United States Court of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

Case: 21-2714 Document: 15 Filed: 02/28/2022 Pages: 28
No. 21-2714
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRETT C. KIMBERLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division
No. 1:79-cr-00007-TWP-MJD — Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ZACHARY A. MYERS
United States Attorney
Brian Reitz
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office

10 W. Market Street, Suite 2100
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(317) 226-6333
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ..................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ........................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................... 8
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 9
I. The District Court Correctly Denied Kimberlin’s Motion for

DNA Testing..................................................................................... 9
A. Standard of Review................................................................. 9
B. Section 3600 Framework........................................................ 9
C. The District Court Correctly Held that § 3600 Was

Inapplicable Because Kimberlin Is Not in Custody............ 11
D. In All Events, Kimberlin Cannot Satisfy the Statutory

Requirements for DNA Testing........................................... 13
1. Kimberlin’s Motion Was Untimely............................ 14
2. The Proposed DNA Testing Would Not Raise a

Reasonable Probability of Innocence......................... 15
3. The Government Is Not in Possession of the Hair....16
E. Kimberlin’s Remaining Claims Are Outside the Scope

of § 3600................................................................................ 17
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 20
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page No.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) ...................................................... 18
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................. 13
Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,

557 U.S. 52 (2009) .............................................................................. 11, 12, 16
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) .................................................................... 16
Illinois v. Fischer, 540 U.S. 544 (2004) ............................................................. 19
In re Perry, 764 F. App’x 442 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................................... 17
Kimberlin v. Dewalt, 12 F. Supp. 2d 487 (D. Md. 1998) .................................... 5
Kimberlin v. Bidwell, 166 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998) ........................................... 5
Kimberlin v. United States, No. 21-1691 (CA7 D. 10, 16) (briefs) .................. 19
Kimberlin v. United States, 2022 WL 59399 (7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022) .. 3, 5, 6, 12
Kimberlin v. White, 7 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1993) ...................................... 1, 3, 4, 5
Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2002) ............................................ 17
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) ................................................................ 13
Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2004)..................................... 17
Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C., 950 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2020) ....................... 13
United States v. Ausby, 916 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................ 6, 7
United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2010) .................................... 19
United States v. Cowley, 814 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2016) .................................... 16
ii
United States v. Fabricant, 623 F. App’x 364 (9th Cir. 2015) ......................... 16
United States v. Fasano, 577 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2009) ...................................... 9
United States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801 (3d Cir. 2017) ...................................... 19
United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014) ........................................ 9
United States v. Jordan, 594 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2010) ...................... 9, 15, 16
United States v. Kimberlin, IP 79-cr-0007-01 (S.D. Ind. July 8, 2005) ............. 6
United States v. Kimberlin, 675 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1982) ................................. 5
United States v. Kimberlin, 776 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1985) ............................... 5
United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1985) ..................... 4, 5, 16
United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) ................. 4, 5, 14, 15
United States v. Kimberlin, 898 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1990) ............................. 14
United States v. Nance, 2006 WL 5845651 (W.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2006) . 13, 17, 18
United States v. Pitera, 675 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2012) ......................................... 9
United States v. Pugh, 426 F. App’x 876 (11th Cir. 2011) ......................... 12, 17
United States v. Roberts, 417 F. App’x 812 (10th Cir. 2011) ........................... 16
United States v. Stallworth, 656 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2011) .............................. 18
United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2004) ................................. 18
United States v. Taylor, 627 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2010) ..................................... 13
United States v. Thomas, 597 F. App’x 882 (7th Cir. 2015) .....................passim
United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................. 16
iii
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 3231 ................................................................................................... 1
18 U.S.C. § 3600 ..........................................................................................passim
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) .....................................................................................passim
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(4) .................................................................................. 10, 16
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(6) .................................................................................. 10, 15
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8) .................................................................................. 10, 15
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10) .................................................................................. 6, 10
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(A) ........................................................................... 10, 14
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B) ................................................................................. 10
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B)(iii) ..................................................................... 11, 14
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B)(iv) ..................................................................... 11, 14
18 U.S.C. § 3600(f) ............................................................................................. 11
18 U.S.C. § 3600(g) ............................................................................................ 11
18 U.S.C. § 3600(h)(2) ........................................................................................ 17
18 U.S.C. § 3600(h)(3) ........................................................................................ 17
18 U.S.C. § 3600A ........................................................................................ 11, 12
18 U.S.C. § 3600A(c)(1) ...................................................................................... 12
18 U.S.C. § 3600A(g) .................................................................................... 17, 18
18 U.S.C. § 701 ..................................................................................................... 1
18 U.S.C. § 713 ..................................................................................................... 1
iv
18 U.S.C. § 842 ..................................................................................................... 1
18 U.S.C. § 912 ..................................................................................................... 1
18 U.S.C. § 922 ..................................................................................................... 1
26 U.S.C. § 5861 ................................................................................................... 1
26 U.S.C. § 5871 ................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 2255 ................................................................................................. 17
Rules
28 C.F.R. § 28.22 .................................................................................................. 7
28 C.F.R. § 28.22(b)(3) ................................................................................. 12, 16
Other
The Indianapolis Star, Bizarre plots planned by Speedway bomber: Kimberlin

case a maze of murder, deceit, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20120526093504/http:/www.indystar.com/
assets/pdf/BG164276919.PDF (last visited August 24, 2021) ....................... 3
v
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The appellant’s jurisdictional statement is not complete and correct.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana had
jurisdiction over Brett C. Kimberlin under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. That
jurisdiction was based on an indictment, filed in 1979, charging Kimberlin
with offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 701, 713, 842, 844, 912, & 922; 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5861 & 5871. (R. 1.) He was convicted on 33 counts, sentenced to
approximately 51 years’ imprisonment, and released from custody in 2001.
(Id.); Kimberlin v. White, 7 F.3d 527, 529 (6th Cir. 1993).
In 2018, Kimberlin filed a motion for DNA testing under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3600. (R. 3.) The district court denied the motion on June 12, 2020. (R.
38.) Kimberlin filed a motion to reconsider on June 22, 2020. (R. 39.) The
district court denied the motion to reconsider on September 3, 2021. (R. 43.)
That was a final, appealable order.
Kimberlin filed a timely notice of appeal on September 16, 2021. (R.
44.) This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1. Whether the district court correctly denied Kimberlin’s motion for
DNA testing, when he was no longer in custody and otherwise could not meet
the statutory requirements for testing.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the second of two interrelated appeals by Brett C. Kimberlin.
Earlier this year, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Kimberlin’s
petition for a writ of coram nobis. Kimberlin v. United States, 2022 WL
59399 (7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022) (order). Here, Kimberlin appeals the denial of
his motion for DNA testing under 18 U.S.C. § 3600.1
The Speedway Bomber
Forty years ago, Kimberlin was convicted as the “Speedway Bomber.”2
Kimberlin v. White, 7 F.3d 527, 528 (6th Cir. 1993); (R. 31). That moniker
was fitting: He “terrorized the city of Speedway, Indiana, by detonating a
series of explosives in early September 1978.” Kimberlin, 7 F.3d at 528.
In the worst incident, Kimberlin placed one of his bombs in a gym bag
and left it in a parking lot outside Speedway High School. Id. Carl DeLong
was leaving a high school football game with his wife when he attempted to
pick up the bag and it exploded. Id. The blast tore off his lower right leg and
two fingers, and embedded bomb fragments in his wife’s leg. Id. He was
1Throughout this brief, the government will make the following references:
(R. = District Court Docket Number); (A. Br. = Appellant’s Brief); (T. = Trial
Transcript).
2See also The Indianapolis Star, Bizarre plots planned by Speedway bomber:
Kimberlin case a maze of murder, deceit, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20120526093504/http:/www.indystar.com/assets/
pdf/BG164276919.PDF (last visited August 24, 2021).
3
hospitalized for six weeks, during which he was forced to undergo nine
operations to complete the amputation of his leg, reattach two fingers, repair
damage to his inner ear, and remove bomb fragments from his stomach,
chest, and arm. Id. at 528–29. In February 1983, DeLong committed suicide.
Id. at 529.
In 1979, Kimberlin was charged in a 34-count indictment. (R. 1);
United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 215–16 (7th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d 1247, 1248 (7th Cir. 1985). He was tried over
the course of three trials in 1980 and 1981. (R. 31.) At the two-month trial
for the Speedway bombings, the government marshalled “strong, albeit
circumstantial, support for the guilty verdict.” Kimberlin, 805 F.2d at 216,
221.
At the bombing trial, Kimberlin called Michael Oliver, an Indiana State
Police examiner, to testify. (T. 6946–48.) Oliver, with Kimberlin’s assent,
compared Kimberlin’s hair to hair found near the bombing scene. (T. 6795,
6949–54, 6961.) As to four hairs, Oliver testified he could not “say positively
they are or are not” Kimberlin’s only that they are “sufficiently similar that,
in [his] professional opinion, they are from the same origin.” (T. 6959.) On
cross-examination, Oliver reiterated that he “cannot state, in fact, that they
are Brett Kimberlin’s hairs.” (T. 6969.)
In closing, Kimberlin relied on the hair testimony to claim innocence:
4
[H]e is not afraid of the truth. Brett Kimberlin wanted the hair
analyzed. The Government didn’t. They didn’t care. Brett wanted
that hair analyzed. Okay, the hair may not have proven much at
all. We know what the hair testimony was, but Brett wasn’t
afraid to look for it.
(T. 7230.)
Ultimately, Kimberlin was convicted on 33 of the 34 counts (he was
acquitted on one impersonation count). Kimberlin, 781 F.2d at 1248; cf.
United States v. Kimberlin, 776 F.2d 1344, 1348 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting the
merger of the two receiving explosives counts). He was sentenced to an
aggregate term of 51 years, six months, and 19 days imprisonment. United
States v. Kimberlin, 675 F.2d 866, 867 (7th Cir. 1982); Kimberlin, 7 F.3d at
529.
This Court recently summarized Kimberlin’s subsequent case history
as follows:
[This Court] affirmed Kimberlin’s convictions and sentence on

direct appeal, see United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d 1247, 1248
(7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 252
(7th Cir. 1986), and collateral review, see United States v.
Kimberlin, 675 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1982). Kimberlin was
paroled in 1994, but his parole was revoked in 1997 for
submitting a fraudulent mortgage loan application and for failure
to pay a civil judgment to victims of the bombings. See Kimberlin
v. Dewalt, 12 F. Supp. 2d 487, 490-94 (D. Md. 1998), aff’d sub
nom. Kimberlin v. Bidwell, 166 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998). He
completed his prison sentence in 2001.
Kimberlin, 2022 WL 59399, at *1.
5
Motion for DNA Testing
In 2004, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3600, which allows for federal
prisoners to seek DNA testing post-conviction, provided several requirements
can be met.
Shortly thereafter, Kimberlin filed a motion under § 3600 to have the
hair found at the bombing scene tested. See United States v. Kimberlin, IP
79-cr-7-01 (S.D. Ind. July 8, 2005) (McKinney, C.J.); (R. 27). In 2005, the
district court denied the motion because Kimberlin was no longer in custody.
(Id.)
Thirteen years later, Kimberlin filed a second motion under § 3600. (R.
3.) The impetus behind this motion was a 2012 Department of Justice (DOJ)
review, where the DOJ “review[ed] cases in which the government had
introduced testimony regarding microscopic hair comparison analysis to
assess whether the government’s forensic expert gave false or misleading
testimony that exceeded the limits of science.” United States v. Ausby, 916
F.3d 1089, 1091–92 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
The government responded that the motion was untimely, under 18
U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10). (R. 10.) The district court, now with Judge Tanya
Walton Pratt presiding, “order[ed] additional briefing in the hopes of deciding
the motion on the merits.” (R. 20.) The government responded that
Kimberlin could not meet several of the statutory requirements, while
6
highlighting the futility of his motion because the government no longer
possessed the hair. (R. 12.)
The district court denied Kimberlin’s motion. (R. 38.) The court
explained that § 3600 does not apply to Kimberlin because he is “no longer
under a sentence of imprisonment” and 28 C.F.R. § 28.22 “makes clear that
§ 3600(a) does not apply after a defendant is released from imprisonment.”
(Id.) The court also denied Kimberlin’s claim that the evidence was destroyed
in bad faith:
The Government actually argued that ATF policies provided for

the destruction of evidence when Kimberlin exhausted his
appeals in 1987. A certificate of destruction would have then
been placed in the case file which could have been destroyed in
2012 pursuant to ATF policy. Kimberlin has not shown that the
evidence was destroyed in bad faith or that he is entitled to
sanctions.
(Id.)
Kimberlin filed a motion to reconsider. (R. 39.) The district court
denied the motion. (R. 43.)
7
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court correctly denied Kimberlin’s motion for DNA testing.
Under the statutory text and operative federal regulations, § 3600 applies
only to individuals still imprisoned. Thus, Kimberlin—who has not been
imprisoned for over two decades—does not fall within § 3600’s ambit.
In all events, Kimberlin cannot meet the statutory requirements for
testing. His motion was presumptively untimely (and no exception applied),
his proposed DNA testing would not raise a reasonable probability of
innocence, and the government no longer possessed the hair.
Here, Kimberlin hardly grapples with § 3600. He, instead, attacks his
convictions substantively. But § 3600 is not a collateral review statute.
This Court should affirm.
8
ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Correctly Denied Kimberlin’s Motion for

DNA Testing
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for DNA testing de novo, with
underlying factual findings reviewed for clear error. United States v.
Thomas, 597 F. App’x 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2015) (order) (citing United States v.
Pitera, 675 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying clear error review); United
States v. Fasano, 577 F.3d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 2009) (same)).
B. Section 3600 Framework
Under § 3600(a), “an individual sentenced to imprisonment or death
pursuant to a conviction for a Federal offense,” may petition for DNA testing.
“Section 3600 imposes 10 requirements before postconviction DNA testing
will be authorized, and [petitioners] need[] to satisfy all of those
requirements. Thomas, 597 F. App’x at 884 (citing § 3600(a); United States v.
Fields, 761 F.3d 443, 481 (5th Cir. 2014); Pitera, 675 F.3d at 127–28; United
States v. Jordan, 594 F.3d 1265, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010); Fasano, 577 F.3d at
575).
Relevant to this appeal, those 10 requirements include:
(4) The specific evidence to be tested is in the possession of the

Government and has been subject to a chain of custody and
retained under conditions sufficient to ensure that such evidence
9
has not been substituted, contaminated, tampered with, replaced,

or altered in any respect material to the proposed DNA testing.
***
(6) The applicant identifies a theory of defense that—
(A) is not inconsistent with an affirmative defense

presented at trial; and
(B) would establish the actual innocence of the applicant

...
***
(8) The proposed DNA testing of the specific evidence may

produce new material evidence that would—
(A) support the theory of defense referenced in paragraph

(6); and
(B) raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did

not commit the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(4), (6), & (8).
In addition, “[t]he motion [must be] made in a timely fashion.” 18
U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10). The statute provides for a “rebuttable presumption of
timeliness” if the motion is made within 60 months of the October 2004
enactment of the statute, or within 36 months of conviction, whichever comes
later. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(A). In all other cases, there is a “rebuttable
presumption against timeliness.” 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B). That
presumption may be rebutted, as relevant here, if the motion is not based
solely upon the applicant’s own assertion of innocence and a denial would
10
result in a “manifest injustice,” or the applicant has demonstrated “good
cause” for the delay. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B)(iii), (iv).
If testing occurs, the statute outlines remedies whether the test is
positive, negative, or inconclusive. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(f), (g).
C. The District Court Correctly Held that § 3600 Was

Inapplicable Because Kimberlin Is Not in Custody
The district court correctly denied Kimberlin’s motion. Section 3600
“allows federal prisoners to move for court-ordered DNA testing.” Dist.
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 63
(2009) (emphasis supplied); see § 3600(a) (limiting application to individuals
“sentenced to imprisonment”).
The Code of Federal Regulations codifies that limitation:
(b) Limitation to circumstances in which a defendant is under a

sentence of imprisonment for the offense. The requirement of
section 3600A to preserve biological evidence secured in the
investigation or prosecution of a Federal offense begins to apply
when a defendant is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for
the offense, and ceases to apply when the defendant or
defendants are released following such imprisonment. The
evidence preservation requirement of section 3600A does not
apply in the following situations:
***
(3) Inapplicability following release. The requirement of

section 3600A to preserve biological evidence ceases to apply
when the defendant or defendants are released following
imprisonment, either unconditionally or under supervision. The
requirement does not apply during any period following the
release of the defendant or defendants from imprisonment, even
11
if the defendant or defendants remain on supervised release or

parole.
28 C.F.R. § 28.22(b)(3).
That is fatal to Kimberlin’s claim. He was paroled in 1994, and entirely
released from any sentence in 2001, well before § 3600(a) was enacted. See
Kimberlin, 2022 WL 59399, at *1. Because Kimberlin is no longer in custody,
§ 3600 does not apply to him. See Osborne, 557 U.S. at 63.
Kimberlin says that § 28.22(b)(3) conflicts with § 3600. (A. Br. 15.) But
that is wrong and irrelevant.
First, § 28.22(b)(3) contains a longer retention period than § 3600.
Section 28.22(b)(3)’s preservation mandate extends until an individual is
released from prison. Whereas, under 18 U.S.C. § 3600A, evidence “may be
destroyed” “after a conviction becomes final and the defendant has exhausted
all opportunities for direct review of the conviction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3600A(c)(1)
(upon notification to the defendant). Because custody terms typically exceed
the length of direct review, § 28.22(b)(3) does not meaningfully conflict with
§ 3600.
Second, § 3600’s preservation mandates do not apply here. The
destruction of the hair postdates the enactment of § 3600 (and the 1999 DOJ
directive Kimberlin cites). (R. 38.) Thus, the government “was not bound by
any of § 3600’s preservation mandates.” United States v. Pugh, 426 F. App’x
12
876, 877 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Nance, 2006 WL 5845651, at *1
(W.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2006), (§ 3600A “does not express a command that it apply
retroactively to conduct already completed”), aff’d by 186 F. App’x 363 (4th
Cir. 2006).
Kimberlin also claims the government waived the custody requirement.
But jurisdiction is not waivable. Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C., 950 F.3d
939, 950 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009));
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989) (custody requirement for federal
habeas statutes is jurisdictional). Even so, the government did not waive this
(or any defense), despite Kimberlin’s persistent attempts to unilaterally avail
himself of inapplicable DOJ policy.
D. In All Events, Kimberlin Cannot Satisfy the Statutory

Requirements for DNA Testing
Beyond the custody requirement, Kimberlin cannot satisfy other
statutory requirements for DNA testing. The district court did not rest its
decision on these grounds, but this Court “may affirm the judgment of the
district court on any ground supported in the record.” United States v.
Taylor, 627 F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 2010).
13
1. Kimberlin’s Motion Was Untimely
Kimberlin’s motion was presumptively untimely. His motion was not
filed within 60 months of the enactment of § 3600(a). See § 3600(a)(10)(A);
Thomas, 597 F. App’x at 886.
Below, Kimberlin asserted that he could rebut that presumption by
showing (1) good cause or (2) that a manifest injustice would occur if his
motion was not granted. § 3600(a)(10)(B)(iii), (iv).
He is incorrect. One, he cannot show good cause. Even if the DOJ’s
hair analysis review was grounds for good cause, Kimberlin waited four years
to file his motion after that report. (R. 3.) Despite being extraordinarily
litigious, see United States v. Kimberlin, 898 F.2d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1990),
he was dilatory here. Thus, he cannot show good cause.
Two, he cannot show manifest injustice. The government introduced
“strong” evidence of his guilt. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d at 221. That evidence was
not based on the hair analysis—which the government did not introduce.
Thomas, 597 F. App’x at 885. And, per Kimberlin at trial, the “hair may not
have proven much at all.” (T. 7230.) No manifest injustice has occurred.
Kimberlin’s motion was untimely.
14
2. The Proposed DNA Testing Would Not Raise a

Reasonable Probability of Innocence
Kimberlin also cannot show that a DNA test of the hair would
constitute material evidence raising a reasonable probability of innocence.
§ 3600(a)(6), (8).
As noted, the government’s evidence was “strong.” Kimberlin, 805 F.2d
at 221. That included evidence that Kimberlin received explosives, had
access to vehicles with incriminating evidence, testimony that Kimberlin
“place[d] a paper sack into a trash can at the sight of explosion No. 1,” and
materials used to make explosives like those used in the bombings were
found in the yard of one of Kimberlin’s alibi witnesses. Id. 219–20.
And the hair analysis was not part of the government’s case-in-chief.
(T. 7230); see Thomas, 597 F. App’x at 885; United States v. Jordan, 594 F.3d
1265, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010). “So if [Kimberlin’s] DNA is not detectable on the
[hair], as he hopes, it does not call into question the strength of the evidence
against him because” it was not used to support the government’s evidence.
Regardless, the evidence was immaterial. “[T]he absence of
[Kimberlin’s] DNA on the [hair] would not definitively show that he never
[entered the car] or wasn’t involved in [the bombings].” Id. In light of the
15
other evidence, “science alone cannot prove [him] innocent.” Osborne, 557
U.S. at 62 (citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 540–48 (2006)).
So, even if Kimberlin is right that the hair near the scene did not
belong to him, “it does not call into question the strength of the evidence
against him.” Thomas, 597 F. App’x at 885; cf. United States v. Cowley, 814
F.3d 691, 700–01 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Fabricant, 623 F. App’x
364, 365 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (citing United States v. Watson, 792
F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015)); United States v. Roberts, 417 F. App’x 812,
824 (10th Cir. 2011); Jordan, 594 F.3d at 1268.
3. The Government Is Not in Possession of the Hair
Further, Kimberlin cannot show that the government possesses the
hair. § 3600(a)(4).
As explained in its response below, the government’s efforts to find the
hair were fruitless. (See R. 27.) That is not surprising considering Kimberlin
was released from prison 21 years ago and no statutory obligation existed to
retain the evidence. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d at 1248–49; § 28.22(b)(3).
True, the best practice would have been for the government to include
an affidavit on this point below. (See R. 38, p. 3.) But, considering the age of
Kimberlin’s conviction, the district court did not clearly err when finding the
evidence was destroyed. (R. 38.) Kimberlin cannot satisfy this requirement
for DNA testing.
16
So Kimberlin’s “assertions about the usefulness of DNA testing do not
matter [because] there is nothing to test.” Thomas, 597 F. App’x at 884; see
also Pugh, 426 F. App’x at 877 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011); Nance, 2006 WL 5845651,
at *1.
E. Kimberlin’s Remaining Claims Are Outside the Scope of

§ 3600
Finally, Kimberlin raises several claims that would convert § 3600 into
a collateral review statute.
But § 3600 is not equivalent to a coram nobis petition. See, e.g., In re
Perry, 764 F. App’x 442, 442 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A motion for DNA testing that
attacks the underlying conviction is properly treated as a motion for leave to
file a successive § 225[5] application.”) (citing Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d
333, 337 (5th Cir. 2002)); Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir.
2004) (A motion substantively within the scope of a collateral attack is a
collateral attack “no matter what title the [litigant] plasters on the cover.”).
Instead, § 3600’s scope is limited to possible DNA testing. Section 3600
motions are “not to be considered . . . a motion under section 2255.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3600(h)(3). Thus, “[n]othing in this section shall provide a basis for relief in
any Federal habeas corpus proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 3600(h)(2); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3600A(g). The sole question under § 3600 is whether a prisoner can meet
17
the 10 requirements for testing (if so, then potential remedies kick in).
So Kimberlin’s due process claims are not cognizable here. Despite his
claims that the destruction of evidence warrants vacating his conviction, (A.
Br. 11–14), § 3600 “confers no authority to the courts to grant relief for
destruction of evidence.” Nance, 2006 WL 5845651, at *1; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3600A(g).
Procedural hurdles aside, he cannot show a due process violation. The
government does not have “an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain
and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary
significance in a particular prosecution.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,
58 (1988). To demonstrate a due process violation stemming from the
destruction of evidence, he would have to show “‘(1) bad faith on the part of
the government; (2) that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent
before the evidence was destroyed; and (3) that the evidence was of such a
nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means.’” United States v. Stallworth, 656 F.3d
721, 731 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079,
1085 (7th Cir. 2004)).
He cannot make such a showing. No bad faith existed when the
government destroyed the evidence 35 years ago. (R. 38.) And the evidence
18
had no exculpatory value, certainly none that was apparent. See supra Part
I.D.2. Thus, no plausible reason existed to retain the evidence longer. See
Illinois v. Fischer, 540 U.S. 544 (2004).
His claims fail for other reasons as well. He cannot relitigate his coram
nobis arguments about whether the hair testimony itself was false. (A. Br.
16–30); see Kimberlin v. United States, No. 21-1691 (CA7 D. 10, 16.) Nor do
internal DOJ policies create due process rights. (A. Br. 16–30); see, e.g.,
United States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801, 813–14 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010)).
19
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the judgment of
the district court.
Respectfully submitted,
By: s/ Brian Reitz

Brian Reitz
20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH

CIRCUIT RULE 32(c)
The foregoing BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
complies with the type volume limitations required under Circuit Rule 32(c)
in that there are not more than 14,000 words using monospaced type in the
brief, that there are 3,678 words typed in Microsoft Word word-processing
this 28th day of February, 2022.
s/ Brian Reitz
Brian Reitz
Office of the United States Attorney
10 West Market Street, Suite 2100
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-3048
Telephone: (317) 229-2434
21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on February 28, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit by using the CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be
served by the CM/ECF system.
I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not
CM/ECF users. I have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail,
postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the following non-CM/ECF
participant:
Brett C. Kimberlin
8100 Beech Tree Road
Bethesda, MD 20817
s/ Brian Reitz
Brian Reitz
Office of the United States Attorney
10 West Market Street, Suite 2100
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-3048
Telephone: (317) 229-2434
22

United States Court of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

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Case: 21-2714 Document: 15 Filed: 02/28/2022 Pages: 28

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

On Appeal from the United States District Court

BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

United States Attorney’s Office

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ..................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ........................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................... 8

I. The District Court Correctly Denied Kimberlin’s Motion for

B. Section 3600 Framework........................................................ 9

C. The District Court Correctly Held that § 3600 Was

D. In All Events, Kimberlin Cannot Satisfy the Statutory

1. Kimberlin’s Motion Was Untimely............................ 14

2. The Proposed DNA Testing Would Not Raise a

3. The Government Is Not in Possession of the Hair....16

E. Kimberlin’s Remaining Claims Are Outside the Scope

Cases Page No.

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) ...................................................... 18

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................. 13

Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) .................................................................... 16

Illinois v. Fischer, 540 U.S. 544 (2004) ............................................................. 19

In re Perry, 764 F. App’x 442 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................................... 17

Kimberlin v. Dewalt, 12 F. Supp. 2d 487 (D. Md. 1998) .................................... 5

Kimberlin v. Bidwell, 166 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998) ........................................... 5

Kimberlin v. United States, 2022 WL 59399 (7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022) .. 3, 5, 6, 12

Kimberlin v. White, 7 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1993) ...................................... 1, 3, 4, 5

Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2002) ............................................ 17

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) ................................................................ 13

Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2004)..................................... 17

United States v. Kimberlin, IP 79-cr-0007-01 (S.D. Ind. July 8, 2005) ............. 6

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ................................................................................................... 1

18 U.S.C. § 3600 ..........................................................................................passim

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) .....................................................................................passim

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(4) .................................................................................. 10, 16

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(6) .................................................................................. 10, 15

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8) .................................................................................. 10, 15

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10) .................................................................................. 6, 10

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(A) ........................................................................... 10, 14

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B) ................................................................................. 10

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B)(iii) ..................................................................... 11, 14

18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(10)(B)(iv) ..................................................................... 11, 14

18 U.S.C. § 3600(f) ............................................................................................. 11

18 U.S.C. § 3600(g) ............................................................................................ 11

18 U.S.C. § 3600(h)(2) ........................................................................................ 17

18 U.S.C. § 3600(h)(3) ........................................................................................ 17

18 U.S.C. § 3600A ........................................................................................ 11, 12

18 U.S.C. § 3600A(c)(1) ...................................................................................... 12

18 U.S.C. § 3600A(g) .................................................................................... 17, 18

18 U.S.C. § 701 ..................................................................................................... 1

18 U.S.C. § 713 ..................................................................................................... 1

18 U.S.C. § 842 ..................................................................................................... 1

18 U.S.C. § 912 ..................................................................................................... 1

18 U.S.C. § 922 ..................................................................................................... 1

26 U.S.C. § 5861 ................................................................................................... 1

26 U.S.C. § 5871 ................................................................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ................................................................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 2255 ................................................................................................. 17

28 C.F.R. § 28.22 .................................................................................................. 7

28 C.F.R. § 28.22(b)(3) ................................................................................. 12, 16

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