1. Re Petition of Al Argosino to Take Lawyer’s Oath, B.M. No.

712, March 19, 1997

Facts:
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of Al Argosino. Petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991 where he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. Later on, he applied for probation
which was approved and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to
take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of office and to admit him to
the practice of law averring that his probation was already terminated.

The Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the
bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had
been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family
and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and be admitted to the
practice of law.

Ruling:
Yes. In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino
is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

The Court stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly
be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

NOTE: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration
of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace
to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

2. Atty. Khan v. Atty. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 9, 2003

Facts:
Respondent Atty. Simbillo had his legal services published in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist. a staff
member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her
husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services. In his answer, respondent admitted
the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the
time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation and prayed that
he be exonerated from all the charges against him.

The case was referred to the IBP for investigation. Later on, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found the respondent guilty. An Urgent MR was filed but it was denied. Thus, this instant
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.02 of the CPR as well as
Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:
Yes. There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits
that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services
again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.

The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort
to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of
simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even
the use of calling cards is now acceptable.  Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.

Premises considered, Atty. Simbillo is guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR.

3. Re: SC Decision v. Atty. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012

Facts:
Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin
A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the
request and sent Abastillas’ letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated
Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes
was away. Abastillas eventually got the ₱10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.

Respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of

Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas’ letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of
₱10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a
falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the
disbursement.

A criminal case was filed with the Sandiganbayan by Ferraren against Atty. Pactolin for
falsification of public document. The latter was found guilty of the same. On appeal, the decision was
affirmed but since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
appropriate action. The case for Atty. Pactolin was recommended to be dismissed by the Investigating
Commissioner because complainant neither appeared nor submitted any pleading.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes
sufficient ground for his disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended
on the following grounds:
(1) deceit;
(2) malpractice;
(3) gross misconduct in office;
(4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(6) violation of the lawyer’s oath;
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice,
honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form
of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar. Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.

Here, Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although
his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet served his sentence. His
conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

4. Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 4, 1997

Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, they were classmates, and used to be friends.
through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units of Villarosa & Co.; and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya
by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
 Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had
resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He also wrote
similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of
Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. In that complaint, she accused
Alauya of:

1. Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;
2. Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;
3. Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .; and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,". He declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. Alauya
justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title
of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Nevertheless, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not, Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar can use the title of “Attorney.”

Ruling:
No. The Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.  While
one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.  As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that
his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

5. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates / In Re
Cunanan, March 18, 1954
Facts:
810 unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar petitioned in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70% effective since
1946. The President requested the views of the Supreme Court on the bill, thus seven members of the
court submitted written comments adverse thereto. Shortly thereafter, the President vetoed it. The
Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.

Republic Act Number 972, known as the “Bar Flunkers” Act of 1953” admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. These candidates took
the exams during the war making reading material scarce. After its approval, around 810 unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others with
motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as
an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without invoking the law in question.

The title of the law was “An Act to Fix the Passing marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.” Section 1 provided the following passing marks: 1946 to 1951: 70%, 1952: 71%, 1953:
72%, 1954: 73%, 1955: 74%. Provided, however that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50
percent.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of
the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

Ruling:
No. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision
have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility.

The Court ruled that Sec. 2 was unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in
the title of the Act. It establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for
allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Sec. 1, the portion for 1946 and 1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect since the Court could not muster enough votes to declared it void.
The said portion was stricken down for the following reasons:

1) The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. By its
declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession.

The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely
more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained
firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate
mission is to create a serious social danger.

2) The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;

3) The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to the practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules of court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;

It is an inherent power of the judicial department of government ultimately to determine the

qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself
in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. It rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as
an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.

Only the Supreme Court can revoke its earlier decisions regarding admissions of bar candidates.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

4) The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

Moreover, the law was passed in 1962, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke exisiting
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of any petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power of Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

NOTE: However, that under the 1987 Constitution, the power to decide who may be admitted to the
practice of law is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court and is no longer shared with Congress.

Article 8, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.