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Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings

Article  in  Terrorism and Political Violence · March 2019

DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2019.1581508

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Manuel R. Torres-Soriano
Universidad Pablo de Olavide
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 Terrorism and Political Violence

ISSN: 0954-6553 (Print) 1556-1836 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20

Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train

Bombings

Manuel R. Torres-Soriano

To cite this article: Manuel R. Torres-Soriano (2019) Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train
Bombings, Terrorism and Political Violence, 31:2, 426-427

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1581508

Published online: 12 Apr 2019.

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TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
2019, VOL. 31, NO. 2, 426–427

BOOK REVIEW

Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings, by Fernando Reinares,

Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Columbia University Press, 2017, 288
pp., $50.00 hardcover, ISBN: 9780231704540

The Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004 are one of the most dramatic episodes in Spain’s
recent history. Their colossal impact is explained not just by the human tragedy caused (191
people were killed and almost two thousand injured, making the attack the second most lethal in
the history of Europe) but also, and above all, by the fact that the bombings were poorly
internalised by Spanish society and became a source of social divide and political polarisation.
The general elections held in the country just three days after the simultaneous detonation of 10
powerful explosive devices produced an unexpected outcome, with José María Aznar’s conser-
vative government ousted in favour of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s socialist party. Shortly
afterwards, the new prime minister made good his controversial election promise to withdraw
Spanish troops from the international coalition occupying Iraq following the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein. Spain’s political U-turn was interpreted by Al Qaeda as a direct consequence
of its actions and the 11 March bombings thus became an iconic event in the jihadist narrative.
The bombings fuelled a bitter confrontation between Spain’s main political parties, with
each accusing the other of lying and capitalising on the tragedy to serve its own interests. From
the outset, the analysis of the attack and of its ramifications was conditioned by all kinds of
partisan pressures, including conspiracy theories disseminated widely in certain influential
Spanish media that refused to accept that the bombings had been carried out by jihadists and
instead pointed to an obscure political plot to force a change of government. This tense
environment was decisive in the imposition of a rushed interpretation based on two ideas:
a) the 11 March bombings were the work of a local cell of radicals with no ties to international
jihadism; b) Spain’s military presence in Iraq was the principal trigger for the attacks.
Incentives for a self-serving interpretation of the bombings were not confined to Spain. In
the Foreword to the book (p. xiv), Bruce Riedel, director of the Brookings Intelligence Project,
notes that the Bush Administration was not particularly keen to link the bombings back to the
Al Qaeda leadership as this would contradict its narrative that Bin Laden’s organisation had
been defeated and was in disarray.
Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings is the culmination of painstaking
research by prestigious Spanish academic Fernando Reinares. In pursuit of a balanced inter-
pretation, the author steps outside the adverse environment that has hampered an objective
analysis of this traumatic incident. The outcome could not have been better. The book by Prof.
Reinares constitutes the definitive work on the 11 March bombings for many reasons. Firstly,
because it offers a much more convincing perspective concerning the significance of the attacks
in the general context of the jihadist threat. The book demonstrates the close links between the
Madrid bombings and the evolution of international jihadist networks, in particular due to the
desire for vengeance of many individuals who survived the dismantling of the first Al Qaeda
cell in Spain, one of the oldest and most active in the West. Reinares shows convincingly that,
far from being an example of the Leaderless Jihad, the attacks were known, approved, and
assisted by the Al Qaeda leadership. The book also offers a fascinating account of the highly
dynamic and porous nature of the global jihadist network and how its organisational structure
and strategic approaches gradually adapted to the post-9/11 scenario.
To arrive at these conclusions, Reinares has carried out an impressive piece of academic
research in which he not only includes and interprets expertly and rigorously a comprehensive
 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 427

range of primary sources but also adds new information sources, to which access would not
have been possible without his personal determination to ensure a successful outcome to this
investigation. The end product is a formidable volume of facts and details which, despite their
abundance, in no way detract from the reading of the book.
The merits of this book extend beyond its substantive content. Al Qaeda’s Revenge is
important also for the lessons that may be drawn for academic studies on terrorism. Firstly,
the crucial importance of time for addressing the phenomenon of terrorist violence. This
temporal distance allows Reinares to extract fresh angles concerning the Madrid plot and
connect the protagonists up with events that have had a significant influence on the evolution
of jihadism, such as the military occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab uprisings, the
death of Osama Bin Laden, and even the emergence of Islamic State. Secondly, the book is
a practical example of the importance to which academic work should aspire. It has not only
succeeded in changing specialised circles’ understanding of an attack which has become
a paradigm for jihadist terrorists but has also contributed decisively through its conclusions
to healing the wounds of a sad event that has fostered political and social polarisation in Spain
for years. Lastly, the book is a magnificent vindication of case studies, demonstrating how they
should be constructed so that their conclusions are as empirically sound as other techniques
which appear to enjoy greater “prestige” in the Social Sciences.

Reviewed by Manuel R. Torres-Soriano

Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain
mrtorsor@upo.es http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1675-2827
© 2019 Taylor & Francis
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1581508

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