Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism” in Survival Volume

42, No. 1, published spring 2000

Reviewed by Isaac Moddel

University of New South Wales
Sydney, Australia

Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin’s article, “America and the New Terrorism”
analyses both what the authors determine to be a new form of terrorism, and the way
American counter-terrorism strategy has evolved.
According to Simon and Benjamin:
[T]he old paradigm of predominantly state sponsored terrorism has been joined by a
new, religiously motivated terrorism that neither relies on the support of sovereign
states nor is constrained by the limits on violence that the state sponsors have
observed themselves or placed on their proxies.1
Simply, the authors believe that the combination of a religious motivation and a desire to
inflict catastrophic damage constitute a new form of terrorism . Whereas, the “old” form of
terrorism would perpetrate terrorist attacks which were usually “carefully targeted and
proportionate in scope and intensity to the practical political objectives being pursued…[due
to the calculation] that indiscriminate violence would alienate compatriots they wanted to
attract.”2 Thus, due to the need for support of their struggle, the “old” terrorists would refrain
from indiscriminate violence, while the “newer” terrorists did not.
Simon and Benjamin also hypothesis that due to the inability to “deter such
adversaries, given their religious passion driving their violent behavior…[which insinuates
that] There will probably be attacks attempted on US soil.”3 For that reason, the United States
would have to amend its counterterrorism approach. The authors observed that the Clinton
administration took major steps in building up its domestic infrastructure to deal with the
threat. For example, the United States not only expanded the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s counter-terrorism division,4 it also centralized the control over operational
activities to counter the terrorist threat, and created the new position of National Coordinator

1
Page 59.
2
Page 65 – 66.
3
Page 72 – 73.
4
Page 59 – 60.

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for Counter-Terrorism, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Security “to oversee the
expanding panoply of federal counter-terrorism programs.”5
While Simon and Benjamin wrote about both what they believe to be a new form of
terrorism and American counter-terrorism strategy, the critique of the authors’ paper will
focus on the concept of new terrorism. This is due to their explanation of American counter-
terrorism strategy being not only descriptive of what has already taken place, but based on
sound evidence. Furthermore, the strategy that the authors advise the American government
to undertake is a comprehensive approach to containing, and maybe even beating, the threat
of terrorism.
In Simon and Benjamin’s explanation of what differentiates the new terrorism from
the old form of terrorism, there seems to arise some contradictions within the paper. For
example, on page 59, as cited earlier, the authors write that the new form of terrorism
“neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by the limits on violence
that the state sponsors have observed themselves or placed on their proxies.” 6 Yet, on page
71, they state that, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) “are difficult to obtain, handle
safely and store.”7 For that reason, the most likely way for terrorists to obtain WMDs is from
a state sponsor, which makes them reliant on the state for such capabilities. Brad Roberts of
the Institute for Defense Analyses supports this argument advocating, “if state sponsors…can
be deterred from facilitating such [WMD] attacks, small cells…seem unlikely to be able to
master all of the technical and operational requirements of successful WMD attacks.” 8
Furthermore, this deterrence, by threat of retaliation against the state sponsor “is credited by
many experts with inducing the leaders of terrorism sponsoring states not to open their WMD
arsenals…to those whom they sponsor.”9 Thus, when it comes to WMDs it seems like there
is flaw in Simon and Benjamin’s analysis, for, not only are terrorists dependent on states for
this capability, but due to threat of retaliation, states have not yet passed on this capability,
which essentially constrains the terrorists limits on violence.
Another problem that arose within the literature was the use of Bruce Hoffman’s
work, “‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative”,
in order to prove that religiously motivated terrorists carried out more lethal attacks than

5
Page 60.
6
Page 59
7
Page 71
8
Roberts, B, 2007, Deterrence and WMD Terrorism: Calibrating its Potential Contributions to Risk
Reduction, Retrieved 9 August, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA470305. Pp. 27.
9
Ibid. Pp. 20.

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terrorist attacks that were not inspired by religion. 10 According to the cited document,
religiously motivated terrorist organizations committed “10 of the 13 most lethal terrorist
attacks” in 1996.11 While this may be true, upon a closer examination of terrorist attacks in
1996, a completely different picture is formed. According to the Global Terrorism Database
in 1996, there were 123 terrorist attacks with ten or more fatalities. 12 Out of 123 attacks sixty
were perpetrated by nationalist or non-religious terrorists, twenty were by religious, with
another forty-three by unknown assailants. While the authors acknowledge that in previous
years there were fewer religiously motivated attacks than non-religiously motivated, they
hypothesis that nonetheless, religiously motivated attacks account for more of a percentage
of fatalities. However, when calculating the average fatality per attack this hypothesis bears
no fruit. Out of the sixty attacks perpetrated by nationalist or non-religious terrorists 1383
people were killed, making the average deaths per an attack 23.05, while out of the 20
terrorist attacks carried out by religiously motivated terrorists, 397 people were killed,
making the average deaths per attack 19.85. (As shown below in Table 1, 2, 3). 13 Thus, upon
a closer examination, it is evident that religiously motivated attacks in 1996 were not more
lethal than those not motivated by religious beliefs.
Although it seems that at the time of the publishing of this article there was not much
of a difference in terms of violence between the “old” and the “new” forms of terrorism, after
the attacks of 9/11, Simon and Benjamin’s hypothesis, that the new form of terrorism opted
for mass causalities over publicity, became extremely relevant. So much so that Bruce
Hoffman, the leading authority on terrorism after 9/11, stated that, Simon and Benjamin’s
“observation was indeed correct.”14Thus, at the time when America was most vulnerable,
Simon and Benjamin’s analysis proved timely, and offered the new American administration
direction on its “war on terrorism”.

10
Page 66.
11
Ibid.
12
Since Simon and Benjamin discussed the destructive nature of the “new terrorism”, instead of looking at
every terrorist attack in 1996, I have only looked at terrorist attacks were there were ten or more fatalities.
13
Global Terrorism Database, Date: (between 1996-01-01 and 1996-12-31), Retrieved 10 August, 2010,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=1996&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=
1996&end_month=12&end_day=31&success=yes&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&count=100#results-table
14
Hoffman, B, 2002, Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11, in Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, Vol. 25, No. 5, Pp. 303 – 316, Retrieved 12 August, 2010, http://jeffreyfields.net/pols/Rethinking
%20terrorism.pdf. Pp. 315.

3
 Table 115
Nationalist/Non-Religious Terrorist Attacks Above 10 Fatalities
Number of Most killed in
Terrorist Group Killed
attacks one attack
Chechen rebels 1 23 23
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 2 28 17
United Front for Nigeria's Liberation
(UFNL) 1 14 14
Karen National Union 2 36 20
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 22 581 90
Shining Path (SL) 2 25 15
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 10 347 91
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) 4 69 31
Right-Wing Paramilitaries (Colombia) 1 10 10
Left-Wing Guerrillas (Colombia) 2 20 10
Sudan Alliance Forces 2 30 15
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) 1 20 20
Rebels (Peru) 1 11 11
Khmer Rouge 1 14 14
Political Activists (Pakistan) 1 10 10
Shinwari Tribe 1 15 15
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 1 12 12
Shanti Bahini 1 30 30
People's War Group (PWG) 1 14 14
National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB) 1 11 11
National Socialist Council of Nagaland 1 30 30
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) 1 33 33
       
Total 60 1383 91
Average deaths per an attack is 23.05

Table 216
15
Global Terrorism Database, Date: (between 1996-01-01 and 1996-12-31), Retrieved 10 August, 2010,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=1996&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=
1996&end_month=12&end_day=31&success=yes&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&count=100#results-table
16
Ibid.

4
 Religious Terrorist Attacks Above 10 Fatalities
Number of Most killed in
Terrorist Group Killed
attacks one attack
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front 1 13 13
Separatists (India) 4 65 20
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 3 59 26
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 2 24 13
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) 1 17 17
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 2 22 12
Hizballah 1 19 19
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 1 18 18
Shiite Muslims (Pakistan) 2 118 97
Ujjan Tribe 1 10 10
Islamic Terrorists (Algeria) 1 12 12
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 1 20 20
       
Total 20 397 97
Average deaths per an attack is 19.85

Table 317
Unknown Organization Behind Terrorist Attacks Above 10 Fatalities
Number of Most killed in
Region Killed
attacks one attack
India 5 66 15
South Africa 1 14 14
Tajikistan 1 22 22
Algeria 16 243 31
Sierra Leone 3 69 36
Uganda 3 36 16
Pakistan 1 37 37
Congo 4 64 28
Peru 1 11 11
Afghanistan 1 16 16
Turkey 1 10 10
Colombia 1 10 10
China 1 11 11
Liberia 1 10 10
Russia 2 57 43
Syria 1 15 15
       
Total 43 691 43
Average deaths per an attack is 16.07

Bibliography:
Global Terrorism Database, Date: (between 1996-01-01 and 1996-12-31), Retrieved 10
August, 2010, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?

17
Ibid.

5
 expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=1996&start_month=1
&start_day=1&end_year=1996&end_month=12&end_day=31&success=yes&ob=GT
DID&od=desc&page=1&count=100#results-table
Hoffman, B, 2002, Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11, in Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 25, No. 5, Pp. 303 – 316, Retrieved 12 August, 2010,
http://jeffreyfields.net/pols/Rethinking%20terrorism.pdf.
Roberts, B, 2007, Deterrence and WMD Terrorism: Calibrating its Potential Contributions to
Risk Reduction, Retrieved 9 August, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA470305.