Aviation Security SITREP Baltic States and Finland

Authors: Dyami DEWIS Team

Update Log:
Version 1.1 (25-02-2022):

- Updated current situation

- Added additional information to cyber threat

- Added a scenario on the possibility of a total closure of Russian airspace to European carriers

Version 1.0 (22-02-2022):

- Original version

1. Current situation
As of the 24th of February 2022, Russian troops have been conducting offensive military
operations within Ukrainian sovereign territory from both Russian and Belarussian bases.
Within Ukraine, non-stop attacks and counter-attacks have impacted multiple cities, civil
infrastructure, and military bases.

These recent developments have severely alarmed the Batlic states and Finland. But while
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are NATO member states, President Vladimir Putin’s recent
comments challenging the foundation and sovereignty of ex-Soviet states have made these
security concerns increasingly acute. And although Finland is neither an ex-USSR nor a NATO
member, it has also expressed increasing worries about the developing situation due to it’s
chequered history with the Russian state.

In response to these recent geo-political developments, NATO has chosen to send additional
troops, armour, and helicopters to bolster the defences of the Baltics; within the intent of
detring further aggression from Russia and Belarus. In addition, the United States, United
Kingdom, European Union, and partner nations have initiated economic sanctions that will
affect Russia’s ability to trade on the world circuit. This is of consideration for the Batlics as
they will have to oblige to European Union sanctions, which in turn will make them an active
target for Russian economic and/or subversive hybrid warfare countermeasures.

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2. Potential developments and wider implications for aviation security
Due to the current and increasing presence of NATO troops within the Baltic region, it is not
expected that Russia will confront Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, or Finland militarily. But due to the
over support of each of these nations for the Ukrainian Government, there is a high likelihood
of retaliatory actions by the Russian state. Naturally, these measures could affect aviation
security in the region. Therefore, the following scenarios will be used to explain what direct
and indirect consequences either an escalation, de-escalation or continuation of tensions
within the Ukrainian crisis could have within the Baltic states and Finland.

2.1. Situations resulting from escalations in tensions:

2.1.1. NATO member states become directly involved in the conflict between Russia
and Ukraine. This is the worst case scenario and will potentially lead to an all out
war between NATO and CSTO2 forces. Global tensions will rise to the highest level
since WWII. In this case, the airspace over the Baltics will become inoperable for
civilian airliners, as air defences along all direct borders between NATO and CSTO
countries are likely to be activated. The risk of misidentification or
misinterpretation of civilian aircrafts in this scenario is extremely high. The
consequences for Finland’s airspace are different since the country is not a NATO
member. Nevertheless, Finland’s strong relationship with NATO could still cause
the Russians to activate their air defences along the Finnish border. The risk of
misidentification or misinterpretation of civilian aircrafts is lower than in the Baltic
region, but should still be considered.

2.1.2. The West places further economic sanctions on oil and gas imports from Russia
as a non-military countermeasure to deter further aggression within Ukraine. This
scenario would likely result in oil and gas lines being shut off by Russia to most or
all NATO members in Europe. For the Baltics this could create short term
shortages of aviation fuel at airports. But due to the Balkans being
semi-independence from Russian oil, it is unlikely that this shortage would prevail
in the long term.

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 2.1.3. Russia conducts cyberattacks on critical infrastructure important to safe air
travel. With cyberattacks having previously occurred last week against the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and two banks, it is feasible that the Baltic states
and Finland could become a target for similar events. Targets may include Air
Traffic Control and Cyber-Physical Systems, which could lead to both short and
long term disruptions to flight operations. Therefore, it would be beneficial to
analyse the security of aviation related computer systems for new and possibly
pre-existing malware related compromises.

2.1.4. Russia closes its airspace to European countries one by one in retaliation for
sanctions. For the baltic states, this could result in multiple challenges for their
airlines. Flight traffic flying the EU-Asia connection will no longer be able to cross
into Russian airspace via the baltics to make their intercontinental passage. This
will result in carriers having to divert to routes crossing over the Balkans, Turkey,
and the middle east. This is an additional consideration as these routes are
already congested, and any attempt to increase traffic within these regions
could result in additional flight risks.

Of note, this situation has already occured for British registered aircraft as a
result of the banning of Aeroflot from the United Kingdom. Therefore, it seems
highly likely that similar bannings of carriers will occur to pro-Ukrainian nations
by Russia. As a result, it is advisable for carriers to consider alternative routes that
avoid dense aviation routes or take this into account in the safety risk analysis.

2.2. Situations resulting from a continuation of current pressures

2.2.1. There still remains a possibility of an accidental firing of surface to air missiles.
Russia maintains an extensive network of surface to air missiles across the
entirety of its border regardless of geopolitical tension levels. While these
systems have been active for an extended period of time during the Ukrainian
crisis without fault, there is still a possibility of a misfire or misidentification of
civilian aircraft as military air assets. This is of special importance to Baltics as it
is covered by Russian long-range surface to air missiles from its East, in addition
to similar short-range systems to its West [based in the Russian enclave of
Kaliningrad]. Another consideration is the rising tension along the Belarus-Baltic
states border due to Belarus’ involvement in the incursion of Ukraine. With Belarus
closing its airspace, the risk of a military response to a possible accidental
airspace incursion by an airliner rises.

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 2.2.2. NATO joint exercises take place over the coming weeks in the Baltic region in a
show of presence, with the intent of deterring Russia from taking further
escalation within the region. NATO training operations are a routine occurrence
and prior warnings are often given to such events due to the disruptions caused
by military aircraft operating within civil airspace; snap training exercises are
expected to take place in the coming weeks. Therefore, such forewarnings are
unlikely to be announced with ample time. There is a high likelihood of these
operations directly impacting flight route planning, and would predominantly
affect Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian airspace due to their NATO membership.
Finland could also hold similar improvised training operations with partner
nations such as Norway and Denmark, resulting in similar disruptions to civilian
air traffic.

2.3. Situations resulting from de-escalation of current tensions.

2.3.1. The situation in Ukraine de-escalates and tensions in the region return to the
level that was usual before Russia’s most recent military buildup. In this scenario,
the risk of misidentification or misinterpretation of civilian aircraft in the
Baltic-Russian and Finnish-Russian border region will reduce drastically. Airliners
would be able to operate under peacetime conditions.

2.3.2. Belarusian airspace becomes viable in the long term if a severe de-escalation of
tensions between the EU, Ukraine, and Minsk occurs. Following the unlawful
interception of a Ryanair Flight FR4978 in May 2021 by the Belarusian government,
the EU banned aircraft from landing in and flying over Belarusian air space. As a
result, air traffic has been re-routed through the Baltics states, which has
increased operational costs for airlines. If a regime change takes place, or
Lukashenko drastically changes his politics with Europe, the resumption of
pre-flight ban civil carrier operations would likely occur.

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Conclusion

Despite recent events, the aviation security situation in the Baltics and Finland remain at
pre-Ukrainian conflict escalation levels. However, while no side intends to shoot down a
civilian airliner, recent incidents involving flights MH17 and PS752/AUI752 show that
heightened tensions always carry the risk of misidentification or misinterpretation. This is
of special importance to the Baltic states, as they are overlapped by surface to air missiles
from both their West and Eastern borders.

Source: Business Insider

In the event of an active conflict breaking out between NATO and the CSTO, all flights within
the vicinity of the dividing lines of the two organisations will be put in immediate risk. But
while this situation still remains unlikely, what is more probable is that Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, and Finland will become the subject of Russian economic sanctions in the near
future. For aviation within the Baltic region, the biggest impact will be the inability of
civilian carriers to access Russian Airspace. This would force carriers to select already
congested air routes over the Balkans, Turkey, and the Middle East, which incurs additional
risks.

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Annexes

NATO CSTO
Member States1 Member States2

Albania France Luxembourg Slovakia Armenia

Belgium Germany Montenegro Slovenia Belarus

Bulgaria Greece Netherlands Spain Kazakhstan

Canada Hungary North Turkey Kyrgyzstan

Macedonia

Croatia Iceland Norway United Tajikistan

Kingdom

Czech Italy Poland United States Russia

Republic

Denmark Latvia Portugal

Estonia Lithuania Romania