An Analysis of Women'S Return-To-Work Decisions Following First Birth

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AN ANALYSIS OF WOMEN’S RETURN-TO-WORK DECISIONS

FOLLOWING FIRST BIRTH


LISA BARROW’

Women j. labor force participation has increased sharply over the last two de-
cades, particularly f o r married women with young children. This suggests women
are spending less time out ofthe labor force for child bearing and rearing. Using
the detailed information available in the NLSK I explore women k decisions to
return to work within one year of their first child k birth, focusing on the efect of
child care costs. Consistent with economic theory, women facing lower child care
costs are more likely to return to work as are women with higher potential wages
and lower family income from other sources. (JEL JO)

I. INTRODUCTION each age) than earlier cohort^.^ This increase


Women’s labor force participation rate has in actual work experience should be reflected
increased sharply over the last two decades, in a narrowing of the gender earnings gap, and
particularly for married women with young in fact, despite the growing wage inequality
children. From 1970 to 1996, the fraction of of the 1980s, the male-female earnings gap
women in the labor market rose from 43.3% has been closing steadily since the late 1970s.
to 59.3%.’ Over this same period, the partic- From 1978 to 1990 the ratio of female to male
ipation rate of married women with preschool- earnings rose from about 0.73 to 0.85 for
aged children more than doubled, from 30.3% whites and from 0.60 to 0.70 for African-
to 62.7%.* The rapid increase in participation A m e r i c a n ~ .A
~ccording to O’Neill and
of women with young children suggests that Polachek [ 19931, about one-quarter of the
women are spending less time out of the labor closing of the male-female wage gap over the
force for child bearing and rearing. Indeed, 1976-87 period can be attributed to changes
looking at new mothers in the National Lon- in the actual labor force experience of women,
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), of those and an additional 50% can be accounted for
with a spouse or partner who were working by changes in returns t o experience for
prior to their first birth, three quarters were women relative to men. Realistically, working
back at work within a year of the birth.3 women who choose to have children will have
An important consequence of the trend to- to take some time off of work either by taking
ward a more rapid reemployment of new family, sick, or vacation leave or by exiting
mothers is that recent cohorts of women will the labor market entirely. Given the impor-
have more actual labor market experience (at tance of experience in determining wages,
however, the faster women return to work fol-
lowing child birth, the closer their actual ex-
* I thank Kristin Butcher, Anne Case, David Card, Seth perience will be to their potential experience
Carpenter, Eugena Estes, Lara Shore-Sheppard, and two and the smaller the average earnings penalty
anonymous referees for helpful comments. I also thank the
National Science Foundation for providing my research for women who have children.
funding. The views expressed in this paper are those of the The goal of this paper is to examine the
author and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve economic determinants of a woman’s decision
Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
Barrow: Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
Phone 1-312-322-5073, Fax 1-312-322-2357
E-mail Ibarrow@frbchi.org 4. Shapiro and Mott [ 19941 provide some evidence that
labor force participation surrounding first birth is an im-
portant predictor of a woman’s later labor force participa-
1. U.S. Bureau of the Census [1997]. Table No. 621. tion behavior, and hence greater actual work experience at
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census [ 19971. Table No. 63 I . all points in life.
3. See below. 5. Blau and Kahn [I9921

432
Economic Inquiry
(ISSN 0095-2583)
Vol. 37, No. 3, July 1999, 432-451 OWestern Economic Association International
BARROW: WOMEN’S RETURN-TO-WORK AFTER FIRST BIRTH 433

to return to work quickly following child ers spend an overall average of $73.30 per
birth. I consider three key factors in this de- week on child care, whereas employed women
cision: the opportunity cost of taking time out with at least one child under age one spend
of the labor force (i.e., the potential wage rate an average of $88.60 per week.’ Since on av-
available to a woman), the wealth effect of erage these women work about 36 hours per
other family income, and, most particularly, week, child care costs impose a $2.00 to $2.50
the opportunity cost of working outside the per hour “tax” on the work effort of mothers
home in terms of child care cost. with young children.
I first present a simple theoretical model of Heckman [ 19741 is one of the earliest stud-
a new mother’s return-to-work decision. The ies to consider the effect of child care costs
model predicts that the decision to return to on the labor supply of women with young
work will depend on a woman’s wage net of children. He develops a specification for the
hourly child care costs and other family in- marginal rate of substitution between money
come (including spouse or partner income). I income and nonmarket time and finds that the
then test the theoretical model as closely as “quality-adjusted’’ price of child care has a
possible. In order to get a measure of child significant positive effect on the marginal rate
care costs faced by women as they decide of substitution and hence decreases mothers’
whether to return to work, I construct two in- labor supply.
dices that proxy for variation in cost across Several more recent studies estimate probit
states and over time. In the models estimated, models for the employment decision of
I find that women with higher wages are sig- women with children. Blau and Robins
nificantly more likely to return to work and [1991], Connelly [1992a], Kimmel [ 19921,
that women facing higher child care costs or Powell [1997], and Ribar [I9921 all include a
having greater other family income are signif- predicted child care cost variable in their
icantly less likely to return to work after first probit specifications. Powell [ 19971 differs
birth. I also find that older women, women from the other studies in that she focuses on
with more education, and women whose adult Canadian women. Connelly [ 1992a1, Kimmel
female role model was working when they [1992], Powell [1997], and Ribar [I9921 find
were teenagers are more likely to return to significant negative effects of child care costs
work. on the employment probability, whereas Blau
The remainder of the paper proceeds as fol- and Robins [ 199 11 find no employment effect.
lows: section I1 considers some of the previ- These studies also include other measures that
ous empirical work on child care costs and might affect child care cost indirectly, such as
female labor force participation, section 111 the number and ages of children, the presence
develops a simple theoretical model of a of other adults, and child care tax credit in-
woman’s employment decision as a utility formation, but the results are not consistent
maximization problem, section IV discusses across studies. Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite
data and estimation, and section V concludes. [ 19921 take a slightly different approach and
look at the determinants of work status in the
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
two years following first birth, allowing cer-
tain effects to vary over time. They conclude
Much of the previous literature on the labor that the presence of a woman’s mother in her
supply behavior of women with young chil- home has no real effect on employment be-
dren has focused on the effect of child care havior but that the generosity of the child care
costs.6 Looking at Census Bureau estimates tax credit has a significant positive effect on
from the Survey of Income and Program Par- the employment rate that persists over the two
ticipation (SIPP) 1988 panel, employed moth- years following birth.
Blau and Robins [1988] and Klerman and
Leibowitz [ 19901 use multinominal logit mod-
6. See Nakamura and Nakamura [ 19921 for a review of els to look at the joint determination of em-
some of the literature analyzing the effect of children on
female labor supply more generally. See Leibowitz and
Klerman [I9951 for a more recent paper looking at the ef- 7. U.S. Bureau of the Census [1992]. Mean expendi-
fects of children on married mothers’ labor supply over
time. ments and have been converted‘io’real 1997 dollars.
.,
tures are conditional on making uositive child care Dav-
434 ECONOMIC INQUIRY

ployment and type of child care used (pur- mixed. The approach taken in this paper
chased or nonpurchased and nonrelative or builds on several of the earlier studies while
relative, respectively). Blau and Robins addi- attempting to improve on the data and meth-
tionally break out work alternatives by ods in several respects. First, I use the rela-
whether any other family member other than tively detailed information available in the
the husband works. Location-specific average NLSY. Although some of the earlier studies-
weekly child care costs have a negative effect Blau and Robins [ 19911, Leibowitz, Klerman,
on the log odds of working for three of the and Waite [ 19921, and Klerman and Leibowitz
four working categories. The number of chil- [ 1990]--use NLSY data as well, their data are
dren ages 0-4also has a significant negative less current and hence less representative of
effect in three of the four categories. Klerman women at first birth. The most recent data
and Leibowitz estimate separate logit models used in the non-NLSY studies discussed are
for working within three months of first birth data from the 1987 SIPP panel. Second, to
and working in 3-24 months of first birth. focus specifically on the return-to-work deci-
They find that average child care wages in the sion, I use the subset of new mothers who
state have a positive effect on returning to were working in the period before their first
work in the 3-24-month period using nonrela- birth. Finally, I construct and compare two al-
tive care but little effect on other outcomes. ternative indices of child care cost that may
The marginal child care tax rate has a negative be better proxies than some of the indices used
effect on all work categories but is only sig- in the previous studies.
nificant for returning in the first 3 months
with nonrelative care, and the maximum child 111. THEORETICAL MODEL
care tax credit has a positive effect on all work I model a woman’s return-to-work decision
categories and is significant for working in the as a utility maximization problem with child
first 3 months regardless of care type. care expenditures entering the budget con-
Finally, several other papers, although less straint and hence affecting the employment
closely related to this paper, also shed some decision.* First, I assume a woman makes her
light on t h e return-to-work process. labor force participation decision by maximiz-
Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel [ 19921 ing her utility, taking her husband’s labor
and Ribar [ 19951 estimate structural models force participation and income as given.9
of women’s labor supply and child care de- For simplicity, I assume a utility function
mand. Both studies find that their measures of consistent with linear labor supply,
child care cost have little effect on employ-
ment and mostly affect child care expendi-
tures or utilization of paid care. Blau and Rob-
ins [1989] estimate a hazard model of transi-
tions from employment or nonemployment. for individual i where wi is the woman’s wage,
Using location-specific average weekly child pdi is the hourly cost of child care the woman
care expenditures and the potential child care faces, Y; is her husband’s income plus other
tax credit as measures of child care cost, they unearned income, Z j is a vector of demo-
find mixed results of the effects on employ-
ment transitions. Average cost has a positive graphic characteristics, and yi is an error term.
effect on moving from employment to nonem- The linear labor supply hnction restricts the
ployment and a negative effect on moving coefficient on the wage net of child care costs
from nonemployment t o employment, to be the same regardless of the level of the
whereas the potential child care tax credit has wage. This is the easiest form to model em-
a negative effect on both moving from em- pirically; however, given that my measures of
ployment to nonemployment and moving cost are indices of the true cost of child care,
from nonemployment to employment.
In summary, although the previous litera-
ture finds fairly consistent positive effects of 8. A more complete discussion of the theoretical model
is included in the Appendix.
wages and negative effects of other family or
9. The validity of this assumption is certainly debatable,
husband income on employment, the conclu- and future analyses could model the labor supply decisions
sions about the role of child care costs are of a woman and her spouse/partner as a joint decision.
BARROW: WOMEN’S RETURN-TO-WORK AFTER FIRST BIRTH 435

I will not impose the additional restriction workers by state and year from the 1979-93
during estimation that the coefficients on National Bureau o f Economic Research
wages and costs are equal. (NBER) Current Population Survey (CPS)
The probability that a woman returns to Labor Extract, Annual Earnings File Ex-
work is the probability that her wage net of tracts.’O The average is the weighted average
child care costs exceeds her reservation wage. of hourly earnings of all surveyed workers
Thus, higher child care costs and lower wages who report a three-digit occupation code for
will decrease the probability that a woman child care workers, private household, or for
will go back to work. Assuming that leisure child care workers, except private house-
is a normal good, higher other family income holds.” Hourly earnings are calculated as ed-
will also decrease the probability of returning ited hourly earnings when paid hourly and ed-
to work. ited or computed usual weekly earnings di-
An important consideration is that there vided by edited usual weekly hours otherwise.
may be unobserved taste shifters that have not Hourly earnings less than $0.50 and above the
been specified in the model. For example, let 95th percentile in each year are dropped.12
z reflect taste for work and enter the model The mean state average child care worker
by affecting the marginal rate of substitution wage over the period is $4.43 with a standard
between leisure and money, that is, let deviation of 0.85.
U = U(X, z-IL), where X is a composite good As a comparative measure of cost, I esti-
excluding day care and leisure and L is hours mate a regression-adjusted state average
of leisure. The greater the taste for work (the weekly child care expenditure using the
greater T), the lower the net wage needed to 1 9 8 6 9 3 panels of the SIPP.I3 The SIPP sur-
exceed the reservation wage. Thus, correla- veys a nationally representative sample of
tions between T and wages or child care costs households every four months for 2.5 years
can lead to biased estimates of their effects on with a core set of questions and various “top-
the probability of returning to work. This ical modules” over the panel. At least one
issue will be further discussed in light of the wave of each panel includes questions on
estimation results that follow. child care usage and expenditure for the youn-
gest three children under 15 years of age. I
use the information on total child care expen-
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATION
ditures, sources of child care, and hours of
Child Care Prices child care needed to estimate a state index of
I estimate two state- and year-level indices child care cost.
of child care cost to proxy for child care prices Ideally, one would like to use total child
actually faced by women in the NLSY data care expenditure to get a cost index that is
set. One would expect to see differences in independent of such factors as how much
the cost of child care across states because of child care is purchased, quality of care, num-
differences in the state minimum wage and ber of children covered, and so forth. To
differences in the supply of low-wage labor, achieve this, I estimate the following linear
among other possibilities. Because these dif- regression of total weekly child care expendi-
ferences may change over time, I calculate ture:
measures of child care cost by state and year.
Differences in child care cost across states
could also arise because of differences in de- 10. Less populated states are identified only in regional
mand for child care. If states in which more groups by SIPP. For 1985 on, the groups are ( I ) Maine and
Vermont; (2) Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota; and
women work have higher child care costs be- (3) Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. I use these same
cause there is more demand for child care, groups throughout for both the cost indices.
however, this will bias the estimates against 11. Weights used are the earnings weights provided in
finding the expected negative effect of child the CPS data.
care cost on the probability a woman returns 12. Nine hundred ninety observations were dropped,
leaving 19,295 wage observations for child care workers in
to work after first birth. 45 states or state groups over 15 years.
As a first measure of child care cost, I cal- 13. The first year of the survey is 1984, so for women
culate average hourly wages for child care with children born in 1979-83 I use the 1984 SIPP data.
43 6 ECONOMIC INQUIRY

FIGURE 1
Weekly Child Care Expenditure Versus Average Child Care Worker Wages by State and Year

-80 I I
I
-.
I
* -
I I
1
I
I
I
I t
2 3 4 5 6 I 8 9
Mean Child Care Worker Wage

Notes: Correlation between measures is 0.30.

(2) TE= HK,+ # K * + M K~ + Z K +~ u, Figure 1 plots the regression-adjusted SIPP


weekly child care expenditure (by state and
year) versus the average child care worker
where TE is total weekly child care expendi- wage. From this preliminary look at the cost
ture, H is total weekly child care hours, # is data, it is reassuring that the two measures are
total weekly child care hours squared, M is a positively correlated (correlation o f 0.30),
matrix containing the number of children since child care worker wages are likely to be
under five years of age, the number of chil- a major portion of the cost of providing child
dren &lo years of age, and indicators for the care. In the estimation below, I use both mea-
use of nonrelative care as one source of child sures to explore the effects of child care cost
care, the use of school as one source of child on the return-to-employment behavior of new
care, and the child's home as one place care mothers. The wage measure is arguably a bet-
is provided. Z is a set of state-year indicator ter measure of child care cost than the SIPP
~ariab1es.I~ By controlling for the source of index for use with the NLSY data, however,
child care and the number of children in dif- since there are no data available from the SIPP
ferent age categories, I hope to purge the ex- before 1984 and more than one-third of the
penditure data of some of the variation due to NLSY women gave birth to their first child
quality differences. The coefficients on the before 1984.
state-year indicators, K ~ are
, then used as the
child care price index in the return-to-work NLSY Data
equation.
My empirical strategy is to study the deter-
minants of the return-to-work decision for
14. Coefficients on hours, hours squared, number of
children, nonrelative care, school-based care, and home new mothers who were working prior to the
care are also allowed to vary by year. birth of their first child. I limit the sample to
BARROW: WOMEN’S RETURN-TO-WORK AFTER FIRST BIRTH 437

women giving birth to their first child for sim- and women who were working at some time
plification of the return-to-work decision. during the year before giving birth. The re-
This group is more uniform in the sense that striction to women with a spouse present be-
all mothers face a first birth but not all will fore the birth of their child gives rise to the
face a subsequent birth. Additionally, these sample of 2,707 individuals (78% of the full
women are all facing the decision to return to sample) shown in column 2 of Table I. Com-
work with the need to hire child care for a paring columns (1) and (2), women with
child under age 1 only, not for multiple chil- spouses or partners are slightly older, more
dren at various ages. Limiting the sample to educated, and less likely to have a parent,
women who worked in the year before birth step-parent, or grandparent in their household.
d e f i n e s a m o r e homogeneous g r o u p o f They are also much less likely to be African-
women, since they all exhibit at least some American. Column 3, the base sample, in-
attachment to the labor force prior to their cludes all women in column (2) who worked
first birth in addition to enabling me to use before first birth and have complete data for
prebirth wage information as a proxy for all variables used in the regression analysis
postbirth offered wages. I also conjecture that with the exception of other income.
women with spouses or partners living in their The NLSY reports the number of weeks
households are reasonably similar to each before and after birth that a woman left and
other but unlike women without spouses or began employment. The women of the NLSY
partners who tend to be younger and are more have high employment rates before giving
likely to live in their parents’ household. In birth: 76% of all mothers and 79% of mothers
particular, it seems that women with spouses with spouses present were working within 51
or partners may be facing more similar con- weeks prior to their first child’s birth. Those
straints on their labor market decisions than who worked tend to have higher other family
women without spouses or partners. income and are older and better educated
The original NLSY sample contains 5,842 (13.0 versus 11.5 years of education).
women, excluding the military sample that In addition to the standard variables in-
was dropped in 1985.15 In this study, I primar- cluded in a labor force participation equa-
ily use the 1994 Child file of the NLSY, which tion-wages, unemployment rates, age, edu-
provides detailed information on the children cation, and race-I also include an indicator
of the original NLSY sample women, includ- for the mother having had a working female
ing some relevant information on their moth- role model when she was 14 and one for the
ers. In addition, I use the 1993 NLSY Youth presence of a woman’s mother/father/step-
file to get geographic and family income in- mother/step-father/grandmother/grandfather
formation for the mothers. According to the in the household around the birth year. The
1994 Child file, there are 3,468 women whose role model variable is intended to help capture
first child was born between 1979 and 1994 a woman’s attitude about being a working
and resided in the mother’s household the first mother. Although a woman may have different
year o f birth.I6 Characteristics of these feelings about working when she has young
women are reported in the first column of children versus when her children are teenag-
Table I.” ers, this is the only information available on
As noted above, I further limit the sample whether a woman lived in a household with a
to women who report having a spouse or part- working female role model. The “grandpar-
ner present at the time of their child’s birth ent” indicator is included to reflect a woman
having greater access to low-cost child care.
1 S. The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of As shown in rows 11 and 12 of Table I, 52%
12,686 men and women who were between the ages of 14 of the NLSY women’s role models worked
and 21 in 1979, including a military sample and an over- when they were 14, and 30% of the overall
sample of African-Americans, Hispanics, and poor non-Af-
rican-Americans and non-Hispanics. See Center for Human sample of new mothers lived with their own
Resource Research [I9891 and [ 19931 for more information parent, step-parent, or grandparent. Among
on the survey. women in the regression sample who worked
16. For the 918 women with first births before 1979
there are no birth-year data available.
in the year before childbirth and had a spouse
17. The Appendix contains more details ofhow the data present, however, the fraction living with a
set is constructed. parent or grandparent is much lower at 15%.
P
W
TABLE I m

Data Description for Mothers at the Time of Their First Birth


Spouse of Regression Return
Variable Description Full Sample Partner Sample Yes No t-value
Woman reports having a spouse or partner present 0.78 1 1 1 1 -
[0.41] [OI [OI [OI [OI
Woman worked within 51 weeks before birth 0.76 0.79 1 1 1 -
[0.42] [0.40] [OI [OI LO1
Woman returned to work within 51 weeks after birth 0.62 0.64 0.77 1 0 -
[0.49] [0.48] [0.42] [OI [OI
State average wage for child care workers 4.38 4.40 4.46 4.47 4.42 1.21
[0.76] [0.77] [0.78] [0.78] 10.791
N=3302 N=2565
Regression-adjusted, state average weekly 4.20 -5.68 -5.12 -5.03 -5.45 0.63
child care expenditure [11.92] [ 1 1.481 [ 1 1.601 [11.56] [ I 1.721
N=3256 N=2529
Hourly wage fourth quarter before birth 9.27 9.61 9.57 9.98 8.15 7.39
[5.04] [5.16] [5.05] [5.26] [3.96]
N=2237 N=1863
Hourly wage fourth quarter after birth 9.66 10.04 10.64 10.64 - -
[5.88] 16.131 [6.41] [6.41]
N=1625 N=1332 N=1056 N= 1056
Spouse or partner income divided by 10,000 1.94 2.55 2.92 2.87 3.09 0.79
[3.26] [3.52] [3.75] [3.39] [4.82]
N=3207 N=2446 N=1578 N=1231 N=347
Mother’s age in years at child’s birth 23.23 23.85 24.67 24.93 23.77 5.10
[4.20] [4.09] [3.94] [3.91] [3.91]
Mother’s education in years by the birth year 12.42 12.69 13.10 13.27 12.53 6.26
[2.29] I2.311 [2.16] [2.17] [2.00]
N=3466 N=2706
Equals I if adult female in mother’s household 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.49 2.45
worked when mother was 14 [OSO] [0.50] [0.50] [OSO] [OSO]
N=3395 N=2653
W
TABLE I continued %
6
Data Description for Mothers at the Time of Their First Birth 0
5
Spouse of Regression Return
Variable Description Full Sample Partner Sample Yes No t-value

Equals 1 if parent, step-parent, or grandparent of 0.30 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.18 1.42
mother resides in household in birth year [0.46] [0.38] [0.36] [0.35] [0.38]
Equals 1 if mother’s race is black 0.23 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 2.11
[0.42] [0.34] [0.33] [0.34] [0.29]
County unemployment rate in birth year 7.88 7.82 7.61 7.54 8.12 3.00 i
[3.27] [3.27] [3.18] [3.09] [3.43] 0
N=3248 N=25 16
County unemployment rate in year following the birth year 8.07 7.95 7.75 7.62 8.20 2.85
[3.33] 13.331 [3.29] [3.16] [3.66]
N=3 159 N=2437
Observations 3468 2707 1700 1314 386
Notes: All means are unweighted. The number of observations are noted where different from the base sample size. Wages and income are in real 1997
dollars. Standard deviations are in brackets.
440 ECONOMlC INQUIRY

FIGURE 2
Employment Rate by Weeks Surrounding First Birth

t : 0-

I Year 6M 3 M Birth 3 M 6M 11 :ar

Full Sample -Regression Sample

Notes: There are 2495 observations in the full sample and 1700 observations in the regression sample.

As shown by the variable in row 3 of Table back at work within a year of childbirth. A
I, 77% of the mothers who were working and simple comparison across the columns sug-
lived with a spouse returned to work within gests that women with higher wages, those
5 1 weeks following their child’s birth. A more with lower other income, older women, those
detailed picture of the process is provided in with more education, and those whose mother
Figure 2, which shows the fraction of the sam- worked are more likely to return to work
ple from column 3 of Table I who were work- quickly. Column 6 presents absolute t-values
ing in each week before and after child birth. for the hypothesis that the means in columns
Expectant mothers gradually withdraw from 4 and 5 are equal. As predicted by the model,
employment in the months before their deliv- women who return to work have higher wages
ery and then gradually return.18 The pattern on average; however, differences in average
for all women who worked in the year before child care costs and in average other family
their first birth is also shown in Figure 2 and income for returners and nonreturners are not
is very similar to that of the regression sam- statistically significant. The differences in
ple. age, education, race, share having had a work-
Columns 4 and 5 of Table I show the char- ing female role model, and unemployment
acteristics of women in the base sample (i.e., rates are also statistically significant. Women
the column 3 sample) who were and were not who return to work are older, more educated,
more likely to have had a working role model,
more likely to be African-American, and are
i 8. Though a larger percentage of NLSY women return
to work after first birth, the employment patterns are very
living in counties with lower average unem-
similar to those of NLS-Young Women presented in McL- ployment rates.
aughlin [1982]. The theoretical model suggests that spouse
BARROW: WOMEN’S RETURN-TO-WORK AFTER FIRST BIRTH 44 1

or partner income and other unearned income model of weeks to return to work following
should be included in the empirical model of birth such as a tobit or hazard model. The re-
the return-to-work decision. However, 122 sults from estimating a tobit model of weeks
observations (7.2%) of the base sample have to return to work censored at 52 weeks, al-
missing information on some component of though not reported in this paper, are consis-
other family income. In some of the specifi- tent with the OLS estimates discussed below.
cations below I use the full sample excluding Women with higher wages and more educa-
unearned income.i9 In others, I use the re- tion return to work more quickly following
stricted subsample shown in column 1 of birth, and women facing higher child care
Table 11. In general, the characteristics of the costs and having higher other family income
subsample are very similar to the overall sam- delay their return to work longer after birth.
ple; in particular, the fraction who return to This should not be surprising, however, since
work within a year is very similar (78%). none of the variables vary over the weeks fol-
Moreover, the characteristics of returners and lowing birth.
nonreturners in the subsample (columns 2 and
3, Table 11) mirror those of the returners and OLS model, excluding spouse or partner in-
nonreturners in the base sample. Column 4 come. Building on equation ( l ) , I use OLS to
provides absolute t-values for the test that the estimate the best linear approximation of the
means in columns 2 and 3 are identical. Once following model, using the prebirth wage as
again, returners are older, more educated, a proxy for the postbirth offered wage:2i
more likely to live with a working female role
model, and more likely to be African-Ameri- (3) Pr[working 1 year a f e r birth] =
can. They also have higher prebirth wages and
live in counties with lower average unemploy-
ment rates. Once again, the differences in av-
erage child care cost between returners and
nonreturners are not statistically significant.

Return-to-Work
where wage is the wage in the fourth quarter
I approach estimation of the model of re- before birth, C is the child care cost variable,
turn-to-work in three ways. First I estimate a Z is a matrix including age, education, and
simple linear probability model of employ- indicator variables for having a working fe-
ment using each of the two measures of child male role model, being African-American,
care cost and excluding spouse or partner in- and having one of the child’s grandparents in
come.2o Next, I speculate that the child care the household, UR is the county unemploy-
cost indices measure the true cost of child care ment rate in the birth year, and URpost is the
faced by these women with some error and county unemployment rate in the year follow-
thus use each as an instrument for the other ing the birth year.
while continuing to omit spouse or partner in- First, I estimate the model specified in
come. Finally, I reestimate the ordinary least equation (3). These results are presented in
squares (OLS) model on the subsample with columns 1 and 2 of Table 111. In both OLS
spouse or partner income data, controlling for models the cost variables have a negative ef-
other family income. fect on the probability that a woman returns
The employment pattern illustrated by Fig- to work after birth, although only the average
ure 2 suggests estimating a more “dynamic” child care worker wage measure of cost has a
statistically significant effect. In both specifi-
cations, wages have a positive and significant
19. It should also be noted that if work decisions are effect, and all other results are very similar.
made jointly by a woman and her spouse or partner, this
other income measure is potentially endogenous.
20. At this stage I estimate a linear probability model 21. Prebirth wage is the best approximation I have of
so that the results may be easily compared to the instrumen- the wage women actually face when making their return-
tal variable estimation results. Results from estimation with to-work decision. Because I am looking at these women
a probit model are qualitatively unchanged except that the over such a small time frame, I assume that there is minimal
wage effect is larger when evaluated at the means. wage erosion over the period.
TABLE I1 N

Data Description for Mothers at the Time of Their First Birth: Sub-sample with Other Income
Available for All Observations
Regression Return
Variable Description Sample Yes No t-value

Woman reports having a spouse or partner present 1 1


PI [OI
Woman worked within 51 weeks before birth 1 1
[OI [OI
Woman returned to work within 5 1 weeks after birth 0.78 1
[0.41] [OI
State average wage for child care workers 4.46 4.46 4.43 0.68
(0.781 10.781 [0.79]

Regression adjusted, state average weekly child care expenditure -5.18 -5.09 -5.50 0.57
[11.78] [11.72] [ 12.0I]

Hourly wage fourth quarter before birth 9.63 10.02 8.23 6.89
[5.09] [5.3 I] [3.95]

Hourly wage fourth quarter after birth 10.64 10.64


[6.43] [6.43]
N=1001 N=1001

Spouse or partner income divided by 10,000 2.92 2.87 3.09 0.79


[3.75] [3.39] [4.82]

Mother’s age in years at child’s birth 24.69 24.92 23.86 4.50


[3.86] [3.82] [3.91]
Mother’s education in years by the birth year 13.15 13.31 12.62 5.57
[2.15] [2.17] [2.00]

Equals 1 if adult female in mother’s household worked when 0.53 0.55 0.48 2.24
mother was 14 [0.50] [0.50] [0.50]

Equals 1 if parent, step-parent, or grandparent of mother resides 0.14 0.13 0.16 1.24
in household in birth year [0.35] [0.34] [0.37]
TABLE I1 continued
Data Description for Mothers at the Time of Their First Birth: Sub-sample with Other Income
Available for All Observations
Regression Return
Variable Description Sample Yes No t-value

Equals 1 if mother’s race is black 0.11 0.12 0.08 2.05


[0.3 11 [0.32] [0.28]
. County unemployment rate in birth year 7.66 7.54 8.10 2.73
[3.21] [3.13] [3.43]
County unemployment rate in year following the birth year 7.72 7.59 8.19 2.76
[3.3 11 [3.19] [3.67]

Observations 1578 1231 347 -

Nores: All means are unweighted. The number of observations are noted where different from the base sample size. Wages and income are
in real 1997 dollars. Standard deviations are in brackets.
444 ECONOMIC INQUIRY

Having more education and having had a To compare the effects of the different
working female role model both increase the child care cost measures on the probability of
probability that a woman will return to work returning to work, I calculate the difference
after giving birth.22 in probability of returning to work while liv-
Considering columns 1 and 2 of Table 111, ing in an average cost state versus living in a
the child care worker wage reflects an hourly high cost state defined as being one standard
cost, whereas the SIPP child care expenditure deviation above the mean. Moving from Penn-
measures a weekly cost. Therefore, in order sylvania to California in 1988, the probability
to compare the coefficient on the hourly child of returning to work decreases about 2.4 per-
care worker wage measure to the weekly ex- centage points using the average child care
penditure measure, the SIPP cost coefficient worker wage measure of cost. The SIPP aver-
needs to be scaled by average weekly hours. age weekly expenditure estimates a decrease
In addition, hourly child care costs are likely of only 0.6 percentage points in probability
to be some portion of the average child care for this same move from Pennsylvania to Cal-
worker wage. First, assuming these women ifornia. More generally, a move from an av-
need an average of 36 hours of child care per erage SIPP expenditure state to one standard
week, the SIPP cost coefficient is scaled up deviation above implies about a 1.4 percent-
by a factor of 36, making the coefficient esti- age point decrease in probability of returning
mates from the two cost measures quite sim- to work.
ilar.23 Given the Census Bureau estimates The theoretical model predicts that offered
from SIPP cited above, however, hourly child wage and child care price should have coeffi-
care cost would be predicted to be at most cients equal in magnitude and opposite in
56% of average child care worker wages.24 sign. In comparing the wage and cost coeffi-
Thus, the cost coefficient estimate from aver- cients, the wage is measured in pretax dollars,
age child care worker wages is nearly dou- whereas the child care costs are measured in
bled, moving the coefficient estimates further after-tax dollars. Assuming the coefficient on
apart. after-tax wages and child care cost equals
0.036, the tax rate would have to be 75% to
22. If the model is estimated including the women who generate the observed wage coefficient. This
do not live with a spouse or partner, the sample size rises result can be partially reconciled if other costs
from 1,700 to 2,048, the wage and child care cost coeffi-
cients increase slightly in magnitude, and the coefficient of working are correlated with child care
on the regression adjusted weekly child care expenditure costs, and thus the child care cost coefficient
is statistically significant. One might be concerned that the estimates are negatively biased.
results simply reflect differences across states that are
fixed over time rather than differences in chiid care costs; In the theory section, I briefly discussed
however, estimating the equation including state fixed ef- the problems of misspecification due to an un-
fects may worsen any attenuation bias caused by measure- observed taste variable that affects the mar-
ment error, and the precision will be decreased by elimi-
nating much o f the variation in the cost measure. ginal rate of substitution between leisure and
Reestimating the column ( 1 ) and (2) specifications includ- money. If there is an unobserved taste-for-
ing state fixed effects, I cannot reject the null hypothesis work variable of this type, the lower wage
that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant
(F[42,1648]=1.10 and F[42,1648]=1.12). Child care cost women observed are likely to have greater
coefficient estimates when controlling for state fixed ef- taste for work (higher t ) on average than the
fects are smaller in absolute value (-0.027 versus -0.03 1 higher wage women. As a result, wages and
and 4.0001 versus -0.001) but within one standard error
of the column ( I ) and column (2) estimates. In addition, t will be negatively correlated in the sample,
the coefficient estimates are much less precise. Thus, I and the estimated effect of wages on the prob-
conclude that the results do not simply reflect time invari- ability of working may be biased toward zero.
ant differences across states and do not include state fixed
effects. This is just one possible explanation for the
23. Women whose youngest child is under one year large differences in wage and cost coeffi-
work an average of 36 hours per week, according to U S . cients. Additionally, problems with measure-
Bureau of Census [I9921 estimates from the SIPP, Fall
1988. ment error in the wage variable could also bias
24. As noted above, U.S. Bureau of Census [ 19921 es- the wage coefficient toward zero. This bias
timates women with at least one child under age I spend could be exacerbated by the inclusion of age
an average of $88.60 on child care per week and work an and education, which are highly correlated
average of 36 hours per week. This $2.46 per hour cost in
I097 dollars is 56% of the mean state average child care with wages and may be measured with less
worker wage of $4.43. error. On the other hand, age and education
BARROW: WOMEN’S RETURN-TO-WORK AFTER FIRST BIRTH 445

TABLE I11
OLS and Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Labor Force Participation Model

State average child care worker wages 4 . 0 3I __ 4.059 ~~

(0.014) (0.050)
Regression adjusted weekly child care expenditure - 4,001 __ 4.006
(0.00I ) (0.003)
Pre-birth wage 0.009 0.009 0.0 10 O.OI0
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s age in birth year 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.009
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Mother’s education at birth year 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Role model work 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.049
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Grandparent 0.014 0.009 0.020 0.019
(0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
African-American 0.054 0.052 0.055 0.044
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Unemployment rate in birth year 4.006 4.006 4.008 4.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployment rate in year following birth year <0.001 <O.OOI <O.OOI 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Intercept 0.500 0.384 0.582 0.281
(0.106) (0.104) (0.182) (0. I 16)

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for returning to work within one year of giving birth to the first child.
There are I700 observations. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors have estimated using the two-sample
correction suggested by Murphy and Topel [I9851 and take into account heteroskedasticity and cost varying only across
states and over time.
aStandard errors have not been corrected for using estimated cost measures but have been corrected for heteroskedasticity
and cost varying only across states and over time.

may be important independent predictors of other in the limit, however, instrumental vari-
returning to work and omitting them may bias able estimation may be used to get consistent
upward the wage ~ o e f f i c i e n t . ~ ~ parameter estimates. Therefore, I reestimate
columns 1 and 2 of Table 111 using each cost
Instrumental variables estimation, excluding measure as an instrument for the other. Col-
spouse or partner income. Given that the umn 3 of Table I11 presents the results from
above measures of child care cost measure instrumenting for the child care worker wage
true child care cost with some error, I am con- measure with the SIPP average weekly expen-
cerned that the OLS estimates may be biased. diture measure, and column 4 presents the re-
Assuming that the measurement errors in the sults of instrumenting for the SIPP weekly ex-
two cost indicators are uncorrelated with each penditure measure with the child care worker
wage measure. As expected, the cost coeffi-
cient increases in magnitude in both equa-
25. Even excluding age and education from the estima- tions; however, because the results are
tion, the wage coefficient never increases enough to eiim- broadly consistent with the OLS results and
inate this difference. The difference in the wage coefficient
estimates between the probit and linear probability models have much larger standard errors, I continue
also will not account for the difference. the analysis using OLS results.
446 ECONOMIC INQUIRY

TABLE IV
OLS Estimates of the Labor Force Participation Model, Controlling
for Spouse or Partner Income
(1) (2) (3) (4 )
Child care worker wage -0.036 -0.032 - -
(0.014) (0.0 15)
Weekly child care expenditures - - -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pre-birth wage 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spouse or partner income divided by 10000 - -0.010 - -0.010
(0.004) (0.004)
Mother’s age in birth year 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother’s education ar birth year 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Role model work 0.046 0.045 0.046 0.045
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Grandparent 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.004
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
African-American 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.050
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Unemployment rate in birth year -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Unemployment rate in year following birth year -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Intercept 0.559 0.504 0.430 0.385
(0.107) (0.108) (0.097) (0.098)

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for returning to work within one year of giving birth to the first child.
There are 1578 observations. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors have estimated using the two-sample
correction suggested by Murphy and Tope1 [ 19851 and take into account heteroskedasticity and cost varying only across
states and over time.

Estimates including spouse or partner in- dicted by the model: the higher a woman’s
come. To address the importance of omitting partner’s income, the less likely she is to re-
s p o u s e o r p a r t n e r i n c o m e , I begin by turn to work.26 If other income is allowed to
reestimating the models of columns 1 and 2 enter separately for women with spouses and
of Table 111, using the sample that has com- women with partners, spouse other income
plete income information while continuing to has a coefficient of -0.004 with a standard
exclude spouse or partner income from the error of 0.001 with either child care cost mea-
model. The results are presented in columns sure. The partner other income variable has a
1 and 3 of Table IV. Excluding these observa- coefficient of -0.005 in both equations and
tions slightly increases the effect of average standard errors of 0.004 and 0.005. Finally, 64
child care worker wages on the decision to observations have other income calculated to
return to work but has little effect on any other be $0. When these observations are excluded,
coefficients. Columns 2 and 4 then reestimate average child care worker wages becomes
columns 1 and 3, including the measure of
other income. The cost coefficient is dimin-
ished slightly in column 2 relative to column 26. Very few observations are affected by the income
1, and the coefficients on wage, age, and ed- top-coding, and including an indicator for the presence of
a top-coded income measure has no important effects on
ucation increase slightly in magnitude. the results and is statistically significant only at the 10%
Spouse or partner income behaves as pre- level.
BARROW: WOMEN’S RETURN-TO-WORK AFTER FIRST BIRTH 441

slightly more important. The coefficient falls who get more education do so because they
to -0.034 with a standard error equal to 0.015. are more committed to the labor force and
The child care expenditure coefficient re- thus are more likely to go back to work. Al-
mains unchanged, whereas the coefficients on ternatively, it may be that women with more
other income, female role model, and African- education are more likely to hold jobs from
American increase in magnitude across both which they can take leave as opposed to hav-
columns, and the education coefficient de- ing to quit and hence they face lower costs of
creases ~lightly.~’ returning to work after birth. Finally, as dis-
The calculated child care cost, wage, and cussed above, this may be reflecting part of
family income elasticities of employment pro- the wage effect due to the high correlation of
vide one way to compare the results of this education with wages and possible measure-
study to others. The column 2 specification of ment error in the wage variable.
Table IV implies a child care cost elasticity The working female role model variable
of -0.1 8.28 This estimate is similar to the av- was included to capture the idea that women
erage price elasticity of employment of -0.20 may have different views about the appropri-
estimated by Connelly [ 1992a1, but somewhat ateness of working when they have children.
smaller than estimates from many other stud- Although a woman may view working when
ies. Blau and Robins [ 19881 calculate a price she has a young child differently than when
elasticity of employment of -0.38 over a she has a 14-year-old child, this is the only
range of child care costs, Kimmel [ 19921 cal- role model information available. Across all
culates an elasticity of -0.31 for married estimated equations, this variable has a con-
women using her preferred child care cost sistent positive and significant Coefficient.
measure, and Powell [1997] calculates an One might be concerned that this variable is
elasticity of -0.38 for married women using reflecting an intergenerational correlation in
predicted cost of child care. Ribar [ 19951 cal- income status rather than a role model effect
culates a much smaller elasticity of 4 . 0 9 , per se. For example, poor women may be
while that of Ribar [1992] is much higher at more likely to work, and their children may
-0.74.29 The wage elasticity of labor force be more likely to be poor and hence more
participation is much smaller at 0.12 than likely to work, also. Including other family
those estimated by Ribar [1992] and [1995] income should help control for wealth, how-
of 0.68 and 0.53, Kimmel [ 19921 of 0.58, and ever, and the role model coefficient remains
Powell [1997] of 0.85 but is larger than the virtually unchanged when unearned income is
0.04 calculated by Michalopoulos, Robins, included.
and Garfinkel [ 1992].30 Finally, the other-in- As for other variables in the model, older
come elasticity of -0.04, is very similar to the women are more likely to return to work after
estimates of Michalopoulos, Robins, and Gar- birth, once other income is controlled for, al-
finkel [ 19921 and Ribar [1995]: -0.01 and - though again this may partially be picking up
0.05, respectively. part of the wage effect. Contrary to expecta-
Although more education seems to increase tions, having a parent or grandparent in the
the probability that a woman will return to household does not seem to affect the reem-
work after first birth, this result has several ployment rate, suggesting that parents and
possible interpretations. It may be that women grandparents may not serve as a major source
of child care. While having a parent or grand-
27. 1 have explored including indicators for the birth parent in the home and the decision to return
year of the child. The results are qualitatively unchanged. to work may be simultaneously determined,
28. Elasticities are calculated at the mean employment omitting the grandparent indicator does not
rate and the mean average child care worker wage across change the coefficient estimates significantly.
observations or the mean weekly child care expenditure
(unadjusted). A more ideal indicator of access to lower cost
29. When the column (4)specification is used, the elas- child care would be a measure of having rel-
ticity is smaller than even the smallest estimates of Ribar atives in close proximity, but this information
[I9951 and Connelly [1992a] at -0.03. is available for only one year of the NLSY.
30. Even if mother’s age and education at child’s birth Finally, at the 10% level of significance, Af-
are omitted from the estimation, the wage coefficient is
never large enough to generate an elasticity as large as the rican-American women in this sample are
cited studies. more likely than the other women in this sam-
448 ECONOMIC INQUIRY

ple to go back to work, but neither higher percentile), the probability she returns within
county unemployment rates nor rising unem- a year rises to 0.82.
ployment rates seem to significantly affect the From these crude estimates i t looks as
probability that a woman returns to work after though delayed child bearing will play a much
first birth. more important role in increasing women’s
labor force participation shortly after child
Implications of the Estimates. Using column birth, and hence their overall actual work ex-
2 in Table IV to explore some of the implica- perience accumulation, than small increases
tions of the estimates, I simulate the effects in child care cost subsidization or the effects
of various external factors on the probability of changing employment opportunities for
of returning to work. First, considering poten- their spouses and partners. Another interesting
tial increases in child care subsidization, I long-term implication of the increased labor
look at the probability of returning to work force participation of mothers today is that
evaluated at the 25th percentile cost relative their daughters may be additionally more
to the mean cost. This amounts to a 12% de- likely to participate in the labor force. Thus
crease in cost and a 2% increase in the prob- we should expect to see continued participa-
ability of returning to work. tion rate increases with new cohorts entering
Next, as women delay child bearing they the labor force.
are more likely to return to work quickly,
holding wages constant. Since wages gener- V. CONCLUSION
ally increase over those years of delayed child This paper attempts to analyze the effects
bearing, older mothers will have an additional of child care cost, potential wages, and other
tendency to return to work quickly because of family income on a woman’s decision to re-
the higher opportunity cost of not working. turn to work shortly following the birth of her
On average the probability of returning to first child. The model developed from a utility
work is 0.78. The probability of returning for maximization framework predicts that child
a 20 year old earning the average wage of care cost and other family income will have
20-year-old mothers in this sample is 0.72. a negative effect on the probability of return-
For a 30-year-old mother earning average ing to work while potential wages will have
wages for a 30-year-old in this sample, the a positive effect. A simple comparison of
probability increases to 0.87. means of cost, wages, and other income for
Finally, from 1988 to 1991 the percentage returners and aonreturners shows differences
of preschoolers cared for by their father rose as predicted by the model that are significant
from 15 to 20.31This number fell back to 16% for the wage measure. Further multivariate
in 1993, according to the most recent census analysis confirms these results for wages and
report.32 As suggested by the Census Bureau, indicates that child care costs and other family
this temporary rise in percentage of children income also have statistically significant ef-
being cared for by their fathers in 1991 may fects on the probability of returning to work.
be attributed to higher unemployment and un- The estimates suggest that the elasticity of the
deremployment of fathers. This is consistent reemployment rate for new mothers with re-
with the possibility that worsening employ- spect to child care costs is about -0.18,
ment opportunities for women’s spouses and whereas the elasticity with respect to other
partners during part of the sample period have family income is about -0.04. Finally, the elas-
encouraged more women to return to work ticity with respect to the mother’s wage is
sooner after child birth. Looking at a high- about 0.12. Additionally, mother’s education
wage woman (wage at the 75th percentile) and having had a working female role model
with a high level of other family income (at have statistically significant positive effects
the 75th percentile), her probability of return- on the probability a woman returns to work.
ing to work in the first year is 0.79. If instead
she faces low other family income (in the 25th APPENDIX
Theoretical Model
3 1. US. Bureau of the Census [ 19941. I model a woman’s return-to-work decision as a
32. U.S. Bureau of the Census [1996]. utility maximization problem with child care expen-
BARROW: WOMEN'S RETURN-TO-WORK AFTER FIRST BIRTH 449

ditures entering the budget constraint and hence af- vation wage, w*(H), the first-order condition can be
fecting the employment decision. First, I assume a rewritten as w - p d = w*(H) - 6 / h. If the woman
woman makes her labor force participation decision works, 6 = 0, the net wage exceeds the reservation
by maximizing her utility, taking her husband's wage evaluated at H = 0, and hours o f work are cho-
labor force participation and income as given.33 Her sen such that w - p d = w*(H) when H > 0.
problem is to maximize: For simplicity, I assume a utility function con-
sistent with linear labor supply,
U(X,D, L ) S.t.

(a) p J + p d D I wH+ Y
for individual i where Z is a vector of demographic
(b)H+L=T characteristics and y is an error term. The linear
labor supply function restricts the coefficient on the
(c) 05 H < T, 0 I L 5 T. wage net of child care costs to be the same regard-
less of the level of the wage. This is the easiest form
where X is a composite good excluding day care to model empirically; however, given that my mea-
sures of cost are indices of the true cost of child
and leisure, px is the price of X , D is the hours of care, I will not impose the additional restriction dur-
day care demanded, pd is the hourly price of day ing estimation that the coefficients on wages and
care, H is the number of hours the woman works, costs are equal. Substituting the budget constraint
w is the wage rate, Y is her husband's income plus into (A2) and solving for the reservation wage,
other unearned income, T is the total time con-
straint, and L is the number of leisure hours.34 In
modeling the decision this way, I am implicitly as- w;(o)= a Iyi+ Zia2 + pi
suming that maternal and market child care are
good substitutes. where a1 = - P 2 / P 1 , az=-P3/P1, and p i = ? i / P I .
Assuming additionally that H < Tand D = H, the The probability that a woman works can be repre-
optimization problem can be written, sented by

(Al) =U(X,L)-h[p,X+(w-pd)L

= Pr[pj < (wj-pdi) - al & - Zja2].


+ 6( T - L), Thus, higher child care costs and lower wages will
decrease the probability that a woman will go back
with the associated conditions: to work. Assuming that leisure is a normal good,
higher other family income will also decrease the
probability of returning to work.
An important consideration is that there may be
unobserved taste shifters that have not been speci-
fied in the model. For example, let T reflect taste
for work and enter the model by affecting the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between leisure and
money, that is, let U = U(X,T-IL). Condition (b)
(d) 6( T - L ) = 0, then becomes ~ - p d = ( ~ - ~ ) U ~ / h - 6w/ hhe,r e
6 = 0 if a woman works. The greater the taste for
work (the greater T), the lower the net wage needed
where h > 0 is the marginal utility of wealth and S to exceed ( T - ' ) U /~h . Thus, correlations between T
is a nonnegative slack variable associated with the and wages or child care costs can lead to biased
woman's hours of work decision.35 From condition estimates of their effects on the probability of re-
(b), w - p d = U z / h - 6 / h . Calling U 2 / h the reser- turning to work. This issue is further discussed in
light of the estimation results.
33. The validity of this assumption is certainly debat-
able, and future analyses could model the labor supply de- Data
cisions of a woman and her spouse or partner as a joint
decision. Child Care Cost Measures. The state-average
34. Below I will assume a linear labor supply function. child care worker wage is the weighted average by
See Stem [I9861 for discussion of the form of the utility state and year of hourly earnings of all surveyed
function and more on the implications of the assumption. workers in the 1979-93 NBER CPS Annual Earn-
ings File Extracts who report a three-digit occupa-
35. I am assuming that day care is specifically pur- tion code for child care workers, private household,
chased to cover hours worked and that a woman's leisure
time includes time she spends caring for her children. Cer- or for child care workers, except private house-
tainly, women may hire child care during their leisure hours, holds. Hourly earnings are calculated as hourly
but I consider these nonwork child care hours to be a sep- earnings where reported and as edited usual weekly
arate good included in the composite good. earnings divided by edited usual weekly hours, oth-
450 ECONOMIC INQUIRY

erwise. Hourly earnings less than $0.50 and above depending on the month of birth. For determining
the 95th percentile for the year are dropped. the usual residence of the child, I count the child
Weights used are the earnings weights provided in as living with the mother if his or her usual resi-
the CPS data. dence is coded as in the mother’s household either
The second measure of child care cost is regres- in the survey year of the birth year or in the survey
sion-adjusted average weekly child care expendi- year after the birth year. Similarly, a spouse or part-
ture by state and year using child care expenditure n e r or m o t h e r ’ s m o t h e r / g r a n d m o t h e r / s t e p -
data from the 1984-93 SIPP topical modules.36 Be- mother/father/grandfather/step-father is present if
cause the survey does not exist before 1984, women the mother reports so either in the birth year or in
with first births before 1984 are assigned the 1984 the survey year following the birth year. Mother’s
regression-adjusted state mean child care expendi- education is the highest grade completed in the sur-
ture for their state of residence in the birth year. For vey year of the birth year or the most recent avail-
the 1984 SIPP, the grouped states are slightly dif- able record from previous years, since the variable
ferent than in subsequent survey years. For 1984, is missing unless the status has changed from the
the grouped states are ( I ) Maine and Vermont; (2) previous year. If highest grade completed is un-
Idaho, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming; graded it is considered missing.
and (3) Mississippi and West Virginia. After 1984, The unemployment rate data included in the
the grouped states are ( I ) Maine and Vermont; (2) Youth geographic data are county unemployment
Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota; and (3) data from the County and City Data Book. The un-
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Also, the employment rate at birth is measured as the unem-
data collected before 1988 provide information only ployment rate in the birth year, and the unemploy-
on hours cared for under the primary child care ar- ment rate after birth is measured as the unemploy-
rangement, and only information on total child care ment rate in the survey year after the birth year. The
expenditure on all children is collected. As a result, state of residence is the residence reported in the
no hours information is provided for secondary survey year of the birth year, unless the code is
child care arrangements, and thus hourly child care missing, in which case it is the state reported in the
costs cannot be calculated directly. Finally, data survey year following the birth year. The child care
from the 1984, 1985, and 1992 panels ask topical cost variable is then matched by these state codes.
module questions on child care expenditure in the From 1979 to 1989, respondents were asked for
fifth and sixth waves; all other years ask in the third total income for their partners in the previous year.
wave. As a result, the reference months for these After 1989 respondents are asked for partner in-
panels are actually in the year following the panel come broken down into several categories. Spouse
year for at least some rotation groups. I use these income for all years is reported broken down into
data for calculating the regression-adjusted aver- several categories. Other income for women with
ages for the birth years equal to these panel years. partners from 1979 to 1989 is partner income as
The averages are calculated controlling for reported in the following survey year. Other income
hours, hours squared, number of children age 0-5, for women with spouses for all years is calculated
number of children age &I 0, and indicators for the as annual spouse income from wages and salary
use of nonrelative care as one source of child care, plus any farm or own business income plus spouse
the use of school as one source of child care, and unemployment compensation plus respondent or
the child’s home as one place care is provided. spouse income from food stamps and other sources.
Across most years, hours, number of children under Other income for women with partners from 1990
5 years of age, and using nonrelative care have sig- to 1993 is calculated as total partner income from
nificant, positive effects on weekly child care ex- wages and salary plus any farm or own business
penditure, whereas hours squared and having care income plus partner’s total welfare income. To min-
received in the child’s home have significant, neg- imize the loss of observations from missing infor-
ative effects on weekly child care expenditure. Fi- mation, other income is used as calculated for the
nally, in later years utilizing school-based care also year of the birth or the year after birth. All income
significantly reduces weekly child care expenditure. is top-coded at $75,001 for 1979-84 and a t
$100,001 for 1985-93. Income is in real 1997 dol-
NLSY Data. The wage and employment data be- lars.
fore and after birth and mother’s age at birth come
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