat 1980, 78).
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines shame (aischunē) as an impression
of a bad reputation from those one admires (Rh. II 6 1384a21–27).29
Here he includes those who may not in fact be admirable. In the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines shame (aidōs) as fear of a bad
reputation (EN IV 9 1128b11–12). Earlier, he talked of the person who
has shame (ho aidēmōn) as being in a mean between the bashful person
and the shameless person (EN II 7 1108a31–35).30 Here he seems to be
speaking of someone with a propensity to shame and not the mere
feeling. Aristotle does not clearly distinguish the two later on.
However, in the Nicomachean Ethics it is possible to distinguish two
types of shame, prospective shame (aidōs), a sense of shame which
restrains one from doing anything bad, and retrospective shame
(aischunē), which follows doing something bad. Aristotle does say
that we praise young people who are restrained by prospective
shame, but we do not praise older people who have retrospective
28
See, too, Aristotle’s Cat. 10 13a20–30.
29
Aristotle also says that “shame (aischunē) is a sort of pain or disturbance about
things that appear to bring bad reputation for bad things, present, past or about
to happen, shamelessness, a certain belittling and indifference about the same
things” (Rh. II 6 1383b12–15).
30
The Eudemian Ethics describes shame (aidōs) as a mean, but not a virtue, too
(EE III 7 1233b 28–29).
shame, since we do not think that they should have done anything bad
to be ashamed of (EN IV 9 1128b20–21). However, he also says that
prospective shame (aidōs) concerns voluntary actions, and no fair-
minded person would ever voluntarily do base actions (EN IV 9
1128b28–30). Aristotle notes that one might say that a fair-minded
person would have prospective shame on the assumption that if he did
bad things, he would have retrospective shame, but he says that that is
not the case when it comes to the virtues.
Nevertheless, there are those who think that prospective shame is
suitable for the good person.31 Not so. In EN III 8, Aristotle distin-
guishes citizen bravery, based on aidōs and the desire for honor, from
true bravery, even though he also says that bravery based on shame is
better than bravery prompted by compulsion and fear. Aidōs, as
Aristotle reiterates in EN IV 9, is not a virtue. Nor, he adds, is enkra-
teia, acting correctly in the face of a recalcitrant appetite. Enkrateia is
a “mixed state” (EN IV 9 1128b33–34). If this comment is connected
with the previous remark, Aristotle may be implying that acting
through a sense of shame is similar to being enkratic.
Is motivation by shame a necessary stage in young people’s education
independent of and before they have any thought? Recall that virtue of
character is objectively good, according to Aristotle. If shame is prop-
erly based on doing actions one objectively should, it will rely on
thought. If it is not properly based, it will be almost as unreliable as
mere fear in encouraging virtuous conduct. Only in the first case will it
lead to virtue, in the case where feeling and thinking are developing
together.32
On the view that even the good person has prospective shame, it
seems as if the good person is attracted to bad actions which he needs to
withstand, but that makes the good person indistinguishable from an
enkratic, a nonvirtuous person. I conclude that shame does not consti-
tute an important and independent feeling stage on the way to being
good.
In conclusion, there are not two stages in becoming virtuous, one of
feeling without any thought – and that includes shame – and then one
of reason. Thinking and feeling develop together, and so the good
31
For example, Taylor (2006, 236).
32
I take it that Jimenez’s view, where shame tracks what is objectively good, to
kalon, is therefore ultimately consistent with my own (Jimenez in press).
person’s prohairesis combines thought and feeling. She has both virtue
of character and thoughtfulness.
This view also solves the much-discussed problem about how to
reconcile EN VI 9 1142b31–33, where Aristotle seems to be saying
that deliberation is about means whereas phronēsis is about the end,
with EN VI 13 1145a5–6, where Aristotle says that phronēsis is about
means, whereas ethical virtue is about the end.33 The first passage is
emphasized by Kantian style interpreters of Aristotle, whereas
the second passage is emphasized by Humean style interpreters. In the
first passage, Aristotle is contrasting thoughtfulness and deliberation.
He says that “if it is the mark of people who have thoughtfulness to
have deliberated well, good deliberation would be correctness with
respect to the advantageous in relation to the goal, of which thought-
fulness is the true grasp.”34 In the second, he is contrasting thoughtful-
ness and ethical virtue: “It <virtue> makes us achieve the goal, whereas
<thoughtfulness> makes us achieve the things that promote the goal.”
On my view, the two passages are compatible: Aristotle’s point is that
good deliberation presupposes thoughtfulness and thoughtfulness pre-
supposes the emotional side to ethical virtue. Virtue of character and
thoughtfulness requires each other (EN VI 13 1144b30–45a2).
33
The second passage is discussed in detail by Moss (2011) and Coope (2012).
Moss (2012, 153–198) and (2014) discusses the first as independent of
the second. This is the main disagreement we have with each other.
34
Translating the passage so that “the advantageous in relation to the goal” is
what phronēsis is the grasp of is grammatically possible, but implausible. See
Irwin (1999, 249).

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3 Developing Thought and Feeling

How to become a good person is a notorious crux of Aristotelian

as described in the Magna Moralia,2 but an integrated process, by

3.1 What Is Habituation? A Preliminary Discussion

a virtuous character one must develop a disposition (hexis) to be well

3.2 The Dispute between Kosman and Joachim

anger to striking out at, in no accidental way” (Kosman 1980, 109) –

3.3 Acting with Feeling in Situations Characterized

feelings and action and thinking needs to be spelled out in order to

3.4 Becoming Good

and particular virtues of thought. (I leave the discussion of the role of

meshes with the Aristotelian particular virtue of justice concerning fair

Thoughtfulness grows as the feelings are cultivated in relation to

3.5 Oneself, Others, and the Polis

Sympathetic consideration is therefore fully developed when used in

I have suggested, together they are essential to statecraft. The ancient

3.6 Becoming Bad

We have seen that in congenial circumstances, the learner will receive

3.6.1 A Digression on Character and Voluntary Action

would be “ignorant of the universal” (what virtuous people in general

The argument of the ﬁrst paragraph of the chapter is notoriously

Aristotle’s anti-Socratic theses that virtuous and vicious actions, and

This makes a difference to whether someone’s ethical dispositions

3.6.2 The Condition of Women and Slaves

3.7 Becoming Half-Bad and the Example of Neoptolemus

bad inﬂuence. However, it is also possible to recover from such akrasia,

3.8 How Important is Shame as a Stage in Moral

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