Q10(2019)(A)

‘The grammatical and ordinary sense of words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity... or inconsistency with the rest of the
instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no
further.’ (Lord Wensleydale).

Explain why the golden rule has generally been abandoned by the courts and
discuss how approaches to statutory interpretation today have improved
statutory interpretation.

Explain the statement:

The quotation illustrates the golden rule, which is considered as a variation or

modification of the literal rule. It is a relaxation of the literal rule to prevent absurdity.
The Literal rule is extreme as it applies the ordinary, dictionary meaning of words of
Plm even though it leads to an absurd application of the law. This can be seen in the
statement of Lord Esher in the case of R v The Judge of the City of London Court
(1892) is that the job of the judiciary is to interpret the law following the words
enacted by Parliament and, if this leads to an ridiculous outcome, then so be it. This
approach attempts to draw a clear line between the roles of the judiciary and the
legislature (Declaratory theory and Plm supremacy). The Golden rule avoids
absurdity by modifying the literal meaning. Both LR and the GR are considered as
„Literal approaches‟ as they both emphasis on the words / letters of the provision.

Excerpts from the examiner‟s report (Zone B question):

A good answer:

Explained that the approaches to statutory interpretation are judge-made rules and
have varied from time to time. Rather than simply describing the ‘rules’ of
interpretation better answers would identify what judges are trying to achieve when
they interpret statutes and then built on this to evaluate why a literal approach /
golden rule (its variation) may not be the best approach.

1. Explain why the golden rule has generally been abandoned? (Weaknesses of
the Literal approach –including the modified version, the golden rule).

 Whilst there has been a shift in attitude (post 1972 & post 1998) in the
judges & the way they approach their task of statutory interpretation, it
would not be accurate to state that the literal approach has been
abandoned. (R v Brown (1996)) It is submitted that there can never be
a complete abandonment of the literal rule, not as long as judges

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 remember the proper scope of their judicial office i.e. to interpret and
not actively partake in legislating/quasi-legislating.
 Weaknesses of the literal approach and the golden rule –focussing
merely on the words of the provision may not uphold the intention of
Plm (R v Maginnis).
 Judges can technically change the law by modifying the meaning of
words in statutes, potentially infringing the separation of powers
between legal and legislature.
 The Golden Rule is of no help if there is no absurdity in the statute.
For example the London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman
(1946) case, where the widow couldn‟t get compensation because the
wording of the statute didn‟t allow for this circumstance. The statute
provided compensation payable on death for those 'relaying or
repairing' the track. Under the literal rule oiling did not come into either
of these categories. This result although very harsh could not to be
said to be absurd so the golden rule could not be applied. There was
no ambiguity in the words therefore the mischief rule could not be
applied.

2. How the approaches used in interpreting statutes today have improved

matters?
 More reliance on wider purposive approach as a result of European
influence – Bulmer v Bollinger , Buchanan v Babco – Lord Denning -it
was necessary to move away from traditional rules of interpretation that
stress the literal meaning of words and adopt the European method (i.e.
look for the design or purpose that lies behind the words). He said that
when European judges come upon a situation which is to their minds
within the spirit, but not the letter, of the legislation, they solve the problem
by looking at the design and purpose of the legislature – at the effect
which it sought to achieve. They then interpret the legislation so as to
produce the desired effect. This means that they fill in gaps, quite
unashamedly, without hesitation. They are giving effect to what the
legislature intended, or may be presumed to have intended.

 Cases on interpretive obligation under S3 HRA 1998 – R v A, & Ghaidan

v Godin Mendoza – also emphasises on the purposive approach instead
of the literal approach.

 What is the benchmark for saying that a particular approach „improves‟

statutory interpretation? Purposive approach remedy the technical
absurdities created by Parliament and try to achieve the purpose

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 Parliament intended instead of simply highlighting the absurdity and
modifying the ordinary meaning.

 Improvement – as it allows judges to use a bit of discretion in applying the

law in a more just / logical way by making references to other external
aids to interpretation such as Hansard (Pepper v Hart).

 Conclusion - the process of SI is complex, it wouldn‟t be accurate to view

the various methods of interpretation in terms of ranking – in other words
it is not right to state that the modern methods are better & that the
traditional rules are subordinate to the modern methods. Each of these
methods is an attempt by the judge to make sense of the wording in the
Statute, face value meaning of those words, meaning behind those words
& its relationship with Parliamentary intention. SI is a changing judicial
practice where at different times, judges have different judicial ideologies
of what would best serve in achieving Parliamentary intention. Each of the
rules must be viewed on its own strengths. Comparatives between the
rules would distort the settled understanding of the practice of SI i.e. “to
interpret/decipher Parliamentary intention”.

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