Batch 1

[G.R. No. 136368. January 16, 2002.
JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C.

Tan, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A.
MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998
1 and its Resolution dated November 9, 1998 2 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP-41738. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The facts are as stated in the impugned Decision, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Involved in this case is a parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 645-C, with an area of
34,829 square meters, more or less, situated in Bunawan, Davao City. The lot was once
covered by TCT No. T-72067 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City in the name of the
late Jaime C. Tan (Tan, for short) married to Praxedes V. Tan.
From the petition, the motion to dismiss petition, their respective annexes and other
pleadings, we gather the following factual antecedents: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of

absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and
Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting
parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within
which to redeem or repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to
redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan’s heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit
against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. Docketed as CIVIL CASE NO.
19049-88, the complaint alleged that, while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their
agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable
mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint was stamped ‘received,’ the Magdangals were able to
have Tan’s title over the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No.
T-134470. This development prompted the heirs of Tan, who were to be later
substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint.
The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is that
on June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered
judgment finding for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff therein. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits B,: B-1) is, in accordance with the true intention
of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;
2. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this
decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the
date the complaint was filed, until paid;
3. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits and to fully give effect to the true intention of
the parties, upon the payment of the aforesaid amount, TCT No. T-134470 in the name
of defendants Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal (Exh. 13) and shall be deemed
canceled and null and void and TCT No. T-72067 in the name of Jaime C. Tan and
Praxedes Valles Tan (Exh. A) be reinstated.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Annex `B’, Petition; Emphasis added).’
From the above, the Magdangals appealed to this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657.
In a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, this Court, thru its then Special
Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower court. Copy of this
affirmatory judgment was each received by the Magdangals and Tan, Jr. on October 5,
1995.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of this Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment
the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment
which, on its face, stated that the said Decision ‘has on October 21, 1995 become final
and executory’ (Annex ‘L’, Petition; Emphasis added).
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR
CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION, therein alleging that they did not appeal
from the aforesaid decision of this Court, adding ‘[T]hat the appealed judgment of the
Court of Appeals has become final and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995 or up
to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days redemption period commences. And noting
that the redemption period has expired without Tan, Jr. exercising his option, the
Magdangals thus prayed that the title ìn the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Tan
be consolidated and confirmed in the name of the (Magdangals) . . . and pending such
issuance, a writ of possession be ordered issued (Annex "C", Petition).
In opposition to this motion (Annex ‘F’, Petition), Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things,
that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy
thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this case
cannot be considered final and executory. Pressing the point, Tan, Jr., citing Cueto v.
Collantes, infra, would then assert that the period of redemption on his part
commenced to run from receipt of entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657.
Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution dated March 27, 1996, which he filed
directly with this court, prayed this court to direct the court a quo to issue the
corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88. In a related move, Tan, Jr.
filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION therein advising the court a
quo of his intention to redeem the property in question and of the fact that, on such
date, he has deposited with its clerk of court the repurchase price, plus interest, as
required by its original decision. By way of relief, Tan, Jr. prayed that the Magdangals
be ordered to claim the amount thus deposited and the Register of Deeds of Davao
City, to reinstate the title of Jaime Tan and Praxedes Tan. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF

POSSESSION of the Magdangals (Annex ‘C’, Petition), MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of
Tan, Jr. (Annex ‘I’, Petition), the court a quo presided by the respondent judge, came
out with the first challenged order of June 10, 1996 (Annex ‘N’, Petition), dispositively
reading, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
`WHEREFORE, . . . the Motion for Consolidation and a Writ of Possession is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit.
The deposit of the amount of P16,032.00 made by plaintiff with the Office of the Clerk
of Court . . . on April 17, 1996 is hereby considered full payment of the redemption
price and the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to deliver said amount to herein
defendants.
The Register of Deeds of Davao City . . . is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. T-134470
in the name of Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal and, thereafter, to reinstate TCT
No. 72067 in the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Valles Tan and to submit her
compliance thereto within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.’
Explaining her action, the respondent judge wrote in the same order: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
`Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cueto v. Collantes, Et Al., 97 Phil. 325,
the 120 days period for plaintiff to pay the amount of P59,200.00 plus interest . . .
should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment . . . which was March 13, 1996.
The plaintiff made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well within the 120-day period mandated
by the decision of this Court.’
In due time, the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration. However, in her next
assailed order of July 24, 1996 (Annex ‘R", Petition), the respondent judge denied the
motion for being pro-forma and fatally defective." 3
Petitioner assails the aforequoted Decision as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. Petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals rendered a
judgment on the merits of private respondents’ petition without granting to petitioner
the opportunity to controvert the same.
II. Appeal not certiorari was the appropriate remedy of private respondents as there

was no grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial judge. Neither is delay in resolving the main case a ground for giving
due course to the petition. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
III. Cueto v. Collantes, 97 Phil. 325, was disregarded by the Court of Appeals in
resolving the petition of private respondents. It is still good case law and was in effect
made a part of section 2 of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Foreclosure
of Mortgage.
IV. The St. Dominic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 242 case is not
applicable to the case at bar; on the other hand the ruling in Gutierrez Hermanos v. de
La Riva, 46 Phil. 827, applies.
V. Equity considerations justify giving due course to this petition." 4 (Emphasis ours)
We will immediately resolve the key issue of what rule should govern the finality of
judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner.
The operative facts show that in its Decision of June 4, 1991, the trial court held that:
(1) the contract between the parties is not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage;
and (2) petitioner Tan should pay to the respondents Magdangal "within 120 days after
the finality of this decision P59,200.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid." 5
On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657, the Special Third Division of the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Both parties received
the decision of the appellate court on October 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of
court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its
face, stated that the said decision "has on October 21, 1995 become final and
executory." 6
The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of
Possession. 7 They alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has
expired. They reckoned that the said period began 15 days after October 5, 1995, the
date when the finality of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate
court commenced to run.
On the other hand, petitioner filed on March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in the
appellate court praying that it "direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88." 8 On April 17, 1996, petitioner deposited with
the clerk of court the repurchase price of the lot plus interest as ordered by the
decision.
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It
ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of
Judgment in the appellate court or from March 13, 1996. 9 The redemption price was
deposited on April 17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the ruling of
the trial court.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of
judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. — If no appeal or motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or
final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be
deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such
judgment or final resolution has become final and executory. (2a, R36)
Sec. 11. Execution of judgment. — Except where the judgment or final order or
resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for
its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall be accompanied by
a certified true copy of the entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to any
appropriate officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court
of Appeals at a time that it is in possession of the original record or the record on
appeal, the resolution granting such motion shall be transmitted to the lower court from
which the case originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment or final
order to be executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue the proper writ
for its enforcement." cralaw virtua1aw library
This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto v. Collantes as follows: 10
"The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of the lower court that
plaintiff can still exercise his right of redemption notwithstanding the expiration of the
90-day period fixed in the original decision and, therefore, defendants should execute
the deed of reconveyance required in said decision. Appellants contend that, the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals having been entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-day
period for the exercise of the right of redemption has long expired, it appearing that
plaintiff deposited the redemption money with the clerk of court only on October 17,
1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days. Appellee brands this computation as
erroneous, or one not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules of
court.
Appellee’s contention should be sustained. The original decision provides that appellee
may exercise his right of redemption within the period of 90 days from the date the
judgment has become final. It should be noted that appellee had appealed from this
decision. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals and final judgment was
entered on July 8, 1953. Does this mean that the judgment became final on that date?
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
chanrob1es
Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification. Once a decision is rendered
by the Court of Appeals a party may appeal therefrom by certiorari by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition within 10 days from the date of entry of such decision
(Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of judgment is made after it has become final, i.e.,
upon the expiration of 15 days after notice thereof to the parties (Section 8, Rule 53, as
modified by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1945). But, as Chief
Justice Moran has said, ‘such finality . . . is subject to the aggrieved party’s right of
filing a petition for certiorari under this section,’ which means that ‘the Court of Appeals
shall remand the case to the lower court for the execution of its judgment, only after
the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of such judgment, if no petition
for certiorari is filed within that period.’ (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., p. 950) It would therefore appear that the date of entry of judgment of the
Court of Appeals is suspended when a petition for review is filed to await the final entry
of the resolution or decision of the Supreme Court.
Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for review within the
reglementary period, which was dismissed by resolution of July 6, 1953, and for lack of
a motion for reconsideration the entry of final judgment was made on August 7, 1953,
it follows that the 90-day period within which appellee may exercise his right of
redemption should be counted from said date, August 7, 1953. And appellee having
exercised such right on October 17, 1953 by depositing the redemption money with the
clerk of court, it is likewise clear that the motion be filed for the exercise of such right is
well taken and is within the purview of the decision of the lower court." 11
On April 18, 1994, this Court issued Circular No. 24-94, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"TO : COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT : RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC APPROVING AND PROMULGATING

THE REVISED PROVISION ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS, SPECIFICALLY IN APPEALED
CASES, AND AMENDING SECTION 1, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases

cannot be promptly enforced because of undue administrative delay in the remand of
the records to the court of origin, aggravated at times by misplacement or misdelivery
of said records. The Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court
has drafted proposals including a provision which can remedy the procedural impasse
created by said contingencies.
Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure, and
to provide a solution to the aforestated problems, the Court Resolved to approve and
promulgate the following section thereof on execution of judgments, amending Section
1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a

matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may
forthwith be applied for in the lower court from which the action originated, on motion
of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof,
with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
This resolution shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall
take effect on June 1, 1994.
April 18, 1994.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA Chief Justice"
The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of
judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a

matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been
duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith
be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case; when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution." cralaw virtua1aw library
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:
12
"1. The term ‘final order’ is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the
issue of appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order
is "final" if it disposes of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order which
leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case (De
la Cruz, Et. Al. v. Paras, Et Al., L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of binding effect
or whether it can be subject of execution, an order is `final’ or executory after the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal and no appeal has been perfected (see Perez, Et.
Al. v. Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30, 1959; cf. Denso [Phil.], Inc. v. IAC, Et Al., G.R. No.
75000, Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla v. CA, Et Al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).
2. On the aspect of appealability, these revised Rules use the adjective ‘final’ with
respect to orders and resolutions, since to terminate a case the trial courts issue orders
while the appellate courts and most of the quasi-judicial agencies issue resolutions.
Judgments are not so qualified since the use of the so-called interlocutory judgments is
not favored in this jurisdiction, while the categorization of an order or a resolution for
purposes of denoting that it is appealable is to distinguish them from interlocutory
orders or resolutions. However, by force of extended usage the phrase `final and
executory judgment’ is sometimes used and tolerated, although the use of èxecutory’
alone would suffice. These observations also apply to the several and separate
judgments contemplated in Rule 36, or partial judgments which totally dispose of a
particular claim or severable part of the case, subject to the power of the court to
suspend or defer action on an appeal from or further proceedings in such special
judgment, or as provided by Rule 35 on the matter of partial summary judgments
which are not considered as appealable (see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the explanation
therein).
The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response to complaints over

the delay caused by the former procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a
judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal, with notice to the parties. As
things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing
party had to wait for the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin when
and where he could then move for the issuance of a writ of execution. The intervening
time could sometimes be substantial, especially if the court a quo is in a remote
province, and could also be availed of by the losing party to delay or thwart actual
execution.cralaw : red
On these considerations, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 24-94, dated April 18,
1994, approving and promulgating in advance this amended Section 1 of Rule 39 and
declaring the same effective as of June 1, 1994.
Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the
judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the
same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without
waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion must be with
notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to
enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters
which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a
bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of
the appellate courts wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable
circumstances, unduly delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion for
execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the records are
still with the appellate court, or even after the same have been remanded to the lower
court, the appellate court can direct the issuance of the writ of execution since such act
is merely in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has the power to require." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed
the subject property within the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the
appellate court’s entry of judgment. The appellate court, however, did not apply the old
rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule
retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general
rule, however, has well-delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo: 13
"9.17. Procedural laws.

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure
by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include
rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide or
regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily
apply to procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is
one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new
obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes
relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract
or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings
pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away
vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions — those which have accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been
held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other
than the existing rules of procedure." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof prescribing that "no
record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal" is procedural in nature and should
therefore be applied retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the question as to whether
an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure of appellant to file
a record on appeal within thirty days as required under the old rules, which question is
pending resolution at the time Batas Bilang 129 took effect, became academic upon the
effectivity of said law because the law no longer requires the filing of a record on appeal
and its retroactive application removed the legal obstacle to giving due course to the
appeal. A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain cases from a court to a
quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to claims that accrued
before its enactment but formulated and filed after it took effect, for it does not create
new nor take away vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the
time it accrued cannot validly try the claim where at the time the claim is formulated
and filed the jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial
tribunal, for even actions pending in one court may be validly taken away and
transferred to another and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by one
particular court.
9.18. Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits
certain exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by
necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or
where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate
circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the
event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural
laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate
problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be
given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a
substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the
decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when
he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing
the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application
of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the
loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square
meters but as petitioner claims, "it is the only property left behind by their father, a
private law practitioner who was felled by an assassin’s bullet." 14
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of
procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The
manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively
if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.
1aw 1ibrary
chanrob1es virtua1
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998 and its
Resolution dated November 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled and set aside.
The Orders dated June 10, 1996 and July 24, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88 are reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19118 January 30, 1965
MARIANO A. ALBERT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., defendant-appellee.
Uy & Artiaga and Antonio M. Molina for plaintiff-appellant.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for defendant-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
No less than three times have the parties here appealed to this Court.
In Albert vs. University Publishing Co., Inc., L-9300, April 18, 1958, we found plaintiff entitled to
damages (for breach of contract) but reduced the amount from P23,000.00 to P15,000.00.
Then in Albert vs. University Publishing Co., Inc., L-15275, October 24, 1960, we held that the
judgment for P15,000.00 which had become final and executory, should be executed to its full
amount, since in fixing it, payment already made had been considered.
Now we are asked whether the judgment may be executed against Jose M. Aruego, supposed
President of University Publishing Co., Inc., as the real defendant.
Fifteen years ago, on September 24, 1949, Mariano A. Albert sued University Publishing Co., Inc.
Plaintiff alleged inter alia that defendant was a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines; that on July 19, 1948, defendant, through Jose M. Aruego, its President,
entered into a contract with plaintifif; that defendant had thereby agreed to pay plaintiff P30,000.00
for the exclusive right to publish his revised Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code and for his
share in previous sales of the book's first edition; that defendant had undertaken to pay in eight
quarterly installments of P3,750.00 starting July 15, 1948; that per contract failure to pay one
installment would render the rest due; and that defendant had failed to pay the second installment.
Defendant admitted plaintiff's allegation of defendant's corporate existence; admitted the execution
and terms of the contract dated July 19, 1948; but alleged that it was plaintiff who breached their
contract by failing to deliver his manuscript. Furthermore, defendant counterclaimed for damages. 1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiff died before trial and Justo R. Albert, his estate's administrator, was substituted for him.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, after trial, rendered decision on April 26, 1954, stating in the
dispositive portion —
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant the University Publishing Co., Inc., ordering the defendant to pay the administrator
Justo R. Albert, the sum of P23,000.00 with legal [rate] of interest from the date of the filing of this
complaint until the whole amount shall have been fully paid. The defendant shall also pay the costs.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.
As aforesaid, we reduced the amount of damages to P15,000.00, to be executed in full. Thereafter,
on July 22, 1961, the court a quo ordered issuance of an execution writ against University Publishing
Co., Inc. Plaintiff, however, on August 10, 1961, petitioned for a writ of execution against Jose M.
Aruego, as the real defendant, stating, "plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff of Manila discovered
that there is no such entity as University Publishing Co., Inc." Plaintiff annexed to his petition a
certification from the securities and Exchange Commission dated July 31, 1961, attesting: "The
records of this Commission do not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC.,
either as a corporation or partnership." "University Publishing Co., Inc." countered by filing, through
counsel (Jose M. Aruego's own law firm), a "manifestation" stating that "Jose M. Aruego is not a
party to this case," and that, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.
Parenthetically, it is not hard to decipher why "University Publishing Co., Inc.," through counsel,
would not want Jose M. Aruego to be considered a party to the present case: should a separate
action be now instituted against Jose M. Aruego, the plaintiff will have to reckon with the statute of
limitations.
The court a quo denied the petition by order of September 9, 1961, and from this, plaintiff has
appealed.
The fact of non-registration of University Publishing Co., Inc. in the Securities and Exchange
Commission has not been disputed. Defendant would only raise the point that "University Publishing
Co., Inc.," and not Jose M. Aruego, is the party defendant; thereby assuming that "University
Publishing Co., Inc." is an existing corporation with an independent juridical personality. Precisely,
however, on account of the non-registration it cannot be considered a corporation, not even a
corporation de facto (Hall vs. Piccio, 86 Phil. 603). It has therefore no personality separate from Jose
M. Aruego; it cannot be sued independently.
The corporation-by-estoppel doctrine has not been invoked. At any rate, the same is inapplicable
here. Aruego represented a non-existent entity and induced not only the plaintiff but even the court
to believe in such representation. He signed the contract as "President" of "University Publishing
Co., Inc.," stating that this was "a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines," and obviously misled plaintiff (Mariano A. Albert) into believing the same. One who has
induced another to act upon his wilful misrepresentation that a corporation was duly organized and
existing under the law, cannot thereafter set up against his victim the principle of corporation by
estoppel (Salvatiera vs. Garlitos, 56 O.G. 3069).
"University Publishing Co., Inc." purported to come to court, answering the complaint and litigating
upon the merits. But as stated, "University Publishing Co., Inc." has no independent personality; it is
just a name. Jose M. Aruego was, in reality, the one who answered and litigated, through his own
law firm as counsel. He was in fact, if not, in name, the defendant.
Even with regard to corporations duly organized and existing under the law, we have in many a case
pierced the veil of corporate fiction to administer the ends of justice. * And in Salvatiera vs.
Garlitos, supra, p. 3073, we ruled: "A person acting or purporting to act on behalf of a corporation
which has no valid existence assumes such privileges and obligations and becomes personally
liable for contracts entered into or for other acts performed as such agent." Had Jose M. Aruego
been named as party defendant instead of, or together with, "University Publishing Co., Inc.," there
would be no room for debate as to his personal liability. Since he was not so named, the matters of
"day in court" and "due process" have arisen.
In this connection, it must be realized that parties to a suit are "persons who have a right to control
the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from a
decision" (67 C.J.S. 887) — and Aruego was, in reality, the person who had and exercised these
rights. Clearly, then, Aruego had his day in court as the real defendant; and due process of law has
been substantially observed.
By "due process of law" we mean " "a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. ... ." (4 Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581.)"; or, as this Court has
said, " "Due process of law" contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, affecting one's person or property" (Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32)." (Sicat
vs. Reyes, L-11023, Dec. 14, 1956.) And it may not be amiss to mention here also that the "due
process" clause of the Constitution is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it
by paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite, but
none the less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 321-322:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which
each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing side
as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
Justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities.
The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as representative of a non-existent
principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the benefits
resulting from it, so much so that partial payments of the consideration were made by him; that he
violated its terms, thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the real
defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice, responsibility under the judgment falls on him.
We need hardly state that should there be persons who under the law are liable to Aruego for
reimbursement or contribution with respect to the payment he makes under the judgment in
question, he may, of course, proceed against them through proper remedial measures.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded
ordering the lower court to hold supplementary proceedings for the purpose of carrying the judgment
into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1653 July 30, 2007

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1498-MTJ)
EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALEZ, Complainant,

vs.
Judge LIZABETH G. TORRES, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong
City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an Administrative Complaint1 filed by Eugenio Juan R. Gonzalez (Gonzalez) against Judge

Lizabeth G. Torres (Judge Torres), Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
60, Mandaluyong City, for the Violations of Section 15, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution and Rules
3.08 and 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 71984
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Revelina R. Limson" pending before said court.
It stemmed from an earlier complaint for perjury filed by Gonzalez against Revelina R. Limson
(Limson) with the Mandaluyong Prosecutor’s Office. After the submission of the necessary pleadings
by the respective parties, the Mandaluyong Prosecutor’s Office recommended the filing of an
information for perjury against Limson. Accordingly, the appropriate information was filed with the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City and was raffled to Branch 60, where it was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 71984. Thereafter, trial ensued.
After Gonzalez rested his case, the defendant Limson, instead of presenting evidence, filed a
Manifestation/Motion to Admit Attached Demurrer to Evidence, which was granted by the court in an
Order dated 18 May 2002. The order also gave Gonzalez ten days within which to file his comment,
which the latter submitted on 14 June 2002. Gonzalez averred that the "Demurrer to Evidence" was
first considered submitted for resolution on 20 June 2002. However, on 26 August 2002, a hearing
was set but the said issue was not resolved. Judge Torres again considered the said matter
submitted for resolution.
In his complaint dated 23 October 2003, Gonzalez charged Judge Torres with delay in resolving
Limson’s Demurrer to Evidence. Gonzalez called the attention of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to the fact that, per the certification dated 21 October 2003 of the Branch Clerk
of Court of MeTC, Branch 60, the issue relating to the "Demurrer to Prosecution Evidence" in
Criminal Case No. 71984 remains unresolved. He prayed that Judge Torres be ordered to inhibit
herself from further taking cognizance of the pending issue and of other matters in connection with
Criminal Case No. 71984.
Through an Indorsement dated 7 November 2003, OCA required Judge Torres to submit her
comment on Gonzalez’s complaint within ten days from receipt of said indorsement. On 3 December
2003, Judge Torres requested for an extension of 20 days within which to file the required comment
which the OCA granted on 15 January 2004.
On 11 March 2004, the OCA sent a 1st Tracer to Judge Torres reminding her of its directive for her
to comment on the allegations in Gonzalez’s administrative complaint. Judge Torres was also
warned that, should she fail to comply within five days from receipt of the 1st Tracer, the matter shall
be submitted to the Court without her comment.
Subsequently, the OCA received a letter dated 5 April 2004 from Judge Torres wherein she
requested a further extension of 20 days from 5 April 2004 to submit her comment, which the OCA
again granted on 21 April 2004. Judge Torres was thus given until 26 April 2004 within which to
submit her comment.
However, on 21 January 2005, the OCA once more received a letter from Judge Torres, requesting
for another extension of 20 days within which to submit her comment on Gonzalez’s administrative
complaint against her. Her request for extension was granted for the third time by the OCA on 26
January 2005.
Judge Torres finally submitted her Comment dated 20 February 2006. In her Comment, she averred
that the record of Criminal Case No. 71984 was rigged and that Gonzalez cited orders that she did
not issue. The hearing dates Gonzalez referred to were without minutes; and those with minutes,
were not signed by legal stenographers, or if they were signed, the signatures were unidentifiable or
were not of the legal stenographers’ signatures on record. Proof of service of the alleged orders she
issued to the adversarial parties was either missing or dubious.
Judge Torres added that the pleadings in Criminal Case No. 71984 were being filed inconsistently.
Some were filed directly at Branch 60, while others were filed at the Office of the Clerk of Court
without record of when the same were purportedly forwarded to her branch. She could not review
the records of Criminal Case No. 71984 as fast as she wanted to because said records were merely
fastened, and the pleadings were not filed chronologically.
She further countered that since 18 May 2002, she had no official intervention in Criminal Case No.
71984. She was constrained to inhibit herself from acting on Limson’s Demurrer to Evidence to
protect the MeTC of Mandaluyong City from being drawn into the real controversy between the
Gonzalezes and their adversaries over the Wack-Wack Apartments.
She expressed offense that the acts alleged by Gonzalez in his administrative complaint made her
appear remiss in her duties. Respondent reasoned that she was acting on inherited cases as
inventoried by the court staff and the records were disorganized. In fact, she claimed that she had
already personally gone to the OCA Legal Staff to explain her predicament.
While admitting that she was not able to quickly comment on the present administrative case, she
invoked her case load and added duties as Executive Judge of MeTC Mandaluyong City, as well as
the four vacancies in her branch (i.e., branch clerk of court, sheriff, legal researcher and
stenographer) as her reasons for the delay.
On 6 July 2006, the OCA submitted its report2 on Gonzalez’s administrative complaint against Judge
Torres, with the following recommendation –
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that
the instant case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and respondent Judge Torres
be FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) and WARNED that further infraction of the Rules
of Court shall be dealt with more severely.
On 23 August 2006, we required3 the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were
willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. On 26 October 2006,
Gonzalez submitted his Manifestation4stating that he was submitting the case for resolution based
on the pleadings filed. Judge Torres, on the other hand, asked for an extension5 of 20 days from 30
October 2006 within which to submit her manifestation, which we granted on 22 November
2006.6 Judge Torres, however, still failed to file her manifestation within the extended period despite
the notice sent to and received by her. Thus, we deemed that Judge Torres had already waived7 her
right to submit supplemental comment/pleadings herein.
Resultantly, the case is submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed, after a review of which,
we find ourselves agreeing in the recommendation of the OCA.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.8
The office of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in
the discharge of official duties.9 Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or
matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date
they are submitted for decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, directs judges to "dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods." Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve
the integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice
more efficient.10 Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to
negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that
have long plagued our courts. Finally, Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics exhort judges
to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before
their courts, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice
delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of
litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits,
he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration
of justice.11
Also relevant herein is Administrative Circular No. 1, dated 28 January 1988, which requires all
magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Article VIII, Section 15 of the
Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
In the case at bar, Limson’s Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 was submitted for
resolution on 20 June 2002. The same was still pending even after Gonzales had filed this
administrative case on 23 October 2003.
Respondent Judge Torres presented several excuses for her delay in resolving the Demurrer to
Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 and in filing her comment to the present administrative case,
among which were her heavy case load, additional duties as Executive Judge of the MeTC of
Mandaluyong City, the vacancies in her branch, and the disorganized record-keeping. These will not
exonerate her.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable, to the
prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice.12
The administrative responsibility for the prompt and speedy disposition of cases rests on the judge’s
shoulders. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. The same Code charges him with the
duty of diligently discharging administrative responsibilities, maintaining professional competence in
court management, and facilitating the performance of the administrative functions of other judges
and court personnel.13
The absence of an efficient record system in her court may not be used by Judge Torres in failing to
resolve the Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984. It is incumbent upon her to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases
and their speedy disposition. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement
of his court personnel since proper and efficient court management is her responsibility. Court
personnel are not the guardians of a judge’s responsibilities. The efficient administration of justice
cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame from one court personnel to another. A judge
should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.14 He
is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. Judges cannot
escape administrative liability by pointing to lapses, absences or negligence of court personnel
under them.15
It must be stressed that the primordial and most important duty of every member of the bench is
decision-making. Furthermore, as administrators of their respective courts, judges have the primary
responsibility of maintaining the professional competences of their staff. Prompt disposition of the
court’s business is attained through proper and efficient court management, and a judge is remiss in
his duty and responsibility as court manager if he fails to adopt a system of record management.16
As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity.
They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional
competence. The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges
can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed in them and the institution they
represent.17
Her failure to decide the case on time cannot be ignored. As we ruled in Española v. Panay,18 if the
case load of the judge prevents the disposition of cases within the reglementary period, again, he
should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to
avoid or dispel any suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on. The Court, cognizant of
the heavy case load of some judges and mindful of the difficulties encountered by them in the
disposition thereof, is almost always disposed to grant such requests on meritorious grounds.19
If it was indeed true that Judge Torres was prevented from the timely disposition of her pending
cases, including Criminal Case No. 71984, by her case load, additional assignments or designations,
lack of personnel, and any other reason, all she had to do was to simply ask this Court for a
reasonable extension of time to dispose of her cases. The records of this administrative matter do
not show that Judge Torres made any attempt to report and request extension of time to resolve the
cases pending before her court. Instead, she preferred to remain silent, kept the cases pending, and
thus clothed the same with suspicion. Obviously, she forgot the character of her office as a public
trust, imposing upon her the highest degree of responsibility, efficiency, as well as transparency.
Judge Torres even stated that she was constrained to inhibit herself from acting on Limson’s
Demurrer to Evidence to protect the MeTC of Mandaluyong City from being drawn into the
controversy between the Gonzalezes and their adversaries over the Wack-Wack Apartments. Such
an excuse is feeble and unacceptable, hardly expected from a judge. First and foremost, it is
precisely Judge Torres’ duty to settle controversies between adversarial parties. Judge Torres
cannot shirk from the responsibility of resolving a case pending before her court because she is
afraid that her court will be dragged into a "controversy." Second, her fear that her court will be
dragged into an even bigger controversy between Gonzalez and other parties involving the Wack-
Wack Apartments is unfounded considering that the MeTC can only take cognizance of the issues
pending before it and over which it has jurisdiction. Third, Judge Torres’ course of action is totally
baseless and irrational. She cannot keep Criminal Case No. 71984 pending before her court, neither
proceeding with it nor dismissing it, for an undetermined period of time or hopefully, perhaps, until
the Wack-Wack Apartments controversy has blown over. And fourth, Judge Torres’ actions, instead
of protecting her court, has actually done more damage to it, raising doubts and suspicions as to its
credibility, impartiality, and independence.
We note that the case left unresolved by Judge Torres is a criminal case. As we previously stressed,
the unjustified delay in the dispensation of justice cuts both ways. On the part of the accused, since
his liberty is at stake, his suffering is unduly prolonged on account of the judge’s failure to promptly
render the judgment of acquittal. On the part of the offended party, the excruciating pain of waiting
for the sentencing of the accused gives the offended party the impression of impropriety that could
diminish his trust in the judicial system.20
Indeed, we have consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires
the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial, which, as defined, is one "[c]onducted
according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays." The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent
the oppression of the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. It is
likewise intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.21
Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious
violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.22
We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case
disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the
lowering of its standards.23 Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong
and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanction on the defaulting judge.24
Finally, this Court takes notice of the fact that respondent judge filed her comment on the present
complaint more than one year from the time the OCA issued a directive25 for her to do so. As a
judge, Judge Torres ought to know that all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his
deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court’s administrative supervision of trial courts and their
personnel, hence, said directives should be respected. Directives issued by the OCA should not be
construed as mere requests, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Failure to
comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for a lawful
order and directive. Judge Torres’ reasoning that she needed more time to be able to make a
detailed comment is not sufficient for her to just ignore the deadline set by OCA. It took resolutions
issued by this Court for Judge Torres to finally file her comment. Even then, Judge Torres had asked
for several more extensions (on 3 December 2003, 5 April 2004 and on 21 January 2005) before
actually filing her comment on 20 February 2005.
On the matter of Gonzalez’s prayer that Judge Torres be ordered to inhibit herself from Criminal
Case No. 719841 on grounds of bias and partiality, be it noted that Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. (then Court Administrator) already issued an Order26 that the motion for inhibition should
be filed with the judge sought to be inhibited. Pertinent portions of said Order read:
Please be advised that under Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998, inhibitions are
":judicial actions which do not require prior administrative approval." Under Circular No. 7 dated 10
November 1980, "orders arising from motions for inhibitions should not be treated as administrative
in character but should be considered as judicial. The party who alleges to be aggrieved may apply
for the appropriate legal remedy."
In the situation at hand, a motion for inhibition should be filed with the judge involved. And, pursuant
to the aforecited provisions, should the party who seeks the inhibition of the judge feel aggrieved by
the action taken by the judge involved, then he should take the appropriate legal remedies.
All told, we find Judge Torres guilty of undue delay in resolving Limson’s Demurrer to Evidence in
Criminal Case No. 71984 which, under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, is
classified as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such
charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months, or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. 1avvphi1
It must be noted also that Judge Torres was already penalized and was fined ₱20,000.00 for her
inefficiency and Violation of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1611 entitled, "Antonio del Mundo
v. Judge Lilibeth G. Torres." She should have known better than to simply let the reglementary
period pass by again in another case.
There are also pending cases against Judge Torres in which she is charged with the following: (1)
Inefficiency, Gross Negligence, Grave Abuse of Discretion and Violation of Code of Judicial
Conduct, docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1464-MTJ, in which she was ordered to pay a fine of
₱1,000.00 for failure to file her comment therein; (2) Violation of Section 15, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution, and Rules 3.08 and 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Grave
Prejudice, docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1496-MTJ; (3) Culpable violation of the Constitution, Gross
Ignorance of the law and Violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, docketed as OCA-IPI-1806-
MTJ; and (4) Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Criminal Case and Gross Inefficiency, docketed as
OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTJ.
Given the foregoing premises, we find that the imposition of the maximum amount of fine,
₱20,000.00, reasonable.
WHEREFORE, Judge Lizabeth G. Torres, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
60, Mandaluyong City, is found guilty of undue delay in resolving the Demurrer to Evidence in
Criminal Case No. 71984 and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00)
Pesos. She is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to her personal records. The Court Administrator is directed
to furnish all concerned copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-286 March 29, 1946

FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO, petitioner,
vs.
M.L. DE LA ROSA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, JOSE R. VICTORIANO, and MARGARITA
VILLARICA,respondents.
Revilla and Palma for petitioner.
Francisco Claravall for respondents.
DE JOYA, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari filed in this court.
The record shows that, on June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one
Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action, to wit, (1) to declare in force the contract of sale,
made on October 1, 1940, between said Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two (2)
parcels of land in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, municipality of
Caloocan, Province of Rizal, with a combined area of 480 square meters, which land was
subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31,
1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale
null and void.
On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly admitting having
sold said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in December, 1944, due to the imperative
necessity of raising funds with which to provide for herself and family, and that she did not remember
the previous sale; at the same time, offering to repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in
the sum of P5,000, but that the latter refused to accept the offer.
On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied the allegations made
therein, and claimed exclusive ownership of the land in question, and at the same time set up a
counterclaim and crossclaim in his answer, demanding from Jose R. Victoriano a P200-monthly rent
on said property, beginning from February, 1945, plus P2,000 as damages.
On July 21, 1945, Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim, denying Fredesvindo S.
Alvero's alleged ownership over said land, and the other allegations contained in Alvero's answer.
After the trial of the case before the Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila, one of the respondents in this case, on November 16, 1945, said respondent
judge rendered his decision, in which it was declared that the two (2) parcels of land in question, with
a combined area of 480 square meters had been sold by Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano,
since October 1, 1940, for the sum of P6,000, on the condition that the purchaser should make a
down payment of P1,700, and a monthly payment of P76.86 in 120 equal monthly installments; that
Jose R. Victoriano continued making said monthly payments until December, 1941, but that owing to
the war-time conditions then existing, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to suspend such payments
until the restoration of peace; that immediately after said sale of said land to him, Jose R. Victoriano
took possession thereof and made improvements thereon to the amount of P800, and continued
occupying said property until December, 1944, when he abandoned the same to go to evacuation
places, but returned thereto in February, 1945; that Margarita Villarica, having forgotten the sale of
said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold the same for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on
December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, but afterwards offered to repurchase said property
from him, for the sum of P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after liberation; that Fredesvindo S.
Alvero presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila, on January 3, 1945, and took possession of said property in December, 1944, but afterwards
found Jose R. Victoriano in the premises in February, 1945; that in the contract of sale executed by
Margarita Villarica, in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, it was agreed that, upon failure of the purchaser to
make payments of three (3) successive mothly installments, the vendor would be free to sell the
property again, forfeiting the payments made, except in the case of force majeure; that there was
really a verbal agreement between Margarita Villarica and Jose Victoriano, made in February, 1942,
for the suspension of the payment of the monthly installments until the restoration of peace; and that
although Jose R. Victoriano had presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of
Deeds, in Pasig, Rizal, like Fredesvindo S. Alvero, he had also failed to secure the transfer of title to
his name. And considering that Jose R. Victoriano's document was older than that of Fredesvindo S.
Alvero, and that he had taken possession of said property, since October 1, 1940, the respondent
judge rendered his decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the property
in question, including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the counterclaim.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said decision; and on December 27,
1945, he filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; and
of said order he was notified on January 7, 1946.
On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal
simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond.
On January 14, 1946, Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same time,
asked for the execution of the judgment.
On January 15, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging
that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and
allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife,
who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the following day.
On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of
the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due
time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said order
dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was denied on
January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
On February 11, 1946, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for certiorari, alleging (1)
that said petition is defective in form as well as in substance; (2) that there has been no excusable
negligence, on the part of the petitioner, or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge, in the instant case.
As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, was
dated November 16, 1945, of which counsel for Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified on November
28, 1945; that his motion for reconsideration and new trial was filed on December 27, 1945, and
denied on January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for Alvero was notified of said order on January 7,
1946; and that he filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal the following day, to wit, January 8,
1946, and that the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.
According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for filing and perfecting the
appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should have filed
his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the P60-appeal bond was
filed only on January 15, 1946.
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the judgment
to become final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34
Phil., 623; Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs.Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of
Lands, 36 Phil., 774.)
The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed may,
however, be extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the
original period. (Layda vs.Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.)
Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of court
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure to
pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the
dismissal of the appeal. (Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In the same manner, on failure of the
appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the
appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, the court may dismiss the appeal.
(Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and file
his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and by
which he was greatly affected.
How little, indeed, does one realize that in life he lives in the midst of death; and that every that
passes in a step nearer towards eternity. Yet, notwithstanding the inexorable laws of human destiny,
every mortal fears death, and such fear is worse than death itself. That is perhaps the reason why
those feeling its approach, in their last moments, want to be surrounded by the ones dearest to their
heart, to hear from them words of tenderness and eternal truth, and thus receive as balm their love
and the cheering influence of the traditional faith, and the consolation of religious hope.
The virtuous and loving wife is the peculiar gift of heaven, and Mother is the name for God in the
innocent lips and hearts of adoring children. "She looketh well to the ways of her household, and
eateth not the bread of idleness." "And her daughters arise up and call her blessed." And when she
dies in the bosom of God, her children find solace in the contemplation of her eternal bliss, as
mirrored in her tranquil beauty.
It is not, therefore, difficult to understand the state of mind of the attorney, and his intense devotion
and ardent affection towards his dying wife.
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration
and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point out specifically the findings or conclusions
in the judgment, are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section 2,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro
forma intended merely to delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or
suspend the period of time for the perfection of the appeal. (Valdez vs. Jugo, 74 Phil., 49, and
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, 74 Phil., 235.) Hence, the period for perfecting herein
petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment
rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and
record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his appeal
bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.
It is futile to speak of hospitals, doctors and nurses to minister alone to the needs of the sick and the
dying, who are dearest to us, for our reasoning powers are of little avail when sorrow or despair
rages within.
But human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should stand in the way of performing a
legal duty.
The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an extension of time, within
which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear
the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court, which have been considered
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial
business, is an imperative necessity.
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable damage has been caused to the
petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as Margarita Villarica, the vendor to the two, of the land in
question, has shown readiness to repair the damage done.
No showing having been made that there had been merely excusable negligece, on the part of the
attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that there had been gave abuse of sound judicial
discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition for certiorari filed in this case, is,
therefore, hereby dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones
JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-6120. June 30, 1953.]
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, Petitioner, v. FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Judge-at-

large presiding over Branch C of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
EUGENIO ANGELES, as City Fiscal of Manila, representing the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Claro M. Recto for Petitioner.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL WITH AID OF ASSESSORS, A

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense
that it must be created and defined by express enactment as opposed to a mere
remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor. The trial with the aid
of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477
of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not embraced
by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section 154
this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right is implied
when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and
substantial by the Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been
invoked (Berbari v. Concepcion Et. Al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 56
Phil., 344).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DISTINGUISHED FROM PROCEDURAL. — A

substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property,
or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs,
whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive
rights may be enforced in courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., p. 4; Bustos v. Lucero, 46 Off. Gaz., Jan. supp., pp. 445, 448.)
3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL; RIGHT TO ASSESSORS STILL

EXISTS IN MANILA AND IN PROVINCES. — The promulgation of the Rules of Court did
not have the effect of repealing the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of
Civil Procedure. These provisions have not been incorporated by the Supreme Court in
the present Rules of Court because they are substantive in nature. This remedy may be
invoked not only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the
promulgation of the Rules of Court. The provisions on assessors embodied in the Code
of Civil Procedure are still in force and the same may still be invoked in the light of the
provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the
trial of two criminal cases which were then pending against petitioner without the
assistance of assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 in relation to section 154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a
writ of preliminary injunction issued so that the trial may be held pending until further
orders of this court.
This petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals, but was later certified to this
court on the ground that the main basis of the petition is section 49 of Republic Act No.
409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, approved on June 18,
1949, and respondents assail the constitutionality of said section in that it contravenes
the constitutional provision that the rules of court "shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade . . ." (Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory
offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was
docketed as criminal case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of
Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines
and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375, in that he failed
to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated
documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from
the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion
praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of
fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid
of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the
Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for
the People of the Philippines.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that
with the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became
effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly
repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule- making power,
expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in
said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.
Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing
abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.
The issues now posed by petitioner are: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute
substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
"II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being substantive right, cannot be
impaired by this court in the exercise of its rule-making power.
"III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of
Manila, creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and
were not repealed by Rules of Court.
"IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil
Procedure and the old Charter of Manila were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the
same provisions were later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter
of Manila, which is now the source of the right to trial with the aid of assessors and
which refers to the Code of Civil Procedure merely to indicate the procedure for
appointing assessors.
"V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid class legislation and does
not violate the constitutional provision that the rules of pleading, practice and
procedure ’shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade.’"
A brief summary of the historical background of the legislation regarding trial with the
aid of assessors in the Philippines may be of help in the determination of the issues
posed by petitioner. The first provision which allowed trial with the aid of assessors in
civil cases in inferior courts and Courts of First Instance is contained in Act No. 190 of
the Philippine Commission, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on October 1, 1901 (Sections 58-62; 154-161). Almost simultaneously, or on
October 17, 1901, the trial with the aid of assessors both in civil and criminal cases was
allowed in the Manila courts upon the enactment of Act No. 267, amending Act No. 183,
the original Charter of Manila. In 1914, the trial by assessors was allowed in criminal
cases in the courts of first instance in the provinces with the enactment of Act No.
2369. And in 1915, Act No. 2520 was passed extending the same trial by assessors to
the courts of first instance and justice of the peace courts in the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu.
In connection with the use of assessors in Manila, section 44 of Act No. 183, the
original Charter of Manila, as amended by section 13 of Act No. 267, was reenacted as
section 2449 of the Administrative Code 1916, Act No. 2657. Section 2449 of the
Administrative Code of 1916 became section 2477 of Act No. 2711, otherwise known as
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. And section 2477 in turn became section 49
of the Republic Act No. 409, which is the present Charter of the City of Manila. This
section 49 is the law now invoked by petitioner in support of his claim to a trial With the
aid of assessors in the two criminal cases now pending against him. Its pertinent
provisions are quoted hereunder for ready reference: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 49. Assessors in the courts in the city. — The aid of assessors in the trial of any
civil or criminal action in the municipal court, or the Court of First Instance, within the
city, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It shall be
the duty of the Municipal Board to prepare one list of the names of twenty-five
residents of the City best fitted by education, natural ability and reputation for probity
to sit as assessors in the trial of actions in the municipal court and a like list of persons
to sit as assessors in the trial of the action in the Court of First Instance. The Board
may at any time strike any name from the list so prepared, by reason of the death,
permanent disability, or unfitness of the person named; and in case names are so
stricken out, other names shall be added in their place, to be selected as in this section
provided. Parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors in the municipal or
Court of First Instance shall proceed as provided for by law or rules of court; and the
method of summoning assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from
attendance, their compensation, oath duties and effect of dissent from the opinion of
the judges shall be as provided in those laws or rules." cralaw virtua1aw library
A careful analysis of the above provisions is interesting. Their most salient features are:
The aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court for
the Court of First Instance may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure. The parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors "shall
proceed as provided for by law or rules of court", and "the method of summoning
assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their
compensation, oath, duties, and effect of the dissent from the opinion of the judge shall
be as provided in those laws or rules." If we are to be guided merely by these
provisions, the right to trial with the aid of assessor would seem to be beyond dispute.
These provisions are simple and clear and appear to be mandatory. But where the
difficulty arises is in their relation or bearing on the directive of the Constitution which
provides that "the existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared rules of courts subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same." Pursuant to this rule-making power, the
Supreme Court promulgated the present Rules of Court, which became effective on July
1, 1940, but because it failed to incorporate therein the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure on assessors, respondents now contend that the right to trial with the aid of
assessors, with all its concomitant provisions, cannot now be invoked because, being
procedural in nature, the same must be deemed to have been impliedly eliminated.
This claim would be correct if we were to hold that the right to trial with the aid of
assessors is not substantive but procedural or adjective in nature. If it were merely
procedural, not having been incorporated in the Rules of Court, the logical conclusion is
that the rule-making power has deemed wise to eliminate it. But no such presumption,
nor conclusion, can be drawn for the reason that the right to a trial by assessors is
substantive in the sense that it must be created and defined by express enactment as
opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress therefor.
"Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A substantive law
creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of
agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be
enforced in courts of justice." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952
ed., p. 4.)
In Bustos v. Lucero, * (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448), this Court cited with
approval the following definitions of substantive law: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J.
980.)
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions (36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S. 1026)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law
and as such are not embraced by the rule making power of the Supreme Court. This is
so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a
party litigant. Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a
manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the
aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this
right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where
the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari v. Concepcion, Et Al., 40 Phil., 320;
Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 54 Phil., 344). Thus, it was there said that these
provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors is
not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or
the spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such,
it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the
proceedings. Were we to agree that for one reason or another the trial by assessors
may be done away with, the same line of reasoning would force us to admit that the
parties litigant may be deprived of their right to be represented by counsel, to appear
and be present at the hearings, and so on, to the extent of omitting the trial in a civil
case, and thus set at naught the essential rights granted by the law to the parties, with
consequent nullity of the proceedings." (Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 54 Phil., 344,
349.)
Being substantive in nature, it is not difficult to see why the provisions concerning trial
by assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by
the Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have been
a travesty of its rule-making power which, by direct mandate of the Constitution, is
limited to matters referring to pleading, practice and procedure. The application that
the respondents draw from the failure to incorporate these provisions in the present
Rules of Court to the effect that the intention was to eliminate them or repeal them all
together cannot, therefore, stand in the light of the observations and authorities we
have above adverted to.
There is a point in the claim that the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied
in the Code of Civil Procedure are not wholly substantive but portions thereof are
remedial such as those which refer to the method of summoning assessors, enforcing
their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their compensation, oath, duties and
effect of dissent from the opinion of the judge, as to which no cogent reason is seen for
their non-incorporation if the intent is not to eliminate them from the Rules of Court.
This is true; but it is likewise true that because said remedial provisions are inextricably
interwoven with the substantive part, it must have been deemed wise and proper to
leave them as they were for reasons of coordination and expediency, it being a truism
that the one cannot be detached from the other. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Remedial
measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended to the portion
of the law to which they belong. Mention should be made here that not all of the
provisions appearing in the Code of Civil Procedure are remedial in nature, such as
those pertaining to prescription, the requisites for making a will, and the succession of
the estate of an adopted child, which are admittedly substantive in character and for
that reason were not incorporated in the Rules of Court. To this group belong the
provisions under consideration.
Granting arguendo that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure and
even in the old Charter of Manila are purely remedial in nature and because of the
failure to incorporate them in the Rules of Court they are deemed to have been
impliedly repealed as claimed by respondents, we are of the opinion that they can still
he invoked by a litigant upon the theory that they had been reaffirmed and reenacted
by Republic Act No. 409, which was approved in 1949, or nine years after the Rules of
Court became effective. As already stated, section 49 of said Act states that the aid of
assessors may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It
likewise states that the parties desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors shall
proceed as provided for by law. The mention made of the Code of Civil Procedure in
said section indicates in itself a re-enactment or incorporation by reference of the
provisions concerning assessors contained in said law. Congress, whose members were
mostly lawyers, must be presumed to know that at the time said Act was approved the
Rules of Court had already been promulgated without incorporating therein the
provisions concerning the aid to assessors, and fully cognizant of this situation, and not
desiring to omit this right granted to a litigant, they must have deemed it wise and
proper to re-enact them by reference in said section 49. This Congress can do, for,
while our Constitution has given the power to adopt rules of procedure to the Supreme
Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any procedural law or
altering, amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be promulgated by the
Supreme Court (Section 13, Article VIII, Philippine Constitution).
The practice of making such reference has long been sanctioned. Our Congress did this
not only in connection with courts in the City of Manila. It also did it in connection with
courts in Quezon City (Republic Act No. 537). Statutes which refer to other statutes and
make them applicable to the subject for legislation are called "reference statutes."
These statutes are frequently used "to avoid encumbering the statute books by
unnecessary repetition, and they have frequently been recognized as an approved
method of legislation, in the absence of constitutional restrictions." [50 Am. Jur. 57;
Gruen v. Tax Commission, 211 P. (2d) (1949) 651, 666.]
Again, it has been held that "The adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as
much as a part of the latter act as though it had been incorporated at full length. This is
true of a legislative act which refers to another act for the procedure to be taken." (50
Am. Jur. 58.) The reference in Republic Act No. 409 to the provisions on assessors must
be deemed, therefore, to have incorporated therein the pertinent provisions on the
matter contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in much the same manner as if the
whole provisions had been reproduced. Consistent with this theory, we cannot but hold
that the observations made by respondents to the effect that the reference made to
said provisions in section 49 is a mere surplusage, or was due to a mere oversight, has
no legal basis, as such innuendo would be tantamount to imputing lack of foresight, if
not brazen negligence, to our legislative body.
It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 is unconstitutional

because it violates the constitutional provisions that procedural rules "shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade" and, therefore, it is a class legislation. This contention
cannot be entertained: firstly, because it is raised for the first time in this instance, a
procedural defect which would bar any further discussion on the matter following well-
known precedents 1 and, secondly, because it is not correct that at present only in
Manila trial with the aid of assessors may be invoked if we will sustain the theory that
the promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the effect of repealing the
provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The contention of respondents — we reckon — is predicated on the assumption that the

provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed.
Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the
matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the
Supreme Court. The corollary to this conclusion is that this remedy may be invoked out
only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior to the promulgation of the
Rules of Court. This is true in civil cases. With regard to criminal cases, we have seen
that they are allowed by Act No. 2369; and we have already said that the same remedy
may be invoked in the cities of Cebu, Iloilo and Quezon, with the particularity that their
charters make express reference, either directly or indirectly, to the provisions of the
code of Civil Procedure. With this historical background, the claim that under the theory
we have entertained the trial with the aid of assessors can only be invoked in the City
of Manila is certainly without merit.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the
Code of Civil Procedure are still in force and that the same may still be invoked in the
light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409. It is therefore our opinion
that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right
to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ.,

concur.
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First
Instance of Pampanga, Respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent
TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying
that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol,
the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant
and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant
was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the
subject matter of this proceeding. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of

First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at
the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed
him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in
the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the
accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence,"
and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present
evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court
for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in
excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling
Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the
respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's
objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation
so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order.
We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice
of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the
bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or
any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course
of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth." chanrobles virtual law library
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the
complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the
preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention
to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a
preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a
matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair
trial.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than
the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or
judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his
witnesses to testify anew. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against
the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library
I am sorry to dissent from the decision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the
Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal
charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty.
"Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence
so that her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion
invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the
accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was forwarded to the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance
praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol,
in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony. The motion was denied, and for that reason the
present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence during
the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a waiver of his alleged right to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the
preliminary investigation provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to
which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with
said court to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering the latter
to make said preliminary investigation. His motion having been denied, the petitioner
has filed the present action in which he squarely attacks the validity of the provision of
section 11, Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted
with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of
section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.
In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not
discuss and decide the question of validity or constitutionality of said section 11 in
connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that question was not raised therein,
and we merely construed the provisions on preliminary investigation or Rule 108. In
said case the writer of this dissenting opinion said:
It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting opinion,
then a practising attorney, was the one who prepared the draft of the Rules of Court
relating to criminal procedure, and the provisions on preliminary investigation in the
draft were the same as those of the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be
confronted with and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. But the
Supreme Court approved and adopted in toto the draft, except the part referring to
preliminary investigation which it modified, by suppressing said right and enacting, in
its stead, the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the old to
the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority decision, which is a judicial
legislation and makes the exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted, with
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or
caprice of a judge or officer conducting the preliminary investigation.
But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is squarely presented
to this Court for decision, we have perforce to pass upon it. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall
have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The
constitution added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to
emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or
promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective laws or rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted by law upon
a defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecuted
in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is
based on human experience, according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie
against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict
him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be
efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is substantive right because by
exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence in his favor, that
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that
there is a probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and
therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus
avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a
public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal
prosecution always entails. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused
outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the final disposition of
criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person charged with
offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of the
promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of
in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a constitutional one,
can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the
rule making power conferred upon this Court by the Constitution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several
cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been
squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it follows that
said section 11 diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and
this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and void.
virtual law library
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case
of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice of the peace
courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request to have the witnesses for the
prosecution recalled to testify again in the presence of the defendant and be cross-
examined by the latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the exercise
of an absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court
or officer making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it.
virtual law library
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
Petition is therefore granted.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library
In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay
vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:
In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted, and applied in a way
that will not contravene the constitutional provision guaranteeing to all accused the
right "to meet the witnesses face to face." (Section 1 [17], Article III.) chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said reglementary section,

the defendant is entitled as a matter of fundamental right to her the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution and to cross-examine them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally be convicted, he is

liable to endure the ordeal eloquently depicted in the decision, and the constitutional
guarantee protects defendants, not only from the jeopardy of being finally convicted
and punished, but also from the physical, mental and moral sufferings that may
unjustly be visited upon him in any one of the stages of the criminal process instituted
against him. He must be afforded the opportunities to have the charges against him
quashed, not only at the final hearing, but also at the preliminary investigation, if by
confronting the witnesses for the prosecution he can convince the court that the
charges are groundless. There is no justice in compelling him to undergo the troubles of
a final hearing if at the preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in his favor.
Otherwise, the preliminary investigation or hearing will be an empty gesture that should
not have a place within the framework of dignified and solemn judicial proceedings.
On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be granted and so we
vote. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petition dismissed.
RESOLUTION
March 8, 1949
TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito and Saling

Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional right of an accused to be
confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor
will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to
a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose the constitutional
question pleaded in the application for certiorari. Heeding the wishes of the petitioner,
we shall enlarge upon the subject. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court 1 infringes section 13,
Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is said that the rule in question deals with
substantive matters and impairs substantive rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like
its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right.
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J.,
980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that
part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.) chanrobles virtual law library
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes
and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the
procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a
crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence - which is the
"the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" - is identified with
and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress
obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers
to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) the
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear
down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole
code of evidence embodied in these Rules. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme Court
said:
Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the
constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or
procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs.
Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228,
232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there may be procedural changes
which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the laws in force at the
time of the commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh
and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri,
107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S.,
343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is not well settled that statutory
changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused
of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class
of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of
persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S.,
575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which
changes the rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against
the accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S.,
380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut. vs.
Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal
appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377, 382,
38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct. Rep., 570.
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an
accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given
evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional
inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an
essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be
done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to
fall within the constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains
unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both
at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still
enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an
accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact

definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89
F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case
beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching
upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary
by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable
that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the
Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not
affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but
operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the
Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing
at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a
general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different
rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The motion is denied.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173942 June 25, 2008
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. and FAIRWAYS AND BLUE-WATERS RESORT AND

COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-VALENCIA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 1,
Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan, and SULLIAN SY NAVAL, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration1 dated 19 November 2007 filed by petitioners Fil-
Estate Properties, Inc. and Blue-waters Resort and Country Club, seeking reconsideration of the
Decision2 of this Court dated 15 October 2007 which denied their petition.
A brief recapitulation of the relevant facts, even though they have already been narrated in the
Decision, is in order.
In 1998, private respondent Sullian Sy Naval filed a complaint3 against petitioners, seeking the
recovery of a parcel of land which petitioners had allegedly taken possession of by constructing a
golf course within the vicinity of her property. Counsel for petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial, and
only private respondent presented evidence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan which
heard the complaint. The RTC rendered a decision4 in favor of private respondent of which
petitioners moved for reconsideration.
The crux of the present matter lies with the facts surrounding the motion for reconsideration. The
motion was filed on 10 May 2000,5 thirteen (13) days after petitioners received their copy of the
RTC’s decision. On 26 July 2000, the RTC issued an order6 of even date denying the motion.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that they received the order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 9 August 2000. They filed a Notice of Appeal on 11 August 2000,7but the postal
money orders purchased and obtained to pay the filing fee were posted
only on 25 August 2000, or beyond the reglementary period to perfect the appeal. Consequently, the
RTC denied the appeal8 and such denial was sustained by the Court of Appeals after petitioners filed
a special civil action for certiorari9 assailing the RTC’s refusal to give due course to the appeal.
The Petition10 before this Court relied on a rather idiosyncratic theory that only upon the adoption of
the amendments to Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure effective 1 May 2000 did it
become obligatory on the part of trial courts to dismiss appeals on account of the failure to pay the
full docket fees. The Court, in its 15 October 2007 Decision,11 rejected this theory and reaffirmed the
rule ordaining the disallowance of the appeal or notice of appeal when the docket fee is not paid in
full within the period for taking the appeal.
The present Motion for Reconsideration12 centers on a different line of argument: that following our
2005 decision in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,13 their Notice of Appeal was perfected on time as the
full docket fees were paid within fifteen (15) days from their receipt of the RTC’s order denying their
motion for reconsideration. Neypes has established a new rule whereby an appellant is granted a
fresh 15-day period, reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration,
within which to perfect the appeal.
Petitioners clarify that they received the RTC’s order denying their motion for reconsideration on 11
August 2005,14a fact which is confirmed by the case records even though the petition had misstated
that said order was received on 9 August 2005. Petitioners argue that following Neypes, they were
entitled to a new 15-day period, i.e., until 26 August 2005 or one (1) day after they had posted the
full appellate docket fees, to perfect the appeal.
Most vitally, petitioners point out that on 10 October 2007, or just five (5) days before the
promulgation of the assailed Decision, the Court through the Third Division rendered a decision
in Sps. De los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat15 declaring that the Neypes ruling indeed can be
retroactively applied to prior instances.
Private respondent filed her Comment16 on the Motion for Reconsideration. She insists that Neypes
should not be retroactively applied, but she fails to cite any authority on that argument or otherwise
contend with the ruling in Sps. De los Santos.
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively
apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes
was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.17 Amendments to procedural
rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but
only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.18
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the
quested retroactive effect, to wit:
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in
order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues
― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within
which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by
the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule"
should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if
not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years
later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order
in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties
receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit
of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant
case, will not.19
Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month as
the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that
in Sps. De los Santos.
We have reexamined the petition to ascertain whether there is any other impediment to granting
favorable relief to petitioners based on the retroactive application of the Neypes doctrine.
Private respondent does argue in her comment on the petition20 and on the motion for
reconsideration21 that petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was
not timely lodged. This argument is premised on petitioners’ requested relief that direct that
proceedings de novo be had starting from pre-trial, by annulling the RTC’s decision and the court’s
ruling on the motion for reconsideration, which was filed by petitioners beyond the 60-day period
mandated by Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for filing a special civil action for certiorari.
Petitioners, in their Reply,22 argue that the certiorari action was timely filed since the RTC had
disallowed the notice of appeal in its 13 September 2000 Order, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on 22 September 2000 or within the 60-day period prior to the filing of their certiorari
petition.
Certainly, the RTC’s order denying the notice of appeal was timely assailed by petitioners via a
special civil action filed with the Court of Appeals. Granting positive relief on that point would have
the effect of giving due course to the notice of appeal. But is there basis for this Court to take the
extra step as requested by petitioners and go as far as to annul the RTC’s rulings that granted the
complaint filed by private respondent?
We deem the challenges raised by petitioners against the correctness of the RTC’s decision and its
subsequent resolution on the motion for reconsideration as inappropriate for this Court to decide.
Such issues may very well be tackled in petitioners’ appeal before the Court of Appeals. After all, as
is now conceded, the appeal was timely filed and the existence of such appeal would, per Section 1,
Rule 65, bar the certiorari action from correcting errors which may be reversed on appeal. Besides,
the resolution of such issues requires a certain level of factual determination, especially as to the
circumstances surrounding the resignation of the counsel who had initially appeared in behalf of the
petitioners, the service of the order resetting the pre-trial and all subsequent notices of trial to
petitioners after private respondent had been allowed to present evidence ex parte. Unlike the Court
of Appeals, this Court is not a trier of facts.23
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and the instant petition is GRANTED IN
PART. The assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC Order dated 13 September 2000
are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioners’ appeal in
Civil Case No. 5626, and to hear and decide such appeal with deliberate dispatch. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in
his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint
Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which
granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent from administrative
charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director,
Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under
the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which
private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when
petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated
July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19,
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No.
807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes
of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression,
misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid
resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out
the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been
his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to
respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of
June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and
exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) 1pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the

Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the charges in
an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She
accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict,
in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No.
6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those
Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section
13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the
Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant
provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. — . . . No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme
Court on pure questions of law.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. — (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall
promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance
of its powers, functions, and duties.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of

the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with due process. . . . .
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All previsionary orders at the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial

evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall
be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the

Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman
as the interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the
Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it, including those rules with respect
to the availability or non-availability of appeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III
of Administrative Order No. 07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely
prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that,
should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the
differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court applying
Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.
As correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.3 and Young
vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.4 were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 5 was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al.,7 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,9 which were for certiorari,
prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al. 10 was initiated by a
pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a
prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto, et al. 11 which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues
therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted
points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ
of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and
whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the
answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements
in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe
and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative
disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact,
which does not appear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability
of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based
on both Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807.
Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No.
7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were
made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of
the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the
proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the
other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this
Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those
cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its
challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that
constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional
grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is
not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of
the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty
to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a
statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to
declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgment. 12
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in
the pleadings, 13 the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not
preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it
lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute. 14
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in
which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. 15 The Court ex mero
motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. 16 The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding. 17
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be
further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was
issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is
"an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order
(Re: Motion for Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411,
entitled "Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director,
Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City," which absolved the latter from the
administrative charges for grave misconduct, among others.
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant
thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7
whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A.
No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof
pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments
thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27
of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571,
October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-
91 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, as now substantially
reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and
involved in this case, and the foregoing legal considerations appear to impugn
the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the
Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first
resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their

position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their
corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such
requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the
other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications
of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She
claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in
which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the
Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing
that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be
raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential
developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a
substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and
have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very provision cited by petitioner
specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over
"final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the
legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be
reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is
included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory
court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the
integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for, in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of
Civil Procedure 19preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of
Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A person desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the
Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from
certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope
of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just
discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time
there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review
on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies 20 are now required
to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-
judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body."
We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President
and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the
Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an
objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative
disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of
Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other
hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals
from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited
to jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the
appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The
jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to,
including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances
when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under
discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition
that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also,
the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties,
although there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua
sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised,
although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue
confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously
necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of
passing upon the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent
but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the
charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The
prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier
explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the
aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some statements
therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues,
hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented
to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. 23 was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court. 24
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto
Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the
factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should
best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will
have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's
position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On
September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646,
setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on
second reading by the House of Representatives. 25 The Senate was informed of the approval of
the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was thereafter enacted into law
by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on
the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the
provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo
Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said
provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
x x x x x x x x x
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to
Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such
provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its
advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator
Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court
regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that
they should be appeals on certiorari. 27
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever
referred to this Court for its advice and consent. 28
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate
jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its
rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive
rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power
of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are
substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question
of great
difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach
is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure
of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure. 32
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. 33 This is so because it is
not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been
preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which
may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in
rules of procedure which relate to the remedy. 34
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals
in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme
Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a
substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because
the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy. 35
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one
court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to
actions pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at bar, when its
invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the
validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and
effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition
for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended
or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and
proper.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173615 October 16, 2009
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review,1 the Philippine National Bank assails the January 3, 2006 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50084, which reversed Resolution Nos. 980716 and 983099
issued by the Civil Service Commission, respectively dated April 14, 1998 and December 7, 1998,
and referred the case back to said office for further proceedings. The assailed Resolutions, in turn,
dismissed respondent Cayetano A. Tejano’s appeal from the resolution of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine National Bank which found him guilty of grave misconduct in connection with a
number of transactions with certain corporate entities.
The case stems from a number of alleged irregular and fraudulent transactions made by respondent
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr. supposedly with the participation of eight (8) other employees of petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in its branch in Cebu City — namely Ma. Teresa Chan, Marcelino
Magdadaro, Douglasia Canuel, Novel Fortich, Jacinto Ouano, Quirubin Blanco, Manuel Manzanares
and Pedrito Ranile. Respondent, together with the other employees, allegedly committed grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
acts violative of Republic Act No. 3019, relative to the corporate accounts of and transactions with
Pat International Trading Corporation (PITC), Khun Tong International Trading Corporation (KITC),
Pat Garments International Corporation (PGIC), Aqua Solar Trading Corporation, Dacebu Traders
and Exporters, Mancao Mercantile Co., Inc. and V&G Better Homes Subdivision. All of these
transactions transpired at the time that PNB was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation.
Respondent, who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the bank, and the eight other
employees were administratively charged before the PNB Management Hearing Committee on
February 24 and March 17, 1994.3 At the close of the hearing on the merits, the Committee found
that with respect to respondent, he was guilty of gross misconduct in misappropriating the funds of
V&G and of gross neglect in extending unwarranted credit accommodations to PITC, PGIC and
KITC which must serve as an aggravating circumstance. The Committee then recommended that
respondent be meted the penalty of forced resignation without forfeiture of benefits.4
The PNB Board of Directors differed. In its Resolution No. 885 dated June 21, 1995, it found that
respondent’s gross neglect in giving unwarranted credit to PITC, PGIC and KITC must serve as an
aggravating circumstance in relation to the offense of grave misconduct consisting of
misappropriation of V&G funds and must serve the penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of
benefits.6
It appears that only herein respondent sought reconsideration but the Board of Directors, in its
Resolution No. 107,7denied the same. Thereafter, on September 21, 1995, respondent appealed to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC)8and, on October 19, 1995, he submitted his Memorandum on
Appeal.9
In the meantime, on May 27, 1996, the PNB had ceased to be a government-owned and controlled
corporation, and in view of its conversion into a private banking institution by virtue of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 80.10 Despite this development, the CSC, on April 14 1998, issued Resolution No.
98071611 dismissing respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 on which the CSC required petitioner to comment. In
its Comment, petitioner theorized that even granting respondent’s appeal was filed on time, the
same must, nevertheless, be dismissed on account of the privatization of PNB which thereby
removed the case from the jurisdiction of the CSC. The CSC found this argument meritorious and,
subsequently, in its Resolution No. 98309913 dated December 7, 1998, it denied respondent’s
reconsideration on that ground.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for review,14 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 50084.
Before the appellate court, respondent, on the one hand, ascribed error to the CSC in denying due
course to his appeal on the basis of the privatization of PNB inasmuch as the incident subject of the
case had transpired way back in 1992, when the bank was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation. He particularly noted that the CSC, before the privatization of the bank, had already
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal upon the filing thereof and subsequent submission of the
memorandum on appeal. This, according to respondent, negated petitioner’s theory that the CSC
could no longer assume jurisdiction and dispose of the appeal on the merits, especially considering
that jurisdiction once acquired generally continues until the final disposition of the case.15 On the
other hand, petitioner argued in essence that although the jurisdiction to act on the appeal must
continue until the final disposition of the case, this rule admits of exceptions as where, in the present
case, the law must be construed in a way as to operate on actions pending before its enactment.16
The Court of Appeals found merit in respondent’s appeal. On January 3, 2006, it issued the assailed
Decision reversing the twin resolutions of the CSC. The appellate court pointed out that respondent’s
appeal before the CSC had been filed on time and that the said commission had not lost jurisdiction
over it despite the supervening privatization of PNB. But inasmuch as the assailed Resolutions did
not permeate the merits of respondent’s appeal, the appellate court found it wise to remand the case
to the CSC for further proceedings. It disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, Resolution No. 980716 dated April 14, 1998 and
Resolution No. 983099 dated December 7, 1998 of the Civil Service Commission are hereby
REVERSED and the case is remanded to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings.
so ordered.17
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.18 Hence, it filed the instant petition for review
bearing the same issue as that raised previously.
At the core of the controversy is the question of whether E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from
the jurisdiction of the CSC the appeal of respondent which was already pending before the CSC at
the time the said law converted PNB into a private banking institution. Petitioner is insistent that,
indeed, the law does have that effect, and this argument is perched on Section 6 of E.O. No. 80,
which materially provides that the bank would cease to be a government-owned and controlled
corporation upon the issuance of its articles of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and would no longer be subject to the coverage of both the CSC and the Commission
on Audit.19 Petitioner believes that while indeed jurisdiction ordinarily continues until the termination
of the case, it advances the opinion that the rule does not apply where the law provides otherwise or
where the said law intends to operate on cases pending at the time of its enactment.20
For his part, respondent submits that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 does not provide for the transfer of
jurisdiction over his pending appeal from the CSC to another administrative authority, and that
neither does the provision authorize its retroactive application in a way that would deprive the CSC
of jurisdiction over cases already pending before it prior to its effectivity.21 Additionally, he invokes
estoppel against petitioner inasmuch as the latter has actively participated in the proceedings before
the CSC and, hence, was already barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, and alleges that
petitioner’s present recourse was taken merely to cause delay in the final resolution of the
controversy.22
We draw no merit in the petition.
In essence, Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, also known as the Revised Charter of PNB, treats of the
effects of converting the bank into a private financial and banking institution. It states:
Section 6. Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank. - When the
ownership of the majority of the issued common voting shares passes to private investors, the
stockholders shall cause the adoption and registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the appropriate Articles of Incorporation and revised by-laws within three (3) months
from such transfer of ownership. Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation under the
provisions of the Corporation Code, this Charter shall cease to have force and effect, and shall be
deemed repealed. Any special privileges granted to the Bank such as the authority to act as official
government depositary, or restrictions imposed upon the Bank, shall be withdrawn, and the Bank
shall thereafter be considered a privately organized bank subject to the laws and regulations
generally applicable to private banks. The Bank shall likewise cease to be a government-owned or
controlled corporation subject to the coverage of service-wide agencies such as the Commission on
Audit and the Civil Service Commission.
The fact of the change of the nature of the Bank from a government-owned and controlled financial
institution to a privately-owned entity shall be given publicity.23
In a language too plain to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no more than the
natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private ownership the majority of the bank’s
voting equity. This is very evident in the title of the section called Change in Ownership of the
Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank. Certainly, the transfer of the majority of the bank’s voting
equity from public to private hands is an inevitable effect of privatization or, conversely, the
privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the voting equity thereof to private
ownership. And as the bank ceases to be government depository, it would, accordingly be coming
under the operation of the definite set of laws and rules applicable to all other private corporations
incorporated under the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more importance in the
present case is that the bank, upon its privatization, would no longer be subject to the coverage of
government service-wide agencies such as the CSC and the Commission on Audit (COA).
By no stretch of intelligent and reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No.
80 be interpreted in such a way as to divest the CSC of jurisdiction over pending disciplinary cases
involving acts committed by an employee of the PNB at the time that the bank was still a
government-owned and controlled corporation. Stated otherwise, no amount of reasonable inference
may be derived from the terms of the said Section to the effect that it intends to modify the
jurisdiction of the CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees of the government.
Sound indeed is the rule that where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even
construction.24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/may2002/133706.htm - _edn13 This is
based on the presumption that the words employed therein correctly express its intent and preclude
even the courts from giving it a different construction.25 Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 is explicit in terms. It
speaks for itself. It does not invite an interpretation that reads into its clear and plain language
petitioner’s adamant assertion that it divested the CSC of jurisdiction to finally dispose of
respondent’s pending appeal despite the privatization of PNB.
In the alternative, petitioner likewise posits that the portion of Section 6 of the E.O. No. 80, which
states that the PNB would no longer be subject to the coverage of both the COA and the CSC, must
be understood to be applicable to cases already pending with the CSC at the time of the bank’s
conversion into a private entity. We are not swayed.
While there is no denying that upon its privatization, the bank would consequently be subject to laws,
rules and regulations applicable to private corporations — which is to say that disciplinary cases
involving its employees would then be placed under the operation of the Labor Code of the
Philippines — still, we cannot validate petitioner’s own interpretation of Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 that
the same must be applied to respondent’s pending appeal with the CSC and that, resultantly, the
CSC must abdicate its appellate jurisdiction without having to resolve the case to finality.
It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a
prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending
disputes and cases. This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law
looks forward and not backward.)26 The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive: the
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and, hence, is unconstitutional.27 Although the rule admits of certain well-
defined exceptions28 such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly provides for
retroactivity,29 we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend credence to
petitioner’s argument obtains in this case. Hence, in other words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No.
80 states that PNB would be removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern acts
committed by the bank’s employees after privatization. 1avvphi1
Moreover, jurisdiction is conferred by no other source than law. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it
continues until the case is finally terminated.30 The disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC over
government officials and employees within its coverage is well-defined in Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 807,31 otherwise known as The Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Section 3732 thereof
materially provides that the CSC shall have jurisdiction over appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary; demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office.
It bears to stress on this score that the CSC was able to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal of
respondent merely upon its filing, followed by the submission of his memorandum on appeal. From
that point, the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC at once attached, thereby vesting it with the authority
to dispose of the case on the merits until it shall have been finally terminated.
Petitioner, however, takes exception. It notes that, while indeed the general rule is that jurisdiction
continues until the termination of the case and is not affected by new legislation on the matter, the
rule does not obtain where the new law provides otherwise, or where said law is intended to apply to
actions pending before its enactment. Again, petitioner insists that E.O. No. 80 is a new legislation of
a character belonging to one of the exceptions inasmuch as supposedly Section 6 thereof expressly
sanctions its application to cases already pending prior to its enactment — particularly that provision
which treats of the jurisdiction of the CSC.33
The argument is unconvincing.
In Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz,34 the Court had dealt with a situation where jurisdiction over
certain cases was transferred by a supervening legislation to another tribunal. Latchme involved a
perfected appeal from the decision of the SEC and pending with the Court of Appeals at the time
P.D. No. 902-A was enacted which transferred appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the SEC
from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. On the question of whether the tribunal with which
the cases were pending had lost jurisdiction over the appeal upon the effectivity of the new law, the
Court ruled in the negative, citing the earlier case of Bengzon v. Inciong,35 thus:
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy,
its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the
statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.36
Petitioner derives support from the exceptions laid down in the cases of Latchme Motoomull and
Bengzon quoted above. Yet, as discussed above, the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 are too
clear and unambiguous to be interpreted in such a way as to abort the continued exercise by the
CSC of its appellate jurisdiction over the appeal filed before the privatization of PNB became
effective. Suffice it to say that nowhere in the said Section can we find even the slightest indication
that indeed it expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to another tribunal over
disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said Commission even prior to the
enactment of the law.
All told, the Court finds that no error was committed by the Court of Appeals in reversing the twin
resolutions issued by the CSC. The Court also agrees that because the merits of respondent’s
appeal with the said Commission have not been completely threshed out, it is only correct and
appropriate to remand the case back to it for further proceedings.
With this disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues propounded by the
parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 3, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50084, which reversed and set aside CSC Resolution Nos. 980716 and 983099 and
ordered the remand of the case to the CSC for further proceedings, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
August 15, 2017

G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality of Section 23 of
1
Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, " which2
provides:X
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless
of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. X
3
The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information
alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control
and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G
containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. X 4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation
5
of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-
time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued
that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section
2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of
the government.X
In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the
6
motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the
Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment
or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to
7
enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of
[R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea
bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."X
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining,
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is
only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making
power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional
because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows
plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A.
No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases
of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme
Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of
dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of
the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of
Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate
the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the
declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because
indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of
the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower
courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which
admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional
given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug
cases pending before this judicial station. X
8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated July 26, 2016;
9
hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:X

I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING
IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. X 10
We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the
petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the
Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a
petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover,
the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona
lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy;
and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without
1âwphi1
much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to
the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the
parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged
procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court
shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications. X
11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the
12
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the
13
lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. At14
the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem
must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the
accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the
law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted." Fully aware of the gravity of the drug
15
menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere,
must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence
of drug lords, pushers and users. X16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should
not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends
for enlightenment and guidance. When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside
17
procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue. X 18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a
necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano
Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time
and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice. X
19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and
no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of
20
Justice, then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the
21
Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.X

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of
Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so
essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions
continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935
Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a
passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and
71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment
- a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x. X22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) further elucidated:X

23
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making
authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-
sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying
in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a
" [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers
debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There
was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme
Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his
proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were
approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of
Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration
was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x. X 24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
25
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on
26
the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules), to wit:X
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
27
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule
43 of the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770.X
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. - The Cooperative
28
Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.X
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio
29
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In 30
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep.
31
of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO,
32
and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.X
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A.
33
No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.X
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion
to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional
independence. X34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940,
when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the
fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under
Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the
1âwphi1
provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and
the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether
or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial.
Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained,
Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a]
conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118 of
35
the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other
matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference
36
in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.X
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules are quoted below:X
37
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense;
and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the
case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
38
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test
39 40
for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature. X

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are
substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It
is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.
It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within
the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule
really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. X 41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights.
For example, in People v. Lacson, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was
42
held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-
bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. Speaking through then Associate Justice
43
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:X

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in
fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly
and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It
took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The
Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar
fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest
shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by
the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the
rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial
courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused
or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such
revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived
or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence,
apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the
accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his
favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to
disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of
the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical
evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage
of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or
commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival
thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate
a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public
obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories
may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself
and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only. X
44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
45
provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but
merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.X
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted
accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without
justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits
their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the
simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment
of conviction. X
46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way
47
of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an

"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice. Some of its salutary effects include:X
48
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also
advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and
prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the
defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of
most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial
confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused
persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative
prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial;
he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in
realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital
and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal
offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the
49 50
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
51
system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution,
and the court. X 52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a
53
right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.X
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty
plea be offered and accepted. In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser
54
crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the
fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and
counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. X 55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
56
but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent
57
to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
58
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence
on hand can sustain. X 59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for
judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how
best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate
the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible
to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to
examine the decision whether to prosecute. " X 60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense
61
than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise
for the convenience of the accused. X 62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
63
court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of
64
discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises
when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. X 65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
66
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could
be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has
submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously
study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on
67
the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any
68
finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of
plea is improper and irregular. X
69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it
is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 150175, March 10, 2006 ]
ERLINDA PILAPIL, HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, NAMELY: ESTELA, ERIBERTO
AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES,
ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA AND PACITA MENDOZA,
PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, NAMELY: SILVERIO S. BRIONES,
PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA,
CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE AND MERCEDES LAGBAS,
RESPONDENTS
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking
the annulment and the setting aside of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
55194, dated 31 August 2001,[1] affirming the decision of the Cebu City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986.[2]
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina's daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the
other nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also
passed away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones
(Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
The facts that gave rise to the petition at bar are recounted as follows.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino
died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband's estate with
the Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of Administration[3] appointing
Donata as the administratrix of Maximino's estate. She submitted an Inventory[4] of Maximino's
properties, which included, among other things, the following parcels of land —
1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-599, acquired by Maximino prior to his
marriage (now covered by TCT No. 21546);[5]
2. TCT No. RT-600, acquired by Maximino prior to his marriage (now covered by TCT
No. 21545);[6]
3. TCT No. 220, acquired by Maximino during the marriage (now covered by TCT No.
21543);[7]
21544);[8] and
21542).[9]
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding ownership of the
aforementioned real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata had the said CFI Order
recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds,[10] and by virtue thereof, received
new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata's nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata's intestate estate.
Controversy arose among Donata's heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three
parcels of land, covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of
Donation, both dated 15 September 1977,[11] allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt Donata.
The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda's claim. This Court, however, was no longer
informed of the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata;
and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be
on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition[12] with

the RTC for Letters of Administration[13] for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially
granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio
to collect rentals from Maximino's properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to
Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already
under his and his wife's administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata.[14] Silverio's
Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the
RTC.[15]
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint[16] with the RTC against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed an Amended Complaint,[17] on 11 December 1992.
They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded
in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
In their Answer[18] to the Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the heirs of Donata raised, as
affirmative and special defenses, the following —
1. The complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action against the defendants;
2. That the titles to the lots in question were legally transferred to the name of the late
Donata Ortiz Briones since 1952 when the surviving heirs of Maximino Briones sold
their rights over the said properties to the late Donata Ortiz Briones;
3. That even granting arguendo that plaintiffs have the right to question the transfer to
the name of the late Donata Ortiz Briones the titles of the said lots any action of that
effect has definitely prescribed for more than 30 years have already occurred when
the titles to said lots were transferred to the name of the late Donata Ortiz Briones;
4. That moreover, even granting arguendo that there is an implied trust, an implied trust
prescribed in 10 years from the day titles to said lots have been transferred to the
name of the late Donata Ortiz Briones. Consequently, the plaintiff's action to enforce
an implied trust has definitely prescribed;
5. Be that as it may, plaintiffs whose claim is merely in a representative capacity

acquires no better right or title than that of their predecessor-in-interest.
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs
of Maximino,[19] pertinent portions thereof are reproduced below —
When Donata Ortiz Briones filed Special Proceedings No. 928-R she was fully aware of the
existence of the hereditary rights of the brothers and sisters of her husband Maximino S.
Briones and their surviving heirs and it was her duty to have informed the Court of such fact
instead of asking the Court to have her declared as the sole heir of her deceased husband in
the alleged order mentioned by the defendants which was never presented at the trial but was
made the basis of the transfer of all the titles of the real properties left by Maximino S. Briones
to the name of Donata Ortiz Briones to the prejudice of the heirs of the brothers and sisters of
Maximino S. Briones.
xxxx
By having the immovable properties of the deceased Maximino S. Briones transferred in her
name as the sole heir of the said deceased despite her knowledge of the existence of other co-
heirs like the plaintiffs, Donata Ortiz Briones's alleged ownership and possession of the subject
properties in question was that of a trustee in an implied trust under Article 1451 of the New
Civil Code x x x.
xxxx
In the absence of partition of the estate of Maximino S. Briones all the properties left upon his
death remained owned in common by his heirs consisting of his surviving spouse and the heirs
of his deceased brothers and sisters the herein plaintiffs. Donata Ortiz Briones's possession and
transfer of the title in her name of her late husband's properties was no more than that of a co-
owner and no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Last paragraph, Art.
494, New Civil Code). Such titles cannot be used as a shield to perpetrate fraud.
xxxx
Since the inventory filed by Donata Ortiz Briones (Exhibit B) has been adopted as Exhibit 3 by
defendants Erlinda Pilapil, Rizalina Ortiz Aguila and the Mendozas, said defendants are bound
by the contents thereof. Defendants, however, failed to show the order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu dated October 2, 1952 mentioned in the primary entry book (Exhibit 4) and
marked as Exhibit 4-C, an omission which amounts to suppression of evidence which is
presumed adverse to the defendant's interest when produced. This supposed declaration of
heirs declaring the late Donata O. Briones as the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the late
Maximino S. Briones entered in the primary entry book in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Cebu City has been made thru Donata O. Briones's misrepresentation to the Court as
Administratrix of the estate of her husband Maximino S. Briones by failing to honestly disclose
to the Court that the decedent was survived not only by his widow but also by his brothers and
sisters and/or their children by right of representation which fact was known to her at the time of
her husband's death.
Hence, the RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to ½ of the real properties
covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda
to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the fruits
thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision,[20] promulgated on 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC
Decision, ratiocinating thus —
The contentions of defendants-appellants are devoid of merit.
At the outset, the proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration was invalid. Firstly,
Donata did not include in her petition for letters of administration the names, ages and
residences of the heirs as required by Rule 79, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Court. Secondly, the
court failed to give notice to the known heirs that a petition has been filed, and the time and
place for hearing thereof as provided in Section 3 of the same rule, to give them ample
opportunity to oppose it, if warranted. Thirdly, the court failed to do its specific duty to require
proof, at the hearing of the petition, that the aforementioned notice has been given to the heirs
in accordance with Section 5 of the same rule.
Consequently, the Order declaring Donata as the sole and exclusive heir would not be binding
against herein plaintiffs-appellees.
xxxx
It should be noted that plaintiffs-appellees' cause of action was not based merely on fraud but
was primarily anchored on their right to inheritance and to have a partition of the same, both of
which are imprescriptible as a general rule. With marked relevance is the fact that their
Complaint is for Partition, Annulment and Recovery of Possession of Real Property.
With respect to the argument on implied trust, We subscribe to the view that there existed an
implied/constructive trust where, through fraudulent representations or by pretending to be the
sole heir of the deceased, an heir succeeded in having the original title of a land in the name of
the deceased cancelled and a new one issued in his name thereby enabling him to possess the
land and get its produce. [Baysa vs. Baysa, [CA] 53 O.G. 7282, October 1957]
This being so, the trustee may claim title by prescription founded on adverse possession where
it appears that: (a) he has performed open and unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the other co-owners; and (c) the evidence thereon should be clear and convincing; and (d) the
period fixed by law has prescribed. [De Leon, Partnership, Agency and Trusts, 4thEdition, 1996]
These conditions were not complied with in the case at bench. Assuming arguendo that the
issuance of the TCT would constitute an open and clear repudiation of the trust, it is well to note
however that the required period has not yet elapsed. Article 1137 [New Civil Code] provides
that, "ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith." This period
should be counted from the date the adverse title was asserted, that is, from the registration of
the title. The TCTs covering the property in question were registered in 1960 or 27 years at the
time of the filing of the Complaint in 1987.
Moreover, there is neither an adverse possession to speak of since Donata and the Heirs of
Briones are deemed co-owners of the property in question in accordance with Article 1078.
[New Civil Code] Hence, mere actual possession by Donata will not give rise to the inference
that the possession was adverse. This is because Donata after all is entitled to possession of
the property as a co-owner.
xxxx
Furthermore, it is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that a co-owner may not acquire

exclusive ownership of common property thru prescription. [Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, L-
18046, March 31, 1964]
xxxx
In determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of
a confidential relationship between the parties is an important circumstance for consideration.
The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are
connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.
[Gallardo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67742, 29 October 1987]
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed the
present Petition,[21]raising the following errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE AS HAVING
BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION;
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE AS HAVING
BEEN BARRED BY LACHES; AND
III. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT ALL THE PROPERTIES,
WHETHER CAPITAL PROPERTIES OF MAXIMINO OR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES
OF MAXIMINO AND DONATA BRIONES, BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN
PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.
Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the RTC in their respective Decisions,
this Court finds the Petition at bar meritorious and dismisses the Complaint for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed before the RTC by the heirs of
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. Not only is the Complaint barred by prior judgment, the
complainants therein, the heirs of Maximino, failed to satisfactorily establish their right to the
remedies prayed for therein.
Maximino left no will at the time of his death, on 1 May 1952, and his estate was to be settled in
accordance with the rules on legal or intestate succession. The heirs of Maximino, respondents
in the Petition at bar, claimed the right to inherit, together with Donata, from the estate of
Maximino, based on the Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, which read —
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children
and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the
entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should
there be any, under article 1001.
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other half.
The heirs of Maximino asserted that Donata had fraudulently excluded them from the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Maximino before the CFI . They were not given notice of the
institution of Special Proceedings No. 928-R and the scheduled hearings therein. When Donata
was declared the "sole, absolute, and exclusive heir" of Maximino in the CFI Order, dated 2
October 1952, and when she managed to have the real properties of Maximino registered in her
own name on the basis of the foregoing CFI Order, she should be deemed to have held the said
properties in trust for her other co-heirs.
The RTC in its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, justified its finding of implied trust on Article 1451 of
the New Civil Code, which provides that, "When land passes by succession to any person and
he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of
law for the benefit of the true owner." This Court, though, believes that Article 1451 is not
applicable to the instant Petition considering that it refers to a situation wherein the heir himself
causes the registration of his legal title under the name of another; the heir, by his voluntary
action, establishes the implied trust and constitutes himself as the trustee. In contrast, in the
Petition herein, Donata managed to have the real properties belonging to the estate of
Maximino registered under her own name to the supposed exclusion of all other legal heirs of
her deceased husband. In such a case, implied trust may be more appropriately in accordance
with Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which declares that, "If the property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."
Now the foremost question that needs to be answered is whether an implied trust under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the instant Petition. This Court
answers in the negative.
Since it was the respondents, heirs of Maximino, who claimed the existence of an implied trust,
they bear the burden of proving that Donata registered in her own name the real properties
belonging to the estate of Maximino either by fraud or mistake, pursuant to Article 1456 of the
New Civil Code. The heirs of Maximino never contended that Donata may have registered the
real properties in her name by mistake, but repeatedly maintain that she did so by fraud. Both
the Court of Appeals and the RTC, in their respective Decisions, found that Donata secured the
CFI Order, dated 02 October 1952, and the new TCTs covering the real properties in her name
fraudulently.
While it is true that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the RTC are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, such is not absolute, and there are recognized exceptions thereto.
This Court justifies its departure from the general rule and the conduct of its own review of the
evidence and other records in the Petition at bar, given that (1) the factual conclusions of the
Court of Appeals and the RTC are grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2)
the inference made were manifestly mistaken; and (3) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals and the RTC are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.[22]
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs covering the
real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners,
heirs of Donata, were unable to present a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising
considering that it was issued 35 years prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of their
Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order,
nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of
Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714.[23] It was annotated on the TCTs
covering the real properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of the heirs
of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never questioned. The allegation
of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or
procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI
Order, contrary to the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of
evidence that would give rise to the presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of Donata
if produced.[24] As this Court already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy[25] —
x x x We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not
applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is
merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and
(4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the
failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would be unfavorable to
the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to testify
as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses
If there is indeed a surviving copy of the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, then there is no
reason to believe that it would be exclusively available only to the heirs of Donata and not to the
heirs of Maximino. It is important to note that two of the documents relating to Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, namely, (1) the Letters of Administration issued in favor of Donata by
the CFI, and (2) the Inventory submitted by Donata to the CFI, were actually produced before
the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 by the heirs of Maximino. It only goes to show that the
heirs of Maximino did have access to the records of Special Proceedings No. 928-R in which
the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, was issued. If there was still a copy of the CFI Order,
dated 2 October 1952, in the records of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and the contents of
such Order were truly adverse to the heirs of Donata, then it would have been more compelling
for the heirs of Maximino to present it before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, with the aid
of the appropriate court processes if necessary.
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively
settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as
its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity
pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced
below —
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in
the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect;
[26]
and it could not give credence to the following statements made by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision[27] —
At the outset, the proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration was invalid. Firstly,
Donata did not include in her petition for letters of administration the names, ages and
residences of the heirs as required by Rule 79, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Court. Secondly, the
court failed to give notice to the known heirs that a petition has been filed, and the time and
place for hearing thereof as provided in Section 3 of the same rule, to give them ample
opportunity to oppose it, if warranted. Thirdly, the court failed to do its specific duty to require
proof, at the hearing of the petition, that the aforementioned notice has been given to the heirs
in accordance with Section 5 of the same rule.
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. First of all, the Petition
filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI
was not even referred to nor presented during the course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794
before the RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a finding that Donata willfully
excluded from the said Petition the names, ages, and residences of the other heirs of
Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing that the CFI actually failed to send
notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require
presentation of proof of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, which included sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service
of such notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk such
presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
at least until 1985. There was no testimony or document presented in which the heirs of
Maximino categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of the pendency of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The only evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of
such proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia),[28] one of the heirs of
Maximino, to wit —
Q When the husband of defendant Erlinda Pilapil was presented before this Court he testified that
when the late Donata Ortiz filed a petition to be declared sole heir according to him the
brothers and sisters of the late Maximino Briones were notified of the said hearing. What can
you say about this, Ms. Witness?
A No, I don't think they were notified. They would have contested their right to inherit their
brother's property because he had no issue with his wife.
Q Likewise the same witness testified that at the time the petition was granted there was no
opposition from the heirs. What can you say about this, Ms. Witness?
A I don't think they were notified because I know they will contest that declaration.
Aurelia's testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not testifying on matters
within her personal knowledge. The phrase "I don't think" is a clear indication that she is merely
voicing out her opinion on how she believed her uncles and aunts would have acted had they
received notice of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of Maximino even emphasized
that Donata lived along the same street as some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed
to inform them of the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and
the issuance in her name of new TCTs covering the real properties which belonged to the estate
of Maximino. This Court, however, appreciates such information differently. It actually works
against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby, Maximino's siblings had ample
opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their deceased brother.
Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were also located within
the same area as their residences in Cebu City, and Maximino's siblings could have regularly
observed the actions and behavior of Donata with regard to the said real properties. It is
uncontested that from the time of Maximino's death on 1 May 1952, Donata had possession of
the real properties. She managed the real properties and even collected rental fees on some of
them until her own death on 1 November 1977. After Donata's death, Erlinda took possession of
the real properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon.
Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the
real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the heirs of Maximino on
guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not
offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximino's death before one of
them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino
on 21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 March
1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real
property belonging to the estate of Maximino. The heirs of Maximino put off acting on their rights
to the estate of Maximino for so long that when they finally did, attributing fraud to Maximino's
wife, Donata, the latter had already passed away, on 1 November 1977, and was no longer
around to explain and defend herself. The delay of the heirs of Maximino is not without
consequence, as this Court explained in Ramos v. Ramos[29] —
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filing of the instant case long after the death of Jose
Ramos and other persons involved in the intestate proceeding renders it difficult to
determine with certitude whether the plaintiffs had really been defrauded - What Justice
Street said in Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507, 518-9 is relevant to this case:
"In passing upon controversies of this character experience teaches the danger of
accepting lightly charges of fraud made many years after the transaction in question was
accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes
effected by time may have given a totally different color to the cause of controversy. In
the case before us the guardian, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is true of Trinidad Diago,
mother of the defendant Agueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now living in Spain. It will be
borne in mind also that, insofar as oral proof is concerned, the charge of fraud rests principally
on the testimony of a single witness who, if fraud was committed, was a participant therein and
who naturally would now be anxious, so far as practicable, to put the blame on others. In this
connection it is well to bear in mind the following impressive language of Mr. Justice Story:
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it thus
removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original
transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against
imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact
proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation
of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The most that can fairly
be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human
infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the
parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we
can hope is to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for
exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living;
for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not here to answer
for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and
violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a
reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498)."
It is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his intestate estate upon his death on 1
May 1952, by virtue of Articles 995 and 1005 of the New Civil Code. Nonetheless, the CFI, in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, had declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino in its Order, dated 2 October 1952. This Court, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, can only presume that Special Proceedings No. 928-R was fair and regular, which
would consequently mean that the CFI complied with the procedural requirements for intestate
proceedings such as publication and notice to interested parties, and that the CFI had carefully
reviewed and studied the claims of creditors, as well as the rights of heirs to the estate, before
issuing the Order, dated 2 October 1952. There is no showing that the Order, dated 2 October
1952, had been appealed and had, therefore, long attained finality, which even this Court would
be bound to respect. Without doubt, if the action for partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession instituted by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 succeeds, then, it
would be a circumvention of the finality of the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, because, necessarily, a recognition of the rights of the other heirs to
the estate of Maximino would violate the sole, absolute, and exclusive right of Donata to the
same estate previously determined by the CFI. As this Court had discussed in Ramos v.
Ortuzar[30] —
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they would
be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the
distribution of the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938,
"The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed
by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of
them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156) "A final order of distribution of the estate
of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees." (Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895) There is no reason why, by
analogy, these salutory doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful,
would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or
order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of.
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata
managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata
was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant
to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The
CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute,
and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of
Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case
No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of Maximino in
Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159593 October 12, 2006

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
MIRANT1 PAGBILAO CORPORATION (formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON,
INC.), respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the Decision,3 dated 30 July 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60783, which
affirmed in toto the Decision,4 dated 11 July 2000, of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case
No. 5658. The CTA partially granted the claim of herein respondent Mirant Pagbilao Corporation
(MPC) for the refund of the input Value Added Tax (VAT) on its purchase of capital goods and
services for the period 1 April 1996 to 31 December 1996, and ordered herein petitioner
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to issue a tax credit certificate in the amount
of P28,744,626.95.
There is no dispute as to the following facts that gave rise to the claim for refund of MPC, as found
by the CTA5 –
[MPC] is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the Philippines with principal office address in Pagbilao Grande Island, Pagbilao, Quezon.
It is licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to principally engage in the
business of power generation and subsequent sale thereof (Exh. A). It is registered with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a VAT registered entity with Certificate of Registration
bearing RDO Control No. 96-600-002498, dated January 26, 1996.
For the period April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996, [MPC] seasonably filed its Quarterly VAT
Returns reflecting an (sic) accumulated input taxes in the amount of P39,330,500.85 (Exhs.
B, C, and D). These input taxes were allegedly paid by [MPC] to the suppliers of capital
goods and services for the construction and development of the power generating plant and
other related facilities in Pagbilao, Quezon (TSN, November 16, 1998, p. 11).
Pursuant to the procedures prescribed under Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, as amended,
[MPC] filed on June 30, 1998, an application for tax credit or refund of the aforementioned
unutilized VAT paid on capital goods (Exhibit "E").
Without waiting for an answer from the [BIR Commissioner], [MPC] filed the instant petition
for review on July 10, 1998, in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period for
claiming a refund under the law.
In answer to the Petition, [the BIR Commissioner] advanced as special and affirmative
defenses that "[MPC]'s claim for refund is still pending investigation and consideration before
the office of [the BIR Commissioner] accordingly, the filing of the present petition is
premature; well-settled is the doctrine that provisions in tax refund and credit are construed
strictly against the taxpayer as they are in the nature of a tax exemption; in an action for
refund or tax credit, the taxpayer has the burden to show that the taxes paid were
erroneously or illegally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is fatal to the action for
refund; it is incumbent upon [MPC] to show that the claim for tax credit has been filed within
the prescriptive period under the Tax Code; and the taxes allegedly paid by [MPC] are
presumed to have been collected and received in accordance with law and revenue
regulations.["]
On July 14, 1998, while the case was pending trial, Revenue Officer, Rosemarie M. Vitto,
was assigned by Revenue District Officer, Ma. Nimfa Penalosa-Asensi, of Revenue District
No. 60 to investigate [MPC]'s application for tax credit or refund of input taxes (Exhs. 1 and
1-a). As a result, a memorandum report, dated August 27, 1998, was submitted
recommending a favorable action but in a reduced amount of P49,616.40 representing
unapplied input taxes on capital goods. (Exhs. 2, 2-a, 3, and 3-a).
[MPC], due to the voluminous nature of evidence to be presented, availed of the services of
an independent Certified Public Accountant pursuant to CTA Circular No. 1-95, as amended.
As a consequence, Mr. Ruben R. Rubio, Partner of SGV & Company, was commissioned to
verify the accuracy of [MPC]'s summary of input taxes (TSN, October 15, 1998, pp. 3-5). A
report, dated March 8, 1999, was presented stating the audit procedures performed and the
finding that out of the total claimed input taxes of P39,330,500.85, only the sum of
P28,745,502.40 was properly supported by valid invoices and/or official receipts (Exh. G; see
also TSN, March 3, 1999, p. 12).
The CTA ruled in favor of MPC, and declared that MPC had overwhelmingly proved, through the
VAT invoices and official receipts it had presented, that its purchases of goods and services were
necessary in the construction of power plant facilities which it used in its business of power
generation and sale. The tax court, however, reduced the amount of refund to which MPC was
entitled, in accordance with the following computation –
Total amount of the claim for refund P39,330,500.85

Less: Disallowances
a. Per independent auditor P10,584,998.45
b. Per CTA's examination 875.45 10,585,873.90
P28,744,626.956
Thus, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision,7 dated 11 July 2000, reads -
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [MPC]'s claim for refund is hereby

partially GRANTED. [The BIR Commissioner] is ORDERED to ISSUE A TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATE in the amount of P28,744,626.95 representing input taxes paid on capital
goods for the period April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996.
The CTA subsequently denied the BIR Commissioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution,8 dated 31 August 2001.
Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review9 of the
foregoing Decision, dated 11 July 2000, and Resolution, dated 31 August 2001, of the CTA. Notably,
the BIR Commissioner identified and discussed as grounds10 for its Petition arguments that were
totally new and were never raised before the CTA, to wit –
1. RESPONDENT BEING AN ELECTRIC UTILITY, IT IS SUBJECT TO FRANCHISE TAX

UNDER THEN SECTION 117 (NOW SECTION 119) OF THE TAX CODE AND NOT TO
VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT).
2. SINCE RESPONDENT IS EXEMPT FROM VAT, IT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE REFUND

OF INPUT VAT PURSUANT TO SECTION 4.103-1 OF REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-
95.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR Commissioner's Petition, and in its Decision, dated
30 July 2003, it pronounced that: (1) The BIR Commissioner cannot validly change his theory of the
case on appeal; (2) The MPC is not a public utility within the contemplation of law; (3) The sale by
MPC of its generated power to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is subject to VAT at
zero percent rate; and (4) The MPC, as a VAT-registered taxpayer, may apply for tax credit.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the said Decision11 reads as follows –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the

assailed 11 July 2000 Decision of respondent Court in CTA Case No. 5658 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
Refusing to give up his cause, the BIR Commissioner filed the present Petition before this Court on
the ground that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the Decision of the CTA
holding respondent entitled to the refund of the amount of P28,744,626.95, allegedly representing
input VAT on capital goods and services for the period 1 April 1996 to 31 December 1996. He
argues that (1) The observance of procedural rules may be relaxed considering that technicalities
are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote the substantive rights of the parties; and
(2) A tax refund is in the nature of a tax exemption which must be construed strictly against the
taxpayer. He reiterates his position before the Court of Appeals that MPC, as a public utility, is
exempt from VAT, subject instead to franchise tax and, thus, not entitled to a refund of input VAT on
its purchase of capital goods and services.
This Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
The general rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal.
To recall, the BIR Commissioner raised in its Answer12 before the CTA the following special and
affirmative defenses –
3. [MPC]'s claim for refund is still pending investigation and consideration before the office of
[the BIR Commissioner]. Accordingly, the present petition is premature;
4. Well-settled is the doctrine that provisions in tax refund and credit are construed strictly
against the taxpayer as they are in the nature of a tax exemption;
5. In an action for refund or tax credit, the taxpayer has the burden to show that the taxes
paid were erroneously or illegally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is fatal to the
action for refund;
6. It is incumbent upon [MPC] to show that the claim for tax credit has been filed within the
prescriptive period under the tax code;
7. The taxes allegedly paid by [MPC] are presumed to have been collected and received in
accordance with law and revenue regulations.
These appear to be general and standard arguments used by the BIR to oppose any claim by a
taxpayer for refund. The Answer did not posit any allegation or contention that would defeat the
particular claim for refund of MPC. Trial proper ensued before the CTA, during which the MPC
presented evidence of its entitlement to the refund and in negation of the afore-cited defenses of the
BIR Commissioner. It was only after the CTA promulgated its Decision on 11 July 2000, which was
favorable to MPC and adverse to the BIR Commissioner, that the latter filed his Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals on 4 October 2000, averring, for the very first time, that MPC was a
public utility, subject to franchise tax and not VAT; and since it was not paying VAT, it could not
claim the refund of input VAT on its purchase of capital goods and services.
There is a palpable shift in the BIR Commissioner's defense against the claim for refund of MPC and
an evident change of theory. Before the CTA, the BIR Commissioner admitted that the MPC is a
VAT-registered taxpayer, but charged it with the burden of proving its entitlement to refund.
However, before the Court of Appeals, the BIR Commissioner, in effect denied that the MPC is
subject to VAT, making an affirmative allegation that it is a public utility liable, instead, for franchise
tax. Irrefragably, the BIR Commissioner raised for the first time on appeal questions of both fact and
law not taken up before the tax court, an actuality which the BIR Commissioner himself does not
deny, but he argues that he should be allowed to do so as an exception to the technical rules of
procedure and in the interest of substantial justice.
It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction that a party may not change his theory of the case on
appeal.13 Such a rule has been expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides –
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has filed a
motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any
question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues
framed by the parties.
Thus, in Carantes v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court emphasized that –
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first
time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in
the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon
that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.
In the more recent case of Mon v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court again pronounced that, in this
jurisdiction, the settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action
on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in
issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on
which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The
rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.
The BIR Commissioner pleads with this Court not to apply the foregoing rule to the instant case, for
a rule on technicality should not defeat substantive justice. The BIR Commissioner apparently
forgets that there are specific reasons why technical or procedural rules are imposed upon the
courts, and that compliance with these rules, should still be the general course of action. Hence, this
Court has expounded that –
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The
requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which
guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." The adjudicatory bodies and the parties
to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not
a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
There have been some instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application
of the rules, but this flexibility was "never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.16
The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to except a case from
their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. What
constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon
the courts.17
In his Petition and Memorandum before this Court, the BIR Commissioner made no attempt to
provide reasonable explanation for his failure to raise before the CTA the issue of MPC being a
public utility subject to franchise tax rather than VAT. The BIR Commissioner argues, in a singular
paragraph in his Petition,18 subsequently reproduced in his Memorandum,19 that the Court of Appeals
should have taken cognizance of the said issue, although it was raised for the first time on appeal,
entirely on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sy v. Court of Appeals.20 He contends that –
The submission fails to take into account that although this Honorable Court has repeatedly
ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene
the basic rules of justice and fair play, the observance of procedural rules may be relaxed,
noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote the
substantive rights of the litigants (Sy v. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 570 [2000]).
This Court is unconvinced. There is no sufficient cause to warrant the relaxation of technical or
procedural rules in the instant case. The general rules of procedure still apply and the BIR
Commissioner cannot be allowed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
It should be emphasized that the BIR Commissioner is invoking a suspension of the general rules of
procedure or an exception thereto, thus, it is incumbent upon him to present sufficient cause or
justifiable circumstance that would qualify his case for such a suspension or exception. That this
Court had previously allowed in another case such suspension of or exception to technical or
procedural rules does not necessarily mean that the same shall also be allowed in the present case.
The BIR Commissioner has the burden of persuading this Court that the same causes or
circumstances that justified the suspension of or exception to the technical or procedural rules in the
other case are also present in the case at bar.
The Sy case, on which the BIR Commissioner fully anchored his claim for suspension of or
exception to the technical or procedural rules, is not even on all fours with his case. It involves a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage instituted by the therein petitioner Filipina Sy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the basis of the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband,
Fernando Sy. Her petition was denied by the RTC because it found that Fernando's acts did not
constitute psychological incapacity, a finding later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In an appeal
by certiorari before this Court, Filipina raised the issue that her marriage to Fernando was void from
the very beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony. This Court took
cognizance of the said issue, reversed the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and ruled in favor of
Filipina. Its ratiocination on the matter is reproduced in full below –
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not
ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said
that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very
reason for their existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be
subject to cavil. In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity
of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent
facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects
according to existing law.21 [Emphasis supplied.]
In the instant case, the conflict between the MPC and the BIR Commissioner could be hardly
described as "deeply seated and violent," it remaining on a professional level.
Moreover, this Court pointed out in the Sy case that the pertinent facts, i.e., the dates of actual
celebration of the marriage, issuance of the marriage certificate, and issuance of the marriage
license, were undisputed. The same cannot be said in the case at bar. That MPC is a public utility
is not an undisputed fact; on the contrary, the determination thereof gives rise to a multitude of other
questions of fact and law. It is a mere deduction on the part of the BIR Commissioner that since the
MPC is engaged in the generation of power, it is a public utility. The MPC contests this arguing that it
is not a public utility because it sells its generated power to NAPOCOR exclusively, and not to the
general public. It asserts that it is subject to VAT and that its sale of generated electricity to
NAPOCOR is subject to zero-rated VAT.
Substantial justice, in such a case, requires not the allowance of issues raised for the first time on
appeal, but that the issue of whether MPC is a public utility, and the correlated issue of whether
MPC is subject to VAT or franchise tax, be raised and threshed out in the first opportunity before the
CTA so that either party would have fully presented its evidence and legal arguments in support of
its position and to contravene or rebut those of the opposing party.
In Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 22 this
Court held that it was too late for the BIR Commissioner to raise an issue of fact of payment for the
first time in his memorandum in the CTA and in his appeal to this Court. If raised earlier, the matter
ought to have been seriously delved into by the CTA. On this ground, this Court was of the opinion
that under all the attendant circumstances of the case, substantial justice would be served if the BIR
Commissioner be held as precluded from attempting to raise the issue at this stage. Failure to assert
a question within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly refused to consider the issues raised by the BIR
Commissioner for the first time on appeal. Its discussion on whether the MPC is a public utility and
whether it is subject to VAT or franchise tax is nothing more than obiter dictum. It is best not at all to
discuss these issues for they do not simply involve questions of law, but also closely-related
questions of fact23 which neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court could presume or garner from
the evidence on record.
II
Input VAT on capital goods and services may be the subject of a claim for refund.
The MPC bases its claim for refund of its input VAT on Section 106(b) of the Tax Code of 1986, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7716,24 which provides –
Sec. 106. Refunds or tax credits of creditable input tax. –
xxxx
(b) Capital goods. - A VAT-registered person may apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund of input taxes paid on capital goods imported or locally purchased, to the
extent that such input taxes have not been applied against output taxes. The application may
be made only within two (2) years, after the close of the taxable quarter when the importation
or purchase was made.
Capital goods or properties, as defined in Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, the implementing rules on
VAT, are "goods and properties with estimated useful life greater than one year and which are
treated as depreciable assets under Section 29(f), used directly or indirectly in the production or sale
of taxable goods or services."25
Contrary to the argument of the BIR Commissioner, input VAT on capital goods is among those
expressly recognized as creditable input tax by Section 104(a) of the Tax Code of 1986, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7716,26to wit –
Sec. 104. Tax Credits. - (a) Creditable input tax. - Any input tax evidenced by a VAT invoice
or official receipt issued in accordance with Section 108 hereof on the following transactions
shall be creditable against the output tax:
(1) Purchase or importation of goods:
(A) For sale; or
(B) For conversion into or intended to form part of a finished product for sale including
packing materials; or
(C) For use as supplies in the course of business; or
(D) For use as materials supplied in the sale of service; or
(E) For use in trade or business for which deduction for depreciation or amortization
is allowed under this Code, except automobiles, aircraft and yachts. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Thus, goods and properties used by the taxpayer in its VAT-taxable business, subject to
depreciation or amortization in accordance with the Tax Code, are considered capital goods. Input
VAT on the purchase of such capital goods is creditable against the taxpayer's output VAT. The
taxpayer is further given the option, under Section 106(b) of the Tax Code of 1986, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7716, to claim refund of the input VAT on its capital goods, but only to the extent
that the said input VAT has not been applied to its output VAT.
This Court, likewise, will not give credence to the BIR Commissioner's contention that the claim for
refund of input VAT on capital goods by the MPC should be denied for the latter's failure to comply
with the requirements for the refund of input VAT credits on zero-rated sales provided in Section 16
of Revenue Regulations No. 5-87, as amended by Revenue Regulations No. 3-88. The BIR
Commissioner is apparently confused. MPC is claiming refund of the input VAT it has paid on the
purchase of capital goods, it is not claiming refund of its input VAT credits attributable to its zero-
rated sales. These are two different input VAT credits, arising from distinct transactions, although
both may be the subject of claims for refund by the taxpayer.27 Indeed, the very same regulation
invoked by the BIR Commissioner, Revenue Regulations No. 5-87, as amended, distinguishes
between these two refundable input VAT credits and discusses them in two separate paragraphs:
Section 16(a) on zero-rated sales of goods and services, and Section 16(b) on capital goods. It is
also worth noting that Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, issued on 9 December 1995, which
consolidated all VAT regulations, already superseded Revenue Regulations No. 5-87. Still, Revenue
Regulations No. 7-95 maintains the distinction between these two input VAT credits, discussing the
zero-rated sales of goods or properties or services in Section 4.106-1(a), and capital goods in
Section 4.106-1(b).
Hence, the present claim for refund of input VAT on capital goods filed by MPC need not comply
with the requirements for refund of input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales.
III
There is no reason for this Court to disturb the findings of fact of the CTA, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
While it is true, as the BIR Commissioner alleges, that the MPC has the burden of proving that it is
entitled to the refund it is claiming for, both the CTA and Court of Appeals had ruled that the MPC
presented substantial evidence to support its claim for refund of its input VAT on capital goods and
services in the amount of P28,744,626.95.
The CTA found that MPC is registered as a VAT-taxpayer, as evidenced by its Certificate of
Registration, issued by the BIR Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 60, on 26 January 1996. The BIR
Commissioner does not contest this fact, and does not offer any explanation as to why the BIR RDO
had approved the registration of MPC as a VAT-taxpayer when, as the BIR Commissioner is now
asserting, the MPC is not subject to VAT but to franchise tax. The MPC had been filing its VAT
Quarterly Returns, including those for the period covered by its claim for refund, 1 April 1996 to 31
December 1996, reporting and reflecting therein the input VAT it had paid on its purchase of capital
goods and services. These capital goods and services were necessary in the construction of the
power plant facilities used by MPC in electric power generation.
The VAT invoices and receipts submitted by MPC, in support of its claim for refund, had been
examined and evaluated by an independent auditor, as well as by the CTA itself. Thus, from the
original amount of P39,330,500.85 claimed by MPC for refund, the independent auditor, SGV & Co.,
found only the sum of P28,745,502.40 sufficiently supported by valid invoices and/or official receipts.
Following its own examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted, the CTA further reduced
the amount refundable to P28,744,626.95 after disallowing the input VAT on the purchase of "xerox
and office supplies which cannot be capitalized and not necessary in the construction of power plant
facilities."28
It is worth noting that the foregoing findings by the CTA were affirmed in totality by the Court of
Appeals. Likewise, this Court finds no reason to disturb the foregoing findings of the tax court.
Another well-settled principle in this jurisdiction is that this Court is bound by the findings of fact of
the CTA. Only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of evidence, are reviewable by this Court.
Findings of fact of the CTA are not to be disturbed unless clearly shown to be unsupported by
substantial evidence.29 Quite the reverse, the claim of MPC for refund of input VAT on its purchase of
capital goods and services in the present case is found to be supported by substantial evidence, not
just by the CTA, but also by the Court of Appeals. The BIR Commissioner failed to convince this
Court otherwise.
IV
The BIR should seriously study and consider each and every application for claim for refund
pending before it.
As a final point, this Court would like to call the attention of the BIR Commissioner, as well as the
responsible BIR officers, to seriously study and consider each and every application for claim for
refund filed before their office. It is very obvious to this Court that the Answer filed by the BIR
Commissioner before the Court of Appeals, which it essentially reproduced as its Memorandum
before the same court, presented general and pro forma arguments. The BIR Commissioner only
raised belatedly before the Court of Appeals the issues of whether MPC is a public utility and
whether it is subject to franchise tax and not VAT. Even then, his Petition for Review before the
appellate court, numbering only six pages, with only one page devoted to a discussion of the merits
of his Petition, left much to be desired and would hardly persuade any court. Since he represents the
interest of the government in tax cases, the BIR Commissioner should exert more effort and exercise
more diligence in preparing his pleadings before any court; he should not wait to do so only upon
appeal of his case to the higher court. This Court may not always be inclined to allow him to remedy
his past laxity.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 30 July
2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60783, which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated
11 July 2000, of the CTA in CTA Case No. 5658, is hereby AFFIRMED. The BIR Commissioner is
hereby ORDERED to issue in favor of MPC a tax credit certificate in the amount of P28,744,626.95
representing input VAT paid on capital goods and services for the period of 1 April 1996 to 31
December 1996. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167471 February 5, 2007

GLICERIA SARMIENTO, Petitioner,
vs.
EMERITA ZARATAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the Court of
Appeals Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79001 entitled, "Emerita Zaratan v. Hon. Ramon A. Cruz, as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, Branch 223, and Gliceria Sarmiento," dated 17 August 2004,
which reversed and set side the Orders dated 19 June 2003 and 31 July 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-03-49437, dismissing respondent’s appeal for
failure to file the memorandum within the period provided for by law.
On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case2 against respondent

Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 36, docketed as
Civil Case No. 29109.
On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently established her causes against the
defendant and hereby order the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her:
1. to pay plaintiff the monthly rentals of ₱3,500.00 for the said premises from August 1, 2002
until defendant vacates the premises;
2. to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱20,000.00 plus ₱1,500.00 per appearance of counsel in court,
as and for attorney’s fees; and
to pay the cost of suit.3
Respondent filed her notice of appeal.4 Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 223, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-49437.
In the Notice of Appealed Case,5 the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in
accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file
a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within
which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time
of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the
delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood
compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet.6 But the motion
remained unacted.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the
appeal as follows:
Record shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through counsel, on
May 19, 2003 (Registry Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p. 298). Thus, under
Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen (15) days or until June 3,
2003 within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further appears on record, however, the
required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003 (Record, p. 623), or
six (6) days beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen day period.
It should be stressed that while the rules should be liberally construed, the provisions on
reglemenatry periods are strictly applied as they are "deemed indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business" (Legaspi-
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60577, October 11, 1983) and strict compliance therewith is
mandatory and imperative (FJR Garments Industries vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49329, June
29, 1984). The same is true with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals (Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals, L-25972, November 26, 1968).
Premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. This renders academic defendant-
appellant’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.7
1awphi1.net
On the basis of the above-quoted Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution,8 while
respondent moved for the Reconsideration.9 Both motions were denied by the RTC on 31 July 2003.
The Order in part reads:
In the main, defendant-appellants Motion for Reconsideration is premised on the argument that she
filed a timely "Motion for Extension of Time To File Memorandum," dated and filed on June 3, 2003,
but that her motion was not acted upon by this Court. She adds that her appeal memorandum was
filed well within the period sought by her in her "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum"
so that her appeal should not have been dismissed.
The argument is without merit. This Court did not take cognizance of defendant-appellant’s "Motion
for Extension of Time to File Memorandum," and rightly so, because it did not contain a notice of
hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an omission for which it
could offer no explanation. As declared in the case of Gozon, et al. v. court of Appeals (G.R. No.
105781, June 17, 1993);
x x x
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that a motion does not meet the requirements of Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has
no right to receive, and the court has no authority to act upon.
x x x
Moreover, parties and counsel should not assume that courts are bound to grant the time they pray
for. A motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied (Orosa vs. Court of Appeals, 261
SCRA 376 [1996]). Thus, defendant-appellant’s appeal was properly dismissed on account of her
failure to file an appeal memorandum within the fifteen (15) day period provided under Section 7(b),
Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
With regard to the "Motion for Immediate Execution," dated June 23, 2003, filed by plaintiff-appellee,
the rule is explicit that the execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, must be sought with the
inferior court which rendered the same. The appellate court which affirms a decision brought before
it on appeal cannot decree its execution in the guise of an execution of the affirming decision. The
only exception is when said appellate court grants an execution pending appeal, which is not the
case herein (City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362; Sy vs. Romero, 214 SCRA 187).10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, while respondent sought clarification on
whether the 31 July 2003 Order dismissing the appeal was anchored on Section (b), Rule 40 or
Section 7(c) of the same Rule.
On 27 August 2003, the RTC reconsidered its previous Order by granting petitioner’s motion for
Immediate Execution, but denied respondent’s Motion for Clarification, in this wise:
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that "the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom. Pursuant to this Rule and taking into account the arguments of the plaintiff in her
"Urgent Motion for Reconsideration," the Court is inclined to grant the same. As further correctly
argued by the plaintiff, through counsel, during the hearing on her motion on August 15, 2003, the
cases of City of Manila v. Court of Appeals (204 SCRA 362) and Sy vs. Romero (214 SCRA 187)
cited in the July 31, 2003 Order refer to ejectment cases which has (sic) been decided with finality
and hence, inapplicable to this case where a further appeal is still available to the defendant. It
should likewise be noted that while the Supreme Court ruled in these cases that execution of a
judgment in an ejectment case must be sought with the inferior court which rendered the same, it
likewise provided that for an exception to this rule, that is, in cases where the appellate court grants
an execution pending appeal, as the case herein.
With regard to defendant’s Motion for Clarification, contained in her Opposition, the Court notes that
the issues raised therein have already been squarely dealt with in the July 31, 2003 Order. The
same must, therefore, be denied.11
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted in a
decision dated 17 August 2004. The appellate court nullified and set aside the 19 June 2003 and 31
July 2003 Orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondent’s appeal. Consequently,
respondent’s appeal memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.12
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13 on 13 September 2004, followed by a Motion for
Inhibition14 of the members of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals on 20 September 2004.
Both motions were denied for lack of merit on 10 March 2005.15
Hence, this appeal by petitioner posing the following issues,16 thus:
1. Whether respondent’s petition for certiorari should have been dismissed in the first place;
2. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s
motion for extension;
3. Whether it is Section 19 of Rule 7 that applies, and not Section 21; and
4. Whether the Court of Appeals Justices should have inhibited themselves from further
proceeding with the subject case.
Stated otherwise, the main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error of law in granting the Writ of Certiorari. In granting the petition, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the RTC erred in dismissing respondent’s appeal for failure to file the required
Memorandum within the period provided by law and in granting petitioner’s Motion for Immediate
Execution of the MeTC decision.
Before resolving the substantive issues raised by petitioner, the Court will first address the
procedural infirmities ascribed by petitioner. Petitioner assails the correctness and propriety of the
remedy resorted to by respondent by filing a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals. According
to petitioner, certiorari is not appropriate and unavailing as the proper remedy is an appeal.
It must be noted that respondent’s appeal in the RTC was dismissed for failure to file the required
memorandum within the period allowed by law, as the Motion for Extension of Time to file
Memorandum was not acted upon for failure to attach a notice of hearing. From the said dismissal,
respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
Respondent correctly filed said petition pursuant to Section 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken:
xxxx
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65. (Underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner also contends that the Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals should be
dismissed as the certification of non-forum shopping was defective. The verification in part reads:
I, EMERITA ZARATAN, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to, according to law, depose and
say:
That I, Emerita Zaratan is one of the respondent (sic) in the above entitled case, hereby declare, that
I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing Comment on the Petition; that I have read
all the allegations therein, which are true and correct to the best of my own knowledge.
That as respondent, I further certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the foregoing Petition in the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or
different Divisions thereof, respectively, or any tribunal, or agency; and should it be known that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending in any of the abovementioned Courts or
different Divisions thereof, the petitioner shall notify the Honorable Court to which this certification is
filed, within five (5) days from such notice. (Underscoring ours.)
Petitioner avers that respondent by stating in the above-quoted certification that she was the
respondent, while in truth she was the petitioner and by stating that respondent caused the
preparation of the comment on the petition, instead of the petition itself, indicate that respondent did
not understand what she was signing. The defect of the verification all renders the petition in the
Court of Appeals without legal effect and constitutes ground for its dismissal.
The contention is baseless.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition
have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is
simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not
necessarily render it fatally defective.17 Perusal of the verification in question shows there was
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the alleged defects are not so material
as to justify the dismissal of the petition in the Court of Appeals. The defects are mere typographical
errors. There appears to be no intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and
certification, which are intended to assure the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition and to discourage forum shopping.18
Now, the substantial issues.
Corollary to the dismissal of the appeal by the RTC is the question of whether the lack of notice of
hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the
filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper.
Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in her
Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion is a
worthless piece of paper with no legal effect.
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her Notice of
Appeal and payment of the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of time to file the
Memorandum, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five days
within which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing required by Section
4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is
mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not
affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.19
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by
the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an
opportunity to be heard.20 The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the
movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet
the arguments of the motion.21 Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not
be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.22
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion
and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.23 Considering the
circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially
complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.24 Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The
required extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to
storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that
said motion was interposed to delay the appeal.25 As it appears, respondent sought extension prior
to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the
requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the
merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion where
notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application,
but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in
the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As a general rule,
notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and
principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard.
It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in
situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the
motion."26
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of
justice would be better served.27 Furthermore, this Court emphasized its policy that technical rules
should accede to the demands of substantial justice because there is no vested right in
technicalities. Litigations, should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the
constant rulings of this Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities.28 Indeed, rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in
court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote justice must be avoided.29
The visible emerging trend is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from constraints and technicalities.
Parenthetically, it must be noted also that when the appeal was dismissed on 19 June 2003, the
memorandum was already filed in court on 9 June 2003.
On the issue of immediate execution of judgment.
The applicable provision is Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 19. Immediate Execution of judgment; how to stay the same.- If judgment is rendered against
the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected
and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal
Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down
to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any,
as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. x x x.
To stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings, Section 19 requires that the
defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically
deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, execution pending appeal was premature as
respondent had already filed a supersedeas bond and the monthly rental for the current month of the
premises in question.30
The invocation of petitioner of the provisions of Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which
runs:
Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.- The judgment of
the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
to justify the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal in this case is misplaced.
A closer examination of the above-quoted provision reveals that said provision applies to decision of
the RTC rendered in its appellate jurisdiction, affirming the decision of the MeTC. In the case at bar,
the RTC order was an order dismissing respondent’s appeal based on technicality. It did not resolve
substantive matters delving on the merits of the parties’ claim in the ejectment case. Thus, the case
brought to the Court of Appeals was the dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the required
memorandum within the period provided by law, and not on the merits of the ejectment case.
Lastly, petitioner posited the view that the Court of Appeals’ justices should have inhibited
themselves because of bias and partiality for deciding the case within eight months and for being
very selective in discussing the issues.
We reject the proposition.
Inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias and partiality is not enough
ground for judges to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown
acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the
stigma of bias and partiality.31 This Court has invariably held that for bias and prejudice to be
considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare
allegations of their partiality will not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according
to law and evidence and without fear and favor."32
There is no factual support to petitioner’s charge of bias and partiality. A perusal of the records of the
case fails to reveal that any bias or prejudice motivated the Court of Appeals in granting
respondent’s petition. Neither did this Court find any questionable or suspicious circumstances
leading to the issuance of the questioned decision, as suggested by petitioner.
The fact alone that the Court of Appeals decided the case within eight months does not in any way
indicate bias and partiality against petitioner. It is within the constitutional mandate to decide the
case within 12 months.33
As to petitioner’s allegation that the Court of Appeals was selective in choosing what issues to
resolve, it bears to stress again that "a judge’s appreciation or misappreciation of the sufficiency of
evidence x x x adduced by the parties, x x x, without proof of malice on the part of respondent judge,
is not sufficient to show bias and partiality."34We also emphasized that "repeated rulings against a
litigant, no matter how erroneously, vigorously and consistently expressed, do not amount to bias
and prejudice which can be bases for the disqualification of a judge."35
IN ALL, petitioner utterly failed to show that the appellate court erred in issuing the assailed decision.
On the contrary, it acted prudently in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 17
August 2004 and the Resolution dated 10 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79001 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142022 September 7, 2005

MINDANAO SAVINGS ANDD LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
VICENTA VDA. DE FLORES, and HEIRS OF FLORENCIO FLORES, SR., namely, EDNA
FLORES EISEIDEL, BELINDA FLORES, FLORENCIO T. FLORES, JR., ROBERTO T. FLORES,
SYLVIA FLORES SICAT and LORNA FLORES FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
nullify and set aside the twin resolutions dated October 27, 19991 and February 15, 20022 of the
Court of Appeals which respectively dismissed petitioner’s appeal from an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Malaybalay, Bukidnon for failure to file its appellant’s brief on time, and
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal resolution.
Records reveal the essential following facts:
During his lifetime, or more specifically on December 9, 1982, Florencio Flores, Sr., husband of
respondent Vicenta Vda. De Flores and predecessor-in-interest of the other respondents, entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement with DS Homes, Inc. (DSHI) for the development and commercial
utilization of the Flores spouses’ two (2) adjoining lots located at the center of the town of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. Pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement, Flores, Sr., as capitalist partner,
secured a loan of ₱1.5M from petitioner Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (MSLAI)
using as collaterals therefor the two (2) aforementioned lots. Under the same agreement, DSHI, as
industrial partner, shall have the full and complete authority to pursue the development project and
the management thereof thereafter.
In time, out of the loan secured by Flores, Sr. from petitioner, a commercial building known as
the Flores Building was constructed on the lots in question.
Business operations of the joint venture commenced in August, 1984. A portion of the first floor of
the building was leased by DSHI to petitioner which used the space as office of its branch at
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, while the rest of the same floor were occupied by a fastfood establishment, a
drugstore and a grocery. The second floor of the building was used as a function room and the third
floor as lodging inn.
In 1986, the joint venture suffered severe business reversals on account of which DSHI discontinued
the management of the Flores Building, prompting respondents to take over its operations.
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1990, petitioner MSLAI, then operating under the name "Davao Savings
and Loan Association", was placed by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank under receivership of
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) which was later designated by the Monetary
Board as liquidator of the already insolvent MSLAI.
On November 10, 1992, respondents received from PDIC a demand letter for the payment of an
outstanding obligation in the staggering amount of ₱23,756,477.61 as of October 31, 1992.
Unable to believe that the original loan of ₱1.5M obtained by their predecessor could have reached
that much, respondents then filed with the Regional Trial Court at Bukidnon a complaint
for Accounting and Liquidation of Joint Venture, Annulment of Loan & Mortgages and
Damages thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 2138. Impleaded as defendants in the case were,
among others, DSHI, petitioner MSLAI and one Francisco D. Villamor and other officers of DSHI.
Albeit not a party to the Joint Venture Agreement, petitioner MSLAI was impleaded as a party-
defendant, it being respondents’ allegation that petitioner and DSHI were practically one and the
same, as in fact defendant Francisco Villamor was the general manager of both corporate entities
and that although the two (DSHI and MSLAI) are separate and distinct corporations, they acted as
one in the implementation and execution of the Joint VentureAgreement under the effective direction
and control of Francisco Villamor who was the moving force in the manipulations of the loans and
dissipation of the funds of the joint venture.
In its answer, petitioner maintained that it is a separate and distinct corporation from DSHI, adding
that respondents have no cause of action against it as it is never a party to the Joint Venture
Agreement between DSHI and respondents’ predecessor-in-interest.
In a decision dated January 26, 1998,3 the trial court, upon a finding that [T]he sum total of the
foregoing evidence abundantly demonstrates further the unity of the corporate defendants and how
they manipulated the loan and the funds of the joint venture, about which petitioner MSLAI failed to
refute plaintiffs’ extensive evidence making out a strong case of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
against it and DHSI, rendered judgment for the respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered:
1. Declaring that the accounting and/or liquidation of the Joint Venture Agreement entered into by
the late Dr. Florencio Flores, Sr., and the Davao Homes, Inc., dated December 9, 1982, to be
already deemed made and terminated. Accordingly, no party or parties shall receive any award of
income/share.
2. All income generated by the Flores building beginning 1986 shall henceforth exclusively belong to
plaintiffs.
3. Annulling and declaring null and void the said Joint Venture Agreement.
4. Declaring the Flores building which was built under the Joint Venture agreement, aforementioned,
in the exclusive ownership of plaintiffs, free from all aliens and encumbrances.
5. Annulling and declaring VOID the contract of loan, together with the corresponding promissory
notes (marked Exhibit "1" to "1-10"), and the real mortgage (marked Exhibits "J’ to "J-3") executed by
Dr. Florencio Flores and Vicenta Flores, as principal borrower, in favor of defendant Bank (Mindanao
Savings and Loan Association) as creditor.
6. No party is entitled to any award of damages including costs.
SO ORDERED.
On February 4, 1998, petitioner MSLAI filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal by reason of which
the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals.
On February 29, 1999, the appellate court issued a notice to the parties requiring them to file their
respective briefs within 45 days from receipt thereof.
On June 21, 1999, the office of the Chief Legal Counsel of the PDIC, as counsel for petitioner
MSLAI, entered its appearance in the appellate court and filed a motion for a 45-day extension of
time to file appellant’s brief.
In its Resolution of August 11, 1999, the appellate court favorably acted on petitioner’s motion and
accordingly granted petitioner forty-five (45) days from June 21 or until August 5, 1999, within which
to file its appellant’s brief.
Come August 5, 1999, but no appellant’s brief was filed by petitioner. Instead, on August 25, 1999,
or way beyond the period given by the appellate court, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit, therein
praying that the appellant’s brief thereto attached be admitted.
In its challenged Resolution dated October 27, 1999, the appellate court denied admission of the
proffered Appellant’s Brief for being filed twenty (20) days late, and consequently dismissed
petitioner’s appeal.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its subsequent Resolution
of February 15, 2000, petitioner is now with us via the instant recourse on the following assigned
errors, which perplexingly, are actually an assault against the decision of the trial court and not the
challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals. We quote the assigned errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ANNULLING AND DECLARING VOID THE CONTRACT OF
LOAN AND THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES EXECUTED BY SPOUSES DR. FLORENCIO
FLORES AND VICENTA FLORES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PIERCING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE FICTION OF MSLAI AND
DSHI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ANNULLING THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT AND
DECLARING RESPONDENTS AS THE EXCLUSIVE OWNER OF THE FLORES BUILDING FREE
FROM ALL LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES.4
At the outset, let it be made clear that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court are only those committed by the Court of
Appeals and not directly those of the trial court.
It is thus unfortunate that the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel of the PDIC, as petitioner’s counsel
in this case, is evidently unaware of how appellate proceedings before this Court go.
As we see it, the sole question before us is the propriety of the appellate court’s resolution
dismissing petitioner’s appeal on account of petitioner’s failure to file its appellant’s brief on time, and
not the desired relaxation of procedural rules regarding reglementary periods.
We must emphasize that review is not a matter of right. Accordingly, there should be strict
adherence to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Section 6 of which delineates the grounds for the
allowance of review to avoid delays in the enforcement of final judgments and orders of lower courts,
to wit:
SEC. 6. Review discretionary. - A review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons
which will be considered:
(a) When the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court; or
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of the
power of supervision.
Petitioner attempts to justify its tardiness by claiming that its handling counsel who resigned from
PDIC on July 30, 1999 failed to turn over the subject case to another lawyer for re-assignment.
This excuse is not only flimsy but utterly lame.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner is represented by no less than the Office of the Chief Legal
Counsel of the PDIC which has, at its helm and command, a battery of lawyers. As pointed out by
respondents, on July 7, 1999, the handling counsel tendered his resignation from PDIC effective on
July 30, 1999.5 Petitioner, therefore, had 29 days from July 7, 1999, or until August 5, 1999, the last
day for filing the subject brief. During those 29 days, petitioner had the luxury of time to file its
appellant’s brief, or, at the very least, ask for another extension from the appellate court. It did not.
Petitioner ought to be reminded that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to the parties’ substantive rights. Like
all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons as when
"transcendental matters" of life, liberty or state security are involved.
True, litigation is not a game of technicalities. It is equally true, however, that every case must be
presented in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.6
Doubtless, and judging from the very nature of petitioner’s assigned errors, the instant petition was
resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. This cannot be allowed, more so when, as
here, such loss is occasioned by petitioner’s own neglect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-22939. November 5, 1924. ]

L. GARDUNO, Petitioner, v. A. DIAZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Respondent.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins & Brady and Camus & Delgado for Petitioner.
Attorney-General Vill-Real for Respondent.
Jose Abad Santos as amicus curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; MOOT CASES. — Courts exist to decide actual controversies, not to give
opinions upon abstract propositions.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
This is a moot case made so by the action of the parties.
The prayer of the original petition for certiorari and prohibition asked that a writ issue
restraining the respondent from proceeding further in the so-called contempt
proceedings, or any proceedings of like nature related to the facts, and particularly
from enforcing the order to show cause previously issued. The prayer of the
supplemental petition was that, since the respondent had revoked the order complained
of, the present case be summarily disposed of by a permanent prohibition against any
renewed attempt to revive the order or any like proceedings. But the respondent judge
assures us that there is no intention on his part nor is he aware of any necessity of
promulgating any further order in the premises.
The sole purpose of issuing the writ would be to establish a principle to govern other
cases. But courts exist to decide actual controversies, not to give a opinions upon
abstract propositions. (U. S. v. Hoffman, [186], 4 Wall., 158; Mills v. Green [1895],
159 U. S., 651; Jones v. Montague [1904], 194 U. S., 147.)
Proceedings ordered dismissed without costs.
Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
The appellants in their own behalf.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW. —

Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were allowed only
to Courts of First Instance. By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has
been so amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when
the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. This amendment of the
procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the
purpose stated — that is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute
or ordinance upon which the judgment was predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing
that such has uniformly been the interpretation of section 43 by this court.
DECISION
TRENT, J. :
The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played
the game of chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to
the Court of First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted upon the same
charge. An appeal was allowed to this court because the validity of Ordinance No, 35
was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court below.
Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No. 35 valid, and (2) is this
court required under the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining
the guilt or innocence of the defendants?
The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United
States v. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of
this branch of the case is unnecessary.
With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason of the defendants’
having in the lower court questioned the legality of Ordinance No. 35, for the violation
of which they have been convicted, this case has been brought to us in all its details of
law and fact, including the evidence taken at the trial, on which the Court of First
Instance founded its judgment touching the guilt and condemning the defendants.
While, on the other hand, it is contended that the questions of fact, which we are [not]
authorized to examine, are those which are essential to be examined for the purpose of
determining the legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the penalties provided for therein, and
no other.
At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal procedure in force in this
jurisdiction prior to the promulgation on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders
No. 58.
The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the execution of the royal decree
of September 4, 1884, wherein it was ordered that the Penal Code in force in the
Peninsula, as amended in accordance with the recommendations of the code
committee, be published and applied in the Philippine Islands, as well as the Provisional
Law of Criminal Procedure which accompanied it. These two laws, having been
published in the Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective
four months thereafter.
According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned provisional law, the

justices of the peace, or gobernadorcillos, had original jurisdiction over the offenses set
forth in Book 3 of the Penal Code.
Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo receives
notice that there has been committed any one of the offenses provided for in Book 3 of
the Penal Code which can be prosecuted by the Government, he shall issue summons
for an oral trial to the complainant, if any, to the alleged culprit, and to the witnesses
who may be able to testify as to the facts, fixing the day and hour for holding the trial.
If this (the trial) takes place at the residence of the promotor fiscal, he shall also be
summoned." Rule 3 provided that the same procedure should be followed in those
cases which can only be prosecuted at the instance of a private party, except that the
promotor fiscal was not cited.
Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of the Peninsula, nor the autos
acordados prescribed any special form for the complaint to be presented to the justice
of the peace or the gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the Compilation of
the Laws of Criminal Procedure of 1879 was applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412
read: "ART. 405. The complaint made in writing must be signed by the complainant,
and if he cannot do so, by some other person at his request. The authority or official
who receives it shall rubricate and seal every page in the presence of the person who
presents it, which also he may do himself or through another person at his request.
"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to writing by the authority or
official who receives it, wherein, in the form of a declaration, shall be set forth such
information as the complainant may have regarding the act complained of and the
circumstances thereof, and both shall sign it at the bottom. If the complainant cannot
sign his name, some other person shall do so at his request." cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the Government must begin with a
complaint."cralaw virtua1aw library
The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days next following the date
when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo received information that the
offense had been committed (Rule 4), the procedure being that provided for in Rule 9,
which reads: "The trial shall be public, beginning with the reading of the complaint, if
any there be, followed by the examination of the witnesses summoned and the
introduction of such other evidence as the complainant, accuser, and public prosecutor,
if he take part, may request and the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo may
regard as pertinent. Immediately thereafter the accused shall be given a hearing, the
witnesses who appear in his defense shall be examined, and such other evidence as the
justice or the gobernadorcillo may declare to be admissible shall be adduced. The
parties shall forthwith make such pleas as they think expedient in support of their
respective contentions, the first to speak being the public prosecutor, if he take part,
then the private complainant, and finally the accused.
"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the trial for misdemeanors,
whenever he is cited thereto, in accordance with Rule 2." cralaw virtua1aw library
A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure was clearly and succinctly
set forth, and signed by all the parties participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)
After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties could appeal to the Court of
First Instance within the first day next following that on which notice of the rendition of
judgment was served. The appeal suspended the judgment. After the appeal had been
allowed, the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo remitted to the Court of First
Instance the original record and cited the parties to appear within the period of five
days before the appellate court. This time could be extended, if the circumstances of
the case required. (Rule 14.) If the appellant appealed, a day was fixed for the trial;
but if he did not appear, the appeal was dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule 16 provides the
procedure for the trial in the second instance. This rule reads: "The hearing at the trial
shall be public, and all the proceedings in the case shall be read therein; then the
parties or their attorneys may speak in their turn, and thereafter the judgment shall be
pronounced and communicated to them.
"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as fixed by Rule 11." cralaw virtua1aw library
Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be admitted other than that
which, offered in the first instance, was not taken for reasons independent of the will of
the parties who had offered it." cralaw virtua1aw library
Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance will be executory, and
there will be no recourse from the same except that of responsibility before the
audiencia del territorio." cralaw virtua1aw library
The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the question under consideration,
are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First Instance or courts of similar
jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts
an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall
also lie from the final judgments of justices of the peace in criminal cases to the courts
of the next superior grade, and the decisions of the latter thereon shall be final and
conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute,
wherein appeal may be made to the Supreme Court." cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justice’s court shall be tried in all respects anew in
the court to which the same are appealed; but on the hearing of such appeals it shall
not be necessary, unless the appeal shall involve the constitutionality or legality of a
statute, that a written record of the proceedings be kept; but shall be sufficient if the
appellate court keeps a docket of the proceedings in the form prescribed in the next
preceding section."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 so as to read as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction,
and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. The convicted party may
appeal from any final judgment of a justice of the peace in a criminal cause to the Court
of First Instance by filing a notice of appeal with such justice within fifteen days after
the entry of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward to the
Court of First Instance all original papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the
cause, and the provincial fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of the
prosecution. The judgment of the Court of First Instance in such appeals shall be final
and conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or
the constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance." cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the passage of Act No. 1627,
that the military governor and the framers of General Orders No. 58 intended by the
use of the word "statute" found in section 43 (supra) to include "ordinances," the
amendment of this section by section 34 of that Act does not affect the issue in the
instant case. The original section provided that "an appeal may be made to the
Supreme Court in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute," and the
section, as amended, authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court in the same class of
cases.
It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must
apply the same rule of construction that the courts in England and the United States
have ,almost uniformly applied to the same term and thus derive an unqualified review
of both the law and the facts. This doubtless would be a correct position in some
jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of the term
"appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. &
Light Co. v. Bunn (168 Fed. Rep., 862), wherein the court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law
for a review of questions of law only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon
both the facts and the law, is vital. These remedies have their origin and functions in
the inherent difference between courts of law and courts of equity, differences which
are recognized in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress. The
’writ of error’ is a common law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the
final judgment of a common-law court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire
facias de novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to us from the civil law along
with the fundamentals which go to make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its
office is to remove the entire cause, and it subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact
and law and is in substance a new trial." cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and
equitable relief is dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts
of equity as they are known and distinguished in England and the United States. All
cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the same manner, including their final
disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as used in section 43
(supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to
another in its entirety, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial,
but it is to be interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction.
The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the law. In order to ascertain
that intention the provisions of the order must be construed in the light of existing law
and the circumstances at the time of its promulgation.
At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal cases originating in Courts
of First Instance came to the audiencia in their entirety, subjecting both the law and the
facts to a review or retrial. But the audiencia, or Philippine Supreme Court, could not
review the judgment of a Court of First Instance in any case tried on appeal from courts
of justices of the peace wherein the latter courts had jurisdiction. Such judgments were
final and conclusive. The aggrieved party could go no further with the case. The only
recourse he had was that mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for violations of
the provisions of Book 3 of the Penal Code over which justices of the peace then had
jurisdiction were generally arreto or arresto menor and small fines. This was the law in
force at the time section 43 (supra) was framed and these were the conditions
confronting the framers of that section at that time. What changes did the section
make?
Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of Courts
of First Instance "and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said
courts." This part of the section is limited to judgments rendered in criminal cases
originating in Courts of First Instance. This is necessarily true because the latter part of
the section makes the decisions of the "courts of next superior grade (which were
Courts of First Instance) rendered in cases appealed from justices’ courts final and
conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The
result is that the former procedure was amended by section 43 so as to also authorize
appeals to the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned in the latter part thereof when
the validity or constitutionality of a statute was drawn in question. To this extent only
was the former procedural law changed in so far as, the question at issue is concerned.
Among the reasons which induced the lawmakers to make this change was the fact that
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace was "extended to all offenses which the Penal
Code designates as punishable by arresto mayor in all of its grades." (Sec. 108.)
If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be illegal and
unconstitutional, the judgment appealed from would necessarily have to be set aside
and defendants would have no interest in presenting to us the evidence taken at the
trial. But we have maintained the legality of that ordinance, and in so doing have we
exhausted our powers and reached the limit of our inquiry? Section 43 does not
expressly so limit our power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the
testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants.
The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation

and the correctness of that imposed by a justice of the peace under a municipal
ordinance, and between the illegality of the ordinance and that of the proceedings or
actions taken under it, is plain and broad. An ordinance may, from the standpoint of the
regularity of all the proceedings leading up to and inclusive of its enactment, be
absolutely faultless and yet the ultimate act done or enacted may be inherently or
intrinsically illegal or unconstitutional. On the other hand, the latter may be perfectly
unassailable and yet the ordinance be illegal or unconstitutional by reason of some fact
or circumstance connected with its passage. It may, for instance, have been presented
in a wrong manner, at a wrong time, or not voted for as directed by law. It is to facts of
this class or character that section 43 refers when it says "the latter thereon shall be
final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a
statute."cralaw virtua1aw library
Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provisions of the
latter part of section 43, already quoted, especially when they are considered in the
light of the former practice above indicated. Under that practice no appeals whatever
were allowed to the Supreme Court from judgments of Courts of First Instance in cases
originating in justices’ courts. We must assume that the framers of section 43 had
knowledge of this practice and its effects. The framers desired to amend this practice to
the extent only of providing a way by which statutory questions, which might arise in
these cases, could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This object could be very
imperfectly obtained, if, when the court assumed jurisdiction of such a case, it would
not only determine the statutory questions, but also inquire into and determine every
other question raised during the progress of the trial. In effect, this would entirely
destroy the former practice, because it would render it possible to bring every case
here in its entirety. All that would be necessary would be to raise some statutory
question, whether material to the decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal
and reexamination of the whole case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was
intended, nor is it manifest from the language employed in section 43. But it is urged
that our ruling in this matter "involves the legal absurdity of disjoining a single case and
turning over one fragment to one court and another parcel to another court." (Elliott on
Appellate Procedure, sec. 17.) In this section the author is speaking of appellate
jurisdiction where the distinction between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He says:
"Where a court of equity retains jurisdiction for one purpose, it will retain it for all
purposes." The same author recognizes a difference in the two systems of appellate
jurisdiction — that is, the one where the distinction between law and equity is
maintained and, the other, where the two are blended. (Section 24.) In this last section
the author says: "In some respects an appeal under the code system may be less
comprehensive in its scope than an appeal under the old system," citing Judge Curtis,
wherein he said that "it is evident that an appeal under the code system does not
necessarily bring up the entire case." In view of the fact that the code system prevails
in the Philippine Islands, blending legal and equitable rights and providing for one
remedial system, our holding in the instant case is not in conflict with Elliot on Appellate
Procedure.
It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. . Columbia Township
Trustees (179 U. S., 472), and followed in the late case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold
Water Co., Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U. S., 84), is directly opposed to our holding in the
case under consideration. These two cases went to the Supreme Court of the United
States on writs of error directly from the circuit courts in accordance with the provisions
of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. This section provides "that appeals or
writs of error may be taken from the district courts, or from the existing circuit courts,
direct to the Supreme Court in the following cases: . . ." Here Congress maintains the
distinction between "appeals" and "writs of error." In each case above cited the
Supreme Court of the United States held that it not only had jurisdiction to review the
constitutional questions, but also every other question properly arising. The court then
proceeded to review all legal questions in those cases and not questions of fact, for the
reason that the cases were before the court on writs of error. Even granting that the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the Act above mentioned to review both
questions of law and fact in cases appealed to that court, such holding would not be
antagonistic to our views in the instant case for the reason that our power to review the
facts touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be found in section 43 of
General Orders No. 58. Our view is, as above indicated, that the framers of that section
did not intend to confer upon this court that power. And all must admit that the military
governor at the time he promulgated General Orders No. 58 had the power to limit or
restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the
character of the one under consideration.
Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the adjudicated cases of this Supreme
Court.
In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the court said: "Upon the facts
stated in the complaint the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but
upon such appeal the only question to be considered will be that of the validity or
invalidity of the ordinance. We cannot review the evidence nor pass upon any other
question of law which may appear in the record." cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant was convicted in the
municipal court of the city of Manila for violating a municipal ordinance. He appealed to
the Court of First Instance, where he was again convicted. An appeal was allowed to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the constitutionality or validity of the ordinance was
drawn in question. On appeal the appellant insisted, among other things, that the trial
court erred in deciding the case without first consulting with the two assessors. This
court held the ordinance valid and, after quoting with approval the language used in the
case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (supra), said: "In cases where the appeal involves the
constitutionality or validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the
judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not authorize this court to
review the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to the question of the
validity of the Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case." cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil. Rep., 610), we examined the
facts touching the due enactment of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was
held valid, but the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the appellant were not gone
into.
In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used this language at page 12:
"While we have discussed at length each of the assignments of error made by the
appellants, nevertheless, the only question, in fact, presented by the appeal under the
law, in the first instance, is whether or not the ordinance under which the defendants
were sentenced is legal. Having concluded that said ordinance is legal and within the
express powers of the Municipal Board to enact, the appeal must be dismissed, with
costs in this instance against the appellants in equal parts." cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court, after quoting the testimony
of a sanitary inspector and after holding the ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the
case, which is undisputed, is sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant the order
complained of. It does not appear therefrom, the defendant himself having introduced
substantially no proof in the case, that he was treated differently from other persons in
that locality, or that he was required to do a thing that the others had not been
required to do, or that he had in any way been discriminated against in the application
of this ordinance to the facts of his case, or that its application was oppressive or
unreasonable in this particular instance.
"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs." cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering this language, together with that used in the opinion wherein the court
said, "The sole question raised on this appeal is that presented by the claim of the
appellant that the ordinance in question is unreasonable and oppressive," it is clear that
the court did not intend to hold that it had authority to examine into the question of the
guilt or innocence of the Appellant.
In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the appellants were
convicted of a violation of Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in
question the validity of that ordinance, an appeal was allowed to this court. In disposing
of this case the court said: "Precisely this question was presented in the case of the
United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court, in which we held
that said Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila was valid and constitutional. That case
is on all fours with the present one, and the judgment of conviction of the Court of First
Instance is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants, on the authority of that
case."cralaw virtua1aw library
No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony touching the guilt or
innocence of the appellants.
In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v. Gaw Kee (R. G., No.
7816); United States v. Lim Cui (R. G., No. 7815); United States v. See Kea (R. G., No.
7828); United States v. Go Tin (R. G., No. 7481); United States v. Sia Kim (R. G., No.
7716); United States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. 7915); United States v. Li Tia (R. G., No.
7826); and United States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not reported, the appellants
were convicted for a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and,
having drawn in question the validity of that ordinance, appeals were allowed to this
court. This court, upon the authority of the United States v. Ten Yu (supra), dismissed
the appeals and directed the records to be returned to the court below for execution of
the sentences.
Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are sufficient to show that we have
followed in the instant case the uniform holding of this court for more than ten years. In
fact, the court has not, since its organization, held in any case that it has the power to
review the facts touching the guilt of an accused person in cases of the character of the
one under consideration.
Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we should use in the final
disposition of cases wherein the statute or ordinance has been upheld. Sometimes we
say, "The judgment is affirmed," and at other times we have said "the appeal is
dismissed," etc. The result is the same and it is of little importance which expression we
use. But, as the case comes to us on appeal for the purpose of testing the legality of
the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment rests and as the judgment cannot be
executed without the sanction of this court, it is perfectly legal to "affirm" or "reverse"
the judgment as the case may be.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the defendants. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113296. January 16, 1998.]
ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ABUNDIO

T. MERCED, doing business under the name and style of SOUTHERN
ENGINEERING WORKS, Respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 6, 1980, a complaint for a sum of money attorney’s fees and damages 1
was filed by petitioner before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Davao City which was raffled to Branch XVI. The pre-trial was conducted by Judge
Pacita Canizares-Nye and later by Judges Alejandro Siazon and Cristeto Dinopol. 2
During the trial on November 20, 1984, Judge Renato Fuentes heard the evidence for
petitioner and private respondent, but the latter’s cross examination on August 28,
1985 and the presentation of the parties’ rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidences were
heard by Judge Roque Agton, having assumed office on August 1, 1985. When the
judiciary was reorganized under the Aquino administration, Judge Agton was
transferred to another branch of the Regional Trial Court, 3 (RTC) but within the same
Judicial Region. Meanwhile, Judge Romeo Marasigan, who assumed office on February
3, 1987, 4 was assigned to Branch XVI. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime on May 1987, Judge Marasigan acted on private respondent’s motion for
extension of time to file memorandum. On June 9, 1987 decision penned by Judge
Agton was rendered in favor of petitioner. Private respondent moved to reconsider said
decision, but the same was denied in an order dated March 1, 1988, issued by Judge
Marasigan. Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which nullified
Judge Agton’s decision on the ground that at the time he rendered the judgment, he
was neither the judge de jure nor the judge de facto of RTC Branch XVI, and
correspondingly remanded the case to the lower court. 5 Hence, this petition on the
sole issue of whether or not the decision of Judge Agton is valid. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the rules, or by the court. Records disclose
that this case was submitted for decision sometime on March 1987 after the parties’
submission of their memoranda as required by the court, at which time Judge
Marasigan was already presiding in Branch XVI. Thus, the case was submitted for
decision to Judge Marasigan and not to Judge Agton who by then was already
transferred to another branch. Judge Agton’s decision, therefore, appears to be tainted
with impropriety. Nevertheless, the subsequent motion for reconsideration of Judge
Agton’s decision was acted upon by Judge Marasigan himself and his denial of the said
motion indicates that he subscribed with and adopted in toto Judge Agton’s decision.
Any incipient defect was cured. Besides, the presumption that both magistrates (Agton
and Marasigan) have regularly performed their official functions, 6 have not at all been
rebutted by contrary evidence.
Moreover, for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during
the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. 7 This is in line with the
Court’s En Banc Resolution of February 10, 1983 implementing B.P. 129 8 which
"merely requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, i.e.,
in this case, a judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the
time the decision is promulgated." 9 Branches of the trial court are not distinct and
separate tribunals from each other. 10 Hence, contrary to private respondent’s
allegation, Judge Agton could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case, because
jurisdiction does not attach to the judge out to the court. 11 The continuity of a court
and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation, or
cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it. To remand a validly decided
case to the incumbent Presiding Judge of Branch XVI, as what the CA suggests, would
only prolong this rather simple collection suit and would run counter to the avowed
policy of the Court to accord a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition for every
action. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE
and the decision of Judge Agton is REINSTATED. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor;
SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's
so-called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion
to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the
issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of
an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698
was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed
at P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for
and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which pertinently states in part:
2
xxx xxx xxx
3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which
required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or
gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further,
she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain.
....
4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended
bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she
is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she
be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court
and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have
recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her
arrest be immediately recalled.
x x x x x x x x x
4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing petitioner to post a
3
cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at
the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said
court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the
other legal fees.
4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of
the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty.
Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying
for about fifteen minutes.
5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991,
setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of
May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said
court on or before June 5, 1991. 6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining
under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would
like to prove as baseless.7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos.
12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential
Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court,
in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment,
originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of
conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said
contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner
until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to
cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and
lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. The motion for
9
reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated
September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure
order against petitioner which reads as follows:
Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to
leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering
the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on
January 13, 1992, although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration
from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that
she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier
claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24,
1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused
unless authorized from (sic) this Court. 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States
to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the
United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and
corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave

abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and

due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order
despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable
Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of
speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but
also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only
under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.
4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing
circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.
5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her
characteristic transparency and candor, there is no reasonable ground to fear that
petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes.
11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the
fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. We
reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of
the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the
court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
12
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. 13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting
of bail bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought
leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan)
for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond
she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be
heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting
the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise
that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional
release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even
attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed by the
fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the
court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and
acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which
ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before
respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that
in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who
requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn
around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and
accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued
the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of
this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to
prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more
reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering
with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She
contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order
previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case
pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary
restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for
reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court
continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a
judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is
taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment
decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is
taken or during the pendency of an appeal, and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations
14
should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where
an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend
the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on
the dismissal of the action. 15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective,
even though it is not final. A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a
16
restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the
restraining order or temporary injunction and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect
17
such dissolution. Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an
18
injunction. There must be a new exercise of .judicial power.

19 20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:
. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that
an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force.
The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge
Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so
insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on
notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one,
yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will
improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever
had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction
impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court." . . .
Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity
practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it
by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . . 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in
point and of more recent vintage:
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of
UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the
petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en
banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment
decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall
not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency
of an appeal. . . . .22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the
Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner.
At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992.
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action
for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether generated
by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason
for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation
for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of
divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is
elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a
case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no
writ of injunction restraining it. The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or
23
restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is
nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case
pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless
continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is
made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure
order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such
24
powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the
25
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are
26 27
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include
28
the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and
usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within
the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper
30
coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the
opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What
ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances. 31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public
statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies
abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of
such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure
order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order
is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further
studies, there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and
that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only
when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete
despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances
and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine
in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down
in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., to the effect that:
32
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right
to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):
. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold

the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines
they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right
to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J.,
Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga
v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as

delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by

preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes. 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of
petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending
cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in
the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been
issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate
remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing
of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through
the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." – Article II, Section 1, Constitution
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the
fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter
how seemingly benign will be tolerated.
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant
and of first impression. We are asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
has the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during
elections.
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
1
COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign Materials dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on
2 3
February 27, 2013.
The facts are not disputed.
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10')
in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
4
contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with
a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified
5
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team
6
Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay": 7
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis

Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren
Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela
Party List Akbayan
Party List Bayan Muna
Party List Anak Pawis
During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of
Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev.
8
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days
from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement
of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be
10
given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this
opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain. 11
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal
12
of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The
letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies available to petitioners. The letter
provides as follows:
Dear Bishop Navarra:
It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty. Mavil Majarucon, had already
given you notice on February 22, 2013 as regards the election propaganda material posted on the
church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups with the following names
and messages, particularly described as follows:
Material size : six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’)
Description : FULL COLOR TARPAULIN
Image of : SEE ATTACHED PICTURES
Message : CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM
BUHAY; (PRO RH) TEAM PATAY
Location : POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY

OF THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY
The three (3) – day notice expired on February 25, 2013.
Considering that the above-mentioned material is found to be in violation of Comelec Resolution No.
9615 promulgated on January 15, 2013 particularly on the size (even with the subsequent division of
the said tarpaulin into two), as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by
three feet (3’), please order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material,
otherwise, we shall be constrained to file an election offense case against you.
We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help the Commission on Elections
inensuring the conduct of peaceful, orderly, honest and credible elections.
Thank you and God Bless!
[signed]
ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA
Director IV13
Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners
initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. They question respondents’ notice dated February 22,
14
2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course;
(2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay
tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of
respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing
them or any other similar order. 15
After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19,
2013.16
On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and
17
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to
question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject
to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution.
Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and
constitutional. 18
During the hearing held on March 19, 2013, the parties were directed to file their respective
memoranda within 10 days or by April 1, 2013, taking into consideration the intervening holidays. 19
The issues, which also served as guide for the oral arguments, are: 20
I.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON

AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE
CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC WHICH
WOULD WARRANT A REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA RULE 65 PETITION[;]
A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS
DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM
COMELEC DECISIONS;
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT

CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE[;]
II.
WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL

ADVERTISEMENT" OR "ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT
A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
III.
WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED SPEECH), OR

ELECTION PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]
A. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF

EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE SAME[;]
B. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]
IV.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON

AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;] [AND]
V.
WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.
I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
I.A
This court’s jurisdiction over COMELEC cases
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final
orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its
adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 21
Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to
raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a
22
special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court,
whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En
Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power." Instead, respondents
23
claim that the assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article
IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution on COMELEC’s power to decide all questions affecting
24
elections. Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Repol v.

25 26
COMELEC, Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC, Blanco v. COMELEC, and Cayetano v. COMELEC, to
27 28 29 30
illustrate how judicialintervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the
COMELEC En Banc. 31
These cases are not applicable.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the
election protest. At issue was the validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division
32
resolution. No motion for reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En
33
Banc. This court declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified:
We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution] to mean final orders, rulings and
34
decisionsof the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not
an interlocutory order of a division.The Supreme Court has no power to review viacertiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
35
However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions
to this general rule. Repolwas another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in
Pagsanghan, Samar. This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First
36
Division issued a status quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision
pending appeal. This court’s ponencia discussed the general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it
37
cannot take jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division. However, consistent
38
with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, it clarified the exception:

39
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for
reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
and speedy remedy available. 40
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral
contests — despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:
1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of labor;
4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or

5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available.
Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repoland decided that the status quo anteorder issued by
the COMELEC Division was unconstitutional.
Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC.This case was also an election protest case
involving candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa City. Petitioners in Soriano, Jr.filed before this
41
court a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First
Division. While the petition was pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the
42
main election protest case. Sorianoapplied the general rule that only final orders should be
43
questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court, however, acknowledged the exceptions to the
general rule in ABS-CBN. 44
Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a disqualification case of one of the
mayoralty candidates of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The COMELEC Second Division ruled that
45
petitioner could not qualify for the 2007 elections due to the findings in an administrative case that he
engaged in vote buying in the 1995 elections. No motion for reconsideration was filed before the
46
COMELEC En Banc. This court, however, took cognizance of this case applying one of the
exceptions in ABS-CBN: The assailed resolution was a nullity. 47
Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election protest case involving the
mayoralty candidates of Taguig City. Petitioner assailed a resolution of the COMELEC denying her
48
motion for reconsideration to dismiss the election protest petition for lack of form and
substance. This court clarified the general rule and refused to take cognizance of the review of the
49
COMELEC order. While recognizing the exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court ruled that these
exceptions did not apply. 50
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as
precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve
election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to
assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation
of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly
enforcingelection laws.
I.B
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,
and limitations on political speech
The main subject of thiscase is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and
the "chilling effect" caused by respondent COMELEC’s notice and letter.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the notice dated February 22,2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013
51 52
ordering the removal of the tarpaulin. It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right
53
to freedom of expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state and, thus, are
unconstitutional.54
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition.
Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority "to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court and defines its powers." Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different
55
from the cases cited by respondents.
Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by
COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people
to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through
the election of representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the
Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation
of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on
the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We
protect both speech and medium because the quality of this freedom in practice will define the
quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable of repetition.
Under the conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case,it could result in a
"chilling effect" that would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the
elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views regarding the election and other related
issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC. Direct resort to this court
is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for raising
grave abuse of discretion.
Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this court’s
expanded exercise of certiorari as provided by the Constitution as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether ornot there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
56
On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions
affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution, provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.

We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of
jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had
any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging
meaningful political speech.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on
free speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the
word "affecting" in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive
power to decide any and allquestions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional
competencies during elections should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the
Constitution.This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of

discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this
court’s power to review.
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act
tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes
actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people
against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate out
weighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
I.C
Hierarchy of courts
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in
directly filing their petition before this court.
Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent
jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition. They add that observation of the
57
hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. While respondents claim
58
that while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present
in this case.59
On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this court’s discretionary power to take
60
cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if warranted by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and
importance of the issues raised. . . ." Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling
61
reasons to justify a direct resort [with] this Court."

62
In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of
63
courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that
the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed
to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and
important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.64
In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto: 65
The Supreme Court is a court of lastresort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by
the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action
for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis omitted)
66
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively
67
perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their
writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the
‘actual case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort
to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues thatmay not
necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in
the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in
respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary
68
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
69
clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have
70 71
provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition toassail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government. 72
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of
expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court
involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has
become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To
quote an eminent political theorist:
[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social
judgments through democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole
way of life. The theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new
society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his
prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a
prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It
contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative,
will allow man to realize his full potentialities.It spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical,
conformist, irrational and stagnant. 73
In a democracy, the citizen’s right tofreely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of
political decision-making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as
public participation in nation-building isa fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their
right to engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court.
A second exception is when the issuesinvolved are of transcendental importance. In these cases,
74
the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and
freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in
this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the
context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen
candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing
their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to
free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore,
allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
75
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United
States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may
76
guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts. 77
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether
the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court
has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is
allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raisedare better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court
78
held that:
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher
judgmentof this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated
in its discussion. (Citation omitted)
79
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality
on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the
Constitution through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013
election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that
necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for
direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body.
In Albano v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that
80
would ensue if the Court of First Instance ofeach and every province were [to] arrogate itself the
power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that
constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence." 81
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with
the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom
respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, thiscourt affords great respect to the
Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court
would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in
the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation
of their right to freedom of expression.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an
exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient
remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found
to be patent nullities, or the appeal was consideredas clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past,
82
questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens’ right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters’
83
registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.

84 85
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is
permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
direct resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls
under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
I.D
The concept of a political question
Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of this court’s power of review. They cite Justice Vitug’s separate opinion
in Osmeña v. COMELEC to support their position:
86
It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the "State
shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution to
be all that adversarial or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event, the
latter, being one of general application, must yield to the specific demands of the Constitution. The
freedom of expression concededly holds, it is true, a vantage point in hierarchy of constitutionally-
enshrined rights but, like all fundamental rights, it is not without limitations.
The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful" and the
"weak" in our society but it is to me a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and the Commission
on Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to media coverage and thereby
be equally perceived as giving real life to the candidates’ right of free expression rather than being
viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that
which the legislature deems to be best in giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the
Court to question; it is a matter that lies beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon. 87
This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is not in point in this case.
The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak,
on their equal opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of
expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post the tarpaulin
in their private property, asan exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the
political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from deciding on the merits of
this case.
In Tañada v. Cuenco, this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political
88
question:
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a
matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
withdiscretionary power to act. (Emphasis omitted)
89
It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be.
In political forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the textof the law is based on a general
discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general application by
the executive branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that
affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.
Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a
specific case-to-case basis, where parties affected by the legal provision seek the courts’
understanding of the law.
The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order
to ensure that the rights of the general public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this
balance, branches of government must afford due respectand deference for the duties and functions
constitutionally delegated to the other. Courts cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence
dictates that we are careful not to veto political acts unless we can craft doctrine narrowly tailored to
the circumstances of the case.
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political
question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court
through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different
agencies and departments of the executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine
is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively
within the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In
such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference. It will decline to void an act
unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Marcos v. Manglapus limited the use of the political question doctrine:

90
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide.
91
How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution
since the timethat it had been first invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has
taken the historical and social context of the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully
and narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines. This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v.
Singson and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.
92 93
Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution involving the removal of petitioners from the Commission on Appointments. In times
past, this would have involved a quint essentially political question as it related to the dominance of
political parties in Congress. However, in these cases, this court exercised its power of judicial
review noting that the requirement of interpreting the constitutional provision involved the legality and
not the wisdom of a manner by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This approach
was again reiterated in Defensor Santiago v. Guingona, Jr. 94
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, this court declared again that the possible existence
95
ofa political question did not bar an examination of whether the exercise of discretion was done with
grave abuse of discretion. In that case, this court ruled on the question of whether there was grave
abuse of discretion in the President’s use of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent and
suppress lawless violence.
In Estrada v. Desierto, this court ruled that the legal question as to whether a former President
96
resigned was not a political question even if the consequences would be to ascertain the political
legitimacy of a successor President.
Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the
resolution of constitutional issues as leverage. But the expanded jurisdiction of this court now
mandates a duty for it to exercise its power of judicial review expanding on principles that may avert
catastrophe or resolve social conflict.
This court’s understanding of the political question has not been static or unbending. In Llamas v.
Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos, this court held:
97
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary
powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue
involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the
limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And
such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it
constitute interference with the functions of the President.98
The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political question was discussed most
extensively in Francisco v. HRET. In this case, the House of Representatives arguedthat the
99
question of the validity of the second impeachment complaint that was filed against former Chief
Justice Hilario Davide was a political question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno elaborated on this concept in his concurring and dissenting opinion:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the new
Constitution which expanded the definition of judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." As well
observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of judicial power considerably
constricted the scope of political question. He opined that the language luminously suggests that this
duty (and power) is available even against the executive and legislative departments including the
President and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary powers. (Emphasis in the
100
original, citations omitted)
Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the political question, as applied in
the following cases:
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held: The
present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court,under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the
political departments to decide. x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes
an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases." (Emphasis and italics supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
....
In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. (Citations omitted)
101
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance
that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that
a political question brings.
I.E
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents insist that petitioners should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or
any of its divisions.
102
Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 65 that "there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." They add
103
that the proper venue to assail the validity of the assailed issuances was in the course of an
administrative hearing to be conducted by COMELEC. In the event that an election offense is filed
104
against petitioners for posting the tarpaulin, they claim that petitioners should resort to the remedies
prescribed in Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 105
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the "prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch [or in this case, organ of government] before a court
may come into the picture." 106
Petitioners’ exercise of their rightto speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in
their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v.
Gonzales, Justice Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized: "[i]f everthere is a hierarchy of
107
protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different
kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the
top." Sovereignty resides in the people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty.
108 109
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental
right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current
controversy is within the exceptions to the principle. In Chua v. Ang, this court held:
110
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial
action may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part ofthe
administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings; (j) whenthe rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention." (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
111
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners
allegethat the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of
separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the
present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law
as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this
case would be unreasonable.
Time and again, we have held that this court "has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to
except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or whenthe purpose of
justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court". Certainly, this case of first impression
112
where COMELEC has threatenedto prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the elections
by calling attention to issues they want debated by the publicin the manner they feel would be
effective is one of those cases.
II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
II.A
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political
113
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do theybelong to any political party. COMELEC does
not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
II.A.1
First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 4. The Commission may,during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
114
Sanidad v. COMELEC involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for the
115
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the
116
provision prohibiting journalists from covering plebiscite issues on the day before and on plebiscite
day. Sanidad argued that the prohibition was a violation of the "constitutional guarantees of the
117
freedom of expression and of the press. . . ." We held that the "evil sought to be prevented by this
118
provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time." This court found that "[m]edia
119
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates[,]" thus, their right to expression during this period may not be
120
regulated by COMELEC. 121
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates.
II.A.2
Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows: 122
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the enumeration made on actsthat may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision
only affects candidates.
Petitioners assail the "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" issued by COMELEC. This was
followed bythe assailed letter regarding the "election propaganda material posted on the church
vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups. . . ."
123
Section 9 of the Fair Election Act on the posting of campaign materials only mentions "parties" and
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"candidates":
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-
list groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places
such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or
exhibit election propaganda: Provided, That the size ofthe poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12)
by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent. Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise
be authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of
which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent. Candidates may post any lawful
propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or
property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates. (Emphasis
supplied)
Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the
Fair Election Act, provides as follows:
SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any lawful
campaign material in:
a. Authorized common poster areasin public places subject to the requirements and/or
limitations set forth in the next following section; and
b. Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.
The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common poster areas
and those enumerated under Section 7 (g) of these Rules and the like is prohibited. Persons posting
the same shall be liable together with the candidates and other persons who caused the posting. It
will be presumed that the candidates and parties caused the posting of campaign materials outside
the common poster areas if they do not remove the same within three (3) days from notice which
shall be issued by the Election Officer of the city or municipality where the unlawful election
propaganda are posted or displayed.
Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election Officeror
other officials of the COMELEC shall apprehend the violators caught in the act, and file the
appropriate charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above
provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties,
and petitioners are neither of the two.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006on "Lawful Election Propaganda" also states that these are
"allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local
elective positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties.
. . ." Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These provisions
show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with
candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties
for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political
parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.
The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political party. There was no allegation that
125
petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the
other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
Respondents also cite National Press Club v. COMELEC in arguing that its regulatory power under
126
the Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to free speech during election period.
127
National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political
advertisements, limiting political advertisements to COMELEC-designated space and time. This
case was brought by representatives of mass media and two candidates for office in the 1992
elections. They argued that the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political
advertisements is tantamount to censorship, which necessarily infringes on the freedom of speech of
the candidates. 128
This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However,
this case does not apply as most of the petitioners were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in
the instant case. Moreover, the subject matter of National Press Club, Section 11(b) of Republic Act
No. 6646, only refers to a particular kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or
129
television. Justice Feliciano emphasized that the provision did not infringe upon the right of
130
reporters or broadcasters to air their commentaries and opinions regarding the candidates, their
qualifications, and program for government. Compared to Sanidadwherein the columnists lost their
ability to give their commentary on the issues involving the plebiscite, National Press Clubdoes not
involve the same infringement.
In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates for the 2013
national elections because of the COMELEC notice and letter. It was not merelya regulation on the
campaigns of candidates vying for public office. Thus, National Press Clubdoes not apply to this
case.
Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
defines an"election campaign" as follows:
....
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against

the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose
the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts ifperformed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants
for nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of
parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions
or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming electionor on attributes of or criticisms
against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention
shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated
under this Article. (Emphasis supplied)
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political
parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be "designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office."
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of
either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke
their right to freedom of expression.
II.B
The violation of the constitutional right
to freedom of speech and expression
Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their
regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed notice and letter ordering itsremoval for being oversized are valid and constitutional. 131
II.B.1
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. 132
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law
Department, this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental
acts.
In Primicias v. Fugoso, respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised
133
Ordinances of 1927 of Manila for the public meeting and assembly organized by petitioner
Primicias. Section 1119 requires a Mayor’s permit for the use of streets and public places for
134
purposes such as athletic games, sports, or celebration of national holidays. What was questioned
135
was not a law but the Mayor’s refusal to issue a permit for the holding of petitioner’s public
meeting. Nevertheless, this court recognized the constitutional right to freedom of speech, to
136
peaceful assembly and to petition for redress of grievances, albeit not absolute, and the petition for
137
mandamus to compel respondent Mayor to issue the permit was granted. 138
In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc Resolution
No. 98-1419 where the COMELEC resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop
ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys. The right to freedom of expression was similarly upheld in
139
this case and, consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set aside. 140
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the
abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and
incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in
the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society
framed by our Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition to
the freedom of speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word "expression" was
added in the 1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29,
it says: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to the
Committee the change of the word "speech" to EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND
EXPRESSION after the word "speech," because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it
would refer to means of expression other than speech.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What does the Committee say?
FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it accepted?
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none;
the amendment is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, expression or of the press . . . ." Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom
141
itself as "[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because speech is the beginning of thought." 142
II.B.2
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech. Communication exists when "(1) a
143
speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because he orshe reasonably believes
that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so
takes the actions." "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either
144
accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for justification." 145
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes
referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’" such that "‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are
146
combined in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be
‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’"147
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances
made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, students who were members of
148
the religious sect Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be expelled from school for refusing to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge. In his concurring opinion, Justice
149
Cruz discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of
expression. He adds that freedom of speech includes even the right to be silent:
150
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that
guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty
not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys
its messageas clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be
compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those
raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when
their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the
unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot
regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of
unorthodox or unpopular views as inthis case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no
less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The
State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels. 151
Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present
Constitution,this court has applied its precedent version to expressions other than verbal utterances.
In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak, petitioners objected to the classification of the
152
motion picture "Kapit sa Patalim" as "For Adults Only." They contend that the classification "is
without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic
expression." This court recognized that "[m]otion pictures are important both as a medium for the
153
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse." It adds that "every writer,actor,
154
or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the
censor." This court found that "[the Board’s] perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be
155
unduly restrictive." However, the petition was dismissed solely on the ground that there were not
156
enough votes for a ruling of grave abuse of discretion in the classification made by the Board. 157
II.B.3
Size does matter

The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the
expression. The present case is in point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it
easier to view its messages from greater distances. Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier
for passengers inside moving vehicles to read its content. Compared with the pedestrians, the
passengers inside moving vehicles have lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the
fonts and images, the greater the probability that it will catch their attention and, thus, the greater the
possibility that they will understand its message.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader.
From an ordinary person’s perspective, those who post their messages in larger fonts care more
about their message than those who carry their messages in smaller media. The perceived
importance given by the speakers, in this case petitioners, to their cause is also part of the message.
The effectivity of communication sometimes relies on the emphasis put by the speakers and onthe
credibility of the speakers themselves. Certainly, larger segments of the public may tend to be more
convinced of the point made by authoritative figures when they make the effort to emphasize their
messages.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more
opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to communicate.
Rather than simply placing the names and images of political candidates and an expression of
support, larger spaces can allow for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates’ platforms
for governance. Larger spaces allow for more precise inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to
advocacies, and contribute more to a more educated and reasoned electorate. A more educated
electorate will increase the possibilities of both good governance and accountability in our
government.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political
parties, that speaks. Too often, the terms of public discussion during elections are framed and kept
hostage by brief and catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the candidate.
Worse, elections sideline political arguments and privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather
than provide obstacles to their speech, government should in fact encourage it. Between the
candidates and the electorate, the latter have the better incentive to demand discussion of the more
important issues. Between the candidates and the electorate, the former have better incentives to
avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on appearances and empty promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. They are fundamentally part of
158
expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
II.B.4
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right
to freedom of expression.
First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions.
Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and]
ethical dialogue isa critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity." This theory may be
159
considered broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all
who will beaffected by the decision." It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every
160
democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in running the state’s affairs,
161
sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key government
positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to
the right of the people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the
people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent,
should thus be protected and encouraged.
Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies." 162
In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs." This court has, thus, adopted the principle
163
that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,and wide open . . . [including even]
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 164
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This
theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by [the]
free trade in ideas:" 165
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. 166
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to "consider, test, and develop their
own conclusions." A free, open, and dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping new
167
ones. This promotes both stability and change where recurring points may crystallize and weak ones
may develop. Of course, free speech is more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and
economic arrangements as it includes, "[t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the
thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us." In fact, free speech may
168
"best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." It is in this context that we should guard
169
against any curtailment of the people’s right to participate in the free trade of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is "a means of
assuring individual self-fulfillment," among others. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
170
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc, this court discussed as follows:
171
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment.Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment
of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in
the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. (Emphasis supplied)
172
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "[v]oluntary associations perform [an]
important democratic role [in providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for deliberation,
and for the formation of identity and community spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any]
governmental interference." They also "provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a free
173
space for the development of individual personality, distinct group identity, and dissident ideas - and
a potential source of opposition to the state." Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find
174
those who have similar and shared values and ideals, to join together and forward common goals.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals and minorities
against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic
governance]." Federalist framers led by James Madison were concerned about two potentially
175
vulnerable groups: "the citizenry at large - majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by
despotic federal officials" and the minorities who may be oppressed by "dominant factions of the
176
electorate [that] capture [the] government for their own selfish ends[.]" According to Madison, "[i]t is
177
of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but
to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." We should strive to ensure
178
that free speech is protected especially in light of any potential oppression against those who find
themselves in the fringes on public issues.
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. This provides that "nonviolent
179
manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence[.]" "[A] dam about to burst . . . resulting
180
in the ‘banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of restriction’" has been 181
used to describe the effect of repressing nonviolent outlets. In order to avoid this situation and
182
prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making
passionate dissent. This includes "free expression and political participation" in that they can "vote
183
for candidates who share their views, petition their legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . .
distribute literature alerting other citizens of their concerns[,]" and conduct peaceful rallies and
184
other similar acts. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s
185
goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means
just to drive a point.
II.B.5
Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Respondents argue that the tarpaulinis election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it. As such, it is 186
subject to regulation by COMELEC under its constitutional mandate. Election propaganda is

187
defined under Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows: SECTION 1. Definitions . .
.
....
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted,
published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo,
brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of
being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a
segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or
candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and
other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political
advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any
Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging
sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views
and beliefs about issues and candidates." They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of
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approval and appreciation of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their
criticism toward those who voted in its favor. It was "part of their advocacy campaign against the RH
189
Law," which was not paid for by any candidate or political party. Thus, "the questioned orders
190 191
which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared
unconstitutional and void." 192
This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values." These rights enjoy precedence and primacy. In Philippine Blooming Mills,
193 194
this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:
Property and property rights can belost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials,
of majorities, ofthe influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions." (Citations omitted)
195
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so "when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage." A similar
196
idea appeared in our jurisprudence as early as 1969, which was Justice Barredo’s concurring and
dissenting opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC: 197
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine
democracy thrives only where the power and right of the people toelect the men to whom they would
entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of
principles of our Constitution, "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II). Translating this
declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it
can be governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in
it is on this cornerstone that I hold it tobe self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and
peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or asa
means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If
our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by our officials
must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and
at all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo exposure any
moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way that he
can rightfully gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard
public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain
periods of time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of
grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to
vote can only be properly enjoyed.It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be next to
useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time. (Emphasis
198
supplied)
Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this court discussed that some types of
speech may be subject to regulation:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police
power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or
society. The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of
speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech.
Distinctionshave therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation ofthe permissible
scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our
jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to
constitutional protection and may be penalized. (Citations omitted)
199
We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech "both
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue," "foster[ing]
200
informed and civicminded deliberation." On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined
201
as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." The expression resulting
202
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. In Justice Brion’s dissenting
opinion, he discussed that "[t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it
subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615." He adds that "[w]hile
203
indeed the RH issue, by itself,is not an electoralmatter, the slant that the petitioners gave the issue
converted the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and
the plea to support one and oppose the other." 204
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the rules and
regulations implementing Republic Act No. 9006 as an aid to interpret the law insofar as the facts of
this case requires, states:
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted,
published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo,
brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of
being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a
segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or
candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and
other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political
advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any
Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging
sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:
SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:

1. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office, and shall include any
of the following:
....
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be considered
acts of election campaigning or partisan politicalactivity unless expressed by government officials in
the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters
should be deemed narrowly tailored only in relation to the facts and issues in this case. It also
appears that such wording in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 does not similarly appear in Republic
Act No. 9006, the law it implements.
We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.
As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos, this court recognized the need for full discussion of
205
public affairs. We acknowledged that free speech includes the right to criticize the conduct of public
men:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of official dom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
206
Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the government for redress of grievances,
allowing for criticism, save for some exceptions. In the 1951 case of Espuelas v. People, this
207 208
court noted every citizen’s privilege to criticize his or her government, provided it is "specific and
therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up." 209
The 1927 case of People v. Titular involved an alleged violation of the Election Law provision
210
"penaliz[ing] the anonymous criticism of a candidate by means of posters or circulars." This court
211
explained that it is the poster’s anonymous character that is being penalized. The ponente adds
212
that he would "dislike very muchto see this decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public
opinion."213
In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing discussed the importance of allowing individuals to vent their views.
214
According to this court, "[i]ts value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing
from the dissenter [and] [t]hat is to ensurea true ferment of ideas."
215
Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms against their government
contributes to every society’s goal for development. It puts forward matters that may be changed for
the better and ideas that may be deliberated on to attain that purpose. Necessarily, it also makes the
government accountable for acts that violate constitutionally protected rights.
In 1998, Osmeña v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibits mass
media from selling print space and air time for campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a
democracy-enhancing measure. This court mentioned how "discussion of public issues and debate
216
on the qualifications of candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the
government established by our Constitution." 217
As pointed out by petitioners, "speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of
elections when the free exercise thereof informs the people what the issues are, and who are
supporting what issues." At the heart of democracy is every advocate’s right to make known what
218
the people need to know, while the meaningful exercise of one’s right of suffrage includes the right
219
of every voter to know what they need to know in order to make their choice.
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC, this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and
220
the freedom of expression especially in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise
of the right of suffrage:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited,
and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and
honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally
vital right of suffrage. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
221
Speech with political consequences isat the core of the freedom of expression and must be
protected by this court.
Justice Brion pointed out that freedomof expression "is not the god of rights to which all other rights
and even government protection of state interest must bow." 222
The right to freedom of expression isindeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are
still subjectto some restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is
content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint
223
of the speaker or the subject of the expression.
II.B.6
Content-based regulation
COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The
order was made simply because petitioners failed to comply with the maximum size limitation for
lawful election propaganda. 224
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it applies
only to political speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech. "[A]ssuming
225
arguendo that the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner
regulation, it’s still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally
sanctioned objective." 226
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-
based. Regardless, the disposition of this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other
227
forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based.
As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned order
applies only to posters and tarpaulins that may affect the elections because they deliver opinions
that shape both their choices. It does not cover, for instance, commercial speech.
Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non-candidates will
be adjudged as "election paraphernalia." There are no existing bright lines to categorize speech as
election-related and those that are not. This is especially true when citizens will want to use their
resources to be able to raise public issues that should be tackled by the candidates as what has
happened in this case. COMELEC’s discretion to limit speech in this case is fundamentally
unbridled.
Size limitations during elections hit ata core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear
and present danger rule as measure. Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
228
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured

against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by
a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposedare neither overbroad nor vague. (Citations
229
omitted)
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’" "Only when the challenged act has
230
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality." 231
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the
right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech." In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
232
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. 233
This court has attempted to define "content-neutral" restraints starting with the 1948 case of
Primicias v. Fugoso. The ordinance in this case was construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to
234
determine the public places that may be used for the procession ormeeting, but not the power to
refuse the issuance of a permit for such procession or meeting. This court explained that free
235
speech and peaceful assembly are "not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not
beinjurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society." 236
The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams involved the National Traffic Commission resolution that
237
prohibited the passing of animal-drawn vehicles along certain roads at specific hours. This court
238
similarly discussed police power in that the assailed rules carry outthe legislative policy that "aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience
of the public."
239
As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado recognized that "more or less disorder will mark the
240
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on
such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. . . ." It is with this backdrop
241
that the state is justified in imposing restrictions on incidental matters as time, place, and manner of
the speech.
In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized the steps that permit applicants
must follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public
place, and time of the assembly. This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if
242
there would be valid objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the standard used
for his decision and the applicants are given the opportunity to be heard. This ruling was practically
243
codified in Batas Pambansa No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as a valid content-neutral
regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita, this court discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880
244
does not prohibit assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and manner. In 2010, this court
245
found in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza that respondent Mayor Atienza committed
246
grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by changing the venue from Mendiola
Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard. 247
We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.
II.B.7
Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the provisions imposing a size limit for
tarpaulins are content-neutral regulations as these "restrict the mannerby which speech is relayed
but not the content of what is conveyed." 248
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the
three requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech. "When the speech
249
restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is
required for its validity," and it is subject only to the intermediate approach.
250 251
This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases. A 252
content-neutral government regulation is sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 253
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the
tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates. On
the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or substantial, it must
also be compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held,
for example, that "the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as
parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . .
254
utterances in TV broadcast." 255
Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal opportunity for public information
campaigns among candidates in connection with the holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible election. 256
Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that "[s]ize limits to posters are necessary to ensure
equality of public information campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes
gives candidates and their supporters the incentive to post larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places
candidates with more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against
candidates with more humble financial capabilities." 257
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private
citizen] to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech." In any case, faced with
258
both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the
tension in a way that protects the right of participation." 259
Second, the pertinent election lawsrelated to private property only require that the private property
owner’s consent be obtained when posting election propaganda in the property. This is consistent
260
with the fundamental right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The present
261
facts do not involve such posting of election propaganda absent consent from the property owner.
Thus, this regulation does not apply in this case.
Respondents likewise cite the Constitution on their authority to recommend effective measures to
262
minimize election spending. Specifically, Article IX-C, Section 2(7) provides:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) This
does not qualify as a compelling and substantial government interest to justify regulation of the
preferred right to freedom of expression.
The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on the two feet (2’) by three feet
(3’) size limitation under Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements
the Fair Election Act that provides for the same size limitation. 263
This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that "[c]ompared to the paramount interest of the State in
guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of
marginal significance." In fact, speech with political consequences, as in this case, should be
264
encouraged and not curtailed. As petitioners pointed out, the size limitation will not serve the
objective of minimizing election spending considering there is no limit on the number of tarpaulins
that may be posted. 265
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing
the restriction, but more so at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not
be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative
avenues for the actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum
sizeof the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
freedom of expression.
The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading
expressions with political consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to
make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for
content-neutral regulations.
The action of the COMELEC in thiscase is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate.
Given the stature of petitioners and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a "chilling
effect" on robust discussion during elections.
The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In the words of Marshall McLuhan,
"the medium is the message." McLuhan’s colleague and mentor Harold Innis has earlier asserted
266
that "the materials on which words were written down have often counted for more than the words
themselves." 267
III
Freedom of expression and equality
III.A
The possibility of abuse
Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of private individuals for the
endorsement of their electoral campaigns.
On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when endorsement materials in the form of
tarpaulins, posters, or media advertisements are made ostensibly by "friends" but in reality are really
paid for by the candidate or political party. This skirts the constitutional value that provides for equal
opportunities for all candidates.
However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this case, this is not the situation
that confronts us. In such cases, it will simply be a matter for investigation and proof of fraud on the
part of the COMELEC.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political
candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is
true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidate’s real levels
of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on
the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy that can stifle
genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement
will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.
On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of a candidate, others will spend
their own resources in order to lend support for the campaigns. This may be without agreement
between the speaker and the candidate or his or her political party. In lieu of donating funds to the
campaign, they will instead use their resources directly in a way that the candidate or political party
would have doneso. This may effectively skirt the constitutional and statutory limits of campaign
spending.
Again, this is not the situation in this case.
The message of petitioners in thiscase will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will
carry in their election posters or media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an
advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the
desire of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be
determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only
secondarily — even almost incidentally — will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a "literary form that employs such
devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies," and this may target any
268
individual or group in society, private and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a
greater purpose, often used for "political and social criticism" "because it tears down facades,
269
deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to
have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed." Northrop Frye, wellknown in this literary field,
270
claimed that satire had two defining features: "one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of
the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of attack." Thus, satire frequently uses
271
exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices.
The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not refer to a list of dead individuals nor could
the Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended it to mean that the entire plan of the
candidates in his list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and
parodies the intention of those in the list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the
list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the theme of its author: Reproductive health is an
important marker for the church of petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election
paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are more declarative and descriptive and contain
no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they usually simply exhort the public
to vote for a person with a brief description of the attributes of the candidate. For example "Vote for
[x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vote for [z], Iba kami sa Makati."
This court’s construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of
censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speaker’s viewpoint or the
content of one’s speech. This is especially true when the expression involved has political
consequences. In this case, it hopes to affect the type of deliberation that happens during elections.
A becoming humility on the part of any human institution no matter how endowed with the secular
ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails that we are not the keepers of all wisdom.
Humanity’s lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides space for the weakest dissent.
Tolerance has always been a libertarian virtue whose version is embedded in our Billof Rights.
There are occasional heretics of yesterday that have become our visionaries. Heterodoxies have
always given us pause. The unforgiving but insistent nuance that the majority surely and comfortably
disregards provides us with the checks upon reality that may soon evolve into creative solutions to
grave social problems. This is the utilitarian version. It could also be that it is just part of human
necessity to evolve through being able to express or communicate.
However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical document. It contains other provisions
which, taken together with the guarantee of free expression, enhances each other’s value. Among
these are the provisions that acknowledge the idea of equality. In shaping doctrine construing these
constitutional values, this court needs to exercise extraordinary prudence and produce narrowly
tailored guidance fit to the facts as given so as not to unwittingly cause the undesired effect of
diluting freedoms as exercised in reality and, thus, render them meaningless.
III.B.
Speech and equality:
Some considerations We first establish that there are two paradigms of free speech that separate at
the point of giving priority to equality vis-à-vis liberty.
272
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but

regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech." This view allows the government
273
leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing,
unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued within society’s ideological
ladder. This view acknowledges that there are dominant political actors who, through authority,
274
power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may drown out the messages of others.
This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like
ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find one’s authentic self or to
participate in the self determination of one’s communities is not new only to law. It has always been
a philosophical problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse
recognized how institutionalized inequality exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms
exercised within such limitation as merely "protect[ing] the already established machinery of
discrimination." In his view, any improvement "in the normal course of events" within an unequal
275
society, without subversion, only strengthens existing interests of those in power and control. 276
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become
meaningless if not taken in a real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises
liberties. In his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results

from a whole series of synthetic judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine one’s own life: to be
able to determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this
autonomy is never the contingent, private individual as that which he actually is or happens to be; it
is rather the individual as a human being who is capable of being free with the others. And the
problem of making possible such a harmony between every individual liberty and the other is not that
of finding a compromise between competitors, or between freedom and law, between general and
individual interest, common and private welfare in an established society, but of creating the society
in which man is no longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the
beginning. In other words, freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the existing
societies. (Emphasis in the original)
277
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all opinions presented to and deliberated by
the people — "implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must be capable of
deliberating and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must have access to authentic
information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought." He278
submits that "[d]ifferent opinions and ‘philosophies’ can no longer compete peacefully for adherence
and persuasion on rational grounds: the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is organized and delimited by those
who determine the national and the individual interest." A slant toward left manifests from his belief
279
that "there is a ‘natural right’ of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use
extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate." Marcuse, thus, stands for an
280
equality that breaks away and transcends from established hierarchies, power structures, and
indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as "repressive tolerance."
Legal scholars
The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal scholars for "stringent protections
of expressive liberty," especially by political egalitarians. Considerations such as "expressive,
281
deliberative, and informational interests," costs or the price of expression, and background facts,
282
when taken together, produce bases for a system of stringent protections for expressive liberties. 283
Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed
that "public discussion is a political duty." Cass Sustein placed political speech on the upper tier of
284
his twotier model for freedom of expression, thus, warranting stringent protection. He defined285
political speech as "both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue."286
But this is usually related also tofair access to opportunities for such liberties. Fair access to
287
opportunity is suggested to mean substantive equality and not mere formal equalitysince "favorable
conditions for realizing the expressive interest will include some assurance of the resources required
for expression and some guarantee that efforts to express views on matters of common concern will
not be drowned out by the speech of betterendowed citizens." Justice Brandeis’ solution is to
288
"remedy the harms of speech with more speech." This view moves away from playing down the
289
danger as merely exaggerated, toward "tak[ing] the costs seriously and embrac[ing] expression as
the preferred strategy for addressing them." However, in some cases, the idea of more speech
290
may not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the need for context and "the specification
of substantive values before [equality] has full meaning." Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon adds
291
that "equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather than a substantive sense." Thus, more292
speech can only mean more speech from the few who are dominant rather than those who are not.
Our jurisprudence
This court has tackled these issues.
Osmeña v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the validity of Section 11(b)
ofthe Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. This section "prohibits mass media from selling or giving free
293
of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission
on Elections." This court explained that this provision only regulates the time and manner of
294
advertising in order to ensure media equality among candidates. This court grounded this measure
295
on constitutional provisions mandating political equality: Article IX-C, Section 4

296
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XIII, Section 1
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priorityto the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reducesocial, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and
its increments. (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 26
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitution’s guarantee for more substantive
expressive freedoms that take equality of opportunities into consideration during elections.
The other view
However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or
equality inthe ability of citizens as speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine.
Under this view, "members of the public are trusted to make their own individual evaluations of
speech, and government is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . .
[thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive ideological market." This is consistent with the
297
libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity
or invalidity of speech.
The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision uses negative rather than affirmative
language. It uses ‘speech’ as its subject and not ‘speakers’. Consequently, the Constitution
298
protects free speech per se, indifferent to the types, status, or associations of its
speakers. Pursuant to this, "government must leave speakers and listeners in the private order to
299
their own devices in sorting out the relative influence of speech." 300
Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC formulates this view that freedom of
speech includes "not only the right to express one’s views, but also other cognate rights relevant to
the free communication [of] ideas, not excluding the right to be informed on matters of public
concern." She adds:
301
And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of elections — qualifications of voters
and candidates, education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, private animosities,
the weather, the threshold of a voter’s resistance to pressure — the utmost ventilation of opinion of
men and issues, through assembly, association and organizations, both by the candidate and the
voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to truly reflect the will of the electorate. (Emphasis
302
supplied)
Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only to emphasize free speech
primacy such that"courts, as a rule are wary to impose greater restrictions as to any attempt to
curtail speeches with political content," thus:
303
the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was
designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources" and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people." 304
This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ submission "that the market place of ideas is still the
best alternative to censorship." 305
Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the argument, the majority of the US Supreme
Court in the campaign expenditures case of Buckley v. Valeo "condemned restrictions (even if
content-neutral) on expressive liberty imposed in the name of ‘enhanc[ing] the relative voice of
others’ and thereby ‘equaliz[ing] access to the political arena." The majority did not use the
306
equality-based paradigm.
One flaw of campaign expenditurelimits is that "any limit placed on the amount which a person can
speak, which takes out of his exclusive judgment the decision of when enough is enough, deprives
him of his free speech."307
Another flaw is how "[a]ny quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the
sum of public information and runs counter to our ‘profound national commitment that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’" 308
In fact, "[c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to raise funds does not ease the
plight of those without funds in the first place . . . [and] even if one’s main concern isslowing the
increase in political costs, it may be more effective torely on market forces toachieve that result than
on active legal intervention." According to Herbert Alexander, "[t]o oppose limitations is not
309
necessarily to argue that the sky’s the limit [because in] any campaign there are saturation levels
and a point where spending no longer pays off in votes per dollar." 310
III. C.
When private speech amounts
to election paraphernalia
The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for
human potentiality and the effect of speech. It valorizes the ability of human beings to express and
their necessity to relate. On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration
the effects it will have in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the
cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect of drowning out the speech and the messages
of those in the minority. In a sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and effect
of the guarantee of free speech. Those who have more will have better access to media that
reaches a wider audience than those who have less. Those who espouse the more popular ideas
will have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters of society.To be really heard and
understood, the marginalized view normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her
expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make judgments
of the value of such viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to
some expression during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the
members of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and
manner. This is the effect of our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v.
COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates
or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally
advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such
regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions
coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate
in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not
amount toan election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates
to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably
the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the
time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be
prohibited or censored onthe basis of its content. For this purpose, it will notmatter whether the
speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal
message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law —
Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if
applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or
tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary.
At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public
and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with
political consequences.
IV
Right to property
Other than the right to freedom of expression and the meaningful exercise of the right to
311
suffrage, the present case also involves one’s right to property.

312 313
Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the circumvention of regulations relating
to election propaganda by applying such regulations to private individuals. Certainly, any provision
314
or regulation can be circumvented. But we are not confronted with this possibility. Respondents
agree that the tarpaulin in question belongs to petitioners. Respondents have also agreed, during
the oral arguments, that petitioners were neither commissioned nor paid by any candidate or political
party to post the material on their walls.
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz: 315
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. (Citation
316
omitted)
This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted
is "so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property." Consequently, it violates
317
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides thatno person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. This court explained:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and
dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right
to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of
the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s acquisitions without control or diminution save
by the law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917]) 318
This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by
a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display
of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except inthe common poster areas
sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared
personal poster on his own front dooror on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly
never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed
with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do. Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private
319
citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an
indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s interpretation of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no
expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement
upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their
fundamental right to speech.
Respondents have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest they seek to promote justifies the
intrusion into petitioners’ property rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable. It must
also acknowledge a private individual’s right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due process
clause will be violated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election
propaganda in private property without the consent of the owners of such private property.
COMELEC has incorrectly implemented these regulations. Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we
find that the act of respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their
own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right to property.
V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech
We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned notice
and letter violated the right of petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.
At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. This takes many
320
forms. Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, for instance provides:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
There are two aspects of this provision. The first is the none stablishment clause. Second is the
321 322
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. 323
The second aspect is atissue in this case.
Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious
make such act immune from any secular regulation. The religious also have a secular existence.
324
They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to
religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners’ claim that "the views and position of the
petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its
Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings. . . ."325
The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be
motivated by moral, ethical, and religious considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal
world, these acts range from belief, to expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and then
to acts of a secular character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same
faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may not have any religious bearing.
Definitely, the characterizations ofthe religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court.
Certainly, our powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious in
nature.
Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu in claiming that the court "emphatically" held that the adherents ofa particular religion shall be
326
the ones to determine whether a particular matter shall be considered ecclesiastical in nature. This327
court in Ebralinagexempted Jehovah’s Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony "out of
respect for their religious beliefs, [no matter how] "bizarre" those beliefsmay seem to others." This
328
court found a balance between the assertion of a religious practice and the compelling necessities of
a secular command. It was an early attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.
In Estrada v. Escritor, this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

329
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies
that take religion specifically intoaccount not to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or
effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." 330
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when:
(1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not
foster an excessive entanglement with religion. 331
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious
doctrine of the Catholic church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with
332
the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within
the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified
under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the
expression onthe tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful,
the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubtas to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor Relations

Commission cited by petitioners finds no application in the present case. The posting of the
333
tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as
enumerated in the Austriacase such as "proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities withattached religious significance." 334
A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this
case. However, it was misdirected.
COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending
among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the
electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for
public office.Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-
list organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single
issue — and a complex piece of legislation at that — can easily be interpreted as anattempt to
stereo type the candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts
were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of
petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and
non-judgmental. Some may have expected that the authors would give more space to practice
forgiveness and humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties.
It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their
conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This
can often be expressed by dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point
dramatically and in a large way does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they
have basis, or that they have been expressed in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of

expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause
debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their
ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have very real secular consequences.
Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that
tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speechby candidates or political
parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their
election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected
as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by
petitioners deserves our protection.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously issued
is hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February
22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 174385 February 20, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge, Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Olongapo City, META TRANS TRADING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, and
HUNDRED YOUNG SUBIC INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for certiorari and prohibition 1 (the present petition) the challenge to the
August 11, 2005 and July 5, 2006 orders2 of respondent Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 102-0-05. The August 11, 2005 order
granted the motion to intervene filed by private respondents Metatrans Trading International
Corporation and Hundred Young Subic International, Inc., while the July 5, 2006 order denied the
motion for reconsideration and the motion to suspend the proceedings filed by the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
The Factual Antecedents
On March 14, 2005,3 Indigo Distribution Corporation and thirteen other petitioners (collectively
referred to as lower court petitioners) filed before the respondent judge a petition for declaratory
relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction4
against the Honorable Secretary of Finance, et al. The petition sought to nullify the implementation
of Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334, otherwise known as "AN ACT INCREASING THE
EXCISE TAX RATES IMPOSED ON ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 131, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145 AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED," as unconstitutional. Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, in part,
reads:
SEC. 6. Section 131 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 131. Payment of Excise Taxes on Imported Articles. –
(A) Persons Liable. – x x x.
xxxx
The provision of any special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, the importation
of cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the Philippines,
even if destined for tax and duty-free shops, shall be subject to all applicable taxes, duties,
charges, including excise taxes due thereon. This shall apply to cigars and cigarettes,
distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or
legislated freeports of the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone, created under
Republic Act No. 7227; the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and Freeport, created under Republic
Act No. 7922; and the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone, created under Republic Act No.
7903, and such other freeports as may hereafter be established or created by law: Provided,
further, That importations of cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines made
directly by a government- owned and operated duty-free shop, like the Duty-Free Philippines (DFP),
shall be exempted from all applicable duties only[.] [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
The lower court petitioners are importers and traders duly licensed to operate inside the Subic
Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SSEFZ).
By way of background, Congress enacted, in 1992, R.A. No. 7227, otherwise known as "The BASES
CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1992," which provided, among others, for the
creation of the SSEFZ, as well as the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Pursuant to this
law, the SBMA granted the lower court petitioners Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption.
The certificates allowed them to engage in the business of import and export of general merchandise
(including alcohol and tobacco products) and uniformly granted them tax exemptions for these
importations.
On January 1, 2005, Congress passed R.A. No. 9334. Based on Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, the
SBMA issued a Memorandum on February 7, 2005 directing its various departments to require
importers in the SSEFZ to pay the applicable duties and taxes on their importations of tobacco and
alcohol products before these importations are cleared and released from the freeport. The
memorandum prompted the lower court petitioners to bring before the RTC their petition for
declaratory relief (Civil Case No. 102-0- 05). The petition included a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or a TRO to enjoin the Republic (acting through the SBMA) from
enforcing the challenged memorandum.
On May 4, 2005,5 the respondent judge granted the lower court petitioners’ application for
preliminary injunction despite the Republic’s opposition, and on May 11, 2005, he issued the
preliminary injunction.
The Republic filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition – docketed in this Court
as G.R. No. 168584 – to annul the respondent judge’s order and the writ issued pursuant to this
order. The petition asked for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. By motion
dated July 21, 2005 filed before the lower court, the Republic asked the respondent judge to
suspend the proceedings pending the resolution of G.R. No. 168584.
On August 5, 2005, the private respondents (in the present petition now before us) filed before the
respondent judge motions for leave to intervene and to admit complaints-in-intervention. They also
asked in these motions that the respondent judge extend to them the effects and benefits of his May
4, 2005 order, in the lower court petitioners’ favor, and the subsequently issued May 11, 2005 writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Without acting on the Republic’s motion to suspend the proceedings, the respondent judge granted
on August 11, 2005 the private respondents’ motions and complaints-in-intervention. The
respondent judge found the private respondents to be similarly situated as the lower court
petitioners; they stood, too, to be adversely affected by the implementation of R.A. No. 9334.
The Republic moved to reconsider6 the respondent judge’s August 11, 2005 order, arguing that it
had been denied due process because it never received copies of the private respondents’ motions
and complaints-in-intervention.
On July 5, 2006, the respondent judge denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration and the
previously filed motion to suspend the proceedings. The respondent judge held that all of the parties
in the case had been duly notified per the records. To justify the denial of the motion to suspend the
proceedings, the respondent judge pointed to the absence of any restraining order in G.R. No.
168584. The Republic responded to the respondent judge’s actions by filing the present petition.
The Petition
The present petition charges that the respondent judge acted with manifest partiality and with grave
abuse of discretion when he issued his August 11, 2005 and July 5, 2006 orders. In particular, the
Republic contends that the respondent judge violated its right to due process when he peremptorily
allowed the private respondents’ motions and complaints-in-intervention and proceeded with their
hearing ex parte despite the absence of any prior notice to it. The Republic maintains that it never
received any notice of hearing, nor any copy of the questioned motions and complaints-in-
intervention.7
Further, the Republic posits that the respondent judge abused his discretion when he extended to
the private respondents the benefits of the preliminary injunction earlier issued to the lower court
petitioners under the same ₱1,000,000.00 bond the lower court petitioners posted. The Republic
labels this action as a violation of Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, claiming at the same time
that the bond is manifestly disproportionate to the resulting damage the Republic stood to incur
considering the number of the original and the additional lower court petitioners.8
Finally, in support of its prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, the
Republic stresses that the assailed orders continue to cause it multi-million tax losses. It justifies its
prayer for the respondent judge’s inhibition by pointing to the latter’s act of continuously allowing
parties to intervene despite the absence of notice and to the inclusion of non-parties to the original
case.
During the pendency of the present petition, the Court en banc partially granted the Republic’s
petition in G.R. No. 168584. By a Decision9 dated October 15, 2007, this Court set aside and nullified
the respondent judge’s order of May 4, 2005 and the subsequent May 11, 2005 writ of preliminary
injunction. On January 15, 2008, the Court denied with finality the lower court petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.10
The Respondent’s Position
In their defense, the private respondents point to the procedural defects in the petition,
specifically: first, the petition was filed out of time, arguing that the Republic only had 53 remaining
days to file the petition from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration, maintaining that the
60-day period within which to file the petition is counted from the notice of the denial of the August
11, 2005 order; second, the petition did not comply with the rules on proof of filing and
service; third, the Republic failed to properly serve their counsel of record a copy of the petition;
and fourth, the Republic did not observe the hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition.11
The private respondents further contend that the respondent judge correctly allowed their
complaints-in-intervention as the matter of intervention is addressed to the courts’ discretion; as
noted in the assailed orders, the records show that the notice of hearing was addressed to all of the
parties in the original case.12
Finally, on the Republic’s prayer for prohibition, the private respondents maintain that prohibition is
improper since this Court, in G.R. No. 168584, denied the Republic’s prayer for a writ of prohibition,
noting that the respondent judge had been suspended, pending resolution of this petition.13
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to PARTLY GRANT the petition.
Relaxation of procedural rules for compelling reasons
We disagree with the private respondents’ procedural objections.
First, we find that the present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to the
private respondents’ position, the 60- day period within which to file the petition for certiorari is
counted from the Republic’s receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying the latter’s motion for
reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point – "In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion."14 We find too that the
present petition complied with the rules on proof of filing and service of the petition. Attached to the
petition – in compliance with Sections 12 and 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court – are the registry
receipts and the affidavit of the person who filed and served the petition by registered mail.
Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourses should be
made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts,15 this principle is not an absolute
rule and admits of exceptions under well-defined circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed
direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground of special
and important reasons clearly stated in the petition;16when dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy; when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the
challenged orders were patent nullities;17 or when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified our immediate and direct handling of the case.18
The Republic claims that the respondent judge violated and continues to violate its right to due
process by allowing the private respondents and several others to intervene in the case sans notice
to the Republic; by extending to them the benefit of the original injunction without the requisite
injunction bond applicable to them as separate injunction applicants; and by continuing to suspend
the Republic’s right to collect excise taxes from the private respondents and from the lower court
petitioners, thus adversely affecting the government’s revenues. To our mind, the demonstrated
extent of the respondent judge’s actions and their effects constitute special and compelling
circumstances calling for our direct and immediate attention.
Lastly, under our rules of procedure,19 service of the petition on a party, when that party is
represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully
served.20 This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit of exceptions when faced with
compelling reasons of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding
circumstances of the case.21 Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a
liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.22
The Republic has consistently and repeatedly maintained that it never received a copy of the
motions and complaints-in-intervention, as evidenced by the certification of the Docket Division of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); it learned of the private respondents’ presence in this case
only after it received copies of the assailed orders, and it even had to inquire from the lower court for
the private respondents’ addresses. Although their counsels did not formally receive any copy of the
petition, the private respondents themselves admitted that they received their copy of the present
petition. The records show that the Republic subsequently complied with the rules on service when,
after the private respondents’ comment, the Republic served copies of its reply and memorandum to
the respondents’ counsel of record.
Under these circumstances, we are satisfied with the Republic’s explanation on why it failed to
initially comply with the rule on service of the present petition; its subsequent compliance with the
rule after being informed of the presence of counsels of record sufficiently warrants the rule’s relaxed
application.23 The lack of a proper service – unlike the situation when the Republic was simply
confronted with already-admitted complaints-in-intervention – did not result in any prejudice; the
private respondents themselves were actually served with, and duly received, their copies of the
present petition, allowing them to comment and to be heard on the petition.
The Republic was denied due process; the respondent judge issued the assailed orders with
grave abuse of discretion
Due process of law is a constitutionally guaranteed right reserved to every litigant. Even the
1âwphi1
Republic as a litigant is entitled to this constitutional right, in the same manner and to the same
extent that this right is guaranteed to private litigants. The essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard, logically preconditioned on prior notice, before judgment is rendered.24
A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory requirements of
notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service,25 save only for those that the courts can act upon
without prejudice to the rights of the other parties.26 A motion which fails to comply with these
requirements is a worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon.27 The reason
for this is plain: a movant asks the court to take a specific course of action, often contrary to the
interest of the adverse party and which the latter must then be given the right and opportunity to
oppose.28 The notice of hearing to the adverse party thus directly services the required due process
as it affords the adverse party the opportunity to properly state his agreement or opposition to the
action that the movant asks for.29 Consequently, our procedural rules provide that a motion that does
not afford the adverse party this kind of opportunity should simply be disregarded.30
The notice requirement is even more mandatory when the movant asks for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction and/or a TRO. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, no preliminary
injunction shall be granted without a hearing and without prior notice to the party sought to be
enjoined. The prior notice under this requirement is as important as the hearing, as no hearing can
meaningfully take place, with both parties present or represented, unless a prior notice of the
hearing is given.
Additionally, in the same way that an original complaint must be served on the defendant, a copy of
the complaint-in-intervention must be served on the adverse party with the requisite proof of service
duly filed prior to any valid court action. Absent these or any reason duly explained and accepted
excusing strict compliance, the court is without authority to act on such complaint; any action taken
without the required service contravenes the law and the rules, and violates the adverse party’s
basic and constitutional right to due process.
In the present case, records show that the OSG had never received – contrary to the private
respondents’ claim – a copy of the motions and complaints-in-intervention.31 The Republic duly and
fully manifested the irregularity before the respondent judge.32 Thus, the mere statement in the
assailed orders that the parties were duly notified is insufficient on the face of the appropriate
manifestation made and the supporting proof that the Republic submitted. In these lights, the
motions and complaints-in-intervention cannot but be mere scraps of paper that the respondent
judge had no reason to consider; in admitting them despite the absence of prior notice, the
respondent judge denied the Republic of its right to due process.
While we may agree with the private respondents’ claim that the matter of intervention is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court,33 what should not be forgotten is the requirement that the
exercise of discretion must in the first place be "sound." In other words, the basic precepts of fair
play and the protection of all interests involved must always be considered in the exercise of
discretion. Under the circumstances of the present case, these considerations demand that the
original parties to the action, which include the Republic, must have been properly informed to give
them a chance to protect their interests. These interests include, among others, the protection of the
Republic’s revenue-generating authority that should have been insulated against damage through
the filing of a proper bond. Thus, even from this narrow view that does not yet consider the element
of fair play, the private respondents’ case must fail; judicial discretion cannot override a party
litigant’s right to due process.
All told, the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of the
corrective writ of certiorari. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates
the Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.34 The term refers to such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, as when the act
amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law .35 The respondent judge so acted so that the orders he issued
should be declared void and of no effect.
Petition for prohibition and prayer for inhibition are denied for having been mooted by subsequent
events
On November 9, 2006, the Republic filed an administrative case against the respondent judge for
gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The case, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, is likewise related to Civil Case No. 102-0-05
that underlie the present petition. By a decision dated June 26, 2009, and while this case was still
pending, this Court found the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Court accordingly dismissed the respondent judge
from the service.
In light of these supervening events, the Court sees no reason to resolve the other matters raised in
this petition for being moot.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We GRANT the writ
of certiorari and accordingly SET ASIDE the orders dated August 11, 2005 and July 5, 2006 of
respondent Judge Ramon S. Caguioa in Civil Case No. 102-0-05 for being NULL and VOID. We
DISMISS the prayer for writ of prohibition on the ground of mootness. Costs against Metatrans
Trading International Corporation and Hundred Young Subic International, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 168203 March 9, 2010
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner,

vs.
VAL L. VILLANUEVA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision1 dated November 12, 2004 and Resolution2 of April 6, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, Branch 34, in SP. Civil Case No. 03-
03 entitled Val L. Villanueva, Petitioner, versus National Electrification Administration and the
Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., Respondents.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Herein respondent Val L. Villanueva (Villanueva) was an elected member of the Board of Directors
(BOD) of Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative (ANECO) for a term of three years, from 2001 to
2003. However, with the subsequent redistricting of the area he represented, his term was extended
until 2006.
In 2002, while serving as a member of the ANECO BOD, he was elected as Barangay Chairman
of Barangay 12, in the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. Thereafter, he was also
elected as President of what was formerly known as the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC),
now known as Liga ng mga Barangay (Liga), of Cabadbaran. By virtue of his position as Liga
President, he sat as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran.
Subsequently, the General Manager of ANECO sought the opinion of herein petitioner National
Electrification Administration (NEA) as to whether or not respondent is still qualified to sit as member
of the ANECO BOD.
In response to such query, the NEA Director for Co-Op Operations came out with the opinion, dated
December 10, 2002, that respondent could no longer serve as a member of the ANECO BOD,
because he was considered automatically resigned from the said position when he took his oath of
office as Liga President. As basis of its opinion, the NEA Director for Co-Op Operations cited as
authority the Local Government Code of 1991, NEA Memorandum dated February 13, 1998, and the
Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric Cooperative District Elections.3
In a letter dated January 3, 2003, respondent sought the opinion of the Provincial Director of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) relative to his disqualification as a member of
the ANECO BOD.
In his letter4 dated January 7, 2003, the DILG Provincial Director gave the view that his office could
not issue an official opinion on the matter being sought, considering that another agency had
jurisdiction over it. Nonetheless, he stated the view that respondent was not a regular member of
the Sangguniang Bayan; instead, he occupied the office only in an ex-officio capacity, because he
was not duly elected thereto by the registered voters of Cabadbaran, but occupied the said position
only by reason of his being the president of the Liga.
On January 31, 2003, respondent requested review and reconsideration of the disputed opinion of
the NEA Director for Co-Op Operations, but the same was denied in a letter dated February 17,
2003 by the NEA Chief Operating Officer/Deputy Administrator for Co-Op Development.5
Aggrieved by such denial, respondent filed with the RTC of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, a
petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction against NEA and ANECO.6 The case was
docketed as SP Civil Case No. 03-03.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining NEA and ANECO
and their representatives, attorneys and agents from disqualifying respondent as member of the
ANECO BOD or allowing him to continue attending meetings or sessions of the said BOD and
granting him back all benefits, emoluments and remunerations due him on account of his
disqualification.7
NEA and ANECO filed separate motions for reconsideration.
On January 7, 2004, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motions for reconsideration of NEA and
ANECO and directing the issuance of a preliminary injunction, which enjoined NEA and ANECO
from enforcing the disqualification of respondent as member of the ANECO BOD and directing them
to put up a bond in the amount of ₱300,000.00.
Consequently, on February 10, 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.9
On November 12, 2004 the RTC rendered its presently assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The injunction issued against respondent is hereby
made permanent.
Respondents are likewise ordered to pay to petitioner the amount of Ph50,000.00 as attorney's fees
and Ph50,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
SO ORDERED.10
NEA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it in its Resolution11 dated April 6, 2005.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Hon. Orlando F. Doyon, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, Branch 34, exercised grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in deciding the case in an
action for certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Injunction it resolved to nullify an order issued
by an administrative agency without sufficient legal basis;
2. Whether or not the instant case should be dismissed for lack of cause of action on the
ground of respondent's failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and
3. Whether or not the law was correctly applied by the trial court in the issuance of the
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.12
Petitioner contends that respondent went to court without first exhausting the administrative
remedies available to him making his action premature or his case not ripe for judicial determination
and, for that reason, he has no cause of action to ventilate in court.
Petitioner also avers that in coming up with its decision nullifying the order issued by the NEA, the
RTC, in effect, deprived the Office of the President of its power to review the disputed order.
Petitioner further argues that the provision under the Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric
Cooperative District Elections, which prohibits persons who hold an elective office in the government
or appointed to an elective position above the level of Barangay Captain from being members of the
BOD of an electric cooperative, applies not only to candidates for membership in the BOD but also
to incumbent members thereof.
Lastly, petitioner asserts that the temporary restraining order issued by the RTC is invalid, because it
was made effective beyond the 20-day period provided under the Rules of Court.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
With respect to the procedural aspect of the case, respondent should have first exhausted the
administrative remedies still available to him by appealing the challenged order of the NEA to the
Office of the President, which exercises the power of supervision over it. Section 13, Chapter II of
Presidential Decree No. 269 (PD 269), otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration Decree, provides that:
Sec. 13 - Supervision over NEA; Power Development Council - The NEA shall be under the
supervision of the Office of the President of the Philippines. All orders, rules and regulations
promulgated by the NEA shall be subject to the approval of the Office of the President of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of petitioner
NEA, the failure of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to a judicial
suit.13 It is settled that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through
court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted.14 If
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before recourse
can be made to courts. The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.15 The non-
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of
action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.16
In the present case, respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed a case
with the RTC without appealing the decision of the NEA to the Office of the President. As such, his
petition filed with the RTC must necessarily fail.
In any case, the main issue of whether respondent can still continue to be a member of the ANECO
BOD after becoming an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran must be
answered in the negative.
Section 7 (8), Article II of the Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric Cooperative District Elections
issued by the NEA Main Office, through its Board of Administrators, on June 23, 1993, provides:
Section 7 – Qualification for Board of Directors. – Bona fide members who possess the following
qualifications are eligible to become and/or to remain as member of Board of Directors:
1. He/she is a Filipino citizen
xxxx
8. He/she does not hold elective office in the government nor appointed to an elective position above
the level of a Barangay Captain.
x x x x17
In the same manner, the Memorandum18 dated February 13, 1998 issued by the NEA Main Office
states:
2.3.1. Book III, Article Three, Sec. 446 of R.A. 7160 listed the composition of the Sangguniang
Bayan which includes, among others, the President of the Municipal Chapter of the Liga ng mga
Barangay x x x. As such, therefore, they are considered as an ex-officio member of the Sanggunian,
as likewise provided for in Rule XXIX, Article 211 (d) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 7160.
2.3.2. All coop officials and employees who are subsequently elected to the post of President of the
Municipal Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay, after having won in the barangay elections, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon taking his/her oath of office as Liga President.
The above-quoted provisions find support in Salomon v. National Electrification Administration 19 − a
case decided by the Court more than a decade prior to respondent's filing of his petition with the
RTC. In the said case, the petitioner, an elected Barangay Captain, sought the nullification of a ruling
issued by the NEA which disqualified her from further acting as a member of the Board of Directors
of La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LUELCO) by reason of the fact that she was appointed as
an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union, representing
the barangay officials of the province. This Court, in upholding the disqualification of therein
petitioner as a member of the Board of Directors, held:
Although the disqualification mandated by the provisions [of PD 269] pertains to elective officers of
the government, except barrio captains and councilors, the same is equally applicable to an
appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which is an elective office. The prohibition
should be construed to refer to a person holding an office, the assumption to which, while generally
determined by an election, is not precluded by appointment. The purpose of the disqualification is
to prevent incumbents of elective offices from exerting political influence and pressure on
the management of the affairs of the cooperative. This purpose cannot be fully achieved if
one who is appointed to an elective office is not made subject to the same disqualification. 1avvphi1
A person appointed to an elective office can exercise all powers and prerogatives attached to
said office. Thus, an appointed member of a Sangguniang Panlalawigan, like petitioner, can
wield as much pressure and influence on an electric cooperative, as an elected member
thereof.1avvphi1
Petitioner, having been appointed as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union, a

position decidedly above the rank of Barangay Captain, cannot remain as Director of LUELCO
without violating the spirit and intent of Section 21 P.D. No. 269, as amended x x x.20
The Court finds that, while the position to which the petitioner in the above-quoted ruling was
appointed is different from the position to which herein respondent was named, the rule or principle
enunciated above, nonetheless, applies squarely to the present case. Consequently, and in
consonance with the Guidelines and Memorandum issued by the NEA, when respondent was
designated as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran, he became ineligible, and was
thereby disqualified as member of the ANECO BOD.
As to the issue of whether the temporary restraining order issued by the RTC remained valid even if
it was beyond the 20-day period provided under the Rules of Court, it is settled that under Section 5,
Rule 5821 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order within a limited life
of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the
application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction
within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the
20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary and the
courts having no discretion to extend the same.22 The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty
(20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a
regional trial court.23 Hence, the RTC committed error when it ruled that the temporary restraining
order it issued on December 2, 2003 was effective until January 5, 2004, a period that was beyond
the twenty (20) days allowed under the Rules of Court. This does not mean, however, that the entire
TRO was invalidated. The same remained valid and in effect, but only within the 20-day period, after
which it automatically expired.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte, Branch 34, dated November 12, 2004, and its Resolution dated
April 6, 2005 in SP. Civil Case No. 03-03, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petition
for certiorari therein filed is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 136762. November 21, 2002.]
ASSOCIATED COMMUNICATIONS and WIRELESS SERVICES, LTD., (ACWS)

being operated and doing business under the trade name UNITED
BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v. FIDELO Q. DUMLAO, CONSUELO
S. PEREZ and TEODORO Y. YABES in their official capacities as Acting
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners, respectively of the NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals dated September 30, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47675, as well as the Resolution
dated December 10, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
in its assailed Decision denied the petition for mandamus and prohibition filed by
Associated Communications and Wireless Services, Ltd. against Fidelo Q. Dumlao as
Acting Commissioner, and Consuelo S. Perez and Teodoro Y. Yabes as Deputy
Commissioners of the National Telecommunications Commission.
The Facts
Petitioner Associated Communications and Wireless Services, Ltd. ("ACWS" for brevity)
is a registered partnership organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
doing business under the trade name United Broadcasting Network, Inc. Initially, ACWS
operated several radio and television stations nationwide by virtue of a legislative
franchise acquired in 1969 under R.A. No. 4551 through Concurrent Resolution No. 58
of the Sixth Congress of the Philippines. 3 Act No. 3846, 4 as amended, otherwise
known as the Radio Laws of the Philippines, requires a person who operates radio
broadcasting stations for commercial purposes to secure a legislative franchise.
In 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A 5 ("PD 576-A" for brevity) took effect providing
for the regulation of radio and television broadcast services in the country. Effective
December 31, 1981, PD 576-A 6 terminated all franchises, grants, licenses, permits,
certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting
systems. PD 576-A conferred on the Board of Communications and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications the power to grant permits to operate radio or TV
broadcast stations. The exercise of this power was made appealable to the Office of the
President.
With the termination of its legislative franchise, ACWS continued to operate its radio
and television stations through permits issued by the Board of Communications and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications pursuant to PD 576-A.
In 1979, Executive Order No. 546 7 ("EO 546" for brevity) created the Ministry of Public
Works and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. EO 546 merged the
Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single
entity called the National Telecommunications Commission under the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. 8 EO 546 vested in the NTC the power to grant
permits for the operation of radio and television stations. Specifically, subparagraphs
(a) and (c) of EO 546 provide as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 15. Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall exercise the
following functions: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities

and services, radio communications systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph
systems, radio and television broadcasting systems and other similar public utilities;
x x x
b. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph
systems and radio communications systems including amateur radio stations and radio
and television broadcasting systems;
x x x." 9 (Emphasis supplied)
The NTC granted ACWS renewable temporary permits and licenses for the continued
operation of its radio 10 and television broadcasting systems.
ACWS operates Channel 25 under call sign DWQH-TV in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
Band as authorized by temporary permits. The latest temporary permit for Channel 25
was Temporary Permit No. BSD-0828-95 dated July 7, 1995, effective from June 29,
1995 to June 28, 1997.
ACWS applied for an increase of the transmitter power of Channel 25 from one kilowatt
to 25 kilowatts, the application docketed as NTC Case No. 91-031. In an Order dated
May 28, 1996, then NTC Commissioner Simeon Kintanar granted the application on the
ground that ACWS "is legally, financially and technically capable and the proposed
increase of power will redound to the interest of the public." Consequently, ACWS
embarked on an expansion program to meet the NTC-approved upgrading of its
facilities.
Before the expiration of Temporary Permit No. BSD-0828-95, ACWS applied for its
renewal on June 3, 1997. In a letter dated January 19, 1998, NTC Senior Executive
Assistant III Delilah F. Deles informed ACWS of the approval of its temporary permit for
Channel 25, to be released upon payment of the necessary fees in the total amount of
P3,600.00. 11 ACWS paid the amount on February 4, 1998 as evidenced by Official
Receipt No. 0879209. 12
The NTC, however, refused to release to ACWS the approved and paid for temporary
permit. Instead, the NTC issued an Order 13 dated February 26, 1998 directing ACWS
to show cause why its temporary permit to operate should not be recalled for failure to
secure a legislative franchise. The NTC also ordered ACWS to cease and desist from
operating Channel 25. The order reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In a letter dated 17 November 1997, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A",
this Commission, thru its Broadcast Service Division, directed above-named
respondents to submit, within thirty (30) days from expiration of its Temporary Permit,
a new congressional franchise and failure to do so may cause a denial of their
application for renewal of their Temporary Permits. Despite this directive, respondents
failed to submit a new congressional franchise.
Earlier on, or on 28 October 1997, this Commission, thru the Chief, Broadcast Division,
received from the Committee on Legislative Franchises, a certification, a copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex "B" that respondents were ordered to submit requirements
to support their franchise application (House Bill No. 14345) but respondents failed to
do, thus the application was never deliberated upon in the 9th Congress. In the 10th
Congress, no refiled application by the respondents was pending in the Committee on
Legislative Franchise.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondents are hereby directed to show cause in writing within ten
(10) days from receipt of this order why their assigned frequency, more specifically
Channel 25 in the UHF Band, should not be recalled for lack of the necessary
Congressional Franchise as required by Section 1, Act No. 3846, as amended.
Moreover, respondent is hereby directed to cease and desist from operating DWQH-TV,
unless subsequently authorized by the Commission.
SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library
The case was docketed as NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009. On March 17, 1998,
ACWS filed its Answer praying among others that the Order dated February 26, 1998 be
set aside and the administrative case be dismissed. Petitioner also prayed that the
approved temporary permit to operate Channel 25 be released. Upon ACWS’s request,
the NTC conducted a hearing on the matter on April 22, 1998, during which ACWS
adduced evidence. ACWS requested a continuance to June 8, 1998.
On May 15, 1998, despite the pendency of NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009 and its
request for continuance, ACWS filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
"Mandamus, Prohibition and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction." ACWS prayed that the NTC be
ordered to release ACWS’s already approved and paid for temporary permit to operate
Channel 25 or to issue the corresponding Certificate of Public Convenience pursuant to
EO 546. ACWS also sought to enjoin NTC from proceeding with NTC Administrative
Case No. 98-009. ACWS likewise sought reimbursement of its legal expenses
amounting to P100,000.00.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1998, the Court of Appeals restrained the NTC from
continuing with the proceedings in NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009. In due course,
however, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision denying ACWS’s petition and its
motion to reconsider the same.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that mandamus does not lie to compel the exercise of
discretion in the grant or release of a temporary permit to operate a television station.
Neither is prohibition proper to enjoin the NTC from proceeding with NTC Administrative
Case No. 98-009. The Court of Appeals explained that even if the renewal of ACWS’s
temporary permit had been approved and paid for, the NTC could still inquire whether
ACWS complied with the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU" for brevity) between
the House Committee on Legislative Franchises and the KBP of which ACWS is a
member. The MOU provides as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The NTC shall continue to issue and grant permits or authorizations to operate radio
and television broadcast stations within their mandate under Section 15 of Executive
Order No. 546, provided that such temporary permits or authorization to operate shall
be valid for two (2) years within which the permittee shall be required to file an
application for a legislative franchise with the congress not later than December 31,
1994; provided further, if the application for franchise remains unacted by the Congress
without however being disapproved or denied, such temporary permit or authorization
to operate shall be extendible for another two (2) year period; provided finally, that if
the permittee of the temporary permit or authorization to operate fails to secure the
legislative franchise with Congress within this period, the NTC shall not extend or renew
its permit or authorization to operate any further." (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of ACWS’s failure to secure a legislative franchise as required by the MOU, the
NTC issued its Order of February 26, 1998.
The Court of Appeals then observed that the matters ventilated in the petition were
substantially the same as those raised in ACWS’s answer in NTC Administrative Case
No. 98-009. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals declared
that the determination of whether ACWS complied with the requisites for the renewal of
its permit is best left for the NTC to decide as the government agency tasked to
oversee the operations of radio and television stations. The Court of Appeals concluded
that ACWS cannot at this stage come to the court to enjoin the NTC from excising a
power clearly vested in it by law.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE TRUE ISSUE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER IN THE

PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
2. FAILING OR REFUSING TO GRASP THE BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MERE

RELEASE OF AN ALREADY APPROVED AND PAID FOR TEMPORARY PERMIT TO OPERATE
AND THE EVALUATION OF PETITIONER’S CAPABILITY TO OPERATE A TELEVISION
STATION.
3. RECOGNIZING THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ENTERED INTO AMONG

THE RESPONDENTS COMPRISING THE NTC, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISES AND THE KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER SA PILIPINAS.
4. FINDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION APPLIES TO THE CASE

AT BAR.
5. NOT ORDERING RESPONDENTS TO REFUND OR REIMBURSE PETITIONER THE

ACTUAL DAMAGES IT SUFFERED ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR REFUSAL TO RELEASE THE
ALREADY APPROVED AND PAID FOR TEMPORARY PERMIT TO OPERATE AS WELL AS
THEIR BASELESS SUSPENSION OF PETITIONER’S OPERATIONS. 14
On the first and second issues, ACWS agrees that the exercise of discretion cannot be
compelled by mandamus. ACWS likewise agrees that the power to grant a permit or
authority to operate a broadcast facility is discretionary. However, ACWS points out
that once the discretionary power has been exercised as in this case where the
temporary permit had already been approved, the simple act of releasing the approved
and paid for temporary permit becomes merely ministerial.
On the third issue, ACWS contends that the MOU is contrary to PD 576-A and EO 546
for requiring a legislative franchise in order to secure a certificate of public convenience.
Moreover, the MOU, as executed by a mere Committee of the Lower House and the KBP
encroaches on the exercise of the executive functions of the NTC.
On the fourth issue, ACWS argues that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
inapplicable to this case considering that the issue submitted to the Court of Appeals
does not call for any "special knowledge, experience and service of the tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact." The question for resolution of the
Court of Appeals is whether the NTC acted in a whimsical and arbitrary manner in its
unjustified refusal to release the already approved and paid for temporary permit and in
immediately ordering the suspension of ACWS’s television operations.
Lastly, petitioner argues that it is entitled to a reimbursement of its legal expenses in
the amount of P100,000.00 on account of NTC’s capricious, vexing and arbitrary
actuations.
In sum, petitioner seeks the following reliefs: (1) the release of its already approved
and paid for temporary permit to operate; (2) the cessation of the administrative
proceedings initiated by NTC against petitioner for the purpose of recalling its Channel
25 permit to operate; and (3) damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for the
capricious, vexing and arbitrary actuations of the NTC officials concerned.
We cannot rule on the merits of the petition on the grounds of non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies and litis pendentia.
NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009 commenced upon NTC’s issuance of the Order
dated February 26, 1998. The Order "directed ACWS to show cause in writing within ten
(10) days from receipt why their assigned frequency, Channel 25 in the UHF Band,
should not be recalled for lack of the necessary congressional franchise as required by
Section 1, Act No. 3846, as amended." The Order also directed ACWS to cease and
desist from operating its television station, unless subsequently authorized by the
Commission. There was no mention of the MOU purportedly executed by the House
Committee on Legislative Franchises and the KBP.
On March 17, 1998, ACWS filed an answer asserting that the frequency assigned to
Channel 25 should not be recalled for the following reasons: (1) Department of Justice
Opinion No. 98, Series of 1991, 15 states that EO 546 authorizes an administrative
agency such as the NTC to issue permits for the operation of radio and television
broadcasting systems without need of a prior franchise issued by Congress; (2) NTC is
estopped from recalling the assigned frequency since it had previously approved the
application for renewal of the temporary permit which has been paid for; (3) the recall
or cancellation is unreasonable, unfair and oppressive considering that ACWS had
commenced upgrading and expanding its facilities, expending millions of pesos
purchasing new equipment after NTC approved its permit to purchase; and (4) the
letter dated November 17, 1997 mentioned in the Order dated February 26, 1998 was
never sent nor received by ACWS as validated by the lack of proof of service or at least
the registry receipt or a return card. ACWS sought the dismissal of the administrative
case and the release of the temporary permit.
Apparently, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for by ACWS before the NTC, the
Court of Appeals and now before this Court are identical and based on the same facts.
ACWS did not wait for the administrative case to proceed to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly denied the
petition for premature invocation of the court’s jurisdiction.
It appears that the NTC issued the Order pursuant to the NTC Rules of Practice and
Procedure. Rule 13, Part IV (Summary Proceedings) of the NTC Rules provides thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PART IV-SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS

Rule 13 — Order to Show Cause
Section 1. When applicable. — Based on the report of an authorized personnel of the

Board, or the credible sworn statement of any offended party, the board instead of
acting according to the procedure indicated for complaints, may issue an order directing
a respondent operator to appear before the board within seventy-two hours from his
receipt of a copy of the order and show cause why his certificate should not be
cancelled or suspended for the cause stated in the report or complaint.
This summary proceeding shall apply, in the discretion of the Board, only in cases
where the continued acts of the public’s utility operator shall cause serious detriment to
public interest.
This summary proceeding shall also be applicable in cases of willful or contumacious

refusal by an operator to comply with an order, rule or regulation of the Board, or any
provision of the Public Services Act, as amended, or any provisions of the Plan.
The Board, for good cause, may prior to the hearing suspend for a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days any certificate or the exercise of any right or authority granted under
the Act or Plan by order of the Board, whenever such step shall in the judgment of the
Board be necessary to avoid serious and irreparable damage or inconvenience to the
public or to private interests.
Section 2. Content. — The order to show cause shall include a statement in substance
of the violation reported or complained of, and, whenever practicable, there shall be
appended to it a copy of the report or complaint upon which the order is based." cralaw virtua1aw library
It is not disputed that ACWS had in fact applied for a franchise with the 9th Congress of
the Philippines but failed to submit the necessary supporting documents. The
Committee on Legislative Franchises issued a certification attesting to this fact. It was
then that the NTC, now acting as a three-member commission, inquired why ACWS
failed to submit the documents. The NTC also warned ACWS about the probable recall
of its assigned frequency for failure to secure a legislative franchise as required by Act
No. 3846.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies is Fatal
Before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. 16 This rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies was explained thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on

the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass
upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical
reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less
expensive and more speedy solution to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a
procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts — for reasons of law, comity and convenience — will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and
the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct errors
committed in the administrative forum." 17 (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, the issues which administrative agencies such as the NTC are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation. The purpose of the administrative case was precisely to thresh out the
legality of the continued operation of Channel 25.
The administrative case was the proper forum for ACWS to ventilate its side. The
administrative case also provides an opportunity for the NTC to correct any actual or
fancied errors attributed to it by way of re-examination of the factual and legal aspects
of the case. This is the reason why ACWS was required to file an answer and hearings
were held on the matter.
Resort to Mandamus and Prohibition was Premature
The NTC in its Order dated February 26, 1998 gave ACWS ten days from receipt to file
an answer. On March 17, 1998, ACWS filed an answer. Upon ACWS’s request, a hearing
was held on April 22, 1998. Upon ACWS’s motion, a continuance to June 8, 1998 was
granted. ACWS filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
on May 15, 1998, thirteen days after the first hearing and twenty-four days before the
scheduled second hearing. Under these circumstances, the NTC could hardly be
expected to have acted on the issues and corrected itself. Clearly, ACWS filed the
petition prematurely.
The special civil actions of prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that a
party can resort to only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of
procedure are powerless to afford relief and where there is no other clear, adequate
and speedier remedy. In this case, NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009 was the
adequate, speedier and less expensive remedy to secure the reliefs sought.
It is basic that a party’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal, especially

where the case involves not just issues of law and of fact but of administrative
discretion. The available administrative procedures must be pursued until a definite and
final determination is held. 18
Litis Pendentia also Fatal to Petitioner’s Cause
In its Memorandum filed before this Court on December 14, 1999, ACWS claims that
the NTC has already decided NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009. ACWS further claims
that it filed an appeal under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of
Appeals from the NTC’s decision in the administrative case. There are in effect two
cases pending between the same parties for the same causes of action and reliefs, one
in the Court of Appeals and the other in this Court.
If we resolve this case on the merits while ACWS’s appeal is pending before the Court
of Appeals, the duplicity of suits would result in confusion and the possibility of
conflicting decisions could arise. For an orderly administration of justice, ACWS’s appeal
now pending before the Court of Appeals should be resolved first considering that the
appeal is from a decision of the NTC on the merits of the case.
No Denial of Due Process
Neither could ACWS plead denial of due process as justification for its immediate resort
to the court. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process
clause" of the Constitution, thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, . . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library
In order to fall within the protection of this provision, two conditions must concur,
namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper
observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must
be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence,
procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,"
while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures
by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." 19
ACWS argues that NTC failed to observe due process in the issuance of the Order dated
February 26, 1998 because ACWS did not receive the letter dated November 17, 1998
20 mentioned in the Order. The letter required petitioner to submit its new
congressional franchise within 30 days from expiration of the temporary permit to be
renewed. The letter did not refer to Channel 25 but to the radio stations maintained and
operated by ACWS. ACWS likewise assails the directive to cease and desist from
operating Channel 25 Obviously, ACWS is referring to the procedural aspect of the due
process clause.
Notice and hearing are fundamental requirements of procedural due process when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial functions. Both were complied with in
this case.
It is of no moment that ACWS did not receive the letter dated November 17, 1998.
What is important is that ACWS received the Order dated February 26, 1998 requiring it
to show cause why its permit to operate Channel 25 should not be cancelled. In any
case, the Court has maintained a clear position with regard to the due process
requirements in administrative cases, that is —
"(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard
is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of" 21 (Emphasis supplied).
The NTC afforded ACWS an opportunity to be heard by requiring it to submit an answer

and by conducting hearings on the matter. All told, ACWS had an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the Order dated February 26, 1998 before the NTC.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 1998, as well
as its Resolution dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47675, is AFFIRMED. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131759 March 23, 2004
MA. TERESITA C. CABALLES, and VLADIMIR RUIDERA, petitioners,

vs.
DRS. PRIMITIVA PEREZ-SISON, LIGAYA D. PEREZ, ANTONIO F. JOSON, JR., BOARD OF
OPTOMETRY OF THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, SAMAHAN NG MGA
OPTOMETRIST SA PILIPINAS (SOP), and CHARLIE HO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The petitioners assail the dismissal of their petition in
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39494 as well as the appellate court's Resolution
1
which dismissed their motion for reconsideration.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On December 1, 1994, the Samahan ng Mga Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOP), through its President,

Charlie L. Ho, filed a Letter-Affidavit with the Board of Optometry of the Professional Regulations
2
Commission (PRC), charging Emma Emperado-Dreyfus, Ma. Teresita C. Caballes, Filemon P.

Esquivel, Jr. and Vladimir L. Ruidera, all employees of Vision Express Philippines, Inc. (VEPI), with
unethical and/or unprofessional conduct. Thus:
The undersigned, as President of the Samahan ng mga Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOP), is
writing in behalf of the association to bring to your attention and proper action possible
violations of certain provisions of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists.
Under Section 3 (e), article III of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists, it is considered
unethical and unprofessional conduct to "xxx (hold) oneself to the public as an optometrist
under the name of any corporation, company, institution, clinic, association, parlor, or any
other name than the name of the optometrist."
Applying said provision to the subject of this letter, please be informed that the following duly
licensed optometrists
1. Emma Emperado-Dreyfus PRC Lic. No. 4433
2. Ma. Teresita C. Caballes PRC Lic. No. 4189
3. Filemon P. Esquivel, Jr. PRC Lic. No. 5629
4. Vladimir L. Ruidera 1994 Board passer
may have possibly committed an infraction considering the following circumstances:
1. They have been employed by a corporation named Vision Express Phils., Inc. since
September 1994 up to the present;
2. Vision Express Phils., Inc. is a corporation that has been charged with illegally engaging in
the practice of optometry before the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC PED
Case No. 94-1732;
3. Since they have been employed by the corporation, it is inevitable that they associate
themselves with and represent themselves to the public as part of the corporation, thus,
adopting the name of the corporation instead of their own in practicing their profession;
4. By consenting to the present arrangement, and knowing that the corporation is engaging
in activities solely reserved for optometrists, they have allowed themselves to be part of the
corporation's illegal practice of optometry.
3
The complaint was supported by affidavits executed by Charlie Ho, Emelito Tecson, and
4 5
Digna Marcelo. In his affidavit, Ho averred as follows:

6
2. Sometime in September 1994, an establishment under the name of Vision Express (VEPI
henceforth) opened at the 4th level-Annex-B Building of the SM Megamall in Mandaluyong.
3. On or about October 1994, I personally visited the said establishment and was able to talk
to Dr. Emma Emperado-Dreyfus, store manager, in connection with the optometrists
employed by the corporation who render optometric services to the public, to wit:
a. Emma Emperado-Dreyfus PRC Lic. No. 4433
b. Ma. Teresita C. Caballes PRC Lic. No. 4189

c. Filemon P. Esquivel, Jr. PRC Lic. No. 5629
d. Vladimir L. Ruidera 1994 Board passer
4. On said occasion, it was admitted to me by said Dr. Dreyfus, but without disclosing their
identities, that there are several optometrists employed by the corporation.
5. As optometrists employed by the corporation, I saw Dr. Dreyfus and Dr. Esquivel in the
establishment rendering services for the corporation in furtherance of the practice of
optometry.
6. There were also other individuals in the establishment performing eye examinations on
patients with the use of an auto-refractor, whose identities are established by the affidavits of
Emelito Tecson and Digna Marcelo, hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B," respectively. 7
The complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. 157. The respondents therein submitted a Joint
Counter-Affidavit where they admitted being employees of VEPI, but denied that they were engaged
8
in the practice of optometry. They alleged that Ho was guilty of unprofessional and unethical
conduct, and prayed that he be stripped of his professional license as optometrist. They averred that
the complaint was malicious and unfounded, and that Ho was moved by malice and bad faith in
bringing forth the complaint. They likewise accused Ho of trying to perpetuate a monopoly of the
optical shop business.
Ho submitted his Reply-Affidavit, while the respondents therein submitted their Rejoinder-
9
Affidavit. Pre-trial then ensued. Thereafter, on August 14, 1995, Teresita Caballes and Valdimir
10
Ruidera filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for its failure to state a cause of action. The
11
petitioners made the following averments:
1. During the last hearing of the instant case on July 20, 1995, plaintiff admitted before this
Honorable Commission that he did not see respondents Teresita Caballes and Vladimir
Ruidera rendering services for the corporation in furtherance of the practice of optometry;
2. The affidavits of plaintiff's witnesses Emil (sic) Tecson and Digna Marcelo do not indicate
any participation of the respondents to the incidents set forth by the said witnesses; neither
are the respondents identified in the said affidavits.
3. Since plaintiff's complaint failed to set forth distinctly, clearly and concisely the charge or
charges or the offense or offenses complained of against respondents Teresita Caballes and
Vladimir Ruidera, they should be discharged as respondents and the cases against them be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.12
The complainant Charlie Ho filed his opposition thereto. 13
On September 26, 1995, the Board of Optometry issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss,
thus:
Again, the Board of Optometry finds the motion to be without basis. The complainant has
properly identified the respondents as employees in the Vision Corporation, a fact which they
themselves admitted in their counter-affidavits. The only question now which is to be proven
is, can they be held guilty for unethical and/or unprofessional conduct by the nature of their
employment in said optical clinic?
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Optometry resolve[s] as it hereby resolves to:
a) Order the respondents to answer the request for admission made by the complainant
dated July 31, 1995.
b) Deny the "Motion To Dismiss" filed by the respondents for lack of merit. 14
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order which was, however, also denied
15
by the Board. It ruled that a reading of the complaint-affidavit reveals that there was, indeed, a
16
cause of action, as the petitioners were charged with alleged violation of Section 6(e) and (j) of
Article III of the Code of Ethics of Optometrists. According to the Board, that the complaint-affidavit
made no mention of the details as to how the unprofessional or undesirable conduct was committed
would not justify the dismissal of the complaint. The Board stated that rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a very rigid or technical sense. 17
The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals, urging the reversal of the questioned orders
on the following grounds:
A. RESPONDENT BOARD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DISMISS
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST THEM PATENTLY FAILED
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
B. RESPONDENT BOARD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FROM ITS SEPTEMBER 26, 1995 ORDER, CITING AS BASIS FOR
ITS DENIAL THE INJURY TO THE COMPLAINANT WHEN THE LATTER DID NOT EVEN
ALLEGE ANY INJURY SUFFERED BY IT ATTRIBUTABLE TO ANY ACT OF ANY OF THE
PETITIONERS.
C. RESPONDENT BOARD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN FROM ITS ORDERS DATED SEPTEMBER 26 AND
DECEMBER 8, IT UNREASONABLY IMPLIED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE
BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR SIMPLY BEING EMPLOYEES OF VEPI.
D. THERE IS NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN SPEEDY REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY

COURSE OF LAW FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS OF THE RESPONDENT
BOARD EXCEPT THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. 18
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant who moves
to dismiss a complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted the allegations therein. Invoking the test of sufficiency, the CA held that the
sole element furnishing the said test is usually the complaint itself, and no other. The absence of
proof to substantiate an allegation in the complaint does not mean that the complaint is insufficient,
only that it is unsupported by evidence. According to the CA, this could be the judgment of the Board
in its decision after trial. At this stage, the Board could not be said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
The appellate court also ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory in
nature, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy of the losing
party in such case is to proceed to trial, and, in case an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal in
due time, assigning the denial of the motion to dismiss as an error. The appellate court added that it
would not preempt the Board of Optometry from deciding on the case.
Thus, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin the Board from
further proceeding with the case.
The petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred as follows:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHEN IT IS VERY CLEAR FROM THE QUESTIONED
COMPLAINT THAT IT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED
PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM ITS 09 JUNE 1997 DECISION
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

FINDING THAT AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS CANNOT BE THE
SUBJECT OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 CITING THE CASE
OF ATIENZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 85455, 232 SCRA 737 (1994). 19
According to the petitioners, in dismissing their petition for certiorari, the CA relied on the fact that
they are employees of VEPI, on the presumption that it was engaged in the illegal practice of
optometry. The petitioners note that the SEC upheld the legality of VEPI's right to engage in its
business, and further upheld its right to engage the services of optometrists. The petitioners assert
that a closer look at the complaint/affidavit would show that it failed to state a cause of action.
Nothing in the said affidavit mentioned that the petitioners committed any act which would constitute
unethical or professional conduct, and all that was mentioned was that they were employees of
VEPI.
The petitioners contend that the averment of the law they allegedly violated, Sections 6(e) and (j) of
Article III of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists, only appeared in a subsequent pleading. The
complaint/affidavit did not mention that the petitioners held themselves out to the public as
optometrists under the name of a corporation nor advertised and practiced under names other than
their own. According to the petitioners, the failure to state the above facts in the complaint/affidavit
itself is fatal, and such defect cannot be cured by alleging those facts in subsequent pleadings. The
act or omission allegedly committed by the petitioners, the very heart of the complaint, was missing.
The petitioners maintain that there is no law which provides that mere employment in a corporation
by an optometrist is prima facie evidence of illegal practice of optometry. The pronouncement made
by the CA that it is up to the Board to decide whether to punish an optometrist by mere employment
in a corporation would set a bad precedent, as it would imply that the Board has the authority to
punish optometrists by the fact of mere employment in a corporation. Furthermore, the petitioners
assert that the ruling of the CA is a bad precedent and is violative of the due process clause under
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. They likewise claim that they are entitled to the equal
protection of laws, as there are a number of professionals who are also employees of other
corporations, but who have not been charged with unethical or unprofessional conduct for simply
being employees.
The petitioners contend that after the Board denied their motion for reconsideration, the plain,
adequate and speedy remedy available to them was a petition for certiorari, and that in the interest
of substantial justice, an order denying a motion to dismiss can be the subject of a petition
for certiorari.
In their Comment, the private respondents aver that the petitioners should have availed themselves
of the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. They likewise
insist that a perusal of the complaint/affidavit of respondent Ho will reveal that the essential
requisites of a cause of action are present. The objection raised in the motion to dismiss is
premature, because the parties were only at the pre-trial stage. Moreover, according to the private
respondents, the petitioners contradicted themselves when they averred that the complaint/affidavit
had no cause of action, but, instead of immediately filing a motion to dismiss, they filed a joint
counter-affidavit, which was actually an answer.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rep. Act No. 8050 specifically vests in the Board of Optometry the power to conduct hearings and
20
investigations to resolve complaints against practitioners of optometry for malpractice, unethical and
unprofessional conduct, or violation of any of the provisions of the Act or any of its regulations and
21
authorizes the said Board to render a decision thereon as long as the vote of three (3) members is
obtained. Thus, the Board may, after giving proper notice and hearing to the party concerned,
22
revoke an optometrist's certificate of registration or suspend his license to practice on the foregoing
grounds, or upon the conviction of the optometrist of a crime involving moral turpitude. The
23
revocation of a certificate or suspension of a professional license by the Board shall become final,
unless appealed to the PRC within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. 24
The petitioners' premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to their cause of action. It is
presumed that an administrative agency, in this case, the Board of Optometry, if afforded an
opportunity to pass upon a matter, would decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the
courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Furthermore, reasons of
law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by
administrative agencies. 25
We note that the petition stems from an order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. It must be
stressed that such order is merely an interlocutory one and therefore not appealable. Neither can it
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of
law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. Although the special civil action for certiorari may be
availed of in case there is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower
court, or body, it would be a breach of orderly procedure to allow a party to come before the
26
appellate court every time an order is issued with which a party does not agree. Hence, as a general
27
rule, there must first be a judgment on the merits of the case before it may be questioned via a
special civil action for certiorari. Thus:
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as
defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an
adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the rule is
not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered
appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c)
appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not
promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order
maintaining the plaintiffs' baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go
through protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.28
The petitioners failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to
the rule. Furthermore, they failed to show that the respondent Board committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39494 and its Resolution dated October 22, 1997 are AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191427 May 30, 2011
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), Petitioner,

vs.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated
October 27, 2009 and Resolution dated February 23, 2010 in CA-G. R. SP No. 107449.
Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) is engaged in, among other things, the manufacture
of animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City.
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through its Pollution Control
Division – Monitoring and Enforcement Section, after conducting on March 14, 2000 a
laboratory analysis of petitioner’s corn oil refinery plant’s wastewater, found that it failed
to comply with government standards provided under Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of
1990.
LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain
why no order should be issued for the cessation of its operations due to its discharge of
pollutive effluents into the Pasig River and why it was operating without a
clearance/permit from the LLDA.
Still later, the LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint conducted on August 31,
2000, another analysis of petitioner’s wastewater, which showed its continued failure to
conform to its effluent standard in terms of Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical
Oxygen Demand (BOD), Color and Oil/Grease.
Hearings on petitioner’s pollution case were thereafter commenced on March 1, 2001.
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA,

petitioner’s wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned
DAOs.
In early 2003, petitioner notified LLDA of its plan to upgrade the wastewater treatment
facility (WTF) of its corn oil refinery plant in an effort to comply with environmental laws,
an upgrade that was completed only in 2007.
On May 9, 2007 on its request,2 a re-sampling of petitioner’s wastewater was conducted

which showed that petitioner’s plant finally complied with government standards.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties, by Manifestation and Motion3 filed

on August 24, 2007 to which it attached copies of its Daily Operation Reports and
Certifications4 to show that accrued daily penalties should only cover a period of 560
days.
After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay5 (OP) dated January 21,
2008, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After careful evaluation of the case, respondent is found to be discharging pollutive

wastewater computed in two periods reckoned from March 14, 2000 – the date of initial
sampling until November 3, 2003 – the date it requested for a re-
sampling covering 932 days in consideration of the interval of time when subsequent
monitoring was conducted after an interval of more than 2 years and from March 15,
2006 – the date when re-sampling was done until April 17, 2007 covering 448
days6 for a total of 1,247 days.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered to pay within fifteen

(15) days from receipt hereof the accumulated daily penalties amounting to a total of
Pesos: One Million Two Hundred Forty-Seven (Thousand) Pesos Only (PHP
1,247,000.00) prior to dismissal of the case and without prejudice of filing another case
for its subsequent violations. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered to pay only accumulated daily
penalties in the sum of Five Hundred Sixty Thousand (₱560,000) Pesos7 on grounds
that the LLDA erred in first, adopting a straight computation of the periods of violation –
based on the flawed assumption that petitioner was operating on a daily basis − without
excluding, among others, the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent
rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days); and
second, in disregarding the Daily Operation Reports and Certifications which petitioner
submitted to attest to the actual number of its operating days, i.e., 560 days.
By Order8 of July 11, 2008, the LLDA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and
reiterated its order to pay the aforestated penalties, disposing of the issues thusly:
On the first issue, while it is true that the Authority failed to state in its OP dated 21
January 2008 the basis for actual computation of the accumulated daily penalties, the
Authority would like to explain that its computation was based on the following, to wit:
The computation of accumulated daily penalties was reckoned period [sic] from 14
March 2000 – the date of initial sampling to 03 November 2003 – the date when its
letter request for re-sampling was received which covers 932 days computed at 6 days
per week operation as reflected in the Reports of Inspection. Since subsequent
inspection conducted after two (2) years and four (4) months, such period was deducted
from the computation. Likewise, the period when the LLDA Laboratory was rehabilitated
from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 was also deducted with a total of Two
Hundred Twelve (212) days.
On the second claim, the same cannot be granted for lack of legal basis since the
documents submitted are self-serving. The period from 15 March 2006 to 17 April 2007
was computed from the date of re-sampling when it failed to conform to the standards
set by law up to the date of receipt of its letter request for re-sampling prior to its
compliance on May 9, 2007. The period covers 342 days.
Hence, respondent is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater not conforming with

the standards set by law computed from March 14, 2000 – November 3, 2003 covering
932 days and from March 15, 2006 – April 17, 2007 covering 342 days for a total of
1,274 days.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of Appeals,
attributing to LLDA grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence,
and maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the
enforcement of LLDA’s order justified such recourse as an exception to the rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial action.
By Decision of October 27, 2009 the appellate court affirmed both LLDA orders, which it
found to be amply supported by substantial evidence, the computation of the
accumulated daily penalties being in accord with prevailing DENR guidelines. The
appellate court held that while petitioner may have offered documentary evidence to
support its assertion that the days when it did not operate must be excluded from the
computation, the LLDA has the prerogative to disregard the same for being unverified,
hence, unreliable.
The appellate court went on to chide petitioner’s petition for certiorari as premature
since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR
Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been
exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.9
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of February

23, 2010, it filed the present petition.
Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
The petition fails.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial

system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence.10 The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.11
Executive Order No. 19212 (EO 192) was issued on June 10, 1987 for the salutary
purpose of reorganizing the DENR, charging it with the task of promulgating rules and
regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution as well as of promulgating
ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of
other pollutants and radiations. EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board
under the Office of the DENR Secretary which took over the powers and functions of the
National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution
cases, including the latter’s role as arbitrator for determining reparation, or restitution of
the damages and losses resulting from pollution.13
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary.
Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an
exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDA’s findings is at best, speculative
and presumptuous.
As for petitioner’s invocation of due process, it fails too. The appellate court thus aptly
brushed aside this claim, in this wise:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
. . . Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the
case against him is decided.
Here, petitioner URC was given ample opportunities to be heard – it was given show
cause orders and allowed to participate in hearing to rebut the allegation against it of
discharging pollutive wastewater to the Pasig River, it was given the chance to present
evidences in support of its claims, it was notified of the assailed "Order to Pay," and it
was allowed to file a motion for reconsideration. Given these, we are of the view that the
minimum requirements of administrative due process have been complied with in this
case.14 (emphasis in the original)
In fine, the assailed LLDA orders of January 21, 2008 and July 11, 2008 correctly
reckoned the two periods within which petitioner was found to have continued
discharging pollutive wastewater and applied the penalty as provided for under Article
VI, Section 32 of LLDA Resolution No. 33, Series of 1996.15 LLDA’s explanation that
behind its inclusion of certain days in its computation of the imposable penalties – that it
had already deducted not just the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent
rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days) but
had also excluded from the computation the period during which no inspections or
compliance monitorings were conducted (a period covering two years and four months)
is well-taken.
It is noted that during the hearing on June 19, 2007, the LLDA gave petitioner the
opportunity "to submit within fifteen (15) days….any valid documents to show proof of its
non-operating dates that would be necessary for the possible reduction of the
accumulated daily penalties,"16 but petitioner failed to comply therewith.
As earlier noted, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to which it attached Daily
Operation Reports and Certifications, which voluminous documents were, however,
unverified in derogation of Rule X, Section 217 of the 2004 Revised Rules, Regulations
and Procedures Implementing Republic Act No. 4850. Absent such verification, the
LLDA may not be faulted for treating such evidence to be purely self-serving.
Respecting LLDA’s decision not to attach any evidentiary weight to the Daily Operation
Reports or Certifications, recall that the LLDA conducted an analysis of petitioner’s
wastewater discharge on August 31, 2000, upon receiving a phone-in complaint. And it
conducted too an analysis on May 3, 2002 in the course of periodic compliance
monitoring. The Daily Operation Reports for both August 31, 200018 and May 3,
200219 submitted by petitioner clearly manifest that the plant did not operate on those
dates. On the other hand, LLDA’s Investigation Report and Report of Inspection20 dated
August 31, 2000 and May 3, 2002, respectively, disclose otherwise. Petitioner never
disputed the factual findings reflected in these reports. Thus spawns doubts on the
veracity and accuracy of the Daily Operation Reports.lawphi1
Petitioner asserts that LLDA had not credited it for undertaking remedial measures to
rehabilitate its wastewater treatment facility, despite the prohibitive costs and at a time
when its income from the agro-industrial business was already severely affected by a
poor business climate; and that the enforcement of the assailed LLDA orders amounted
to a gross disincentive to its business.
Without belaboring petitioner’s assertions, it must be underscored that the protection of

the environment, including bodies of water, is no less urgent or vital than the pressing
concerns of private enterprises, big or small. Everyone must do their share to conserve
the national patrimony’s meager resources for the benefit of not only this generation, but
of those to follow. The length of time alone it took petitioner to upgrade its WTF (from
2003 to 2007), a move arrived at only under threat of continuing sanctions, militates
against any genuine concern for the well-being of the country’s waterways.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 27, 2009 Decision and the
February 23, 2010 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 107449, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive

Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action

for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section
68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent
Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of
the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the
truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained
1
petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section
68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents
filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director
Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. Subsequently, the
2
case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents'
statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be
denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." Pending resolution
3
however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private
respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial
4
Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
5
respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the
6
trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 28, 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition
7
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the
trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present
8
petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse
9
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993.
By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of temporary
10
restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court
could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents,
on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case
falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated
because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful
on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the
truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we
are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's
judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause
of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal
11
for lack of cause of

action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal
12
reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for
a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons
of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate
that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an
ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when
there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when
13 14
the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when
15
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
16
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
17
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
18
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a

19
claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule
20 21
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
23
administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The
letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review
and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate
and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an
administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of
the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court
to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy
25
Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS
26
vs. Vasquez, this Court held:

27
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the
pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted
cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not
but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there
was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of
petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean
or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by
28
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
29
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
30
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in
31
the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their
side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in
an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled that
32
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck
because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts
under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section
68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of

the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not
only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that
can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis
ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating
the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad
enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is
that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In
the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected
in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
33
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. In this wise, the observation of the
34
Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to present
situations and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining
resources of the country," that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This
amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from
criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the
inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions.
The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest

resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and

protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from

technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize

certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;"
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other
hand, confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been
provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation
cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section
68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have
provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra. 35
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners
themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck
of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was
given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:
. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission
of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and
in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . 36
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated
that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner
thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate
the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners
pointed out:
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by

Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance
used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents.
She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in
question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is
therefor liable. . .
37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under
Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order
that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act
constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D.
705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the
aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.
— Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands,
or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license
or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before
its amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended

to read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest

products without license. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section
68, P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a
distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated
the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there
is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings
in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the
case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies
in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and
more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be
waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in
39
custody," and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling
40
with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or
right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is
41
indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is
entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant,
alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized
under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual
value of the property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful
42
detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized
by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the
DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful
detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705,
as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to
the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The
Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through
a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED;
the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the
Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 112708-09 March 29, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY TRADING CORPORATION and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Save for slight modification of a specific disquisition made by the SANDIGANBAYAN in its now-assailed judgment dated August 23, 1993,
we affirm the same, as well as its Resolution promulgated on October 7, 1993 denying the Motion For Reconsideration.
The factual background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation
and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their
sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court
assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions and the filing of the
comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties, this Court referred the cases to public
respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition, where SIPALAY's petition was docketed as
1
S.B. 0095, and that of ALLIED as S.B. 0100.
Concerning SIPALAY (S.B. 0095), its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corporation which owns the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the PCGG, part of Lucio
C. Tan's ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG on July 24, 1988 thus sequestered these SIPALAY shares
under a "Sequestration Order and Supervisory Committee" which reads:
24 July 1986
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation

C/O Mr. Lucio C. Tan
Allied Banking Corporation
Allied Bank Center
Ayala Ave., Makati
Metro Manila
Subject: Sequestration Order and Supervisory Committee
Gentlemen:
By virtue of the powers vested in the Presidential Commission on Good Government

by authority of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, we hereby sequester
the shares of stocks in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation held by and/or in the
name of Sipalay Trading Corporation.
We direct you not to cause any transfer, conveyance, encumbrance, concealment, or

liquidation of the aforementioned shares of stocks without any written authority from
the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
This sequestration order and formation of the Supervisory Committee shall take
effect upon your receipt of this Order.
For your immediate and strict compliance.
Very truly yours,
FOR THE COMMISSION:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
RAMON A. DIAZ QUINTIN S. DOROMAL
Commissioner Commissioner 2
SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the PCGG sought to implement the sequestration
without acting on its motions ". . . To Lift Sequestration Order" and ". . . For Hearing For
Specification Of Charges And For Copies Of Evidence". SIPALAY maintained that the
sequestration was without evidentiary substantiation, violative of due process, and deemed
automatically lifted when no judicial proceeding was brought against it within the period
mandated under Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution.
Anent ALLIED (S.B. 0100), its Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 was served a "Search and
Seizure Order" by agents of the PCGG, the text of which reads:
The Manager
Allied Banking Corporation
Valenzuela Branch
Valenzuela, Metro Manila
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
Gentlemen:
By virtue of the powers vested in this Commission by the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, you are hereby directed to submit for search and seizure all bank
documents in the abovementioned premises which our representative may find
necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted by this Commission.
Atty. Benjamin Alonte is deputized to head the team that will implement this Order.
August 13, 1986, Pasig, Metro Manila.
FOR
THE
COMM
ISSION
:
(Sgd.)
RAMO
N A.
DIAZ
Commi
ssioner
(Sgd.)
MARY
CONC
EPCIO
N
BAUTI
STA
Commi
ssioner
3
ALLIED went to court for the same reason that the PCGG was bent on implementing the
order. ALLIED contended that this order is not one for sequestration but is particularly a
general search warrant which fails to meet the constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.
The petitions were jointly heard by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Briefly, the more salient events which
transpired therein are as follows:
At the presentation of their evidence, PCGG Secretary Ramon Hontiveros appeared as the lone
witness for SIPALAY and ALLIED. He produced and identified excerpts of the minutes of the PCGG
meetings held on March 13 and 12, 1986 in response to a subpoena duces tecum.
4
For the PCGG's part, its witnesses were Commissioner Dr. Quintin Doromal, former PCGG
Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista, now deceased, and Atty. Benjamin Alonte, Director IV,
Legal Department of the PCGG who headed the team that served the search and seizure order on
ALLIED. Commissioner Doromal identified voluminous documents. Former Commissioner Bautista
died midway her cross-examination. The PCGG almost failed to present Atty. Alonte, had the
SANDIGANBAYAN not reconsidered its Order of March 8, 1993 declaring the cases submitted for
5 6
decision after the PCGG was deemed to have waived presentation of its evidence for its repeated
postponements of the hearing. After Atty. Alonte's testimony and upon the PCGG's manifestation
that it was no longer presenting any witness, the SANDIGANBAYAN gave the PCGG twenty (20)
7
days (from July 1, 1993) within which to submit its formal evidence in writing. SIPALAY and ALLIED
were given the same period (20 days) from receipt of such written formal offer of evidence within
which to file their formal comments and/or objections thereto, and after which, the incident will be
deemed submitted for resolution.
What the PCGG filed on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal offer of its evidence as directed by the
SANDIGANBAYAN, but a "Motion To Dismiss" the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions. Admittedly, this
motion to dismiss came nearly seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their
petitions before this Court on September 16, 1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground
was SIPALAY's and ALLIED's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued
that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the
President before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations. An "Opposition" and a "Reply" were filed in relation to the motion.
At some earlier time (May 21, 1992), the PCGG filed a "Motion For The Consolidation Or Joint Trial"
of SIPALAY's and ALLIED's petitions (S.B. 0095 and S.B. 0100) with Civil Case 0005 — a complaint
for "Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages" dated July 17, 1987 likewise
filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN by the PCGG against Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
and other defendants. The SANDIGANBAYAN formally denied this motion in an extended
8
Resolution dated July 6, 1993. The PCGG filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" thereof. This motion
was deemed submitted for resolution when no opposition and reply were filed. SIPALAY and ALLlED
then filed a "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For Decision", to which an opposition and reply
were filed.
The PCGG lost in these cases below. The SANDIGANBAYAN in its now-assailed August 23, 1993
Decision voided the orders issued against SIPALAY and ALLIED. The decretal portion reads:
9
In S.B. No. 0095
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court has no judicious recourse but
to declare, as it hereby declares, the writ of sequestration issued against petitioner
Sipalay Trading Corporation's shares of stock in Maranaw Hotel and Resorts
Corporation as deemed automatically lifted for respondent PCGG's failure to implead
the petitioner within the period mandated under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. The same writ is likewise declared null and void for having issued
without sufficient evidentiary foundation — respondent PCGG having failed to
adduce and proffer that quantum of evidence necessary for its validity — without
prejudice to the issue of ill-gotten wealth being attributed to petitioner Sipalay Trading
Corporation and/or defendants Lucio C. Tan, et al. being threshed out and litigated in
Civil Case No. 0005.
In S.B. No. 0100
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the Court hereby declares the subject
search and seizure order issued by respondent PCGG directed against petitioner
Allied Banking Corporation's Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 as null and
void ab initio for having been issued without due process and in contravetion of the
organic law then in force, the Freedom Constitution, under which mantle, the Bill of
Rights found in the 1973 Constitution was amply protected and enforced.
Consequently, all documents, records and other tangible objections (sic) seized
pursuant thereto are hereby ordered returned to petitioner Allied Banking Corporation
through its duly authorized representative, after proper inventory and accounting
shall have been made within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
The resolution of PCGG's motions to dismiss and for reconsideration of the denial of its
motion for consolidation or joint trial, as well as SIPALAY's and ALLIED's motion to consider
the cases submitted for decision, was incorporated in the decision. And after its motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied in a Resolution promulgated on October 7,
1993, the PCGG brought the instant petition. A comment, reply, and rejoinder were
10
subsequently filed.
The key issues, in query form, are:
(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss proper?
(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than resolving it
as part of the judgment?
(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the search and
seizure order issued against ALLIED correct?
(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure to
bring an action in court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the constitutionally prescribed period?
Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on
lack of cause of action. The supporting cases cited by the PCGG in its petition indeed spell this out,
to wit: "Pestanas v. Dyogi", "Aboitiz v. Coll. of Customs", and "Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato", And
11 12 13
in the case of "Ocampo v. Buenaventura" likewise cited by PCGG, the Court in essence approves
14
of the filing of a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action at any stage of the
proceedings.
As a general rule, a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads

(Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the
defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the
contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any
stage of the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of action . . .
These principles, at first impression, appear to favor the PCGG. Sections 5 and 6 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations indeed provide an administrative mechanism for persons or
entities contesting the sequestration orders issued against them.
Sec. 5. — Who may contest — The person against whom a writ of sequestration or
freeze or hold order is directed may request the lifting thereof in writing, either
personally or through counsel within five (5) days from the receipt of the writ of
order . . .
Sec. 6. — Procedure for Review of writ or order — After due hearing or motu
propio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ or order
unconditionally or subject to such condition as it may deem necessary, taking into
consideration the evidence and circumstances of the case. The resolution of the
Commission may be appealed by the party concerned to the Office of the President
of the Philippines within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
Neither an initial request before the PCGG for the lifting of the sequestration orders nor an
appeal to the Office of the President was made by SIPALAY and ALLIED before they filed
their respective petitions in court. The PCGG's motion to dismiss was anchored on lack of
cause of action, albeit filed beyond the period to answer.
However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principles aforestated.
The SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions were both filed on the third quarter of 1986 (September 16 and
August 26, respectively), while the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss only in the middle of
1993 (July 7). Nearly seven (7) years came to pass in between that so much has already transpired
in the proceedings during the interregnum. SIPALAY and ALLIED had rested their cases, and the
PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses, not to mention other various motions and incidents
already disposed of by the SANDIGANBAYAN, with special attention to the numerous
postponements granted the PCGG for presentation of its evidence which prevented an earlier
termination of the proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the
proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of
evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Soto v. Jareno" has made it quite
15
clear that:
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not

affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of
decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the
complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take
cognizance of the case and try it. (Emphasis supplied).
The length of time the PCGG allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion to
dismiss only at the homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as "proper time". This factual
scenario largely differs from the "Ocampo" case relied upon by the PCGG. In that case and
the case of "Community Investment & Finance Corp. v. Garcia" cited therein, the motions to
16
dismiss involved were filed just after the filing of the answer, and not at some belated time
nearing the end of the trial. The parties in those cases have not presented any testimonial or
documentary evidence yet, as the trial proper has not commenced, and neither does it
appear that the movants concerned took close to seven (7) years before filing their
respective motions to dismiss. The PCGG therefore cannot seek refuge in the "Ocampo"
case to justify the marked delay in filing its motion to dismiss. Such tarried maneuver made
the PCGG guilty of estoppel by laches — the definition and effect of which this Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Regalado, had the occasion to visit anew in the relatively
recent case of "Olizon v. CA." 7 1
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
With its undenied belated action, seven (7) years in the making at that, it is only proper to
presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it
bewailed as the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions' lack of cause of action. More accurately, the
PCGG should be deemed to have waived such perceived defect in line with the "Soto"
case, for "proper time" cannot mean nor sanction an unexplained and unreasonable length
18
of time such as seven (7) years. The leniency extended by the Rules (Rule 9, Section 2,
Rules of Court) and by jurisprudence ("Ocampo case") in allowing a motion to dismiss based
on lack of cause of action filed after the answer or at any stage of the proceedings cannot be
invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of
laches — or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right
at a proper time which, in this case, was one of the PCGG's follies. Indeed, in matters of
19
timeliness, "indecent waste" is just as reprehensible as "indecent haste".
Another equally forceful reason warranting the denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss is that this
case falls under two recognized exceptions to the general rule of prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and the SANDIGANBAYAN's brief but lucid disquisition on one exception merits this
Court's approval.
Two. The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative (sic) remedies does not apply to
petitioners' case. This rule, which is based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, is not inflexible. It is subject to many exceptions, to wit: (i) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii)
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; and (iv) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice. 20
xxx xxx xxx
. . . there was no absolute necessity of appealing respondent PCGG's resolution to

the Office of the President, as purportedly required by Section 6 of the PCGG Rules
and Regulations, inasmuch as respondent PCGG seemed to have exhibited
indifference towards petitioners' pleas for the lifting of the sequestration and search
and seizure orders. Official inaction or unreasonable delay, as heretofore intimated,
is one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Hence, under the circumstance, petitioners may not be faulted for seeking relief
directly from the courts.21
The other exception is the first in the enumeration, i.e., "where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine", consisting in the PCGG's being guilty of estoppel by
laches which has just been discussed in great length. In answer therefore to the first key
issue, this Court rules in the affirmative. The denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss was in
order.
In respect of the second key issue, the PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating in the
judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should have been resolved
first and separately. That would have been unnecessary and injudicious in the light of the
"peculiarities" of this case where the motion was filed only at the tail end of the trial and when the
PCGG has virtually presented all its evidence. At that stage, there was in fact nothing left for the
parties to do but to await the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the
submission of the PCGG's written formal offer of documentary evidence as directed by that court,
which the PCGG failed to do within the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to dismiss
instead. In this connection, the PCGG's contention that the 20-day period for the submission of its
written formal offer of evidence was suspended upon the filing of the motion to dismiss has no merit.
The SANDIGANBAYAN's observation on this matter, as espoused by private respondents SIPALAY
and ALLIED, is correct.
The Court agrees with petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only
period suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period to file an answer (Section 4,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court) and that where a period is to be suspended by the
22
filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension
(Section 1[b], Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, for instance, provides for the suspension
of the period to file a responsive pleading if a motion for bill of particulars is
filed). Consequently, respondent's (PCGG) filing of a motion to dismiss, without
23
seeking leave of court to stay or suspend the running of the period for filing its written
formal offer of evidence — as agreed upon and ordered in open court during the
hearing on July 1, 1993 — could not have the effect of suspending the period within
which it should submit its formal offer of evidence in writing. Without express leave of
court, respondent (PCGG) could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to
suspend the running of the period agreed upon. Respondent (PCGG) should have
been prudent enough to seek the permission of this Court in respect of such matter
to avert possible controversy arising therefrom. More importantly, respondent
(PCGG) should not have made a unilateral presumption of procedural
norm. 24
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the Court has no judicious recourse but to sustain
petitioners' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance and declare, as it hereby declares, that
respondent (PCGG) is deemed to have waived presentation of further evidence and
to have its evidence rested on the basis of the evidence on record. 25
Besides, to insist on a prior and separate resolution of the PCGG's motion to dismiss and the
suspension of the 20-day period for the filing of the written formal offer of its evidence would
have needlessly prolonged further the proceedings below — something that certainly does
not, and will not, sit well with a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding" envisioned by Section 2, Rule 1, of the Rules of Court. The same reasoning
likewise justifies dispensing with a prior determination of the PCGG's "Motion For
Reconsideration" of the SANDIGANBAYAN's Resolution denying consolidation or joint trial of
the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions with Civil Case 0005, and private respondents' (SIPALAY
and ALLIED) "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For Decision." Thus, the second key
issue should be resolved against the PCGG. The SANDIGANBAYAN was well-justified in
incorporating in its decision the resolution of the PCGG's motion to dismiss, as well as its
motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion for consolidation or joint trial and
private respondents' (SIPALAY and ALLIED) motion to consider the cases submitted for
decision.
Going now to the third key issue, the sequestration order and the search and seizure order issued
against SIPALAY and ALLIED, respectively, were nullified by the SANDIGANBAYAN on the ground
of non-compliance with constitutional requirements. Let us examine the SIPALAY and ALLIED cases
separately.
The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in SIPALAY's case is Section 26 of Article XVIII. It
reads in full:
Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall
remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this
Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the
Congress may extend said period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima

facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification
of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed
within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the
judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the
issuance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action
or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
The SANDIGANBAYAN voided the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY "for lack of
sufficient prima facie factual foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account the
26
testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, Bautista and Alonte. It appears further that the
SANDIGANBAYAN particularly zeroed in on Commissioner Doromal's testimony,
considering its observations that: 1) "The testimony of former PCGG Commissioner Mary
Concepcion Bautista has no probative value and cannot be admitted in evidence in view of
said witness' untimely demise prior to the completion of her cross-examination by petitioner's
counsel" (citing the cases of "Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. CIR, et al." [86 SCRA 27] and
"Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines" [64 SCRA 610]), 7 and 2) "Neither is
2
Atty. Benjamin Alonte's testimony relevant. His oral declarations, aside from being hearsay,
do not go into the substance of the cases." 28
By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN's exclusive
reliance on the testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The SANDIGANBAYAN
had no other choice, for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG,
inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might have supported the testimonial evidence were
offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence decree that "The court shall
29 30
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." There is no doubt that the testimonies of
the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as evidence meriting due appreciation by the
SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules requires that the offer of testimonial
evidence "must be made at the time the witness is called to testify." With respect to documents,
however, the same Section 35 (second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer, to wit:
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to
be done in writing.
The twenty (20)-day period from July 1, 1993, or until July 20, for the submission of a written
formal offer of evidence given by the SANDIGANBAYAN to the PCGG after the latter's last
witness (Atty. Alonte) has testified, was intended precisely to accommodate any and all
documentary evidence — even object evidence for that matter, the PCGG would have
wanted to offer. But, as previously discussed under the second key issue, the PCGG waived
such offer when it opted to file a motion to dismiss sans/in lieu of the written formal offer of
evidence within such given period that expired without interruption. Quite accurately
therefore can it be said that due to its lapse in procedure, the PCGG brought it upon itself if
the existence or non-existence of "prima facie factual foundation" had to be determined by
the SANDIGANBAYAN only from what can be drawn from the PCGG's testimonial evidences
— and from no other. And the Court, in reviewing that court's finding that no prima
facie evidence exists to support the sequestration order, likewise has no other choice but to
be similarly confined thereto.
But whose testimony or testimonies? The question becomes significant inasmuch as the
SANDIGANBAYAN found as inadmissible some of the PCGG witnesses' testimonies.
Dr. Doromal's testimony is reviewable as no attack on its admissibility was ever launched by the
SANDIGANBAYAN. With respect to Atty. Alonte's testimony, the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as
hearsay which finding the PCGG does not contest. The PCGG in fact now appears to do away with
his testimony considering that the PCGG neither quoted in, nor annexed to its petition, such
testimony or any portion thereof. Atty. Alonte's testimony therefore can be dispensed with. However,
the Court disagrees with the SANDIGANBAYAN's ruling that Commissioner Bautista's supervening
death in the course of her cross-examination rendered her entire testimony without probative value
and inadmissible. The SANDIGANBAYAN apparently clung to the principle enunciated in the
"Bachrach" and "Ortigas" cases, to wit:
31
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the
witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-
examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-
examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to
the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent.
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it

is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The
express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render
the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. . . . Until
such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the
evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case.
But the "Bachrach" and "Ortigas" cases involved different factual features. In those cases,
the witnesses concerned whose testimonies were rightly stricken off the records either left for
abroad or simply failed to appear at the time they were supposed to be cross-examined by
the adverse party. In short, the lack of cross-examination by the opposing parties therein was
occasioned by sudden or unexplained non-appearance, unlike in this case where no less
than the witness Bautista's death prevented the completion of her cross-examination. The
controlling case here is "Fulgado v. C.A., et al." where the Court, in allowing the testimony
32
of therein plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado who died before his cross-examination, to remain in the
record, ruled that:
The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural
impasse because it prejudiced the party whose only fault during the entire
proceedings was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent alternative
should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-
examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. And
more compellingly so in the instant case where it has become evident that the
adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination but through
his own fault failed to cross-examine the witness.
Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no

responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems a
harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination.
(Emphasis supplied)
If testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-examination, with more
reason should testimony partially cross-examined at the time of the witness' death (as in
Commissioner Bautista's case) remain intact. Thus, with the exception of Atty. Alonte's
testimony, Dr. Doromal's and deceased Commissioner Bautista's testimonies, together with
the evidence of SIPALAY and ALLIED, deserve a second scrutiny in determining the
correctness of the SANDIGANBAYAN's finding of "lack of prima facie factual foundation."
Here then are the highlights of Dr. Doromal's and deceased Commissioner Bautista's testimonies.
DR. DOROMAL
(DIRECT)
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Purpose please?
ATTY. LEYNES:
The testimony of this witness will cover the fact that at the time of
sequestration there were issued (sic), there were more prima
facie evidence.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Dr. Doromal, do you know the petitioner, Sipalay Trading

Corporation?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know Sipalay Trading Corporation?
A It is one of those companies which we had investigated and

eventually issued a Sequestration Order.
Q Do you you (sic) Maranao Hotels and Resorts?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know this Maranao Hotels and Resorts?
A Again it is one of those we had sequestered because of its relation

with Sipalay Trading Corporation?
Q Do you know the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know it?
A In the same manner that the material of documents we had, we

ended up having a Sequestration Order on Allied Banking
Corporation.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Dr. Doromal at that time that the sequestration order which you
have just recognized was issued and which sequestration order was
signed by you and Commissioner Ramon Diaz, what documents if
any did you consider?
A We considered documents which were gotten from Malacañang

after the previous President had left.
We had also document (sic) which were gotten from the U.S. which
were given by the States Department to the PCGG and whatever had
been gotten by our operation people.
Q If I show to you some of these documents will you be able to

recognize them?
A Yes, some of them I will be able to recognize.
Q I show to you a set of documents, what relation have these set of

documents to those documents which you have mentioned you and
Commissioner Diaz or the Commission considered when the
Sequestration Order dated July 24, 1986 was issued?
Will you please go over these documents?
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness is going over the voluminous documents.
WITNESS:
A The documents that I have just slipped into here that would have to
do with Sipalay Trading Corporation, this I remember.
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q The question is, what relation has this document to the document
you considered in issuing the Sequestration Order subject matter of
this case?
A This one which I had flipped into this had been considered by the
Commission at the time of the sequestration.
ATTY. LEYNES:
May I request that this document which the witness had identified,
these documents consisted of seventy-six documents and we have
earlier inadvertently marked them as Exhibit A to WWW but if we can
have them marked accordingly as Exhibits 1, 2 to 76 accordingly.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Doctor Doromal when you issued, when the Sequestration Order

was issued in the judgment of the Commission, what quantum of
evidence do these documents amount to?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Objection to the question, Your Honors (sic) please.
First of all the witness did not identify all of those documents as he
was going over the folder of documents. He was picking up particular
documents in the folder and it is a question of law.
ATTY. LEYNES:
We are proving that there is more prima facie evidence in the

judgment when he issued the Sequestration Order.
What is the quantum of evidence do these documents represent?
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
For the purpose of issuance thereof?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
With that qualification are you willing to accept that qualification?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Witness may answer:
WITNESS:
A These documents are more than just prima facie evidence which is

the only thing required of us before issuing the Sequestration Order.
In fact over and above what is needed there are plenty of evidence of
these documents which movant amply justifies our issuing of the
Sequestration Order in the sense that there is just no reason no
question that there is a preponderance of evidence for the
sequestration.
ATTY. LEYNES:
That would be all, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
How about this 0095?
ATTY. LEYNES:
In both cases, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Does the document include any reference to the Allied Banking

Corporation?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Yes, Your Honor; but the Sequestration Order was issued by

Commissioner Diaz and Mary Con Bautista.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
With respect to?
ATTY. LEYNES:
Allied Banking Corporation.
May I ask additional questions, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Please proceed.
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Dr. Doromal what if any is your participation in the issuance of the

Sequestration Order or the Search and Seizure Order against Allied
Banking Corporation?
A All these Sequestration Orders were brought by the

Commission in (sic) banc and we are present with the documents that
had been available.
We listen to them and the action is made by the Commission and in
the issuance of the Sequestration Order.
Then whoever is the Commissioner most involved in that particular

company thus signs or do sign the Sequestration Order.
In this particular case that you mentioned about Allied Banking

Corporation, the two other Commissioners who were there ahead of
me were the ones who signed because they are most familiar with
the Allied Banking Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Specifically what is your participation in the issuance of the

sequestration personally of Allied Banking Corporation?
A I am one of the most who participated in the discussion when I

became a member and that was April in 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q When deliberated upon what documents were considered?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A First of all when this Search and Seizure Order was issued this was
during the time that I was already a member of the PCGG as
Commissioner and when this is brought before the group before the
Commission there are the attached documents that backed up this
Search and Seizure Order and for that matter other items that have to
do with the sequestration or something similar to that so what I am
saying the materials that go with this would indicate the reason for the
Search and Seizure Order similar to the papers that are needed
when we issued the Sequestration Order.
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q I will show you again this Exhibit 1, these Exhibits 1 to 76 will you
please go over the same and state before this Honorable court what
relation have these documents to the documents which you
mentioned were considered in the deliberation for the issuance of
Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking Corporation?
xxx xxx xxx

WITNESS:
A I am looking at some of these documents that have to do with the

Allied Banking Corporation and I recognize some of these and the
others I do not see because some of these are materials which were
gathered by other groups and their attachments but the others such
as this letter, this I remember.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Dr. Doromal in your recollection what is the reason or the finding of

the PCGG why the Sequestration Order was issued against Sipalay
Trading Corporation or Maranao Hotels and Resorts?
WITNESS:
A The reason was that in the Maranao Corporation which was the
company which was later on acquired by Sipalay Trading Corporation
which was the holding company it was our judgment that there are
enough indications there that these were acquired because of
closeness to the president and that this was really in fact one of those
that had been gotten from DBP, Development Bank of the Philippines
with the idea being that it was, it could be gotten through the help of
the Office of the President and the President himself.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q What if any is the finding of PCGG regarding the ownership of

Sipalay Trading Corporation?
A Sipalay Trading Corporation was holding company and owner. The

people in the ownership is not only Lucio Tan but looks like relatives
of Mr. Tan.
Q In your recollection Doctor Doromal, what is the finding or reason

of companies why it issued the Search and Issue (sic) Order against
Allied Banking Corporation?
WITNESS:
A The Commission wanted to find out documents that would indicate

or prove the relationship between President Marcos and Lucio Tan
and one way to do that is to have access to the papers to the
documents that were in the Allied Banking Corporation.
ATTY. LEYNES:
That would be all, Your Honor. 33
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
(DIRECT)
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Purpose, please.
ATTY. LEYNES:
The testimony of the witness is offered for the purpose of proving that
when the Presidential Commission on Good Government issued the
search and seizure order dated August 13, 1988, the Commission
considered ample evidence in the issuance thereof and also to prove
that defendant Lucio Tan in concert with defendants Ferdinand
Marcos and Imelda Marcos acquired General Bank and Trust
Company in violation of existing rules and for remedial consideration
and that later on Genbank was converted by defendant Lucio Tan
and company to Allied Bank of which defendant Lucio Tan and
defendants Ferdinand Marcos owned beneficially.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Madam Witness, what basis or document, if any did the

commission consider when it issued the search and seizure order?
A We had several documents in our possession at that time one of

the documents was a list which have been taken from the office of
Imee M. Araneta on EDSA which contained a listing of the holdings of
the late President Marcos in several corporations and the extent of
his participation on this corporation. And the other, in addition to what
have been given by certain informants, another was an affidavit of Mr.
Gapud which he had issued wherein he had mentioned also the
participation of Mr. Marcos in Allied Banking, I think that affidavit is
here and also the fact that deposits were made from Allied Banking in
the accounts of Mr. Marcos in the Security Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Madam Witness, you mentioned certain documents on the basis of

which the PCGG issued the search and seizure order against Allied
Banking Corporation, I am showing to you a folder containing Exhibit
1 to 18, will you please go over this document and state which of
these documents were considered by the Commission when it issued
the search and seizure order.
A These documents marked Exhibits 1 which is a list, which is a
letter, unfortunately I don't see page two of this but this is the
document which we have addressed principally, as far as we know
addressed to the late President Marcos and together with this we
have Exhibit 2, another letter dated March 28, 1977 addressed to the
Deputy Governor Mr. Briñas about the intention to purchase General
Bank and Trust Company and subsequently documents Exhibit 3
signed by Carlota Valenzuela, Special Assistant to the Governor,
Exhibit 4 another document marked Confidential signed by Mr. Barin
reporting on the action taken regarding Genbank.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
And another document which has been marked as Exhibit 4, 5, 6, 7,

these documents refers to the acquisition by Lucio Tan of the
Genbank for the amount of P500,000.00, the commission then
considered that plus the fact that the acquisition and transfer of
Genbank to the Lucio Tan group was done in a short time without
proper observance of public bidding which the Commission then
considered to be irregular, so this is one of the documents we look at.
Mr. Tan in the acquisition of Genbank had been given a favored
treatment.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
This document dated May 17, 1989 under letterhead Allied Banking
Corporation addressed to His Excellency President Marcos,
President and Prime Minister signed by Lucio Tan. In addition we
have a document which has already been marked as Exhibit 12
which is the affidavit of Mr. Rolando Gapud dated January 14, this is
series of 1987, in this document Mr. Gapus (sic) has also made an
enumeration of deposits made by certain individuals from certain
banks among them Allied Banking Corporation for the account of Mr.
Marcos in the Security Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
Exhibits 13 and 13-a which is a listings (sic) of deposits made and

placements in the bank, in the bank account of Mr. Marcos. In
addition, we have the documents marked up to Exhibits 13-g, h, l, all
showing checks or amounts received from Allied Bank deposited in
the Security Bank and Trust Company. Exhibits up to Exhibit 13-k, l,
m, p, t, v, 2, y and x.
34
xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Chairman Bautista, during the last hearing before it was adjourned

we were going over this folder containing Exhibits 1 to 80 and we are
indicating which of these exhibits were considered by the PCGG
when it issued the Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking
Corporation;
Will you please go over again this folder and indicate to this Exhibit to
whether what was considered by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government when it issued the Search and Seizure Order
against Allied Banking Corporation.
A I recall that we had already pointed to the document marked Exhibit

7 in red which is a letter of Lucio Tan to the Governor Licaros of the
Central Bank and the one marked in red as Exhibit 8 which is the
letter to Mr. Gregorio Licaros signed by T.O. Domingo, the Allied
Banking Report which is marked as Exhibit 9.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Apart from these exhibits which you have just mentioned what
other evidence if any did the Commission consider?
A There were for instance the verbal information given to us by

individuals as well as the information given to us by Mr. Rolando
Gaffud verbally.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
Q What is the finding based on these Exhibits which you mentioned

and the information given by Rolando Gaffud which he later on
formalized in an affidavit.
What finding if any with regards to the Allied Banking Corporation did
the Commission arrive that led to the issuance of the Search and
Seixure (sic) Order?
A The Commission after reviewing al (sic) of these exhibits as with all

the information that had come into its possession had come to the
conclusion that indeed Mr. Lucio Tan was a close associate of the
late President Marcos and they were involved in business associates
and transactions and that the late President had substantial holdings
in this corporation in which Lucio Tan was also involved and therefore
the commission would have to act in accordance to its powers of the
sequestration granted under Executive Order No. 1.
xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. LEYNES:
Q To what corporation do you refer to when you mentioned Mr.

Marcos has equity in the corporation owned by Lucio Tan?
A Among them is precisely Allied Banking Corporation, Asia Brewery

and Sipalay Trading Corporation. I mean these are some of the
corporations.
Q Chairman Bautista, what is the legal basis or authority by the

commission of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
when it issued the Search and Seizure Order against the Allied
Banking Corporation?
A The Commission under Executive Order No. 1, the President has

been given specifically the power to sequester business and property
owned by the late President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, relatives and
closed business associates and to take possession or take over this
business and assets in order to prevent dissipation of these assets or
removal of these assets and concealment of these assets and also to
take over such documents as the Commission may consider
necessary in order that these documents may be preserved for the
purpose of the filing of the case in order to prosecute or conduct civil
action against President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, relatives and other
close business associates that is very clearly stated in Executive
Order No. 1.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LEYNES:
0100, Your Honor.
Q Chairman Bautista, the Search and Seizure Order issued by PCGG

dated August 13, 1986 against Allied Banking Corporation reads in
pertinent part and I quote:
"You are hereby directed to submit for Search and Seizure all bank
documents in the above mentioned premises which our
representatives may find necessary and relevant to the investigation
conducted by the Commission."
A Well I think we clearly specify there that we are to seize the bank
documents.
It is specifically stated that the Search and Seizure Order refers to

bank documents precisely because of the information that had been
given to us that these documents could be found in the particular
place.
xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. LEYNES:
Q Now, Chairman Bautista do you know what happened after the

Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking Corporation?
WITNESS.
A We were not able to seize any document precisely because of the

objection raised and so what happened is that the parties agreed to
just seal this place so that neither of the parties would be able to
remove any documents.
ATTY. LEYNES:
That will be all, Your Honor. 35
Dr. Doromal was basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents purportedly
coming from Malacañang, the US State Department and other sources. What his testimony
essentially yields is the fact that theprima facie evidence/s supporting the sequestration order issued
against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to repeat, any reference
thereto is unwarranted since there was no offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized at
this point that mere identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any
evidentiary weight on documents not formally offered. In "People v. Santito, Jr." the Court, speaking
36
through Mr. Justice Regalado once again, thus said that:
Even assuming that the same had been identified in court, it would have no
evidentiary value. Identification of documentary evidence must be distinguished from
its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only
when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been
offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if
it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at
all. (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily then, without the PCGG documents having been formally offered, however decisive
and compelling they may otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie case does not exist at all. That
makes Dr. Doromal's testimony by and in itself worthless. The same can be said of
deceased Commissioner Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in the mechanical
process of identification. In fact, her testimony and the documents she referred to were
totally unrelated to the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY, as they chiefly dwelt on
the search and seizure order issued against ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom
can shore up aprima facie case against SIPALAY. And it may well be clarified at this juncture
that it is the immateriality of deceased Commissioner Bautista's testimony that justified the
SANDIGANBAYAN into paying particular attention to Dr. Doromal's testimony in its search
for prima facie evidence — not the inadmissibility of her testimony arising from her death
during cross-examination which we have heretofore adjudged to be a faulty observation. The
SANDIGANBAYAN was therefore correct in saying that:
No direct connection or relationship has been established, at least, as far as the

evidence extant on the records of these cases are concerned, between petitioner
Sipalay Trading's acquisition and ownership of the sequestered shares of stock and
Lucio C. Tan's alleged fraudulent business maneuverings and connivance with the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. These oral testimonies are practically
dependent on the existence of official records of respondent PCGG which, due to the
latter's own doing, have not been formally offered. Hence, these oral testimonies
have no leg to stand on. 7
3
xxx xxx xxx
Without credible and competent documentary evidence to fortify the witnesses' bare
allegations as aforestated, it is difficult to sustain a finding of prima facie case in the
proceedings — especially taking into account the fact that petitioner Sipalay Trading
is presumed by law to possess a separate and distinct judicial personality from its
principal stockholders, i.e., Lucio Tan, et al. . . .
38
The difficulty is easier to grasp when reckoned with the various but uniform definitions
of prima faciecase/evidence aside from that given by the SANDIGANBAYAN, to wit:
Prima facie evidence has been defined as evidence which, standing alone

unexplained or uncontroverted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed. It is
such as, in judgment of law, is sufficient to establish the fact, and if not rebutted,
remains sufficient for that purpose. 39
xxx xxx xxx
It is evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and
overcome by other evidence. 40
xxx xxx xxx
It is evidence which, standing alone and unexplained, would maintain the proposition
and warrant the conclusion to support which it is introduced. 41
xxx xxx xxx
Prima facie case is such as will suffice until contradicted and overcome by other
evidence. 42
xxx xxx xxx
A prima facie case is one which is apparently established by evidence adduced by

plaintiff in support of his case up to the time such evidence stands unexplained and
uncontradicted. 43
xxx xxx xxx
A prima facie case is one in which the evidence in favor of a proposition is sufficient

to support a finding in its favor, if all the evidence to the contrary is disregarded.44
xxx xxx xxx

A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is
sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, is
one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only be
rebutting evidence adduced on the other side. 45
From whatever definition we look at it, Dr. Doromal's and deceased Commissioner Bautista's
testimonies are by no means sufficiently strong evidence to make up a prima facie case for the
PCGG. What gave them colorable weight were the unoffered documents. But as things stand in the
absence of such documentary evidence, they are empty and crumble on their own even without
counter-explanation or contradiction, as anything that may tend to prove the proposition that the
SIPALAY shares in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation were/are ill-gotten is just nowhere
extractable from these testimonies by and in themselves. These declarations unfortunately fail to
hurdle judicial inspection, proceeding from the principle that a party's evidence is "of necessity
subject to a rigid scrutiny" when he possesses, but does not produce, documentary evidence which
would be far more satisfactory. We are thus vividly and fittingly reminded of the proverbial words of
46
Mr. Justice Story that:
Naked statements must be entitled to little weight when the parties hold better
evidence behind the scenes 7 and
4
A party's nonproduction of a document which courts almost invariably expect will be

produced unavoidably throws a suspicion over the cause. 48
Corollary to this is that the presumption is always and inevitably against a litigant who fails to
furnish evidence within his reach, and it is the stronger when the documents, writings, etc.,
would be conclusive in establishing his
case. This is indeed an occasion to emphasize once again that the superiority of written
49
evidence, compared with oral, is so pronounced, obvious and well known, that in most cases
the deliberate and inexcusable withholding of the written evidence, and effort to secure
favorable consideration of oral testimony in the place of it , is an affront to the intelligence of
the court. 50
At best, the bare testimonies of Dr. Doromal and deceased Commissioner Bautista, in the eyes of
the Court, yield nothing but mere uncorroborated speculations or suspicions insofar as the PCGG
attempted to establish the "prima facie factual foundation" that would hold up the sequestration order
against SIPALAY. But a fact cannot be found by mere surmise or conjecture. Suspicion cannot give
51
probative force to testimony which in itself is insufficient to establish or to justify an inference of a

particular fact, for "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
52
rudder or compass". And as it is not the habit of any courts of justice to yield themselves up in
53
matters of right to mere conjectures and possibilities, courts are not permitted to render verdicts or
54
judgments upon guesses or surmises. 55
Turning now to the evidence for SIPALAY and ALLIED, it unveiled no "prima facie factual
foundation" either. Former PCGG secretary and lone witness Atty. Hontiveros, in response to two (2)
subpoenas duces tecum requested by counsel for both corporations 7 which required him to bring
56 5
to the court "all records, including minutes of meeting of the PCGG, its resolutions, together with all
supporting evidence or documents of whatever nature" in connection with the issuance of the
sequestration order against SIPALAY and the search and seizure order against ALLIED, could only
produce the following excerpts of minutes of two (2) PCGG meetings held on March 13 and March
12, 1986:
6. Commissioner Daza also informed the Commissioner that upon the instructions of
Minister Salonga, any Commissioner can file or issue a sequestral order provided the
order has the conformity verbal or written of another Commissioner. These could
include any other order or seizure. 58
xxx xxx xxx
6. Commissioner Pedro L. Yap before his departure on a mission, reported the work
he had accomplished during the past days. These included numerous "freeze" and
"sequestration" orders. He asked that the list of orders should not be particularized in
the minutes. 59
after admittedly spending no less than two (2) months tracing documents to bring to court:
ATTY. MENDOZA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am asking you how many months did it take looking for records?
A I think more than two months, sir.
Q And these were the records you found, marked Exhibits A and B?
A Yes, sir, during the time I devoted to them. 60
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. MENDOZA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q But nonetheless, for two months you tried looking for records
corresponding to the subpoena?
A Yes, sir. 61
Other than being informative of PCGG internal procedure on how and by whom
sequestration orders in general are issued and of the "accomplishments" of one of its then
commissioners, the excerpts are absolutely unreflective of any deliberation by PCGG
commissioners particularly concerning the sequestration order against SIPALAY, much less
the factual basis for its issuance. They do not even make the slightest allusion to SIPALAY,
or ALLIED. That Atty. Hontiveros devoted two (2) months for document-searching only to
come up with minutes that are as barren as the testimonial evidences of the PCGG validates
indeed the claim of respondent corporations which may well sum-up the PCGG's case
specifically against SIPALAY, that:
The only logical conclusion that may be reached by Atty. Hontiveros' inability to
produce PCGG records in regard respondent Sipalay is that there was no evidence
before the PCGG or any of its Commissioners which would tend to establish that the
shares of stock in Maranaw registered in the name of private respondent Sipalay are
ill-gotten.
62
There being no evidence, not even a prima facie one, there was therefore no valid
sequestration of the SIPALAY shares in the Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation. We
hereby re-emphasize the indispensability of prima facie evidence by adverting to the Court's
pronouncement in "Republic v. Sandiganbayan," to wit:
63
IV. The issue on the existence of prima facie evidence in support of the issuance of a
sequestration order has likewise been laid to rest in the BASECO case, in this wise:
8. Requisites for Validity
What is indispensable is that, again as in the case of attachment and

receivership, there exist a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for
the sequestration, freeze or takeover order, and adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or
nullification.
Both were assured under the executive orders in question and the
rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
a. Prima Facie Evidence as Basis for Orders
Executive Order No. 14 enjoins that there be "due regard to the

requirements of fairness and due process." Executive Order No. 2
declares that with respect to claims on allegedly "ill-gotten" assets
and properties, "it is the position of the new democratic government
that President Marcos . . . (and other parties affected) be afforded fair
opportunity to contest these claims before appropriate Philippine
authorities." Section 7 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
provides that sequestration or freeze (and takeover) orders issue
upon the authority of at least two commissioners, based on
the affirmation or complaint of an interested party, or motu
propio when the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that
the issuance thereof is warranted. A similar requirement is now found
in Section 26, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that
a "sequestion or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of
a prima facie case." (Emphasis in the original text)
Notably the PCGG, in what apparently appears to be a desperate attempt to slither its way
out of its failure to show a prima facie case, would now argue that:
. . . it is worth-mentioning the fact that the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION under which

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A had been issued, categorically authorized
the issuance of writs of sequestration without requiring any finding of prima
facie evidence to support such issuance. Nevertheless, the PCGG saw to it that
before any writ of sequestration was issued, the Commissioners carefully examined
and weighed the evidence on hand that would justify such issuance of sequestration
order. The FREEDOM CONSTITUTION provides under Article II, Section 1, the
following:
Sec. 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a New
Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative
power.
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate

of the people to:
a) . . .
b) . . .
c) . . . and
d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and

supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the
people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts.
It is only in the 1987 Constitution that the existence or finding of prima facie case was
required before a sequestration order could be issued. The writ of sequestration in
question was issued long before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution; hence, it
was covered by the Freedom Constitution which did not require, the prior finding
of prima facie evidence. 64
This argument is clearly without merit in the face of this Court's pronouncement in the
"Baseco" case, that:
65
Parenthetically, even if the requirement for a prima facie showing of ill-gotten wealth

were not expressly imposed by some rule or regulation as a condition to warrant the
sequestration or freezing of property contemplated in the executive orders in
question, it would nevertheless be exigible in this jurisdiction in which the Rule of
Law prevails and official acts which are devoid of rational basis in fact or law, or are
whimsical and capricious, are condemned and struck down.
Going now to the case of ALLIED, the principal objection raised regarding the order issued against it
is that the PCGG made use of an unauthorized and constitutionally defective search warrant to
effect the sequestration. The SANDIGANBAYAN saw and declared it as such. We agree.
There can be no doubt that the order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a search
warrant (full text of which appears in the early part of this decision). Not only is the order captioned
as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch manager to make
available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is unauthorized
because nowhere in the same Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG
66
to justify the search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of
a process in pursuit of its mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of
E.O. No. 1 enumerates the following powers of the PCGG:
Sec. 3. — The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry

out the purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any
building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any
records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or
disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise
prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.
(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or
dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the
Marcos administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos,
until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by
the appropriate authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person
or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make
ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and/or the production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, statement of accounts and other documents as may be material to the
investigation conducted by the Commission.
(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties, following the same procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of
Court.
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality of the
government.
(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this order.
The Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG" 7 simplified these powers in this wise:
6
From the foregoing provisions of law, it is clear that the PCGG has the following
powers and authority:
1. To conduct an investigation including the preliminary investigation and prosecution

of the ill-gotten wealth cases of former President Marcos, relatives and associates,
and graft and corruption cases assigned by the President to it;
2. Issue sequestration orders in relation to property claimed to be ill-gotten;
3. Issue "freeze orders" prohibiting persons in possession of property alleged to be

ill-gotten from transferring or otherwise disposing of the same;
4. Issue provisional takeover orders of the said property;
5. Administer oaths and issue subpoenas in the conduct of investigation;
6. Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate
penalties as provided by the rules.
Neither can it be validly argued by the PCGG that its authority to issue a search and seizure
order possessing the essential features of a search warrant is derivable from subparagraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from No. 4 of the simplified enumeration in the
"Cojuangco" case, by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and for all the essential nature
of the provisional measures of sequestration, freeze orders and provisional takeover that the
PCGG is explicitly equipped with:
As thus described, sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the
provisional remedy of preliminary attachment, or receivership. By attachment, a
sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or
dissipated, or lost intentionally or otherwise, pending the action. By receivership,
property, real or personal, which is subject of litigation, is placed in the possession
and control of a receiver appointed by the Court, who shall conserve it pending final
determination of the title or right or possession over it. All these remedies —
sequestration, freezing, provisional takeover, attachment and receivership — are
provisional, temporary, designed for particular exigencies, attended by no character
or permanency or finality, and always subject to the control of the issuing court or
agency.
Attachment and receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not
involving an active and drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a search
warrant (or search and seizure order) necessarily entails. All processes that the PCGG is
allowed to issue in discharging the duty for which it was created, therefore, ought to be
viewed strictly in this context. And this finds further support in "Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" where the Court stressed anew that:
68
The question of the validity of PCGG sequestration and freeze orders as provisional
measures to collect and conserve the assets believed to be ill-gotten wealth has
been laid to rest in BASECO vs. PCGG (150 SCRA 181) where this Court held that
such orders are not confiscatory but only preservative in character, not designed to
effect a confiscation of, but only to conserve propertiesbelieved to be ill-gotten wealth
of the ex-president, his family and associates, and to prevent their concealment,
dissipation, or transfer, pending the determination of their true ownership. (Emphasis
supplied)
Being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER cannot escape, and must
pass, the acid test for validity as provided by the prevailing constitution under which it was issued —
the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION which adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution
(Section 3, Article IV) relating to search warrants, to wit:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrant's validity,
the absence of even one will cause its downright nullification:
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized.69
In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is
so constitutionally defective.
Firstly, as it suffered from the same inherent weakness or emptiness as that which marred Dr.
Doromal's testimony (as earlier discussed extensively), deceased Commissioner Bautista's in-court
declarations did not in any way establish probable cause which has been consistently defined as:
. . . such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 70
This is so because, as what her testimony irresistibly suggested, the purported facts and
circumstances supporting the order are exclusively traceable from documents she identified
but which were never formally offered in evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN. She never
testified to any fact of her own personal knowledge to bolster the PCGG's claim that ALLIED
was in possession and control of illegally-amassed wealth by Lucio Tan. Her testimony,
therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving, or uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that
search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
suspicion or belief.
71
Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a "judge" and "such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" were empowered by the FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in
"Baseco", to wit:
It should also by now be reasonably evident from what has thus far been said that
the PCGG is not, and was never intended to act as, judge. Its general function is to
conduct investigations in order to collect evidence establishing instances of "ill-gotten
wealth"; issue sequestration, and such orders as may be warranted by the evidence
thus collected and as may be necessary to preserve and conserve the assets of
which it takes custody and contral and prevent their disappearance, loss or
dissipation; and eventually file and prosecute in the proper court of competent
jurisdiction all cases investigated by it as may be warranted by its findings. It does
not try and decide, or hear and determine, or adjudicate with any character of finality
or compulsion, cases involving the essential issue of whether or not property should
be forfeited and transferred to the State because "ill-gotten" within the meaning of the
Constitution and the executive orders. This function is reserved to the designated
court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan. There can therefore be no serious regard
accorded to the accusation, leveled by BASECO, that the PCGG plays the perfidious
role of prosecutor and judge at the same time. (Emphasis supplied.)
And the PCGG cannot be considered as "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" because Executive Order No. 1, to reiterate, did not expressly nor
impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search warrants orders.
Thirdly, the order does not provide a specification of the documents sought to be searched/seized
from ALLIED. The body thereof, to quote again, reads:
By virtue of the powers vested in the Commission by the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, you are hereby directed to submit for search and seizure all bank
documents in the aforementioned premises which our representative may find
necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted by this Commission.
x x x x x x x x x
It expressly refers to "all bank documents" which is too all-embracing, the obvious intent of
which is to subject virtually all records pertaining to all business transactions of ALLIED of
whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant is not a particular
description, thus contravening the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a
72
particular description of things to be seized. Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND
73
SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally objectionable and to be more precise, void for lack of
74
particularity. We end our discussion on this matter with the Court's admonition in "People v.
75
Veloso":76
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and
statutory provisions under which it was issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings
upon search warrants, it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is
not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be
construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify under it.
The third key issue should therefore be answered in the affirmative, i.e., the nullification of
the sequestration and search and seizure orders was in order.
The last key issue involves another constitutional imperative — i.e., that the corresponding suit or
suits against a sequestered entity or entities should be brought in the proper court, the
Sandiganbayan to be precise, 7 within the prescribed period — failure of which automatically lifts the
7
sequestration order or orders issued. Up for determination is whether under the factual features of
the case, there was compliance with this rule as professed by the PCGG, or non-observance
thereof, as argued and declared by respondent corporations and the SANDIGANBAYAN,
respectively. Stress should be given to the fact that the Court's resolution of this crucial issue would
particularly apply to SIPALAY inasmuch as it involves a sequestration order — not to ALLIED
against whom was issued a search and seizure order that we have just heretofore declared as void.
Nonetheless, for simplicity's sake, such resolution can be made to cover ALLIED's case as well. We
thus forego with the distinction in this instance and assume that ALLIED was
sequestered via sequestration order similar to that issued against SIPALAY.
At the fore once again is Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically the second
and third paragraphs:
Sec. 26.
xxx xxx xxx
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima

facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification
of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed
within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the
judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the
issuance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action

or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
And here are the relevant and undisputable facts: The 1987 Constitution was ratified on
February 2, 1987. Counting six (6) months therefrom, August 2, 1987 was the constitutional
deadline for the PCGG to file the corresponding judicial action/proceeding against entity or
entities it sequestered prior to February 2, 1987. Among such entity or entities were
SIPALAY and ALLIED, the dates of their sequestration as appearing from the corresponding
orders issued against them are July 14, 1986 and August 13, 1986, respectively. The PCGG
admittedly did not file any direct complaint either against SIPALAY or ALLIED before the
SANDIGANBAYAN between February 2 and August 2 of 1987. But within such period,
specifically on July 17, 1987, the PCGG filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN a civil case
against Lucio Tan and others, for "Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and
Damages", docketed as CC No. 0005. The original complaint in CC No. 0005 did not name
78
SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants, as it enumerated only natural persons, except for
one, as such. SIPALAY and ALLIED were impleaded as defendants in CC No. 0005 for the
79
first time only after the lapse of more than four (4) years from the filing of the original
complaint in July of 1987, under an amended complaint filed by the PCGG in September of
1991.
Given this factual backdrop, two propositions are being bruited by the PCGG:
1) that the July 17, 1987 original complaint against Lucio C. Tan, et al. (CC No. 0005) is the judicial
action required by the 1987 Constitution to justify the continued sequestration of SIPALAY (and
ALLIED), and
2) even assuming arguendo that such original complaint was defective for not naming therein
SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants, still there was faithful compliance with the constitutional
mandate, since the September, 1991 amended complaint impleading SIPALAY and ALLIED as
defendants — even when filed beyond the August 2, 1987 deadline — retroacted to July 17, 1987
which, thus, cured the defect.
Both propositions have to be rejected.
As to the first, the SANDIGANBAYAN correctly struck it down by following the doctrine laid down in
"PCGG v. International Copra Export Corporation, Interco Manufacturing Corporation and
Sandiganbayan" ("INTERCO" case, for short). We thus quote with approval the pertinent
80
disquisitions, to wit:
. . . On not a few occasions, the Court has sustained the merit and logic of motions
seeking the lifting of writs of sequestration for respondent PCGG's failure to institute
the corresponding judicial action or proceeding against corporations which, either
through sheer oversight or gross neglect, have not been expressly impleaded in the
various civil complaints filed before this Court. The case of "PCGG v. International
Copra Export Corporation, et al." (INTERCO case) is illuminating on this point.
Therein, the Supreme Court made a distinction between the juridical personalities of
a corporation and its stockholders, ruling that if a corporation is not impleaded, it
cannot be deemed to have been sued in an action against its stockholders.
A perusal of the original complaint in Civil Case No. 0005, which was concededly
filed within the six-month period provided for under the organic law, reveals that
petitioner Sipalay Trading was not specifically impleaded therein as party-defendant,
either in a nominal or principal capacity. If at all, the latter has been included therein
as part of principal defendant's ill-gotten assets. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules
of Court, "(P)arties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."
It bears emphasis along this vein that, as implied from INTERCO, petitioner Sipalay
Trading has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders. As
such, any civil charge filed against principal defendant Lucio C. Tan and/or his
dummies or agents is not deemed a suit against the former. Neither does mere
inclusion in the list of ill-gotten assets as part of principal defendant's ill-gotten wealth
suffice to comply with the constitutional injunction. Impleading a party means bringing
the suit against it. Listing or annexing it to the complaint, on the other hand, implies
being the object of the action.
xxx xxx xxx
It must be stated with equal respect that the phrase "judicial action or proceeding,"
within the meaning of the organic law, is subject to the ordinary rules of procedure
and is subordinate to the requirements of due process. Failure to implead petitioner
corporation in the action within the constitutional period is, therefore, patently
transgressive of the constitutional mandate against deprivation of life, liberty and
property without due process of law. 81
To fortify this ruling, we need only to point out the similarity in factual antecedents obtaining
in "INTERCO" and the instant case. In "INTERCO", no judicial action or proceeding was
instituted by the PCGG directly against respondent corporations therein (International Copra
Export and International Manufacturing) which it sequestered on June 10, 1987 purportedly
upon a prima facie finding that certain shares of stocks in those corporations are beneficially
owned but were acquired with ill-gotten wealth by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., within six (6)
months from the date of their sequestration — i.e., between June 10, 1987 and December
10, 1987. And the PCGG in "INTERCO" likewise filed a complaint before the
SANDIGANBAYAN on July 31, 1987 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., among others (Civil
Case No. 0033) without, however, impleading respondent corporations as parties-
defendants. The Court in "INTERCO" rejected the PCGG's contention that the July 31, 1987
complaint against Cojuangco, Jr., et al. was substantial compliance with the requirement
under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, by upholding very fundamental
principles in corporation law:
In this jurisdiction, a corporation has a legal personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders. Thus, a suit against any of the stockholders is not ipso facto a suit
against the corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
There is likewise no merit to petitioner's argument that the doctrine which justifies the
"piercing of the veil of corporate fiction" is applicable to the case at bar. The
Sandiganbayan correctly found the record bereft of sufficient basis from which to
conclude that private respondents' respective corporate identities have been used to
defeat public convenience, protect fraudulent schemes, or evade obligations and
liabilities under statutes. Whether or not Enrique Luy, a major stockholder of private
respondents, acted as a dummy of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and whether or not the
shareholders of Enrique Luy are beneficially owned by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., are
matters still to be established in Civil Case No. 0033. But as far as private
respondents are concerned, inclusion of their major stockholder in Civil Case No.
0033 does not detract from, nor excuse, petitioner's failure to file the proper judicial
action against them in compliance with the constitutional requirement under Section
26 of Article XVIII.
And following the rule, elsewise stated, that cases circumstanced identically should be
resolved consistently, adherence to the ruling of the Court in "INTERCO" is necessary and
inescapable.
Regarding its second proposition, the PCGG erroneously relies on "Pangasinan Transportation Co.
v. Philippine Farming Co., Ltd." where it was ruled to the effect that:
82
Where the original complaint states a cause of action, but does it imperfectly, and
afterward an amended complaint is filed, correcting the defect, the plea of statute of
limitations will relate to the time of filing the original complaint.
The "Pangasinan" case dealt solely with a defect in the cause of action stated in the original
complaint filed by therein petitioner Pangasinan Transport against its competitor, respondent
Philippine Farming before the Public Service Commission; for illegal reduction of rates
— i.e., non-specification of the acts constituting the offense. It did not in any way involve a
failure to implead a party-defendant which is an entirely different thing from a defective
cause of action. The scope of the retroactive and curative effect of an amended complaint as
declared in "Pangasinan" therefore ought not be broadened so as to cover infirmities in the
original complaint other than amendable imperfections in a cause of action. In fact, insofar as
the failure to implead a party or parties in the original complaint is specifically concerned, the
Court on at least two occasions said that the rule in "Pangasinan" would not apply to the
party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. These are the cases of "Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation" and "Seno, et al., v. Mangubat, et
83
al." cited by herein SIPALAY and ALLIED in their "Comment." In "Aetna", the amended
84
complaint filed by therein appellant Aetna Insurance Co. as plaintiff before the then CFI of
Manila impleading Barber Line Far East Service as defendant for the first time, was filed
beyond the one-year period fixed in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. In "Seno", one
Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat were likewise impleaded as defendants for
the first time under an amended complaint filed beyond the ten-year period required under
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code within which to bring an action upon a written contract.
And in both cases, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaints against these newly
impleaded defendants by refusing the application of the "Pangasinan" ruling and decreeing
that the amended complaints did not stall the running of the prescription periods provided
under the applicable laws. Bearing once again similar factual features as the "Aetna" and
"Seno" cases, this particular sub-issue should, perforce, be resolved in accordance
therewith.
This Court is, of course, fully aware of that very recent case of "Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al.",
240 SCRA 376 [January 23, 1995], where its "Final Dispositions" relating to the judicial
action/proceeding in sequestration cases appear to clash with "INTERCO". In resolving what
appeared to be the "crucial question" involved in that 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case, to wit:
DOES INCLUSION IN THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY THE PCGG BEFORE THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF CORPORATIONS BEING
"DUMMIES" OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE
DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN AND USED AS INSTRUMENTS FOR
ACQUISITION, OR AS BEING DEPOSITARIES OR PRODUCTS, OF ILL-GOTTEN
WEALTH; OR THE ANNEXING TO SAID COMPLAINTS OF A LIST OF SAID
FIRMS, BUT WITHOUT ACTUALLY IMPLEADING THEM AS DEFENDANTS,
SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT IN ORDER TO
MAINTAIN A SEIZURE EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 1, s. 1986, THE CORRESPONDING "JUDICIAL ACTION OR PROCEEDING"
SHOULD BE FILED WITHIN THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN
SECTION 26, ARTICLE XVIII, OF THE (1987) CONSTITUTION?
the Court made these conclusions:
It is thus both needful and timely to pronounce that:
1) Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution does not, by its terms or any fair
interpretation thereof, require that corporations or business enterprises alleged to be
repositories of "ill-gotten wealth", as the term is used in said provision, be actually
and formally impleaded in the actions for the recovery thereof, in order to maintain in
effect existing sequestrations thereof;
2) complaints for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which merely identify and/or allege
said corporations or enterprises to be the instruments, repositories or the fruits of ill-
gotten wealth, without more, come within the meaning of the phrase "corresponding
judicial action or proceeding" contemplated by the constitutional provision referred to;
the more so, that normally, said corporations, as distinguished from their
stockholders or members, are not generally suable for the latter's illegal or criminal
actuations in the acquisition of the assets invested by them in the former;
3) even assuming the impleading of said corporations to be necessary and proper so

that judgment may comprehensively and effectively be rendered in the actions,
amendment of the complaints to implead them as defendants may, under existing
rules of procedure, be done at any time during the pendency of the actions thereby
initiated, and even during the pendency of an appeal to the Supreme Court — a
procedure that, in any case, is not inconsistent with or proscribed by the
constitutional time limits to the filing of the corresponding complaints "for" — i.e., with
regard or in relation to, in respect of, or in connection with, or concerning — orders of
sequestration, freezing, or provisional takeover.
These fresh pronouncements, however, did not reverse, abandon or supplant "INTERCO". What the
Court did was to explain the two apparently colliding dispositions by making this "hairline", but
critical, distinction:
XVI. The "Interco" and "PJI" Rulings
This Court is not unmindful of the fact that its Resolution of July 26, 1991 on the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 92755 (PCGG vs. Interco) appears
to sustain the proposition that actual impleading in the recovery action of a
corporation under sequestration for being a repository of illegally-acquired wealth, is
necessary and requisite for such proposed or pending seizure to come under the
protective umbrella of the Constitution. But Interco is to be differentiated from the
cases now under review in that in the former, as already elsewhere herein made
clear, there was a lack of proof, even of the prima facie kind, that Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. owned any stock in Interco, the evidence on record being in fact that
said corporation had been organized as a family corporation of the Luys.
So, too, this Court's judgment in the so-called "PJI Case" (Republic of the Philippines
[PCGG] v. Sandiganbayan and Rosario Olivares) may not be regarded as on all
fours with the cases under consideration. The PJI Case involved the shares of stock
in the name of eight (8) natural persons which had never been sequestered at all.
What happened was that the PCGG simply arrogated unto itself the right to vote
those unsequestered shares on the bare claim that the eight (8) registered owners
thereof were "dummies" of Benjamin Romualdez, the real owner of the shares; and
all that the PCGG had done as predicate for that act of appropriation of the stock,
was to include all the shares of PJI in a list (Annex A) appended to its complaint in
Sandiganbayan Case No. 0035, describing them as among the properties illegally
acquired by Romualdez. Unfortunately, as in Interco, the PCGG failed to substantiate
by competent evidence its theory of clandestine ownership of Romualdez; and since
moreover, there had been no sequestration of the alleged dummies' shares of stock,
it was undoubtedly correct for the Sandiganbayan to grant the latter's motion for
them to be recognized and declared as the true owners of the stock in question,
which judgment this Court subsequently pronounced to be free from grave abuse of
discretion.85
We need only to recall at this juncture that, as in "INTERCO", evidence of the PCGG is nil to
even come up with a prima facie case against SIPALAY (and ALLIED). This similitude is the
one decisive factor that draws the instant case away from the "Final Dispositions" made by
the Court in the 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case — thus making "INTERCO", as
supported by the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, the controlling precedent. The principle
of Stare Decisis, indeed, is most compelling, for "when the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same." And it is in this light
86
that Mr. Justice Padilla's lone "Dissent" in the 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case
becomes meaningfully relevant, to wit:
. . . failure to implead these corporations as defendants and merely annexing a list of

such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it
would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality without a
hearing.
In cases where stocks of a corporation were allegedly the fruits of ill-gotten wealth, it
should be remembered that in most of these cases the stocks involved constitute a
substantial if not controlling interest in the corporations. The basic tenets of fair play
demand that these corporations be impleaded as defendants since a judgment in
favor of the government will undoubtedly substantially and decisively affect the
corporations as distinct entities. The judgment could strip them of everything without
being previously heard as they are not parties to the action in which the judgment is
rendered.
. . . Holding that the "corresponding judicial action or proceeding" contemplated by

the Constitution is any action concerning or involving the corporation under
sequestration is oversimplifying the solution, the result of which is antagonistic to the
principles of justice and fair play.
. . . the actions contemplated by the Constitution should be those which include the
corporation not as a mere annex to the complaint but as defendant. This is the
minimum requirement of the due process guarantee. Short of being impleaded, the
corporation has no standing in the judicial action. It cannot adequately defend itself. It
may not even be heard.
On the . . . opinion that alternatively the corporations can be impleaded as

defendants by amendment of the complaint, Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution would appear to preclude this procedure, for allowing amendment of the
complaint to implead theretofore unimpleaded corporations would in effect allow
complaints against the corporations to be filed beyond the periods fixed by said
Section 26.
Justice Amuerfina Melencio-Herrera in her separate opinion in Bataan Shipyard and

Engineering Corporation, Inc. v. PCGG (150 SCRA 181, 253) correctly stated what
should be the rule, thus:
Sequestration is an extraordinary, harsh and severe remedy. It

should be confined to its lawful parameters and exercised, with due
regard, in the words of its enabling laws, to the requirements
of fairness, due process, and Justice. (Emphasis supplied)
While government efforts to recover illegally amassed wealth should have support
from all its branches, eagerness and zeal should not be allowed to run berserk,
overriding in the process the very principles that it is sworn to uphold. In our legal
system, the ends do not always justify the means. Wrongs are never corrected by
committing other wrongs, and as above-discussed the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
does not and should never justify unreasonable intrusions into constitutionally
forbidden grounds. . . .
In answer therefore to the last key issue, we hold that the sequestration and the search and
seizure orders issued were indeed automatically lifted.
Finally, the PCGG in its "Reply" raises as "additional issue" the bias and partiality of the now-
assailed decision'sponente and Chairman of the SANDIGANBAYAN's SECOND DIVISION, Justice
Romeo Escareal. To bolster this charge, the PCGG harps on alleged prejudicial acts committed by
Justice Escareal affecting CC No. 0005 — the case filed against Lucio C. Tan, and the instant case
(S.B. Nos. 0095 against SIPALAY and 0100 against ALLIED).
This issue deserves no merit at all. Firstly, the PCGG's complaints against Justice Escareal's
purported bias and partiality in CC No. 0005 have no bearing whatsoever to the instant case. That
should be ventilated and passed upon there, not here. And secondly, SIPALAY and ALLIED in their
"Rejoinder" meritoriously parried the PCGG's accusation by arguing that:
1.02. Petitioner apparently overlooks that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court

which sits in divisions composed of three (3) members each. The unanimous vote of
all the three (3) members of a division is required for the rendition of a judgment (See
Section 1(b), Rule XVIII, Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan). The Decision and
Resolution subject of the present appeal, though penned by Justice Romeo
Escareal, the Chairman of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, were
concurred in by the two (2) other members of the Sandiganbayan's Second Division.
Such being the case, petitioner's fears of bias or partiality on the part of Justice
Romeo Escareal cannot affect the questioned Decision and Resolution rendered by
the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). As held by this Honorable Court in Miriam
Defensor-Santiago vs. Hon. Justice Francis Garchitorena, et al. (G.R. No. 109226,
December 2, 1993):
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into

consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with
three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members
is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division. (P.D. 1606,
Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders
baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes vs. Gopenco, 29 SCRA 688
[1969]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120704. March 3, 1997]
HON. BARTOLOME C. CARALE, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC), HON. IRENEA A. CENIZA, Presiding Commissioner, Fourth Division,
NLRC, and HON. REYNOSO A. BELARMINO, Executive Labor Arbiter, Regional
Arbitration Branch, Region VII, Petitioners, v. HON. PAMPIO A. ABARINTOS,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cebu City, and FERDINAND
V. PONTEJOS, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Did respondent Judge Pampio A. Abarintos commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he: (1) denied the petitioners motions to dismiss
the complaint filed by respondent Ferdinand V. Pontejos (hereinafter PONTEJOS) to
declare null and void an Administrative Order of petitioner Carale, as Chairman of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (hereinafter CARALE), detailing Pontejos
to the Fourth Division of the NLRC in Cebu City; and the motion to reconsider the order
of denial; and then (2) granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction?
This is the key issue raised in this petition.
The relevant factual antecedents summarized in the petition are as follows:
9. Private respondent Pontejos was issued an original and permanent appointment

dated January 10, 1989 as Labor and Employment Development Officer (RAB VII) in
the National Labor Relations Commission with a salary of P36,864.00 per annum under
Title No. 211-10 of the Appropriations Act R.A. 6642. In 1992, the aforesaid position
was reclassified as Labor Arbitration Associate with compensation of P99,000.00 per
annum or rank at salary grade 22, retroactive to June 30, 1989. Private respondent
holds this position up to the present.
10.On 03 October 1994, petitioner Chairman of the NLRC, issued Administrative Order
No. 10-03 series of 1994, detailing/reassigning private respondent to the NLRC, Fourth
Division, Cebu City, effective October 17, 1994. Said Order reads:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10-03
(Series of 1994)
In the interest of the service, Mr. Ferdinand Pontejos, Labor Arbitration

Branch No. VII, is hereby detailed to the Fourth Division, Cebu City,
effective October 17, 1994, until further orders from the undersigned.
Mr. Pontejos is directed to wind up his pending work and thereafter
report to the Presiding Commissioner Irene E. Ceniza for instruction
regarding his new assignment.
Manila, October 3, 1994.
(SGD) BARTOLOME S. CARALE

Chairman
11.Similar personnel actions, prior to and after Pontejos reassignment to NLRC, Cebu
City, were also effected by petitioner Carale pursuant to his exercise of administrative
authority and supervision over all NLRC officials and employees....
12.On 24 October 1994, private respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City against herein petitioners for Illegal Transfer Tantamount To
Removal Without Cause In Gross Violation Of The Security Of Tenure Afforded Under
The Constitution And In Utter Disregard Of The Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
Republic Act 6715, with Prayer For The Issuance Of A Writ Of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction With Damages. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-16671....
13.Motions to dismiss dated November 8, 1994 and November 15, 1994, were
respectively filed by petitioner Ceniza and Carale, arguing that it is the Civil Service
Commission which has exclusive jurisdiction over any question concerning personnel
movement....
14.A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated November 21, 1994 was filed by petitioner
Belarmino arguing that the questioned administrative order is in the nature of a detail
and the civil service employee who is not satisfied with or aggrieved by such detail may
appeal the matter before the Civil Service Commission....
15.On December 20, 1994, respondent judge issued the first questioned order denying
petitioners Motions to Dismiss holding that alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies before where the surrounding circumstances of the matter before this Court
indicate an urgency of judicial intervention....
16.In the same Order, respondent judge also granted the prayer for preliminary
injunction restraining petitioners from implementing the transfer order....
17.A motion for reconsideration dated January 9, 1995 was filed by petitioner
Belarmino which was denied in the second questioned order dated February 7, 1995....
18.On 06 March 1995, Jeoffrey S. Joaquino, Clerk of Court VII, pursuant to respondent
judges order dated December 20, 1994, issued a writ of injunction enjoining herein
petitioners from unduly interfering with and/or obstructing private respondent Pontejos
lawful discharge of his duties and functions as such Labor Arbitration Associate, until
further orders from respondent judge. The writ of injunction was received by petitioner
Carale on March 21, 1995....1
Pontejos complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-16671 suggested that the uncordial
relationship between himself, as president of the Unified Employees Union of the NLRC,
RAB VII, and Chairman of the NLRC-RAB-VII Multi-Purpose Cooperative, and petitioners
Presiding Commissioner Ceniza and Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino, against whom
the petitioner had earlier filed a petition for certiorari with this Court and a complaint
for harassment and intimidation, respectively, had something to do with his detail to
the Fourth Division of the NLRC. Pontejos alleged as there was no position of Labor
Arbitration Associate in that Division, the detail order was maliciously resorted to as a
scheme to lure [him] away from his permanent position, thereby violating his security
of tenure; and described it as an act of vindictiveness against him and was patently
illegal, malicious, arbitrary and an exercise of grave abuse of discretion in excess of
jurisdiction.2 To justify his direct resort to the court, Pontejos alleged that [t]here is no
other available and speedy remedy in order to protect [his] interest than to resort to
this Honorable Court; that the urgency of judicial intervention is an exception to the
rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies,3 not to mention the fact that the
administrative act in question is patently illegal.4 To support his application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining [order], Pontejos alleged that:
11.[He] is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of such relief consists
in RESTRAINING OR PREVENTING the defendants, their agents and all persons acting
for or in their behalf, from enforcing and implementing the questioned Administrative
Order No. 10-03, Series of 1994;
12.The commission of the continuance of the acts complained of during the litigation or
the non-performance thereof, could probably work grave injustice to the plaintiff... so
that the defendants... must be enjoined by a restraining order from implementing
and/or enforcing the... questioned Administrative Order;
13.[He] is willing to post a bond executed to he defendants enjoined, in an amount to

be fixed by the court, to the effect that [he] will pay to such party all damages which
they [sic] may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide that
the plaintiff is not entitled thereto.5
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Pontejos further asserted that the petitioners had acted with gross and evident bad
faith, and by their conduct, have violated all forms of good human conduct and dealings
and did not exhibit any degree of good faith, honesty and propriety, as a consequence
of which he has suffered mental anxiety, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and moral
shock; and had displayed anti-social acts and conduct, contrary to the tenents [sic]
enunciated in the Preliminary Title in Human relations found in Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. On account thereof, he prayed for the award
of P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the challenged order of 20 December 1994, the trial court, in dismissing the
petitioners motions to dismiss, ruled that the only effect of non-compliance with the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that it will deprive the complainant of a
cause of action; it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Since the factual
allegations of the complaint satisfactorily meet the test of sufficiency of the complaint
insofar as cause of action is concerned, the complaint was not dismissible.
In the challenged resolution of 7 February 1995 denying the petitioners motion to
reconsider the order of 20 December 1994, the trial court further held that the case
before it fell within one of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies, namely, where the question to be settled is whether the controverted act of
respondent Commissioner Carale was performed with grave abuse of discretion. 7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this special civil action for certiorari, the petitioners assert that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY OF THE

TRANSFER ORDER ISSUED BY PETITIONER CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION SINCE THE CONTROVERSY IS WITHIN THE ORIGINAL AND
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE

COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS AS IT CONSTITUTES A SUIT AGAINST THE
STATE WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
III
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT REPRESENTED IN THE TRIAL COURT BY THEIR

STATUTORY COUNSEL, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, HENCE THE
PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN IS A NULLITY.
As to the first ground, the petitioners maintain that being a permanent civil service
employee, Pontejos is subject to civil service laws and regulations pursuant to
Subsection 1(1), Section 8-B, Article IX-A of the Constitution. His grievance concerning
Carales administrative order detailing him to the Fourth Division of the NLRC should
have been raised in an appropriate complaint before the Merit Systems and Protection
Board (MSPB) created under P.D. No. 1409, whose functions, pursuant to Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 93-2387, have been transferred directly to the CSC
itself. The petitioners further claim that there is no factual or legal basis indicative of
the urgency of judicial intervention to justify the trial courts assumption of jurisdiction
over this case and to order the issuance of the questioned writ of preliminary
injunction.
Anent the second ground, the petitioners, citing Veterans Manpower and Protective
Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,8 submit that Pontejos complaint, which asked for a
writ of injunction and damages, is in effect a suit against the State without its consent,
hence, the petitioners, who are all public officials, are immune from such suit.
In support of the third ground, the petitioners alleged that all throughout the
proceedings before the trial court, the petitioners were not represented by their
statutory counsel, the Solicitor General, whose authority is mandated under P.D. No.
478, the magna carta of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). 9 Consequently, the
questioned orders and the writ of preliminary injunction were invalid.
In the 26 July 1995 resolution, we required the respondents to comment on the petition
and issued a temporary restraining order, effective as of the said date, which enjoined
the respondents from enforcing the orders of 20 December 1994 and 7 February 1995
issued in Civil Case No. CEB-16671.
We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. However, only Pontejos complied, the Office of the Solicitor
General failing to despite two extensions of time. We denied on 20 November 1996 its
third motion for extension of time to file its Memorandum.
We find merit in the petition, but not necessarily on strength of the grounds raised.
The primary issue in this special civil action, as stated in the opening paragraph of
this ponencia, is whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motions to dismiss and the motion
for reconsideration, and granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Carales Administrative Order 10-
03, Series of 1994.
The motions to dismiss separately filed in the trial court by petitioners Carale and
Presiding Commissioner Ceniza were principally anchored on lack of jurisdiction due to
the failure of Pontejos to exhaust administrative remedies. Obviously, the petitioners
failed to appreciate that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional.
It only renders the action premature, i.e., the claimed cause of action is not ripe for
judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in
court.10 Their motions to dismiss must then be understood to be based on: (a) lack of
jurisdiction; and (b) lack of cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound

practice and policy. It ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting
process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the
administrative agency, avoidance of interference with functions of the administrative
agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative process had run its
course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first
instance.11 The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the
administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will
decide the same correctly.12 There are both legal and practical reasons for this principle.
The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy
solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or
reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and
the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum. 13 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accordingly, the party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary
and premature resort to the court.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, Pontejos did not attempt to seek administrative relief, which was
both available and sufficient. Initially, he could have asked for reconsideration of the
detail order, failing which, he could have gone directly to the CSC, through the MSPB,
which is empowered to:
(2) Hear and decide cases brought before it by offices and employees who feel
aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving... transfer,
detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints
against any officers in the government arising from personnel actions of
these officers or from violations of the merit system.... 15 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-16671 convinces us that Pontejos ever
thought of pursuing the available administrative remedies. Neither do we find sufficient
basis for his invocation of the exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. What he offered were nothing but vague and general averments that could
best qualify as motherhood statements. Further, they were unsupported by allegations
of fact or law which would prima facie bring his case within any of the accepted
exceptions to the rule, namely: (1) where the question is purely legal, (2) where
judicial intervention is urgent, (3) when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage, (4) where the controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high
government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and (6) when the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. 16
II
We do not likewise hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion when he granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction without
any notice of hearing. The rule on preliminary injunction plainly provides that it cannot
be granted without notice to the defendant. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
states, in part, as follows:
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice. -- No preliminary injunction
shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown
by affidavits or by verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter could be heard on notice, the judge to whom the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be
effective only for a period of twenty days from date of issuance. Within the said twenty-
day period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring
him to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, and determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order....
(underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of 20 December

1994 and 7 February 1995 in Civil Case No. CEB-16671 of Branch 22 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, entitled Ferdinand V. Pontejos v. Hon. Bartolome C. Carale, et
al., are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Pampio A. Abarintos is
hereby directed to forthwith issue an order DISMISSING the said case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-25786. February 27, 1978.]
LUCIANO PESTANAS, ANGEL PESTANAS, JOSE PESTANAS, ELISEO PESTANAS,

EXEQUIEL PAGADORA, LUCIANA TORRES, SOLOMON TENA, and FELIX
ATENTAR, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOSEFA DYOGI, JOAQUIN LACORTE, the
Director of Lands, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Defendants-Appellees.
Rafael de la Peña for Appellants.
Silvestre L. Tagarao for appellee Lacorta.
Javier & Fabros for appellee Dyogi.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R.

Rosete and Solicitor Augusto M. Andres for Appellees.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants filed with the Bureau of Lands a petition for cancellation of a free patent
issued in favor of private appellee. While the petition was pending investigation by the
Bureau, appellants filed a complaints in the Court of First Instance to have the same
free patent declared null and void. Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint because it
stated no cause of action and because the filing was premature due to the pending
administrative action. Appellants contended that it had sufficient cause of action and
that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary since the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources had not acted on the petition notwithstanding the
lapse of more than one year from the date of filing. The Court of First Instance
dismissed the complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The order was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
SYLLABUS
1. ACTIONS; PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF PATENTS; EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. — Where a party seeks for the cancellation of a free
patent with the Bureau of Lands, he must pursue his action in the proper Department
and a review by the Courts will not be permitted unless the administrative remedies are
first exhausted.
2. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION. — There can be no cause of action for filing a complaint
for cancellation of a free patent in court unless the administrative remedies provided by
law shall have been exhausted.
DECISION
SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal, filed on December 7, 1965, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, dismissing the plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint in Civil Case No. 508
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
It appears that in 1929, Severo Ungriano took possession of a parcel of land consisting
of thirty (30) hectares located at Barrio Libo, Panukulan, Quezon. He cleared and
cultivated the holding and introduced improvements thereon. Subsequently, he filed
Homestead Application No. 145134 (E-86406) for a 24-hectare parcel embraced within
said 30-hectare property, which application was approved by the Director of Lands. 1
In 1942 and on various dates subsequent thereto, Ungriano transferred his right to
possess the aforementioned parcel of land to the herein plaintiffs-appellants. These
transferees continued to clear and cultivate the land and to introduce improvements
over the portions respectively occupied by them. The holding, however, was forest land,
being part of Timberland Block B. LC Project No. 19-C Polillo, Quezon, per BF Map LC
2066. 2 Therefore, to perfect their titles over the land, plaintiffs-appellants made
representations with the authorities for the release of the game from the Forest Zone.
One of the persons they approached was then President of the Senate, Eulogio
Rodriguez Sr., who, upon learning of the situation, wrote the then Director of the
Bureau of Forestry, Felipe Amos, and requested the latter "to find ways and means for
the immediate release of this land so that the present occupants thereof could perfect
their titles over the said land." 3
The land was finally released from the Forest Zone sometime in May, 1968: 4 On
October 5, 1969 plaintiffs-appellants were advised by the Director of Lands, to file
appropriate public land applications and to have the land surveyed so that their claims
thereto may be perfected. 5
Meanwhile, and prior to its release from the Forest Zone, the land in controversy was
part of a timber concession held by defendant-appellee Josefa Dyogi by virtue of an
Ordinary Timber License (O.T. Lic. No. 84-’55) granted to her in 1960. 6 At the instance
of defendant-appellee Josefa Dyogi, a criminal information was filed on May 29, 1968
against three of the herein appellants — namely, Exequiel Pagadora, Luciano and Angel
Pestanas — for unlawful possession and destruction of public forest before the Justice of
the Peace Court of Polillo, Quezon. On November 29, 1968, the three accused
appellants were convicted and sentenced to suffer one (1) month imprisonment, but on
appeal to the Court of First Instance, all the cases against them were dismissed. 7
Josefa Dyogi nevertheless did not cease in her attempt to have the ownership of the
24-hectare lot in controversy declared in her name. She filed with the Bureau of Lands
Free Patent Application No. 8-2103 covering the portions occupied by the appellants.
The Director of Lands approved said free patent application on the strength of the
report submitted by public lands inspector Joaquin Lacorte, one of the defendants, to
the effect that the land was free from claims and conflicts, and that there was no
person occupying or claiming the land other than Josefa Dyogi. 8 On March 20, 1961,
free patent No. V-166123 was issued to Josefa Dyogi by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. 9
On September 13, 1961, plaintiffs appellants filed with the Bureau of Lands a petition
for cancellation of free patent No. V-166123 issued to Josefa Dyogi.
On March 17, 1962, or six months thereafter, while the foregoing petition for
cancellation was pending investigation by the Bureau of Lands 10 they filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, to have the identical free patent No. V-166123
declared null and void and prayed that they be declared the owners of the portions of
land possessed by them and/or that they be declared as having the preferential right to
acquire the said land. The complaint alleged, among other things: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"11. — That defendant Josefa Dyogi filed with the Bureau of Lands Free Patent
Application No. 8-2103 covering the portions of land occupied and possessed by
plaintiffs, but in filing the said free patent application, the said Josefa Dyogi acted in
bad faith and committed fraud, deceit and misrepresentations by alleging that she is a
Filipino citizen, when in truth and in fact, she is a Chinese citizen who is disqualified to
own public agricultural lands and by further alleging that the land is not claimed and
occupied by any other person.
12. — That defendant Joaquin Lacorte, a public lands inspector with official station at
Lucena City, in connivance with his co-defendant Josefa Dyogi, submitted a false report
in investigation making it appear in said report that he conducted an ocular
investigation of the land; that the land was free from claims and conflicts; that there
was n person occupying or claiming the land other than the applicant-defendant Josefa
Dyogi and that defendant Josefa Dyogi has complied with all the requirements of the
law regarding residence and cultivation of the land, which facts are absolutely false and
untrue."cralaw virtua1aw library
Defendants, now appellees, moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) that the complaint states no cause of action, and (2) that the filing thereof was
premature, because of the pendency of the administrative case for cancellation of free
patent No. V-166123. 11
Plaintiffs-appellants answered that their complaint states sufficient cause of action and
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary" (S)ince the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources has not acted on the Petition of the plaintiffs for
cancellation of the said Free Patent Title, notwithstanding the lapse of a period of more
than one year from the date it was filed . . . 12
Defendant-appellee Dyogi filed a Rejoinder wherein she reiterated the need to exhaust
all administrative remedies in this case. 13
The lower court sustained the defendants’ contentions. By an order dated June 21,
1963, it dismissed the complaint as to Lacorte on the ground that he "has no
personality in this case and that there is no cause of action against him." 14 After
hearing defendant Dyogi’s motion to dismiss, 15 the lower court granted it and by an
order dated March 29, 1966, dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. Said order reads in part: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A careful perusal of the record of the case and basing on the arguments of the parties
during the oral argument it has been satisfactorily proved and established that the
plaintiff, as stated above has filed with the Director of Lands, a petition for the
cancellation of the free patent issued in favor of the defendant Josefa A. Dyogi over the
land in question and that the case is still pending before the Director of Lands. This
being so, the plaintiffs have to wait for the outcome of said case and should the
decision be adverse to the plaintiffs, they still have the right to appeal to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and to the President of the Philippines. Until these
administrative remedies shall have been exhausted by the plaintiffs, the filing of the
instant case with the court is rather premature because there can be no cause of action
for filing the complaint unless the administrative remedies provided for by law shall
have been exhausted." 16
On April 30, 1965, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration 17 which
was denied by the lower court by an order dated September 9, 1965 because said
motion was "without merits." 18
Hence this appeal, on the following assignment of errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT.
2. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE TO WAIT
FOR THE OUTCOME OF PETITION THEY FILED WITH THE BUREAU OF LANDS FOR
CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. V-166123 BEFORE TAKING THIS
CASE TO COURT.
3. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CAUSE
OF ACTION UNTIL THEY EXHAUSTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE
INSTANT CASE. 19
The three errors assigned actually raise one issue only, i.e. whether or not the lower
court properly applied the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As aptly
put by the appellee, the sole issue in this case involves & purely legal question which
may be stated briefly as follows: Whether or not a party, aggrieved by a decision of the
Director of Lands, may file an action in court for the cancellation of a free patent
granted under the provisions of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
without waiting for the outcome of a petition previously filed with the Director of Lands
praying for the same relief. 20
This appeal is clearly without merit. The order of dismissal — on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and non-exhaustion of administrative remedy, and the order denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof, are in order. It is now well-settled that where a
party seeks for the cancellation of a free patent with the Bureau of Lands, he must
pursue his section in the proper Department and a review by the Courts will not be
permitted unless the administrative remedies are first exhausted. 21 Thus We held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Indeed,
he seeks, in effect, a review of the decision of the Director of Lands in causing a patent
to be issued to defendant Avila. Yet, plaintiff does not appear to have asked the
Director of Lands to reconsider said decision, or to have appealed therefrom to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who controls said official and is the
‘officer charged with carrying out the provisions’ of our revised public land law (CA 141,
Sec. 3). It is well settled that, before the decisions or administrative bodies can be
brought to courts for review, all administrative remedies must first be exhausted,
especially in dispute concerning public lands, where the findings of said administrative
bodies as to questions of fact, are declared by statute to be ‘conclusive’." 22
"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable to judicial review of

decisions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is too well known and need not be restated. 23
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies with greater force in this
case since the Bureau of Lands has not yet — as of the time of this appeal — even
rendered a decision on the matter.
There is merit also in the lower court’s finding that the plaintiffs appellants have no
cause of action. For it is also a settled rule in this jurisdiction that there can be no cause
of action for filing a complaint in court unless the administrative remedies provided for
by law shall have been exhausted. 24
Wherefore, the order of the lower court dismissing the plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262 November 27, 2013
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek to reverse and set aside the following: (1)
Decision dated October 18, 2010 and Resolution dated July 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
1 2
CA-G.R. SP No. 111754; and (2) Decision dated August 31, 2011 and Resolution dated June 27,
3 4
2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073.
The Facts
On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and
Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the
Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost is ₱38,900,000: P
18,700,000 for the design and construction of passenger terminal, and ₱20,200,000 for the design
and construction of the jetty port facility. In the course of construction, petitioner issued
5
variation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work under these change orders were
agreed upon by petitioner and respondent. 6
On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the
construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan.
The contract price for Phase II is ₱2,475,345.54. 7
On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount of ₱22,419,112.96 covering
the following items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle:
1. Unpaid accomplishments on additional works

undertaken - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 12,396,143.09
2. Refund of taxes levied despite it not being

covered by original contract- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 884,098.59
3. Price escalation (Consistent with Section 7.5,

Original Contract- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 1,291,714.98
4. Additional Labor Cost resulting [from]

numerous change orders issued sporadically - - - - - - - - Php 3,303,486.60
5. Additional Overhead Cost resulting [from]

numerous Orders issued sporadically - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 1,101,162.60
6. Interest resulting [from] payment delays

consistent with Section 7.3.b of the Original
Contract - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 3,442,507.50. 8
On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City (Civil
Case No. 06-1122-MK) to collect the aforesaid amounts. On August 17, 2006, the trial court issued
9
a writ of preliminary attachment.10
Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent. It asserted that the sums being
claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of
Provincial Governor. Also cited was respondent’s June 10, 2003 letter absolving petitioner from
liability for any cost in connection with the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project. 11
After trial, the trial court rendered its Decision on August 14, 2009, the dispositive portion of which
12
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Jody
King Construction And Development Corporation and against defendant Province of Aklan, as
follows:
1. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount of Php7,396,143.09 representing
the unpaid accomplishment on additional works undertaken by the plaintiff;
2. ordering the defendant to refund to the plaintiff the amount of Php884,098.59 representing
additional 2% tax levied upon against the plaintiff;
3. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff price escalation in the amount of
Php1,291,714.98 pursuant to Section 7.5 of the original contract;
4. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount of Php3,303,486.60 representing
additional labor cost resulting from change orders issued by the defendant;
5. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Php1,101,162.00 overhead cost
resulting from change orders issued by the defendant;
6. ordering the defendant to pay the sum of Php3,442,507.50 representing interest resulting
from payment delays up to October 15, 2001 pursuant to Section 7.3.b of the original
contract;
7. ordering the defendant to pay interest of 3% per month from unpaid claims as of October
16, 2001 to date of actual payment pursuant to Section 7.3.b[;]
8. ordering the [defendant] to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Php500,000.00 as moral
damages;
9. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Php300,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
10. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php200,000.00, as and for
attorney’s fees; and
11. ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 13
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on October 9, 2009 stating that it received a copy of
14
the decision on September 25, 2009. In its Order dated October 27, 2009, the trial court denied the
15
motion for reconsideration upon verification from the records that as shown by the return card, copy
of the decision was actually received by both Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ronaldo B. Ingente
and Atty. Lee T. Manares on September 23, 2009. Since petitioner only had until October 8, 2009
within which to file a motion for reconsideration, its motion filed on October 9, 2009 was filed one day
after the finality of the decision. The trial court further noted that there was a deliberate attempt on
both Atty. Manares and Prosecutor Ingente to mislead the court and make it appear that their motion
for reconsideration was filed on time. Petitioner filed a Manifestation reiterating the explanation set
16
forth in its Rejoinder to respondent’s comment/opposition and motion to dismiss that the wrong date
of receipt of the decision stated in the motion for reconsideration was due to pure inadvertence
attributable to the staff of petitioner’s counsel. It stressed that there was no intention to mislead the
trial court nor cause undue prejudice to the case, as in fact its counsel immediately corrected the
error upon discovery by explaining the attendant circumstances in the Rejoinder dated October 29,
2009.
On November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E.
Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment of ₱67,027,378.34 and tender the
same to the respondent. Consequently, Sheriff Gamboa served notices of garnishment on Land
Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines at their
branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited under
the account of petitioner. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court order, citing
the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of government
monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.
17
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 111754.
On December 7, 2009, the trial court denied petitioner’s notice of appeal filed on December 1, 2009.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 2009 Order was likewise denied. On May
18
20, 2010, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders
denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073.
By Decision dated October 18, 2010, the CA’s First Division dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 111754 as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court’s issuance of the writ of
execution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the CA. The CA
stressed that even assuming as true the alleged errors committed by the trial court, these were
insufficient for a ruling that grave abuse of discretion had been committed. On the matter of
execution of the trial court’s decision, the appellate court said that it was rendered moot by
respondent’s filing of a petition before the Commission on Audit (COA).
On August 31, 2011, the CA’s Sixteenth Division rendered its Decision dismissing the petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 114073. The CA said that petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its failure to
file a timely motion for reconsideration; counsel’s explanation that he believed in good faith that the
August 14, 2009 Decision of the trial court was received on September 25, 2009 because it was
handed to him by his personnel only on that day is not a justifiable excuse that would warrant the
relaxation of the rule on reglementary period of appeal. The CA also held that petitioner is estopped
from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COA’s primary
jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.
The Cases
In G.R. No. 197592, petitioner submits the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION DATED 14 AUGUST 2009 RENDERED BY THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 273, MARIKINA CITY AND THE WRIT OF
EXECUTION DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2009 SHOULD BE RENDERED VOID FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 273, MARIKINA CITY
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE DECISION DATED 14 AUGUST 2009 AND ISSUING
THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2009 EVEN IT FAILED TO DISPOSE
ALL THE ISSUES OF THE CASE BY NOT RESOLVING PETITIONER’S "URGENT
MOTION TO DISCHARGE EX-PARTE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT" DATED
31 AUGUST 2006.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2009 WHICH

WAS HASTILY ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 10-2000 SHOULD BE RENDERED VOID. 19
The petition in G.R. No. 202623 sets forth the following arguments:
Petitioner is not estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 273,
Marikina City over the subject matter of the case. 20
The petition for certiorari filed before the CA due to the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s Notice of Appeal
was in accord with jurisprudence. 21
The Issues
The controversy boils down to the following issues: (1) the applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction to this case; and (2) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution.
Our Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondent’s money claims Petitioner is not estopped from
raising the issue of jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter
may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
22
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may
suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view
or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. 23
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. 24
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by
petitioner, a local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it
25 26
is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the
general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of
ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those
accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property
received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and
settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned
or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards,
commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental
entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the government, those
required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a
counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing laws, the COA
27
promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Rule II, Section 1
specifically enumerated those matters falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include
"money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule VIII, Section 1 further provides:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal retainers by
government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in
amounts exceeding one million pesos (₱1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for
loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five Million pesos
(₱5,000,000.00).
In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, we ruled that it is the COA and not the
28
RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner’s money claim against respondent local
government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties’ failure to argue the issue nor
active participation in the proceedings. Thus:
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although
petitioner’s collection suit for ₱487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances
surrounding petitioner’s claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COA’s jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money against a
local government unit. This brought the case within the COA’s domain to pass upon money claims
against the government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines:
The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and comprehend all matters
relating to x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. x x x.
The scope of the COA’s authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed, however, by an
unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean only liquidated claims, or those
determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of
accounting officers. Petitioner’s claim was for a fixed amount and although respondent took issue
with the accuracy of petitioner’s summation of its accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily
determinable from the receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the
COA’s jurisdiction under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Second, petitioner’s money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of
respondent’s public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the
Local Government Code provisions on supply and property management and their implementing
rules and regulations promulgated by the COA pursuant to Section 383 of said Code. Petitioner’s
claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such
matters are not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but
within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of
fidelity to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, we need
only state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation
cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper
distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the
parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
29
Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim
should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the
30
proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively
small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong
public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing
31
circumstances is applicable in the present case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and
32
decisions rendered thereby are null and void. 33
Writ of Execution issued in violation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is void
Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the void
34
judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. 35
Clearly, the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered
the execution of its judgment against petitioner and garnishment of the latter’s funds.
In its Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner argued that it is the COA and not the
RTC which has original jurisdiction over money claim against government agencies and
subdivisions. The CA, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that the issue
1âwphi1
had become moot by respondent's filing of the proper petition with the COA. However, respondent's
belated compliance with the formal requirements of presenting its money claim before the COA did
not cure the serious errors committed by the RTC in implementing its void decision. The RTC's
orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction must be set aside because a void
judgment can never be validly executed.
Finally, the RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in issuing the
writ of execution and notices of garnishment against petitioner. The RTC had no authority to direct
the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from petitioner's depositary
banks. Such act violated the express directives of this Court under Administrative Circular No. 10-
36
2000, which was issued "precisely in order to prevent the circumvention of Presidential Decree No.
37
1445, as well as of the rules and procedures of the COA." WHEREFORE, both petitions in G.R.
38
Nos. 197592 and 202623 are GRANTED. The Decision dated October 18, 2010 and Resolution
dated July 5 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754, and Decision dated August
31, 2011 and Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in CA- G.R. SP No. 114073 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14 2009, Writ of Execution and subsequent issuances
implementing the said decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City in Civil Case No. 06-
1122-MK are all SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
[G.R. No. 167891 : January 15, 2010]
SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO AND EMER FAJARDO, PETITIONERS, VS. ANITA R.

FLORES, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, BIENVENIDO FLORES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
October 28, 2004 and its Resolution dated April 19, 2005, denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The facts are as follows:
Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 2351 (Cad. 320-
D), with an area of 25,513 square meters (sq m), located in Barangay Sumandig in
Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus
Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally between the two
until 1975 when the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order [2] from
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which Jesus Fajardo
religiously complied with. From the time petitioner cultivated the land, he was allowed
by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land,
which is the subject of controversy.
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir, herein
respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and
Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement, denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI
NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG." [3] This was
followed by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," executed on July
10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq
m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in the
interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was
referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag, Bulacan. [4] In the
Report and Recommendation dated May 3, 2000, the Legal Officer advised the parties
to ventilate their claims and counterclaims with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.[5]
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein respondent Anita
Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she alleged that,
as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she inherited a parcel of land
consisting of stony land, not devoted to agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to
agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that, sometime in
the 1960s, during the lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus Fajardo requested the
former to allow him to work and cultivate that portion of land devoted to agriculture;
that Jesus Fajardo was then allowed to erect a house on the stony part of the land, and
that the use and occupation of the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance only;
and that the land, which was divided equally between the two parties, excluded the
stony portion. In February 1999, respondent approached petitioners and verbally
informed them of her intention to repossess the stony portion, but petitioners refused
to heed the request.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No. 2351, with an area of 25,513
sq m, was agricultural land; that they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, and
personally cultivating the same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, considering that the dispute between the parties, regarding
the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; and that the assumption by the DARAB of
jurisdiction over the controversy involving the lot in question therefore precluded the
MTC from exercising jurisdiction over the case.
Resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at first glance, the court did
not have jurisdiction over the case, considering that it was admitted that petitioner was
allowed to cultivate the land, a closer look at the Kasunduan, however, revealed that
what was divided was only the portion being tilled. By contrast, the subject matter of
the complaint was the stony portion where petitioners' house was erected. Thus, the
court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter. [6]
On April 25, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

(respondent), ORDERING defendants (petitioners) -
1) and all persons claiming rights under them to VACATE the subject premises where
they have erected their house, which is a portion of Lot No. 2351, Cad-320-D situated
[in] Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan;
2) to DEMOLISH their house on the subject premises;
3) to PAY plaintiff the sum of P400.00 a month by way of reasonable compensation for
their use and occupation of the subject premises starting [in] June 2000 and every
month thereafter until they finally vacate the same; and
4) to PAY attorney's fees of P10,000.00 and the cost of suit. [7]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Third Judicial Region, Malolos,
Bulacan, affirmed the MTC Decision in toto upon a finding that no reversible error was
committed by the court a quo in its Decision[8]dated August 29, 2002.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an Order on December 10,
2002, reversing its decision dated August 29, 2002. The RTC found that the issue
involved appeared to be an agrarian dispute, which fell within the contemplation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, and thus ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
A petition for review was then filed by respondents with the CA to annul the Order of
the RTC dated December 10, 2002.
On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed decision, which reinstated the MTC
decision. It disagreed with the findings of the RTC and ruled that the part of Lot No.
2351 where petitioners' house stood was stony and residential in nature, one that may
not be made to fall within the ambit of the operation of Philippine agrarian laws, owing
to its non-agriculture character. The CA explained that, on the strength of the two
instruments, the parties made a partition and divided the agricultural portion of Lot No.
2351 equally among themselves. By virtue of said division, the parties effectively
severed and terminated the agricultural leasehold/tenancy relationship between them;
thus, there was no longer any agrarian dispute to speak of. Fajardo had already
acquired the benefits under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when one-half of
the agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351 was allotted to him. Petitioners cannot,
therefore, be allowed to continue possession of a part of the stony portion, which was
not included in the land he was cultivating. [9] The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding that the court a quo seriously erred when it
reversed itself, its Order dated December 10, 2002 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 25, 2001 of the MTC of San Ildefonso,
Bulacan is hereby REINSTATED.[10]
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.
The issue in this case is whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the
case.
There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the parties executed an agreement,
denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN
UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG." Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the
tiller of the land. This Kasunduan was subsequently followed by another agreement,
"KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," whereby an area of 10,923 sq m of Lot No. 2351
was given to petitioners. The portion of the land where petitioners' house is erected is
the subject of the instant case for unlawful detainer. Respondent argues that this
portion is not included in the deed of partition, while petitioners insist that it is.
We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order dated December 10,
2002 that the resolution of this case hinges on the correct interpretation of the
contracts executed by the parties. The issue of who has a better right of possession
over the subject land cannot be determined without resolving first the matter as to
whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is not simply a case for unlawful
detainer, but one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the
competence of the MTC.[11]
More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural land, which petitioners have
continuously and personally cultivated since the 1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was
admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees,
petitioners have a right to a home lot and a right to exclusive possession thereof by
virtue of Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. [12] Logically,
therefore, the case involves an agrarian dispute, which falls within the contemplation of
R.A. No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
An agrarian dispute[13] refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any
controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. [14]
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial arrangements.

The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the tenancy
relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit of
R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the
controversy involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-
tenant relationship.
.Amurao v. Villalobos is quite instructive:
The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial arrangements

because the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate the same. Even assuming
that the tenancy relationship between the parties had ceased due to
the Kasulatan, there still exists an agrarian dispute because the action involves an
incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.
In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:
[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if
true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the
characterization of the controversy as an "agrarian dispute." x x x Even if the tenurial
arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the
landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former
landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in
consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian
dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:
"Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that àll cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and
disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This
jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant--
at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely
from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or
shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said
relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from
the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court
of Agrarian Relations . . ."
In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated
by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the
legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such
relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of
the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian
dispute.[15]
Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the parties, regarding the
interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to the DAR, which in
turn referred the case to the DARAB.[16] In view of the foregoing, we reiterate Hilario v.
Prudente,[17] that:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy
over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated December
10, 2002 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207074

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs.MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction, including the allocation of
rights and determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's
name.
The name through which one is known is generally, however, not chosen by the individual who
bears it. Rather, it is chosen by one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a
product of the exercise of autonomy of the individual to whom it refers.
In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's identity, the law requires that these
labels be registered. Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other aspects
of one's identity that pertain to one's name are not reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of
Live Birth filed with the civil registrar.
Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of two (2) motives. The first,
as an exercise of one's autonomy, is to change the appellation that one was given for various
reasons. The other is not an exercise to change the label that was given to a person; it is simply
to correct the data as it was recorded in the Civil Registry.
This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the Republic of the Philippines' appeal 3
from the Regional Trial Court December 7, 2010 Order4 granting herein respondent Michelle
Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court
of Ilagan City, Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155 5 for the correction of her name from "Michael"
to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 1086 of the Rules of
Court.7
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"·' her mother's middle
name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May
23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded. 8
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official
transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage
certificate. 9
The Regional Trial Court, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a
hearing on August 2, 2010. It also ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Isabela.10
The Office of the Solicitor General authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear
on its behalf. 11 Trial then ensued.
During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's
certification, and transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor
who examined her also certified that she was female. 12 On cross-examination, Gallo explained
that she never undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to
evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport. 13
The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 20 I 0 Order, granted the petition. 14 It lent
credence to the documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections she sought were
"harmless and innocuous."15 It concluded that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate
of Live Birth and applied Rule I 08 of the Rules of Court, 16 citing Republic v. Cagandahan. 17
Thus:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, an order is hereby issued directing the Civil
Registrar General, NSO through the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the
entries in the Birth Certificate of the petitioner as well as in the National Statistics Office
Authenticated copy particularly her first name "MICHAEL" to "MICHELLE", gender from "MALE"
to "FEMALE'', middle name of petitioner to be entered as "SORIANO", middle names of
petitioner's parents to be properly supplied as "ANGANGAN" for the mother and "BALINGAO"
for the father, as well as date of marriage of petitioner's parents to be recorded as "MAY 23,
1981 ", after payment of legal fees if there be any.
SO ORDERED.18
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. 19 It argued that Gallo did not
comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and
the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo."20 Furthermore, the
published Order was also defective for not stating the cause of the change of name.21
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the Solicitor
General's appeal.22 It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the
corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous.23 It further clarified that Rule 108 is
limited to the implementation of Article 412 of the Civil Code24 and that the proceedings which
stem from it can "either be summary, if the correction sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if [it]
affects . . . civil status, citizenship or nationality ... which are deemed substantial corrections."25
The Court of Appeals discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs the proceeding for
changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register."26
Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name,
to wit: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; ( c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is
based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.27
The Court of Appeals also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the matter,
classifies a change in the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as clerical error that may
be corrected without a judicial order."28 It applied this ruling on the inclusion of Gallo's middle
name, her parents' middle names, and the latter's date of marriage, as they do not involve
substantial corrections.29
As the petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held that a
summary proceeding would have sufficed. With this determination, the Regional Trial Court's
more rigid and stringent adversarial proceeding was more than enough to satisfy the procedural
requirements under Rule 108. 30
However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For it,
Gallo wants to change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule
45 under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors made by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in finding for Gallo.31
Citing Republic v. Mercadera,32 petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule
108.33 Thus, the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name.34 As "Michael" could
not have been the result of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case should fall
under Rule 103 for it contemplates a substantial change. 35
Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule. 36 It also argues
that the use of a different name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103. 37
Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction38 as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of
first name, superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.39
To support its claim, it cited Silverio v. Republic, 40 which held that "[t]he intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 ... and 108 ... of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied."41
Respondent Gallo, in her Comment, 42 counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned
corrections are innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45.43 In any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence,
the applicable rule is Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial
proceeding properly satisfied. 44 Lastly, she contends that petitioner has waived its right to
invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction when
it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues
before this Court. 45
Petitioner filed its Reply.46 The case was then submitted for resolution after the parties filed their
respective Memoranda.47
The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the
change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error;
Second, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors; and
Finally, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.1âwphi1
This Court finds for the respondent.1âwphi1 Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil
Registry.
In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere correction
of error, petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition, which should
only raise questions of law.
Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions do not
include weighing and analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over again.
In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.48:
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of
law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh
evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.
Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a

question of fact:
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question
of fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The
test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation
given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the
issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether
or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the
question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
49
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as
determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change
requires looking into the party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other
evidence.
On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048, is
helpful in identifying the nature of the determination sought.
Republic Act No. 1017250 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
....
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day
and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of
nationality, age, or status of the petitioner. 51
Likewise, Republic Act No. 904852 states:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
....
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.53
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made
after reference to and evaluation of existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate
was ever used.
This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of
Appeals, that this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this
Court is bound by the lower courts' findings.
II.A
In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the
entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act
No. 9048 applies to all other corrections sought.
Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,"54 which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated there.55
Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of
marriage, judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions,
acknowledgments of natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of
name.56
As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172,
which amended Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on
changes or corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.
Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name.
57
On the other hand, Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any
entry in the civil register may be changed or corrected. 58
Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial
changes in the given name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons
recognized by law, or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors.
This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties,
who may be affected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these
proceedings bind the whole world.59
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent
special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others,
that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change
of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called
in the community in which he lives and is best known." When granted, a person's identity and
interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the
world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a
change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court
decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order
issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition.
When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As
notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family
relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or
civil status. However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to
objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he
would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might
be erroneously impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what
is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced ... mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant ... "60 (Citations omitted)
Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether
must file a petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order
setting a hearing date and directing the order's publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.61
After finding that there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional
Trial Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civi1 register.62
On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and
innocuous mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. 63 It also governs the
correction of substantial errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of this
Rule64 and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a person.65 The
proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the correction pertains to clerical
mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors. 66
As explained in Republic v. Mercadera:67
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as
even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible
to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue
an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings
depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or
citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted .... " "Where such a change is
ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an
erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution."68 (Emphasis
in the original)
Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province. 69 After the hearing, the trial court may grant
or dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar. 70
Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule
108, thus:
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with
Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on
grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a
proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked
therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also
includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule
108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of
clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above,
Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like
citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths
about the facts recorded therein."71 (Citations omitted)
However, Republic Act No. 904872 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively
removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting
them under the jurisdiction of the civil registrar. 73
In Silverio v. Republic:74
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .
....
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.75
(Citations omitted)
In Republic v. Cagandahan: 76
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.77 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In Republic v. Sali:78
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first
name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been
publicly known by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition
is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court. 79 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any
clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames. 80
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.81
Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her
name through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative
petition has been filed and later denied.
In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172.82
In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person
may now be changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these
changes may now be administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical
or typographical mistake in the entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn
affidavit with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being
sought to be corrected or changed is kept.83
Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and
month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations. 84 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on
August 15, 2012-more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on
May 13, 2010.85 Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
II.B
As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the
nature of the correction sought by Gallo.
Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent
contends that it is Rule 108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of clerical
errors.
Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's
Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.
A clerical or typographical error pertains to a
[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records[.] 86
However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered
clerical or typographical. 87
Jurisprudence is replete with cases determining what constitutes a clerical or typographical error
in names with the civil register.
In Republic v. Mercadera, 88 Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) sought to correct her name from
"Marilyn" to "Merlyn." 89 She alleged that "she had been known as MERLYN ever since" and she
prayed that the trial court correct her recorded given name "Marilyn" "to conform to the one she
grew up to."90 The Office of the Solicitor General argued that this change was substantial which
must comply with the procedure under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 91 However, this Court
ruled that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition merely sought to correct a misspelled
given name:
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that
what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn'' is patently a rectification of a name that is
clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a
mix-up that blemished Mercadera's Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest
to correct the same.
The [Court of Appeals] did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was
the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could
remember. 92
Mercadera also cited similar cases in which this Court determined what constitutes harmless
errors that need not go through the proceedings under Rule 103:
Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize
the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio'
which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e'
amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In LabayoRowe v. Republic, it was held that
the change of petitioner's name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo"
was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the
substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name
would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General,
ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from 'Midael
C. Mazon' to 'Michael C. Mazon' cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can
be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).93
(Citations omitted)
Likewise, in Republic v. Sali,94 Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali) sought to correct her Certificate of
Live Birth, alleging that her first name was erroneously entered as "Dorothy" instead of
"Lorena," and her date of birth as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." She alleged that
she had been using the name "Lorena" and the birth date "April 24, 1968" ever since. She also
averred that she had always been known as "Lorena" in her community. She claimed that the
petition was just to correct the error and not to evade any criminal or civil liability, or to affect any
succession of another person. 95
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, argued against Sali's
claim, alleging that the petition was for a change of name under Rule 103 and not for the
correction of a simple clerical error. It averred that there must be a valid ground for the name
change, and the applicant's names and aliases must be stated in the title of the petition and the
order setting it for hearing. It also contended that assuming Rule 108 was the proper remedy,
Sali failed to exhaust her remedies when she did not file an affidavit under Republic Act No.
9048.96
In Sali, this Court held that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition was not for a change of
name, but a petition for correction of errors in the recording of Sali's name and birth date. Sali
had been using the name "Lorena" since birth, and she merely sought to have her records
conform to the name she had been using as her true name. She had no intention of changing
her name altogether. Thus, her prayer for the correction of her misspelled name is not
contemplated by Rule 103.97
In the case at bar, petitioner, raising the same arguments as that in Sali, claims that the change
sought by Gallo is substantial, covered by Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly
entirely different from each other. It argues that "Michael" could not have been the result of a
misspelling of "Michelle."98
On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108, with
the requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly complied. 99
Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name
by which she is commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103.
Gallo is not filing the petition to change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the
misspelling of her name.
Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute. 100
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the
misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially
since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only
pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and
"Michael" may also be vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or
intonations of different people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different
appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all
throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given
name.
However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. 101 The current law,
Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012.102
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048. 103
To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the
correction of clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with
the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil
register, or changes of first name or nickname. Thus:
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 104
Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the
Regional Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar
can the Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case. In Republic v. Sali, 105
Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for
correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which
were committed in the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all
alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical
errors may be set right under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth,
she has been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to
change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first
name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with.
Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect . . .
....
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first
name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been
publicly known by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition
is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court . . .
....
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within
the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been
administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's
first name. 106
Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents
as Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage
as May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No.
9048.
Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. 107
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it
involves any change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.
Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" 108 fall within the coverage
of clerical mistakes not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there
is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction
may be made.
Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before
filing a petition under Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this
was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic
Act No. 9048. 109
This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan: 110

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error.
It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
111
(Citation omitted)
It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries
as to biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a
typographical or clerical error. 112
However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be
considered a substantive matter.
In Cagandahan, 113 this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex
in his or her Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition
under Rule 108.114 In that case, it was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of
an error in recording but a petition for a change of records because the sex change was initiated
by the petitioner. 115
IV
Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before
proceeding to the courts, petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9048.116
On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these
doctrines because it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only
raised these issues before this Court. 117
This Court rules in favor of Gallo.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative
officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her
jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as
these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case
in court. 118
However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
affect the court's jurisdiction.119 Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno: 120
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only
effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action,
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is
deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. 121 (Citation
omitted)
Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal
has jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within
its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion
requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.122
In Republic v. Lacap: 123
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by
the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 124 (Citation omitted)
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to
take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it cannot be waived.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that
failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on
that ground by way of laches.125
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy:126
True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance
of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering
the facts and circumstances of the present case - which shall forthwith be set forth - We are of
the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for
the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation . . .
....
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction ... In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of
the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated- obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court ... And in Littleton vs. Burgess, ... the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative
relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. 127 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised
only as an afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from
doing so.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are
not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel
on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; ( d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; ( e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; G) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo warranto
proceedings . . 128 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was only
raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court,
it is estopped from invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358 is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry
in the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo is GRANTED. This Court directs that the
Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo be corrected as follows:
1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";
2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";
3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";
4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";

5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and
6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONENAssociate Justice
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225 September 6, 2011

(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)
ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi
City, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve the administrative complaint against respondent Acting Presiding Judge Rasad G.
Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8, for Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the
Interest of the Judicial Service.1
The Factual Antecedents
The antecedent facts, gathered from the records, are summarized below.
Civil Case No. 06-29542 is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against the
Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of
Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to several others.
On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for
damages amounting to ₱2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC
decision and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to finality. On January 19, 2009, Entry of
Judgment was made.3
On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution.4 The MSU, however, failed to
comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of
Garnishment on the MSU’s depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City
Branch.5
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf of
MSU.6 The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded
to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and
mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.7 The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC,
Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8,
2009.8 After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from
garnishing ₱2,726,189.90 from MSU’s LBP-Marawi City Branch account.9
On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.10 On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje
moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.11 The respondent Judge thereafter
granted the motion and dismissed the case.12
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of
the Judicial Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC,
by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing ₱2,726,189.90 from MSU’s LBP-Marawi
City Branch account.13
The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan City
RTC.14 He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard and eventually
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.15
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent
Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with
the proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.16 It recommended a fine of ₱40,000.00, noting
that this is the respondent Judge’s second offense.17
The Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter and to require the
parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings/records on file.18
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19, 2010,19 stating that he
learned from reliable sources that the respondent Judge is "basically a good Judge," and "an
admonition will probably suffice as reminder to respondent not to repeat the same mistake in the
future."20 The respondent Judge filed his manifestation on September 28, 2010.21
The Court finds the OCA’s recommendation well-taken.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice:22 no court can interfere by injunction
with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
relief sought by the injunction.23 The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a
court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents,
and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.24
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered
as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.25 A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.26 To hold otherwise would be to
divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.27
Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
In Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano,28 the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for issuing a TRO that
interfered with or frustrated the implementation of an order of another court of co-equal jurisdiction.
In Yau v. The Manila Banking Corporation,29 the Court held that undue interference by one in the
proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law.
In Coronado v. Rojas,30 the judge was found liable for gross ignorance of the law when he proceeded
to enjoin the final and executory decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
on the pretext that the temporary injunction and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed
against the HLURB’s writ of execution, but only against the manner of its execution. The Court noted
that the judge "cannot feign ignorance that the effect of the injunctive writ was to freeze the
enforcement of the writ of execution, thus frustrating the lawful order of the HLURB, a co-equal
body."31
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera,32 the Court penalized two judges for issuing a TRO against the
execution of a demolition order issued by another co-equal court. The Court stressed that "when the
respondents-judges acted on the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they
were acting on matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC,
which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 435-T.
Nonetheless, respondent-judges still opted to interfere with the order of a co-equal and coordinate
court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-
established axiom in adjective law." 33
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing
a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The
remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to
nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution,
under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,34 speaks of and which this Court has operationalized
through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.35
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing
a TRO to temporarily restrain36 Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal
court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of
₱2,726,189.90 from MSU’s account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was
aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-
equal and coordinate court since he even quoted MSU’s allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.37 1avvphi1
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Court’s
deliberations, finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third
person, other than the judgment obligor or his agent;38 a third-party claimant of a property under
execution may file a claim with another court39 which, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may
issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for injunction before the respondent
Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or
exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a
motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any
other court,40 or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari.41 In this case, MSU filed
the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek
recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an
erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses
the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial
and not discretionary.42 As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the
implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure,
to seek redress through a higher judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file its opposition before the
issuing court — Iligan City RTC — which denied this opposition.
That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually dismissing the petition
before him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the respondent Judge can use.43 His lack of
familiarity with the rules in interfering with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence
in the judiciary through his demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan
public that the kind of interference he exhibited can be done, even if only temporarily, i.e., that an
official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted by going to the Marawi City RTC although they are
co-equal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed
course and manifested that the respondent Judge is "basically a good Judge,"44 and should only be
reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judge’s liability. This liability and the commensurate
penalty do not depend on the complainant’s personal opinion but on the facts he alleged and proved,
and on the applicable law and jurisprudence. 1avvphil
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.45
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of
Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more
than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service.
Considering the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court — after prolonged deliberations —
holds that a fine of ₱30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This imposition is an act of leniency as we
can, if we so hold, rule for the maximum fine of ₱40,000.00 or for suspension since this is the
respondent Judge’s second offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance
of the Law and FINED in the amount of ₱30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the
same will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175303 : April 11, 2012]
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN), PETITIONER, VS. EIJI* YANAGISAWA,

RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation, made in open court and
embodied in a court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said property, creates
a right in favor of the person relying thereon. The latter may seek the annulment of
actions that are done in violation of such undertaking. cralaw
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] of the August 1, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944, which held:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 20, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 258, Parañaque
City, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered annulling the Real
Estate Mortgage executed on August 25, 1998 in favor of defendant Pacific Ace Finance
Ltd.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, and Evelyn F. Castañeda

(Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila. [4]
On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located at
Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Parañaque townhouse unit).[5] The Registry of
Deeds for Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to “Evelyn P.
Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen[,] both of legal
age.”[6]
In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn
on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case). The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 96-776, was raffled to Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(Makati RTC). During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary
Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the
properties registered in her name.
At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to
dispose of the properties registered in her name during the pendency of the case, thus
rendering Eiji’s application and motion moot. On the basis of said commitment, the
Makati RTC rendered the following Order dated October 2, 1996:
ORDER
In view of the commitment made in open court by Atty. Lupo Leyva, counsel for the
defendant [Evelyn], together with his client, the defendant in this case, that the
properties registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated
or encumbered in any manner during the pendency of this petition, the Motion for the
Issuance of a Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction
scheduled today is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
The above Order was annotated on the title of the Parañaque townhouse unit or TCT
No. 99791, thus:
Entry No. 8729 – Order – issued by Hon. Josefina Guevara Salonga, Judge, RTC, Branch
149, Makati City, ordering the defendant in Civil Case No. 96-776 – entitled Eiji
Yanagisawa, Plaintiff-versus-Evelyn Castañeda Yanagisawa, that the properties
registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or
encumbered in any manner during the pendency of the petition, the Motion for
the Issuance of a Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby considered moot and academic.
Date of Instrument – October 2, 1996
Date of Inscription – March 17, 1997 – 11:21 a.m. [8] (Emphasis supplied.)
Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific
Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN).[9] To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25, 1998 a
real estate mortgage (REM)[10] in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque townhouse unit
covered by TCT No. 99791. The instrument was submitted to the Register of Deeds of
Parañaque City for annotation on the same date.[11]
At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending
before the CA.[12] The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, [13] and had
ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the Parañaque
townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided between the parties. [14] The Decision of
the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her name.
Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No. 99791. Deeming the mortgage
as a violation of the Makati RTC’s October 2, 1996 Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the
annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and PAFIN. [15] The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0431, was raffled to Branch 258 of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City (Parañaque RTC).
For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order against
Evelyn. It admitted, however, that it did not conduct any verification of the title with
the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City “because x x x Evelyn was a good, friendly and
trusted neighbor.”[16] PAFIN maintained that Eiji has no personality to seek the
annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own real properties located
within the Philippines.[17]
Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order. [18] Evelyn asserted
that she paid for the property with her own funds [19] and that she has exclusive
ownership thereof. [20]
Parañaque Regional Trial Court Decision[21]
The Parañaque RTC determined that the only issue before it is “whether x x x [Eiji] has
a cause of action against the defendants and x x x is entitled to the reliefs prayed for
despite the fact that he is not the registered owner of the property being a Japanese
national.”[22]
The Parañaque RTC explained that Eiji, as a foreign national, cannot possibly own the
mortgaged property. Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding the
defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against them. [23]
Thus, the Parañaque RTC dismissed Eiji’s complaint:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the plaintiff to state a cause of action
against defendants, EVELYN CASTAÑEDA YANAGISAWA and Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.
(PAFIN), this case is DISMISSED.
The counterclaim and cross-claim are likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Eiji appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that the trial court erred in holding that
his inability to own real estate property in the Philippines deprives him of all interest in
the mortgaged property, which was bought with his money. He added that the Makati
RTC has even recognized his contribution in the purchase of the property by its
declaration that he is entitled to half of the proceeds that would be obtained from its
sale.
Eiji also emphasized that Evelyn had made a commitment to him and to the Makati RTC
that she would not dispose of, alienate, or encumber the properties registered in her
name while the case was pending. This commitment incapacitates Evelyn from entering
into the REM contract.
Court of Appeals Decision[25]
The CA found merit in Eiji’s appeal.
The CA noted that the Makati RTC ruled on Eiji’s and Evelyn’s ownership rights over the
properties that were acquired during their marriage, including the Parañaque
townhouse unit. It was determined therein that the registered properties should be
sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof to be divided between Eiji and Evelyn. [26]
Contrary to this ruling, the Parañaque RTC ruled that Eiji has no ownership rights over
the Parañaque townhouse unit in light of the constitutional prohibition on foreign
ownership of lands and that the subject property is Evelyn’s exclusive property. [27]
The appellate court determined that the Parañaque RTC’s Decision was improper
because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of equal jurisdiction, such
as regional trial courts, have no appellate jurisdiction over each other. [28] For this
reason, the CA annulled and set aside the Parañaque RTC’s decision to dismiss Eiji’s
complaint.[29]
The CA then proceeded to resolve Eiji’s complaint. [30] The CA noted that Eiji anchored
his complaint upon Evelyn’s violation of her commitment to the Makati RTC and to Eiji
that she would not dispose of, alienate, or encumber the properties registered in her
name, including the Parañaque townhouse unit. This commitment created a right in
favor of Eiji to rely thereon and a correlative obligation on Evelyn’s part not to
encumber the Parañaque townhouse unit. Since Evelyn’s commitment was annotated
on TCT No. 99791, all those who deal with the said property are charged with notice of
the burdens on the property and its registered owner.[31]
On the basis of Evelyn’s commitment and its annotation on TCT No. 99791, the CA
determined that Eiji has a cause of action to annul the REM contract. Evelyn was aware
of her legal impediment to encumber and dispose of the Parañaque townhouse unit.
Meanwhile, PAFIN displayed a wanton disregard of ordinary prudence when it admitted
not conducting any verification of the title whatsoever. The CA determined that PAFIN
was a mortgagee in bad faith.[32]
Thus, the CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.
The parties to the annulled mortgage filed separate motions for reconsideration on
August 22, 2006,[33] which were both denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in
its November 7, 2006 Resolution.[34]
PAFIN filed this petition for review.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which allegedly affirmed the
Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists that
the CA sustained a violation of the constitution with its declaration that an alien can
have an interest in real property located in the Philippines. [35]
Petitioner also seeks the reinstatement of the Parañaque RTC’s Decision dated April 20,
2003[36] and prays that this Court render a decision that Eiji cannot have ownership
rights over the mortgaged property and that Evelyn enjoys exclusive ownership
thereof. As the sole owner, Evelyn can validly mortgage the same to PAFIN without
need of Eiji’s consent. Corollarily, Eiji has no cause of action to seek the REM’s
annulment.[37]
Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent argues that he has an interest to have the REM annulled on two grounds:
First, Evelyn made a commitment in open court that she will not encumber the
Parañaque townhouse unit during the pendency of the case. Second, the Makati RTC’s
decision declared that he is entitled to share in the proceeds of the Parañaque
townhouse unit.[38]
Respondent also insists that petitioner is in bad faith for entering into the mortgage
contract with Evelyn despite the annotation on TCT No. 99791 that Evelyn committed
herself not to encumber the same.[39]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:[40]
1. Whether a real property in the Philippines can be part of the community property of
a Filipina and her foreigner spouse;
2. Whether a real property registered solely in the name of the Filipina wife is
paraphernal or conjugal;
3. Who is entitled to the real property mentioned above when the marriage is declared
void?
4. Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same
issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between
Eiji and Evelyn owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati
RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been
interfered with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was improper for
the Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties
acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the
resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending[41]appeal before the CA. The doctrine of
judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption
by the Parañaque RTC.[42] By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC
effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and created the
possibility of conflicting decisions. Cojuangco v. Villegas[43] states: “The various
branches of the [regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the
same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate
jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead
to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.” The matter is further
explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that
the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires

jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to
the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that
no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is
applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is
essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance
might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon
such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process. [44]
Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Parañaque RTC to rule on the
ownership issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the
REM.[45]
The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership
of the Parañaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for
seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment
not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order
of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.
It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own real property as their
defense to the suit. They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real
estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this
argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji.
This defense does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the
Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the
annotations entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based
on this defense.
Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate court’s ruling, which held that
Evelyn and PAFIN executed the REM in complete disregard and violation of the October
2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT No. 99791. It did not
dispute the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s capacity to encumber
the Parañaque townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is a mortgagee in bad
faith.
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a
standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who
are not in good faith.[46] The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause
of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions. [47] The following is instructive:
An injunction or restraining order must be obeyed while it remains in full force and
effect until the injunction or restraining order has been set aside, vacated, or modified
by the court which granted it, or until the order or decree awarding it has been
reversed on appeal. The injuction must be obeyed irrespective of the ultimate validity
of the order, and no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be in its
terms.[48]
cralaw
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised
by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

August 1, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179257, November 23, 2015
UNITED ALLOY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. UNITED COCONUT

PLANTERS BANK [UCPB] AND/OR PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION [PDIC], JAKOB VAN DER SLUIS AND ROBERT
T.CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"[T]he dismissal of the principal action x x x [carries] with it the denial, disallowance or
revocation of all reliefs ancillary to the main remedy sought in that action." 1
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 is the August 17, 2007 Decision3 of
the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City Station (CA CDO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67079
dismissing petitioner United Alloy Philippines Corporation's (UniAlloy) Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus filed therewith. In said Petition, UniAlloy sought to nullify
the Orders dated September 134 and 14,5 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 40, Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case No. 2001-219 that dismissed its
Complaint for Annulment and/or Reformation of Contract and Damages with Prayer for
A Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 6 and ordered it
to surrender the possession of the disputed premises to respondent United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB).
Factual Antecedents
UniAlloy is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and

trading on wholesale basis of alloy products, such as ferrochrome, ferrosilicon and
ferromanganese. It has its principal office and business address at Phividec Industrial
Area, Tagaloan, Misamis Oriental. Respondent UCPB, on the other hand, is a banking
corporation while respondent Robert T. Chua (Chua) is one of its Vice-Presidents.
Respondent Jakob Van Der Sluis is a Dutch citizen and was the Chairman of UniAlloy.
Respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation is the assignee-in-interest of
UCPB as regards the loan account of UniAlloy.
On September 10, 1999, UniAlloy and UCPB entered into a Lease Purchase
Agreement7 (LPA) wherein UniAlloy leased from UCPB several parcels of land with a
total area of 156,372 square meters located in Barangay Gracia, Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental,8 The three-year lease commenced on August 1, 1999 to run until July 31,
2002 for a monthly rent: of P756/700.00. The parties stipulated that upon the
expiration of the lease, UniAlloy shall purchase the leased properties for P300 million to
be paid on staggered basis. UniAlloy also obtained loans from UCPB.
On August 27, 2001, however, UniAlloy filed the aforesaid Complaint 9 against
respondents. It claimed that, thru misrepresentation and manipulation, respondent
Jakob Van Der Sluis took foil control of the management and operation of UniAlloy; that
respondents connived with one another to obtain fictitious loans purportedly for
UniAlloy as evidenced by Promissory Note Nos. 8111-00-00110-6, 8111-00-20031-1,
and 8111-01-20005-6 for P6 million, US$10,000.00, and US$320,000.00, respectively;
that UCPB demanded payment of said loans; and, that UCPB unilaterally rescinded the
LPA. UniAlloy prayed that judgment be issued: (i) ordering the annulment and/or
reformation of the three Promissory Notes; (ii) nullifying UCPB's unilateral rescission of
the LPA; (iii) enjoining UCPB from taking possession of the leased premises; and (iv)
ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay nominal and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees of P500,000.00 each. As ancillary relief, UniAlloy prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
On the same day, the Executive Judge of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City issued a 72-
hour TRO directing UCPB to cease and desist from taking possession of the disputed
premises.10 The following day, respondent Jakob Van Der Sluis filed a Motion to Dismiss
and Opposition to the Application for Injunction or TRO 11 on the grounds of improper
venue, forum-shopping,12 litis pendentia, and for being a harassment suit under the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Cases. He argued that the LPA
specifically provides that any legal action aiising therefrom should be brought
exclusively in the proper courts of Makati City. The Complaint did not disclose the
pendency of Civil Case No. 2001-156 entitled "Ernesto Paraiso and United Alloy
Philippines Corporation v. Jakob Van Der Sluis" before Branch 40, as well as CA-G.R. SP
No, 66240 entitled "Jakob Van Der Sluis v. Honorable Epifanio T. Nacaya, et al." He
further averred that what UniAlloy sought to enjoin is already fait accompli.
Respondents UCPB and Chua, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss & Motion to
Recall Temporary Restraining Order.13 In addition to the ground of improper venue,
they raised the issue of lack of authority of the person who verified the Complaint as no
secretary's certificate or a board resolution was attached thereto.
During the hearing on the writ of preliminary injunction on August 30, 2001, the RTC
directed the parties to maintain the status quo by not disturbing the possession of the
present occupants of the properties in question pending resolution of respondents'
motions,
On September 13, 2001, the RTC, acting as Special Commercial Court, issued an
Order14 granting the motions to dismiss and ordering the dismissal of the case on the
grounds of improper venue, forum-shopping and for being a harassment suit. The RTC
held that venue was improperly laid considering that the Promissory Notes sought to be
annulled were issued pursuant to a Credit Agreement which, in turn, stipulates that any
legal action relating thereto shall be initiated exclusively in the proper courts of Makati
City. It also opined that UniAlloy committed forum-shopping for failing to disclose in its
certificate of non-forum-shopping the pendency of Civil Case No, 2001-156 which
involves the same parties, the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances. The cases, as ruled by the RTC, have also identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. The dispositive portion of the September 13, 2001 Order
reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, finding meritorious that the venue is improperly laid and the
complain[an]t engaged in forum-shopping and harassment of defendant Jakob Van der
Sluis, this case is hereby DISMISSED rendering the prayer issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction moot and academic, and ordering plaintiff to turn over
possession of the subject premises of the properties in question at Barangay Gracia,
Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental to defendant United Coconut Planters Bank.
SO ORDERED.15
cralawlawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Upon UCPB's motion, the RTC issued another Order16 dated September 14, 2001
directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its September 13, 2001 Order.
Accordingly, a Writ of Execution17 was issued directing the Sheriff to put UCPB in
possession of the disputed premises. It was satisfied on September 17, 2001. 18 The
employees of UniAlloy were evicted from the leased premises and UCPB's
representatives were placed in possession thereof.
On September 25, 2001, UniAlloy received copies of the RTC Orders. 19 And on October
9, 2001, it filed with the Court of Appeals, Manila Station (CA Manila) its petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67079 attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a
quo in (i) dismissing its petition on the grounds of improper venue, forum-shopping and
harassment, (ii) ordering the turnover of the property in question to UCPB after the
dismissal of the Complaint, and (iii) applying the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-
corporate Controversies.
On October 18,2001, the CA Manila issued a TRO. After hearing, the CA Manila issued a
Resolution20 dated February 18, 2002 granting UniAlloy's ancillary prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting of a bond in the amount of
P300,000.00.
UniAlloy posted the requisite bond.
However, no writ of preliminary injunction was actually issued by the CA Manila

because of this Court's March 18, 2002 Resolution21 in G.R. No. 152238 restraining it
from enforcing its February 18, 2002 Resolution. G.RNo. 152238 is a Petition
for Certiorari initiated by UCPB assailing said Resolution of CA Manila. And, in deference
to this Court, the CA Manila refrained from taking further action in CA-G.R. SP No.
67079 until G.R. No. 152238 was resolved. 22
On January 28, 2005, this Court rendered its Decision23 in G.R. No. 152238 finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in issuing its February 18, 2002
Resolution and, consequently, denying UCPB's petition.
Thereafter, and since this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 152238 attained finality, UniAUoy
filed with the CA Manila a Motion to Issue and Implement Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.24 In the meantime, the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 67079 were forwarded to
CA CDO pursuant to Republic Act No. 8246.25 cralawred
On May 31, 2006, the CA CDO issued a Resolution 26 denying UniAlloy's motion. It found
that UniAUoy had lost its right to remain in possession of the disputed premises
because it defaulted in the payment of lease rentals and it was duly served with a
notice of extrajudicial termination of the LPA. Said court also found that UniAUoy
vacated the leased premises and UCPB was already in actual physical possession
thereof as of August 24, 2001, or three days before UniAUoy filed its complaint with the
RTC. Hence, it could no longer avail of the remedy of preliminary injunction to regain
possession of the disputed premises.
UniAUoy filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 27 which was denied in the CA CDO's
November 29,2006 Resolution.28
On August 17, 2007, the CA CDO issued the assailed Decision denying UniAlloy's
petition and affirming the RTC's questioned Orders. It opined inter alia that UniAUoy
erred in resorting to a Rule 65 petition because its proper recourse should have been to
appeal the questioned Orders of the RTC, viz.: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is plain from the record, though, that Unialloy had lost its right to appeal. The time to
make use of that remedy is gone. It is glaringly obvious that Unialloy resorted to this
extraordinary remedy of certiorari and mandamus as a substitute vehicle for securing a
review and reversal of the questioned order of dismissal which it had, by its own fault,
allowed to lapse into finality. Unfortunately, none of the arguments and issues raised by
Unialloy in its petition can adequately brand the 13 September 2001 Order as void on
its face for being jurisdietionaily flawed, nor mask the fact that it became final and
executory by Unialloy's failure to file an appeal on time. And so, even if the assailed
order of dismissal might arguably not have been entirely free from some errors in
substance, or lapses in procedure or in findings of fact or of law, and which that account
could have been reversed or modified on appeal, the indelible fact, however is that it
was never appealed. It had become final and executory. It is now beyond the power of
this Court to modify it.29
cralawlawlibrary
Hence, this Petition raising the following issues for Our resolution:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals (Cagayan de Oro City) erred, or acted

without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of
discretion arnounting to lack, or excess of jurisdiction in DENYING United
Alloy's Motion to Issue and Implement Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction in this case, DESPITE the earlier resolution dated February 18,
2002 issued by the same Court of Appeals (Manila) of coordinate and co-
equal jurisdiction which granted United Alloy's Motion for Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction upon bond of P300,000.00, and DESPITE this
Honorable Court's decision dated January 28, 2005 in the certiorari case
G.R. No. 152238 filed by UCPB to assail the Court of Appeals's Resolution
of February 18, 2002, which decision sustained the said resolution of
February 18, 2002, and DENIED UCPB's petition in said G.R. No. 152238.
As sub-issue - Whether the Court of Appeals (Cagayan de Oro City)
disregarded the rule that every court must take cognizance of decisions
the Supreme Court has rendered, because they are proper subjects of
mandatory judicial notice. The said decisions more importantly, form part
of the legal system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute
an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law and
shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court
magistrate x x x
2. Whether x x x the Court of Appeals (Cagayan de Qro City) decided this

case in accord with law and the evidence, and so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise
of the supervisory power of this Honorable Court, and to entitle this
petition to allowance and the review sought in this case. 30
cralawlawlibrary
Issue
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether the CA CDO erred in dismissing
UniAlloy's Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. For if the said court did not commit an
error then it would be pointless to determine whether UniAlloy is entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction pursuant to CA Manila's February 18, 2002 Resolution which was
issued as a mere ancillary' remedy in said petition.
Our Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Before delving on the focal issue, the Court shall first pass upon some procedural
matters.
UniAlloy availed of the proper remedy

in assailing the RTC's September 13, 2001
Order dismissing its Complaint
In its Comment,31 UCPB defends the CA CDO in denying due course to UniAlloy's

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. It posits that UniAlloy should have filed with the
RTC a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated September 13, 2001 instead of a Rule 65
petition before the CA, Respondents Jakob Van der Sluis and Chua echo UCPB's
contention that UniAlloy resorted to a wrong mode of remedy and that the dismissal of
its complaint had become final and executory which, in turn, rendered UniAlloy's Rule
65 petition before the CA moot and academic.32
In its Consolidated Reply,33 UniAlloy counter-argues that it filed a Rule 65 petition with

the CA because the remedy of appeal is inadequate as the RTC had already directed the
issuance of a writ of execution and that the RTC Orders are patently illegal.
UniAlloy availed of the correct remedy. Under Section 1 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
the following may be raised as grounds in a motion to dismiss: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions
of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. cralawlawlibrary
Except for cases falling under paragraphs (f), (h), or (i), the dismissal of an action
based on the above-enumerated grounds is without prejudice and does not preclude
the refiling of the same action. And, under Section l(g) of Rule 41, 34 an order dismissing
an action without prejudice is not appealable. The proper remedy therefrom is a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,35 But, if the reason for the dismissal is based on
paragraphs (f), (h), or (i) (i.e., res judicata, prescription, extinguishment of the claim
or demand, and unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds) the dismissal, under
Section 5,36 of Rule 16, is with prejudiceand the remedy of the aggrieved party is to
appeal the order granting the motion to dismiss.
Here, the dismissal of UniAlloy's Complaint was without prejudice. The September 13,
2001 Order of the RTC dismissing UniAlloy's Complaint was based on the grounds of
improper venue, forum-shopping and for being a harassment suit, which do not fall
under paragraphs (f), (h), or (i) of Section 1, Rule 16. Stated differently, none of the
grounds for the dismissal of UniAlloy's Complaint is included in Section 5 of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. Hence, since the dismissal of its Complaint was without prejudice,
the remedy then available to UniAlloy was a Rule 65 petition.
CA CDO did not err in affirming the

dismissal of UniAlloy's Complaint on the
grounds of improper venue, forum-shopping
and for being a harassment suit
The RTC was correct in dismissing UniAlloy's Complaint on the ground of improper
venue. In general, personal actions must be commenced and tried (i) where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, (ii) where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or (III) in the case of a resident defendant where he may
be found, at the election of the plaintiff.37 Nevertheless, the parties may agree in
writing to limit the venue of future actions between them to a specified place. 38
In the case at bench, paragraph 18 of the LPA expressly provides that "[a]ny legal
action arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be brought exclusively in
the proper courts of Makati City, Metro Manila." 39 Hence, UniAlloy should have filed its
complaint before the RTC of Makati City, and not with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.
But to justify its choice of venue, UniAlloy insists that the subject matter of its
Complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-219 is not the LPA, but the fictitious loans that
purportedly matured on April 17, 2001.40
UniAlloy's insistence lacks merit. Its Complaint unequivocally sought to declare "as null
and void the unilateral rescission made by defendant UCPB of its subsisting Lease
Purchase Agreement with [UniAlloy]."41 What UCPB unilaterally rescinded is the LPA and
without it there can be no unilateral rescission to speak of. Hence, the LPA is the
subject matter or at least one of the subject matters of the Complaint. Moreover, and
to paraphrase the aforecited paragraph 18 of the LPA, as long as the controversy arises
out of or is connected therewith, any legal action should be filed exclusively before the
proper courts of Makati City. Thus, even assuming that the LPA is not the main subject
matter, considering that what is being sought to be annulled is an act connected and
inseparably related thereto, the Complaint should have been filed before the proper
courts in Makati City.
With regard forum-shopping, our review of the records of this case revealed that
UniAlloy did not disclose in the Verification/Certification of the Complaint the pendency
of Civil Case No. 2001-156 entitled "Ernesto Paraiso and United Alloy Philippines
Corporation v. Jakob Van Der Sluis." The trial court took judicial notice of its pendency
as said case is also assigned and pending before it. Thus, we adopt the following
unrebutted finding of the RTC: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
These two civil cases have identical causes of action or issues against defendant Jakob
Van Der Sluis for having misrepresented to plaintiff and its stockholders that he can
extend financial assistance in running the operation of the corporation, such that on
April 6, 2001 plaintiff adopted a Stockholders Resolution making defendant Jakob
chairman of the corporation for having the financial capability to provide the financial
needs of plaintiff and willing to finance the operational needs thereof; that a
Memorandum of Agreement was subsequently entered between the parties whereby
defendant Jakob obligated to provide sufficient financial loan to plaintiff to make it
profitable; that Jakob maliciously and willfiilly reneged [on] his financial commitments
to plaintiff prompting the stockholders to call his attention and warned him of avoiding
the said agreement; that defendant who had then complete control of plaintiffs bank
account with defendant UCPB, through fraudulent machinations and manipulations, was
able to maliciously convince David C. Chua to pre-sign several checks; that defendant
Jakob facilitated several huge loans purportedly obtained by plaintiff which defendant
himself could not even account and did not even pay the debts of the corporation but
instead abused and maliciously manipulated plaintiffs account.
Forum-shopping indeed exists in this case, for both actions involve the same
transactions and same essential facts and circumstances as well as identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues, x x x42 cralawlawlibrary
The dismissal of UniAlloy's main

action carries with it the dissolution of
any ancillary relief previously granted
therein.
UniAlloy argues that the CA CDO erred in denying its petition considering that this Court
has already sustained with finality the CA Manila's February 18, 2002 Resolution
granting its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
The contention is non sequitur.
"Provisional remedies [also known as ancillary or auxiliary remedies], are writs and
processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests pending rendition, and for
purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional
because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent
upon the result of the main action."43 One of the provisional remedies provided in the
Rules of Court is preliminary injunction, which may be resorted to by a litigant at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order to compel a party
or a court, agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act or
acts.44 In Bacolod City Water District v. Hon. Labayen, 45 this Court elucidated that the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction persists only until it is dissolved or until the
tepnination of the main action without the court issuing a final injunction, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to

do or refrain from doing a certain act, It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as an incident in the main action.
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may
issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final
injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo
until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved
or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. 46 cralawlawlibrary
Based on the foregoing, it is indubitably clear that the August 17, 2007 Decision of CA
CDO dismissing UniAlloy's Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus effectively superseded
the February 18, 2002 Resolution of the CA Manila granting UniAUoy's ancillary prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It wrote finisnot only to the main
case but also to the ancillary relief of preliminary injunction issued in the main case.
For the same reason, there is no merit in UniAUoy's contention that the RTC grievously
erred in ordering it to turn over the possession of the subject premises to UCPB
considering that the latter never prayed for it. As borne out by the records of the case,
UCPB was already in actual possession of the litigated premises prior to the filing of the
Complaint on August 27, 2001. This conforms with the finding of the CA CDO which
pronounced that "an actual turnover of the premises x x x was really effected on August
24, 2001, prior to the institution of the complaint a quo."47 UniAlloy was able to regain
possession of the disputed premises only by virtue of the RTC's 72-hour TRO. With the
issuance of the RTC's September 13, 2001 Order dismissing the Complaint of UniAlloy,
however, the RTC's 72-hour TRO and August 30, 2001 order to maintain status quo,
which are mere incidents of the main action, lost their efficacy. As discussed above, one
of the inevitable consequences of the dismissal of the main action is the dissolution of
the ancillary relief granted therein. Besides, the RTC issued the status quo order with
the express caveat that the same shall remain in force until it has resolved
respondents' motions to dismiss, which it subsequently granted. Consequently, UniAlloy
has no more bases to remain in possession of the disputed premises. It must,
therefore, restitute whatever it may have possessed by virtue of the dissolved
provisional remedy, even if the opposing party did not pray for it.
The August 17, 2007 Decision neither

violated this Court's January 28, 2005
Decision in G.R. No. 152238 nor contradicted
the CA Manila's February 18, 2002 Resolution.
UniAlloy further argues that in denying its petition, CA CDO contradicted the earlier
Resolution of a coordinate court, the CA Manila, and the January 28, 2005 Decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 152238. It insists that no court can interfere with the judgment,
orders or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
True, under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, "no court can interfere
by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. The rationale for the rule is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case
and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all
other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice,, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment."48 But said doctrine is not applicable to this case. Here, the proceeding in CA
CDO is a continuation of the proceeding conducted in CA Manila. There is only one case
as what was resolved by CA CDO is the same case, CA-G.R. SP No. 67079 earlier filed
with and handled by CA Manila. It was referred to CA CDO pursuant to Republic Act No.
8246 creating three divisions of the CA each in Cebu and Cagayan de Qro. Section 5
thereof provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 5. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all pending cases, except those which have
been submitted for resolution, shall be referred to the proper division of the Court of
Appeals.cralawlawlibrary
In fine, CA CDO did not intrude into an order issued by another co-equal court in a
different case. Rather, it continued to hear the petition until its termination after the CA
Manila referred the same to it by virtue of a law.
The fact that said February 18, 2002 Resolution of CA Manila was affirmed by this Court
in its January 28, 2005 Decision in G.R. No. 152238 is likewise of no moment. Said
Resolution of CA Manila only granted UniAlloy's ancillary prayer for injunctive relief. It
did not touch on the issues of improper venue, forum-shopping, and harassment. Thus,
neither did this Court tackle said issues in its January 28, 2005 Decision. In fact, this
Court cautiously limited its discussions on the propriety of the CA's directive temporarily
restraining the RTC from placing UCPB in possession of the disputed premises and
deliberately reserved to the CA the determination of whether the RTC erred in
dismissing the main case. Thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-219 on the grounds of forum-shopping, improper
venue and harassment - although raised, too, by Unialloy in its Petition before the
Court of Appeals - was not passed upon in the assailed interlocutory CA Resolution. As
a consequence, it would be premature and improper for us to pass upon the RTC's
dismissal of the case. Hence, we shall limit our discussion to the assailed Resolutions
temporarily stopping the trial court's turnover of the litigated property to petitioner. 49
cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 127371 April 25, 2002
PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY, petitioners,

vs.
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC., respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
1 2
23, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36943, "Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Cesar M.
Ybañez, et al." which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 94-186 for injunction.
The antecedents are:
On January 21, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform
Policy for the power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2 of which provides:
"Continue direct connection for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of
Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such time as the appropriate regulatory board
determines that direct connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the
franchise area of the specific utility or cooperative. Determination shall be based in the
utility or cooperatives meeting the standards of financial and technical capability with
satisfactory guarantees of non-prejudice to industry to be set in consultation with NPC and
relevant government agencies and reviewed periodically by the regulatory board." (emphasis
ours)
Pursuant to such Cabinet Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co.
(CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric power to the municipalities of
3
Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of the province of Misamis
Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition entitled "In Re: Petition for
Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector," docketed as ERB Case No. 89-430.
The petition sought the "discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power
Corporation (NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area." 4
The ERB issued a notice of public hearing which was published in the newspapers and posted in the
affected areas. It likewise furnished NAPOCOR and the Board of Investments (BOI) copies of the
petition and directed them to submit their comments.
After hearing, the ERB rendered a decision granting the petition, the dispositive portion reads:
5
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, where the petitioner has been proven to
be capable of distributing power to its industrial consumers and having passed the
secondary considerations with a passing mark of 85%, judgment is hereby rendered granting
relief prayed for. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that all direct connection of industries to
NPC within the franchise area of CEPALCO is no longer necessary. Therefore, all existing
NPC (now NAPOCOR) direct supply of power to industrial consumers within the franchise
area of CEPALCO is hereby ordered to be discontinued. x x x." 6
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, holding that the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of
time and therefore, the assailed decision became final and executory and could no longer be subject
of a petition for review.
1âwphi1.nêt
On a petition for review on certiorari, this Court affirmed the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
7
Judgment was entered on September 22, 1993, thus rendering final the decision of the ERB. 8
To implement the decision in ERB Case No. 89-430, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation
(PSC), petitioner, and advised the latter of its desire "to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken
from NPC (NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred" to CEPALCO. PSC is an entity operating
9
its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate (located in the Municipalities of Tagoloan and
10
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, covered by CEPALCO's franchise). The Estate is managed and
operated by the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA). PSC refused CEPALCO's request, citing its
11
contract for power supply with NAPOCOR effective until July 26, 1996.
To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against
CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17, docketed as Civil Case
No. 94-186. They alleged, inter alia, that there exists no legal basis to cut-off PSC's power supply
with NAPOCOR and substitute the latter with CEPALCO since: (a) there is a subsisting contract
between PSC and NAPOCOR; (b) the ERB decision is not binding on PSC since it was not
impleaded as a party to the case; and (c) PSC is operating within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, a
franchise area of PIA, not CEPALCO, pursuant to Sec. 4 (1) of P.D. 538. Moreover, the execution of
the ERB decision would cause PSC a 2% increase in its electrical bills.
On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of PSC and PIA, thus:
12
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, by preponderance of

evidence, in favor of plaintiffs PSC and PIA and against defendant CEPALCO and the
petition for injunction should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. Accordingly, the defendant
CEPALCO, its agents and/or representative, and all those acting in its behalf, are hereby
ordered to refrain, cease and desist from cutting and disconnecting and/or causing to be cut
and disconnected the direct electric power supply of the plaintiff PSC from the NPC and from
transferring the same to defendant CEPALCO, now and until July 26, 1996, when the
contract between plaintiff PSC and the NPC for direct power supply shall have expired. The
counter-claim filed by defendant CEPALCO is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 13
CEPALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court in its order dated
December 13, 1994. Aggrieved, CEPALCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 23, 1996, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
14
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated April 11, 1994 and the Order dated December 13, 1994 are SET
ASIDE. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is DISSOLVED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 15
PSC and PIA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated December
16
2, 1996. Hence the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for our resolution:
I. THE DECISION OF THE ERB IS CONTRARY TO THE CABINET POLICY REFORM.
II. THE ERB DECISION INVOLVED ADJUDICATION OF RIGHTS TO THE PREJUDICE OF

PETITIONERS PIA AND PSC.
III. THE CABINET POLICY REFORM CANNOT AMEND THE CHARTER OF PIA, PD 538,
AS AMENDED.
IV. PETITIONERS PIA AND PSC WERE NOT NOTIFIED BY CEPALCO OF ITS PETITION
WITH THE ERB.
V. CIVIL CASE NO. 91-383 ENTITLED PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY VS.

CEPALCO BEFORE BRANCH 17, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY REINFORCES THE ISSUE THAT THE ERB DECISION MUST NECESSARILY BE
ENJOINED FROM BEING ENFORCED AGAINST PIA AND PSC.
VI. THE ERB DECISION IS NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY. 17
Petitioners contend that the ERB decision is contrary to the Cabinet Policy Reform since PIA, one of
the relevant government agencies referred to in the Cabinet Memorandum, was not consulted, much
less notified by the ERB before it rendered its decision; that since PIA is not a party in ERB Case
No. 89-430, then the decision therein does not bind it; that P.D. 538 (the charter of PIA) excluded the
municipalities of Tagoloan and Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, from the franchise area of CEPALCO
and transferred the same to PIA; and that the ERB decision is not final and executory since the
same is subject to periodic review under the Cabinet Memorandum.
For its part, respondent CEPALCO maintains that the ERB decision shows that it has met the
requirements of the Cabinet Policy Reforms on financial and technical capability of the utility or
cooperative. Anent petitioners' argument that the ERB decision does not bind them for lack of
personal notice, respondent explains that such notice is not required since the proceedings in the
ERB are in rem. Besides, the only issue in the ERB case is whether or not CEPALCO has met the
standards mandated by the Cabinet Policy Reforms. Lastly, respondent contends that what is
subject to periodic review under the Cabinet Memorandum is only the capability standards.
This is not the first time that a controversy arose involving the franchise of CEPALCO vis-à-vis the
authority of NAPOCOR to supply power directly. In National Power Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that CEPALCO is the lawful provider of the increased power supply to the
18
Philippine Packing Corporation under PD 40 promulgated on November 7, 1972. The Court ruled
19
that distribution of electric power, whether an increase in existing voltage or a new and separate
electric service, shall be undertaken by cooperatives, private utilities (such as CEPALCO), local
governments and other entities duly authorized subject to state regulation.
Subsequently, this Court, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. vs. National Power
Corporation, sustained the decision of the trial court ordering NAPOCOR to permanently desist from
20
continuing the direct supply, sale and delivery of electricity to Ferrochrome Philippines, Inc., an
industry operating its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental,
because it violates the right of CEPALCO under its legislative franchise. The Court stressed that the
statutory authority (PD 395) given to NAPOCOR with respect to sale of energy in bulk directly to
BOI-registered enterprises should always be subordinate to the "total-electrification-of-the-entire-
country-on-an-area-coverage-basis policy" enunciated in P.D. No. 40.
In National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, this Court struck down as irregular the
21
determination by the NAPOCOR on whether or not it should supply power directly to the PIA or the
industries within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate-Misamis Oriental (PIE-MO); and held that such
authority pertains exclusively to the ERB which was transferred to the Department of Energy (DOE)
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7638. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the DOE to
determine whether it is CEPALCO or the NAPOCOR, through the PIA, which should supply electric
power to the industries in the PIE-MO.
In the present case, the only issue for our determination is whether or not injunction lies against the
final and executory judgment of the ERB.
We rule in the negative.
In Bachrach Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
22
pertinently held:
"The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has gained finality,
it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should
interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly
admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render
execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its
execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can
warrant an injunctive relief."
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a

showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or
that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by
the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit
is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments. In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative,
Inc. vs. Torres, we underscored the importance of this principle, thus:
23
"We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative decisions must end
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies.
Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every
step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what had already been terminated
should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not commend itself to sound
public policy."
Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a review
of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where the law
24
provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court, being co-equal with
25
the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-
interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability
in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. 26
Granting that the ERB decision has not attained finality, or that the ERB is not co-equal with the
RTC, still injunction will not lie. As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must
show: (1) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act
against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. In the case at bar, petitioners
27
failed to show any clear legal right which would be violated if the power supply of PSC from the
NAPOCOR is disconnected and transferred to CEPALCO. If it were true that PSC has the exclusive
right to operate and maintain electric light within the municipalities of Tagoloan and Villanueva
pursuant to its charter (PD 538), then this Court would have made such pronouncement in National
Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by
28
this Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the government to private corporations, the
interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee. More importantly, the
29
Constitution prohibits monopoly of franchise. Another significant fact which militates against the
30
claim of PIA is that it previously allowed CEPALCO to distribute electric power to industries
operating within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. This, to our mind, sufficiently indicates PIA's
recognition of CEPALCO's franchise. Indeed, it is unimaginable that an implementation of a long-
standing government policy which had been sustained by this Court can be stalled by an injunctive
31
writ.
Likewise, petitioners' assertion that the ERB decision contradicts the Cabinet Reform Policy is
misplaced. On the contrary, we find the decision to be in accord with the policy that direct connection
with the NAPOCOR is no longer necessary when a cooperative or utility, such as CEPALCO,
operating within a franchise proves to be capable of distributing power to the industries therein. In
this regard, it is apt to reiterate the pronouncement of this Court in Cagayan Electric Power and Light
Company, Inc. vs. National Power Corporation: 32
"It is likewise worthy of note that the defunct Power Development Council, in implementing
P.D. 395, promulgated on January 28, 1977 PDC Resolution No. 77-01-02, which in part
reads:
'1) At any given service area, priority should be given to the authorized

cooperative or franchise holder in the right to supply the power requirement of
existing or prospective industrial enterprises (whether BOI-registered or not) that
are located or plan to locate within the franchise area or coop service area as shall
be determined by the Board of Power or National Electrification Administration
whichever the case may be.'
The statutory authority given to respondent-appellant NPC in respect of sales of

energy in bulk direct to BOI registered enterprises should always be subordinate to
the "total-electrification-of-the-entire-country-on-an-area-coverage-basis policy"
enunciated in P.D. No. 40. Thus, in NPC vs. CEPALCO, supra, this Court held:
'x x x The law on the matter is clear. PD 40 promulgated on 7 November 1973

expressly provides that the generation of electric power shall be undertaken solely by
the NPC. However, Section 3 of the same decree also provides that the distribution
of electric power shall be undertaken by cooperatives, private utilities (such as
CEPALCO), local governments and other entities duly authorized, subject to state
regulation. x x x.'" (emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 36943 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 203371, June 30, 2020 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CHARLIE MINTAS FELIX, A.K.A. SHIRLEY
MINTAS FELIX, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 94253:
1. Decision2 dated April 23, 2012 affirming the grant of respondent's petition for correction of
entries and the trial court's directive for cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate;
2. Resolution3 dated August 30, 2012 denying the Republic's motion for reconsideration.
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
In his Petition for Correction of Entries4 dated July 30, 2007, respondent Charlie Mintas a.k.a.
Shirley Mintas Felix essentially alleged that he was born on October 1, 1976 in Itogon, Benguet. his
birth was registered with the Local Civil Registrar (LCR)-Itogin, Benguet where his birth certificate
bore the following erroneous entries: his first name "Shirley" instead of "Charlie," his gender "female"
instead of "male," and his father's surname "Filex" instead of "Felix". but he has another birth
certificate carried the correct entries" his first name as Charlie, his gender as male, and his father's
surname as "Felix".
In all his subsequent official transactions, he used the birth certificate registered with LCR-
Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija. But when he subsequently requested for authenticated copy of his birth
certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), what it officially released to him was the
erroneous birth certificate with LCR-Itogon, Benguet.5
He, thus, prayed for correction of his birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and cancellation
of his second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.6
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicior General (OSG), prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on ground that the RTC-La Trinidad, Benguet did not have jurisdiction over
the LCR-Carranglan, nueva Ecija which ought to implement the directive for cancellation of
respondent's second birth certificate,7 should be the same be granted by the trial court.
Following compliance with the requisite publication, notices and posting, the case was heard on the
merits. Respondent testified on his petition and offered his two (2) certificates of birth and other
documents including the corresponding medical certificate and scrotal ultrasound result indicating
that respondent is male.
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision8 dated July 23, 2009, the trial court granted the petition, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, there being satisfactory proof that the Order setting the case for hearing was duly
published as directed; that the allegations of the petition are true and correct and that it is appearing
that there is proper and valid cause for the grant of the relief prayed for.
IT IS HEREBY DECREED that for all legal intents and purposes, the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Itogon, Benguet
are ordered to change and correct from its records the following entries in the Certificate of Live Birth
of Charlie Mintas Felix, viz:
1. His sex/gender from female to MALE;
2. His first name from Shirley to CHARLIE; and
3. His father's surname from Filex to FELIX.
Furthermore, the Local Civil Registrar of Carranglan, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to cancel from
its record the registration of the facts of birth of Charlie Mintas Felix.
Furnish copy of this Decision to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Itogon, Benguet to correct
its record and to issue an amended Birth Certificate to said Charlie Mintas Felix upon his request
after payment of the required fees.
Further, furnish copies hereof to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati city; the Provincial
Prosecutor of Benguet; the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office,
Manila; the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet; the petitioner and his counsel.
SO ORDERED.9
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Republic assailed the trial court for taking cognizance of the case, albeit, it had no
jurisdiction to order the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's second birth
registration therewith.10
Respondent, nonetheless, countered that to require him to file another petition to cancel his second
birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija was unnecessary and would only result in the
further clogging of the court docket.11
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
By Decision12 dated April 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It ruled that the RTC-La Trinidad,
Benguet had jurisdiction over the petition for correction of entries in respondent's first birth certificate
with the LRC- Itogon, Benguet. The consequent cancellation of his second birth certificate with the
LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija was merely incidental to and a necessary consequence of his action
for correction of entries.13
The Court of Appeals further held that the correction of respondent's NSO officially recognized birth
certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and the consequent cancellation of respondent's second
birth certificate with LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija may be joined in the same case for correction of
entries. Splitting them violated the rule against multiplicity of suits.14
The Republic's motion for reconsideration was denied through Resolution dated August 30, 2012.15
The Present Petition
The Republic now urges the Court to exercise its discretionary appellate jurisdiction to review and
reverse the dispositions of the Court of Appeals.
The Republic repleads its argument that the RTC-La Trinidad, Benguet has no jurisdiction over the
LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, hence, could not have validly ordered the latter to cancel
respondent's second birth certificate. According to the Republic, just because the second registration
appears to be a mere surplus age does not cure the jurisdictional infirmity which incipiently tainted
the proceedings below.16
In refutation, respondent reiterates that the joinder of both actions for correction and cancellation of
entries in respondent's birth certificates conformed with the rule against multiplicity of suits.17
Issues
First. Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it rejected the Republic's challenge
against the trial court's jurisdiction to direct the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's
second birth certificate as a consequence of its order to correct respondent's first birth certificate?
Second. Did Republic Act No. 9048 (RA 9048) as amended by Republic Act No. 10172 (RA 10172)
divest the regional trial courts of jurisdiction over petitions for correction of entries in the civil
registry?
Ruling
The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial court's jurisdiction to order the LCR-Carranglan,
Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's second birth certificate.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom and
connected therewith under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
Here, the trial court has jurisdiction over respondent's petition for correction of entries in his first birth
certificate on file with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet. The trial court has jurisdiction, as well, to direct the
cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija as an
incident or as a necessary consequence of the action to correct the entries sought by respondent.
Indeed, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may
thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not he
within its cognizance.18
Mendez vs. Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District, et al.19 is in point:
To rule that the ShCC is without jurisdiction to resolve issues on custody after it had decided on the
issue of divorce, simply because it appears to contravene Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083, would be
antithetical to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. "While a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of
prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it,
and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope
of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. Hence, demands, matters
or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is
in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to
consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance."
Following the doctrine, the ShCC, in cases involving divorce, possesses the power to resolve the
issue of custody, it being a related issue to the main cause of action.
xxx xxx xxx
A distinction must be made between a case for divorce wherein the issue of custody is an ancillary
issue and a case where custody is the main issue. Jurisdiction in the former, as discussed above,
lies with the ShCC, as the main cause of action is divorce. The latter on the other hand, where the
main cause of action is one of custody, the same must be filed with the ShDC, pursuant to Article
143 of P.D. No. 1083.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly affirmed the trial court's directive to cancel respondent's
second birth certificate on file with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, as a consequence of the main
relief sought by and granted to respondent. To file two (2) separate petitions, one for correction of
entries in his first birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and two, for cancellation of his
second birth certificate with LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija --- will certainly violate the rule against
multiplicity of suits.
More important, a petition for correction is an action in rem. A decision therein binds not only the
parties themselves but the whole world, as well. An in rem proceeding entails publication as a
jurisdictional requirement--- to give notice to and bring the whole world as a party into the case.
Surely, the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija is part of the world and based on the records, was in fact
duly notified of the petition. Consequently, it is bound by the judgment rendered there in the case.
RA 9048, as amended does not divest
the regional trial courts of jurisdiction
over petitions for correction of entries
in the civil registry.
Relevant to the issue of jurisdiction, the Court now brings to fore what seems to be an overlap of
jurisdictions over petitions for correction of entries under Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP
129) in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, on one hand, and RA Nos. 9048 as
amended by 10172 on the other.
Sec. 19 of BP 129 provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
Deemed included therein are petitions for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court, being themselves incapable of pecuniary estimation. Rule 108 states:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Section 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
Section 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Section 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Section 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the proceeding is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of
the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Section 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment
shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
On April 22, 2001, RA 904820 took effect, thus:
Nickname - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
x x x x x x x x x
Section 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. - Any person having direct and personal interest in
the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname
in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.
x x x x x x x x x
On August 15, 2012, R.A. No. 9048 was amended by R.A. No. 1017221 expanding the scope of the
entries in the civil registry which may be administratively corrected, viz:
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9048, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the
date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical
error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations." (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
Here, respondent resorted to judicial proceedings when he sought the correction of the entries in his
birth certificate. For while RA 9048 allowed the administrative correction of respondent's first name
and the typographical error in his father's surname, it did not allow correction of the entry pertaining
to respondent's biological sex.
For it was only on October 24, 2012 that the amendatory law RA 10172 took effect long before
respondent initiated his petition with the court. Had RA 10172 taken effect on or before he initiated
his petition, he could have resorted to the administrative process under these twin laws just for the
purpose of correcting all at once the three (3) entries in his birth certificate.
He could have then saved a substantial amount of time and expense which precisely what RA Nos.
9048 and 10172 seek to accomplish, among others.
But then again, respondent's petition came before RA 10172 took effect, this time allowing correction
of erroneous entries pertaining to one's biological sex. Surely, to pursue the administrative
procedure prescribed under RA 9048 with respect to his first name and typographical error in his
father's name and a judicial procedure under Rule 108 with respect to the correction of his biological
sex is anathema to the proscription against splitting a cause of action under Section 4, Rule 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court, thus:
Section 4, Rule 2. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of — If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
The next question is - Does RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 divest the regional trial courts of its
jurisdiction over petitions for correction of entries under BP 129 in relation Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court?
Republic v. Gallo22 bears the answer, viz:
Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional
Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province. After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the
petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.
x x x x x x x x x
However, Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively
removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them
under the jurisdiction of the civil register.
x x x x x x x x x
Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name
through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has
been filed and later denied.
x x x x x x x x x
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer
concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction.
Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer
to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court.
However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
court's jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:23
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect
of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a
ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and
the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, even with the advent of RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 prescribing the administrative
remedy for correction of entries with the civil registry, the regional trial courts are not divested of their
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for correction of entries "Even the failure to observe the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court."24
So must it be.
Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated April 23, 2012 and Resolution dated
August 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 94253 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON,
ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN
TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by
their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the
deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous
relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this
relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September
3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and
Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein
petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children" as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to
wit:
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein
plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as
well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family

rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status

of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with
the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above
outlined.2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate
children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate

daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the
estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00
as atty's fee;
8. Cost against the defendants. 3

Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive
Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in
the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that
it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by
herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in
a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by
the respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY

NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE
APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY

PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION.
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO

PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND
THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE
CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE
STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL
CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY THE
CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR

PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN
APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST. 4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under
Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the
manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on
August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the
ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article
172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of
illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any
exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during
the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and
her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their
presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as
provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case
pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested of acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the
application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private
respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. "The
Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to
determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the
answer for each and every question that may arise in the future." 5
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as "Claim for
6
Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the
"open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action
of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the
regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein
adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in
7
the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant
case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested
with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying
the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's
cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia
Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to
the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article
175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as
the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent
to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact
that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion
then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when
the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it
was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the
trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost
jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of
the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil
cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,
1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 206728, November 12, 2014
APO CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MINGSON MINING INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 13, 2012
and the Resolution3dated April 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
100456 which affirmed the Decision4dated July 31, 2007 of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) in MAB
Case No. 02-96 (POA Case No. CEB-001).
The Facts
The instant case arose from a dispute involving the mining claims known as “Allied 1
and 2” and “Lapulapu 31 and 32” (subject mining claims) between petitioner Apo
Cement Corporation (Apocemco) and respondent Mingson Mining Industries Corporation
(Mingson).5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For the supposed failure of the old locators to develop and put to productive use the
mineral properties found in the area, Apocemco submitted a Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) proposal on June 19, 1991 before the DENR, 6 essentially seeking to
take over their current holder, Luvimin Cebu Mining Corporation (Luvimin). 7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 18, 19928 and March 2, 1993,9 the DENR - Central Visayas, Region 7 Office
(DENR Regional Office) declared the subject mining claims, among others, abandoned
and open for location to other interested parties,10 prompting Luvimin to file an
appeal.11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Similarly, Mingson assailed the aforementioned declarations on the ground that its own
mining claims, i.e., “Yellow Eagle I to VII,” overlapped with the subject mining claims.
Particularly, Mingson averred that its “Yellow Eagle IV” claim was registered on
February 7, 1983 and was found to have overlapped with the “Allied 1 and 2” claims,
while its “Yellow Eagle III” claim was registered on April 12, 1982 and overlapped with
the “Lapulapu 31 and 32” claims.12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The DENR Proceedings
In an Order13 dated March 1, 1995, the DENR Regional Office decreed that portions of
the subject mining claims be awarded to Mingson, considering that said claims have
encroached its Yellow Eagle I to VII claims.
However, upon Apocemco’s motion for reconsideration,14 the DENR Regional Office’s

Legal Division issued a Resolution15 dated September 5, 1995, recommending that the
subject mining claims be awarded, instead, to Apocemco, subject, however, to the
outcome of Luvimin’s appeal. In an Order16 dated September 20, 1995, the DENR
Regional Director affirmed the foregoing resolution, but subject to the review and
concurrence of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 - Panel of Arbitrators
(POA), considering that pursuant to Section 21817of DENR Department Administrative
Order No. (DAO) 95-23, Series of 1995,18 the POA has been mandated to resolve,
among others, disputes involving rights to mining areas.
In a Decision19 dated May 3, 1996, the POA upheld the September 5, 1995 Resolution
and the September 20, 1995 Order, reiterating the findings therein made, without,
however, requiring the parties to file any pleading or setting the matter for hearing.
Aggrieved, Mingson appealed20 the POA’s Decision before the DENR MAB, averring that
the said Decision was not supported by facts and the evidence on record, and that it
was arbitrary and issued with grave abuse of authority. 21 Subsequently, in Mingson’s
letter22 dated August 8, 1996, it claimed denial of due process.
In a Decision23 dated July 31, 2007, the DENR MAB granted Mingson’s appeal and
thereby reversed and set aside the POA’s Decision. It found that the POA merely
conducted a review of the case and Mingson, in particular, was not given an opportunity
to be heard, which is repugnant to due process.24 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, Apocemco elevated the matter to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated June 13, 2012, the CA dismissed Apocemco’s appeal and
cralawred
sustained the DENR MAB’s finding that Mingson was not afforded by the POA its right to
due process, given that none of the applicable procedures found in DENR DAO 95-23
were followed.26 As an added ground for dismissal, the CA held that Apocemco failed to
perfect its appeal in accordance with the Rules of Court, considering that the DENR MAB
was not served a copy of its petition.27 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Unconvinced, Apocemco filed a motion for reconsideration 28 which was, however,

denied in a Resolution29dated April 23, 2013, hence, the petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ordered the
dismissal of Apocemco’s appeal.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sections 22330 (on preliminary conference), 22431 (on hearing), and 22732 (on the

proceedings before the POA), as well as Sections 221 33 (on due course) and 22234 (on
answers) of DENR DAO 95-23, or the Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995,35 clearly require that the parties involved in mining disputes be given the
opportunity to be heard. These rules – which were already in effect 36 during the time
the dispute between the parties arose – flesh out the core requirement of due process;
thus, a stark and unjustified contravention of the same would oust the errant tribunal of
its jurisdiction and, in effect, render its decision null and void. As explained in PO2
Montoya v. Police Director Varilla:37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.38 (Emphases supplied)
Here, it has been established that the POA proceeded to resolve the present mining
dispute without affording either party any fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard
in violation of the aforementioned provisions of DENR DAO 95-23. Thus, as correctly
ruled by the DENR MAB and later affirmed by the CA, Mingson’s due process rights were
violated, thereby rendering the POA’s Decision null and void.
In this relation, the Court finds it apt to clarify that the DENR MAB did not err in taking
cognizance of the due process issue. While such issue was not assigned as an error in
Mingson’s Appeal39 dated July 27, 1996, the same was squarely raised in Mingson’s
August 8, 1996 letter40 to the DENR MAB. Given the lack of any formal procedure on
appeals at that time,41 the DENR MAB cannot be faulted for considering the letter and
the issues raised therein as part of Mingson’s appeal. It must be added that the DENR
MAB is not a court of law but an administrative body; hence, it is not bound by strict
rules of procedure and evidence, and is allowed to use all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively without resort to technical
rules,42 as in this case.
Besides, an apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any time since
due process is a jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether administrative or
judicial, are duty bound to observe. In Salva v. Valle,43 the Court pronounced that “[a]
decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime
directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in
any action or proceeding where it is invoked.” The Court sees no defensible reason as
to why this principle should not be herein applied.
That being said, and considering too Apocemco’s failure to comply with Sections 5 and
7, 44 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in the proceedings before the appellate court, the
instant petition is hereby denied and the rulings of the CA are affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 13, 2012 and the
Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100456 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this
Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may
be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as
there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that
Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain,
whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present
Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all
probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward
while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has
transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect
that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to
wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal
of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a
copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution
expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No.
7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and
the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging
the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law."
The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of
judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives;
(2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not
lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that
the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and
considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not
incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic
review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601,
where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and
regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999
merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and
Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to
intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by
the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its
jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.
Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in
accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there
should be a place to begin litigation." To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its
1
final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of
this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of
Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled

case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to
declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as
unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section
17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to
provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the
Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict
and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and
implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is
hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
Clerk
of
Court
By:
(SGD)
TERES
ITA G.
DIMAI
SIP
Acting
Chief
Judicial
Record
s Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable
Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the
Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On
October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has
caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the
Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable
mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced
and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary
to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows:
2
x x x x x x x x x
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the
case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the
3
jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify
or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for
the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment
becomes final. . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances
4
may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed
out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of
Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, viz:
6
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review
the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment
has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it
does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference
to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then
passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are
certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no
power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty
and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It
is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can
be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by
discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms
that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the
case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways
is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court)
has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended,
if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be
addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has
jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be
the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
7
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and
adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its
processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section 6 of
8
Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court
restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its
fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. 1âwphi1.nêt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no
jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the
judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the
jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court
promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out
the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts
have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution
of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases.
Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance
its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity,
courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
9
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section
13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
10
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a
11
passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and
71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment
— a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
12
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
x x x x x x x x x
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,

and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which,
however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the
Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen
the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has
no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which
it has exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to
control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our
Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November
6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of
this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable
Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the
Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death
convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the
execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide
the appropriate relief" state:
x x x x x x x x x
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation

however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation
and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date
of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information
necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders
nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's
right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable
Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein

respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his
power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections
pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative
Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the
Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to
it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are
faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information

about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the
President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at
all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot
grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day
certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a
precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at
this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat
the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when
the date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that
designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the

date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates
Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may beprovided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the

State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies

"the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed
(Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id.,
at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded
which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized
that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the
right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision
of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner
Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his
client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel
for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more
jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by
the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998.
There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from
contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court
does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function." Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19,
14
Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public
respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also
provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has
been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in
the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction
cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally
15
assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence
upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." The suspension of such a death sentence is
16
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In
the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing
the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute
final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been
enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President
to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal
and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its
proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by
vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at
about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4,
the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive
clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator
Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital
punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of
the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment,
and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding
review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would
only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the
Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent
17
Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be
executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's
allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere
speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that
petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print
and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and
has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still
unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death
Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's
minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify
petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not
rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional
duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal
or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was
compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the
petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the
Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt
it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was
believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the
life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization
of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents,
thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that
Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as
follows:
x x x x x x x x x
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing
the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the
law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and
that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of
the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the
reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of
the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all
means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was
signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended
up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative
with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House
Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review
Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify
the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian
purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital
punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as
men believe in punishment." In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked,
19
the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by
emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of
epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse
of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty
of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice
Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of
Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities." Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where
20
justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of
rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is
the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass
their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining
Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in
accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 141375 - April 30, 2003
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M.

NAPARI,Petitioner, vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC, Represented
by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary

disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, it follows that
regional trial courts have the power and the authority to hear and determine such
controversy.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to

annul the October 29, 1999 Order2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc
City (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 3722-O. The decretal portion of the assailed Order
reads as follows:
"For the foregoing considerations, this Court is not inclined to approve and grant the
motion to dismiss[,] although the municipality has all the right to bring the matter or
issue to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari purely on question of law." 3
The Facts
A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc.
By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint session
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Kananga on October 31, 1997.
No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint session issued
Resolution No. 97-01, which in part reads:
"x x x IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED x x x to pass a resolution certifying that both the

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga, Leyte
have failed to settle amicably their boundary dispute and have agreed to elevate the
same to the proper court for settlement by any of the interested party (sic)." 4
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City
(Branch 35) on September 2, 1999, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 3722-O.
On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
"(1) That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
"(2) That there is no cause of action; and
"(3) That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been complied with[.]" 5
Ruling of the Trial Court
In denying the Municipality of Kanangas Motion to Dismiss, the RTC held that it had
jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that
Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with,
because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences.
In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It
also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree
upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Not satisfied with the denial of its Motion, the Municipality of Kananga filed this
Petition.6
Issue
In their respective Memoranda, both parties raise the lone issue of whether respondent
court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute
between a municipality and an independent component city.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the authority to hear and
determine a cause.7 It is a question of law.8 As consistently ruled by this Court,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. 9 Because it is "a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court." 10
Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), 11 which provides:
"Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary

disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably. To this end:
"(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
"(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
"(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different

provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces
concerned.
"(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and
a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
"(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60)
days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that
effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above."
Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or
a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -- or between
two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No.
542.12 By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such.
However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city created
under Republic Act No. 179.13 Section 89 thereof reads:
"Sec. 89. Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the
Province of Leyte. The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled
to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial
board of the Province of Leyte."
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized.
Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the
province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in
Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643,14 which calls for a plebiscite; and the
Omnibus Election Code,15 which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang
Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an
allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted
in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city. 16
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a

municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an
independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply
to them.
Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable settlement was reached.
A resolution to that effect was issued, and the sanggunians of both local government
units mutually agreed to bring the dispute to the RTC for adjudication. The question
now is: Does the regional trial court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim?
We rule in the affirmative.
As previously stated, "jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived

by the parties."17 It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the
consent of the parties or by estoppel.18 It should not be confused with venue.
Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the
general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is
found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,19 otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. 20 Section 19(6) of this law
provides:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxx-xxx-xxx
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions[."
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over
the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to
adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
powers.21 They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted
for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts
at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 we held that boundary disputes should be

resolved with fairness and certainty. We ruled as follows:
"The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. x
x x."
Indeed, unresolved boundary disputes have sown costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers and prejudiced the peoples welfare. Precisely because of these
disputes, the Philippine National Oil Company has withheld the share in the proceeds
from the development and the utilization of natural wealth, as provided for in Section
289 of the LGC.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED. No

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108072. December 12, 1995.]
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the

Visayas, Petitioner, v. HON. MERCEDES GOZODADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch
XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M.
OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE and Mandaue City
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The determination of whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, 1
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his country to
conduct administrative investigation over local elective officials by virtue of the
subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, 2 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, is the pivotal issue before the court in this petition.
The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October
1992, issued against petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court
from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14. 3
Parenthetically, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo Mojica assumed the office of
Juan Hagad, now resigned, 4 who took the initiative in instituting this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition.
The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on
22 July 1992, against herein respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno
Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of
Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were
charged with having violated R.A No. 3019, as amended; 5 Articles 170 6 and 171 7 of
the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713. 8 Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred
that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or
falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein
from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were separately docketed as Criminal
Case No. OMB-VIS-92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.
A day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was
executed by Mandaue City Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in support of
the accusations against respondent officials. The next day, petitioner ordered
respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue
City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days
from receipt of the order Forthwith, Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the
preventive suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative
case.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05
August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the
administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against
said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been
vested with the Office of the President. In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992,
Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not have
repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution
granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials
and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under
the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties were directed
by the Deputy Ombudsman to file their respective memoranda.
In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against an
elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city
and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there
was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman
superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments.
In an Order, 9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied
the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent
officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would
have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. 10 Respondent officials were formally
placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order
11 of 21 September 1992.
On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning
officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restraining order directed at
petitioner, enjoining him." . . from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order
of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015." cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail The court a quo, on 15
October 1992, denied the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, holding thusly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"So by following and applying the well-established rules of statutory construction that
endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of these two laws in order that
each shall be effective, it is the finding of this Court that since the investigatory power
of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague and gives wider discretion to
disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions against a responsible public
official or employee while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code
provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon which a local elective official
can be subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it could be considered that
the latter law could be an exception to the authority and administrative power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an investigation against local elective officials and as such, the
jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against local elective officials is
already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160.
"x x x
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) Expanding the restraining order dated September 25, 1992 issued by the Court into
an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of the
petitioners of the bond in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) conditioned
that the latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and/or
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court will finally
adjudge that the petitioners are not entitled thereto; and
"2) Denying the respondent’s Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack of
merit.
"SO ORDERED." 12

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 21 October 1992. 13 A motion for
reconsideration made by petitioner was denied by the trial court.
The instant recourse seeks the nullification of the order of 15 October 1992 and the writ
of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 both issued by the trial court and prays
that respondent judge be directed to desist from further proceeding with RTC Case No.
MDE-14.
There is merit in the petition.
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1,) Article
XI, of the 1987 Constitution, 14 thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;"
while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section

19 of R.A. No. 6770 that reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in

accordance with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification." cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority Exceptions. — The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions. instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress and the Judiciary." (Emphasis supplied)
Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that
the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive
suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. Said section of
the law provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
"The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided." cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the
subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority
to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section 60 15 thereof, on various
offices In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and
highly urbanized cities the Code states: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified complaint against
any erring local elective officials shall be prepared as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code,
preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is
an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component
city; . . ." under sub-paragraph (b) thereof: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence; Provided, That any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall
not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several
administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively
suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension." cralaw virtua1aw library
In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the
case would be a matter of national concern, the Solicitor- General has viewed the Local
Government Code of 1991 as having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the
Office of the President (and the various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local
elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the
Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional
mandate. In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy
that should have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before
this Court rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The
two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well
settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts
must generally assume their congruent application. 17 The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, 18 and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn. 19 The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare legibus esf optimus interpretendi, i e, every statute must be so interpreted
and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
20 The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. 21 Hence, all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, 22 and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 23
Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that
underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate
said office from the long tentacles of officialdom." 24
Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run
almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and
Section 63 of the precursor Local Government Code of 1983, 25 under the heading of
"Suspension and Removal," read: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. — Verified complaints against local elective
officials shall be prepared as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local
Government." cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Minister of Local Government if the respondent is an provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or
municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
"(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act
or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of
the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days
after the start of said suspension.
"(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its
termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault,
neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension." cralaw virtua1aw library
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive

suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the
enactment of R.A No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent
of the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), in fine, did
not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the
substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay
under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day
preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even
now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify
the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the
evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee
should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent’s continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The
Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials,
whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in
imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in
the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the
issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe
that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of
culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of

discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any
hearing.
The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of
preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on
the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in
compliance with the directive of petitioner Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held
that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on
an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges
are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of
guilt or innocence. In the early case of Nera v. Garcia, 26 reiterated in subsequent
cases, 27 we have said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or
penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after
such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity
to prove his innocence." cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only
after petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 28
that the evidence of guilt was strong. Petitioner gave his justification for the preventive
suspension in this wise: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at this stage,
it is the holding of this office that the evidence of guilt against the respondents in the
instant case is strong. There is no question that the charge against the respondents
involves dishonesty or gross misconduct which would warrant their removal from the
service and there is no gainsaying the fact that the charge for falsification of veritable
documents like city ordinances are very serious charges that affect the very foundations
of duly established representative governments Finally, it is likewise the holding of this
office at this stage that the continued stay in office of respondents may prejudice the
judicious investigation and resolution of the instant case." 29
Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General that respondent
officials’ petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of
petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained
by the trial court. The proscription in Section 14 of R A. No. 6770 reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
"No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." cralaw virtua1aw library
Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this
Court on matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases
originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . .
"In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court." (Emphasis supplied)
All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly,
grant the petition.
WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 162420 April 22, 2008
JAGUAR SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO A. SALES, JAIME L. MORON, MELVIN R. TAMAYO, JESUS B. SILVA, JR., DIONISIO
C. CARANYAGAN, DANETH FETALVERO and DELTA MILLING INDUSTRIES,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated
October 21, 2002 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2004, dismissing the petition filed by Jaguar
Security and Investigation Agency (petitioner) and affirming the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Resolutions dated September 19, 2000 and November 9, 2001.
The facts of the case, as narrated by the CA, are undisputed:

Petitioner Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency ("Jaguar") is a private corporation
engaged in the business of providing security services to its clients, one of whom is Delta
Milling Industries, Inc. ("Delta").
Private respondents Rodolfo Sales, Melvin Tamayo, Dionisio Caranyagan, Jesus Silva, Jr.,
Jaime Moron and Daneth Fetalvero were hired as security guards by Jaguar. They were
assigned at the premises of Delta in Libis, Quezon City. Caranyagan and Tamayo were
terminated by Jaguar on May 26, 1998 and August 21, 1998, respectively. Allegedly their
dismissals were arbitrary and illegal. Sales, Moron, Fetalvero and Silva remained with
Jaguar. All the guard-employees, claim for monetary benefits such as underpayment,
overtime pay, rest day and holiday premium pay, underpaid 13th month pay, night shift
differential, five days service and incentive leave pay. In addition to these money claims,
Caranyagan and Tamayo argue that they were entitled to separation pay and back wages,
for the time they were illegally dismissed until finality of the decision. Furthermore, all
respondents claim for moral and exemplary damages.
On September 18, 1998, respondent security guards instituted the instant labor case before
the labor arbiter.
xxxx
On May 25, 1999, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondents Sales,
et al., the dispositive portion of which provides:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the charges of illegal

dismissal on the part of the complainants MELVIN R. TAMAYO and DIONISIO C.
CARANYAGAN for lack of merit but ordering respondents JAGUAR SECURITY AND
INVESTIGATION AGENCY and DELTA MILLING INDUSTRIES, INC., to jointly and
severally pay all the six complainants, namely: RODOLFO A. SALES, MELVIN R.
TAMAYO, JAIME MORON and DANETH FETALVERO the following money claims
for their services rendered from April 24, 1995 to April 24, 1998:
a) wage differentials
b) overtime pay differentials (4 hours a day)
c) rest day pay
d) holiday pay
e) holiday premium pay
f) 13th month pay differentials
g) five days service incentive leave pay per year subject to the exception earlier
cited.
The Research and Information Unit of this Commission is hereby directed to compute
and quantify the above awards and submit a report thereon within 15 days from
receipt of this decision.
For purposes of any appeal, the appeal bond is tentatively set at P100,000.00.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Jaguar filed a partial appeal questioning the failure of public
respondent NLRC to resolve its cross-claim against Delta as the party ultimately liable for
payment of the monetary award to the security guards.
In its Resolution dated September 19, 2000, the NLRC dismissed the appeal, holding that it
was not the proper forum to raise the issue. It went on to say that Jaguar, being the direct
employer of the security guards, is the one principally liable to the employees. Thus, it
directed petitioner to file a separate civil action for recovery of the amount before the regular
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter, for the purpose of proving the liability of
Delta.
Jaguar sought reconsideration of the dismissal, but the Commission denied the same in its
Resolution dated November 9, 2001.3
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which, in the herein assailed Decision dated
October 21, 20024and Resolution dated February 13, 2004,5 dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
In the present petition, the following error is set forth as a ground for the modification of the assailed
Decision and Resolution:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING
PETITIONER'S CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT DELTA MILLING
INDUSTRIES, INC.6
Petitioner insists that its cross-claim should have been ruled upon in the labor case as the filing of a
cross-claim is allowed under Section 3 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides for the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court. Petitioner argues that the claim arose out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action. Petitioner further argues
that as principal, Delta Milling Industries, Inc. (Delta Milling) is liable for the awarded wage increases,
pursuant to Wage Order Nos. NCR-04, NCR-05 and NCR-06; and in line with the ruling in Eagle
Security Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,7 petitioner should be reimbursed of
any payments to be made.
There is no question as regards the respective liabilities of petitioner and Delta Milling. Under
Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, the joint and several liability of the contractor and the
principal is mandated to assure compliance of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum
wage. The contractor, petitioner in this case, is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer.
On the other hand, Delta Milling, as principal, is made the indirect employer of the contractor's
employees for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the contractor be unable to pay
them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers'
performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection as mandated
by the 1987 Constitution.8
However, in the event that petitioner pays his obligation to the guard employees pursuant to the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and CA, petitioner has the right of
reimbursement from Delta Milling under Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or
more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds
to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the
debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
xxxx
The question that now arises is whether petitioner may claim reimbursement from Delta Milling
through a cross-claim filed with the labor court.
This question has already been decisively resolved in Lapanday Agricultural Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,9 to wit:
We resolve first the issue of jurisdiction. We agree with the respondent that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is well-settled in law and
jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and
no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor
statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor
Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged
breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the realm
of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the
resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor
code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the
respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code
as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original jurisdiction only over the
following:
1. Unfair labor practices;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with
a claim for reinstatement.
In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional

requisite; and there is none in this case.10 (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisdiction of labor courts extends only to cases where an employer-employee relationship
exists.
In the present case, there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Delta
Milling. In its cross-claim, petitioner is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but merely
reimbursement of the monetary benefits claims awarded and to be paid to the guard employees.
There is no labor dispute involved in the cross-claim against Delta Milling. Rather, the cross-claim
involves a civil dispute between petitioner and Delta Milling. Petitioner's cross-claim is within the
realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.
Moreover, the liability of Delta Milling to reimburse petitioner will only arise if and when petitioner
actually pays its employees the adjudged liabilities.11 Payment, which means not only the delivery of
money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which
will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to
each of the debtors.12 In this case, it appears that petitioner has yet to pay the guard employees. As
stated in Lapanday:
However, it is not disputed that the private respondent has not actually paid the security
guards the wage increases granted under the Wage Orders in question. Neither is it alleged
that there is an extant claim for such wage adjustments from the security guards concerned,
whose services have already been terminated by the contractor. Accordingly, private
respondent has no cause of action against petitioner to recover the wage increases.
Needless to stress, the increases in wages are intended for the benefit of the laborers and
the contractor may not assert a claim against the principal for salary wage adjustments that it
has not actually paid. Otherwise, as correctly put by the respondent, the contractor would be
unduly enriching itself by recovering wage increases, for its own benefit.13
Consequently, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the petition and in affirming the NLRC
Resolutions dated September 19, 2000 and November 9, 2001.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167711 October 10, 2008
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
RAMON C. GALICIA, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
GENERALLY, the Ombudsman must yield to the Division School Superintendent in the investigation
of administrative charges against public school teachers.
The rule and the exception are at focus in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) divesting the Ombudsman of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Culled from the records, the facts are as follows:2
Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School
(MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that he submitted forming part of his
201 file, Galicia graduated from the Far Eastern University with a degree in civil engineering but
failed to pass the board examinations. He also represented himself to have earned eighteen (18)
units in education in school year (SY) 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records
(TOR) from the Caloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers'
Professional Board Examination (TPBE) given on November 22, 1987.
Subsequently, on December 2001, Reynaldo V. Yamsuan, then Principal of the MBASHS, reviewed
the 201 files of his teaching staff. He took note that the TOR submitted by Galicia was not an original
copy, but only stamped with "verified correct from the original" signed by Administrative Officer
Rogelio Mallari. Pursuant to a Division Memorandum, Yamsuan required Galicia and other teachers
with similar records, to secure authenticated copies of the TOR that they submitted. All of the
teachers who were given the said instruction complied, with the exception of Galicia.
Yamsuan proceeded to verify the authenticity of the said TOR by requesting for confirmation from
the school. Yamsuan was surprised to receive a reply from Marilyn Torres-De Jesus, College
Registrar of CCPC, stating that they had no record of the said TOR, and more importantly, that they
had no records that Galicia, indeed, took up eighteen (18) units of education in SY 1985-1986. The
letter of De Jesus stated:
This has reference to the herein attached photocopy of Transcript of Records of MR.
RAMON C. GALICIA which you forwarded in our office for authentication dated November
29, 2002.
Relative to this, we would like to inform you that on the basis of our records kept in this
office, MR. RAMON C. GALICIA has no records from the 18 units of Education 1st Semester
1985-1986.3
Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave
misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.4
In his Counter-Affidavit,5 Galicia contended that the complaint was malicious and motivated by
revenge. Yamsuan had an axe to grind against him. Earlier, he filed a falsification case against
Yamsuan. The two likewise clashed on account of Galicia's chairmanship of the teachers'
cooperative.
Galicia stressed that the TOR he submitted was authentic, as shown by the signature of then
College Registrar Rolando Labrador. He argued that the certification from the present college
registrar that CCPC had no record of his TOR did not prove that the document was spurious. Rather,
it only proved that CCPC's filing system of scholastic records was disorganized. This, according to
Galicia, explained why the school's copy of the TOR could not be found. Moreover, Galicia argued
that the TPBE was a highly specialized type of exam that could only be passed if the examinee
acquired academic units in education. If he did not take up the said eighteen (18) units in education,
then he could not have possibly passed the TPBE which he took on November 22, 1987.
During the preliminary conference, Galicia presented for comparison the original of the TOR and
Certificate of Grades (COG), as well as the original copies of the other documents in his 201 file.
A subpoena duces tecum was subsequently served upon Prof. Marilyn T. De Jesus, Registrar of
CCPC, to appear before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau for the purpose of
certifying the authenticity of Galicia's school records. De Jesus, however, declined to certify the
documents because no copies were on file in the school. In her reply letter, De Jesus stated:
x x x we would like to inform your good office that since I was appointed as the College
Registrar only June 20, 1997, I cannot certify whether or not the attached documents were
issued by the Caloocan City Polytechnic College. But, we would like to inform you that
based on the records kept in this office, the attached two documents are not available
in our file and MR. RAMON C. GALICIA has no records from the 18 units of Education,
1st Semester, 1985-1986.6
Ombudsman Disposition
After the parties submitted their reply, rejoinder, and respective memoranda, the Ombudsman gave
judgment with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding Galicia

RAMON C. GALICIA, Guilty of Dishonesty for which the penalty of Dismissal From the
Service, Forfeiture of Leave Credits and Retirement Benefits and Temporary Disqualification
for Re-employment in the Government Service for a period of One (1) Year from the Finality
of this Decision, is hereby imposed, pursuant to Section 52 (A-1) OF THE Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases (CSC Resolution No. 991936).7
While stating that Galicia presented the original of the questioned documents during the preliminary
conference,8the Ombudsman nevertheless found that the absence of a certification from the College
Registrar destroyed the TOR's credibility. Said the Ombudsman:
In the preliminary conference of the case held on September 10, 2002, the respondent,
together with his counsel presented for comparison the original copies of the
following documents: (1) transcript of records (FEU for Civil Engineering), (2) transcript of
records, Caloocan City Polytechnic College of the 18 units subject signed by the then
Registrar Rolando Labrador; (3) Certification of grades also signed by then Registrar
Rolando Labrador; and (4) PBET (teachers board examination grade 73.75% issued by the
Civil Service).
All these documents (transcript from the Far Eastern University and the Caloocan City
Polytechnic College) were duly signed by their respective registrar.9
xxxx
It is therefore clear that the pieces of evidence on record tend to establish the fact that the
Official Transcript of Records submitted by the respondent is spurious, owing to the
fact that he does not have any record of having attended and/or obtained the eighteen
(18) units of teaching education subjects.
The photocopy of his Official Transcript of Records does not in any way rebut the evident
findings against him, as the same prove to be weak as specie of evidence. If, indeed, the
respondent has obtained the eighteen (18) units of teaching education which he claims, then
he could easily prove the same apart from the mere photocopy of this Official Transcript of
Records. Stated otherwise, if the respondents did took (sic) eighteen (18) units of
teaching education subjects, then the same can be easily established by the records
of the college itself. However, the Caloocan City Polytechnic College has been
consistent in its stand that the respondent has no record of having obtained the
teaching education units in question.10 (Emphasis supplied)
Galicia filed a motion for reconsideration, raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time. He argued
that it is not the Ombudsman, but the Department of Education, through the School Superintendent,
which has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers, as mandated by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.11
Galicia further challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by invoking Section 20 of R.A. No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act12 which enumerates the instances when the Ombudsman may not
conduct an administrative investigation. Under the said provision, the Ombudsman may not conduct
investigation if the following requisites concur:
1. Complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
2. The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman;
3. The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
4. Complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or
5. The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.13
According to Galicia, all of the above conditions were present in the case filed against him. An
adequate remedy existed in the Office of the Secretary of Education; the matter was outside the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; the complaint was made in bad faith; and complainant Yamsuan had
no sufficient personal interest in the matter.
Lastly, Galicia claimed that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction inasmuch as the complaint was filed
only in 2002, thirteen (13) years from the time he allegedly committed the dishonest act in 1989.
According to him, this violated Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770, which mandated that all complaints
must be filed within one year from the occurrence of the act charged.14
The Ombudsman denied Galicia's motion for reconsideration.15 It declared that the Ombudsman's
disciplining authority extended over all illegal, unjust, and improper acts of public officials or
employees, as expressly provided by the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
Even granting that R.A. No. 467016 gave the School Superintendent jurisdiction over administrative
cases against public school teachers like Galicia, it did not operate to oust the Ombudsman from its
disciplining authority over public employees. There was, in fact, as argued by the Ombudsman,
concurrent jurisdiction between the two.
Galicia elevated the case to the CA.
CA Decision
On January 20, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman,17 disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
Decision dated October 18, 2002 as well as the Order dated July 28, 2003 of public
respondent are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered REINSTATED to
his former position and is hereby awarded backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal
until he is reinstated and also all other monetary benefits that may have accrued to him
during the period of his unjustified dismissal.18
Principally, the CA held that jurisdiction over public school teachers belonged to the School
Superintendent as mandated by R.A. No. 4670.19
The CA, however, did not hinge its decision solely on the question of jurisdiction. It upheld the
arguments of Galicia and, consequently, overturned the findings of fact during the investigation
proceedings. Contrary to the ruling of the Ombudsman, the CA ruled that the school's lack of
certification did not establish that the TOR was fabricated or spurious. It was possible that the
records were only missing. The "verified correct from the original" notations in the photocopied TOR
and COG prove that the documents were, indeed, authentic.
Issues
In this petition for review, the Ombudsman, via Rule 45, imputes to the CA twin errors, viz.:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NULLIFYING

THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ON ALLEGED JURISDICTIONAL
INFIRMITY.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WHICH ARE BASED
ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.20(Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
At the center of the present controversy is the authority granted to the Ombudsman over
administrative cases against public school teachers. Before We proceed to discuss the merits of the
petition, We shall first review the authority granted to the Ombudsman under existing laws.
The duty and privilege of the Ombudsman to act as protector of the people against the illegal
and unjust acts of those who are in the public service, emanate from no less than the 1987
Constitution. Section 12 of Article XI states:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations on its own or
upon complaint by any person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
He is also given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public
officials and employees.
In Deloso v. Domingo,21 the Court declared that the clause "illegal act or omission of any public
official" encompasses any crime committed by a public official or employee. Its reach is so vast that
there is no requirement that the act or omission be related to or be connected with the performance
of official duty. The rationale for this grant of vast authority is to insulate the Ombudsman from the
corrupt influences of interested persons who are able to sway decisions in their favor, and thus
thwart the efforts to prosecute offenses committed while in office and to penalize erring employees
and officials.
As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, The Ombudsman Act was enacted in line with the state's
policy of maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service and take effective measures against
graft and corruption.22Its investigative authority is enshrined in Section 15:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies,
such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts.23 The power
to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice.24 Despite the passage of the Local Government
Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and
the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.25
Section 19 of the Ombudsman Act further enumerates the types of acts covered by the authority
granted to the Ombudsman:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited to acts or omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance
with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification
In the exercise of its duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His
power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to
conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and
place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee.26
A review of the Ombudsman Act and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers reveals an
apparent overlapping of jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers grants jurisdiction over erring public school
teachers to an Investigating Committee headed by the Division School Superintendent. The
provision reads:
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. - Administrative charges against a teacher shall be

heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent
of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a
division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or,
in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of
the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty
days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
Galicia argues that jurisdiction exclusively belongs to the investigating committee on the main thesis
that the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers is a special law which should take precedence
over the Ombudsman Act, a general law. The Ombudsman maintains that jurisdiction among the two
bodies is concurrent since there is no express repeal in either of the laws that would oust the
Ombudsman from its authority over public school teachers.
This is not a novel issue. This Court has recently ruled in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Estandarte27 that by virtue of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, original jurisdiction
belongs to the school superintendent. The intention of the law, which is to impose a separate
standard and procedural requirement for administrative cases involving public school teachers, must
be given consideration.28 Hence, the Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the Division School
Superintendent. Even in the earlier case of Alcala v. Villar,29 the Court held that:
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except
over officials who may be removed by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary. However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was held that R.A. No. 4670, the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative
proceedings involving public school teachers. x x x30 (Emphasis supplied)
Be that as it may, We hold here that the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
The CA was in error in relying on Alcala, without taking into consideration the case's full import.
In Alcala, the Court, while recognizing the jurisdiction of the School Superintendent, nonetheless
upheld the decision of the Ombudsman on the rationale that the parties were afforded their right to
due process during the investigation proceedings. Respondent in the Alcala case was given
sufficient opportunity to be heard and submit his defenses to the charges made against him. Thus,
he is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman after an adverse decision was
promulgated.
In the same manner, the recent Estandarte case recognized similar circumstances cited in Emin v.
De Leon.31 In De Leon, it was found that the parties were afforded their right to due process when
both fully participated in the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The Court
ruled that while jurisdiction lies with the School Superintendent, respondent is estopped from
attacking the proceedings before the CSC.
In the present case, records show that Galicia was given the right to due process in the investigation
of the charges against him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his defenses in the
pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a decision adverse to him was rendered did he
question the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is now too late for Galicia to assail the
administrative investigation conducted and the decision rendered against him.
Galicia strongly believes and claims that he was denied due process for the reason that he only
presented his original documents once and he was allegedly not informed of the hearing date when
De Jesus, the CCPC Registrar, testified. A perusal of the records show, however, that Galicia was
given an opportunity by petitioner to comment on the certification issued by De Jesus that CCPC has
no record of the TOR and COG presented by Galicia.32 Indeed, Galicia was able to present his side
when he filed his comment to said certification on January 17, 2003.33
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.34 During the proceedings
before the Ombudsman, Galicia filed a Counter-Affidavit, Rejoinder-Affidavit, Comment on the
Certification of the CCPC Registrar, and a Rejoinder to Reply. He also submitted documents in
support of his contentions. Likewise, there is no indication that the proceedings were done in a
manner that would prevent him from presenting his defenses. Verily, these suffice to satisfy the
requirements of due process because the opportunity to be heard especially in administrative
proceedings (where technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied) is not limited
to oral arguments. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties
submit to present their charges and defenses.35
In sum, We reiterate that it is the School Superintendent and not the Ombudsman that has
jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. Yet, Galicia is estopped from
belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. His right to due process was satisfied when
he participated fully in the investigation proceedings. He was able to present evidence and
arguments in his defense. The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was therefore valid.
We now proceed to discuss the meat of the petition.
Superior courts are not triers of facts. When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by
substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive.36 This court recognizes the expertise
and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of
grave abuse of discretion.37 However, the findings of fact of the Ombudsman will not escape judicial
review, more so in cases where the CA reached a different conclusion on appeal.38
The Ombudsman found that the TOR submitted by Galicia as evidence that he took up eighteen (18)
units of education in the CCPC is spurious. In arriving at this conclusion, the Ombudsman conducted
investigation proceedings and examined the evidence presented by both parties. In essence, it was
held that a TOR that is not authenticated by the school is not a valid document.
Records show that Galicia presented an original copy of the TOR and COG during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman.39 He argues that these original copies are enough proof
that his documents are authentic and the fact that the present registrar of the school did not certify
his school records is not persuasive evidence to defeat his original documents.
On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the Ombudsman on the ground that the certification by
the present College Registrar attests merely to the fact that petitioner's transcript does not appear in
their records. According to the CA, Galicia did present the original copy of his TOR during the
preliminary conference. We quote with approval the observations of the CA on this matter:
The certification issued by the present College Registrar, Prof. Marilyn de Jesus of the
Polytechnic College of Caloocan City attests merely to the fact that petitioner's transcript
does not appear on their records. It is possible that the transcript of petitioner's was only
misplaced and/or missing. Such certification, however, does not necessarily mean that
petitioner fabricated his education records or that the one which he presented is
spurious just so he could gain employment at the M.B. Asistio Sr. High School. Verily,
the failure of Prof. Marilyn de Jesus to locate the transcript of records of petitioner
should not be taken against the latter. Besides, as confirmed by the investigating officer in
the administrative proceedings, petitioner presented the original of his transcript of
records at the preliminary conference of the case on September 10, 2002.
As earlier intimated, the transcript of grades for the 18 units of teaching education which
petitioner submitted was issued to him by then College Registrar Rolando Labrador and
bears the signature of Administrative Officer III Rogelio Mallari with the notation: "verified
correct from the original." The certification was signed by Administrative Officer III Rogelio
Mallari and the previous College Registrar, Rolando Labrador. Said notation, thus,
connotes that the transcript of records and accompanying certification are authentic
reproductions of the original.40 (Emphasis supplied)
We are mindful of Our decision in Lumancas v. Intas,41 where two government employees submitted
TORs and Special Orders as proof of their educational attainment. Upon verification with the CHED,
it was found that there were no records with the Department of Education that respondents were
enrolled with the named school during the period. Consequently, the decision of the Ombudsman
finding them guilty of falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct was upheld.
We find, however, that Lumancas is not applicable to this case. In Lumancas, it was the CHED
which issued the negative certification, a public document of a government institution which enjoys
the presumption of regularity.42Here, what was presented to the Ombudsman was a certification not
from the CHED but from a college, and that does not enjoy the same evidentiary value.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in
the complaint.43 Absent substantial evidence to prove the falsity of the TOR presented by Galicia
duly signed by the College Registrar at that time, We are constrained to uphold his innocence of the
charges of falsification.
Galicia's original TOR, although belatedly submitted, is positive evidence that, indeed, he took up 18
units of education at the CCPC. The present College Registrar's certification of the absence of
Galicia's records in her office, is negative evidence to the contrary. Following the general rule that
positive evidence is more credible than negative evidence, We find more reason to uphold the
findings of the CA.44
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 148106 : July 17, 2006]
EURO-MED LABORATORIES, PHIL., INC., represented by LEONARDO H.

TORIBIO, Petitioner, v. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its
Governor, HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS,Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing, on pure questions of

law, the March 7 and May 16, 2001 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas City2 in Civil Case No. 5300.
Civil Case No. 5300 was a complaint for sum of money 3 filed by petitioner Euro-Med
Laboratories, Phil., Inc. against respondent Province of Batangas. The pertinent
portions of the complaint read:
3. On several occasions, particularly from the period of 19 August 1992 to 11 August

1998, defendant [respondent here], thru its various authorized representatives of the
government hospitals identified and listed below, purchased various Intravenous Fluids
(IVF) products from the plaintiff [petitioner here], with an unpaid balance of Four
Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos and Eighty Centavos
(P487,662.80), as of 28 February 1998, broken down as follows: x x x x which
purchases were evidenced by invoices duly received and signed by defendant's
authorized representatives, upon delivery of the merchandise listed in said invoices.
4. Under the terms and conditions of the aforesaid invoices, defendant agreed and
covenanted to pay plaintiff, without need of demand, its obligations in the above-
enumerated invoices on various terms indicated therein.
5. Plaintiff made several demands for defendant to pay its accountabilities, including
setting up several dialogues with plaintiff's representatives, but these proved fruitless.
6. Despite repeated demands by plaintiff for defendant to pay and settle its unpaid and
outstanding accounts under the aforementioned invoices, said defendant has failed and
still fails to comply therewith.4
In its answer,5 respondent admitted most of the allegations in the complaint, denying

only those relating to the unpaid balance supposedly still due petitioner. Respondent
alleged that some payments it had already made were not reflected in the computation
set forth in the complaint and that it was continuously exerting genuine and earnest
efforts "to find out the true and actual amount owed." 6 Pre-trial and trial followed.
At the conclusion of petitioner's presentation of evidence, respondent filed a motion to

dismiss7 the complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioner's
money claim was lodged with the Commission on Audit (COA). Respondent pointed out
that petitioner's claim, arising as it did from a series of procurement transactions with
the province, was governed by the Local Government Code provisions and COA rules
and regulations on supply and property management in local governments. Respondent
argued that the case called for a determination of whether these provisions and rules
were complied with, and that was within the exclusive domain of COA to make.
Finding the motion to be well-taken, the RTC issued on March 7, 2001 an

order8 dismissing petitioner's complaint without prejudice to the filing of the proper
money claim with the COA. In a subsequent order dated May 16, 2001, 9 the RTC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The resolution of this case turns on whether it is the COA or the RTC which has primary
jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner's money claim against the Province of Batangas. We
rule that it is the COA which does. Therefore, we deny the petition.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts
is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. 10It applies where
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case,
the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view 11 or, if the parties
would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. 12
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for
although petitioner's collection suit for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the
RTC,13 the circumstances surrounding petitioner's claim brought it clearly within the
ambit of the COA's jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money
against a local government unit. This brought the case within the COA's domain to pass
upon money claims against the government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26
of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines: 14
The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to x x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all
debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. x x x x.
The scope of the COA's authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed,

however, by an unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean
only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers,
invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. 15 Petitioner's claim
was for a fixed amount and although respondent took issue with the accuracy of
petitioner's summation of its accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily
determinable from the receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus, the claim was well
within the COA's jurisdiction under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Second, petitioner's money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical
supplies of respondent's public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions
were governed by the Local Government Code provisions on supply and property
management16 and their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
COA17 pursuant to Section 383 of said Code.18 Petitioner's claim therefore involved
compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are
not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but
within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but
proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss
petitioner's complaint.
Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC's
jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the
subsequent proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue
of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of
the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power
between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties. 19
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 7, and May 16, 2001 orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 88158. March 4, 1992.]
DANIEL GARCIA and TEODORO O’HARA, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO DE JESUS and

CECILIA DAVID, and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 97108-09. March 4, 1992.]
TOMAS TOBON UY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE C.

NEYRA, Respondents.
F .B. Santiago, Nalus, Magtalas, Catalan & Associates for petitioners in 88158.
Dionisio E. Bala, Jr. and Julian de la Rosa for petitioner in 97108-09.

Francisco V . Marallag & Fred V . Marallag for private respondent in 97108-09.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ISSUE

WRITS OF CERTIORARI. — In the absence of any specific conferment upon the
COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of
jurisdiction to issue said Writs. It is the COMELEC alone, invoking its Constitutionally
invested appellate jurisdiction and rule-making power, that arrogated unto itself the
authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in Rule 28, Section 1,
of its Rules of Procedure. However, neither the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; DEFINED AND CLASSIFICATION. — Jurisdiction or

the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a
matter of law. It may be classified into original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction.
Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law.
Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final
order or judgment of a lower Court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review
(Remedial Law Compendium, Regalado, Florenz D., Fifth Revised Edition, Vol. 1, p. 3).
Since the two jurisdictions are exclusive of each other, each must be expressly
conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is inferred from, the other.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRIT INVOLVES

THE EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION; COMELEC ONLY WITH APPELLATE
JURISDICTION. — In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such
authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law.
What the Constitution granted the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution
makes no mention of any power given the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction
over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in the case of the
Supreme Court which was specifically conferred such authority (Art. VIII, Sec, 5[1]).
The immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction is fixed by law, the power to issue such
Writs cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Just as
implied repeal of statutes are frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body to tabooed. If appellate
jurisdiction has to be statutorily granted, how much more the original jurisdiction to
issue the prerogative Writs?
4. ID.; JURISDICTION; CONFERRED BY LAW AND NEVER DERIVED BY IMPLICATION. —

As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law (Orosa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76826-32, 28 January
1991; Bacalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is
never derived by implication. Indeed," (w)hile the power to issue the writ of certiorari is
in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions,
ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated" (J.
Aquino’s Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 53581-83, December
19, 1980, 101 SCRA 769, citing 14 C.J.S. 202; Emphasis ours).
5. POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ONLY WITH APPELLATE

JURISDICTION ABSENT ANY SPECIFIC CONFERMENT TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. — Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on
its Certiorari jurisdiction is patterned after the previous authorization to the Court of
Appeals to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. That authority, however, was not inherent in the Court of Appeals but was
specifically conferred by Section 30 of the Judiciary Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section
9(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). It does not follow that
just because the 1987 Constitution vests the COMELEC with appellate jurisdiction,
without more, it can issue such Writs in aid of that appellate jurisdiction.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; VIEW THAT WRITS ARE BUT
COMMON-LAW WRITS, NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS JURISDICTION. — The view that the
subject Writs are but common-law Writs not owing their existence to any constitutional
provision or statutory enactment may be true in foreign jurisdictions but not in the
Philippine judicial system where such Writs are specifically characterized as original
Special Civil Actions (Rule 65, Rules of Court). It is original jurisdiction, as contrasted to
appellate jurisdiction, that is exercised in the issuance of said Writs.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRITS INHERENT TO JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS EXERCISING APPELLATE

JURISDICTION; DOES NOT COMPREHEND AGENCIES EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE
AND QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS. — Although there may be authorities in other
jurisdictions which maintain that such Writs are inherent in the power of higher Courts
exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same refers to judicial tribunals, which the
COMELEC is not. What this agency exercises are administrative and quasi-judicial
powers (Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-31455, 28
February 1985, 135 SCRA 25).
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. — As defined, Certiorari "is a writ from a superior court to an

inferior court or tribunal commanding the latter to send up the record of a particular
case" (Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra). The function of a Writ of Certiorari is to keep an
inferior Court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49).
9. POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; GRANT OF APPELLATE

JURISDICTION THERETO DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE IT A SUPERIOR COURT. —
The grant of appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC does not necessarily make it a
"superior Court" vis-a-vis Regional Trial Courts. In fact, in People v. Delgado (G.R. Nos.
93419-32,18 September 1990, 189 SCRA 715), we ruled that Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction to review the actions taken by the COMELEC in criminal prosecutions
for violations of election laws. This, notwithstanding the grant to the COMELEC of
"exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses
punishable under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code.
10. ID.; ID.; POWER TO PROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE, CANNOT
INCLUDE THE CONFINEMENT UPON ITSELF OF JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF
CERTIORARI. — The power vested in the COMELEC to promulgate its Rules of Procedure
neither confers upon itself the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs. Procedure, as
distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a Court
to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney
General, 20 Phil. 523). Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive.
They cover only rules on pleadings and practice. And in respect of the COMELEC, the
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure was specifically "in order to expedite
disposition of cases" (Section 3, Article IX-C). That limited purpose can not be
expanded to include the conferment upon itself of jurisdiction which is substantive in
nature and can only be fixed by law.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PIMENTEL CASE, REITERATED IN CASE AT
BAR. — The doctrine laid down in Pimentel, supra, holding that the COMELEC has not
been invested with jurisdiction to issue the Writs in question, therefore, still finds
application under the 1987 Constitution. Said case also involved an elective municipal
official except that it was decided under the regime of the 1973 Constitution and the
1987 Election Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296). There is no gainsaying that, unlike the
1987 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution did not grant appellate jurisdiction to the
COMELEC over election contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction. Nonetheless, such appellate jurisdiction was conferred
upon it by Section 196 of the 1987 Election Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296). Section 190
referred to in the first paragraph deals with election contests for municipal and
municipal district offices. Again, while the 1973 Constitution did not empower the
COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure, Section 192 of the same 1978
Election Code granted it such powers. It would appear, therefore, that what were
merely statutory provisions under the 1978 Election Code became constitutional grants
under the 1987 Constitution. Significantly, however, neither the 1973 Constitution nor
the 1987 Constitution expressly confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to issue
Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. In essence, therefore, the statutory set-
up in the present Petition and in Pimentel, insofar as the COMELEC power to issue those
Writs is concerned, is on all fours.
12. ID.; CONGRESS; WITH POWER TO DEFINE JURISDICTION OF VARIOUS COURTS

AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES. — There is no specific grant to the COMELEC, either in
the Constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction over said petitions. In the last
analysis, the remedy lies with the legislature and not with this Court. It is Congress that
has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various Courts
(Art. VIII, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution). That should include quasi-judicial bodies.
13. ID.; DUE PROCESS; OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, INDISPENSABLE. — Absence of

hearing per se, does not necessarily imply denial of due process. The fact that they
were afforded reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy through
their pleadings, destroys the validity of their argument. As long as the parties were
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 95016, 11 January 1991, 194
SCRA 25).
14. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO DEPRIVE REGIONAL

COURTS OF POWER TO ORDER EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. — The COMELEC,
however, is bereft of authority to deprive Regional Trial Courts of the competence to
order execution pending appeal. For one, it is essentially a judicial prerogative. For
another, it is a pronouncement of the COMELEC alone in its procedural rules, without
benefit of statute, unlike in the past where it was specifically provided for in Section
177 of the Revised Election Code (Rep. Act No. 180, as amended) and Section 224 of
the Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act No. 6388) from whence the rule was lifted
verbatim. Significantly, however, when the Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act No. 6388)
was superseded by the 1978 Election Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296), said clause was
deleted therefrom. It is likewise absent in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (Rep. Act
No. 6646) and in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which were the election
laws in effect during the 18 January 1988 local elections. There is no express provision
of law, therefore, disauthorizing executions pending appeal, and the COMELEC, in its
procedural rules alone, should not be allowed to divest Regional Trial Courts of that
authority. It deprives the prevailing party of a substantive right to move for such relief
contrary to the constitutional mandate that those Rules can not diminish nor modify
substantive rights (Section 6, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
15. ID.; REVISED ELECTION CODE; CLAUSE "AS SOON AS THE JUDGMENT BECOMES
FINAL," INTERPRETED AS DEFINING THE EFFECT OF A FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE
RIGHT OF A DE JURE ELECTIVE OFFICIAL TO SERVE UP TO THE END OF THE TERM. —
At any rate, the clause "as soon as the judgment becomes final" had already been
interpreted by this Court as a general one defining the effect of a final judgment on the
right of the winner to assume the contested office as the de jure elected official to serve
up to the end of the term (Gahol v. Hon. Riodique, G.R. No. L-40415, 27 June 1975, 64
SCRA 494 at p. 514). It does not disallow Regional Trial Courts from ordering execution
pending appeal.
16. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT, APPLIED BY ANALOGY TO

ELECTION CONTESTS. — Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows
Regional Trial Courts to order executions pending appeal upon good reasons stated in a
special order, may be made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to election contests
decided by them (Rule 43, Section 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure).
17. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COURT’S DECISION ON PROCLAMATION CASES

GIVEN PREFERENCE OVER PROCLAMATION MADE BY THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS. —
Indeed, as much recognition should be given to the value of the decision of a judicial
body as a basis for the right to assume office as that given by law to the proclamation
made by the Board of Canvassers. To construe otherwise would be to bring back the
ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest" techniques so often resorted
to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an
elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate
(See Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30570, 29 July 1969; Lagumbay v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-25444, 31 January 1966, 16 SCRA 175).
CRUZ, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; WITH POWER TO DEFINE JURISDICTION OF

VARIOUS COURTS. — It is only Congress that has the power to "define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," subject only to certain specified
limitations. (Article VIII, Section 2). Conformably, every judicial tribunal must trace its
power to issue writs of certiorari to an express authorization from the legislature and
not to mere inference. I know of no such tribunal that exercises this power on the sole
justification that it is an appellate court.
2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI, AN EXPRESS

GRANT. — The Supreme Court itself derives its power to issue writs of certiorari not by
implication only from its appellate jurisdiction but by an express grant in Article VIII,
Section 5 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it may exercise this power only "as the law
or rules of Court may provide" under paragraph 2 of that section, which means that the
conferment is not automatic or self-executing. Without such implementation, this Court
is powerless to issue writs of certiorari in the appealed cases mentioned in that
provision even if it is the highest court in the land.
3. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITHOUT

AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI. — We cannot be less strict with the
Commission on Elections, which is essentially only an administrative body. If even the
Supreme Court itself can be so inhibited by no less than the Constitution, I see no logic
in allowing the Commission on Elections a wider latitude in the exercise of what is
clearly a judicial power. And on such a fragile ground. While I may concede that this
agency can exercise the power if expressly allowed by the legislature, I reject the
notion that it can claim such jurisdiction by mere implication.
BIDIN, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; WRITS MAY BE ISSUED IN

THE EXERCISE OF NOT ONLY ORIGINAL BUT ALSO IN AID OF APPELLATE
JURISDICTION. — The writs of certiorari may be issued not only in the exercise of
original jurisdiction but also in aid of appellate jurisdiction as now conferred upon the
Court of Appeals (Sec. 9 [1], BP 129). Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals had been
issuing writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 9 [1], BP
129, and before that Sec. 4, Rule 65, it cannot be said that certiorari is limited to the
exercise of original jurisdiction only.
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; DOCTRINE LAID DOWN

IN PIMENTEL CASE (101 SCRA 769 [1980]) THAT COMELEC DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS,
DEEMED ABANDONED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. — In Pimentel, (101 SCRA
769 [1980]), this Court ruled that the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus in election contests cognizable by the then
Court of First Instance and appealable to the Commission on the ground that such
jurisdiction was not conferred to it by constitutional or statutory enactment. It must be
noted, however, that the Pimentel case was decided under the 1973 Constitution which
limited the Commission’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the members of
the Batasang Pambansa, elective provincial and city officials, and excluded therefrom
election contests involving municipal and barangay officials. Such limitation no longer
holds true under the present state of the law. Neither is this a case where the COMELEC
justifies its assumption of jurisdiction by applying, by analogy, Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court as it did in the case of Pimentel. Section 2 (2), Art. IX-C of the 1987
Constitution now grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal official decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Taken in
conjunction with Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, which empowers the Commission to promulgate its
rules of procedure, the above constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
COMELEC over election cases cognizable by the trial courts of general or limited
jurisdiction is broad enough to cover petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE-MAKING POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IMPLIES
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. — It is
significant to note that no similar provision granting respondent COMELEC with rule-
making power as provided in the present Constitution is found in the 1973 Constitution,
the fundamental law in force when the Pimentel case was decided. Such constitutional
conferment of rule-making power in favor of the COMELEC necessarily implies, if not in
itself inherent, the authority of the Commission to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction expressly conferred by the
constitution.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; FUNCTION OF THE WRIT. —

It is elementary that the function of the writ is to keep an inferior court within its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 429
[1989]; Calagui v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 564 [1990]; Brillo v. Buklatan, 87 Phil.
519 [1950]).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO ISSUE WRITS FLOWS FROM THE EXISTENCE OF APPELLATE
JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR. — The power to issue special writs also flows from the
existence of appellate jurisdiction is a doctrinal pronouncement and settled
jurisprudence. It has been held that "grant of jurisdiction implies that there is included
in it the power necessary to its effective exercise and to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action and give effect to the final determination of the
appeal" (Kjellander v. Kjellander (132 P 1170 [1913]). Premises considered, the
COMELEC may issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; A COMMON LAW WRIT WHICH DOES NOT OWE ITS EXISTENCE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION OR STATUTORY ENACTMENT. — The Court must not lose
sight of the fact of the origin and historical development of the special writs as it was
understood in common law jurisdiction from where it evolved and carried over to the
Philippine court system (i.e., from Act 190 through RA 296 to BP 129) that" (t)he writ
of certiorari does not owe its existence to constitutional provision or statutory
enactment. It is a common law writ, of ancient origin, and one of the most valuable and
efficient remedies which came to us with that admirable system of jurisprudence"
(Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Campbell, 75 SW 1012 [1903]).
7. ID.; COURTS; ONE OF THE INHERENT POWERS OF AN APPELLATE COURT IS TO

MAKE USE OF ALL WRITS. —" (I)t is an essential doctrine that one of the essential
attributes of appellate jurisdiction, and one of the inherent powers of the appellate
court, is the right to make use of all writs known to the common law, and, if necessary,
to invent new writs or proceedings in order to suitably exercise the jurisdiction
conferred (Wheller v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 11 P 103 [1986]; citing Attorney
General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; U.S. v.
Commissioners, 1 Morris, (Iowa) 42; Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis 277).
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; WITH JUDICIAL POWERS TO

BE JUDGE OF ELECTION CONTESTS. — The power to be the "judge . . . of . . . contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of any public official is essentially
judicial. As such, . . ., it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only
insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise." (Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 [1966];
citing Matthews, American Constitutional System; Cooley, Thomas M., A Treatise on
Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, pp. 270-271, 1927 ed.; 23 W & P 147 [1965 Pocket
Part]; State ex rel. Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So. 2d 507, 511, 23 W & P 148, supra). In
granting the COMELEC with the powers and functions to "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction" (Sec.
2 [2], Art. IX-C, Constitution), the Constitution vested upon the COMELEC judicial
powers to decide all contests relating to elective local officials as therein provided.
9. ID.; JUDICIAL POWER, DEFINED. — As defined in the Constitution," (j)udicial power

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art, VIII).
10. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; WITH JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF

CERTIORARI IN AID OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION. — Since the COMELEC, in
discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts a court of
justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the COMELEC, by constitutional mandate, is
vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
11. ID.; ID.; SHOULD NOT BE HAMPERED WITH RESTRICTIONS IN THE DISCHARGE OF
ITS DUTIES. — The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
functions, it should not be hampered with restriction that would be fully warranted in
the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court
also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but
unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should
not interfere. Politics is a practical matter . . . (Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288.)
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to issue Writs of Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus in electoral contests involving municipal and barangay
officials is the common question addressed in these elections cases, hence, their
consolidation.
The antecedent facts follow: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) G.R. No. 88158 (The Antipolo Case)
In the 18 January 1988 local elections, Petitioners Daniel GARCIA and Teodoro O’HARA
were the winning candidates for Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively, of Antipolo, Rizal.
They were proclaimed as such on 22 January 1988.
On 1 February 1988, Private Respondents Ernesto DE JESUS and Cecilia DAVID

instituted an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
72 (RTC), docketed as Election Case No. 02-A, where the results in twenty-five (25)
precincts were put in issue.
On 25 July 1988, the RTC issued an Order directing the delivery to it of all ballot boxes
and other election paraphernalia used in the 25 protested precincts so that the ballots
could be examined and the votes recounted
After five (5) ballot boxes were already examined and revised, Petitioner’s newly-hired
counsel moved for the suspension of the hearing being conducted on 18 September
1988 alleging that an error was committed in the proceedings because there was no
basis for the opening of the ballot boxes. He contended that the irregularities alleged in
the election protest do not relate to the appreciation of ballots and thus, the opening of
those boxes would not affect the result of the election.
On 26 September 1988, Petitioners GARCIA and O’HARA filed before the RTC a "Motion
To Dismiss Opening Of Ballot Boxes and/or To Dismiss The Protest" which was premised
on the ground that the allegations in the election protest were merely self-serving. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Acting on the aforesaid Motion, the RTC issued an Order dated 28 October 1988,
amending its Order dated 25 July 1988, limiting the opening of ballot boxes to only nine
(9) precincts out of the 25 protested ones, and limiting the examination of the ballot
boxes only to those anomalies specified in the annexes attached to the election protest
by Respondents DE JESUS and DAVID.
The latter moved for reconsideration thereof which was denied by the RTC, in an Order
dated 27 December 1988. On 9 January 1989, Respondents DE JESUS and DAVID filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 289,
which sought to nullify the RTC Order limiting the examination of ballot boxes to only 9
precincts.
On 13 January 1989, respondent COMELEC temporarily restrained the proceedings

before the RTC and set for hearing Respondents DAVID and DE JESUS’ application for
Preliminary Injunction on 29 January 1989.
Petitioners GARCIA and O’HARA, meanwhile, registered their objection to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over the Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus through their "Manifestation With Motion To Dismiss." It was their
contention that the COMELEC was not empowered to take cognizance of Petitions
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the COMELEC issued the
questioned Decision, dated 27 April 1989, which directed the RTC to open all the ballot
boxes in the 25 protested precincts.
(2) G.R. Nos. 97108-09 (The Isabela Case)
After the canvass of election returns was made in the same local elections, Respondent
Jose C. NEYRA was proclaimed Mayor of Gama, Isabela over Petitioner Tomas TOBON
UY, with a plurality of 28 votes.
Petitioner TOBON UY filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan,
Isabela, Branch 16 (RTC), docketed as Election Case No. 369. On 7 January 1991, the
RTC declared TOBON UY the winner "by a majority of five (5) votes" over NEYRA (RTC
Decision, p. 24).
On the same date that said RTC Decision was promulgated, NEYRA filed a "Notice of
Appeal," and TOBON UY, a "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal," with the latter
pleading set for hearing on 10 January 1991.
The day before, or on 9 January 1991, NEYRA filed before the COMELEC a Petition
for Certiorari and/or Prohibition, docketed as SPR No. 1-91, seeking to enjoin the RTC
from further acting on TOBON UY’s aforesaid "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal." cralaw virtua1aw library
On 10 January 1991, the RTC, after due hearing, gave due course to NEYRA’s appeal,
granted execution pending appeal stating the special reasons Therefor, and required
TOBON UY to post a bond in the amount of P300,000.00. On the same date, the
COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the RTC from further
proceeding with the case. NEYRA’s application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
likewise set for hearing by the COMELEC on 24 January 1991.
On 15 January 1991, NEYRA filed a second Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition

before the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 2-91. This time, he sought to set aside the
RTC Order, dated 10 January 1991, which granted TOBON UY’s "Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal." cralaw virtua1aw library
The COMELEC took cognizance of both Certiorari Petitions and, on 15 February 1991,

issued the questioned Resolution (in SPR Nos. 1-91 & 2-91), declaring as null and void
the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal granted by the RTC, premised on Rule 35, Section
18, of its Rules of Procedure, and enjoining TOBON UY from "assuming the office and
performing in whatever and however manner the duties of Mayor of Gamu, Isabela,
until the final disposition of the appeal." cralaw virtua1aw library
Principally, Petitioners GARCIA and O’HARA in G.R. No. 88158, and Petitioner TOBON
UY in G.R. Nos. 97108-09, question the arrogation unto itself by the COMELEC of the
power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. They invoke The previous
ruling of this Court in Pimentel v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 53581-83, 19 December 1980,
101 SCRA 769), which maintained that no such jurisdiction was ever conferred on
respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution or by law. cralawnad
On the other hand, all Respondents in the Antipolo Case (G.R. No. 88158) and in the
Isabela Case (G.R. Nos. 97108-09) contend that since the 1987 Constitution now
expressly empowers the COMELEC to exercise "appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction"
(Section 2[2], Article IX-C), and to "promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it" provided they do "not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights" (Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C), the COMELEC validly
promulgated the rule which empowers it to issue the special Writs.
As a subsidiary issue, Petitioners GARCIA and O’HARA maintain that the COMELEC
denied them due process in the Antipolo Case (G.R. No. 88158) when it rendered its
questioned Decision without benefit of hearing. For his part, TOBON UY, in the Isabela
Case (G.R. Nos. 97108-09), raises the question of whether or not Regional Trial Courts
have the authority to order execution pending appeal in election contests decided by it.
His view is that said Courts possess that authority. Respondent NEYRA contends
otherwise.
In the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the
Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to issue said
Writs.
It is the COMELEC alone, invoking its Constitutionally invested appellate jurisdiction and
rule-making power, that arrogated unto itself the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus in Rule 28, Section 1, of its Rules of Procedure, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. When available. — In aid of its appellate jurisdiction in election cases

before courts of general jurisdiction relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of elective municipal officials, and before courts of limited jurisdiction in cases relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of elective barangay officials, the
Commission en banc may hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus." cralaw virtua1aw library
However, neither the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC nor its rule-making power
justifies such self-conferment of authority.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must
exist as a matter of law. It may be classified into original jurisdiction and appellate
jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of
a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law.
Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final
order or judgment of a lower Court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review
(Remedial Law Compendium, Regalado, Florenz D., Fifth Revised Edition, Vol. I, p. 3).
Since the two jurisdictions are exclusive of each other, each must be expressly
conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is inferred from, the other.
In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has always
been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the
well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law
(Orosa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso v.
Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by
implication. Indeed," (w)hile the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance
conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are expressly designated" (J. Aquino’s
Concurring Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202; Emphasis ours).
Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments. To
enumerate: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
(1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court such
jurisdiction;
(2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, to the Court of Appeals (then Intermediate Appellate Court);
(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to Regional Trial Courts;
(4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created Shari’ah Appellate Court; and
(5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shari’ah District Courts.
Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction.
The Constitution makes no mention of any power given the COMELEC to exercise
original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in the
case of the Supreme Court which was specifically conferred such authority (Art. VIII,
Sec, 5[1]). The immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction is fixed by law, the power to
issue such Writs cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
Just as implied repeal of statutes are frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body to tabooed. If appellate
jurisdiction has to be statutorily granted, how much more the original jurisdiction to
issue the prerogative Writs?
Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on its Certiorari jurisdiction is patterned after the

previous authorization to the Court of Appeals to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. That authority, however, was not
inherent in the Court of Appeals but was specifically conferred by Section 30 of the
Judiciary Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section 9(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). It does not follow that just because the 1987 Constitution vests
the COMELEC with appellate jurisdiction, without more, it can issue such Writs in aid of
that appellate jurisdiction.
The view that the subject Writs are but common-law Writs not owing their existence to
any constitutional provision or statutory enactment may be true in foreign jurisdictions
but not in the Philippine judicial system where such Writs are specifically characterized
as original Special Civil Actions (Rule 65, Rules of Court). It is original jurisdiction, as
contrasted to appellate jurisdiction, that is exercised in the issuance of said Writs. And
although there may be authorities in other jurisdictions which maintain that such Writs
are inherent in the power of higher Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same
refers to judicial tribunals, which the COMELEC is not. What this agency exercises are
administrative and quasi-judicial powers (Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v.
Ferrer, G.R. No. L-31455, 28 February 1985, 135 SCRA 25).
As defined, Certiorari "is a writ from a superior court to an inferior court or tribunal

commanding the latter to send up the record of a particular case" (Pimentel v.
COMELEC, supra). The function of a Writ of Certiorari is to keep an inferior Court within
the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49). The grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the COMELEC does not necessarily make it a "superior Court" vis-a-vis
Regional Trial Courts. In fact, in People v. Delgado (G.R. Nos. 93419-32,18 September
1990, 189 SCRA 715), we ruled that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to review
the actions taken by the COMELEC in criminal prosecutions for violations of election
laws. This, notwithstanding the grant to the COMELEC of "exclusive power" to conduct
preliminary investigations of all election offenses punishable under Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The power vested in the COMELEC to promulgate its Rules of Procedure neither confers
upon itself the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs. Procedure, as distinguished
from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a Court to hear and
decide a class of cases is put into action (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20
Phil. 523). Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover
only rules on pleadings and practice. And in respect of the COMELEC, the authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure was specifically "in order to expedite disposition of
cases" (Section 3, Article IX-C). That limited purpose can not be expanded to include
the conferment upon itself of jurisdiction which is substantive in nature and can only be
fixed by law.
The doctrine laid down in Pimentel, supra, holding that the COMELEC has not been
invested with jurisdiction to issue the Writs in question, therefore, still finds application
under the 1987 Constitution. Said case also involved an elective municipal official
except that it was decided under the regime of the 1973 Constitution and the 1978
Election Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296).
There is no gainsaying that, unlike the 1987 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution did not
grant appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC over election contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction. Nonetheless, such
appellate jurisdiction was conferred upon it by Section 196 of the 1978 Election Code
(Pres. Decree No. 1296), reading: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 196. Appeal. — From any decision rendered by the Court of First Instance in
the cases stated in Section 190 hereof, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
Commission within five days after receipt of a copy of the decision; Provided, That no
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained by the court (Emphasis ours).
"The appeal shall proceed as in a criminal case and shall be decided within sixty days
after the case has been submitted for decision." cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 190 referred to in the first paragraph deals with election contests for municipal
and municipal district offices.
Again, while the 1973 Constitution did not empower the COMELEC to promulgate its
own rules of procedure, Section 192 of the same 1978 Election Code granted it such
powers. Thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 192. Procedure in election contests. — The Commission shall prescribe the
rules to govern the procedure and other matters relating to election contests pertaining
to all national, regional, provincial, city, municipal and barangay offices. Such rules
shall provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for the expeditious disposition of
election contests" (Emphasis ours). chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It would appear, therefore, that what were merely statutory provisions under the 1978
Election Code became constitutional grants under the 1987 Constitution. Significantly,
however, neither the 1973 Constitution nor the 1987 Constitution expressly confers
upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus. In essence, therefore, the statutory set-up in the present Petition and in
Pimentel, insofar as the COMELEC power to issue those Writs is concerned, is on all
fours.
Then, as now, there is no specific grant to the COMELEC, either in the Constitution or
by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction over said petitions.
It may be that, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, division of authority between
the Courts and the COMELEC could affect the expeditious settlement of election
contests. That is no justification, however, for conferring a quasi-judicial body with
original Certiorari jurisdiction. That would place the COMELEC in a class by itself apart
from similar administrative and quasi-judicial agencies. Neither would there be "sharing
of appellate jurisdiction" thereby, since the issuance of the special Writs involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction.
In the last analysis, the remedy lies with the legislature and not with this Court. It is
Congress that has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various Courts (Art. VIII, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution). That should include quasi-judicial
bodies.
Considering that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, it would thus be moot and academic to still pass upon
GARCIA and O’HARA’s contention that they were denied due process when the
respondent Commission issued the questioned Decision in the Antipolo Case. Suffice it
to state that absence of hearing per se, does not necessarily imply denial of due
process. The fact that they were afforded reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy through their pleadings, destroys the validity of their argument. As long
as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered,
the demands of due process are sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 95016,
11 January 1991, 194 SCRA 25).
We now come to the subsidiary issue raised by Petitioner TOBON UY in G.R. Nos.
97108-09 of whether or not Regional Trial Courts can order execution pending appeal in
election contests decided by it involving elective municipal officials.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure would also deprive Regional Trial Courts of the
prerogative to order execution pending appeal in Rule 35, Section 18, reading: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 18. Decision on the contest. — The Court shall decide the election contest within
thirty (30) days from the date it is submitted for decision, but in every case within six
(6) months after its filing and shall declare who among the parties has been elected, or
in a proper case, that none of them has been legally elected. The party who in the
judgment has been declared elected shall have the right to assume the office as soon
as the judgment becomes final." (Emphasis ours).
The COMELEC, however, is bereft of authority to deprive Regional Trial Courts of the
competence to order execution pending appeal. For one, it is essentially a judicial
prerogative. For another, it is a pronouncement of the COMELEC alone in its procedural
rules, without benefit of statute, unlike in the past where it was specifically provided for
in Section 177 of the Revised Election Code (Rep. Act No. 180, as amended) 1 and
Section 224 of the Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act No. 6388) 2 from whence the rule
was lifted verbatim. Significantly, however, when the Election Code of 1971 (Rep. Act
No. 6388) was superseded by the 1978 Election Code (Pres. Decree No. 1296), said
clause was deleted therefrom. It is likewise absent in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
(Rep. Act No. 6646) and in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which were the
election laws in effect during the 18 January 1988 local elections.
There is no express provision of law, therefore, disauthorizing executions pending

appeal, and the COMELEC, in its procedural rules alone, should not be allowed to divest
Regional Trial Courts of that authority. It deprives the prevailing party of a substantive
right to move for such relief contrary to the constitutional mandate that those Rules can
not diminish nor modify substantive rights (Section 6, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
At any rate, the clause "as soon as the judgment becomes final" had already been
interpreted by this Court as a general one defining the effect of a final judgment on the
right of the winner to assume the contested office as the de jure elected official to serve
up to the end of the term (Gahol v. Hon. Riodique, G.R. No. L-40415, 27 June 1975, 64
SCRA 494 at p. 514). It does not disallow Regional Trial Courts from ordering execution
pending appeal.
Admittedly, unlike in Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971, applied in Gahol v. Hon.
Riodique, supra, there is no express provision in the Electoral Reforms Law (Rep. Act
No. 6646) nor in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) that would allow execution
pending appeal. Said Section 218 reads: chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"Sec. 218. Assumption of office notwithstanding an election contest. — Every candidate

for a provincial, city, municipal or municipal district office duly proclaimed elected by
the corresponding board of canvassers shall assume office, notwithstanding the
pendency in the courts of any contest against his election, without prejudice to the final
decision thereon and applicable provisions of the Rules of Court regarding execution of
judgment pending appeal." cralaw virtua1aw library
Nonetheless, Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows Regional Trial
Courts to order executions pending appeal upon good reasons stated in a special order,
may be made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to election contests decided by them
(Rule 43, Section 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure). Indeed, as much recognition should
be given to the value of the decision of a judicial body as a basis for the right to
assume office as that given by law to the proclamation made by the Board of
Canvassers. In the words of Gahol v. Hon. Riodique, supra: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as a basis of the
right to assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not
the decision of a court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of
canvassers is composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make an
accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more apt to yield to external
considerations, and that the board must act summarily, practically racing against time,
while on the other hand, the judge has the benefit of all the evidence the parties can
offer and of admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart from his
being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before
rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the immediate
execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees, notwithstanding the
perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound
discretion of the court, good reasons therefor." cralaw virtua1aw library
To construe otherwise would be to bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-

prolong-the-protest" techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in
their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence,
lay to waste the will of the electorate (See Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30570,
29 July 1969; Lagumbay v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-25444, 31 January 1966, 16 SCRA
175).
In retrospect, good reasons did, in fact, exist which justified the RTC Order, dated 10
January 1991, granting execution pending appeal. Among others mentioned by the RTC
are the combined considerations of the near expiration of the term of office, public
interest, the pendency of the election contest for more than three (3) years, and that
TOBON UY had filed a bond in the amount of P300,000.00 (Rollo, p. 46).
To recapitulate, in the absence of an express Constitutional or legislative authorization,

the COMELEC is devoid of competence to issue special Writs simply on the basis of its
appellate jurisdiction and its rule-making power. Neither is the COMELEC empowered,
through its procedural rules alone, to deprive Regional Trial Courts of authority, in the
exercise of their discretion, to order execution pending appeal upon good reasons
stated in a special order.
It must be noted that the term of office of the contested positions is nearing expiration.
There is need, then, for this Decision to be immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and prohibition are hereby
GRANTED. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In G.R. No. 88158, the COMELEC Decision, dated 27 April 1989, in SPR No. 2-89 is
hereby SET ASIDE, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
72, dated 28 October 1988 in Election Case No. 02-A, limiting the opening of ballot
boxes to only nine (9) precincts, is hereby REINSTATED, the case to proceed until final
disposition.
In G.R. Nos. 97108-09, the COMELEC Resolution dated 15 February 1991, in SPR Nos.
1-91 and 2-91, is likewise SET ASIDE, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16, dated 10 January 1991, in Election Case No. 369 granting
execution pending appeal, is hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the disposition
of respondent Jose Neyra’s appeal before the COMELEC.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
December 13, 2017
G.R. No. 192048
DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
1
reverse and set aside the Decision dated November 19, 2009 (assailed Decision) and the
2
Resolution dated April 20, 2010 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
3
No. 1077 48, denying petitioner's action for revival of judgment.
In consideration for a loan obtained from respondent First National City Bank of New York (now
Citibank, N.A.) (Citibank), on November 10, 1972, petitioner Douglas F. Anama (Anama) executed a
promissory note in the amount of ₱418,000.00 in favor of Citibank. To secure payment of the
4
obligation, Anama also executed in favor of Citibank a chattel mortgage over various industrial
machineries and equipment located on his property at No. 1302, E. de los Santos Avenue, Quezon
City. For Anama's failure to pay the monthly installments due on the promissory note starting
5
January 1974, Citibank filed a complaint for sum of money and replevin dated November 13, 1974
6
(docketed as Civil Case No. 95991) with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial
Court), Branch 11. Anama filed his answer with counterclaim and his amended answer with
7
counterclaim, alleging, among others, that his failure to pay the monthly installments was due to the
8
fault of Citibank as it refused to receive the checks he issued, and that the chattel mortgage was
defective and void. 9
On December 2, 1974, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), upon proof of default of Anama in the
payment of his loan, issued an Order of Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by
the chattel mortgage. 10
On January 29, 1977, Citibank, alleging that the properties subject of the Order of Replevin which
were taken by the Sheriff under his custody were not delivered to it, filed a motion for [issuance of]
alias writ of seizure. Citibank prayed that an alias writ of seizure be issued directing the Sheriff to
11
seize the properties and to dispose them in accordance with Section 6, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The RTC granted the motion through its Resolution dated February 28, 1977. The Ex-
12
Officio Sheriff of Quezon City issued three receipts for the seized properties on March 1 7, 18, and
19, 1977. Anama filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC in a
13
Resolution dated March 18, 1977.

14
Anama then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction with the CA
on March 21, 1977 (docketed as CAG. R. SP No. 06499) on the ground that the above resolutions of
the trial court were issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because of the
lack of evidence proving Citibank's right to possession over the properties subject of the chattel
mortgage. 15
On July 30, 1982, the CA rendered a Decision (July 30, 1982 Decision) granting Anama's petition
16
for certiorari and prohibition and nullifying the RTC's orders of seizure, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The questioned resolutions issued by the respondent judge in
Civil Case No. 95991, dated February 28, 1977, and March 18, 1977, together with the writs and
processes emanating or deriving therefrom, are hereby declared null and void ab initio.
The respondent ex-of[f]icio sheriff of Quezon City and the respondent First National City Bank are
hereby ordered to return all the machineries and equipments with their accessories seized,
dismantled and hauled, to their original and respective places and positions in the shop flooring of
the petitioner's premises where these articles were, before they were dismantled, seized and hauled
at their own expense. The said respondents are further ordered to cause the repair of the concrete
foundations destroyed by them including the repair of the electrical wiring and facilities affected
during the seizure, dismantling and hauling.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore in effect is hereby made permanent. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED. 17
On August 25, 1982, Citibank filed its petition for review on certiorari with this Court (docketed as
G.R. No. 61508) assailing the July 30, 1982 Decision of the CA.18 On March 17, 1999, we
promulgated a Decision19 dismissing Citibank's petition for lack of merit and affirming the July 30,
1982 Decision of the CA. An Entry of Judgment20 was subsequently issued on April 12, 1999.
Meanwhile, on November 19, 1981, during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 06499 in the CA, the
fourth floor of the Manila City Hall, where Branch 11 of the R TC of Manila and its records, including
the records of Civil Case No. 95991 were located, was destroyed by fire. 21
On February 10, 1982, Anama filed a petition for reconstruction of record in the RTC, which the
22
latter granted in an Order dated May 3, 1982. On December 2, 1982, considering that G.R. No.
23
61508 was already pending before this Court, the R TC issued an Order directing that all pending
24
incidents in Civil Case No. 95991 be suspended until G.R. No. 61508 has been resolved.
On March 12, 2009, Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment with the CA (docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 107748). Anama sought to revive the CA's July 30, 1982 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
25
06499 and argued that Citibank's failure to file an action for the reconstitution of the records in the
RTC in Civil Case No. 95991 constituted abandonment of its cause of action and complaint against
Anama. In addition to the revival of the CA's July 30, 1982 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499,
26
Anama sought to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings in Civil Case No. 95991,
particularly his counterclaims against Citibank. 27
In its comment, Citibank argued that the petition should be dismissed as an action for revival of
judgment is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. It also argued that laches has set in
against Anama for having slept on his rights for almost 10 years. Lastly, Citibank claimed that it did
not abandon its money claim against Anama when it did not initiate the reconstitution proceedings in
the RTC. 28
On November 19, 2009, the CA denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the
assailed Decision reads:
[W]e find that respondent bank correctly question (sic) this Court's jurisdiction to entertain the instant
petition to revive the July 30, 1982 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 06499. While concededly filed within
10 years from the April 12, 1999 entry of the decision rendered in G.R. No. 61508, the petition
should have been filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and/or all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. x x x 29
Anama filed his motion for reconsideration which the CA denied through its assailed Resolution30
dated April 20, 2010.
On June 10, 2010, Anama filed this petition and argued that his petition for revival of judgment
31
should be filed in the court that issued the judgment sought to be revived, the CA in this case. 32
In its comment, Citibank agrees with the CA that jurisdiction over actions for revival of judgments is
33
with the R TC. Citibank also argues that Anama's petition to revive judgment is already barred by
34
laches and that it did not waive or abandon its claim against Anama in Civil Case No. 95991. 35
On December 30, 2010, Anama filed his reply. 36
On August 25, 2016, Anama filed a manifestation reiterating the arguments on his petition. On
37
February 17, 2017, Citibank filed its comment stressing that the CA did not err in dismissing the
38
petition to revive judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On March 16, 2017, Anama filed his
reply.
39
We deny the petition.
An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment which
could no longer be enforced by mere motion. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
40
provides:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time,
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If
the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the
said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint
in a regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes final. 41
Further, a revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of action the judgment sought to be
revived. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is
42 43
a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of
the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is
premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent
action, is already final and executory.44
As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the rules on
instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional
requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the petition does not necessarily have to
be filed in the same court which rendered judgment. 45
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. 46
The principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
47
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. 48
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
and its amendments, is the law which confers jurisdiction to the courts. Section 19 of BP 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides:
49
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs. 50
As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right to have the final
and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and does not involve recovery
of a sum of money, we rule that jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is properly with the R
TCs. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's
action for revival of judgment.
A reading of the CA's jurisdiction also highlights the conclusion that an action for revival of judgment
is outside the scope of jurisdiction of the CA. Section 9 of BP 129 provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo

warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts;
and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The CA also has concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for issuance of writ of amparo, writ
51
of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan.

52 53
Not being one of the enumerated cases above, it is clear that the CA is without jurisdiction to hear
and decide an action for revival of judgment.
Anama's reliance on Aldeguer v. Gemelo to justify his filing with the CA is misplaced. The issue
54
1avvphi1
in Aldeguer is not jurisdiction but venue. The issue was which between the RTC of Iloilo and RTC of
Negros Occidental was the proper court to hear the action.
However, venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by
consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the
parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the
failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid
judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties,
whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional,
55
and hence may be waived. 56
As we have already ruled on jurisdiction, there is no more reason to discuss whether laches has set
in against Anama.
Considering, however, that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 95991 have been suspended and
remains pending since 1982, we deem it necessary to lift the order of suspension and instruct the
trial court to hear and try the case with deliberate dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 19, 2009 and Resolution
dated April 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107748 are AFFIRMED.
We direct the trial court to proceed with the hearing and disposition in Civil Case No. 95991 with all
deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 204970, February 01, 2016
SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA, Petitioners, v. BERNARDO

SEJAS AND JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE
PAGLINAWAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the following dispositions of the
Court of Appeals (CA): 1) November 29, 2011 Decision 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02315 which
granted respondents' Petition for Certiorari and nullified the September 3, 20073 and
February 21, 20084 Orders of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 9 th Judicial
Region, Pagadian City in Civil Case No. 4633-2K5; and 2) November 19, 2012
Resolution5denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
In 2005, petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted before the RTC Civil
Case No. 4633-2K5 against respondent Bernardo Sejas (Sejas). In their Complaint 6 for
specific performance and damages, petitioners claimed among others that Sejas was
the registered owner of a 434-square meter parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del
Sur covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8,337 7 (TCT T-8,337); that by virtue
of a private handwritten document,8 Sejas sold said parcel of land to them in 1982; that
thereafter, they took possession of the land and constructed a house thereon; that they
resided in said house and continued to reside therein; that Sejas later reasserted his
ownership over said land and was thus guilty of fraud and deceit in so doing; and that
they caused the annotation of an adverse claim. They prayed that Sejas be ordered to
execute a final deed of sale over the property and transfer the same to them, and that
they be awarded the sum of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,500.00 per court
appearance of counsel.
In an Amended Complaint,9 this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and

damages, petitioners impleaded respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional
defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the subject property to her, after
which she caused the cancellation of TCT T-8,337 and the issuance of a new title - TCT
T-46,627 - in her name. Petitioners prayed that Sejas be ordered to execute a final
deed of sale in their favor and transfer the property to them; that Paglinawan's TCT T-
46,627 be canceled and the property be reconveyed to them; and that they be awarded
P50,000.00 in moral damages, in addition to the P30,000.00 attorney's fees and
P1,500.00 per court appearance of counsel originally prayed for in the Complaint.
However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in the Amended
Complaint were not paid.10 Likewise, for the additional causes of action, no docket fees
were charged and paid.
Respondents moved for dismissal of the case, claiming lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and prescription. The RTC denied the motion in a September 3, 2007
Order.11
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 arguing that petitioners' case was not
for specific performance but was in reality a real action or one involving title to and
possession of real property, in which case the value of the property should be alleged in
the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be computed and paid; that since
the value of the land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper filing fee
was not paid, and for this reason the case should be dismissed; and that petitioners'
cause of action is barred by prescription since the 10-year period to sue upon the
handwritten contract - counted from their purchase of the land in 1982 - had already
lapsed when they filed the case in 2005. However, in a February 21, 2008 Order, 13 the
RTC denied the motion, stating among others that petitioners' case is not a real action
but indeed one for specific performance and thus one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondents filed an original Petition for Certiorari14 before the CA, which was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 02315, On November 29, 2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision,
which contained the following pronouncement: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act
in a case. In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law, the rule is
settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant
allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character
of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted.
Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that
the prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the
effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed filing and docket fees.
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-G4-SC and Supreme
Court Amended Administrative Circular No, 35-2004, provides that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. -
(a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim,

CROSSCLAIM, or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a
third-party, fourth-party, etc, complaint, or a compldnt-in-intervention, if the total sum
claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES
OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES
AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the
REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR
CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION X X X AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is:
[Table of fees omitted.]

If the action involves both a money claim and relief pertaining to property, then THE
fees will be charged on both the amounts claimed and value of property based on the
formula prescribed in this paragraph a.
(b) For filing:

1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated
2. Special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure of mortgage,

EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND QUIETING OF TITLE
which will [sic]
3. All other actions not involving property [Table of fees omitted.]
The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141. in cases involving real property depend
on the fair market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the
higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or
flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
xxxx
As can be gleaned from the records, the Amended Complaint was styled as one for
'Specific Performance and Damages,' whereby private respondents 15 sought to compel
petitioner Sejas to execute fee deed of sale over the subject land in their favor on the
premise that they bought the said land from petitioner Sejas through a private
document. They declared themselves to be the true and real owners of the subject land
and had in fact taken possession over it to the exclusion of others including petitioner
Sejas.
While it may appear that the suit filed is one for specific performance, hence an aption
incapable of pecuniary estimation, a closer look at the allegations and reliefs prayed for
in the Complaint, however, shows that private respondents were not merely seeking
the execution of the deed of sale in their favor. They were also asking the lower court
earnestly to cancel TCT No. T-46,627 which was allegedly issued to petitioner
Pagljnawan through fraudulent means and have the same reconveyed to them as the
owners of the subject land, The ultimate purpose then of private respondents in filing
the complaint before the RTC is to secure their vaunted ownership and title to the
subject land which they claimed was purchased from petitioner Sejas. Their cause of
action clearly springs from their right as purchaser of the subject land, Under these
circumstances, the suit before the RTC is a real action, affecting as it did title to the real
property sought to be reconveyed. A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC, had a specific paragraph governing the assessment of the docket fees for real
action, to wit:
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees.
But it is important to note that, with the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC, which became effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7, Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, pertaining specifically to the basis for the computation of docket
fees for real actions was deleted. Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as amended,
provides that 'in cases involving real property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL
property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL
VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH [sic] IS HIGHER, OR IF
THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x x x' shall be
the basis for the computation of the docket fees.
Unfortunately, private respondents never alleged in their Amended Complaint, much

less in the prayer portion thereof, the fair market value of the subject res as stated in
the Tax Declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which
[sic] is higher, or if there is none, the stated value thereof, to serve as basis for the
receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing fee due?
thereon. In the absence of such allegation, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or
the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action. There is
therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the action of the private respondents. Hence, the RTC erred in taking
cognizance of the case despite private respondents' non-payment of the correct docket
fees which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
The consistent rule is that 'a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court,' and that jurisdiction over any case is
acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory
and jurisdictional. x x x
xxxx
This case at bench bears similarity to Gochan v. Gochan,16 where the Supreme Court
held that although the caption of the complaint filed by therein respondents Mercedes
Gochan, et al. with the RTC was denominated as one for 'specific performance and
damages,' the relief sought was the conveyance or transfer of real property, or
ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties
enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances,
the case before the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or
possession of real property. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket
fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as
alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in their complaint
the value of the real properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the correct docket fees.
More to the point is Huguete v. Embudo,17 There, petitioners argued that a complaint

for annulment of a deed of sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
thus falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. However, the Supreme Court
ruled that 'the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of
the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where
the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed
value of the property subject thereof.'
Likewise, in Siapno v. Manalo,18 the Supreme Court disregarded the title/denomination

of therein plaintiff Manalo's amended petition as one for Mandamus with Revocation of
Title and Damages; and adjudged the same to be a real action, the filing fees for which
should have been computed based on the assessed value of the subject property or, if
there was none, the estimated value thereof. x x x
xxxx
In fine, We rule and so hold that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
4633-2K5, hence, its act of taking cognizance of the subject Complaint was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion is defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.
Given the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to dwell on the issue of prescription
raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders
dated 03 September 2007 and 21 February 2008, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), 9th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Pagadian City, are DECLARED NULL and
VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction, The Amended Complaint filed [sic]
private respondents docketed as Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 which the CA denied in its assailed

November 19, 2012 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
In a March 19, 2014 Resolution,21 the Court resolved to give due course to the instant
Petition.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. Did the Court of Appeals ruled [sic] correctly when it dismissed the complaint by
reason of Petitioner-Appellants' alleged non-payment of the correct dockets [sic] fees
due to its [sic] failure to alleged [sic] the fair market value or the stated value of the
subject property in the amended complaint?
2. Did the filing of the amended complaint sufficiently divested [sic] and ousted [sic]
the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case that had initially validly attached by virtue
of the Original complaint for specific performance? 22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners' Arguments
In praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that their Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 be reinstated, petitioners contend in their Petition
and Reply23 that it was error for the CA to order the dismissal of their Amended
Complaint simply because additional causes of action were alleged and new reliefs were
prayed for, and the additional docket fees therefor were not paid; that while
reconveyance was sought in the Amended Complaint, the principal action was still for
specific performance, and the reconveyance prayed for was merely incidental thereto;
that since the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case with the filing of the original
Complaint, it did not lose the same as a result of the filing of the Amended Complaint;
that jurisdiction continued to attach even with the submission of the Amended
Complaint; that their failure to pay the additional docket fees required for the Amended
Complaint does not result in loss of jurisdiction over the case - instead, the Amended
Complaint is simply not admitted and the original Complaint remains; 24 that instead of
dismissing the case, the Amended Complaint should have been disregarded, or
petitioners should have been ordered to pay the deficiency in docket fees within a
reasonable period of time; that "the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable
time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such
payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action,
unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action;"25 and that the rules of procedure should be liberally applied in their case, as
there is no intention to evade the payment of additional docket fees, as is shown by the
payment of the original filing fees when the case was instituted.
Respondents' Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment26 that the CA was correct in
ruling that Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 should be dismissed; that while the complaint is for
specific performance, the relief prayed for includes reconveyance, which is a real action
- in which case the assessed value of the property should have been alleged for the
proper computation of the docket fees. Thus, they pray for the denial of the Petition,
with double costs against petitioners.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as
one mainly for specific performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the
property, as well as the cancellation of Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627. In other words,
petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed ownership
and title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 27 a real action is one that affects
title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.
Since Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later
filed, petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC28 relative to declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current
tax declaration or zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Since no
such allegation was made in the Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject
property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the
Amended Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of
docket fees to be paid.
The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required
declaration of the fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or first level court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since the jurisdiction
of these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property. Under applicable
rules,
Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of
BP 129,29which reads;
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129,
which provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (950,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the
declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000.00.
The handwritten document sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was
purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case
against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the
absence of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR. Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC and Supreme Court Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, provides that -
a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or
money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party,
fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed,
INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND,
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving
property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT x x x (Emphasis supplied)
shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees to be paid. Since the value of
the subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the
RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance; it should have
dismissed Civil Case No. 4633-2K5. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of
the case, the trial court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, The assailed November 29, 2011 Decision and
November 19, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02315
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
[G.R. No. 159941 : August 17, 2011]
HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA AND ELISA RETERTA, NAMELY:

EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, AND AVELINA M. RETERTA,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES LORENZO MORES AND VIRGINIA LOPEZ,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and
reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being friar land under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of
discretion that can be corrected through certiorari.
The petitioners, whose complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance the RTC had
dismissed, had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but the Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that certiorari was not a substitute
for an appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal. They now appeal that ruling of
the CA promulgated on April 25, 2003.[1]
Antecedents
On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983), [2] averring that
they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez
Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited
the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had
been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late
father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in
1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed
whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue
of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent
Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting

that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the
land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence
Civil Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding:[3]
Considering that plaintiffs in this case sought the review of the propriety of the grant of
lot 2938 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Friar Lands Estate by the Lands Management
Bureau of the defendant Lorenzo Mores through the use of the forged Affidavit and
Sales Certificate No. V-769 which eventually led to the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-64071
to defendant Lorenzo Mores and wife Virginia Mores, and considering further that the
land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently
Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands
the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the determination
whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate
rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion
that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. On the second ground relied
upon by the defendants in their Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state that the Court
deemed not to discuss the same.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let this instant case be dismissed as it is hereby

dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied
their motion for reconsideration on February 21, 2002.[4]
On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition

for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on April 25, 2003, holding: [5]
Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the case at bench, when the court rendered the assailed decision, the remedy of the
petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But petitioners did not.
Instead they filed the present special civil action for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the
decision of the court a quo has become final.
The Order dismissing the case was issued by the court a quo on 29 October 2001,
which Order was received by the petitioners on November 16, 2001. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration dated November 26, 2001 but the same was denied by the
court a quo on 21 February 2002. The Order denying the motion for reconsideration
was received by the petitioners on 20 March 2002.
Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari on May 15, 2002. Certiorari, however cannot
be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423, the Supreme Court had the following
to say:
<BLOCKQUOTE>"We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar
that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Certiorari cannot
be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive."</BLOCKQUOTE>
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.[6]
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioners submit that:
I.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, RULE 41, SECOND PARAGRAPH, SUBPARAGRAPH (a),
AND SECTION 9, RULE 37, 1997 RULES OF COURT;
II.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO APPLY THE

RULING IN THE CASE OF ROSETE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 339 SCRA 193, 199,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ALREADY
TOOK EFFECT ON JULY 1, 1997.
III.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN NOT FINDING

THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
COMPLAINT RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE NATURE OF THE
ACTION, AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SAME.[7]
Briefly stated, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
1.
Propriety of certiorari as remedy
against dismissal of the action
The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that the
order granting the respondents' motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due
course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its
being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.[8]
Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their
proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of
procedure, specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of
the Rules of Court ("An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order") prohibited
an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph
of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( "No appeal may be taken from: xxx An
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration") expressly declared that an
order denying a motion for reconsideration was not appealable. They remind that the
third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the instances "where
the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65."
The petitioners' position has no basis.
For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order
granting the respondents' motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order
for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to
do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an
interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,[9] viz:
The concept of `final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has `become final' (or
èxecutory' as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A `final'
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more
to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits
which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of
the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be
done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may
consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an
appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it
becomes `final' or, to use the established and more distinctive term, `final and
executory.'
xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end
the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court, is ìnterlocutory,' e.g., an order denying
a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or
things, etc. Unlike a `final' judgment or order, which is appealable, as above
pointed out, an ìnterlocutory' order may not be questioned on appeal except
only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
rendered in the case.
Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners,
indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the
respondents' motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly:
<BLOCKQUOTE>Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or

reconsideration. - An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final
order.</BLOCKQUOTE>
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for

reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable.
A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new
evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of
the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either
because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to
justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.
[10]
By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a
trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and
leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the
denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.
The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court - the version in force at the time when the CA
rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 - included an order denying a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. -- An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or

compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main
case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)
It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has
since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders,
and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to
reverse the CA on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA
correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed
final order.
2.
RTC or MTC has jurisdiction over the action
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is
available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to
and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the
broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the
undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and
(b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco
Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court has declared that the requirement
that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the
issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use
of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy
remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety
of certiorari.[12] A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency.[13] It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by
resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and
set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of
Court.[14]
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available
as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look
beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise
supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to
make it conformable to law and justice.[15] Verily, the instances in which certiorari will
issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and
usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of
the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of
superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the
writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.[16]
The petitioners' complaint - self-styled as being for the "quieting of title and
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate, reconveyance and
damages" - would challenge the efficacy of the respondents' certificate of title under the
theory that there had been no valid transfer or assignment from the petitioners'
predecessor in interest to the respondents of the rights or interests in the land due to
the affidavit assigning such rights and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.
The petitioners' cause of action for reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing
upon the manner by which to establish a right in a piece of friar land. According
to Arayata v. Joya,[17] in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of
sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of
transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his
approval and registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of
a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words, where a person considered
as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon, such transfer must
conform to certain requirements of the law. Under Director of Lands v. Rizal,[18]the
purchaser in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the
actual owner of the lot purchased even before the payment of the full payment price
and before the execution of the final deed ofconveyance, subject to the obligation to
pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that of
a mere lien holder or mortgagee.[19]
Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120, [20] had grantee Teofilo Reterta perfected
his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him and taken title from him
upon his death. By law, therefore, should the execution of the deed in favor of the
respondents be held invalid, the interests of Teofilo Reterta should descend to the
petitioners and the deed should issue in their favor. Adding significance to the
petitioners' claim was their allegation in the complaint that they were in possession of
the land. Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners' opposition to the motion to dismiss of
the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the price of the land. [21]
Given the foregoing, the petitioners' complaint made out a good case for reconveyance
or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might well warrant the
reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the petitioners. It did not matter that
the respondents already held a certificate of title in their names. In essence, an action
for reconveyance respects the incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks
the transfer of the property to its rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having
been fraudulently or mistakenly registered in another person's name. There is no
special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the aggrieved party
asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered owner, and
that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
[22]
On this score, it is also worthy to stress that the title of a piece of a friar land
obtained by a grantee from the Government without conforming with the requirements
set by the law may be assailed and nullified.
Was the petitioners' action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court?
We answer the query in the affirmative.
The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[24] which provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. -- Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
xxx
Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a

cloud on one's title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the
assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC
having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative
of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the
assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought. [25]
The respondents' reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their
position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction
was without basis. The provisions read:
Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to
sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so
fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands
xxx and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held
by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective
in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration
Act xxx.
Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to
the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners' action
for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in
favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latter's name. By ignoring the
petitioners' showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by
disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and
capriciously.
Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. [26] The abuse
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.[27]
The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners
bereft of any remedy to protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such,
they would suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC's
dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do
justice to the unjustly aggrieved.[28]
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for certiorari; sets aside the decision the
Court of Appeals promulgated on April 25, 2003; and directs Branch 23 of the Regional
Trial Court in Trece Martires City to resume the proceedings in Civil Case No. TM-983
with dispatch.
The respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173390 June 27, 2012
MELCHOR L. LAGUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
In dismissing the present Petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we find no valid,
justifiable reason for petitioner’s failure to file his appellant’s brief with the Court of Appeals (CA) that
would warrant a reversal of the CA Resolutions dated 25 November 2005 and 17 May 2006. To rule
1 2
otherwise would make light of this Court’s extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction, which operates only
upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the appellate tribunal.
3
On 11 April 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig rendered a Decision in Criminal Case
Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H finding the accused petitioner guilty of homicide and sentencing him
to 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years of reclusion temporal as maximum in each case.
On 19 May 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
27423. On 18 June 2003, he filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail Pending Appeal, which the CA
granted without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. On 6 November 2003, an Order of
4
release upon bond was issued in his favor by the Division Clerk of Court of the CA. 5
On 14 October 2003, petitioner received the Order from the CA requiring, within 45 days from receipt
thereof, or until 28 November 2003, the filing of his Appellant’s Brief. He filed a Motion for Extension
6
of another 45 days from 28 November 2003, or until 12 January 2004, within which to file the said
brief. On 8 January 2004, he filed a Second Motion for Extension asking for an additional 45 days,
which the CA granted with a warning that no further extension shall be allowed. Thus, petitioner had
7
45 days from 12 January 2004 or until 26 February 2004.
Despite the two extensions, petitioner Lagua still failed to file his appellant’s brief. On 5 May 2004,
the CA ordered him through counsel to show cause, within five days from receipt, why the appeal
should not be dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. He again failed to
submit his brief within the reglementary period and to comply with the Court’s 5 May 2004
Resolution. Thus, on 1 September 2004, the CA issued a Resolution declaring the appeal
abandoned and accordingly dismissed pursuant to the Rules.
On 14 October 2004, petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Salvador Quimpo, manifested to the Court
that he had already withdrawn as defense counsel for petitioner, but that he had failed to secure the
latter’s conformity. The following day, petitioner himself filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 1
8
September 2004 Resolution, requesting more time to secure the services of another counsel. On 20
October 2004, the Solicitor General, manifesting that accused-appellant’s abandonment of his
appeal rendered the judgment of conviction final and executory, moved for his immediate arrest and
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. 9
In its Resolution dated 9 February 2005, the CA stated that it had never received a Notice of
Withdrawal from Atty. Quimpo, but nevertheless granted a 30-day period for petitioner and his new
counsel to file a Notice of Appearance. Again, petitioner failed to comply. On 8 July 2005, the CA
issued another Show Cause Order, directing him to explain within 10 days why he had not caused
the appearance of his new counsel, and why the appeal should not be considered abandoned.
Instead of filing a timely compliance, petitioner’s new counsel, Atty. Emerson Barrientos filed a
Notice of Appearance on 8 March 2005 or almost a month after the Show Cause Order.
On 17 August 2005, the CA filed a Resolution stating that in the interest of justice, the Notice of
Appearance was considered sufficient compliance with the Order of 8 July 2005. It granted the
Motion for Reconsideration, set aside the Order of Dismissal issued on 1 September 2004, and gave
petitioner and his new counsel a non-extendible period of 30 days within which to file the appellant’s
brief.
Notwithstanding the new non-extendible period, petitioner again failed to seasonably file his brief,
prompting the CA to issue the first assailed Resolution dated 25 November 2005, which, for the
second time, declared his appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissed. Roused from inaction, he
filed another Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief on 19 December
2005, or 18 days after his counsel received the 25 November 2005 Resolution.
In its second assailed Resolution issued on 17 May 2006, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and ordered the Appellant’s Brief to be expunged from the records, viz:
Indeed the present appeal has been dismissed twice by the Court because of accused-appellant’s
failure to file his brief. The present motion for reconsideration of the second dismissal of the appeal
was even filed three (3) days beyond the reglementary period. Ineluctably, the dismissal of the
present appeal has become final and accused-appellant has lost his right to appeal.
It bears stressing that accused-appellant cannot simply trifle with the rules of procedure on the
pretext that his life and liberty are at stake. For appeal is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law granting the privilege. x x x.
10
Petitioner comes to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in
declaring the appeal abandoned, pointing to the negligence and errors of his counsel as the cause of
the two-year delay in coming up with the brief. Petitioner reasons that there would be no prejudice to
the People if his appeal is reinstated, and that he has a good defense that can lead to his acquittal.
We dismiss the Petition.
The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is rigorously streamlined, such that Rule 65 only
admits cases based on the specific grounds provided therein. The Rule applies if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The independent
action for certiorari will lie only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proven to exist. Grave
abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross. 11
In the present case, petitioner would have us strike down the Resolutions of the CA declaring his
appeal as abandoned for purportedly being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Yet, far from
committing the grievous error petitioner presents it to be, the CA merely exercised the authority
expressly granted to it under Rule 124, which we quote below:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may,
upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this rule, except in case the appellant
is represented by a counsel de oficio.
Petitioner was represented by private counsel (and not counsel de oficio) to whom the CA had
granted multiple extensions: two for Atty. Quimpo; and two for Atty. Barrientos, whose Notice of
Appearance was submitted a month after the Show Cause Order of 8 July 2005. As for Atty.
Quimpo, he filed his Manifestation more than a month after the CA had first issued the dismissal. It
was only because of the plea for compassion in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration that the CA
granted him another 30 days in order to secure the services of another lawyer. Again, petitioner
failed to comply. Both he and the new counsel, Atty. Barrientos, also failed to comply with the
second Show Cause Order.
Yet again, the CA allowed Atty. Barrientos’ Notice of Appearance and considered it substantial
compliance with the second Show Cause Order. Out of the CA’s liberality, petitioner was given
another 30 days to come up with the Appellant’s Brief. This he failed to submit, prompting the CA, for
the second and final time, to declare his appeal as abandoned. Even then, his Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief was filed 18 days after his counsel received
the CA Resolution.
In his Petition, Lagua bewails the negligence and mishandling by his two previous counsels as the
reason for the delay, which has lasted for more than two years. However, it is clear from the facts
that despite the liberality and consideration afforded to him by the CA, he is by no means blameless.
More importantly, his excuse cannot serve as a substitute for the jurisdictional requirements under
Rule 65. It does not amount to any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
discretion that may be attributable to the appellate court. Under the circumstances, the CA was well
within the authority granted to it under the cited rule.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the
client. Otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit, so long as counsel could allege its own
12
fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the
operation of law.
The rationale for this rule is reiterated in the recent case Bejarasco v. People:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm
of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the
implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel
within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of
the client himself.
It is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed
of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of
his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. (Emphasis supplied.)
13
In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact with their counsel from time to time, and
informed themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that standard of care "which
an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business."
Even in the absence of the petitioner’s negligence, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is bound
by the mistakes of his counsel. In the earlier case of Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized –
It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct
of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he
proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be
admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new
counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent or experienced or learned."
Thus, with the ordinary remedy of appeal lost through the petitioner’s own fault, we affirm that no
reversible error was committed in the dismissal of the petition by the appellate court. 14
Petitioner was granted bail, and he had all the time to contact his counsel or follow up on the appeal
himself. He is similarly responsible for procuring the services of new counsel after having been told
1âwphi1
of Atty. Quimpo’s withdrawal. Yet he offered no explanation why it took him so long to apprise Atty.
Barrientos of the case, or why they had repeatedly failed to comply with the CA’s Orders after
several extensions. As he has lost the ordinary remedy of appeal because of his own laxity, we
cannot allow him to haphazardly take advantage of the remedy of certiorari.
The Court cannot tolerate habitual failure to follow the procedural rules, which are indispensable for
the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. Otherwise these rules would be rendered useless. In 15
Polintan v. People, the Court of Appeals gave the petitioner therein a total of 75 days to submit his
Appellant’s Brief, but he failed to do so. In that case, the accused Polintan filed a "Very Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief." This Court affirmed the CA Resolution declaring his appeal
abandoned, after finding his excuses too flimsy to warrant reversal.
In the present case, accused Lagua was given more time, not only to file his Appellant’s Brief, but
also to secure new counsel to adequately prepare the appeal. The CA issued two Show Cause
Orders and two Resolutions declaring the appeal as abandoned. Despite these issuances, his
second Motion for Reconsideration was filed 18 days after his receipt of the second and final CA
Resolution. To our mind, this delay is indicative of sheer laxity and indifference on his part, for which
he has lost the statutory right of appeal. Even during the intervening period after counsel has
withdrawn, litigants are expected to be vigilant and conscious of the status of their cases, viz:
The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants
have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have
only themselves to blame for their counsel’s utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect in not
having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same. They could not even
claim ignorance of the appellate court’s notice to file brief since it had required withdrawing counsel
Valente to secure their written conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and certainly
they must have ascertained from him as well as new counsel the status of their appeal — which
accounts for Atty. Valente’s repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the granting of
sufficient time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a year thereafter to make sure that
their new counsel did attend to their appeal and did file the brief.
16
In Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang v. Gaviola, the Court made a clear finding of negligence on
17
the part of the lawyer handling the petitioner’s case, but nevertheless affirmed the denial of the
appeal. It confirmed that the petitioner was bound by his counsel’s negligence. It ruled that "the right
to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law."
Neither can we deem petitioner Lagua’s Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s
Brief as substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. In Cariño v. Espinoza, the18
appellate court rightly disallowed the submission of the Appellant’s Brief after a delay of seven
months. In this case, it took petitioner almost two years from 26 February 2004 (after the CA gave
him a second non-extendible period of 45 days) to finally submit his Appellant’s Brief on 19
December 2005.
Lastly, it is erroneous for petitioner to declare that there would be no prejudice to the People if his
appeal is reinstated. The judgment of conviction having attained finality, respondent is now entitled
19
to execution as a matter of right. This Court has recently declared:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded,
for the immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major
component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the
full execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or
enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strict
observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence. x x x.
20
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals
on 25 November 2005 and 17 May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27423 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein
private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration
Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was
no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the
semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax
(VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle
of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management
of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other
government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita
then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between
the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the
labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he
worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995
to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and petitioner. 4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed
5
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997
for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
6
discretion.
7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and
opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial
review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing
number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over
the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the
Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)
now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of
Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be
appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six
months after its promulgation. Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was
8
attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination
only. Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of
9
appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been
provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the
decision of the NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715,
10
instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt
of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is
an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties;
and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
12
65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
13
decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already
have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if
filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as
follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under
the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective
March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power
to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court
of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, the
16
following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A.
No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the
Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the
section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code
of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over
which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and terminology.
As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now
been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of
course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional
Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except,
among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ."
This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie
from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from
17
the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has
no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned
amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and
impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases
in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may
have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the
term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently
arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No.
10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech from
19
which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and
powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final
judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court
by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of
Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the
"decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines
and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court
are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions
enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review
of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation
Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court.
(Emphases and corrections ours)
x x x x x x x x x
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides
the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without
depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in

1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme

Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties
involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the
guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic
rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been
cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to
400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall
continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have
submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and
collegial approval of our Chamber.
x x x x x x x x x
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was
introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that
issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was
also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we
understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee
amendments.
approved. (Emphasis supplied).
x x x x x x x x x
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second
reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. The
21
Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having
theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the
Senate on February 20, 1995, inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme
22
Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action
of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use
of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been
a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes
of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them,
however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action
of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are
23
allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse
from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be
circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically
emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of
Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be
reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said
bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal
to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual
in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law,
on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being
elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the
case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions;
and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major
aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their
hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. should be taken into
25
account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the
part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants
who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is
available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction,
or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not
only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because
of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the
case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without
SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. 136368. January 16, 2002.

JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C.

The facts are as stated in the impugned Decision, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of

SO ORDERED. (Annex `B’, Petition; Emphasis added).’

Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF

`WHEREFORE, . . . the Motion for Consolidation and a Writ of Possession is hereby

Petitioner assails the aforequoted Decision as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

II. Appeal not certiorari was the appropriate remedy of private respondents as there

"TO : COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL

SUBJECT : RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC APPROVING AND PROMULGATING

It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a

April 18, 1994.

(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA Chief Justice"

The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.

"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a

The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response to complaints over

"9.17. Procedural laws.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1653 July 30, 2007

EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALEZ, Complainant,

This is an Administrative Complaint1 filed by Eugenio Juan R. Gonzalez (Gonzalez) against Judge

G.R. No. L-286 March 29, 1946

[G.R. No. L-6120. June 30, 1953.]

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, Petitioner, v. FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Judge-at-

Claro M. Recto for Petitioner.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles for Respondents.

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL WITH AID OF ASSESSORS, A

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DISTINGUISHED FROM PROCEDURAL. — A

3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ASSESSORS; TRIAL; RIGHT TO ASSESSORS STILL

The issues now posed by petitioner are: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 is unconstitutional

The contention of respondents — we reckon — is predicated on the assumption that the

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ.,

G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of

Petition is therefore granted.

Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said reglementary section,

Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally be convicted, he is

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito and Saling

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact

The motion is denied.

G.R. No. 173942 June 25, 2008

FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. and FAIRWAYS AND BLUE-WATERS RESORT AND

G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their

Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A person desiring to appeal

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

G.R. No. 173615 October 16, 2009

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

We draw no merit in the petition.

The argument is unconvincing.

August 15, 2017

Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, " which2

The facts are not in dispute.