Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007

FACTS:This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR. On
June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax
shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying
“Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because
she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed
that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also
contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under
Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with
the discharge of the functions of his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within
his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by
the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA,
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a
general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the
motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the
mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful.
Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an
invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent

ABERCA v. VER

FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial
search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use
of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted
the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was
replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified
to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1.  NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. These
rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will
perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights
of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official duties”. Article 32 speaks of any
public officer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional rights does not exempt them from
responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for the
illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ
suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It
cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as well as people
who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers are the ones who gave the order,
and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who directly and
indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.

G.R. No. 168906             December 4, 2008

PERLA S. ESGUERRA, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, J. WALTER THOMPSON COMPANY (PHILS.), INC., and AGL
MARKET RESEARCH INCORPORATED, respondents.

Facts: Esguerra is a licensed nutritionist-dietitian presently employed as the Chief Dietitian of the Philippine Heart
Center (PHC), located at East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City. Respondents J. Walter Thompson Company 3 (JWT)
and AGL Market Research, Inc. (AGL) are corporations duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. On 15
May 2000, AB Food and Beverages4 Philippines (AB Food) entered into a contract with JWT whereby the latter
would handle the advertising, marketing, promotional and general publicity requirements of the former.

Esguerra filed an Amended Complaint 5 for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against JWT and AGL, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and raffled to Branch
87 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), presided by respondent Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala (Judge
Asdala).

In her Amended Complaint, Esguerra alleged that on 14 May 2003, AGL, thru its Director/General Manager Nicanor
G. Aguirre (Aguirre), wrote a letter to the PHC, inviting nutritionists from the said hospital to participate in a study it
was conducting. Aguirre gave the assurance that "all information that would be generated from this study would be
kept completely confidential," and the AGL representative bearing the letter made it understood that, among other
things, a talent fee of P20,000.00 would be paid to the nutritionist who would be chosen to appear in a commercial
that would subsequently be shot.

Esguerra narrated that she showed up at the Cravings Restaurant in San Juan at the appointed time on 16 May 2003 to
participate in the AGL "study." The first stage thereof consisted in being "interviewed" by a lady about two unnamed
products with disclosed ingredients and nutrients; the second product had evidently higher nutrients. Esguerra was
requested to compare the two products and asked whether she would endorse use of the higher-nutrient product. In the
second stage of the supposed study, Esguerra was taken inside a room where she was asked additional questions by
another lady, while a man, apparently representing JWT, focused a video-camera on her. She was then asked to
uncover and find out for herself the product she preferred to endorse. Her candid reaction to the "discovery" was that
it was Ovaltine. The incident was taped on the video-camera. As Esguerra emerged from the room, a third lady
approached her asking her to sign a piece of paper and telling her that it had to do with the taping that just took place.
Since she was in a hurry to keep another appointment in Quezon City, Esguerra signed the document, which appeared
to be a contract of agreement, but expressly writing at the side thereof that in case she would be chosen to appear in
the commercial, which she thought would still be shot at some future time, clearance from the Director of the PHC
must first be obtained before such commercial may be shown to the public. Esguerra also verbally informed the third
lady of this condition.

On 16 June 2003, at about noontime, an Ovaltine commercial was aired on television with Esguerra appearing
therein. The said commercial showed a portion of Esguerra’s interview videotaped on 16 May 2003. According to
Esguerra, there was absolutely no advice from either JWT or AGL prior to the airing of the commercial that she had
been chosen to so appear therein. Neither did JWT and AGL secure the required clearance from the PHC Director nor
did they pay Esguerra any talent fee for the commercial.

That same afternoon of 16 June 2003, after being informed of the unexpected airing of the Ovaltine commercial, and
fearful of any adverse consequences, disciplinary sanction, or misunderstanding which may result therefrom,
Esguerra allegedly took the following actions: (a) she immediately called up JWT Account Director Joef Peña to
protest against the showing of the commercial; (b) she wrote a letter dated 17 June 2003 to JWT, copy furnished
AGL, to formally protest the airing of the commercial and to demand the immediate pull-out of the same; and (c) she
furnished the PHC Director and her Association with copies of her 17 June 2003 letter to inform and explain to them
that what happened anent the Ovaltine commercial was not of her volition.

Esguerra averred that JWT responded by transmitting to her, on 24 June 2003, a communication officially informing
her for the first time of her selection as one of those who would appear in the Ovaltine commercial, for which she
would receive remuneration in the amount of P5,000.00. Not satisfied therewith, Esguerra, through her counsel, wrote
JWT on 4 July 2003 a second missive seeking, among other demands, the immediate cessation of the airing of the
Ovaltine commercial and payment of the agreed upon talent fee of P20,000.00. Despite her letter-protest, received by
JWT and AGL, the Ovaltine commercial showing Esguerra continued to be broadcasted on a daily basis up to the
time she instituted Civil Case No. Q-03-50205.

Esguerra claimed to have made several inquiries on the status of her application for preliminary injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court. She was assured that her application
would be set for hearing. After almost three weeks of waiting without her application for injunctive relief being set
for hearing, Esguerra filed on 26 August 2003 an Urgent Motion for Inhibition of RTC Judge Asdala, asserting
therein that "by failing to act swiftly on her application for TRO as mandated under the law, [RTC Judge Asdala] has
already displayed partiality and bias against her and in favor of the [herein respondents JWT and AGL], whether or
not for `valuable’ consideration."
It is clear from the foregoing that in petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, the public respondent, such
as Judge Asdala herein, should not actively participate in the proceedings as a general rule, unless directed otherwise
by the court. The inclusion of the public respondent in such petitions is more of a formality, since it is still the private
respondent/s who must contest the said petitions. It is likewise explicitly stated in the afore-quoted provision that the
public respondent in petitions under Rule 65 shall not be liable for the costs which may be awarded to the petitioner/s.
It can be rationally deduced therefrom that in such petitions, the public respondent is not meant to incur or shoulder
personal liability for his official actions, even if the writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus are so issued against
him.

Esguerra’s subsequent reinstatement of her application for injunction/TRO before RTC-Branch 215 did not revive the
grounds for her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. She sought recourse with the Court of Appeals because RTC-
Branch 87 denied her previous application for injunctive relief. In contrast, RTC-Branch 215, upon reinstatement by
Esguerra of her application, actually granted her a TRO and also a preliminary injunction. Esguerra, however, cannot
use her reinstated application for injunctive relief which was favorably acted upon by RTC-Branch 215, as the basis
for her then pending Petition before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. This, certainly, will be
repugnant to the fundamental due process which Judge Asdala must not be deprived of.

Finally, Esguerra is still litigating her civil case against JWT and AGL before RTC-Branch 215, Quezon City, in
which she also prays for compensation for the damages she had suffered from the airing of the Ovaltine commercial.
To insist on recovering damages from Judge Asdala for the same act, i.e., the showing of the Ovaltine commercial,
suspiciously appears to be an attempt to recover double compensation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is denied for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 31 March 2005 and its Resolution dated 12 July 2005 CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 are  AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.