ARTICLES OF THE DAY

Feb 01, 2022

WITH BIDEN DISTRACTED BY RUSSIA AND CHINA, NORTH KOREA IS READY TO CONFRONT THE US ................ 2

TOM FOWDY, RUSSIA TODAY .......................................................................................................................... 2

DR. KARIN KNEISSL, RUSSIA TODAY ................................................................................................................. 4

HAITI’S FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY ...................................................................................................................... 6

MONIQUE CLESCA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS .............................................................................................................. 6

SHER KHASHIMOV, THE DIPLOMAT ............................................................................................................... 11

JUBEDA CHOWDHURY, DAILYTIMES .............................................................................................................. 15

OWEN BENNETT-JONES, DAWN NEWS........................................................................................................... 17

ATIQUE UR REHMAN, THE NATION ................................................................................................................ 19

With Biden distracted by Russia and China, North Korea is ready
to confront the US
Tom Fowdy, Russia Today
N orth Korea has just
conducted its most
significant missile
test in years, to the alarm of
many in the West. A
Hwasong-12 intermediate
range ballistic missile (IRBM)
was launched on a lofted
trajectory into space, before
landing in the East Sea.
Despite Pyongyang’s self-
declared cessation of all
longer-range testing, this was
its seventh test so far in 2022,
and a stark reminder of its
discontent with a United
States that it considers to be
refusing to negotiate with it on
equal terms. It also
demonstrates the inadequacy
of the peace process led by
outgoing South Korean
President Moon Jae-in, who
has effectively had his hands
tied by Washington. On
coming to office, the Biden
administration did not make
talks with North Korea a
priority issue, which has
caused Pyongyang’s patience
to run out. Thus, as it always
does, North Korea is aiming to
force itself onto the agenda by
manufacturing a crisis and
actively ramping up tensions,
recognizing that it can create a
perfect storm for a presidency
already overwhelmed by
multiple foreign policy
problems, including with
Russia and China.
The solution? North Korea
hopes it will be some form of
compromise – but don’t
expect common sense from
the hawks holding
Washington hostage over their
obsession with nothing but
complete denuclearization for
Pyongyang.
For those familiar with North
Korean affairs, this has been a
long time coming, evolving in
slow motion because of the
disruption posed by the
pandemic.
In early 2019, the Trump
administration effectively
ended all hope of an American
breakthrough with North
Korea after John Bolton
convinced the then-president
to abort his second summit
with Kim Jong-un in Hanoi.
The meetings between Trump
and Kim effectively proved
fruitless, because the White
House could not accept the
idea of compromising with a
nuclear-armed North Korea
and giving de-facto
recognition to its capabilities.
There was talk of ‘peace’, but
the discussions were empty
and unsubstantial.
This continued US pursuit of
the complete
denuclearizationof North
Korea has become an
obsession, and it represents an
entrenched delusion that
Pyongyang will, one way or
another, surrender its
increasingly extensive
capabilities for the sake of
relief from sanctions. Unlike
Trump, Biden has not engaged
with Pyongyang and is
adopting the failed Obama-era
approach of strategic patience,
while dismissing Trump’s
attempts at dialogue as
morally unacceptable. Kim
Jong-un sent many signals he
was keen for negotiations to
resume throughout 2020 and
2021, but these were ignored.
This is a gross misreading of a
North Korea which perceives
that the only way to deal with
the US is to force an
acceptance of it on its own
terms through growing
nuclear and missile
development. This is the
pinnacle of the state’s
ideology, Juche, which places
the preservation of national
sovereignty as the foremost
political priority. This
includes the willingness to
endure any hardship to
achieve its ultimate goal in the
long term, as opposed to
accepting short-term gains
which would bring
interference and potential
domination by another
country. Blanket United
Nations sanctions, combined
with a self-imposed exclusion
from the outside world, have
not deterred Pyongyang’s
nuclear and missile programs
at all. The country has
struggled economically, but
what would be considered
capitulation will never be an
acceptable price for relief.
Now, the focus has returned
back to confrontation, given
Washington’s failure to
engage.
Pyongyang has factored in the
reality that the world is
changing. Amid the US’ dual
struggle with Russia and
China, it recognises that both
countries will be less willing
to acquiesce to American
demands in imposing further
penalties on it, and so senses
an opportunity.
In 2017, the Trump
administration had sought
China’s support regarding
North Korea before it
orientated US foreign policy
against Beijing, knowing such
cooperation would be
impossible to secure within
the context it was about to
create. Biden, though, is
making a key strategic error,
as he still believes he can
wage hostile policies against
China but then court its
cooperation on other matters.
It’s a mistaken assumption,
and Pyongyang can see how
China is rebuffing it. America
is still formulating foreign
policy strategies in pursuit of
unipolarity in a multipolar
world.
As a result, Kim Jong-un
considers Washington’s hand
to be weaker than before,
giving him the opportunity to
push back with a view to
forcing through his demands.
That’s what the missile
activity is all about. Each test
has effectively been a warning
to test the red lines of all the
players around him,
proceeding carefully, but
moving further each time.
The solution would be for the
US to compromise, but for
many political and ideological
reasons that remains off
limits. The Americans’ fear is
that accepting a nuclear North
Korea – despite the reality of
what that might actually
constitute in practice –
amounts to a form of
appeasement which weakens
the non-nuclear proliferation
regime. Washington is also
not keen to make concessions
on its military presence in
South Korea through
facilitating ‘peace’.
However, the truth is the
longer the US attempts to
ignore North Korea or crush it
with more sanctions, the more
powerful Pyongyang will
become, making it harder to
contain the country’s
capabilities through dialogue
or arms control agreements.
It is easy to underestimate
North Korea due to its poor
economy, yet it is
unquestionably moving
forward in multiple areas,
including hypersonic missiles.
If no progress can be made
using diplomacy, Kim will
continue to pursue ICBM tests
in the hope the missiles’
ability to reach the American
territory of Guam might focus
Biden’s attention. Some might
say, though, that it’s too late
already. Effectively,
Pyongyang has already
returned to crisis mode and is
rapidly escalating tensions.
The more it is ignored, the
harder it will push. The result
is that Biden now faces hard
choices as he pursues an
overstretched foreign policy
that is obsessed with affirming
absolute hegemony over every
frontier.
His mistake so far has been to
assume that by focusing on
China, he can simply put other
issues on ice, ignoring the
likes of North Korea as long as
sanctions are in place.
Kim Jong-un has reminded
him that you can’t do that. He
is looking to box Biden into a
corner with an ultimatum that
he accepts a nuclear-armed
North Korea for what it is, and
negotiates with it. The
alternative is dealing with an
unhappy Pyongyang with a
growing nuclear capability,
which is a considerably worse
scenario for American
interests.
 The Bolshevik Revolution and the Ukraine crisis: What can they
possibly have in common?
Dr. Karin Kneissl, Russia Today
W estern interference
in Russian politics
has a long tradition.
Lenin’s journey in 1917
probably had the greatest
impact. And, 105 years later,
an explosive mixture of word
salad in the news and military
machinery is overshadowing
an eastern front that has been
built up by the media.
Almost 40 years ago, I learnt
in history class that the
German general staff had
organised a secret operation
during World War I to bring
Russian communist Vladimir
Lenin from his exile in
Geneva to Petrograd (now
known as St. Petersburg) in a
sealed train in April 1917.
This chapter of the war
fascinated me. Since then, I
have been under the
impression that it was a
spontaneous operation to
pacify the so-called Eastern
Front. The real consequences,
of course, were the October
Revolution and the collapse of
Russia.
The warlike chessboard of
Helphand, aka ParvusIt
wasn’t until I read a book
written in 2000 by Austrian
historian Elisabeth Heresch
titled ‘Geheimakte Parvus –
Die Gekaufte Revolution’
(‘Secret Files: Parvus – The
Bought Revolution’), that I
realized preparations for a
power change in Russia had
been long in the making. It
was almost a fixed agenda of
the foreign ministries in
Vienna and Berlin. In their
traditional rivalry with the
Russian tsars, the Habsburgs
were primarily concerned
with their power in the
Balkans.
The key lobbyist for this
foreign interference in Russia
was a Minsk-born man, Israel
Lazarevich Helphand, who
later went by the name of
Alexander Parvus. As a
publicist and, above all, as a
financier of various
revolutionary circles in
Europe and in the Ottoman
Empire, he pulled many
strings from the 1890s
onwards. On his chessboard,
he moved figures such as
Lenin and Trotsky but also the
revolutionary Young Turks
Using thoroughly researched
documents, Heresch describes
the intrigues of European
diplomacy at the beginning of
the 20th century, which aimed
to stop Russia through
anarchy and bring down the
country and its people. So, it
was not an ad hoc decision to
ship the sidelined extreme
Bolshevik Lenin to Russia,
where the pragmatic
Mensheviks had gained the
upper hand. Rather, it was the
last stone to be added to a pile
of stones that had been
building up for a long time. It
would first affect Europe and
later bury Russia.
Germany’s General Erich
Ludendorff wrote in 1917:
“Lenin’s entry into Russia
was successful. It is working
just as we wanted.” Parvus
was always involved in this
operation. Not only did he pull
the strings and place his pieces
on the political chessboard, he
also made millions doing it.
However, his plan to become
a minister in Lenin’s
revolutionary cabinet did not
work out as intended.
Interference then and now
“Only internal unrest will
shake the Russian colossus,”
wrote the Viennese diplomat
Alexander Hoyos in
September 1914. A few weeks
earlier, the old Emperor Franz
Joseph I of Austria had sent
Serbia a declaration of war.
The text was based on false
reports and the world
staggered into the Great War.
All attempts by Russian
Emperor Nicholas II, in
particular with telegrams to
the German Emperor Wilhelm
II, his cousin, to persuade him
to find a diplomatic solution
failed. Nicholas suggested in
vain that the facts surrounding
the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand of Austria in
June 1914 should be clarified
by means of a precise legal
investigation. Incidentally, the
two cousins, Niki and Willi,
often corresponded in
English.
Austrian diplomacy also
proved to be particularly
active in its commitment to
promoting revolutionary
movements in Russia, as well
as the formation of a
Ukrainian state. In her book,
Heresch cites reports such as
the following:
“Simultaneously, with the
beginning of Austria-
Hungary’s war with Russia,
the Austrian government took
measures to spark
revolutionary unrest in
Russia. To this end, Austrian
politicians offered some
political émigrés staying in
Austria the opportunity to
leave for Russia – after
providing them with false
passports – and carry out
revolutionary propaganda
there. They were also offered
sums of money.” At the same
time, an effort by Vienna and
Lausanne was underway to
promote the separation of
Ukraine via publications such
as the German-language daily
Der Bund. It was supposedly
about “freeing the Ukrainian
people from the Russian yoke
once and for all”.
Heresch goes on to say that
these “proclamations were
received extremely negatively
by Russian socialists, largely
thanks to the fact that the
venality of their authors was
so clearly expressed”.
Some parallels may come to
mind in view of the current
situation regarding Ukraine,
in which it is almost
impossible to distinguish
between right and wrong. The
media machine started up in
October with a Washington
Post report on Russian troop
movements on Russian soil,
which apparently agitated
Ukraine less than it did
NATO.
Meanwhile, government
officials in Kiev called for
calm in the face of Western
reports of an impending
Russian invasion of Ukraine
and the withdrawal of
diplomats. Alexey Danilov,
secretary of Ukraine’s
National Security and Defense
Council, said last week: “As
of today, we see no evidence
in support of an alleged large-
scale attack on our country.”
The EU foreign ministers, on
the other hand, showed
themselves to be more
Catholic than the Pope by
announcing that any further
military aggression against
Ukraine would have “massive
consequences and severe
costs”. This includes a wide
range of sanctions against
Russian economic sectors and
individuals. Work on the
preparations for these
sanctions has been
accelerated. A dangerous
momentAs is so often the
case, a mountain of words has
been piled up at EU level,
which is now being pushed
and repeated like a mantra,
without anyone daring to
respond out loud and
independently. We know
these rituals from many other
dossiers, whether from the
Middle East or Southeast
Europe.
It almost seems that, both at
NATO headquarters and in
the US Congress, which are
teeming with energy lobbyists
– and, yes, it’s still about the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline – or in
the EU councils, war reporting
is already more intensive than
in either Ukraine or Russia.
This mixture of propaganda –
such as British media reports
alleging there’s a Russian plot
to install “a puppet leadership
in Kiev” – a tangible
mobilisation and thousands of
US soldiers on this new,
artificially created eastern
front, is highly explosive.
Unlike 100 years ago, there is
no perfidious character like
Parvus pulling the strings, as
described by Heresch. Rather,
many unscrupulous cooks are
making a porridge on which
many may burn their mouths.
A combination of arrogance
and ignorance has only ever
created chaos.
The history of Russia knows
its constants, which are
determined, among other
factors, by geography. But it
also has its variables – and
these are determined by the
people involved.
 Haiti’s Fight for Democracy
Monique Clesca, Foreign Affairs
A
showdown is
brewing in Haiti. Ever
since President
Jovenel Moïse was
assassinated in July, it has
been an open question who
should lead the country next.
Immediately after the killing,
the country’s interim prime
minister served as the de facto
head of state. Then, less than
two weeks later, the U.S.
embassy anointed Ariel
Henry, Moïse’s nominee for
prime minister, by tweeting an
extraordinary statement from
a group of ambassadors
asking him to form a
government. Ever since then,
Henry has had a tenuous hold
on power, which is growing
weaker by the day. Evidence
has emerged that he was in
communication with one of
the key suspects behind
Moïse’s assassination just
hours after the attack,
suggesting that he had a hand
in a plot that brought him to
power. This January, on a trip
to Gonaïves in northern Haiti,
Henry had to be exfiltrated
from a shootout between his
security guards and gunmen.
Now, his authority is about to
come under even greater
pressure starting on February
7, the date that Moïse had
claimed his term would end.
At the same time, a coalition
of civil society groups is
offering a plan for how to
move the country forward.
The effort began last March,
when the Commission to
Search for a Haitian Solution
to the Crisis was formed to
lead the initiative. I serve as
one of its 13 members. By
August, the commission
developed an agreement with
groups across Haiti, including
unions, professional
associations, farmers’
alliances, human rights
organizations, diaspora
groups, and faith groups.
Known as the Montana
Accord (after the name of the
hotel in Port-au-Prince where
it was announced), the
agreement is a blueprint for a
two-year transitional
government that will serve
Haitians’ basic needs, bolster
democratic institutions,
reestablish legitimacy and
trust, and organize free, fair,
and participatory elections. In
mid-January, the coalition
grew bigger and now includes
the modified Protocole
d’Entente Nationale (PEN), a
powerful alliance of seven
political parties, including that
of the president of the Senate.
Together, we are working to
establish a representative
transitional government
whose members are
nominated by a broad base of
Haitian society.
Henry has presented his own
accord, which looks a lot like
the status quo. It consolidates
power in the hands of one
person—the acting prime
minister, Henry. It focuses on
quick elections without
sufficient reform to make
them credible or ensure
participation. Most of its
supporters represent groups
already aligned with Henry’s
government and benefiting
from and invested in the
corruption of the ruling class.
Henry, who has no mandate or
constituency, has indicated
that he rejects any attempt at
installing an interim
government and instead plans
to introduce a new
constitution—which is
unconstitutional—and move
the country directly toward
elections. If he continues
down this path, he will fail
because he has no base of
support among Haitians and
remains in power only
because the international
community has continued to
support him. However
appealing quick elections may
appear to outside powers, it is
clear they are not the answer
to Haiti’s problems: in all
likelihood, they will lead only
to undemocratic outcomes and
further instability. The Haitian
Tèt Kale Party grips the levers
of power so tightly that
elections now could not be
free or fair. Over his last year
in office, Moïse dismantled
the electoral commission and
the Supreme Court of Haiti,
which could be asked to
decide important questions
connected with the elections.
Violence, meanwhile, is
rampant, with gangs that have
ties to politicians controlling
about half of Haiti’s territory
and undertaking kidnappings,
rapes, arson, and massacres.
Many Haitians don’t want to
leave the house to go shopping
or commute to work, let alone
to vote. Until it is safe enough
for people to vote freely and
democratic institutions are
strengthened, Haiti would
only be going through the
motions of democracy, rather
than putting in place a
government elected by the
people. For now, then, what
Haiti needs most is a
transitional government that
can improve security, address
the country’s humanitarian
needs, and lay the groundwork
for something it has lacked for
three decades: truly free and
fair elections
A LEADERLESS
STATEAfter Haiti was struck
by a devastating earthquake in
2010, Washington pressured
the country to hold elections.
Michel Martelly, one of
Haiti’s best-known musicians,
ran for president and came in
third. After reviewing the
results, the international
community dismissed one of
the leading candidates and
picked Martelly for the runoff
election, in which he was
declared the winner. Once in
power, he ruled through a tiny,
corrupt circle and repeatedly
failed to hold elections. In an
effort to escape its history of
dictatorships, the constitution
that Haiti adopted in 1987 bars
anyone from running for two
consecutive terms as
president, so Martelly
couldn’t remain in office after
his first term. He handpicked
Moïse, a businessman who
enjoyed close ties to
Martelly’s associates
(including figures involved in
the drug trade) and who had
once been indicted for money
laundering, to replace him.
The first round of voting in the
2015 presidential elections
was marred by allegations of
corruption and claims that the
process was rigged in favor of
Moïse, and the elections were
thus postponed. When it came
time for Martelly to leave
office, there was still no one
elected to take his place. Amid
this crisis, Martelly reached a
political agreement with the
Parliament: he stepped down
in February 2016, and the
Parliament elected Senator
Jocelerme Privert, its own
president, to serve as
temporary president of Haiti.
When the elections were
finally held, later in 2016,
Moïse won with only 600,000
votes in a country of nearly six
million registered voters—
certainly the lowest voter
turnout in Haitian history and
one of the lowest turnout rates
recorded anywhere. There are
many reasons so few Haitians
participated, among them the
sentiment that elections didn’t
necessarily equal
participatory democracy.
There was also the view that
no matter what Haitians
wanted, the international
community would pick the
winner, just as it had seemed
to do in 2011.
To say Moïse was unloved is
an understatement. When he
raised gas prices in July 2018,
Haitians rioted. Young people
turned out in massive numbers
to protest his corrupt rule and
his failure to meet Haitians’
basic needs. Lacking
legitimacy, Moïse turned to
extreme measures to stay in
power, further empowering
gangs and destroying
democratic institutions. As he
tried to overstay his term in
February 2021, Moïse and his
allies announced that there
had been an attempted coup,
which served as an excuse to
round up those he perceived as
threats to his power, including
a Supreme Court judge. The
court pushed back, so Moïse
dismembered it—creating a
full-blown constitutional
crisis.
Many Haitians don’t want to
leave the house to go shopping
or commute to work, let alone
to vote. On July 5, Moïse
tapped Henry, a
neurosurgeon, to serve as the
next prime minister. It was
widely reported that Henry, a
political operative who had
switched party alliances
numerous times, was the
choice of Moïse’s mentor,
Martelly. According to The
New York Times, Moïse had
been contemplating a break
from his corrupt benefactors
in the days and weeks before
he was killed. He had
compiled a list of politicians
and businesspeople involved
in the country’s drug trade and
planned to give it to the U.S.
government. But that list
never saw the light of day. On
July 7, a group of
mercenaries—26 Colombians
and two Haitian Americans—
made their way into Moïse’s
heavily guarded residence in
Port-au-Prince and shot him
dead. Although several
people, all with some
connection to the drug trade,
have been arrested in Haiti
and in the United States, it is
still unknown exactly who
hired the gunmen and why.
Henry, who is supposed to be
leading his government’s
investigation into the murder,
kept in contact with one of the
prime suspects before and
after Moïse was killed, The
New York Times reported.
Although he denies any
connection to the murder, he
has refused to answer a
judge’s questions about his
phone calls with the suspect
and instead fired the judge.
In the months after the
assassination, the chaos only
grew. Shortly after Moïse’s
death, a massive earthquake
shook the southern peninsula
of the country, leaving over
2,000 dead and thousands
more injured and homeless.
Armed gangs, who have taken
over roughly half of Haitian
territory, continue to terrorize
the local population with
abductions, rapes, arson, and
murders. At the same time, a
massive wave of Haitian
refugees who had migrated to
Brazil and Chile after the 2010
earthquake headed north for
the United States in the fall of
2021, hoping they’d gain
asylum. The Biden
administration’s inhumane
handling of the migrant crisis
led to two high-profile
resignations, including the
U.S. special envoy for Haiti,
Ambassador Daniel Foote.
Today, it is no exaggeration to
say that the world’s first
Black-led republic faces one
of the gravest crises in its 218-
year history.
THE OLD RULES DON’T
APPLYWith democratic
governance sliding backward,
Haitians must establish new
rules of the game and, just as
important, determine who gets
to decide them. Elections rely
on a kind of compact between
citizens and states in which
citizens agree to the state’s
rules governing how they
choose their leaders. Usually,
these are spelled out in a
country’s constitution, but the
process outlined in Haiti’s
current constitution offers no
script for how to recover when
there’s no legislature, no
president, no legitimate prime
minister, no legitimate
Supreme Court, no legitimate
electoral council—and an
illegitimate head of state
ruling by decree. The
constitution didn’t anticipate
this situation. With only ten
democratically elected
officials in the entire country
and in the presence of a near-
total constitutional void,
someone needs to decide
when and how elections will
happen and who will oversee
them. The process by which
these decisions are made will
determine whether the next
elections will enjoy
legitimacy—and whether the
winners will govern with a
mandate.
To escape its current morass,
Haiti will need to establish an
interim government. Only
then can new leaders rebuild
the institutions—and the
independence and trust—
needed to hold participatory
elections. Absent clear
constitutional guidance on
how to restore institutions and
democracy, the group I joined
earlier this year, the
Commission to Search for a
Haitian Solution to the Crisis,
improvised a different kind of
compact to build legitimacy. It
gathered a critical mass of
citizens and organizations
from civil society, political
parties, religious
organizations, professional
associations, and other
organizations in-country and
in the Haitian diaspora, which
collectively constituted a
force strong enough to agree
to rules governing how
Haitians choose their leaders.
This Haitian-bred and
Haitian-led solution was
reached after a broad and
lengthy process of
consultation and continuous
dialogue over more than ten
months. This consensus is
what gives the Montana
Accord its legitimacy.
The January consensus
agreement with the political
alliance known as PEN
establishes the positions of a
presidential council with five
members and a prime minister
who will lead a two-year
transition guided by the 1987
constitution. The accord also
envisions a pseudo-parliament
that will function as a check
and balance on the
government. The accord now
has more than 990 signatories,
who are leaders of
organizations that represent
millions of Haitians. This is a
historic moment: it has been
decades since Haitians came
together to identify their own
solutions to their problems.
Haitians say they must decide
their own fate. The United
States and other countries
must accept this. The path
ahead should include
American and foreign
solidarity, but not foreign
interference, political
meddling, or an imposition of
choices on the Haitian people.
Successive U.S.
administrations, Republican
and Democratic alike, have
interfered in Haitian politics,
supporting Haiti’s political
elite and opting for stability no
matter the price. U.S.
President Joe Biden is now
faced with the same choice of
so many of his predecessors:
whether to support the status
quo in Haiti or risk taking the
rocky path toward true
democracy. His
administration has said that
the electoral process should be
driven by conditions on the
ground—as though American
officials have had no hand in
creating and maintaining
those conditions. U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State
Brian Nichols said at a
January meeting with the
commission that the United
States will not pick winners
and losers because every time
outsiders pick, “it’s a sad
story.” Although this
statement should be
applauded, it does not
acknowledge that continuing
U.S. support for Henry is itself
picking a winner. The United
States and other countries
have tolerated and perpetuated
political dysfunction in Haiti.
This is not only bad for Haiti,
it is also counterproductive for
the United States, as the
collapse of Haitian democracy
is pushing thousands of
migrants to U.S. borders.
SAFETY FIRSTThe end goal
of an interim government
would be to hold meaningful
and participatory elections,
and in order for that to occur,
security must improve. The
human toll of the current crisis
has been astronomical. At
least 950 people were
kidnapped in 2021 for ransom.
Some of them were killed;
others were raped or tortured
in captivity. Families have had
to sell their possessions and
borrow enormous sums to pay
the ransoms demanded.
One of the first actions a
transitional government
should take is to depoliticize
the 13,000-member Haitian
National Police so the force
can carry out its mission
without a political agenda or
hindrance from politicians.
Police also need equipment
appropriate for the threat they
face, including armored
vehicles and drones. While
Haitian gangs have become
increasingly well armed, the
police have not benefited from
essential upgrades in
equipment and expertise. The
United States can, with
urgency, supply such
equipment and technical law
enforcement assistance during
the transitional period.
A transitional government
should also break the supply
chain of arms and munitions
to the gangs. Customs
authorities will have to step up
the control of entry points.
Police will have to secure the
roads leading to gang-
controlled areas to cut off their
supply lines. The kind of
terror to which Haitians have
been subjected over the Moïse
years—notably, 13 massacres
between 2017 and 2021, three
of which human rights
observers have characterized
as crimes against humanity—
has required an abundance of
arms and munitions. Haiti
does not produce either.
Although the United Nations
does not have an arms
embargo on Haiti, the United
States does, and it should
immediately do its part by
controlling shipments and
punishing those who break the
law. There is also an urgent
need to vet Haitian policemen,
as there is proof that the police
force is infiltrated by gangs.
Another measure that can also
produce quick results is the
creation of “green zones,”
secure areas not under gang
control that are protected by
the police. Considering the
rapid pace at which the gangs
are claiming territory, such a
measure should be applied
immediately.
The United States and other
countries have tolerated and
perpetuated political
dysfunction in Haiti. An
interim government will also
need to address Haiti’s
enormous humanitarian
needs. Urban violence has
forced thousands from their
homes, as did the August
earthquake. The UN has
estimated that 4.6 million
Haitians, about 40 percent of
the population, suffer from
food insecurity. These needs
must be met rapidly, despite
obstacles such as lack of
access to areas blocked by
gang activity and lack of
donor financing. A growing
concern is that the
humanitarian crises are
becoming a defining feature
of the country, so the real
response to such disasters
should be the resolution of
Haiti’s structural problems. In
other words, Haiti’s long-term
solution is to fast-track its
development.
Foreign aid is desperately
needed, but Haiti could also
better provide for itself if it
stopped the looting of state
coffers. Economists have told
me that revenues from
customs at the ports are
approximately $450 million
per year and could be double
that if corrupt officials did not
siphon them off. A transition
government should enforce
existing laws and take control
of customs and taxation so
that the Haitian state generates
the revenue it should. An
interim government should
also start to carry out fiscal
reform and adopt policies that
prioritize national production,
particularly in the declining
agriculture sector, over
importation. It could also raise
taxes on most imports: at three
to six percent, Haiti’s import
duties are among the lowest in
the Caribbean. Bad political
choices are destroying the
country’s economy. It doesn’t
have to be this way. It’s time
to change Haiti’s economic
governance model.
DON’T LET HISTORY
REPEATIn an October op-ed
in The Washington Post,
Henry proposed holding
elections in the second half of
2022. That is too soon—but
the point is less about when
the elections are held and
more about who holds them
and how they are organized.
Will they simply perpetuate
the ruling elite? Will they
inspire a large share of the
population to vote? It is hard
to imagine that the current
government could hold
elections that encourage broad
participation and confidence
in their result. Henry rose to
power through a corrupt and
predatory political system; he
has nothing to gain from truly
democratic elections.
Haiti cannot solve all of its
problems in a two-year
transition—but a legitimate
transition government could
use that time to kick-start the
rebuilding of the country. It
would send a strong signal
that state institutions are
working again. The ultimate
objective would be peaceful,
transparent, and free elections
that at last allow Haitians to
choose a government that delayed reckoning. Now,
works for them. Haitians must intercept a
rapacious regime that is
Many observers look at Haiti
unwilling to let go of power
and see failure. It’s a
and build one that serves its
testament to how much has
people. To build real
gone wrong, both long ago
democracy, Haiti must take
and much more recently. But
the counterintuitive position
there is reason to hope that this
of holding off on elections
enduring and complicated
until the moment is right.
crisis and the current chaos
can serve as a clarifying
moment for Haiti’s long-
 The Struggle to Power Tajikistan
Sher Khashimov, The Diplomat
E
very fall, Muhibahon,
a 30-year-old master’s
student who lives in
Hisor, a small town 30
minutes outside of
Tajikistan’s capital,
Dushanbe, is forced to
drastically change her daily
routine. As October sets in,
she wakes up at 6 a.m. every
day to iron clothes for all five
members of her family, make
everyone breakfast, prepare
some food for dinner, and
charge everyone’s phones
before local authorities cut off
the electricity in her town at 8
a.m.
“Sometimes during the day, I
simply don’t have enough
battery charge to make a quick
call,” Muhibahon told The
Diplomat over the messaging
app Telegram. (Like everyone
else interviewed for this piece,
Muhibahon asked to keep her
last name out of print fearing
retaliation from the
government). Her responses
in the chat come strictly
between 5 p.m. and 11 p.m.
local time, when the
electricity is turned back on in
Hisor. It’s a narrow window of
time in which she must do
household chores, complete
her school assignments, and
cook for the family on a
smelly wood stove because
electricity is too unreliable
and gas is too expensive.
Despite this, Muhibahon, who
has lived in Hisor for the past
six years and is planning to
move to Russia, says things
used to be much worse. “I
used to live in Isfara before
moving to Hisor. Back in
2007-08, we didn’t have
electricity there for months on
end.”
“Back in [the] early and mid-
2000s, we had electricity
maybe only once a week,”
Fotima, a 57-year-old
psychologist from Isfara,
confirmed to The Diplomat.
Isfara is a town an hour east of
Khujand, Tajikistan’s second-
largest city. The schedule of
electricity access in Isfara
today is not much different
from the one in Hisor – in the
fall, electricity is supplied
from 5 a.m. to 8 a.m. and from
5 p.m. to 10 p.m.; in the
winter, electricity is cut off
mostly from 10 p.m. until 6
a.m. “I go to bed early because
I need to be under the covers
before power is shut off and
the house gets too cold,” said
Fotima. “This electricity limit
is a source of major stress for
women who are forced to
cook, wash clothes, and clean
their homes in those narrow,
unpredictable windows during
which we have power.” The
residents of Isfara and Hisor
are not alone in their struggles
with electricity blackouts:
Most of Tajikistan outside of
its biggest cities, Dushanbe
and Khujand, is subject to
annual electricity rationing –
scheduled but unannounced
blackouts that usually last
from early October well into
winter, colloquially known as
the “electricity limit.”
The experiences of rural
residents in the country –
stress and uncertainty, lost
productivity and business, the
cost of repairing electric
appliances, and even physical
injuries and deaths – come in
sharp contrast with annual
assurances from the
government that there is no
rationing of electricity and
“occasional” power cuts are
merely the result of
maintenance work on the
country’s power grid. Such
pronouncements
understandably raise
eyebrows over why
maintenance work would be
done in the winter, when the
population needs electricity
the most, and not over the
summer, when power is in
abundance and outages are
easier to manage.
“There’s no [electricity]
limit, just maintenance
works,” Ashraf, a 29-year-old
endocrinologist who lives in a
village an hour west of
Tajikistan’s capital,
sarcastically responded over
Telegram. “Even my brother
who works for the local utility
doesn’t receive any
information from above about
the reasons for power cuts.”
“Nobody even asks about the
reasons, people just know that
the limit is on come October,”
said Fotima.
The rationing costs Tajikistan
dearly: economic losses of up
to 3 percent of the country’s
GDP and of up to a third of the
country’s agricultural output.
In 2019, over 8 percent of
local enterprises named an
unreliable electricity supply as
a major constraint to doing
business in Tajikistan, a share
significantly above the
average of 3.8 percent across
Europe and Central Asia. In
2019, Tajikistan ranked only
163rd among 190 countries
for the ease of getting
electricity and 107th among
141 countries for the quality
of electricity supply.
Three decades’ worth of
government promises of
energy abundance and
independence – promised now
by 2030 – only add salt to the
wound of the annual
electricity rationing. Thirty
years after independence, the
country still requires
significant financial
investment in infrastructure
and institutional reforms. But
the state electricity monopoly,
Barqi Tojik – which owns and
operates most of the country’s
power plants and transmits,
dispatches, and distributes
electricity to all regions of
Tajikistan, except for Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous
Oblast in the east of the
country – holds $2.7 billion in
debt (equal to a third of the
country’s 2020 GDP).
The government reluctantly
admits that energy reforms
and infrastructure
rehabilitation efforts are slow
due to Barqi Tojik’s enormous
debt, which, in turn, is the
result of a maddening Catch-
22: Barqi Tojik desperately
needs to raise electricity
prices to collect the revenues
necessary to reform the
energy sector, but the
population cannot afford to
pay higher prices, in many
ways because unreliable
electricity supply results in
economic losses and low
incomes.
Electricity prices in Tajikistan
historically have been among
the lowest in the world. In
2021, an average domestic
consumer in Tajikistan paid
$0.023 per kWh, making it the
sixth-lowest electricity price
in the world. Yet the low price
of electricity, meant to be a
rare windfall for the
economically strained
population of Tajikistan,
where annual per capita
incomes hover around $1,000,
can still be unaffordable for
locals.
“Don’t get me started on
comparing prices between
Tajikistan and Russia where
most services and products
cost the same but salaries are
three times higher,“ said
Ashraf.
“Electricity is awfully
expensive in Tajikistan and
gets more expensive every
year. My family spends over
10 percent of our monthly
budget on electricity,”
complained Muhibahon. That
puts her family in the high
energy burden category,
among the households who
spend over a tenth of their
monthly budget to keep their
homes warm and lit.
“Every winter, my family
faces a choice – either spend
the money we don’t have on
electricity to keep the house
warm or spend the money we
don’t have on cold medicine
and doctors,” a resident of
Khujand who asked to remain
anonymous told The
Diplomat.
While often unaffordable for
Tajiks, the country’s
electricity prices are still too
low in the sense that they do
not reflect the costs of
producing and distributing
power. Faced with
unaffordable electricity bills,
Tajiks often instead pay a
bribe to bill collectors that
costs less than their monthly
bill, which keeps the much-
needed revenue out of Barqi
Tojik’s coffers. Conflicts
between bill collectors and
economically strained
residents sometimes even
result in violence. Internal
corruption allegations also
abound: In 2019, a Barqi Tojik
employee embezzled 96
percent of the revenue he
collected; in 2020,
prosecutors accused hundreds
of low-level Barqi Tojik
employees of embezzling over
$5.6 million. The collection
rate for billed electricity thus
hovers at only 85 percent – a
rate well below the 95-percent
threshold typical for well-
functioning energy utilities.
The country’s outdated energy
infrastructure was mostly
constructed in the 1960s and
1970s and hasn’t been
fundamentally updated since
then. It loses an estimated
quarter of total annual
electricity generation, twice
the accepted level of technical
losses in power systems with
similar configurations and
age. Coupled with corruption
and low collection rates, it
prevents Barqi Tojik from
covering its operating costs,
repairing and replacing its
equipment, and improving its
infrastructural and
institutional capacity, and
results in an unreliable power
supply that causes stress,
injuries, and even deaths
among locals. Daytime power
cuts across the country
interfere with the operating
hours of schools, hospitals,
banks, and local businesses.
There are reports of shortages
of coal, wood, and even
matches across the country as
people are forced to search for
different means to keep their
businesses running and their
houses warm.
“Due to interruptions and
power drops, appliances often
break down or light up. The
AC unit in my office cannot
work because the electricity
voltage is too low; the wires
once even caught on fire and
left traces of melted particles
on the carpet,” Fotima said,
sharing her misfortunes with
The Diplomat.
“I have heard of several cases
of people getting electrocuted
and dying when the power
was switched on
unexpectedly,” said Munir, an
undergraduate student from
Panjakent, a town in western
Tajikistan.
Under pressure from
international donors, the
government has committed to
slowly reform Tajikistan’s
energy sector. Barqi Tojik’s
organizational structure is
being unbundled into separate
electricity generation,
transmission, and distribution
companies, and the electricity
prices are gradually
increasing. Additional, albeit
limited, investments are being
made into upgrading the
country’s transmission lines.
But instead of putting all its
focus on fixing the leaky pipe
of energy generation and
distribution, the Tajik
government has decided to
focus on increasing generation
and simply push more
electricity through the pipe by
tapping into the country’s
virtually unlimited
hydropower potential.
Tajikistan generates over 90
percent of its electricity from
glacier-fed rivers. Because the
country holds 60 percent of
Central Asia’s water
resources, most of it in high-
altitude glaciers, Tajikistan
can in theory produce 527
billion kWh per year – a 25-
fold increase of what it
generates currently and one of
the largest untapped energy
potentials in the world. Taking
advantage of this potential
would, in theory, not only
cover all of the country’s
domestic energy needs but
also make Tajikistan into a net
energy exporter and bring in
critically needed revenue –
something the government has
been tirelessly pursuing since
Tajikistan became
independent in 1991.
In 2021, Tajikistan exported
over $94 million worth of
electricity to Afghanistan and
Uzbekistan and even exported
a million kWh per day to
Kyrgyzstan in early October
before abruptly stopping the
trade, reportedly so as not to
anger the population as the
domestic electricity rationing
began. Despite its tough
public stance against the
Taliban, the Tajik government
quietly renewed its contract to
continue exporting electricity
to Afghanistan in 2022 – an
important source of revenue
Tajikistan can’t afford to lose.
In 2022, Tajikistan also is set
to return to the Central Asian
Power System (CAPS) – a
regional power-sharing
system that during the Soviet
years allowed Tajikistan to
export surplus energy to its
Central Asian neighbors in
summer and import energy in
winter. This arrangement
crumbled with the collapse of
the Soviet Union; Tajikistan
has been chasing energy
exporter status ever since to
remain relevant regionally and
to collect desperately needed
revenue. Under late President
Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan
shut Tajikistan out from
CAPS in 2009 over a regional
water resources dispute,
preventing Tajikistan from
trading energy with other
regional states; Karimov’s
successor Shavkat
Mirziyoyev restored the
energy trade between the two
countries in April 2018.
Tajikistan has also been
pushing for the completion of
the $1 billion Central Asia-
South Asia Electricity
Transmission and Trade
Project (CASA-1000), which,
if ever finished, would allow
Tajikistan to export electricity
to Pakistan through
Afghanistan.
Both the return to CAPS and
the construction of CASA-
1000 are tied to the
cornerstone of Tajikistan’s
ambitions to be at the heart of
the Central Asian energy
trade: the 3,600 MW Rogun
hydropower plant. The plant
has been in the works since
1976, but the fall of the Soviet
Union, the five-year civil war
in the 1990s, and the post-
Soviet era dispute with
downstream Uzbekistan
derailed the progress of the
project for decades. The
government of Tajikistan
spent the post-civil war years
trying to rally international
support to revive Rogun. In
2016, the government finally
restarted the construction of
the hydropower plant, which
is supposed to double
Tajikistan’s current energy
generation and turn the
country into a net energy
exporter at last.
The government is not put off
by the price of such
aspirations: At the cost of
almost $4 billion and with
most of the funds borrowed
from international creditors,
the Rogun hydropower plant
has created a budget hole half
the size of Tajikistan’s $7
billion annual GDP. Just in
2025-2027 alone, Tajikistan
will have to pay $200 million
in loan repayments.
This is where the government
is setting itself up for failure.
Currently, 70 percent of
Tajikistan’s power generation
is supplied by the Nurek
hydropower plant in the south
of the country. If Rogun is
ever finished, it would
concentrate 90 percent of
Tajikistan electricity
generation in two big
hydropower impoundment
plants – plants that rely on
large river-fed reservoirs to
produce power – making the
country extremely vulnerable
to the accelerating effects of
climate change.
Over 8,000 glaciers occupy
around 8 percent of
Tajikistan’s territory and
provide over a fifth of the
country’s river water. These
glaciers are rapidly
disappearing, taking the
country’s unlimited and
untapped hydropower
potential along with them.
Tajikistan has lost about a
third of its glaciers since the
1930s and is predicted to lose
another fifth by 2050. The
gradual disappearance of
glaciers will significantly
reduce river flows and render
large impoundment power
plants like Rogun and Nurek
useless over time.
There have been plenty of
warning signs in the past few
years. In July 2020, in the
middle of the summer surplus
season, the water level in the
Nurek reservoir was 17 meters
lower compared to 2019
because the water flow of the
Vakhsh and Panj rivers that
feed into the reservoir was
reduced by 50 percent.
Tajikistan was forced to halt
electricity exports to
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan
that summer. Since then, the
government hasn’t gone into
detail when discussing the
water levels in the Nurek
reservoir. The disappearance
of Tajikistan’s glaciers is a
regional problem.
Neighboring Kyrgyzstan
relies on hydropower for 90
percent of its energy needs.
The Kyrgyz government,
faced with an energy crisis
this past fall, reported that the
water level at Toktogul – a
1,200 MW hydropower plant
that supplies around 40
percent of the country’s
electricity – was at its lowest
level in years. Uzbekistan,
whose hydropower plants
account for some 12 percent
of the country’s electricity
generation, attributed a 23-
percent decrease in power
supply in 2021 to low water
levels, too. But while
Uzbekistan, with its proven
gas reserves of 800 billion
cubic meters and with 88
percent of its electricity
coming from thermal power
plants, can theoretically
protect its energy output from
the consequences of glacier
melt, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan are in jeopardy
and will have to rely on
increased regional energy
trade, diversification of their
power generation portfolio,
and much-needed
infrastructural rehabilitation
and institutional reforms.
In 2021, after years of
precedent, Barqi Tojik did not
set up hotlines that locals
could call to report power
outages. This past November,
residents of Khujand received
a text message from Barqi
Tojik urging them to use
electricity wisely and
threatening further power cuts
in response to any energy
waste. Such transgressions
will continue while the
government of Tajikistan
figures out how to back out of
the dead end it has gotten itself
into, leaving the population
with no avenue for recourse
and dreaming of greener
pastures with no power cuts.
“I apologize for leaving our
conversation so abruptly
yesterday – my phone ran out
of battery and there was no
way to charge it,” Rukhsora, a
high school student from
Kanibadam in northern
Tajikistan, said in a Telegram
voice message. Her family’s
only child, she is tasked with
helping her mother, a local
realtor, get all the domestic
chores done during the
evening electricity window.
Rukhsora dreams of moving
to Dushanbe for her
undergraduate studies. “I
know there’s no electricity
limit there and I won’t have to
worry about fully charging my
phone every morning,” she
laughed in her last voice
message to The Diplomat.
 Why Does Pakistan lag behind Bangladesh?
Jubeda Chowdhury, Dailytimes
B
angladesh recently
celebrated its 50th
founding anniversary.
In 1972, Henry Kissinger, the
US Secretary of State,
described Bangladesh as a
“bottomless basket” for an
independent country. On the
other hand, in 1976,
Norwegian economist Just
Faland and American
economist JR Parkinson
published a book from
London called Bangladesh the
Test Case for Development.
The book says, “Bangladesh is
a testing ground for
development. If Bangladesh
can solve its development
problems, then it must be
understood that any country
can improve.”
Successful statesman Sheikh
Hasina has achieved full
potential to move from a least
developed country to a
developing country. Even
before the 50th anniversary of
independence, Bangladesh
has come a long way than that
of Pakistan. It has been
possible because of People’s
hard-working and strong
leadership.
In the 70s, independent
Bangladesh was recognised
by the world as a city plagued
by food shortage, famine, and
natural disasters. But in the
last 50 years, the image of
Bangladesh has been
discussed in different
contexts. Now, positive
aspects predominate in
discussions about Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has always tried
to build a bright image in the
world by highlighting its
2,554, compared to Pakistan’s
various achievements. In 50
years, Bangladesh has 1,543. On the other hand,
overcome many negative while the current economy of
images. Bangladesh is 410 billion, the
size of Pakistan’s economy is
Abid Hassan, a former adviser
about 260 billion. Some mega
to the World Bank and a
projects are being
Pakistani economist, wrote a
implemented in Bangladesh.
few months ago; praising
These projects help
Bangladesh’s economic
Bangladesh to revive its
potential. He said that even 20
economy during this Covid-19
years ago, it was unthinkable
pandemic. Nobel laureate
that Bangladesh’s per capita
economist Amartya Sen
income would double in 2020.
always cited Bangladesh as an
If Bangladesh’s current
example when it comes to the
progress continues, it will
development model. During a
become an economic
visit to Bangladesh last year,
powerhouse by 2030. He
Kaushik Basu, then senior
further wrote that if the
vice president and chief
current situation in Pakistan
economist at the World Bank,
does not change, it may be
said Bangladesh’s economy
necessary to seek help from
was now in a flying start. “It
Bangladesh by 2030.
would not be an exaggeration
In the ’70s, independent to say that Bangladesh will
Bangladesh was recognised soon emerge as the new tiger
by the world as a city plagued of Asia,” he said.
by food shortage, famine, and
At the age of 50, Bangladesh
natural disasters.
is going to be the economic
Human resources are wonder of South Asia.
considered to be the most Although Bangladesh (then
important element in the East Pakistan) was part of
development of any country. Pakistan, it has already
So Bangladesh has now surpassed Pakistan in almost
surpassed not only Pakistan all socio-cultural and
but also India in several economic indicators.
indicators. Various
The main reason for this
international organisations,
progress of Bangladesh and
including the World Bank, the
the backwardness of Pakistan
World Economic Forum, and
is that in the last ten years
the Economic Intelligence
Bangladesh under the
Unit, have identified
leadership of PM Sheikh
Bangladesh’s economic
Hasina has achieved an
development as a “wonderful
average growth rate of 7% and
puzzle.” From 2011 to 2019,
has been ranked as the fastest-
Bangladesh’s exports have
growing country in Pakistan.
increased at a rate of 8.6 per
It is on the bottom. In addition
cent per annum as compared
to this, the population is also
to 0.4 per cent in the world.
increasing the problem of
GDP per capita has risen to
Pakistan. While the Bangladesh is 38 per cent, statements came in support of
population of Pakistan was 1o which is 23 per cent in Jaigham Khan’s proposal.
million less than that of Pakistan. Honour killings still
Columns started appearing in
Bangladesh in 1971, it is now exist there.
the media. Talks are also
about 4o million more. At this
A few years ago, former discussed on television talk
time the population growth
cricketer, Imran Khan, came shows. One such talk show is
rate of Bangladesh is 1.2 per
to power after being elected as viral through clipping social
cent whereas that of Pakistan
the Prime Minister of Pakistan media. There, negotiator
is 2.1 per cent, which is almost
and announced that he would Jaigham Khan said in a very
double. On the other hand,
run the country on the strong voice, there is no point
Pakistan has lagged due to
Swedish governance model. in using the example of any
social conditions. Property
He also dreamed of other country, Pakistan should
management is such that all
transforming Pakistan into try to be Bangladesh first. And
property is in the hands of a
Sweden in five years. As a it will take at least 10 years.
small number of people.
result, discussions began on a Until then, Bangladesh will go
Besides, it goes without
role model across Pakistan. It a long way in terms of
saying that women do not
was at this time that a column development. The people of
have rights in the country.
written by Jaigham Khan, a Pakistan are now thinking that
Bangladesh ranks 50th out of
development activist, was the country, which was
156 countries in the Gender
published. The article titled separated from Pakistan after
Parity Index, while Pakistan
“The Bangladesh Model” a long and bloody war of nine
ranks 153rd; In other words, it
suggested that Pakistan should months, is a role model. This
has fallen to the bottom.
become Bangladesh instead of information is enough to show
According to the International
being transformed into how far Bangladesh has come.
Labor Organisation’s 2019
Sweden. One after other
data, the participation rate of
women in the workplace in

Owen Bennett-Jones, Dawn News
P
AKISTAN is a country
of resistance.
On the face of it, that’s
somewhat surprising. After
all, Pakistani politicians are
famous for their inability to
take a principled stand. Most
of them show no loyalty to any
leader or party and are
strangers to deeply held
convictions. As Pakistanis
know all too well, most of
their elected representatives
can sell their votes and change
their allegiances at a the province and there is no
moment’s notice.
And yet, even dictators in
Pakistan have found it
difficult to suppress dissent.
For one reason or another,
Pakistan’s military rulers
never seem to last more than a
decade or so. The country’s
first military ruler, Ayub
Khan, faced waves of protest
as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto toured
the country whipping up anti-
government feeling. Gen Zia
may have been Pakistan’s
harshest dictator, fitting
microphones to amplify the
screams of those being lashed.
But even Zia could not get a
grip of his country’s truculent
journalists — not for nothing
did he call the Karachi Press
Club “enemy territory”. And
then there was Gen
Musharraf. When he tried to
sack the chief justice,
thousands of lawyers marched
through tear gas to get him
reinstated. Despite having an
army at his disposal and
despite the authorities’ record
of torturing and even
disappearing people, when
Musharraf opened up the
media, journalists used their
new freedoms to satirise him.
A hard country...
Even dictators have found it
difficult to suppress dissent.
Civilian governments too,
have felt the brunt of
protesters’ ire. True, there
may have been some official
sponsorship of the protests
that helped bring down
successive elected
governments but there has
never been a shortage of
people willing to take to the
streets demanding change.
For a time, it was just the PPP
that understood the value of
protest and martyrdom.
Leaders such as Benazir
Bhutto and Salmaan Taseer
walked to their deaths, heads
held high, defending
democratic ideals. Both fully
understood their likely fate
and both could have lived in
comfort abroad. But they
refused to bow down before
the threats they faced. And it’s
not just been the senior leaders
willing to make the ultimate
sacrifice. After the execution
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, some
PPP activists self-immolated
to make clear the depth of
their despair at what the
government had done. More
recently, the archetypical
establishment party, the PML-
N, has also come to
understand the value of
resistance. Its leaders now
make barnstorming speeches
up and down Punjab,
denouncing the powers that be
in the strongest terms. And
nowadays they are also
willing to suffer behind bars
so as to make their point. And
the fact that so many
Pakistanis admire such
defiance only makes the task
of the authorities more
difficult. Whoever is in power
— military or civilian — faces
a dilemma: the more they
clamp down on resistance, the
more resistance they face.
And then there are the Baloch.
Even if many Pakistanis view
their successive independence
campaigns as misguided,
there is no denying the
determination of the Baloch to
fight for their goals. Ever
since 1947 there have been
waves of violent insurgency in
sign of it stopping any time
soon.
In her latest book, Countering
Violent Extremism in
Pakistan: Local Actions,
Local Voices, Oregon scholar
Anita Weiss has shown how,
at the lowest levels of society,
there have been in recent years
many displays of resistance to
the Taliban’s attempt to
impose its views on others.
Pashto poets and Sindhi
singers expressed their disdain
for the puritan mullahs in their
midst. Her book celebrates
those Pakistanis who, with no
official protection, reasserted
their traditional culture in the
face of violent fanatics willing
to murder in the name of their
religious dogma.
And we must not forget the
Taliban themselves. They can,
after all, be seen not only as
oppressors but also, as Prime
Minister Imran Khan pointed
out, as liberators. They have
pulled off one of the most
implausible victories of our
age. Over a period of two
decades after 9/11, countless
young men left their homes
and took their lives in their
hands as they crossed the
border with Afghanistan and
fought the vastly
technologically superior US
forces. Whatever else there is
to say about them, it was a
campaign of resistance that
eventually led to victory.
There are various
explanations as to why
Pakistanis are so consistently
rebellious. Poor governance Pakistanis have died fighting
means that they have plenty to for their ideas.
protest about. Poverty means
In Pakistan’s great ally China,
some have little to lose. State
there are countless millions
weakness means that people
who day after day comply
can hope to avoid detection. A
with the diktats of the state.
lack of commitment to the rule
But not in Pakistan. It’s a
of law can mean protesters
country of resistance.
enjoy impunity. But such
explanations only go so far.
The fact remains that many
 Afghanistan: A battleground
Atique Ur Rehman, The Nation
O
n January 28, 2022,
disturbing news
surfaced in the
Afghan news agency Tolo;
‘Faced with starvation,
Afghans sell kidneys. Donors
are mostly women and
children who are forced to sell
their organs.’ The people of
Afghanistan have been living
under stress due to insurgency
for a long time. But presently,
the country faces an acute
shortage of food, water and
medicines. Such food security
issues are a product of
sanctions which were imposed
by the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the US Federal
Reserve on Afghanistan’s
$9.5 billion assets.
Unemployment, poverty and
hunger have reached alarming
levels in the country. If the US
releases the $7 billion held
with its reserve bank, it will
ease the Afghan situation and
save precious human lives.
Chaos and unrest in South
Asia is yet another strategic
quest of the US to counter
China. India is helping it in
achieving this objective by
destabilising the whole
region. A new game is being
played by punishing 23
million innocent Afghan
citizens through the freezing
of assets. The geostrategic
positioning of Afghanistan is
a nightmare for the country as
it provides an incentive to
external forces to play their
game in the region. The US is
creating unrest amongst the
civil population to rise against
their own government and
ultimately leave their country
and run to Pakistan and Iran.
In the same breadth, it is also
trying to influence the ruling
elite and terrorists inside the
country which are trying to
settle and align themselves
against the Taliban
government. However,
Pakistan cannot remain
isolated in this situation
because it’s equally
threatened by terrorists in
Afghanistan. The US and
India are using all its covert
and overt leverages to mould
the behaviour of the Taliban
government and are pushing it
to accept the Northern
Alliance. This political move
has been named an ‘inclusive
government’. The US is not
only putting pressure directly
on the Taliban government
but indirectly through the
G20, India and Central Asian
Republics. The G20 countries
met with representatives of
the Islamic Emirate and civil
society in Oslo on January 24.
The forum expressed their
concern about human rights
violations in Afghanistan,
stressed the need for an
inclusive government and a
peaceful future for the
country. The participants of
the meeting also stressed the
need for urgent help. India is
playing its game through the
Central Asian states. On
January 29, Prime Minister
Modi held a virtual meeting
with 5 CAR heads and
discussed the situation in
Afghanistan. India also held
the meeting immediately after
the US forces withdrew from
Afghanistan. It considers
itself as a regional hegemon
and wants its influence in
Afghanistan to counter China
and Pakistan’s interests. The
Northern Alliance has
supported India through
Tajikistan, as well as the ISK.
This combination of support
to terrorist outfits in
Afghanistan has been pitched
by India and other external
forces, particularly the CARs,
to bring the Taliban regime
under pressure. This will put
Afghanistan on the path
towards instability which will
further escalate the law-and-
order situation in the country.
India’s quest to have control
over Afghanistan is driven by
multiple objectives; access to
Central Asian states via
Chahbahar and to contain the
Chinese Belt and Road
Initiative and to pursue their
strategic autonomy objective.
One contradictory aspect of
the US-Indian collaboration
on the Afghanistan issue is
Iran. India has a soft corner for
Iran due to its strategic
economic and defence ties.
Meanwhile, the US has
imposed sanctions on Iran due
to its nuclear programme. The
Taliban spokesman has
expressed his dismay over the
response of developed nations
and has repeatedly asked them
to define the inclusive
government. The spokesman
said the Afghan caretaker
government is inclusive in all
ways and it represents all
sections of the society.
Pakistan recently announced
its National Security Policy
for the next five years and
termed Afghanistan’s
situation a big variable for
stability. On January 27, 2022,
ten Pakistani soldiers
embraced shahadat in a fight
with terrorists who entered
from across the border which
Pakistan shares with
Afghanistan and Iran. No
more details were available
but it explains the
vulnerability of Pakistan.
Analysing the situation, it is
easy to conclude that all
n.
external stakeholders are
making efforts to control the
security situation in the
region. The Taliban, which
were the main disrupting force
before the withdrawal of the
US from Afghanistan, has
now been trapped in
governance issues, external
pressures and the rising threat
of ISK and TTP. The country
is almost at a standstill due to
a lack of resources, an
ineffective government,
external pressures, the
existing threat of ISK and the
TTP and rising inflation. Only
limited amounts of aid is
reaching Afghanistan. Global
powers are moving on a
contradictory path to
recognise the Taliban
government and help the 23
million Afghans who are
undergoing a traumatic
situation. Pakistan has fenced
its western border and
fortified its defence to plug in
gaps at the porous border. The
internal situation is also being
monitored for any links with
external forces to thwart any
terrorist threat. However, the
region still remains vulnerable
due to the great game being
played in Afghanista