Ii Addl. Judicial First Class ... vs State Of A.P. Represented By The ...

on 7 September, 2004

Andhra High Court

Ii Addl. Judicial First Class ... vs State Of A.P. Represented By The ... on 7 September, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005 (1) ALD Cri 625, 2005 CriLJ 1168
Author: G Bikshapathy
Bench: G Bikshapathy, S Prasad
JUDGMENT G. Bikshapathy J.

1. At the instance of the learned II Addl. Judicial First Class Magistrate, Bhimavaram, the following
reference is transmitted under Section 395 of Code of Criminal Procedure for decision of the High
Court:

"Competency of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class to impose minimum sentence of fine of Rs.
10,000/- or Rs. 20,000/- as the case may be for the offence punishable under Section 8(b)(i) and
(ii) of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in
PANKAJBHAI NAGJIBHAI PATEL v. STATE OF GUJARAT (2001(1) A.L.T. (CRL.) 129 (S.C.) =
2001(1) supreme 124)"

2. The facts leading to the reference are as follows:

Accused in C.C. No. 813 of 2002 on the file of the II Addl. Judicial First Class Magistrate,
Bhimavaram stood charged for the offence punishable under Section 8(b)(i) and 8(b)(ii) of the A.P.
Prohibition Act, 1995. The trial Court found the accused guilty of the charges under Section 8(b)(i)
and 8(b)(ii) and he was convicted under Section 248(2) Cr.P.C. The minimum fine imposable shall
not be less than Rs. 10,000/- under Section 8(b)(i) while under Section 8(b)(ii) it shall not be less
than Rs. 20,000/-.

3. Under sub-section (2) of Section 29 of Cr.P.C., a Judicial Magistrate of First class is empowered to
pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or of fine not exceeding Rs.
5,000/- or of both. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid provisions contained in Section 29 read with
Section 8(b)(i) and 8(b)(ii) as the case may be, the question that calls for consideration is whether
the Magistrate of First Class is empowered to pass a sentence of fine of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs.
20,000/- as the case may be even though the power to impose fine is restricted to Rs. 5,000/- under
Section 29 of Cr.P.C.

4. Under Section 25 of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, a Magistrate of First Class is empowered to
take cognizance of the Offences punishable under the Act including Section 8(b)(i) and 8(b)(ii).

5. The Government of Andhra Pradesh with a view to introduce prohibition of the manufacture, sale
and consumption of arrack and regulation of the manufacture of other intoxicated liquor in the State
of Andhra Pradesh and matters connected therewith and incidental thereto enacted the Act No. 17 of
1995 (Called A.P. Prohibition Act, 1995). It entered force on 20.2.1995. Under Section 7, selling,
buying, being in possession and consumption of liquor otherwise than in accordance with the
provisions of Excise Act and or as the case may be, the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 was
prohibited. Similarly, under Section 7(A), the production, manufacture, storage possession,

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collection, purchase, sale and transport of arrack was also prohibited. Various punishments were
prescribed under Section 8 of the Act and we are concerned only with Sections 8(b)(i) and 8(b)(ii),
which are extracted below:

"8. Punishment for buying, selling, consumption etc., of liquors:- Whoever,

(a) xxxxxx xxx

(b) possesses, collects, buys, sells, transports, produces or manufactures any liquor other than
arrack except in accordance with the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (Act 17 of
1968), or the terms of any rule notification, order, license or permit issued thereunder] shall be
punished,

(i) where the liquor involved in the offence is less than such quantity as may be notified in this
behalf with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend
upto three years or with fine] which shall not be less than rupees ten thousand or shall not be less
than thrice the value of the liquor involved in the offence whichever is higher but which may extend
upto six times the value of such liquor. Such value being arrived at in the manner prescribed or with
both.

(ii) where the liquor involved in the offence is not less than the quantity notified as aforesaid with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend upto five years
and with fine which shall not be less than rupees twenty thousand or shall not be less than thrice the
value of the liquor involved in the offence, whichever is higher but which may extend up to six times
the value of such liquor, such value being arrived at in the manner prescribed [x x x]

(iii) xxx

(c) to (e) xxxxxxxxx"

6. Under Section 31, overriding effect was accorded to the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act and the
provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 and the Rules made thereunder for the time being in force. Under
Section 25 of the Act, an offence under the Act shall be cognizable and the provisions of the Code
with reference to the cognisable offences shall be applied to them. Under Section 25-A, enhanced
punishment is provided if any person having been previously convicted of an offence punishable
under this Act subsequently commits and is convicted of an offence punishable under this Act, he
shall be liable upto twice the punishment which might be imposed on the first conviction under this
Act.

7. As already observed above, a Magistrate of First Class is empowered to take cognizance of the
offence and impose punishment of sentence under Section 29 of Cr.P.C. Under Section 5 of the
Code, saving clause is provided to the effect that the provisions of the Code will not affect the special
or local laws in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary either on account of the

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restriction enjoined under Section 4(2) or by virtue of the provisions of Section 5 of the Cr.P.C. The
said provision read thus:

"Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect
any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or
any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force."

Therefore, by virtue of the aforesaid provision, if the special or local law authorises the Magistrate of
First Class to exercise special jurisdiction or power conferred under the said law, then Section 29
gets ousted and in such an event, the Magistrate of First Class shall be entitled to exercise the
jurisdiction and the powers enjoined under the provisions of such special or local law. We see such
provisions in certain special enactments, wherein the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial
Magistrate of First Class has specifically empowered by the Legislature to pass a sentence of fine
exceeding the limits prescribed under Section 29(2) of Cr.P.C. Under Section 12 of the Essential
Commodities Act, we come across such a provision, which reads thus:

"12. Special provision regarding fine- Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 29 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974), it shall be lawful for any Metropolitan Magistrate, or any
Judicial Magistrate of First Class specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, to
pass a sentence of fine exceeding five thousand rupees on any person convicted of contravening any
Order made under Section 3."

Of course, subsequently that provision has been deleted and the jurisdiction was conferred on the
Court of Sessions.

Similarly, under Section 36 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, we find similar provision, which reads
thus:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code it shall be lawful for any Metropolitan Magistrate
or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class to pass any sentence authorised by this Act in excess of the
power under the Code."

Section 21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act also confers higher powers than the
prescribed under Section 29(2). Section 21 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act reads thus:

"Section 21:- Magistrate's power to impose enhanced penalties.- Notwithstanding anything

contained in Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), it shall be lawful for any
Metropolitan Magistrate or any Judicial Magistrate of First Class to pass any sentence authorised by
this Act, except a sentence of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding six years, in excess of his
powers under the said Section."

But such a special provision has not been provided in the Prohibition Act. If such special provision is
made in special enactments, no difficulty would arise in awarding the punishment of imprisonment
or fine as the case may be. But, if no such special provision is stipulated in the special Act, the

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difficulty would arise.

8. Similar issue arose before the Supreme Court in PANKAJBHAI NAGIBHAI PATEL V. THE
STATE OF GUJARAT. Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act provides punishment of
imprisonment for a term, which may extend to one year or fine, which may extend to twice the
amount of cheque or with both. This provision would not result in any anomaly when the amount of
cheque is less than Rs. 2,500/- as the maximum fine which could be imposed by the Magistrate is
Rs. 5,000/-. In the said case, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class after convicting the accused for
the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act sentenced him to suffer Rigorous
Imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 83,000/- and they were confirmed in appeal and also
in revision. On a special leave petition, moved by the accused, the question arose as to whether
Judicial Magistrate of First Class could impose fine beyond Rs. 5,000/- in view of the limitation as
contained in Section 29(2) of the Code arose for consideration. The Supreme Court referred to the
provisions contained in Sections 138 and 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act and it was held that the
non-obstante clause was intended to operate only in respect of the three aspects and nothing more.
The first is - under the Code Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence either upon receiving a
complaint, or upon a police report, or upon receiving information from any person, or upon his own
knowledge except in the cases differently indicated in Chapter XIV of the Code. But Section 142 of
the N.I. Act says that insofar as the offence under Section 138 is concerned no Court shall take
cognizance except upon a complaint made by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque.
The second is - Under the Code a complaint could be made at any time subject to the provisions of
Chapter XXXVI. But so far as the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is
concerned such complaint shall be made within one month of the cause of action. Third is: Under
Article 511 of the first Schedule of the Code, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for less
than 3 years or with fine only under any enactment (other than Indian Penal Code) such offence can
be tried by any Magistrate. Normally Section 138 of the N.I. Act which is punishable with a
maximum sentence of imprisonment for one year would have fallen within the scope of the said
Article. But Section 142 of the N. I. Act says that for the offence under Section 138, no Court inferior
to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of first class shall try the sane. Thus, the
Supreme Court observed that non-obstante limb provided in Section 142 of N.I. Act was not
intended to expand the powers of a Magistrate of First Class beyond what is fixed under Chapter III
of the Code. Section 29, which falls within Chapter III of the Code, contains a limit for a Magistrate
of First Class in the matter of imposing a sentence as noticed above i.e. If the sentence is
imprisonment it shall not exceed 3 years and if the sentence is fine (even if it is part of the sentence)
it shall not exceed Rs. 5,000/-. In such an event, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

"14. IN this context, we may also point out that if a Magistrate of first class thinks that the fact
situation in a particular case warrants imposition of a sentence more severe than the limit fixed
under Section 29 of the Code, the legislature has taken care of such a situation also. Section 325 of
the Code is included for that purpose. Sub-section (1) of that Section reads thus:

"Whenever a Magistrate is of opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the
accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from,
or more severe than that which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or, being a Magistrate of the

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second class, is of opinion that the accused ought to be required to execute a bond under Section
106, he may record the opinion and submit his proceedings, and forward the accused, to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate to whom he is subordinate."

If proceedings are so submitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 325(1) of the Code it
is for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to pass such judgment, sentence or order in the case, as he thinks
fit. It is so provided in sub-section (3) thereof.

15. Even that apart, a Magistrate who thinks it fit that the complainant must be compensated with
his loss he can resort to the course indicated in Section 357 of the Code. This aspect has been dealt
with in Bhaskaran's case (supra) as follows:

"However, the Magistrate in such cases can alleviate the grievance of the complainant by making
resort to Section 357(3) of the Code. It is well to remember that this Court has emphasised the need
for making liberal use of that provision (Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, . No limit is mentioned in the
sub-section and therefore, a Magistrate can award any sum as compensation. Of course while fixing
the quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to consider what would be the reasonable
amount of compensation payable to the complainant. Thus, even if the trial was before a Court of
Magistrate of the first class in respect of a cheque which covers an amount exceeding Rs. 5000.00
the Court has power to award compensation to be paid to the complainant.

16. In our view this question does not now pose any practical difficulty. Whenever a Magistrate of
the first class feels that the complainant should be compensated he can, after imposing a term of
imprisonment, award compensation to the complainant for which no limit is prescribed in Section
357of the Code.

17. In the result, while retaining the sentence of imprisonment of six months we delete the fine
portion from the sentence and direct the appellant to pay compensation of Rs. 83,000.00 to the
respondent-complainant. The said amount shall be deposited with the trial Court within six months
falling which the trial Court shall resorted to the steps permitted by law to realise it from the
appellant."

9. In fact, the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case reported in PERUMALLA KOTESWARA
RAO (A-3) V. STATE OF A.P., 2001(1) A.L.T. (Crl.) 232(A.P.) held that the procedure contemplated
under Section 36-A of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 by way of summary trial is permissible only in
respect of offences which are punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. In
asmuch as, the offence under Section 27(c) is punishable with imprisonment upto three years, but
which may extend to five years, it cannot be said to be punishable with imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three years as contemplated in Section 36-A. Obviously, the provisions under Section
36-A cannot be invoked. The matter came up before the learned Single Judge under Section 482
Cr.P.C. challenging the Order passed by the learned Additional Munsif Magistrate, Sathenapally in
which an application was filed by the accused No.3 in the said C.C. for conducting trial in summary
way as contemplated under Section 36-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The said application
having been dismissed, a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed. The learned Judge

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observed as follows:

"It is pertinent to mention here that what Section 29(2) of Cr.P.C. provides for is the competence of
the Magistrate to impose sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three years. To restrict
competence of power to impose the sentence of imprisonment has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate. The desideratum for invoking the provisions of Section 36-A of Drugs
and Cosmetics Act is not the power of the Magistrate to impose the sentence, but it is the extent of
sentence of imprisonment provided as a punishment for the offence for which the accused is facing
trial. In this case, the offence is under Section 27(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. In asmuch as
the said offence is punishable with imprisonment for not less than three years, which may extend
upto five years, the question of applicability of Section 36-A of Drugs and Cosmetics Act does not
arise. It may be pertinent to point out that where an offence tried by a Magistrate is punishable with
more severe punishment than the Magistrate can impose under Section 29(2) of Cr.P.C. and if the
Magistrate after the trial is over and finds the accused guilty is of opinion that he ought to receive a
punishment more severe than with which the Magistrate is empowered to inflict, it is open to the
Magistrate to record his opinion and submit the proceedings to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to
whom he is subordinate under Section 325(3) of Cr.P.C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the
proceedings are so submitted may after taking such further evidence and following the procedure
prescribed pass such judgment or Order as he finds fit according to law."

10. Justice Punnayya in the case reported in MARAKULA AGAMMA v. THE STATE OF A.P., 1977(1)
A.P.L.J. 376 (H.C.) was dealing with the similar identical situation. In that case the petitioners were
A-1 to A-4 in C.C.No. 2593/74. According to the prosecution, the petitioners and another who is the
5th accused were alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 465,
468 and 471 IPC; and charges were framed on 11.10.1974 to that effect. In the trial, the prosecution
examined 12 witnesses by 25.10.1976 out of 25 witnesses cited to be examined and all the witnesses
were cross-examined. At this stage, the learned Magistrate felt that as the amount involved in the
case was Rs. 6,38,822-39 and as highest punishment has to be imposed on the accused if they were
to be convicted and also as the case requires speedy disposal, the case has to be committed to the
Sessions Court which is proper Court competent to award adequate punishment proportionate to
the amounts involved and also dispose of the case speedily. He therefore, passed an Order under
Section 323 Cr.P.C. committing the accused to the Sessions Court. On a challenge made, the learned
Judge observed as follows:

" I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. As stated above, the learned
Magistrate took cognisance of the case for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 466,
468 and 471 IPC. These offences are to be tried by the First Class Magistrate, as could be seen from
the Ist Schedule given in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The offences under Sections 420, 466, 468
and 471 I.P.C. can be tried by the First Class Magistrate and the sentence to be awarded for each of
the offences is seven years imprisonment. It is therefore, clear that though the offences are triable by
a First Class Magistrate or by a Metropolitan Magistrate, he is not competent to award maximum
sentences to be awarded for these offences. The First Class Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate is
competent to award imprisonment upto three years, but not beyond that period. Then what is the
course open to the First Class Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate when he desires or proposes to

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impose a sentence of imprisonment for four years or five years, or six years or seven years? If the
offences are exclusively triable by Sessions Court, the Magistrate is empowered to commit the
accused under Section 209 Cr.P.C. to the Court of Session. If the offences are exclusively triable by a
Magistrate and are to be adequately punishable by a Magistrate then there is no difficulty since the
Magistrate himself can dispose of it. But, the difficulty arises when the offences, though triable by a
Magistrate, cannot be adequately punishable by him. In such a case Section 325 Cr.P.C., comes to
his rescue. If the Magistrate, on finding the accused from the evidence, guilty, is of opinion that the
punishment to be awarded should be more severe than he can inflict he should (without convicting
the accused) submit the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 325 Cr.P.C.

The learned Magistrate in this case did not do so, but resorted to Section 323 Cr.P.C. and committed
the case to Court of Sessions. The question is whether the Magistrate is justified to do so?"

11. In NAGESH V. STATE OF KARNATAKA, 1990 CRL.L.J. 2234 the learned Single Judge of
Karnataka High Court was dealing with a provision of Karnataka Forest Act. In that case, the
accused was prosecuted for the offences punishable under Section 87 and 50(k) of the Act read with
Section 411 of IPC. After the trial was completed, the accused was examined under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. Thereafter the matter was posted for arguments. At that stage, the accused filed an
application challenging the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to try the offence. It was the contention of
the accused that the offences under Section 87 of the Act, the punishment provided was
imprisonment for a term, which may extend to seven years and fine, which may extend to Rs.
25,000/- in case of first offence. In case of first offence, the term of imprisonment shall not be less
than three years and the amount of fine shall not be less than ten thousand rupees. In the case of
subsequent offence, the minimum punishment provided is shall not be less than five years and the
amount of fine shall not be less than Rs. 20,000/-. In the year 1981, Section 104-E was inserted
conferring enhanced jurisdiction of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class, which reads thus:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(Central Act 2 of 1974), it shall be lawful for the Judicial Magistrate of First Class or the
Metropolitan Magistrate to exercise the power of imposing imprisonment for a term not exceeding
seven years and fine not exceeding twenty five thousand rupees in respect of offences punishable
under this Act."

The learned Magistrate held that if he were come to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the
offences alleged against him in view of the limitation prescribed under Section 29 (2) of Cr.P.C. and
in view of the punishment prescribed under Section 87(2) of the Act, he would not be in a position to
award punishment to the accused including the minimum prescribed in the case of first offence and
in the case of second offence or subsequent offence, he could invoke the provisions in Section 325
Cr.P.C. and submit the proceedings to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and holding thus dismissed the
application. The learned Single Judge held that in view of the special proviso inserted with effect
from 23.11.1981, Section 104-E, that if the Magistrate to come to the conclusion that the petitioner
guilty of the offences punishable under Section 87(1) of the Act, in view of the provisions contained
in Section 29(2) of the Code, he would be in a position to award punishment to the accused
including the minimum punishment in case of first offence and in case of second offence

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subsequently in accordance with law.

12. However, the said provision was deleted with effect from 1.3.1984 and the offences alleged to
have been committed on 26.6.1985 i.e. after the deletion of the special provision. Therefore, in view
of this, the learned Single Judge held in para 48 thus:

"In my considered opinion, the view taken by the learned Magistrate that in the event of his opinion
that the petitioner is guilty of the offence under Section 87(1) of the Act punishable under Section
87(2) and of the contravention of Section 50(k) of the Act punishable under Section 104 and in the
event of his holding that the petitioner would deserve the maximum punishment for contravention
of Section 50(k) of the Act under the Proviso to Section 104 and in view of fact that he could not
sentence the petitioner in accordance with law for the offence under Section 87(1) of the Act in view
of the limitations imposed on his power of sentencing under Section 29(2) of the Code, he can have
recourse to the provisions contained in Section 325 of the Code appears to be correct and proper."

13. Similar identical issue came up before the learned Single Judge (T.Ch. Surya Rao. J) of this High
Court in M/s A.M. AGENCIES V. UNITED PHOSPHOROUS LTD., 2001(1) A.L.T. (Crl.) 1 A.P.. As
already observed, that there is no special provision enabling the Magistrate of First Class to award
higher punishment than what was stipulated under Section 29(2) of Cr.P.C. The learned Single
Judge relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in K. BHASKARAN V. SANKARAN
VAIDHYAN BALAN (2001(1) A.L.T. (Crl.) 42 (S.C.) held in Para 20 thus:

"It is no doubt true that the Apex Court has not considered Section 138 of the Act in juxtaposition to
Section 29(2) and Section 4(2) of the Code. Nonetheless the judgment of the Apex Court is binding
on all the Courts including this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In view of this
change of law, it cannot but be held that the sentence passed by the trial Court in these cases
imposing fine equivalent to the cheques amount plus an additional amount of Rs. 5,000/- is
obviously wrong and is, therefore, liable to be set aside, in asmuch as it is beyond the competence of
the trial Court. The appellate Court also in appeal cannot inflict a greater punishment for the offence
which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by
the Court passing the Order of sentence, under appeal, in view of the second proviso to clause (c) of
Section 386."

14. In the instant case, as observed by us, there is no special provision authorising the Magistrate of
First Class to award higher punishments than those stipulated under Section 29(2). Under those
circumstances, the Magistrate is not empowered to award higher punishment even though he was
trying the offences punishable under Section 8(b)(i) and 8(b)(ii) as the case may be. In such an
event, it cannot be said that he was left with no solution. The Supreme Court observed that in such
an event, recourse can be had to Section 325 Cr.P.C. wherein he is entitled to submit the
proceedings to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who will take action in accordance with the said
provision, which reads thus:

"SECTION 325 Procedure when Magistrate cannot pass sentence sufficiently severe:-

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(1) Whenever a Magistrate is of opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the
accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from,
or more severe than, that which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or, being a Magistrate of
the second class, is of opinion that the accused ought to be required to execute a bond under Section
106, he may record the opinion and submit his proceedings, and forward the accused, to the Chief
judicial Magistrate to whom he is subordinate.

(2) When more accused than one are being tried together, and the Magistrate considers it necessary
to proceed under sub-section (1), in regard to any of such accused, he shall forward all the accused,
who are in his opinion guilty, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

(3) The Chief judicial Magistrate to whom the proceedings are submitted may, if he thinks fit,
examine the parties and recall and examine any witness who has already given evidence in the case
and may call for and take any further evidence, and shall pass such judgment, sentence or order in
the case as he thinks fit, and as is according to law. Corresponding old law.-Section 349 of the Code
(V of 1898)."

If the Magistrate feels he is of the opinion that since the minimum fine imposed under Section 83(i)
or 83(ii) is more than Rs. 5,000/-, necessarily the Magistrate has to submit the proceedings to the
Chief Judicial Magistrate. It is also brought to our notice that earlier the High Court has designated
the District and Sessions Judge as a Chief Judicial Magistrate in the Districts and in the
metropolitan areas Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, but in view of the recent judgment of the
Supreme Court in ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. UNION OF INDIA, it was directed that
the Asst. Sessions Judge should be appointed as a Chief Judicial Magistrate in non-metro areas and
in the metro areas Asst. Sessions Judge should be appointed, the High Court has issued appropriate
Orders appointing the Chief Judicial Magistrates in the metropolitan areas as well as in the other
Districts. Under those circumstances, and in view of the fact that the accused was convicted for the
offences punishable under Section 8(b)(i) and 8(b)(ii) of A.P. Prohibition Act, the learned referring
offer is required to transmit the proceedings under Section 325 Cr.P.C. to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate concerned as notified by the High Court for imposing appropriate fine amount. Of
course, it is made clear that no limitation has been prescribed for awarding compensation, but we
are not concerned with that issue. The reference is thus answered accordingly.

15. Mr. P. Gopal Das was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court. He placed relevant material
and case law on the subject and analysed the matter efficiently. We place on record our appreciation
for his able assistance in disposal of this reference.

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