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The evolution and challenges of modern Distributed Control Systems

Conference Paper · May 2020

DOI: 10.1109/SACI49304.2020.9118829

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 SACI 2020 • IEEE 14th International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics • May 21-23 • Timişoara, Romania
The evolution and challenges of modern
Distributed Control Systems
Dănuț Adrian Poștovei
Faculty of Power Engineering
University Politehnica of Bucharest
Bucharest, Romania
postovei@yahoo.com
Ion Triștiu
Faculty of Power Engineering
University Politehnica of Bucharest
Bucharest, Romania
ion_tristiu@yahoo.com
Abstract—This paper presents the evolution and
development trends of the distributed control systems (DCS)
implemented in the Electrical Power Systems, highlighting the
impact of the modern versus traditional DCS systems. The
principles of the modern DCS systems presented in this paper
can be found implemented in Romania in the Transmission and
Distribution energy sector, implemented by the Romanian
Transmission and System Operator CNTEE Transelectrica SA
and, as well as the electricity distribution operators like
Electrica, EoN and CEZ.
Keywords—DCS, SCADA, HMI, RTU, ERP, Cyber Security,
Virtualization, substation, redundancy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid evolution of technology has made it possible to
reduce the production costs of the equipment components of
Distributed Control Systems (DCS), which results in a large-
scale implementation. Basically, one cannot talk about a
modernization in the Electric Power System without
considering the implementation of a DCS system.
Although modern DCS continue to provide basic
functions, just as traditional DCS systems, namely monitoring
and controlling a large volume of inputs / outputs, they have
evolved to interconnect all monitoring and control equipment,
ensuring full visibility of all data at the central level, usually
in the power plant / substation control room [1].
Redundancy
Modern DCS challenges
Cybersecurity
Cloud Computing
Virtualization
ERP integration
Fig.1 Modern DCS challenges
978-1-7281-7377-1/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE
Authorized licensed use limited to: University College London. Downloaded on June 19,2020 at 08:12:44 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Constantin Bulac
Faculty of Power Engineering
University Politehnica of Bucharest
Bucharest, Romania
cbulac@yahoo.com
Balduino Camachi
Faculty of Automatic Control and Computer Science
University Politehnica of Bucharest
Bucharest, Romania
estison@hotmail.com
As shown schematically in Figure 1 and detailed in the
following chapters, the future development of DCS must
ensure:
- High availability, achieved through the redundancy of
the equipment components of the system;
- Cybersecurity;
- Cloud computing, both in the intranet environment
(private) and in the internet environment (public);
- Server virtualization, in order to reduce the costs of the
hardware equipment, their maintenance and maintenance
through the optimal use of the existing hardware resources
which are classically used at a reduced capacity;
- Integration of DCS into ERP (Enterprise Resource
Planning) systems in order to quickly process a very large
volume of data and adjust the production parameters in real
time to market requirements.
II. DCS SYSTEMS OVERVIEW
A. The DCS concept
A Distributed Control System, with a typical architecture
presented in Figure 2, is a monitoring and control system for
an industrial process or plant, in which the monitoring and
control elements are distributed throughout the system.
Fig.2 Distributed Control System (DCS) architecture (adapted from [2])
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D. A. Poștovei et al. • The evolution and challenges of modern Distributed Control Systems
The architecture is opposed to a non-distributed control
system that uses a single controller located in the system
central location of the serviced installation.
In a DCS, the hierarchy of system controllers is
constituted and is physically realized through connection
within some communications networks, and this network and
the DCS software platform make users perceive it as a single
and coherent system.
Although the hardware part of the DCS, through the
specific characteristics of each controller, it is perceived that
a multitude of autonomous entities, the software platform that
manages them, makes the whole software program that
controls the entire process be perceived as a single system.
In terms of complexity, in the Electrical Power System
there are two important types of DCS, one complex used in
the installations for the production of electricity alone (Power
Plants) or combined with heat (CHP-Combined heat and
power) and another, which usually do not have at all or just a
few automatic adjustment loops like PID controller, used in
electrical power substations.
Generally, for medium voltage substations there is not yet
required to implement a dedicated DCS systems. However,
the medium voltage substation controllers and IEDs, where it
is possible, must be integrated in the existing or the new
220/110kV DCS systems. Where it is not possible, the
monitoring and control of the medium voltage substation is
performed independently with the help of an IED, BCU or
PLC numerical terminal, connected to a GSM device.
There is no perfect scenario regarding the integration of an
existing DCS system into a new one or to operate separately
the two systems. Depending on the technological differences
between the two systems, each situation has to be analyzed
separately.
B. DCS vs SCADA
The evolution and complexity of DCS systems has made
the difference to a SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition) system [3] diminish greatly. However, several
features differentiate them:
- DCS is commonly used to manage operations in a single
location;
- SCADA is preferred for applications that are spread
across a wide geographical location, such as territorial or
national control centers;
- DCS is a control system with advanced monitoring and
control capabilities of the single location (plant or substation);
- SCADA has a central station running a software platform
that interconnects multiple RTUs, DCS systems or simple
PLC controllers;
- DCS is oriented towards the technological process, being
able to receive and send data to the controllers distributed in
the controlled installation;
- SCADA is oriented towards data collection, and its
central station usually "stands" over simple RTUs [4] or over
the complex local DCS systems;
- DCS is a process control system that uses a network to
interconnect sensors, controllers and actuators;
- DCS consists of one or more distributed controllers for
the implementation of advanced process control techniques;
- SCADA cannot perform advanced process control
techniques by its own, as it is based on supervision of the
process and is influencing it mainly by changing primary
equipment position and by changing set points of automations,
closing the decision through a human loop.
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C. DCS - Traditional vs Modern
TABLE I. COMPARISON BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND MODERN DCS
Traditional DCS Modern DCS
Monitoring and fragmented control Centralized supervision of the
of the installation / technological installation / technological process;
process;
Not scalable systems; Scalable and modular system;
Mainly closed network and use of Easy integration with other DCS /
proprietary protocols; SCADA systems;
Detecting errors and troubleshooting Easy diagnosis and maintenance;
are time consuming tasks;
Dedicated operational personnel; Very low or no operational personnel,
due to remote control capabilities;
Unique provider of equipment; Multiple equipment suppliers;
Exposed to Cybersecurity attacks; High level of Cybersecurity;
Limited resources in term of number Facile technical support, including
and coverage area for technical remote interventions;
support;
Limited integration with modern IT Web browser, SMS, remote access,
platforms and facilities; virtualization and cloud computing;
III. MODERN DCS -TRENDS AND CHALLENGES
A. DCS availability
A DCS system availability is directly associated with
overall plant or controlled technological process availability.
Modern DCS systems are designed for high availability
of process servers and controllers, especially in production
facilities as well as in electrical transmission and distribution
substations with voltage levels above 110 kV, where minimal
interruption is an essential requirement for the continuous
monitoring and safe control of the installation served by the
DCS. High availability is often achieved by implementing a
redundant architecture with multiple communication
interfaces. The redundancy of the communication network is
not only necessary to prevent a communication failure of the
network, but also to allow the updating, removal or
reintroduction of the equipment into the network, without
disturbing the system in operation [5].
In a redundant network, the most important parameter
is the recovery time required to restore the fault-free operation
of the network, following a failure. The concept behind
network redundancy is to provide alternative means of
communication between source and destination devices. As a
standard, Ethernet does not allow rings or loops in the
communications network, as this would result in data frames
running endlessly and could block the network. As a result,
the network infrastructure must support communication
protocols that ensure redundancy, which is not achieved by
default on a standard Ethernet network.
Currently, the most common communication architectures
in a DCS implemented in the Electrical Power System are
represented by the combinations between "Link Aggregate"
and RSTP (Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol), or "Link
Aggregate" and PRP (Parallel Redundancy Protocol) as
shown in Figure 3 and 4.
The term "Link Aggregate" refers to how to connect
multiple network links in parallel, to increase the transfer
capacity or, more importantly, to see a DCS ensuring
redundancy in case of one communication link failure.
The RSTP protocol prevents the problem of loops in the
communications network by forming a logical tree network
that includes all the switches in the network, thus ensuring that
certain network connections are put in a standby state, so that
there is no traffic data through that connection, thus breaking
any physical loop in the network.
 SACI 2020 • IEEE 14th International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics • May 21-23 • Timişoara, Romania
The PRP protocol offers uninterrupted communication
redundancy, with an error failure time of 0 ms required for
high-speed critical functions. The “sender” uses two
independent network interfaces that transmit the same data
simultaneously, and the “receiver” uses the first data packet
and rejects the second one. If only one data packet has been
received, the receiver interprets that a fault has appeared on
the other communication channel.
In case of limited budget and implementation RSTP is the
right choice being a protocol supported by most industrial
devices. RSTP is not recommended for very complex DCS
architectures and interoperability with proprietary protocols,
or in the situation where the recovery time of communication
failure is essential, due to the network high latency.
PRP can run on two independent networks and therefore
can perform hot swap switching of network devices,
regardless of network topology: star, ring or mixed,
performing communication recovery in 0ms (bump less), a
function achieved by continuous monitoring of network
devices. This aspect is achieved by doubling the network
interfaces and the copper or fiber optic cable connections,
which leads to a high cost with the implementation of the DCS
network.
The use of the combination of the two standards ensures
an N-1 redundancy, having the network return time within a
range of seconds.
Fig.3 Link aggregation and RSTP, single ring (adapted from [5])
Fig.4 Link aggregation and PRP, double ring (adapted from [5])
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B. Cybersecurity
Electrical Power Systems are critical infrastructures which
are essential to the well-being of a nation, thus the installation
or refurbishment of a DCS, to be protected from cyber-attacks
as a must, in order not to endanger the equipment of the
technological process controlled by that DCS system [6].
With the penetration of modern IT systems into the
locations where DCS systems are installed, cyber security has
become a real issue for the end users.
Although DCS systems have gained a great deal of
importance in the monitoring and control of technological
processes, DCS systems manufacturers do not pay much
attention to cyber security for these systems, and in many
cases, the security of DCS systems is left to the operating staff,
without sufficient knowledge of Cybersecurity, where access
is made without the access password or with very weak access
credentials. In short, the security of DCS systems guarantees
the integrity, availability and confidentiality of the data of
these systems [7].
Compared to other IT systems, the data that is transmitted
in the communications networks of DCS systems mainly
refers to three parameters: status, signal quality and time
stamp. Any cyber-attack on the DCS network, which changes
the integrity of this data, endangers the integrity of the
equipment operated as well as the proper functioning of the
entire technological process, with serious security
consequences for the operating personnel and very high
operating costs.
For example, imagine a cyber-attack on the DCS network
that changes the status of a variable used in the interlocking
logic or the triggering / operating of some switching
equipment. Take for example the position of an earthing
switch for a 220kV busbar, where the "open" position is
changed by “closed" position. This erroneous information
may cause the operator to execute the closing of a busbar
disconnector, which would automatically put the entire 220
kV busbar on the ground, activating the trigger signal from
the differential busbar protection , followed by a
disconnection of all connected sources and consumers at that
busbar.
Not less important is a cyber-attack that blocks or slows
down the transmission of data in the DCS network, affecting
the availability of data during their normal transmission time,
respectively several milliseconds for the signals in the
protection relays up to a few seconds for the transmission of
analog measures, thus reducing the needed real-time behavior.
Also, as in any computer system, data confidentiality is
very important, even if in a DCS system this is not the main
concern.
A concrete example of a cyber-attack is a photovoltaic
station made by Efacec in 2013 in Târgu Mureș, with a
Substation Automation System [8] which was operated by the
client via remote access, but with an entry-level elementary
cyber protection provided by the operating system. This made
possible a cyber-attack, fortunately a minor one, after which
the system server database was accessed and the records with
the data collected up to the moment of the attack were deleted.
C. Cloud computing
Cloud computing is a networking of servers and terminal
users through private intranet or public internet to enable the
resource sharing in which the terminal users can access the
servers, as a virtual server [9].
D. A. Poștovei et al. • The evolution and challenges of modern Distributed Control Systems
Nowadays most of companies and some universities have
their own cloud platform and virtual infrastructure, where they
run business critical application and store data [10].
By default, DCS are considered to implement closed
automation systems and moving just partially some processes
in cloud is at this point only a distant prospect, but this trend
imposed by modern IT systems will also influence the design
of future DCS. There are many advantages in this regard,
namely the elimination of the physical dependence between
hardware and software, the rapid recovery and restoration of
the system in case of hardware defects as well as a great
flexibility in the configuration and testing phase.
The disadvantage would be the high cost of implementing
a private intranet-based IT system which can provide an
increased security, so that the DCS domain is separated from
the other areas of activity of the company.
Migrating DCS applications to the Internet (public) space
is not currently being discussed, precisely because of
uncertainties on the Cybersecurity threats.
D. Virtualization
In a nutshell, virtualization is a process of sharing physical
resources between several virtual entities, and in the case of
DCS systems, it is specifically addressed to process servers.
DCS system providers have already been incorporated into
the software platform the "server virtualization" functions,
especially for the configuration, simulation and testing part
and for the school activities. Of course, virtualization is not
appropriate for the entire DCS, given that hardware dedicated
for very short response time (milliseconds) or real-time
applications which cannot be replaced with a software
application running on a virtual machine.
The slow pace of virtualization is dictated by the existence
of own hardware and software platforms of DCS providers,
which represents a major technical obstacle in the widespread
adoption of virtualization. In the last 15 years, DCS providers
have managed to standardize only in terms of communication
protocols and here we mention the industrial protocol
IEC61850 [11], while a standardization of hardware or DCS
software platforms remains a purpose for the future. The
adoption of the IEC61850 protocol practically by all DCS
system providers was mainly determined by the need to
reduce the costs of integrating controllers and monitoring and
control equipment from other providers and less from the need
for a common standard. This can also be seen from the
different implementation of DCS system providers, system
architectures, automation software or HMI interfaces.
Last but not least, the "dependence" on technology and
mobility of each of us makes DCS aligned with this trend, and
in the coming years all providers will invest heavily in tablet
and smartphone applications, mainly for monitoring and alarm
and even in extended control command functions.
E. Enterprise and Resource Planning integration
Although ERP systems are found especially in
manufacturing facilities, there is a tendency to adapt DCS to
integrate them into ERP systems as well. This aspect resulted
from the need to process a large volume of information in a
short time and for a better connection between the
administrative and management side with the monitoring and
control of the technological process.
Resuming, the costs of implementing an ERP system make
sense for a DCS from a refinery, power plant, nuclear power
plant and are not yet justified for a DCS from a power
transmission and distribution substation.
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IV. STUDY CASE - RAURENI 220/110 KV SUBSTATION
In order to highlight the evolution and development
trends of DCS systems in the last 10 years, a case study was
performed in the area with the highest dynamics, namely the
Power Transmission sector.
The study case analyzes two DSC architectures, belonging
to the same electric power substation selected for
modernization, respectively Raureni 220/110 kV. This high
voltage substation, which is part of Romania Transmissions
power grid, was selected for modernization for the first time
in 2008, but due to the economic crisis, the investment was
put on hold. When the investment was resumed in 2018, after
a period of 10 years, the DCS implementation had to meet the
requirements of the newest international standards, the newest
internal norms (NTI) of the Beneficiary CNTEE
Transelectrica SA, and up to date software and technology.
STUDY CASE RESULTS:
A. 2008-RAURENI 220/110 KV SUBSTATION
 Scope: Delivery of new DCS system;
 Supplier: Areva T&D France;
 Network redundancy: RSTP and ring architecture;
 Implemented communication protocols: Ethernet,
IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-103, IEC 60870–5–101,
Modbus and Courier.
The substation 2008 architecture was designed based on
Ethernet network, with three DCS levels: Level 0- Field level;
Level 1-Direct Control; Level 3-Plant Supervisory [12].
The field devices such as circuit breakers, disconnectors,
power transformers control and monitoring systems and
AC/DC auxiliary services were directly hardwired to the
monitoring and control IEDs, namely BCUs designed to
exchange data with the system servers through the network
and IEC 61850 protocol.
All BCUs are equipped with Ethernet communication
boards, which makes it possible to create a communication
ring for these elements through these internal switches.
Although it is an economic solution represent a big issue in
the safe operation of the system.
All the other IEDs, like protection relay are physically
connected to those BCUs by a serial interface and IEC 60870-
5-103 Master-Slave communication protocol [13]. In this type
of communication, a network issue of a BCU will cut the
protection relays communication with the system servers, and
automatically with operator interface (HMI) and SCADA
interface (NCC), while the protection functions are still in
place. A double fault, meaning that two BCUs being
disconnected from the network, represent a major disruption
of the DCS system, due to the inability to monitor and control
all the devices located between the two defective BCUs.
The voltage, current and tap position indicators, pressure
and temperature sensors are connected to BCUs by RS485
serial interface and Modbus, a Master-Slave communication
protocol as well.
In addition to above standard protocol, Courier a
proprietary Areva protocol was used to build a protection
serial network, needed for extracting logs and events from the
protection relays and available at EWS (Engineering
Workstation) interface and plant supervisory level.
The above-mentioned major disruption in the DCS system
is applicable for Courier network and all Modbus devices too.
The communication with the NCC is managed by
redundant Gateways using IEC 60870-5-101, a Master-Slave
communication protocol [14].
 SACI 2020 • IEEE 14th International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics • May 21-23 • Timişoara, Romania

Fig.5 220/110 kV Substation - DCS Architecture 2008

Fig.6 220/110 kV Substation - DCS Architecture 2018

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 D. A. Poștovei et al. • The evolution and challenges of modern Distributed Control Systems
B. 2018-RAURENI 220/110 KV SUBSTATION
 Scope: Upgrade the existing DCS system;
 Supplier: Areva T&D France;
 Network redundancy: Link aggregation and PRP
 Implemented communication protocols: Ethernet,
IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-101.
Same as in the 2008 architecture, the owner maintained
the design with three DCS levels, finding that at Level 0 were
not need any changes.
The big changes were found at Level 1 and Level 2 of the
new DCS architecture (Figure 6).
First of all, all the Master-Slave communication
protocols at Level 1 were not present anymore. All IEDs, were
connected to Ethernet network only by IEC 61850 protocol.
This aspect extends the usage of GOOSE (Generic Object
Oriented Substation Event) messages from BCUs only in the
old architecture to all IEDs in the new one.
Another important aspect is related to high availability of
the new network design achieved by using a combination of
Link Aggregation and PRP protocol. As a result, apart from
the having two network interfaces to prevent a single network
failure, any device failure will not affect other equipment in
the network as in the old architecture.
In the ten years between the two DCS implementation,
there was not any change or upgrade in the NCC
communication interface, and the new substation monitoring
And control from NCC center is still managed using IEC
60870-5-101, a Master-Slave communication protocol
ADVANTAGES AND DISATVANTAGES OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERN DCS SYSTEMS
Advantages:
1. High availability due redundancy realized with a
combination of RSTP and PRP communication
protocols;
2. Increased safety operation and protection of the
installation against defects, by implementing a
redundant protection system 2018 compared to a
single one in 2008;
3. The PRP architecture runs on two independent
networks and therefore can achieve the hot swap
switching, with the recovery of the
communication in 0ms (bump less), of all the
equipment connected in the DCS network;
4. The PRP network architecture continuously
monitors the network devices in order to manage
the redundancy and tolerates any defects of the
network components;
5. Very complex communication architectures can
be realized.
6. High interoperability with other communication
networks;
7. Use of a single communication protocol for the
entire process or plant, respectively IEC 61850.
Disadvantages
1. Only the cost should be mentioned as the main
disadvantage. It results due to duplication of
redundancy equipment, network interfaces,
copper cables, optical fiber, and the associated
engineering, installation and maintenance costs.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the current and future socio-economic context,
where a country's progress is closely linked to energy
infrastructure, a large-scale implementation of DCS solutions
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is required in all sectors of the electrical power system,
starting with the production sector and continuing with the
transport and distribution ones.
A very important aspect related to a DCS implementation
in a substation is to use the common automation technologies
available for all the vendors for an easy, compatibility with
modern IT facilities and a better interface with business and
plant management staff.
In addition to the full adoption of a common
communication protocol, namely IEC61850, future DCS
design must evolve towards a standardization of process
architectures and HMI interface technology, to reduce end-
user engineering and straining costs.
Although the progress of DCS systems depends on each
supplier and is achieved in a closed system, a major benefit
for the entire industry of DCS will be their evolution towards
open and standardized systems, without the proprietary
characteristics of the suppliers, which represents a technical
barrier in the direction of standardization.
The DCS servers, running the Windows / Linux operating
system, are the focus of the entire set of applications. In order
to avoid the risks related to the integrity, availability and
confidentiality of the data, the cyber security of these systems
must be improved and managed by professionals in the field
and not left in the hands of the operational personnel.
DCS systems represent today's reality, both in terms of
process monitoring and control and a better interface with
business and plant management staff.
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