Constitutional Law I

I. IN GENERAL

A. Political Law Defined

Is a branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental
organs of the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (Macariola vs
Asuncion)
B. Constitutional Law Defined- Study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as
represented by the three (3) inherent powers of the state and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

a. Constitution defined- the basic principles and laws of a nation, state, or social group that
determine the powers and duties of the government and guarantee certain rights to the people.
Written instrument embodying the rules of a political or social organization.

C. Constitution defined
Is a body of rules and maxims in accordance with the powers of the sovereignty that are
habitually exercised

1. Types of Constitutional law

English type -Unwritten, no judicial review, parliamentary supremacy
European Type- Written but no judicial review, advisory opinions
American- Written with judicial review on the validity of the act of the legislature
and the executive branch of the government

i. Rigid- Is one that can be amended only by formal and usually difficult
process
ii. Flexible- Is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation
iii. Written- One whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of
documents
iv. Unwritten- Consist of rules which have not been integrated into a single,
concrete form but are scattered in various sources.
v. Conventional- is an enacted constitutionally, formally “struck off” at a
definite time and place following a conscious and deliberate effort by a
constituent body or rules.
vi. Cumulative- result of political evolution “not inaugurated at any specific
time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method

The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid

2. Parts of a Constitution
a. Government- Articles VI, VII, VIII and IX
b. Liberty- Article III, Bill of Rights
c. Sovereignty-Article XVII
History of the Constitution
1. December 10, 1898- Treaty of Paris
2. July 1, 1900- Philippine Bill of 1902
3. August 29, 1916- Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act)
4. March 23, 1934- Tydings- McDufffie Law (Philippine Independence Act)
5. November 15, 1935- 1935 Constitution
6. January 17, 1973- 1973 Constitution

B. The 1986 Provisional Constitution

Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government-Freedom Constitution)
appointing key cabinet ministers and creating certain task forces
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 Declaring A National Policy To Implement Reforms
Mandated By The People Protecting Their Basic Rights, Adopting A Provisional Constitution, And
Providing For An Orderly Transition To A Government Under A New Constitution
For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the Judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. (Lawyers league vs Aquino)
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of cause of action.
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the
Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure
(Bermudez G.R 76180).
That the Aquino government was "revolutionary in the sense that it came into existence in
defiance of the existing legal processes" and that it was a revolutionary government "instituted by
the direct action of the people and in opposition to the authoritarian values and practices of the
overthrown government." (Letter of Associate Justice Puno)

Effectivity of 1987 Constitution

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, therefore to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners.(De Leon vs Esguerra)

Effectivity of Laws
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
 begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. (Tanada vs
Tuvera)

II. SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intention, if
it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow down to the mandate
of this law. The Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its
disregard result in the usurpation of majesty of law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.
A. Construction

2. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered
into a private persons or purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
(Manila Prince vs GSIS)

Before the court can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will
have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of the law, but also of
the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will give way and
has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. (Endencia vs David)

3. Presumption of Constitutional Supremacy

An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within

constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on
the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.

There is a strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is established

doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather
in violation of, the constitution. (Perez vs People)

4. Interpretation of the Provision of the Constitution

The basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have a common use and given their ordinary meaning,
except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. (Francisco vs House of Representative)

i. Verba legis- “Plain meaning rule” that is wherever possible, the words used
in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
 ii. Ratio legis est anima- The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers.
iii. Ut magis valeat quam pereat- The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the
sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms
are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. (Datu Abas Kida vs
Senate)

Executing and non-executing Provisions

The provisions under the Article II are generally considered not self-executing, and there is
no plausible reason for a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. (Pamatong vs
Comelec)

Self-executing provision- A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and

extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to legislature for action. unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. (Francisco vs House of Representative)

Non self executing- legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate. A

constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
(Francisco vs House of Representative)

Power of Judicial Review

Definition: Power of the courts to test the validity of governmental acts in light of their
conformity with a higher norm (Constitution).

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (SEC. 1, ARTICLE VIII,
1987 Constitution)

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving
the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon. (SEC. 4 (2), ARTICLE VIII, 1987 Constitution)
 The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. (Garcia vs
Executive Secretary)

When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the official whose action is being questioned

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion to mean the capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility. (Garcia vs Executive Secretary)

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a “controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide.

1. Judicial Review Characterized

2. Conditions for the exercise of Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial

review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; Direct injury
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Constitutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case
(Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission)
Legal Standing
The person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. (Chamber of Real Estate vs ERC)
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
 (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(Funa vs Exe. Secretary)
Unless a person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or governmental
action, he has no legal standing to challenge the statute or governmental action.

Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result
of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi,
as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. Neither can locus standi be
conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizens standing must
rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even
provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual
petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
(SOUTHERN HEMISHPHERE VS. ATC)
Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is
an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and
to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. (Biraogo vs Phil. Truth
Commission)
Exceptions
1. Transcendental Importance
a. Constitutional issues
b. Tax payers- There must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional
c. Citizens- There must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early, the character of funds or assets
involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory
prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest to bring the suit.
d. Voters-There must be showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question.
e. Legislators. There must be a claim that the official action complained
infringes their prerogatives as legislators
f. National Security
g. Environmental cases- Any citizens
(David vs Macapagal-Arroyo and Funa vs Executive Secretary)
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional
prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding
two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a
concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such
illegal act by public officials. (Funa vs Executive Secretary)
Their personality to sue on behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
 preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. (Oposa vs Factoran)
However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a
more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence
have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate
objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court
access in environmental cases.(Resident Mammals vs Sec.of DENR)
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that
they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are
citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the present
petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity
as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of
petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence (Akbayan vs Aquino)

Actual case or controversy

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when
a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. (Pormento vs Estrada)

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been
lifted. (Lacson vs Perez)

Exceptions:

The Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being
rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like:

(1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; Separation of powers,
non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, and accountability of local autonomy.

(2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public
interest;
(3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.

(Belgica vs Exec. Secretary)

An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility
of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances
satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the
requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented
by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been
allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise,
therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court. (Araullo vs Aquino)

The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening
event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised
its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening
events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional
issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.[42] Assuming that the
petitioners’ several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these
cases would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from
exercising its power of judicial review. (Araullo vs Aquino)

The Court holds that President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital
issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional
act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative."

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public's
interest, involving as they do the people's basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of
the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in
the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. (David vs Macapagal-Arroyo)

Conflicts of legal rights, an assertion of opposite claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as

distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. Related to the requirement of
actual case or controversy is the requirement of “ ripeness” meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. (Belgica vs Exe. Secretary)

Real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
 passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.[104]

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the
matter now. (Imbong vs Ochoa)

Lis Mota
The cause of the suit or action
No other way to resolve the issue but by the constitution itself
No collateral issue
Very subject of the case

Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the
executive and legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government. This means that the
petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case
cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is
unavoidable. (KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIHIRAP VS. ROBREDO)

If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will
be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Thus, to justify the nullification
of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is
doubtful, speculative or argumentative.

The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the constitutionality
of a law must show that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional
question is unavoidable. Consequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of
constitutionality avoided. (REPUBLIC VS. DELA MERCED)

Timeliness

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (GARCIA VS. DRILON)

Pillars of Judicial Review

1. Absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. That rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of
the case
3. That judgement may not be sustained on some other ground
4. That there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. That the parties are not in estoppel
6. That the court upholds the presumption of constitutionality

(FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REP.)

3. Functions of Judicial Review
i. Checking- Invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be in contrary
with the constitution

ii. Legitimizing- Upholding the validity of the legislative or the executive act

iii. Symbolic- To educate the bench and the bar of controlling principles and
concepts of great public importance.

APPLICATION

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions
but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest
of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same.
There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been
settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are
also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not
only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign

press that elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the
main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and
violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other election
anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the
induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the
sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was
human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the
polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged
plebiscites and referenda that also elicited derision and provoked the
resentments of the people. JAVIER VS COMELEC

We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a

"preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive
economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom
of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system.
(Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by
Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so
because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom
of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions.
This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints
have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials.
Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It
cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.

In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to
violence, much less an advocacy of force or a conspiracy to organize the use
of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about
the likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat
against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or
unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech.
Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444)
states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The
words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best recollections of
Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.

Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration

is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The
same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of
membership in a subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No.
885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute prima
facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion
amounts to:

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating the bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees. SALONGA VS PANO

The Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."

Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked
here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they
likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the... dissemination of data
derived therefrom. ABS-CBN VS COMELEC

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.

The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification
must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption
of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the
BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If
the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers
and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely
arbitrary in the legislative sense. CENTRAL BANK VS BSP
4. Who can Exercise Judicial Review?

The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial
Courts.

"Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue."

APPLICATION

This Court has declared that while lower courts should

observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of
lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by
these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be

constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive
and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing
of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will
be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," to recall
Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts
should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned.
On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to
relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and
so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is

demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other
similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following

must be present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose

The reasonable connection between the means employed and

the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is
missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the
animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will
make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a
reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is
invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner
a chance to be heard. YNOT VS IAC

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction

to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are

special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A.
8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children.[42] In accordance
with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the
branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in
each of several key cities identified.[43] To achieve harmony with the
first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the
latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a

Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such a court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of

Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general
original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.[44] It is settled that RTCs
have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,[45] “this
authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”[46] The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.[47]
We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA[48] that, “[p]lainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law,
for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts
in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.”
GARCIA VS DRILON

It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and

jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
decree, or executive order.[9] The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.

"Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior

courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue."[11]

Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the

authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with the
Constitution, thus:
"SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is

incapable of pecuniary estimation;"
The pivotal issue, which we must address, is whether it was
proper for the trial court to have exercised judicial review.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding

that it was improper for the trial court to have declared P.D. No.
579[12] unconstitutional, since petitioners had not complied with
Rule 64, Section 3, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that
said Rule specifically refers only to actions for declaratory relief and
not to an ordinary action for accounting, specific performance, and
damages.

Petitioners' contentions are bereft of merit. Rule 64, Section 3

of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. - In any action which
involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the
Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute,
executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon
such a question."
This should be read in relation to Section 1 [c] of P.D. No.
478,[13] which states in part: "SECTION 1. Functions and
Organizations - (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall...have
the following specific powers and functions

"[c] Appear in any court in any action involving the validity

of any treaty, law, executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation
when in his judgment his intervention is necessary or when requested
by the court."
It is basic legal construction that where words of command
such as "shall," "must," or "ought" are employed, they are generally
and ordinarily regarded as mandatory.[14] Thus, where, as in Rule
64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word "shall" is used, a
mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is

to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
 intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be
tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that,
contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not
limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies.
The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action"
and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for
construction.[15] In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the
Solicitor General is mandatory.

In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about

Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to
appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or
memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence,
the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required
notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the
constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.
MIRASOL VS CA

5. Effects of the Declaration of Unconstitutionality

i. Orthodox vs Unorthodox view

Orthodox view- Unconstitutional act is not a law; It confers no rights;

it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it has not been passed.

Unorthodox- the court in passing upon the question of

constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding
the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no
judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may
operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases,
but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not
repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit
are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.
ii. Doctrine of Operative Fact- recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as
an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects (Araullo vs Aquino, DAP)

iii. Partial Unconstitutionality- Salvage the valid provisions in order to

give effect to the legislative will. Nevertheless, a declaration on the
partial unconstitutionality will be valid only in 2 conditions: (1)
Legislature is willing to retain the valid portions even if the rest of
the statue is illegal and (2) Valid portions can stand independently as
a separate statute.
APPLICATION

There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the

unconstitutionality of a statute. The first is the orthodox view. Under
this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from
the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only
the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it
nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is,
in other words, a total nullity.

The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view,

the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court
may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the
decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the
statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a
precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it does not
strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede,
revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by
the judgment, but no one else is bound.

The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code,

providing that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
REPUBLIC VS CA

The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953  when
it was declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the
purpose of prescription  since the Debt Moratorium Law was
operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had  elapsed
(1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor
who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium
Law was effective, only to be told later  that his respect for an
apparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. Art. 7 of the
Civil Code which provides that, "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent  with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern."  DE AGBAYANI VS PNB

"A Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain amidst

the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the
waves.” One of the characteristics of the Constitution is permanence,
i.e., "its capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not
by legitimate needs but only by passing fancies, temporary passions
 or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities x x
x x Such a Constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit
political expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for
change.” FLORES VS DRILON

Political Questions vs Justiciable review

Political questions are questions under the constitution to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislature or executive branch of the government.

Judicial review

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government Section 1, Article 8 of the Constitution)

5. EFFECTS OF THE DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

IV. AMENDMENT AND REVISION

Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within
five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the
question of calling such a convention.
 SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

A. Amendment vs Revision

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to
a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.

The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as
to directly change the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and
does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in
the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."Whether there is an alteration
in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the]
basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental
powers of its Branches."A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."

B. Proposals for Amendment or Revision

1. By Congress as Constituent Assembly

APPLICATION

Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the

same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exer­cising the same, it is said that
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as
such, the members of Congress derive their author­ity from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution-they are the very source of all powers of government,
including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the

Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental
Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not
their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
govern­ment of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such
rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Con­stitution expressly confers upon the
 Supreme Court,[14] the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the
eminently political character of the treaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Con­gress – acting as a

constituent assembly – violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may
be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this
point.

There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein

referred to is a "special," not a general election. The circumstance that three previous
amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratifi­cation in
special elections merely shows that Congress deem­ed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.

It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the

proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval
independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact
that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of proposed amendments is
likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice
of personalities in­volved in general elections, particularly when provincial and
municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these con­siderations are addressed to
the wisdom of holding a plebi­scite simultaneously with the election of public
officers. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as
implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the above-quoted
provision of the Constitu­tion. Such authority becomes even more patent when we
con­sider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V
of the Constitu­tion, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "elec­tion," but
"plebiscite."

Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV

of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election. Some
members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"
without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that
constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not
transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may
reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of
the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not
insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to
affect the selection of elective officials. GONZALES VS COMELEC

2. By Constitutional Convention
3. By People’s Initiative
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter. Section 2 Article 17 of the Constitution
APPLICATION
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in
providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather
intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements
of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need
to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the
Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. Following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion
is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people
"before" they sign such a proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign
there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such a complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the
Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the
bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To
allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of
the Constitution. LAMBINO VS COMELEC
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of
his present powers.
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another
related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential
Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.
Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential
Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential
Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members,
or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote
of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate
in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted
in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment
to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a
peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the
Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for
the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the
National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made
between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative
 character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.nSuch being the
case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary
cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution. SANIDAD VS COMELEC
4. Submission of Proposals
APPLICATION
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2,
which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969,
calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,
approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of
delegates to said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971
Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President
issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On
November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the
Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as
setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973
On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the
affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando,
Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to
which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time
within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said
period to the petitioners in said Case No.
L-35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the
Court should go farther and decide on the merits of each of the cases under
Consideration.
WHEREFORE, all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered. PLANAS VS COMELEC
5. RATIFICATION
APPLICATION

1. What is the procedure prescribed by the 1935 Constitution for its

amendment?
 Under section 1 of Art. XV of said Constitution, three (3) steps
are essential, namely:

1. That the amendments to the Constitution be proposed either

by Congress or by a convention called for that purpose, "by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives voting separately," but "in joint session assembled";

2. That such amendments be "submitted to the people for their

ratification" at an "election"; and

3. That such amendments be "approved by a majority of the

votes cast" in said election.

Whether the new Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional

Convention has been ratified in accordance with the provisions
The five questions thus agreed upon as reflecting the basic issues herein
involved are the following:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or
political and therefore non-justiciable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
4. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution been acquiesced in (with
or without valid ratification) by the people?
5. Are petitioners entitled to relief? And
Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the
members of the Court in their respective opinions and/or concurrences, are as
follows
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, Justices
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members
of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a
justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second
question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed
that there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question
of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative,
the Court should keep its hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in the
negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution has been complied with." Justices Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is
political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
 2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court
also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters."[87]
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the
1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain
that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said
Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the
votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements
thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize
as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for
considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the
political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have
cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what
counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court
hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the
constitutional requirements for valid ratification
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the
aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the
Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."[88]
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that
there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the
people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of
the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is
conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that
independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted or
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at
this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the
shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind
of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of
martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or
competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by
Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the
free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicles restricted, (they) have
no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution."[89]
 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to
DISMISS the petition. Justices Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of
their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the
basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations
other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court,[90] are
relevant and unavoidable."[91]
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due
course to the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on
the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people
have accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4)
dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,
all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect. It is so ordered. JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY

V. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

1933 Montevideo Convention-Article 1. The state as a person of international law should
possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory;
(c).government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
Declarative Theory of Statehood- Customary International law
Constitutive Theory-

APPLICATION
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the
 national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The Constitution does not allow creation of another state within
the state.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis
supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous
region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous
region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still
be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to
2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM
during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned
earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the
above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001,
however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their
inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. PROVINCE OF NORTH
COTABATO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
V. THE PHILIPPINE AS A STATE
A. State Defined
a. 1933 Montevideo Convention
NATIONAL TERRITORY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Article 1, 1987 Constitution
 The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Archipelago
means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and
other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other
natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which
historically have been regarded as such.
Archipelagic State
means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other
islands;
Archipelagic Doctrine
The Archipelagic Doctrine as enshrined in Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that an Archipelago shall be regarded as a single unit, so that the waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the state.
The territorial waters- 12 nautical miles from the baselines
Contiguous zone- 24 nautical miles from the baselines
Exclusive economic zone- 200 nautical miles from the baselines

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to
the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as
the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;

2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights
and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the
provisions of this Convention.
3. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive
right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction operation
and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article
56 and other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise
of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.

Continental shelf-

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of states. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law
to mark out base points along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. It
merely informs the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
ARCHIPELAGIC STATES
Article 46 Use of terms For the purposes of this Convention: (a) "archipelagic State"
means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other
islands; (b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such
islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.
Article 47 Archipelagic baselines
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that
within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the
area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to
3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that
length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
4. Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless
lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built
on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island.
5. The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic State in such
a manner as to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive economic zone the territorial sea
of another State.
6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies between two parts
of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, existing rights and all other legitimate
interests which the latter State has traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights
stipulated by agreement between those States shall continue and be respected.
7. For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land under paragraph l, land
areas may include waters lying within the fringing reefs of islands and atolls, including that
part of a steep-sided oceanic plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of
limestone islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau.
8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown on charts of a
scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Alternatively, lists of geographical
coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted.
9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of
geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 48 Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured
from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.
Article 49 Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic
waters and of their bed and subsoil 1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to
the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47,
described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 2. This
sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein. 3. This sovereignty is exercised subject to this
Part. 4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in
other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the
exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space,
bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

APPLICATION
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights
over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from
the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to
codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in
the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77)
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces
the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the
Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn
from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in
the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory.
Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not
by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones
and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside
UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international
law.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles
of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,
increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
miles, as shown in the table below:29
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world
call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic
baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of
violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of
such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat
magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi
natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by
international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that
our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic
baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is
Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or
the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin
ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang
circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United
Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of
the archipelago.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
"regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of
municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with
the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically,
the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are
now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is
a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community. The fact of sovereignty,
however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not
marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing
nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus
of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are
subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does
not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right
of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the
waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More
importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the
waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate
islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between
islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States
under UNCLOS III
 In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to
delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation
is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary
to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines.
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic
zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants
new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found
within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however,
preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached
to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of
UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at
the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option
comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law,
an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international
dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress
wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows
an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step
on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest. MAGALONA VS ERMITA

D. PEOPLE
I. INHABITANTS
Article II
SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Article III
 SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Article XIII
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition
of property and its increments.

APPLICATION
It must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his
person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:
3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual
demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine
whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is
warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon,
prescribes the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to
make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of
the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same.
In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall be issued or
not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are
to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions
requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed,
an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the
law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on
the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be
viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the
Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power,
nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The
guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on
such a shaky foundation. QUE CHAN VS DEPORTATION BOARD

II. ELECTORS
 Article VI
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be
provided by law.
Article VII
SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct
vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four
years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
Article XVIII
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.

III. CITIZENS
Article II
SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
SECTION 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal military or civil service.
Article III
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

2. CITIZENSHIP
I. MODES OF ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
A. Who are Citizens of the Philippines
Article IV of 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines
 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the

Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,

who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and

Pursuant to this provision, two (2) conditions

must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship therein mentioned may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the
election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b)
said election must be made "upon reaching the age of
majority.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Article III of the 1973 Constitution

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Article IV of 1935 Constitution

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the

time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents

who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,

upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
 The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest
civil registry.

The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.

APPLICATION

Sometime in March 1936, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon,

Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel,
Rizal, and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, A
Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631
square meters, designed as lot 398 and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue
and Pavia Street, Roxas City.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of

the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands
of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. "If land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen
or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.33
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos
may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial
transfer.34 The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our
lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. LEE VS DIRECTOR OF
LANDS

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."

Jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary

basis of citizenship by birth.

What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public

service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault
of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child
of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public
office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice
nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to
ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien
father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would
exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or
discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration –

is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the
day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is
no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where
there clearly are none provided.

In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of

discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful. TECSON VS COMELEC

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an

amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children
with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines,
and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily
because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to
warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to
them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the
effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the
mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in
the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them

stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one
among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not
just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the
statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright.
There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an
improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political
rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not
separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born

citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to
examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
POE-LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC

Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on 13 March 1975 in

Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and
Anita T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March
1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen
before the Bureau of Immigration (BI).

We agree with the Court of Appeals that while the affidavits of

Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of Quintos’
certificate of live birth, such certificate remains valid unless declared
invalid by competent authority. The rule stands that "documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.

We further sustain the Court of Appeals that there could be reasons

why the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the census,
such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their
absence in the master’s list of voters, they could have failed to
register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos’
certificate of live birth was made 10 years after her birth and not
anytime near the filing of respondent’s petition for recognition as
Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be presumed that the
certificate’s late filing was meant to use it fraudulently. Finally, the
Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself
attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted
Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of
Quintos’ Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her
nationality as Filipino. These pieces of evidence should prevail over
the affidavits submitted by Soliman and Peralta to the Senate
Committees. Gonzalez vs Pennisi

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of
Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private
respondent who was born in 1948.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an

order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory
and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent
then a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in
the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate
him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the
local populace were concerned.

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make

the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow
interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.

It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not
always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The
spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially
where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice.
(Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it
effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed,
hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the
letter thereof.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected

citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He
could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987
the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for
one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.CO VS
HRET

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier

Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino

citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter
but as a candidate, as well

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind

Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for
a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was
married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso
jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the
Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the
COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No.
95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the
elective position of Davao Oriental governor. VALLES VS
COMELEC

Petitioner was born in Dapa, Surigao, on February 16, 1923; that his
parents are "Benito Dy Cueco, Chinese (now deceased)" and "Julita
Duyapat, Filipina, a native of Surigao, Philippines"

The only evidence on the political status of petitioner's mother, Julita

Duyapat, consists of a certificate of baptism, stating that Julita
Gonzaga was born in General Luna, Surigao, on July 30, 1881, and
that her parents were Marcelino Duyapat and Consolacion Gonzaga,
 and a picture showing that she has the features of a Filipina and is
attired in the typical dress of a Filipina.

Petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on

February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May
15,1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear
that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of
majority". Cueco vs SOJ

B. Election of Philippine Citizenship

1973 Constitution- Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
1935 Constitution- Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

CA 625- AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION

TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A
PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN

The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),

section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

Execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file

the same with the nearest civil registry

"two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship
may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age
of majority."

APPLICATION

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be

claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to
elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such,
he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this
case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result.
this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. APPLICATION OF CHING,
BAR MATTER

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing

Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case
of the respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her
Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since
 birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. Republic vs Lim.

C. Natural-born Citizens
SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizen

D. Naturalization
Modes of Naturalization
a. CA No. 473
b. RA No. 530
c. RA No. 6809
d. RA No. 9139
Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time

of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his

parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless one year after
reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the

Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.—Any person who

shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or cause or aid
any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in
falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a
naturalization certificate for the purpose of making use thereof, or in
order that the same may be used by another person or persons, and
any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a
naturalization certificate in violation of the provisions of this Act,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand pesos or
by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in the case
that the person convicted is a naturalized citizen his certificate of
 naturalization and the registration of the same in the proper civil
registry shall be ordered cancelled.
APPLICATION
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalised
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who
might herself be lawfully naturalised," refers to a class or race who
might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other
conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.
Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalised," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but she must also possess the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral
character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of
real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the
principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove
only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to
establish her citizenship status as a fact
Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who i subsequently naturalised here follows the Philippines citizenship
of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4
Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organised
governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have
not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United States, whose
laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof
Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has
repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the
qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino
citizenship. More specifically, the Court has had occasion to state:
"Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic
of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not
be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict
compliance with the law." 15 Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price
which should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its
sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could
constitute ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence,
compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the
satisfaction of the Court. Republic vs Li Yao.

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion

made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may
cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil
Register: Limkaichong v s COMELEC
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance
judge motu propio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called
to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already
taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of
naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the
proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal
or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the
court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked
in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth
Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper
provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these
officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
 invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s
descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an
office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned
before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be
strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking
Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments
of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only
deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in
whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale
behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for
her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. Limkaichong
vs COMELEC
In Republic v. Hong,21 it was held that an applicant for naturalization must
show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the
naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied.
This ponente has likewise held that “[t]he courts must always be mindful
that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The
burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of law.” REPUBLIC VS HUANG TE
FU

II. LOSS OR REACQUISITION

CA No. 63- AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
Republic Act 8171: An Act of Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women
Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born
Filipinos
Republic Act No. 9225- AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

A. Loss of citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6
of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good
moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten
 years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal
dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has
filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification
therefore. Republic vs dela Rosa
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and
practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted
exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice;(f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k)
when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. GUY
VS IGNACIO
B. Loss of citizenship by express renunciation
C. Repatriation
III. Dual Citizenship
Article 4 of the 1987 Constitution
SECTION 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.
Local Government Code
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position: (d) Those with dual citizenship

APPLICATION

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a

Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines,

when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions
for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. MERCADO VS
MANZANO