De castro vs JBC

FACTS:
The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some
argue that the disputed constitutional provisions – Article VII, Section 15 and
Article VIII, Section 4(1) – are clear and speak for themselves on what the
Constitution covers in banning appointments during the election period.23 One
even posits that there is no conflict because both provisions can be given effect
without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other,24 although the
effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favor of a deferment
for the incoming President’s action. Still others, repeating their original arguments,
appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point.
Issues:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII of the Phil Consti. does not lead to an
interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight
appointments
RULING:
The court denies the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the
matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by
the decision of March 17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some
matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela
ruling,
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are
resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the
incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to
appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any

unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter

Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018 (MR)

FACTS:

The OSG filed a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto
to declare void Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC)
for failing to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC which disqualifies her
from being a candidate for the said position. The petitioner argues that since
Respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven
integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo
warranto. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the Chief Justice may only
be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

By its plain language, does Section 2 of Article XI preclude a quo warranto action
questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office?

RULING:

No. Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo warranto action questioning an

impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. These qualifications include
age, citizenship and professional experience - matters which are manifestly outside
the purview of impeachment under the above-cited provision.
Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

ISSUE:

Being on leave from UP, is CJ Sereno "serving in an honorary capacity" and thus
exempted from the SALN constitutionally-mandated requirement pursuant to Sec.
8 of R.A. 6713?

RULING

No. Respondent’s claim for exception on the argument that for the periods she was
on official leave from U.P., she did not receive any pay is inaccurate. The fact that
respondent did not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make
her government worker "serving in an honorary capacity" to be exempted from the
SALN laws. She did not receive pay not because she was serving in an honorary
capacity, but for the simple reason that she did not render any service for said
period. Fundamental is the rule that workers who were not required to work are
not, by law, entitled to any compensation.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA  vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A.

SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., 

G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014 733 SCRA

279

FACTS:

The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of
Associate Justice Roberto Abad and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce
an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in
the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed. However, he received calls from
some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking
unanimity rule against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself
available" before the JBC which he would be informed of the objections to his
integrity. Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition praying that the Court, in
the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, to issue an
order.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information

which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he
would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request
was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to
compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ
Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist of

nominees submitted to the president.

RULING:

The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:

1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule

10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for the
government.

2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading

fall within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would have
warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was not afforded due
process in its application.

3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial
posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nominees to the
 President. The sui generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a
blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-010.

4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the
JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity
nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.

With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have
been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court
intend to strike down the "unanimity rule" as it reflects the JBC’s policy and,
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment
that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe
the minimum requirements of due process.

Aguinaldo vs. Aquino

G.R. No. 224302

Nov. 29, 2016

Facts: This case is about the alleged failure of President Aquino to appoint any
nominees for the 10th Sandigan Bayan Associate Justice submitted by the JBC. The
petitioners put the name of President Aquino as respondent in their petition.

The OSG contends that the name of the President should not be made a respondent
because of his immunity from suit.

Issue: If the President committed grave abuse of discretion, can he be named as

respondent in a petition for certiorari.

Held: No, the president cannot be named as a respondent in a petition for certiorari
even if he committed grave abuse of discretion. In Lozada vs Arroyo, the court
contends that “the immunity from suit of the president remains preserved…, even
though not expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution.” And in Soliven vs
Makasiar, the court ruled that “ the President is granted the privilege of immunity
from suit to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or obstruction…” In this case, the Court “finds it proper to drop
President Aquino as respondent taking into account that when this petition was
filed on May 17, 2016, he was still then the incumbent President who enjoyed
immunity from suit,” despite his grave abuse of discretion.

DOUGLAS R. VILLAVERT
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, et. al.
G.R. No. 133715
February 13, 2000

Judicial Power

FACTS:

An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales &
Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer
recommended the dismissal of the case. However, Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas
issued a Memorandum finding Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27
of RA 6770.

ISSUE:

May decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed to the

Supreme Court?

RULING:

No. Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared
violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the
Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v.
Ombudsman.
Fortich vs. Corona

G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of

Sumilao, Bukidnon), NQSR Management and Development Corporation

Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato Corona, Agrarian Reform

Secretary Ernesto Garilao

Summary:

The subject of the controversy is an agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidnon,

measuring 144 hectares. The municipality of Sumilao wanted to convert this into
an agro-industrial land. In its Order dated March 29, 1996, Office of the President
acceded to this conversion, and converted the whole 144 hectares to agro-industrial
land in order to attract investors. This order became final and executory. Feeling
aggrieve, farmers commenced a hunger-strike in protest of this ruling. The OP
wanted to appease the farmers, hence, they issued a new resolution. They said that
only 44 hectares will be converted into agro-industrial land and that the remaining
100 hectares will be distributed to the farmers. The respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration, but there was “no result” because the justices voted 2-2 in
resolving such MR. Now, the respondents wanted to refer the case to the Supreme
Court en banc. The Supreme Court said that the resolution of the MR cannot be
referred to the Court en banc. It based its reasoning on Article 8, Sec. 4 (3) of the
Constitution. From that certain paragraph, the Court differentiated CASES from
MATTERS. CASES are to be DECIDED, while MATTERS are to be
RESOLVED. An example of a MATTER is a motion for reconsideration, such as
the one in this case. Only CASES which do not obtain the required number of
votes are required to be elevated en banc. On the other hand, as regards
MATTERS, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case undecided. If there is a tie in resolving a matter, the
earlier decision of the Court is upheld.

RESOLUTION

(We will learn the difference between “Decision” and “Resolution” in this case.
This case is a “Resolution”, just in case sir asks :D )

Facts:

 Background facts:
 On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike
in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City.
They protested the decision of the Office of the President (OP) dated March
29, 1996which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. Note that this decision
already became final and executory.
o The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by
NQSRMDC (Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and
Development Corp). It was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del
Monte.
o The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in
the property, and enacted an ordinance converting the said land to
industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors in order to
achieve economic vitality.
o Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department
of Agrarian Reform. The DAR rejected the land conversion and
instead opted to put the same under CARP and ordered the
distribution of the property to the farmers.
o The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decisionreversing the
DAR and converting the land to agro-indusrial area, which became
the subject of the strike of the farmers.
o The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some
presidential candidates tried to intervene for their “cause”.
  These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec.Corona, to issue the
so-called “Win-Win” Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision
(see decision dated March 29, 1996) after it had already become final and
executory.
o It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area
only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the
remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
 The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich
and company and declared that the “Win-Win” Resolution is VOID and of
no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 resolution of the OP
already became final and executory.
 ALERT – This is where the issue relevant to our topic arose: Aggrieved,
respondents Corona and Garilaofiled [separate] motions for
reconsideration for the said ruling (separate MRs perorinesolveng Court
through one resolution).
o The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-
TWO on the separate MRs filed by Corona and Garilao assailing the
April 24, 1998 Decision.
 Hence, this motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred to the
Court en banc.They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for
reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a
vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not
met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this
Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of
at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the Court sitting en banc.

Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court (the

resolution addressing the MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should be referred to
the Court en banc – NO.
Ratio:

 A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the

intention of the framers to draw a distinction between CASES and
MATTERS.
o CASES are “decided”.
o MATTERS, which include motions, are “resolved”.
 Otherwise put, the word “decided” must refer to “cases”; while the word
“resolved” must refer to “matters”, applying the rule of
reddendosingulasingulis.
o This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article
VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution
where these words appear.
 With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained.
 Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three
votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of
“case” and not “matter”.
 The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains
to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there
is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the
Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division
and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of
the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does
not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must
stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster
the necessary vote for its reconsideration.
 Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration
is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
 Respondents further argue that the issues submitted in their separate
motions for reconsideration are of first impression. They are arguing that the
local government unit concerned still needs to obtain the approval of DAR
 when converting land. However, this was rebutted in the resolution dated
November 17, wherein it was expressed that:
o “Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are
matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court
en banc. In the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain
the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.”
o The Court voted uninamously in that case, hence, the argument of the
petitioners that their MRs are motions involving first impression is
flawed.
 Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration is generally prohibited,
unless there is a showing of extraordinary persuasive reasons and a leave of
court is filed. In this case, there was none.
 Remember that the Court, in its Decision, upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling
of the OP because it was already final and executory thus the Win-Win
resolution cannot be implemented anymore? Well, because of this, there
was a litany of protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors
including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment
was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case
was “disposed of on a mere technicality”.
o The Court however said that it was not a “mere technicality” because
the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on
the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property.
 Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors have
standing to intervene in this case. The Court said there was none, because
the source of their “standing to file” is the “Win-Win Resolution” (note that
in that resolution, pinamigayngayunglupasamga farmers, ngayon,
meronsilang Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). Dahil dun, nag
intervene sila).
o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors who
derived their rights from the Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the
CLOA to them does not grant them the requisite standing in view of
the nullity of the “Win-Win” Resolution. No legal rights can emanate
from a resolution that is null and void.
 Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner,
  vs.
 Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003

 07/08/2019 | De Jure vs De Facto | Constitutional Law 1| Section 1-B


 Facts:
 This case is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Sandiganbayan resolution dismissing petitioner’s amended complaint and
ordering the return of the items confiscated belonging to Elizabeth
Dimaano.

 Following President Cory Aquino’s assumption to office, she issued E.O.
No.1, which gave birth to the PCGG, or the Presidential Commission on
Good Government. The PCGG was primarily tasked with recovering and re-
distributing the ill-gotten wealth of President Ferdinand Marcos along with
that of his family, subordinates, associates, etc. E.O. No.1 reinforced
PCGG’s purpose by giving them several powers and responsibilities; (1)” to
conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry
out the purposes of this order", and (2) “the power to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order."
 The PCGG then decided to construct an AFP Anti-Graft Board, whose
purpose was to investigate and resolve issues of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices detected by this board, by active or retired personnel.

 On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendations on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, who was
the Commanding General of the AFP during Marcos’ regime. Dimaano is
described as Ramas’ mistress, with no visible source of income.

 The items found after several investigations and a raid led by the
Constabulary searching for illegal firearms and ammunition included
numerous assets such as Military equipment, Jewelry, and cash in the
amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 at Dimaano’s house. The AFP Board
discovered several other assets including a house and lot located in Quezon
City, worth at least ₱700,000.00, as well as a house and lot in Cebu City
with an area of 3,327 square meters. The sum of the unexplained wealth and
assets are estimated to be around ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

 After concluding the findings, The AFP Board then recommended that
General Ramas and Dimaano be prosecuted by Sandiganbayan. The case
mounted against Ramas was a violation of RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as well as RA 1379, also known as the Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. The Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez then filed a complaint against Ramas and Dimaano.
 After receiving the case, Sandiganbayan dismissed it on the grounds of a
lack of merit.
 The grounds for Sandiganbayan’s dismissal were the following: (1) the
PCGG had no jurisdiction over the respondents, and thus had no power to
 investigate Ramas and Dimaano, and (2) The conduct of the Constabulary’s
search and seizure was unjust and illegal.

 Petitioner then appealed before the Supreme Court, stressing that the
conduct of the search and seizure was a product of an act made by a
revolutionary government bound by no constitutional limitation. It is worth
noting that Petitioners argued that during the interregnum, which is
identified as the period where normal government is suspended, especially
between successive regimes, The exclusionary right from illegal search and
seizure granted to Ramas and Dimaano by the Bill of Rights was not in
effect.

 Issues:
 Whether or not the assets confiscated from the house of Dimaano were
seized illegally and are thereby inadmissible as evidence against
Respondents.


 Held:
 Yes. Though the Bill of Rights were inoperative during the
Interregnum, the Revolutionary Government still operated as a Government
paying heed to treaty obligations provided by the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights as (ICCPR) as well as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR). The Revolutionary Government, which was in
fact a De Jure Government, assumed under International Law, assumed
 responsibility for the compliance of the state with Good Faith with the
Covenant, to which the Philippines is a signatory and a part of.
 Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1 and 2) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor is he to be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his property.”

 The illegality of the search conducted in Dimaano’s house lies in the details
of the warrant prescribed to the Constabulary. The raid insured the
confiscation of items other than “Illegal Firearms and Ammunition”. The
items excluded from the list were confiscated by the raiders on their own
authority.
 The court then held the following: The seizure of these items was therefore
void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they
must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these
items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis
to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that
these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano, so ordered.

#7 CANLAS et al vs NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

GR No. 182795
June 5, 2008
Facts: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy.
Manggahan, PasigCity. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time
of filing of the petition, or isabout to be demolished pursuant to a court
judgment.Petitioners claim that respondents holdfraudulent and spurious titles.
Thus, the petition for writ of amparo. The rule on writ of amparo isa remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatenedwith violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a privateindividual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings
or disappearances.

Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.

Held: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners.
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court
is not included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. Their claim to
their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory
judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. 
There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. Also, the
factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged at
all in the petition.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is

intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his
or her right to life, liberty and security.  The Court will not spare any time or effort
on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature.  However, the Court
will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Title : LEO ECHEGARAY vs SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Citation : G.R. No. 132601

January 19, 1999

Ponente : PUNO, J.

Facts :
 The Supreme Court issued a TRO On January 4, 1999, staying the execution
of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day.

The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment
but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue:

Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary

Restraining Order on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality
of judgment has already been rendered .

Held:

No. The respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source
of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of
their decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the
life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no higher right than the right to life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.

G.R. No. 124295            October 23, 2001

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II,
MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his
capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR.,
in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respondents.

FACTS:

 Pursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao

City, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH, filed an
expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the
project. The Special Civil Case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes,
petitioner in this case.
 The government won the expropriation case.
 Because DPWH still owed the lot owners, Judge Fuentes granted the motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy the
unpaid claim. DPWH's counsel, OSG, received its copy of the order only a
month after.
 Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy describing the properties subject of
the levy as 'All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the DPWH depot at
Panacan, Davao City.
 The auction sale pushed through at the DPWH depot in Panacan, Davao
City. Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder.
 Alex Bacquial, together with Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the
auctioned properties. They were prevented by the custodian of the subject
DPWH properties, Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of
the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties were
still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.
 Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a 'break through'
order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The
motion was granted by Judge Fuentes on the same day.
 Armed with the lower court's order, Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the
scrap iron/junk equipment in the depot, including the repairable equipment
within the DPWH depot.
 On the basis of letters from Cong. Garcia of Davao City and Engr. Alejo, the
Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Fuentes and Sheriff
Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an
administrative case against them for the anomalous implementation of the
writ of execution.
 Supreme Court promulgated a decision declaring Sheriff PARALISAN and
directing the office of the Court Administrator to conduct an investigation
 on Judge Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result so warrants. The
OSG was likewise ordered to take appropriate action to recover the value of
the serviceable or repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by
Bacquial.
 Dir. Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended
that petitioner Judge Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged
before the SC with acts unbecoming of a judge.
 Dir. Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with
violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3 (e).
 petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to
dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the
Supreme Court.
 Graft Investigation Officer Trabajo-Daray denied the motion of petitioner.
 Judge Fuentes file this petition alleging the respondent Ombudsman-
Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against
petitioner and he encroached on the power of the SC of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel.

ISSUE: whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge

in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same
acts before the SC

RATIO:

 RA 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

o "Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.-

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of
the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary."
  Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant
to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse
the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
 Art. VIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the CA to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
 Hence, it is the SC that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel
aNd take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the
judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
 Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of government
property and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office,
well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for
lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of
execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in
the course of the judicial action only by the SC That is tasked to supervise
the courts. No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution
or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and
executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.

MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ

221 SCRA 464
Date of Promulgation: April 22, 1993
Ponente: Nocon, J.

Keywords: administrative power; falsification of certificate of service;

administrative and criminal liability; separation of powers; office of the
ombudsman

QuickGuide: Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee

arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer it to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Facts:
- Petitioner (Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the
RTC of Antique) seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman:

(1) The Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to
refer to the Supreme Court (SC) filed by petitioner; and

(2) The Order dated November 22, 1991 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidences.

- Respondent’s (Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office)

allegations:

(1) Petitioner falsified his Certificate of Service dated February 6, 1989, by

certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for
decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1998," when petitioner knew that no
decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision.

(2) Petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of
February and April to August of 1989; and those from January to September
1990.

- Petitioner’s arguments:

(1) He had been granted by the SC an extension of 90 days to decide the

aforementioned cases.

(2) The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite the SC’s
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the
judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the SC.
 (3) The investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the SC's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

Issue/s:
(1) W/N the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for
the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the SC.

(2) If it can (with regard to Issue 1), w/n a referral should be made first to the
SC.
Ruling:
- The instant petition is granted.

- The SC directed the Ombudsman to dismiss the complaint and to refer it to

the SC for appropriate action.

Ratio:
(1) Issue 1: YES.
- There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties.

- A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is:

(1) administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and

inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and

(2) criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.

(2) Issue 2: YES.

- Referral to the SC
o The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to the SC for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to make such a determination.
 o The Ombudsman cannot compel the SC, as one of the three branches
of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on the matter.

- Administrative Power
o Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in
the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk.

o By virtue of the Court’s administrative power, it is only the SC that

can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation.

- Separation of Powers
o In the absence of any administrative action taken against petitioner by
the SC with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel,
in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

o No other branch of government may intrude into the Court’s

administrative power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

- Ombudsman’s Justification
o The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the
powers granted to it by Article XI, section 13 (1) and (2) of the 1987
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the
specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to
the SC over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines
the independence of the judiciary.

- Rationale for SC Referral

 o Administratively, the question before the Court is: Should a judge,
having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide
cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service?

o As the aforementioned question had not yet been raised and resolved
by the SC, it is questionable how the Ombudsman could resolve the
criminal complaint that requires the resolution of the aforementioned
question.
- Joaquin T. Borromeo Vs. Court of Appeals,
- 186 SCRA 1
-
- Facts:
-
- Petitioner, Joaquin Borromeo, filed a complaint for damages and charged
several personnel of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division and Chief
of Judicial Records of the Supreme Court with usurpation of judicial
functions, for allegedly issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional
'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273. This petition is
based on the resolution of the Supreme Court through its Third Division
which disposed of Borromeo's petition which was noted that the motion
merely reiterated the same arguments earlier raised and already passed upon
by the Court and was, therefore without merit.
-
- Issue:
-
- Whether or not a case without merit may be disposed by the Court
through minute resolutions and need to be signed by its members who took
part in the deliberation, considering that the petitioner contends that the
resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not
state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only
by the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void.
-
- Ruling:
-
- Yes, a case without merit may be disposed by the Court through
minute resolutions and need not be signed by its members.
-
- In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional
requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and
law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing
of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, "No
petition for review ... shall be refused due course ...without stating the legal
basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution).
-
- In this case, the Court disposes the case by minute resolution and
decrees them as final and executory, as where it is without merits where it is
clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution
denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court nor do
they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members to
sign all resolutions issued would not only delay the issuance of its
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions
more properly performed by the Clerk of court.
- Dizon v. Lopez
- A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997
- Judgment
- See: Rule 120 Section 1. Judgment; Definition and Form
- Rule 120 Section 6. Promulgation of Judgment
-
-
- FACTS: On April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered against Dizon,
convicting him of falsification of private document. The promulgation of the
judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision
sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on
him. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their
copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his father by turns went to
the court to obtain a copy of the decision,they were not able to do so. To
protect his right, complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration
expressly reserving his right to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of
the decision. The hearing of the motion for reconsideration was scheduled,
but the case was not called as complainant's counsel was told that the
decision had not yet been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant
filed an Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss
the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion,
 complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993, finding
him, Fernando Dizon, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Private Document as sentencing him to imprisonment of two
years, four months and one day to 6 years and payment of fine of Php
5,000.00.
-
- Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a
copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months after the
promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a
violation of Art. VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts
from rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and law on which they are based and Section 15 of the same Art.
VIII, which provides that in all cases, lower courts must render their
decisions within three months from the date of their submission. He alleges
further that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Art. III,
Section 14 of the Constitution and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by
antedating it and including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of PhP
5,000.00.
-
- Complainant filed another motion for reconsideration after receiving a copy
of the full decision of the court. He moved to disqualify respondent from
hearing the motions for reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent
judge responded by voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration
of the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
reraffle.
-
- Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was
promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was
already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it,
she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation.
Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had been read to
complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II,
presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of
the decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant with a
copy of the decision was unintentional.
-
- Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision
 and to a series of personal problems which contributed to this delay in the
release of her decision, to wit:
-
- She has only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court,
making it necessary for her to make use of the Social Worker assigned to her
to type her decisions. During the period January to December 1993, she had
to dispose of 285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big
number of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well as special
proceedings filed in her court which required the holding of hearings in the
mornings and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through
some personal tragedies. She lost her niece, whom she had raised from
childhood, due to a hospital accident.
-
- This was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, who had
been under respondents care for the past eight years after suffering a stroke.
On September 17, 1993, respondents father died of diabetes, renal failure,
pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one who singlehandedly
brought them in and out of the hospital because all her ablebodied relatives
are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and
hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from
September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in addition to her other leaves of
absence. Aside from these, respondent's family suffered financial reverses
because of estafa committed against them.
-
- Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding
the charge of violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called
attention to the written decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered
to complainant late, nonetheless states the facts and law on which it is based.
He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct and falsification to be
without basis in view of the absence of malice.
-
- However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be well founded on the basis
of respondent's failure to furnish complainant or his counsel a copy of the
decision within a reasonable time after its promulgation. Hence, the Deputy
Court Administrator believes that Judge Lopez should be given admonition
for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her for
violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be
dismissed for lack of merit.
-
- ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed a violation of the
law by reading only the dispositive portion during promulgation of the
judgment without serving a copy of the decision to the accused
-
- HELD: Yes.
-
- The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, Section 15 of the
Constitution which provides:
-
- All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty four months from date of submission for
the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower
courts.
-
- Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of
the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive
portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the
text of her decision, containing her findings and discussion of complainants
liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form by
incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the fact is that it took a year
and eight months more before this was done and a copy of the complete
decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994.
-
- Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
-
- 1. Judgment defined. The term judgment as used in this Rule means the
adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the
offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability
provided for by law on the accused.
-
- 2. Form and contents of judgment. The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed
by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based.
-
- 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading the
same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it
 was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When
the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
-
- It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the
accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating
the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this was done
only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was
served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her
decision within three months as required by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.
-
- If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in
open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the decision
allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent
judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do so.
Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a
series of personal and other problems which leads the Court to believe that
when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the preparation of
the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension of
time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she
had finished it.
-
- What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin
perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in
support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment.
That is why, in answer to complainant's charge that the dispositive portion of
the judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the
addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no such
fine had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As
respondent judge states, because the decision was not complete it could be
modified.
-
- Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on
April 22, 1993 was a sin perjuicio judgment which was incomplete and
needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was based.
However, the Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of
rendering sin perjuicio judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed
because of the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when the
 decision is finally rendered. The Court has expressed approval of the
practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their
opinions until the very last moment of promulgation of their judgment in
order to prevent leakage, but that refers to the preparation of their decision,
not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete
decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a
secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment.
-
- The respondent was REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of
the same acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.
-
- RATIO: Rule 120 Section 1. Judgment; Definition and Form. Judgment is
the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil
liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly
and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based.
-
- Rule 120 Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the court in which it is rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
-
- If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon
request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating
the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to
approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and
resolved by the appellate court.
-
- The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present
at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia
because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be
 served at his last known address.
-
- In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.
-
- If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He
shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if
he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
- JUDGE JOSE CAOIBES (petitioner)
- vs.
- THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN AND JUDGE
- and JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES
- G.R. No. 132177 July 19, 2001
- Case Digest
-
- Facts: 
- Alumbres and Caoibes were both RTC Judges stationed in Las Pinas City.
The two were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of
office furniture.

On May 23, 1997, Judge Alumbres (respondent) filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious
mischief for the destruction of complainant’s eyeglasses, and assault upon a
person in authority. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the
Sandiganbayan against Judge Caoibes.

On June 13, 1997, Judge Alumbres also lodged an administrative case with
the SC praying for the dismissal of Judge Caoibes from the judiciary on the
ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer.

The Office of the Ombudsman required Judge Caoibes (petitioner) to file a

counter-affidavit but instead of filing a counter-affidavit, he filed on an "Ex-
 Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the
Office of the Ombudsman hold or defer its investigation of the case, and
refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case.
- The petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has
the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective
culpability of petitioner and respondent, both being members of the bench,
are under its exclusive supervision and control.

The Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion thereafter stating that it is
within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges.

Issue:

- Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case
No. OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.
-
- Held:

Yes. The Supreme court held that the Ombudsman is duty bound to have all
cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the
Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is
involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court.
- Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter.
- Dayot vs. judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1282, march 1, 2001
-
-
- SOFRONIO DAYOT, complainant, vs. JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, CALAVATRA - TOBOSO,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent.
-
- DECISION
-
- GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
-
- Complainant Sofronio Dayot was accused of the crime of Grave Slander
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5072-T. He was convicted by
respondent Judge Rodolfo Garcia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Calavatra, Negros Occidental and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months of arresto
mayor and to pay the offended party the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of suit. The Regional
Trial Court affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty to three (3)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of
prision correccional as maximum. The award of moral damages was
likewise increased to P10,000.00. Complainant filed a petition for review,
but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Motion for
Reconsideration therefrom was likewise denied. The case was elevated to
this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as
G.R. No. 132446. The Court’s Second Division, in its Resolution dated
March 11, 1998, denied due course to the petition. Herein complainant filed
on April 17, 1998 a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Resolution.
While this motion was pending, respondent judge issued a warrant for the
arrest of herein complainant and ordered his detention in the Order dated
May 4, 1998. On July 6, 1998, this Court resolved to deny the motion with
finality.
-
- In the present case, Complainant alleges that respondent judge committed
misconduct of office, abuse of authority and oppression when he issued the
warrant of arrest and ordered complainant's detention despite the pendency
of a motion for reconsideration as this Court had yet to resolve the petition
with finality; that he filed a motion to lift the arrest warrant but up to this
time the same remained unacted upon; that respondent Judge further issued
an Order discrediting his service of sentence from May 6, 1998 up to
November 6, 1998, the date of the order, after considering that his service of
sentence was made outside the prison cell.
-
- In the Resolution dated June 14, 2000, the parties were required to manifest
if they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already
filed and submitted. Both parties submitted their respective “Manifestation
with Additional Records.”
-
- The Court Administrator, in his Memorandum, recommended that
respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 upon finding that
respondent Judge issued the Order dated November 6, 1998 (which declared
that the service of sentence from May 6, 1998 to November 6, 1998 be not
credited as service by herein complainant) without a hearing or notice to the
accused and/or his counsel.
-
- We find the recommendation of the Court Administrator to be well-taken.
-
- Complainant charges respondent Judge with misconduct of office, abuse of
authority and oppression when he issued the warrant of arrest and ordered
complainant's detention despite the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 132446 before this Court. It should be noted
that complainant filed a Manifestation in G.R. No. 132446 reiterating the
fact that a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge despite the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration but the said Manifestation was
merely noted without action in view of the fact that the petition for review
on certiorari had already been denied for lack of merit and the motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied with finality per SC Resolution dated
October 12, 1998 (Annex “A”). As to whether there was error on the part of
the respondent Judge in ordering the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
complainant addressed this matter in the Motion to Lift the said warrant of
arrest which he filed with the respondent Judge, wherein complainant argued
that the petition before this Court is still pending. This motion was however
denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated June 25, 1998. Whether the
respondent Judge correctly denied the motion is a judicial matter which is
not a proper subject in an administrative proceeding. Consequently,
complainant’s charge that respondent Judge failed to act on the Motion to
Lift the arrest warrant is untenable as he had issued an Order on June 25,
1998 denying the said motion.
-
- With regard to the allegation that complainant was denied his right to be
heard, it appears that the subject Order dated November 6, 1998 was issued
upon “oral complaint of the mother of the offended party that accused-
convict Sofronio Dayot is serving his one (1) year term of imprisonment x x
x not inside the prison cell.” It appears that thereafter respondent Judge
issued an order which decreed that such service of sentence be not credited
as service by herein complainant. It is not disputed that the said order was
issued without a hearing or notice to the accused or his counsel. As
 correctly pointed out by the Court Administrator, respondent Judge may
have been prompted by his desire to get rid of corruption and special
treatment extended to some prisoners, but that is not a license for him to
abuse his judicial discretion by depriving the accused of his right to be
heard. If indeed complainant was getting special treatment, being provided
with special sleeping quarters in the third floor of the municipal building
instead of serving sentence inside the jail, this matter is essentially the
responsibility of the Jail Warden and the sanction imposed upon the accused
should be given only upon due hearing. While a judge may not always be
subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he
renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives (De Vera vs. Dames II,
310 SCRA 213). The issuance of the Order of November 6, 1998 without
the benefit of a hearing is a clear evidence of the judge’s failure to
understand the limitations of his power and betrays his ignorance of the
cardinal principles of due process (Macasasa vs. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385).
By unilaterally discrediting the period served outside the jail without giving
complainant a chance to be heard, respondent Judge failed to observe the
requirements of due process.
-
- WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Court Administrator, respondent
Judge is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos,
with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely by this Court.
-
- SO ORDERED.

Executive Department cases

Estrada v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

FACTS: 
During the May 1998 election, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term,
however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity.

On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a long time friend of the petitioner,
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signedby 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of
all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote
of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets
of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the
Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau
chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day,
petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day,
he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and
Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.

Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings
in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question.
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of
Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section
II of Article VII.  The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from
suit.  They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity.  As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that
“it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II.  EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government.  EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President.  EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and
the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.  EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions.

SECOND ISSUE

Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
a.) The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
b.) The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes,
as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
c.) During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
transition period.
d.) His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.  In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.  Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.  Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion
of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.  Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.  The press
release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.
THIRD ISSUE

The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII:

“Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions.”
Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of
Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75  which states:  
“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION
AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.”
The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: 
“RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.  Even if petitioner
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH ISSUE

The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s
argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.  The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency.  On February
7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court
is Functus Officio.”  Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted.  The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution.  The debates
in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from
suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the
petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in
the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.  The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such
but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
FIFTH ISSUE

Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial
to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-
day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of
the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the
trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. 

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS:
President Aquino issued EO No. 284, which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
It was assailed for it violates the Constitution. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 284
on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in
the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an executive order allowing members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices in addition to their primary positions is valid.

HELD:
Invalid. In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.