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Adr Case Digest Final PDF Free
Adr Case Digest Final PDF Free
May 5, 2003
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
MAGWIN MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON TIU, BENITO SY
and ANDERSON UY,respondents.
It must be emphasized however that once the dismissal attains the attribute
of finality, the trial court cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and
executor dismissal although without prejudice divests the trial court of jurisdiction
over the civil case as well as any residual power to order anything relative to the
dismissed case; it would have to wait until the complaint is docketed once again.
FACTS:
RCBC filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money with writ of
preliminary attachment against Magwin and 4 others. The writ was partially
satisfied. Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial. For about 6
months the parties tried to settle through loan restricting program but only one
of the defendants signed the agreement.
RTC Makati dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute
for unreasonable length of time. A motion for reconsideration is filed informing
the court of the on-going amicable settlement. The judgment was set aside and
the plaintiffs are directed to submit the compromise agreement.
Motion to set the case for pre-trial was filed by petitioner for the failure of the
parties to compromise. The trial court denied the motion. The CA approved the
decision and said that the order of trial court setting aside is dependent on two
conditions.
1) Submission of compromise agreement within 15 days, and
2) Failure to submit shall cause the imposition of payment of docket fees for
refilling of the case
The CA said that the order of the RTC was been set aside because a party need
not pay docket fees for refilling if the original case is revived.
ISSUE:
Once dismissal attained finality, the trial court cannot impose legal fees
again because executory dismissal divest the trial court jurisdiction as well as
residual powers to order anything relative to the case. It would have to wait till
the case is decided again. In that case, no need to file docket fees for continuation
of hearing wont set aside order of dismissal and reinstatement of complaint.
G.R. No. 126619
UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Arbitration has been defined as "an arrangement for taking and abiding by
the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to
established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay,
the expense and vexation of ordinary litigation.
FACTS:
Whether or not CIAC should have applied the Rules of Court in the arbitration
proceeding.
Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction
contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to
voluntary arbitration.
The Court will not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat
the objective of voluntary arbitration for its own private motives. After submitting
itself to arbitration proceedings and actively participating therein, petitioner is
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter
rendered an adverse decision.
FACTS:
A complaint for damages was filed with the RTC by the Cid spouses against
Philrock, Inc. and seven of its officers and engineers in connection with the
construction of the former's house. The same was dismissed and referred to the
CIAC pursuant to the parties’ Agreement to Arbitrate.
Due to disagreements on the issue whether moral and exemplary damages and
tort should be included along with breach of contract and the inclusion of the
seven officers and engineers therein who are not parties to the Agreement to
Arbitrate, the case was remanded to the trial court who, however, declared that it
no longer had jurisdiction. The case was remanded back to the CIAC and resumed
preliminary conferences.
Philrock argued that said Order was based on a mistaken premise that 'the
proceedings in the CIAC fell through because of the refusal of [Petitioner] Philrock
to include the issue of damages therein,' whereas the true reason for the
withdrawal of the case from the CIAC was due to Philrock's opposition to the
inclusion of its seven officers and engineers, who did not give their consent to
arbitration, as party defendants.
Private respondent Nelia Cid manifested that she was willing to exclude the seven
officers and engineers of Philrock as parties to the case so as to facilitate or
expedite the proceedings. With such manifestation from the Cid spouses, the
Arbitral Tribunal denied Philrock's request for the suspension of the proceedings.
And the proceedings therein continued with the exclusion of the seven officers.
Terms of Reference to settle the differences of the parties by an Arbitral Tribunal
was signed and later, the CIAC rendered a decision in favor of the Cid spouses.
Petitioner contested the jurisdiction of the CIAC to hear the arbitration case
due to the parties' withdrawal of their consent to arbitrate and assailed its
decision.
However, the Court of Appeals upheld the same reasoning that CIAC acquires
jurisdiction when the parties agree to submit their dispute to voluntary
arbitration which is based on the principle that once acquired, jurisdiction
remains "until the full termination of the case unless a law provides the contrary."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CIAC could take jurisdiction over the case after the case
had been dismissed by both the RTC and the CIAC.
RULING:
YES. Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from construction contracts
entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary
arbitration. Here, the parties agreed to arbitrate in the CIAC with the issue of
exclusion of the seven officers settled. Petitioner continued participating in the
arbitration proceedings and even signed the Terms of Reference. Petitioner was
stopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
METRO CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. CHATHAM
PROPERTIES, INC., respondent .
Under Circular No. 1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may
be brought to the Court of Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. The
grounds for the appeal are likewise broadened to include appeals on questions of
facts and appeals involving mixed questions of fact and law.
FACTS:
On April 21, 1994, respondent and petitioner entered into a contract for
the construction of the Chatham House in Makati City. In April 1998, petitioner
sought to collect from respondent a sum of money for unpaid progress billings
and other charges and instituted a request for adjudication of its claims with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). Among others, the parties
submitted for CIAC's resolution the issue on whether or not petitioner failed to
complete and/or deliver the project within the approved completion date and, if
so, whether petitioner was liable for liquidated damages. After due hearing, the
CIAC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner and directed the respondent to pay
petitioner P16,126,922.91. The CIAC held that the provision of the contract
insofar as the Overall Schedule is concerned cannot be justifiably applied in the
instant case in view of the implied takeover of the project by respondent.
Accordingly, the CIAC found it unnecessary to rule on whether MCI completed
and/or delivered the project within the approved completion schedule of the
project since respondent failed to observe the antecedent acts required for the
termination of the contract, as set forth in the Construction Agreement. The CIAC,
however, found petitioner liable for liquidated damages. Based on the CIAC's
assessment, petitioner's responsibility was based on its delay in the concreting
milestone.
Respondent instituted a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the CIAC except on the matter of
liquidated damages. In its decision, the appellate court held that there was no
takeover by respondent and that petitioner exercised complete control, authority
and responsibility over the construction. The appellate court also found petitioner
liable for liquidated damages but made a contrary conclusion and declared that
petitioner was in delay based on the overall schedule of completion of the
project. Thus, it directed petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P4,935,578.31.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the same for
lack of merit.
ISSUE:
The core issue in this case is whether under existing law and rules the Court
of Appeals can also review findings of facts of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
RULING:
Hence, this instant petition for review. Petitioner alleged that the Court of
Appeals, in reviewing and reversing the CIAC's factual findings, contravened
Section 19 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008, which provides that the arbitral
award of the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which
are appealable to the Supreme Court.
The Court rejected petitioner's contention holding that under Circular No.
1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may be brought to the Court of
Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. The grounds for the appeal are
likewise broadened to include appeals on questions of facts and appeals involving
mixed questions of fact and law. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
appeals from final orders or decisions of the CIAC is further fortified by the
amendments to B.P. Blg. 129, as introduced by R.A. No. 7902. The Court affirmed
the CIAC's findings and arbitral award. The Court found that the evidence taken as
a whole or in their totality revealed that there was an implied takeover by
respondent on the completion of the project.
G.R. No. 169332 February 11, 2008
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
WORLD INTERACTIVE NETWORK SYSTEMS (WINS) JAPAN CO., LTD., respondent.
Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 43
pertain to errors of fact, law or mixed questions of fact and law. While a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 should only limit itself to errors of jurisdiction, that is,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover,
it cannot be availed of where appeal is the proper remedy or as a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The assigned errors reveals that the real issues calling for the CA's
resolution were less the alleged grave abuse of discretion exercised by the
arbitrator and more about the arbitrator’s appreciation of the issues and evidence
presented by the parties. Therefore, the issues clearly fall under the classification
of errors of fact and law — questions which may be passed upon by the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner cleverly crafted its assignment of
errors in such a way as to straddle both judicial remedies, that is, by alleging
serious errors of fact and law (in which case a petition for review under Rule 43
would be proper) and grave abuse of discretion (because of which a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 would be permissible).
Section 24 of RA 876 clearly provides that the RTC must issue an order
vacating an arbitral award only "in any one of the . . . cases" enumerated therein.
Under the legal maxim in statutory construction expressiouniusestexclusioalterius,
the explicit mention of one thing in a statute means the elimination of others not
specifically mentioned. As RA 876 did not expressly provide for errors of fact
and/or law and grave abuse of discretion (proper grounds for a petition for review
under Rule 43 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, respectively) as grounds
for maintaining a petition to vacate an arbitral award in the RTC, it necessarily
follows that a party may not avail of the latter remedy on the grounds of errors of
fact and/or law or grave abuse of discretion to overturn an arbitral award.
Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 43
pertain to errors of fact, law or mixed questions of fact and law. While a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 should only limit itself to errors of jurisdiction, that is,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover,
it cannot be availed of where appeal is the proper remedy or as a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.
Time and again, we have ruled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
The petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 152878. May 5, 2003
ORMOC SUGARCANE PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (OSPA),OCCIDENTAL LEYTE
FARMERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (OLFAMCA), UNIFARM MULTI-
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (UNIFARM) and ORMOC NORTH DISTRICT
IRRIGATION MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (ONDIMCO),Petitioners,
-versus-
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Sixth Division), HIDECO SUGAR
MILLING CO., INC., and ORMOC SUGAR MILLING CO., INC., Respondents
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
proper.
RULING:
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to challenge the judgment of the CA under Section 1 of Rule 65
states:
Even assuming that all the petitioners were able to present milling
contracts in favor of their members, it is undeniable that under the arbitration
clause in these contracts it is the parties thereto who have the right to submit a
controversy or dispute to arbitration.