Jhon Anthony M Briones

Juris Doctor 2B

XIV. CANVASSING AND PROCLAMATION

LIBARDOS v. CASAR

FACTS:

Complainant Librados alleged that she was an official mayoralty candidate of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Maigo, Lanao del Norte, in the synchronized
national and local elections held on 11 May 1992; that during the canvassing of the election
returns, the candidate of the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), Wilfredo Randa, filed a
complaint for Preliminary Injunction with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Kolambugan- Maigo, Lanao del Norte, presided over by respondent judge, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 19, entitled "Wilfredo P. Randa, candidate for Mayor under NPC against
Board of Canvassers, Maigo, Lanao del Norte;" that on the basis of the said complaint,
subscribed before respondent judge, said respondent issued the aforesaid order dated 14
May 1992, ordering the Board of Canvassers to suspend the canvassing of the election
returns of Precinct No. 10-A until either the Commission on Elections, Manila, or the
Regional Trial Court in Iligan City could act on the complaint of Wilfredo Randa; that the said
order caused the delay in the canvassing of the election returns which was resumed only
after the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte sent a message to the COMELEC
(Manila) requesting that an order be issued ordering the Board of Canvassers, Maigo, Lanao
del Norte, to disregard the restraining order of respondent judge.

Complainant further avers that despite the fact that respondent judge lacked
jurisdiction over the matter, he nevertheless issued the assailed order of 14 May 1992 on the
alleged ground that the judges of the "RTC at Iligan City are not available to issue a
Preliminary Injunction, and, it is admitted fact the COMELEC, Manila is very far and might
not receive on time the appeal of the petitioner." Complainant asserts that respondent's
justification in issuing the order constituted ignorance of the law, considering that on 14
May 1992 there was as yet no appeal to speak of from the decision of the Board of
Canvassers because the election returns had not been canvassed and that it is an express
provision of law that an appeal can be had only after the Board of Canvassers has rendered
its ruling on the objections of any party to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns.

Respondent Judge Casar admitted having issued without jurisdiction the questioned
order of 14 May 1992. He justified its issuance "as an immediate remedy and arrangement to
prevent bloodshed between the contending parties, the complainant's followers, the LDP and
the oppositions (sic) followers, the NPC, which if said eminent (sic) trouble will occur, would
caused (sic) not only irreparable damages but may ignite and give rise to the revival of the old
centuries (sic) conflict between Christians and Muslims in the province." He pointed out that
complainant's failure to question or move for a reconsideration of the assailed order implied
her acceptance thereof. He likewise suggested that complainant filed the complaint for the
purpose of harassing him and to block his application for promotion to the Regional Trial
Court.

On 23 November 1993, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court Administrator
for evaluation, report and recommendation.

ISSUE:

WHETHER RESPONSENT JUDGE IS GUILTY OF IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND MAY

BE HELD LIABLE.
HELD:

YES. Respondent judge administratively liable for having knowingly issued an order
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

The Court cannot overlook the fact that respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing his Order dated May 14, 1992 ordering the Board of Canvassers of
Maigo, Lanao del Norte to suspend the canvassing of the election returns knowing full (sic)
well that he does not have jurisdiction to act on the petition filed by Wilfredo Randa.

Respondent's actuation as unbecoming that of a worthy Judge, for a judge should be faithful
to the law and maintain professional competence (Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial
Conduct). While his reasons for issuing the assailed order are perhaps commendable and
demonstrative of his concern for peace and order during the election period in the given
community, he lost sight of his bounden duty, as a Judge, to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1, supra). A Judge should
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary (Rule 2.01, Canon 2, supra).
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

This is a case for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by the petitioner Aquilino L.
Pimentel III with regard to the proceedings of the Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao in re-canvassing the votes therein to settle the 12th
senatorial seat of the 14 May 2007 elections, now a contest between him and private
respondent, Juan Miguel F. Zubiri. Among his claims in the case at bar is his
question of the manner the re-canvassing was being done where parties are not
allowed to ask questions. He claims that it deprives him of his right to due process
and equal protection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the procedure followed by the Special Provincial Board of

Canvassers for Maguindanao was without legal basis and violative of petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process and equal protection.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the procedure followed by the SPBOC –
Maguindanao was in order. The matter is a pre-proclamation controversy defined by
BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as “any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party before the board or directly with the Commission.” Further,
according to Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases to resolve
pre-proclamation controversies are allowed in local elections. However, in Section 15
of the same statute, this is prohibited as to elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. RA 9369 amended Section 15
of RA 7166 by adding an excepting phrase to the general prohibition against pre-
proclamation controversies in elections for President down to the Members of the
House of Representatives.

The exemption is contained in Section 30 of RA 7166, likewise amended by RA

9369. This mandates Congress and the Commission en banc to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice-
president and senators, respectively as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local
board of canvassers. In elections for House of Representatives up to the President, the
general rule still is that the pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are still prohibited. The recognized exceptions to the
prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the
composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the
authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.

Pimentel argues that his pre-proclamation case is an exemption to the prohibition. The
Court ruled for the respondents. Undeniably, the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not
Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, as specifically charged by law to
perform such function; (1) Congress as the NBC for the election for President and Vice-
President; and (2) COMELEC en banc as the NBC for the election for Senators. This is
a case where the law is clear. It speaks in a language that is categorical. It is quite
explicit; it is too plain to be misread. No interpretation is needed. All that is called for
is to apply the statutory command.
 Even if there is still a need for this Court to construe Section 30 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, it still cannot extend the scope of
said provision to local boards of canvassers. A preproclamation case under Section 30
is allowed only as an exception to the prohibition under Section 15 of Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. According to the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, are strictly, but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication. A maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the
expressed exception or exemption excludes others. Exceptio firmat regulim in casibus
non exceptis. The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions;
conversely, those which are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed
included in the general rule. And, in the case, the exception applies only to Congress
or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not the local boards of canvassers
who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation
controversies.

This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process problematic since
he has not established what he is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. Pimentel
cannot invoke denial of substantive due process because he is not assailing any law,
which, arbitrarily or without sufficient justification, supposedly deprived him of life,
liberty, or property. At most, Pimentel can claim that he was denied procedural due
process when he was not allowed by the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao to
propound questions to certain election officials. But even on this point, Pimentel fails
to convince this Court. Asking election officials questions and confronting them with
evidence are not part of the canvass proceedings. There is no statute or regulation
expressly providing for such a procedure.

With regard to his right to equal protection, he was in fact similarly treated with other
senatorial candidates, none were allowed to question the canvassers.

Finding no basis for the other grounds as well, the Court dismissed the petition.
BRILLANTES V. COMELEC

FACTS

Congress enacted Republic Act No. 84362 authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also
mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer
equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials.COMELEC initially intended to implement the automation during the May
11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in the ARMM. The failure of the machines
to read correctly some automated ballots, however, deferred its implementation.

In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both
national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been
acquired for that electoral exercise because of time constraints.COMELEC adopted, in
its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004 elections consisting
of three (3) phases, to wit:

(1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the

so-called "biometrics" system of registration;(2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and
counting of votes; and(3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results.

Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003,
allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May
10, 2004 elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the
release of a further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the
COMELEC.

The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual
voting and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations
with companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized
voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the
COMELEC nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial
results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also
dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."

Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretionamounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712.
Respondent COMELEC contends that its advancement in tabulation procedures is
allowed within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code
that:

Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices,
taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the
purpose. Provided, That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of
accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of
the use of such devices.

COMELEC denies that the assailed resolution was promulgated pursuant to Rep. Act
No. 8436, and that it is the implementation of Phase III of its modernization program.
Rather, as its bases, the respondent COMELEC invokes the general grant to it of the
power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections and to
promulgate rules and regulations to ensure free, orderly and honest elections by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and Rep. Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166.

ISSUE

Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 is void and unconstitutional

HELD

YES! First, the assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial"
tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and
Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in part; The returns
of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to
the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

Second, the assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision

that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."By its very terms, the electronic transmission and
tabulation of the election results projected under Resolution No. 6712 is "unofficial" in
character, meaning "not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the
government or government body. Any disbursement of public funds to implement this
project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which
is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds
appropriated for the AES for the "unofficial" quick count project may even be
considered as a felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Third. The assailed resolution disregards existing laws which authorize solely the
duly-accredited citizens’ arm to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes. Under
Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173,49 and reiterated
in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,50 the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case,
NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the
conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local
elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to
use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count.

Fourth. Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC
as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest
technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the
COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties
and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and
electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such
devices.

Fifth. The assailed resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis. That
respondent COMELEC is the sole body tasked to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall"56 and to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections" is
beyond cavil. That it possesses the power to promulgate rules and regulations in the
performance of its constitutional duties is, likewise, undisputed. However, the duties
of the COMELEC under the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 7166, and other election laws
are carried out, at all times, in its official capacity. There is no constitutional and
statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC to undertake a separate and an
"unofficial" tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically. Indeed, by
conducting such "unofficial" tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC
descends to the level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose.
Besides, it is absurd for the COMELEC to conduct two kinds of electoral counts – a
slow but "official" count, and an alleged quicker but "unofficial" count, the results of
each may substantially differ.
NAVARRO VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Amelita S. Navarro (petitioner) and Jose C. Miranda (private respondent) were candidates for
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela in the May 14, 2001 elections.

On May 15, 2001, the City Board of Canvassers (BOC) convened for the canvassing of the
election returns.Upon opening of the envelope containing the first return, counsel for petitioner
objected on the ground that the return was not properly sealed in accordance with the
Omnibus Election Code.4 Also alleging that in fact 95% of the returns in the first ballot box
was not properly sealed, petitioner objected to the inclusion thereof.

The following day or on May 16, 2001, petitioner filed before the BOC a petition to exclude the
election returns contained in 9 ballot boxes on the ground that they were not secured with the
required 3 padlocks.On account of the filing of such petition, the BOC suspended the
canvassing.

By Decision of May 19, 2001,the BOC denied the petition to exclude the election returns
contained in the questioned 9 ballot boxes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lack of the required number of padlocks on the ballot boxes containing the
election returns is a proper issue in a pre-proclamation case.

HELD:

This Court is not persuaded. Non-compliance by a BOC of the prescribed canvassing procedure
is not an "illegal proceeding" under paragraph (a) of Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code,
given the summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy, consistent with the law’s desire
that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible.19 A pre-proclamation
controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face and the
COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate the
alleged election irregularities.20

Petitioner’s allegation that the absence of the required number of padlocks puts into question
the integrity of the election returns fails, she not having alleged nor proved that the election
returns showed on their face tampering or alteration.

"While the aforesaid grounds may, indeed, involve a violation of the rules governing the
preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not necessarily affect the
authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from
the canvassing. The grounds for objection to the election returns made by petitioners are
clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that the election returns were
tampered with or spurious."

Non-compliance by a BOC of the prescribed canvassing procedure is not an "illegal proceeding"

under paragraph (a) of Section 243 of the OEC, given the summary nature of a pre-
proclamation controversy, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and proclamation
be delayed as little as possible. The enumeration of pre-proclamation grounds under Section
243 of the OEC is exclusive. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the
election returns on their face and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face
of the returns and investigate the alleged election irregularities. The absence of the required
number of padlocks on ballot boxes containing the election returns prior to actual canvassing
is not a ground for exclusion of election returns.
PATORAY VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Patoray and private respondent Disomimba were the mayoralty

candidates of Tamporan, Lanao del Sur during the May 8, 1995 elections.  During the
canvassing of the votes by the MBC, private respondent objected to the inclusion of
election returns from 4 precincts “for being substituted, fraudulent and obviously
manufacture “ but the same was denied by the MBC.  On appeal, the COMELEC
Second Division ordered the exclusion from the count of election returns from 2
precincts owing to discrepancy between the “taras” and the written figures and the
incomplete data as to provincial and congressional candidates.  The COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and ordered the constitution of a
new MBC to implement the second Division’s resolution.

Petitioner Patoray filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the
COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether  the  exclusion  of  the  2  election  returns  was  the  proper  remedy to
answer the discrepancy between the taras and  the written figures   and  the 
incompleteness  of   the  data  as  to  provincial  and congressional candidates?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the discrepancy between the taras and the written figure
and the incomplete data as to the provincial and congressional candidates found in
the excluded election returns constituted materials defects in the election return. 
While the COMELEC was correct in  excluding  the 2 election returns, in addition it
should have also ordered a recount of the votes cast in the 2 precincts.  Its failure to
do this resulted in the disenfranchisement of the voters in these precincts.  The
recounting of the votes is consistent with the summary nature of proceedings involving
pre-proclamation controversies.

The Municipal BOC correctly ruled that objections in the course of canvass of returns
alleging that the election returns are manufactured, fabricated or not authentic,
considering that the election returns includes votes on ballots which are spurious,
marked and invalid ballots are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy. It is
beyond the competence of the BOC; neither is it a pre-proclamation issue, and the
refusal of the BOCs to consider such objection or rule on the same is not erroneous.
Issues relative to the appreciation of ballots cannot be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy.
BARBERS VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Robert Z. Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates for re-election to the
Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of Senators
promulgated a resolution proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the
elections. The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning
candidate for Senator after canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs.

On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution proclaiming

Biazon as “the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator. According to COMELEC,
Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers.  The COMELEC stated that this
difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there
was failure of elections.

Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator claiming

that the latter’s proclamation was void, illegal and premature being based on an
incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and
votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would
undoubtedly affect the results of the elections.

On the other hand, Biazon asserts that the COMELEC 1st Division has no
jurisdiction to review, reverse or modify the actuations of COMELEC en banc sitting as
National Board of Canvassers for Senators and that because he already took his oath,
it should not entertain Barbers’ petition. It also argued that considering his lead over
Barbers, the remaining votes in the uncanvassed COCs would not substantially affect
the results as to the 12th senator. On the other hand, Barbers countered by saying
that there could be no valid proclamation based on an incomplete canvass. COMELEC
denied Barbers’ petition.

It ruled that Barbers’ petition cannot be categorized as a pre-proclamation

controversy since the issues cited are not proper for such nor it can be categorized as
an election protest since the ground cited also does not make it as such. Besides, the
COMELEC also found out that considering Biazon’s lead over that of Barbers, even if
those unincluded votes would be counted in favor of Barbers still it would not affect
the results. MR denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition.

Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, after having used
Provincial Certificates of Canvass in the canvass of election results for Senators up to
2 June 2004, the COMELEC used the Municipal Certificates of Canvass in the final
tabulation of the uncanvassed results and that of the special elections yet to be held in
certain parts of the country

HELD:

No. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal that has the exclusive jurisdiction to
entertain this kind of petition in light of Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as
well as Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Senate Electoral Tribunal as well as the ruling
in Pangilinan v. COMELEC. In Javier v. COMELEC, it was held that the phrase
“election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to
all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title.  But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls, including the
listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of
the votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The word
“sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised
Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.  The authority
conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete.  It is therefore clear that this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests
Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which
has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.

No. It is a rule that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the
basis of a subsequent proclamation.  A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. 
However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect
the results of the election. (Sec. 233, Omnibus Election Code; Sec. 9 COMELEC
Resolution No. 6749)

In the present case, the report which the COMELEC Supervisory Committee
submitted shows that Barbers obtained 6,736 votes in areas where results were not
included in the national canvass.  As for Biazon, he garnered 2,263 votes. Also, the
Supervisory Committee’s report shows that the total number of registered voters in
areas where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931, covering only
19 precincts in three municipalities. Since the election returns not included in the
national canvass as well as the results of the special elections to be held would not
materially affect the results of the elections, it is immaterial whether the COMELEC
used PCOCs or MCOCs in the subsequent canvass.
SAMAD V. COMELEC,

FACTS

Petitioner Sukarno S. Samad and private respondent Bai Unggie Abdula were
among the contenders for this office in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992.
Both were proclaimed mayor-elect by two different canvassing boards — the private
respondent, by the board headed by Abas A. Saga, on May 28, 1992, and the
petitioner, by the board headed by Mucado M. Pagayao, on May 29, 1992. Both went
to the Commission on Elections in separate petitions against each other.

In SPA 92-314, sought the nullification of the proclamation made in favor of

Abdula and the calling of a special election in three precincts. In SPC 92-421, Abdula
prayed that the proclamation of Samad be nullified and that he be enjoined from
assuming as mayor of Kabuntalan.

COMELEC issued a resolution in SPA 92-314 directing its Law Department to:
1) summon both election registrars Saga and Pagayao to appear before the
Commission; 2) conduct an investigation of the matter with a view to the prosecution
of any one found responsible for falsification of the election documents; and 3) require
Election Supervisor CarmencitaCabacungan to comment on the petition.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2489 declaring the termination of all pre-
proclamation cases except the 86 cases named in the list annexed thereto. SPA 92-314
was not included in the list.

The petitioner filed in the RTC of Cotabato City an action against the private
respondent for quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Abdula filed
a petition with the CA, questioning the validity of the order.

COMELEC declared that pending implementation of the challenged resolution,

it was the responsibility of the Department of Interior and Local Government to
designate an OIC-Mayor in the Municipality of Kabuntalan.This declaration prompted
Samad to file with this Court a petition for certiorari with restraining order and
injunction.

DILG issued a letter-directive recognizing the petitioner as mayor of

Kabuntalan, but on December 14, 1992, it allegedly issued another letter, this time
authorizing the private respondent to continue serving as a hold-over mayor. President
Fidel V. Ramos designated respondent Abdula as officer-in-charge of the Office of the
Mayor of Kabuntalan.

ISSUE

Whether jurisdiction over the present controversy remained with the COMELEC
or was vested in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City upon the filing of the
petition for quo warranto.

HELD

YES! As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or
amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the
authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired
jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative
thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This
procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority. Conformably, we have ruled
in a number of cases that after a proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation
case before the COMELEC is no longer viable.

The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: 1) the board of canvassers was
improperly constituted; 2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy;3) what was filed
was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul
a proclamation; 4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was
expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad
cautelam; and 5) the proclamation was null and void. All the exceptions except the
fourth apply here.

Moreover, quo warranto was not the proper remedy because both the petitioner and
the private respondent claimed to have assumed the office of the mayor of Kabuntalan.
In a quo warranto proceeding, the petitioner is not occupying the position in dispute.
Moreover, under the Omnibus Election Code, quo warranto is proper only for the
purpose of questioning the election of a candidate on the ground of disloyalty or
ineligibility. Neither of these grounds was invoked by Samad in SPL Civil Case 2938.A
petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the
disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the
respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place.

An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the
ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the
preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality
of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.
ONG V. COMELEC

FACTS

Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the congressional seat of
the second district of Northern Samar during the recently-concluded May 11, 1992
elections. Following the elections, petitioner Ong garnered 24,272 votes while private
respondent Lucero obtained 24,068 votes or a difference of 204 votes as determined by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar.

Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC for the suspension of the
proclamation of petitioner and for a recount in precinct since there was a failure of
election occasioned by the snatching of ballot boxes.

COMELEC in an en banc resolution denied Lucero's prayer for a correction of

certificates of canvass from Las Navas equivalent to 20 votes; granted Lucero's prayer
for a recounting of votes from precincts 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos by ordering the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Northern Samar to produce the ballot boxes from
said precincts before the COMELEC; deferred its resolution on the issue of special
election for precinct 13 of Silvino Lobos until after the results from precincts 7 and 16
shall have been determined and denied Lucero's prayer for the recount of votes cast in
52 precincts of Catubig, Las Navas, Pambuyan, San Roque and Laong. The private
respondent filed with COMELEC an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of
Election Inspectors. Five days later, petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the
COMELEC from enforcing its June 2 order and its June 13, 1992 resolution.

COMELEC convened en banc constituted a Special Board of Election Inspectors (BEI),

a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) for precinct and a Special Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar (PBC), through Resolution No. 92-1813.
COMELEC and the Special BEI recounted the votes from precinct 16 as contained in
an election returns showing the following results: Lucero — 43 and Ong — 2. MBC
canvassed the said election return. Pursuant to the COMELEC's amended resolution
No. 92-1815, the special BEI likewise canvassed the COMELEC's copy of the election
return from precinct 7 with Ong winning 61 votes and Lucero gaining 29 votes. The
canvass of the election return from precinct 7 was made after the special MBC
overruled private respondent's objection. Thereafter, private respondent filed a notice
of appeal with the COMELEC. Immediately upon receipt of the TRO, the COMELEC
ceased to conduct any proceeding on SPA Case No. 92-282.

Notwithstanding the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioner filed with

the Special PBC for Northern Samar an urgent motion to proceed with the canvass
and to proclaim the winning candidate. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the COMELEC
en banc an equitable petition to review and to annul/set aside the recount made on
June 23, 1992 of precinct 16 of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar.

ISSUE

Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its order and its resolution which ordered the chairman of the PBC of Northern Samar
not to reconvene the board and granted a recount of the ballots in precincts 7 and 16
of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar.

HELD
YES! While we agree with petitioner with regard to the COMELEC en banc's power to
rule on the question of holding special elections for precinct 13 as clearly provided by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, 18 we rule that the COMELEC en banc gravely
abused its jurisdiction when it ordered a recount in precincts 7 and 16 because these
are matters which should have been first referred to its division, thus contravening
Section 3, subdivision c of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which expressly
provides:"SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition
of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in a division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."

By now it is well-settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation

controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the Commission. The
Commission en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide it in the first
instance.

The COMELEC indiscriminately issued the order of recount even before the remedies
under the law as stated in Sections 233 and 234 of the Omnibus Election Code have
been complied with. Indeed, nowhere in Section 233 is there any mention of a recount
of ballots. Instead, the remedy under said Section is a referral to other authentic
copies of election returns issued by the Commission.

It bears stressing that under Sections 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election
Code, an order for a recount shall be issued only as a last resort and only if the
Commission is satisfied that the identity and integrity of the ballots have not been
violated. So restrictive is the authority to recount that under Section 237, once the
integrity of ballots is violated, the Commission shall not order a recount but shall seal
and secure the ballot box.
QUILALA V. COMELEC

FACTS:

Cirilo M. Quilala was the KBL candidate for Mayor in the Municipality of Currimao,
Ilocos Norte while Wilbur Go was the official administration candidate.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Currimao, Ilocos Norte completed its canvass of the
election returns in the afternoon of January 19, 1988, and immediately thereafter proclaimed
Wilbur C. Go as the winning candidate.

Quilala filed a petition alleging that he was not represented in the canvassing of the election
returns, firstly, because the canvass was conducted only in the morning of January 19, 1988;
Secondly because he was not notified of the resetting of the canvassing and the time, place and
date when the same would take place; and thirdly, because his representative was prevented
from witnessing the canvass, by elements of the Philippine Marines. Such absence of
representation, Quilala claims can be gleaned from the fact that the Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation for the municipality does not contain the signature of the
representative of the KBL. Quilala prays for a declaration of nullity of the canvass and the
proclamation of Wilbur Go and for an order directing the Board of Canvassers to conduct a
proper canvass.

COMELEC 2nd division issued its now assailed Decision dismissing SPC No. 88-214 and
confirming the validity of the proceeding of the Board of Canvassers of Currimao, Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE:

Whether Quilala’s right to due process was violated

HELD:

No. There was no necessity to send another notice to Quilala when the Board of
Canvassers recessed at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 18, 1988 because "it was the
responsibility of petitioner or his watcher to verify when actual canvass of the returns were
going to be made." Indeed, the notice demanded by petitioner is not necessary because there
was no subsequent meeting of the Board of Canvassers to speak of. It merely recessed after it
convened at 6:00 p.m. because there were no returns to canvass yet. However, it resumed its
proceedings as soon as the returns arrived.

It should be noted that the law requires the Board of Canvasser to "meet continuously
from day to day until the canvass is completed and may adjourn but only for the purpose of
awaiting the other election returns from other polling places within its jurisdiction" and "as
soon as the other election returns are delivered, the board shall immediately resume
canvassing until all the returns have been canvassed" (Section 231, B.P. 881). Quilala may not
claim ignorance of the aforesaid provisions as these are matters directly affecting his political
fortune.

The alleged defect in the notice is only one of form, not substance. Quilala is making a
big issue of the discrepancy between the specific place in the Sangguniang Bayan stated in the
notice as the site of the canvassing and the place in the same building where the canvassing
was actually held, but does not explain why his watcher, with just a modicum of diligence and
resourcefulness, failed to find the place of the canvassing. The Sangguniang Bayan is not a
cavernous structure and canvass giving is not a very quiet affair.

Another matter which militates against the cause of petitioner is that he has not shown that he
suffered prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend the canvassing.
TUGADE V. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Eduard V. Tugade and respondent Florencio Agustin were candidates

for the position of Punong Barangay of San Raymundo, Pangasinan in the 2002
syncrhonize barangay and SK elections.

Results of the canvass showed that Tugade obtained 246 votes while Agustin
garnered 245 votes, or a margin of only 1 vote, thus the Brgy Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Tugade as the elected Punong Barangay.

One week after the proclamation, Agustin filed with the MTC an election
protest.

The MTC rendered its decision declaring Agustin as the duly elected Punong Barangay
given the review of the final tally of votes, including those in the contested precincts,
Agustin garnering 246 while Tugade received 242.

On appeal, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring a tie between Agustin and
Tugade, with both of them obtaining 246 votes considering the validated claimed votes
and invalidated votes. It ordered the Brgy Board of Canvassers to reconvene for a
special public meeting where there will be drawing of lots to determine who will be
proclaimed Punong Barangay, pursuant to sec 240 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Tugade filed a MR with the COMELEC but was denied for several reasons, such as
failing to file the motion within the 5-day reglementary period, paying the required
fees, verifying the motion and filing the required number of copies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC’s resolution declaring a tie between the two candidates
is in accordance with law and jurisprudence

HELD: Yes

COMELEC in ordering the immediate implementation of the Resolution issued

for the drawing of lots acted in accordance with Section 240 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides:

Sec 240. Election resulting in tie. –Whenever it shall appear from the canvass
that two or more candidates have received an equal and highest number of votes, or in
cases where two or more candidates are to be elected for the same positionand two or
more candidates received the same number of votes for the last place in the number to
be elected, the board of canvassers, after recording this fact in its minutes,shall by
resolution, upon five days notice to all the tied candidates,hold a special public
meeting at which the board of canvassers shall proceed to the drawing of lots of the
candidates who have tiedand shall proclaim as elected the candidates who may be
favored by luck, and the candidates so proclaimed shall have the right to assume
office in the same manner as if he had been elected by plurality of vote. The board of
canvassers shall forthwith make a certificate stating the name of the candidate who
had been favored by luck and his proclamation on the basis thereof.
XV. ELECTION CONTESTS

1. Sampayan v. Daza, G.R. No. 103903, September 11, 1992

Facts:

On February 18, 1992, Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional

District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to
disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same
congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the
ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the
United States since October 16, 1974.

Petitioners allege that Hr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced
his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.

On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they

filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in
the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code (SPC 92-084) and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the

House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Held:

No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot
and academic for the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his
position forthe duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending
June 30, 1992.  Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House
Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired.   Furthermore as a de facto public
officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term
of office becaus e his acts are as valid as those of a dejure officer.  Moreover, as
a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
2. Republic of the Philippines v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of
the Philippines:
 
(1) to annul the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-
admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and

(2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.

Petitioner then filed a petition on September 20, 1991 for naturalization

captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of the Philippines. 

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead
of Schedule, that it shall be done on January instead of having it on March, " where he
manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion
was granted and the hearing was moved on February.

On February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held
that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of
a natural born Filipino citizen.
 
The Solicitor General subsequently interposed a timely appeal directly with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as

Filipino.

HELD:

No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen
of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of
the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same
to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:

(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without
a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;

(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;

(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and

(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
3. Tan v. COMELEC, 507 SCRA 352 (2006)

Facts:

Petitioners Abdusakur M. Tan and Basaron Burahan were the

gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates, respectively, of Sulu Province
in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On May 17, 2004, petitioners,
together with other local candidates for congressman, mayor, and vice-mayor,
filed with the COMELEC four (4) Petitions for Declaration of Failure of Elections
in the towns of Maimbung, Luuk, Tongkil, and Panamao, all of Sulu Province.
For the municipality of Luuk, Sulu, another Petition for Declaration of Failure
of Elections was filed by another gubernatorial candidate, Yusop Jikiri.

Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division, acting on the Petitions for

Declaration of Failure of Elections, issued its May 17, 2004 Order suspending
the proclamation of the winning gubernatorial candidate of Sulu, but lifted the
suspension three (3) days later. In the May 20, 2004 lifting Order, the
COMELEC Second Division directed the Sulu PBOC to complete the canvass of
votes and "to bring all canvass documents to Manila, and to proclaim the
winning candidates for Governor in Manila.

Even before the filing of the four (4) aforesaid petitions, Abdusakur M.
Tan had filed four (4) other petitions, one before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Parang, Sulu for the exclusion of election returns from several
precincts. All these petitions were dismissed by the Boards concerned,
prompting petitioner Tan to file an appeal with the COMELEC First Division
which issued an Order 25 on May 24, 2004 directing the concerned boards of
canvassers to suspend their proceedings and to refrain from proclaiming any
winning candidate.

However, on the same day that the COMELEC First Division issued the
said Order, private respondent Benjamin Loong was proclaimed the winning
governor of Sulu and he assumed office. This prompted petitioner Tan to file a
Petition for Annulment of the Proclamation with the COMELEC First Division

On June 21, 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued an Order 26 which
granted the petition and annulled the proclamation of respondent Loong as
governor of Sulu Province.

In the meantime, on July 19, 2004, respondent Yusop H. Jikiri filed

before the COMELEC a Petition of Protest Ad Cautelam, praying, inter alia, for
the recount or revision of the ballots cast and the examination of election
returns in four (4) municipalities of Sulu, namely, Luuk, Tongkil, Maimbung,
and Parang.

The COMELEC en banc, through its October 18, 2004 Joint Resolution,
dismissed all five (5) petitions filed on May 17, 2004 to declare a failure of
elections. This prompted respondent Jikiri to immediately convert his
petition ad cautelam into a regular election protest which was granted by the
COMELEC First Division

Issues:

Whether [or not] the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain electoral

protests filed beyond ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of an
election for a given provincial office.
 Whether [or not] the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain
simultaneously pre-proclamation controversies and electoral protests.

Held:

The petitions are bereft of merit.

Distinction between electoral protests filed under

Sections 248 and 258 of the Omnibus Election Code

Moving to the issues raised in the second petition (G.R. No. 166891), we
note that while petitioner Loong doubtlessly concedes the original jurisdiction
of COMELEC over election protests involving provincial officials, among others,
he excepts, at the first instance, to its assumption of jurisdiction over such
contest which, to him, was filed after the reglementary period.

Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code85 under which the petitioner

anchors his case provides as follows:

Section 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and

city offices. – A sworn petition contesting the election of … any regional,
provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate
who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same
office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
(Underscoring added)

The complementing Section 1, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

practically says the same thing.

The petitioner’s formulation of his basic submission and the premises holding
it together run as follows: The PBOC of Sulu proclaimed the results of the
gubernatorial election, or, in fine, declared him as the duly elected governor of
Sulu, on May 24, 2004. Accordingly, a protest contesting his election ought to
have been filed on or before June 3, 2004 or ten (10) days from May 24, 2004.
A belated protest, as what private respondent Jikiri filed on July 19, 2004 or a
little over fifty (50) days after the proclamation, effectively deprived the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to entertain the said protest. According to petitioner,
the COMELEC First Division acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it nonetheless entertained respondent Jikiri’s election protest
filed beyond the reglementary 10-day period.

Petitioner’s basic posture may be accorded plausibility, except that it glossed

over a statutory provision which, in the light of certain proceedings as thus
narrated, militates against his stance. Under Section 248 of the Election Code,
the filing of certain petitions works to stop the running of the reglementary
period to file an election protest, thus:

Section 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation. –

The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the
proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within
which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.

As may be noted, the aforequoted Section 248 contemplates two (2) points of
reference, that is, pre- and post-proclamation, under which either of the
petitions referred to therein is filed. Before the proclamation, what ought to be
filed is a petition to "suspend" or stop an impending proclamation. After the
proclamation, an adverse party should file a petition to "annul" or undo a
proclamation made. Pre-proclamation controversies partake of the nature of
petitions to suspend. The purpose for allowing pre-proclamation controversies,
the filing of which is covered by the aforequoted Section 248 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is to nip in the bud the occurrence of what, in election practice,
is referred to as "grab the proclamation and prolong the protest" situation. 86

Correlating the petitions mentioned in Section 248 with the 10-day period set
forth in the succeeding Section 250, a petition to suspend tolls the 10-day
period for filing an election protest from running, while a petition to annul
interrupts the running of the period. In other words, in a Section 248 petition
to suspend where the 10-day period did not start to run at all, the filing of
a Section 250 election contest after the tenth (10th) day from proclamation is
not late. On the other hand, in a Section 248 petition to annul, the party
seeking annulment must file the petition before the expiration of the 10-day
period.

Election protest case filed on time

In the case at bench, the petitioner’s arguments on the belated filing of

the respondent’s election protest may merit consideration had the petitions
against him been only for the annulment of his May 24, 2004 proclamation.
However, the numerous election-related petitions, which were filed against
petitioner Loong by the other Sulu gubernatorial candidates, sought
to suspend his then impending proclamation which, as turned out, was
eventually made on May 24, 2004. And as events unfolded, some of the
petitions adverted to resulted in the issuance on May 17, 2004 of an Order
suspending the proclamation of the governor-elect of Sulu. 87 Petitioner Loong
himself admitted as much: "x x x on May 17, 2004, the COMELEC Second
Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of the winning
candidate for Governor of the province of Sulu."88

Not to be overlooked, because a corresponding position could have

preceded it, is the June 21, 2004 Order of the COMELEC First Division
annulling petitioner Loong’s proclamation as governor-elect. The fallo of said
annulling order reads:

In view of the foregoing but without prejudice to any resolution which would
issue in disposition of the pending appeals and petitions involved in SPC 04-
138, SPA No. 04-163, SPA No. 04-164 and SPA No. 04-165, [SPC instead of
SPA should have been used] the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) hereby
ANNULS the precipitate and premature proclamation of BENJAMIN LOONG as
the winning candidate of governor of Sulu.89

Upon the foregoing considerations, the filing of the election protest ad

cautelam on July 19, 2004 or fifty-six (56) days after the May 24, 2004
proclamation was contextually on time. This is because the 10-day
reglementary period to file such protest––which ordinarily would have expired
on June 3, 2004––did not start to run at all. It cannot be over-emphasized that
the pre-proclamation controversies Abdusakur Tan initiated right after the May
10, 2004 elections, that is, SPC Nos. 04-163, 04-164, and 04-165, were only
resolved on March 18, 2005. We reproduce with approval what the public
respondent said, respecting the denial of the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner Loong against the election protest of respondent Jikiri:
Records show that there are still pre-proclamation cases pending before the
Commission, the result of which could affect the protestee [petitioner Loong], to
wit: SPC 04-163 (Abdusakur Tan vs. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sulu), SPC 04-164 (Abdusakur Tan vs. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu)
and SPC 04-165 (Abdusakur Tan vs. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu).
This situation distinguishes the instant case from that of Dagloc vs. COMELEC
(321 SCRA 273) to which the protestee is anchoring his defense.

It is likewise of no moment that the pre-proclamation cases were filed not by

the protestant but by another candidate. Section 248 of the Omnibus Election
Code does not require that the petition to annul or to suspend the
proclamation be filed by the protestant. This liberal interpretation likewise sits
well with our policy to forego with technicalities if they stand in the way of
determining the true will of the people.

That the cases are still pending with the Commission will not prevent the
protestant from converting his election protest ad cautela into a regular one.
Such conversion is an option which the protestant enjoys. Said fact likewise
does not preclude us from deciding the election protest case. Pre-proclamation
controversies and election protest cases have different causes of action. They
can proceed independently.90

Thus, the imputation of grave abuse of discretion, on the part of respondent

COMELEC’s First Division, in refusing to dismiss respondent Jikiri’s Petition of
Protest Ad Cautelam (EPC No. 2004-66) on the stated ground that he filed the
same after the lapse of the period for filing an election protest is untenable.

Second Issue: Simultaneous prosecution of pre-proclamation

controversies and election protests

On the last issue of the propriety of prosecuting simultaneously pre-

proclamation controversies and an electoral protest, petitioner Loong holds the
negative view, submitting, in gist, that an election contest should be put on hold until
pre-proclamation controversies are concluded. He thus faults and goes on to ascribe
grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC First Division for holding otherwise,
stating as follows:

Clearly, the [ruling of the COMELEC First Division] is illogical and absurd. What will
happen if the pre-proclamation appeals of … Tan are sustained and the defeated
candidate … Tan is found to be the winner in his pre-proclamation appeals?
Obviously, the ruling of the COMELEC does not promote orderly procedure in the
resolution of election cases. It promotes useless, unnecessary, and vexatious
litigations.93

As earlier stated, it is not legally possible for the COMELEC First Division to declare
Jikiri the elected governor in the electoral protest filed against petitioner [Loong] and
at the same time issue a decision in the pre-proclamation appeals of Abdusakur Tan
that the latter is the elected governor. The grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction is very obvious.94

Petitioner Loong’s arguments, for all their easily-perceptible merit, are not anchored
on any legal provision.1âwphi1 They are common sensical to be sure. Nonetheless,
laying grave abuse of discretion on the doorsteps of the respondent COMELEC First
Division for giving due course to respondent Jikiri’s electoral protest without waiting
for the final result of the pre-proclamation appeals is a different matter altogether.
4. Roquero v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 150 (1998)

Petitioner Eduardo V. Roquero and private respondent Reynaldo A.

Villano were candidates for Mayor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan during the
local elections held on May 8, 1995.

On July 19, 1995, the MBC proclaimed petitioner Roquero as the duly
elected Mayor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan garnering 20,131 votes to
private respondent Villano's 18,312 votes.

Thereafter, or on July 24, 1995, private respondent Villano filed a motion for
reconsideration of the COMELEC Order dated July 18, 1995.

Said motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC on

September 8, 1995 in a resolution received by private respondent Villano on
September 11, 1995.

On October 10, 1995, private respondent filed a petition

for certiorari before this Court assailing the COMELEC's denial of his motion
for reconsideration.

On January 30, 1996, this Court issued a resolution dismissing said

petition. A reconsideration of the same resolution was denied on April 16,
1996. This resolution was received by private respondent Villano on May 7,
1996.

On May 17, 1996, private respondent Villano filed an election protest

before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 82,

On June 4, 1996, before summons were served to petitioner Roquero,

private respondent Villano filed a supplemental petition enumerating the 104
precincts of San Jose del Monte he was contesting.

On July 15, 1996, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the election protest did not allege facts constituting a cause of action for an
election protest and that the election protest was filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period for filing the same.

On August 29, 1996, respondent judge Oscar P. Barrientos issued an

order denying petitioner Roquero's motion to dismiss.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the foregoing orders, petitioner Roquero

filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before respondent COMELEC,

On January 28, 1997, respondent COMELEC issued the questioned

resolution (1) dismissing the petition for lack of merit and (2) directing the RTC
to proceed with the revision of ballots and decide the election protest with
dispatch. Hence, the present petition:

Issue:

Was the election protest filed by private respondent Villano filed on time?
Held:

The COMELEC, in ruling that the election protest was filed on time,
merely reckoned the 10-day period from May 7, 1996 (which was the receipt by
respondent Villano of this Court's resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing his petition) to May 17, 1996 when
he filed his election protest. In computing the 10-day period, the COMELEC did
not consider the running of the period from the date of proclamation of the
petitioner candidate to the date the pleading was filed with the COMELEC to
annul or suspend the proclamation; and from the time private respondent
received the ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition, to the time he filed
the petition before this Court questioning the COMELEC's ruling.

Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. — A sworn petition

contesting the election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper
regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after
proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 190, 1978 EC)

Petitioner Roquero was proclaimed by the MBC as the duly elected mayor
of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on July 19, 1995. Five (5) days later, or on
July 24, 1995, private respondent Villano filed with respondent COMELEC a
pre-proclamation motion for reconsideration assailing the latter's order
directing the MBC to proclaim petitioner Roquero as the winning candidate for
the mayoralty of the said municipality. Consequently, only five (5) days of the
ten (10) day reglementary period to file an election protest remained.

Section 248 of the same Election Code is clear and provides thusly:

Sec. 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation.

— The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend
the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of the
period within which to file an election protest or quo
warranto proceedings.

Applying the above provision to the instant case, the ten (10) day
reglementary period was suspended during the pendency of the pre-
proclamation case in the COMELEC and in this Court, until private respondent
Villano received a copy of this Court's Resolution dated April 16, 1996, denying
his motion for reconsideration on May 7, 1996. Verily, on May 7, 1996, the
five-day remainder of the reglementary period to file an election protest
resumed to run again and expired on May 12, 1996. Private respondent Villano
therefore belatedly filed his election protest on May 17, 1996, five (5) days after
the deadline for filing the same.5

The rule prescribing the ten-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional,

and the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the protest.6 Violation of this rule should not be taken lightly
nor should it be brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be
overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement,
the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.

The Court would like to take note also of petitioner Roquero's contention
that private respondent Villano should have filed his election protest on
September 17, 1995 (should be September 16, 1995), five (5) days after he
received a copy of the COMELEC resolution deying his motion for
reconsideration on September 11, 1995.

The running of the reglementary period to file an election protest is tolled by a

party's elevation to the Supreme Court of a COMELEC decision or resolution of
a pre-proclamation case. The appeal by certiorari to this Court is part of an
entire proceeding. The case is not terminated until this Court has rendered
judgment. Consequently, the computation of the ten-day period, or the
remainder of said period for filing an election contest, as in this case, does not
commence to run until this Court hands down its verdict. 11

Anent the rest of the errors raised, we find no reason to discuss the same, they
having been rendered moot and inutile by the preceding disquisition.

For all the foregoing, this Court holds that respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Roquero's petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
5. Dagloc v. COMELEC, 321 SCRA 273 (1999)

Facts:

Private respondent Salambai Ambolodto and Sukarno Samad were mayoralty

candidates in the local elections held on May 11, 1998 in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao.
Samad was declared winner. He and herein petitioner Salipongan Dagloc, who was
elected vice-mayor, were proclaimed on May 14, 1998.

On May 23, 1998, private respondent filed a petition in the COMELEC . In

addition, on June 19, 1998, she filed an ELECTION PROTEST EX ABUNDANTI
CAUTELA, 3 docketed as Election Protest No. 38-98, in the RTC, Branch 14, Cotabato
City.

On July 6, 1998, private respondent moved to withdraw in the COMELEC in

order to prosecute Election Protest. The COMELEC granted her motion in its order
dated February 4, 1999.

Meanwhile, Samad filed his answer in Election Protest No. 38-98 in which he
sought the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it was filed more than 10 days
from the date of proclamation on May 14, 1998. He reiterated his motion to dismiss 6
in a subsequent pleading, and, in addition, asked that it be resolved before private
respondent’s motion for technical examination of C.E. Forms 1 and 2. In an order,
dated August 18, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

Samad then filed a petition for certiorari (SPR No. 37-98) in the COMELEC,

assailing the order of the RTC denying his motion to dismiss. While the case was
pending, Samad died, and herein petitioner, who had succeeded him as mayor of
Kabuntalan, was substituted in his place in the pending cases before the COMELEC
(SPR No. 37-98) and the RTC (Election Protest No. 38-98).

On June 29, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed SPR No. 37-98 for lack of
merit. It held that while SPA No. 98-356 filed by Samad was denominated as
PETITION TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF ELECTION AND/OR TO ANNUL THE
ELECTION RESULTS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF KABUNTALAN, FIRST DISTRICT OF
MAGUINDANAO, the case was actually a petition for annulment of proclamation
which, under §248 of the Omnibus Election Code, suspended the running of the
period for filing an election protest. Consequently, the filing of Election Protest No. 38-
98 in the RTC on June 19, 1998 was timely as SPA No. 98-356, filed one day before
the lapse of the period for filing an election protest, prevented the expiration of said
period. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether private respondent’s election protest was timely file d.

Held:

In Matalam v. COMELEC, 11 it was held that an action for a declaration of the

failure of election is not in the nature of a pre proclamation controversy. The
distinction between the two actions was discussed by the Court in Loong v. COMELEC
12 in this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

While, however, the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an

examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go
beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty
bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and other analogous
causes in ac tions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of
elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus, the COMELEC,
in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and
analyze voters’ signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the
elections had indeed been free, honest and clean. Needless to say, a pre-proclamation
controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or
declaration of failure of elections.

Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that as long as there is a

prayer for the annulment of a proclamation, the filing of such petition effectively
suspends the running of the period for filing an election protest. This contention has
no merit. Not all actions seeking the-annulment of proclamation suspend the running
of the period for filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto. For it is not
the relief prayed for which distinguishes actions under §248 from an election protest
or quo warranto proceedings, but the grounds on which the are based.chanrobles
lawlibra

The purpose for allowing pre-proclamation controversies is to put a stop to the

pernicious practice of unscrupulous candidates of "grabbing the proclamation and
prolonging the protest." Accordingly, grounds which are proper for electoral protests
should not be allowed to delay the proclamation of the winners. As this Court pointed
out in Dimaporo v. Commission on Elections:

It may well be true that public policy may occasionally permit the occurrence of
"grab the proclamation and prolong the protest" situations; that public policy,
however, balances the possibility of such situations against the shortening of the
period during which no winners are proclaimed, a period commonly fraught with
tension and danger for the public at large.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the filing by private respondent of a

petition for declaration of failure of election (SPA No. 98-356) did not suspend the
running of the reglementary period within which to file an election protest or quo
warranto proceedings. The period for private respondent to do so expired on May 24,
1998, 10 days from the proclamation of Sukarno Samad and petitioner as mayor and
vice-mayor, respectively. The filing of private respondent’s election protest in the RTC
on June 19, 1998 was made out of time.

However, petitioner’s contention that the assailed resolution is invalid because

Commissioner Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar had no authority to sign the same,
because his term had expired when the resolution was promulgated, is without merit.
It appears that Commissioner Marohombsar’s term expired on June 3, 1999 (not June
4, 1999 as alleged by petitioner), while the assailed resolution was promulgated on
June 29, 1999. The voting was 6-1. Even disregarding the vote of Commissioner
Marohombsar there was still a majority. The resolution in question is, therefore, valid.
6. Roces v. HRET, 469 SCRA 681 (2005)

Facts:

Petitioner Miles Roces (Roces) and former Congressman Harry Ang Ping (Mr.
Ang Ping) filed their respective certificates of candidacy (COCs) for the position of
Representative for the 3rd Congressional District of Manila in the May 2004 elections.

On January 5, 2004, a registered voter of Manila named Alejandro Gomez questioned

Mr. Ang Ping’s candidacy before the COMELEC through a petition to deny due course
or cancel his COC.1 The petition alleged that Mr. Ang Ping misrepresented himself to
be a natural-born citizen, hence was disqualified for the position.

Acting for the COMELEC First Division, Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcilliano issued

an order on April 30, 2004 scheduling the promulgation of its resolution on May 5,
2004.2 Two days before the scheduled promulgation or on May 3, 2004, Mr. Ang Ping
filed with the COMELEC a Sworn Declaration of Withdrawal of his COC. 3

 The next day, May 4, 2004, the General Counsel for the Nationalist Peoples Coalition,
the political party of Mr. Ang Ping, sought that Mr. Ang Ping’s wife, Ma. Zenaida Ang
Ping (Mrs. Ang Ping), substitute for him.4 Mr. Ang Ping also filed a motion to cancel the
scheduled promulgation and dismiss the petition to deny due course or cancel his
COC on the same date.5 On May 5, 2004, Commissioner Resurreccion Z.
Borra deferred the promulgation for lack of quorum as he was the sole Commissioner
in attendance.6

Despite all these developments, the COMELEC First Division, through Commissioners

Rufino S.B. Javier, Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Virgilio O. Garcilliano, issued
a resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Ping’s COC and
ordering the Board of Election Inspectors of Manila not to count any vote cast in his
favor.7 It ruled that the resolution which was originally scheduled for promulgation by
Commissioner Garcilliano on May 5, 2004 was instead promulgated on April 30, 2004,
the same date that the notice of promulgation was issued. 8 The resolution was served
on Mr. Ang Ping’s counsel on May 8, 2004.9

Compounding the woes of Mr. Ang Ping, and despite the deferment of the
promulgation by Commissioner Borra at a hearing on May 5, 2004, the COMELEC
First Division issued on the same date an order denying Mr. Ang Ping’s motion to
dismiss. It held that the motion to dismiss was filed after the "promulgation" of
the April 30, 2004 resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang
Ping’s COC.10 On May 9, 2004, and before the expiration of the five-day reglementary
period,11 Mr. Ang Ping moved for reconsideration of the April 30, 2004 resolution and
the case was elevated to the COMELEC en banc.12

While the case was still with the COMELEC First Division, or on May 8, 2004, the
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6823, declaring moot Mr. Ang Ping’s
Affidavit of Withdrawal, denying due course to the substitute COC of Mrs. Ang Ping
and ordering the Regional Election Director to delete Mr. Ang Ping’s name from the
certified list of candidates.13 Among the signatories to the Resolution
were Commissioners Javier, Borra, and Garcilliano of the COMELEC First
Division before which the petition to deny due course was still pending.14 Mr. Ang Ping
had no knowledge of the resolution.

Racing against time or on May 11, 2004, the spouses Ang Ping repaired to this
Court and filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order,
status quo order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as G.R. No. 163259,
assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823. 15 The next day or on May 12, 2004, this
Court issued a resolution requiring Roces to comment and denied the issuance of an
order suspending the proclamation.16

On the election day itself, the Manila City Board of Canvassers resolved not to canvass

the votes for Mr. or Mrs. Ang Ping citing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823.17 On May 15,
2004, after counting only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387 registered voters in the
district, it proclaimed Roces winner.

 The spouses Ang Ping appealed the Board resolution to the COMELEC en banc19 and
filed a petition to annul the proclamation20 but these were dismissed by COMELEC’s
Resolution No. 7257 and Omnibus Order of July 6, 2004. 21

On May 19, 2004, Roces filed his Comment to the petition of spouses Ang Ping with
this Court. On May 25, 2004, this Court required the spouses Ang Ping to file their
consolidated reply to the Comment.23

On May 24, 2004, Mrs. Ang Ping filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), In her election protest, Mrs. Ang Ping
alleged, among others, that COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was a "glaring case of
deprivation" of Mr. and Mrs. Ang Ping’s right to "elevate SPC 04-224 to the
Commission en banc" and that the COMELEC’s April 30, 2004 resolution was
irregularly promulgated. Roces filed his answer alleging, among others, that the HRET
has no jurisdiction over the case.

On July 16, 2004, the spouses Ang Ping filed their consolidated reply with this
Court.26 On July 27, 2004, we required Mrs. Ang Ping to show cause why the petition
in G.R. No. 163259 should not be dismissed in view of the filing and pendency of
HRET Case No. 04-004.27 In her Compliance filed on July 30, 2004, Mrs. Ang Ping
explained that the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 may be ventilated as one of the issues to
be settled in the HRET Election Protest since the non-canvassing of the "Ang Ping
votes" and the proclamation of petitioner Roces were founded on COMELEC
Resolution No. 6823 and were raised as the principal issues in the HRET Election
Protest. This notwithstanding, the spouses Ang Ping manifested that they will "submit
to any disposal which this Honorable Court may find appropriate under the above
circumstances" and "would defer and will accept any order/resolution of the
Honorable Court that would resolve to dismiss the instant petition/controversy, but
allowing them to pursue and concentrate their time and effort in the above-
mentioned Ad Cautela HRET Election Protest Case, which they intend to convert to a
REGULAR PROTEST case, in such an event."28

On August 10, 2004, this Court dismissed G.R. No. 163259 in view of the pending
HRET protest filed by Mrs. Ang Ping. 29 The resolution eventually became final and
executory.30 Thereafter, Mrs. Ang Ping filed in the HRET a motion to convert the ad
cautelam protest to a regular protest. The HRET granted the motion on September 9,
2004.31

In the HRET, Roces filed a motion to dismiss the protest, assailing in the main
the personality of Mrs. Ang Ping to file the protest. It also raised the following issues:
(1) whether the HRET has jurisdiction to review COMELEC Resolution No. 6823; (2)
whether Mrs. Ang Ping can validly substitute for Mr. Ang Ping; (3) whether the protest
may be resolved by mere canvass of election returns; (4) whether the proceeding is a
"protest" considering that it questions proceedings held before the Manila City Board
of Canvassers; (5) whether Mrs. Ang Ping could claim any right to the ballots cast
considering she was not listed in the certified list of COMELEC candidates; (6) whether
the petition is sufficient in form and substance despite failing to state the specific
precincts protested; and (7) whether forum shopping was committed.

After extensive oral arguments, the HRET denied Roces’s motion to dismiss on March
3, 2005. It ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to file the protest against
Roces since: (1) there was no final COMELEC resolution disqualifying or denying due
course to the COC of Mr. Ang Ping, thus her substitution for the latter was legally
permissible under the Omnibus Election Code; 32 (2) she was one of the candidates
voted for during election day in the 3rd District of Manila; 33 and (3) the COMELEC
Order of May 5, 2004 was of questionable validity for the reason that: (a) it was issued
in violation of its April 30, 2004 resolution setting the promulgation for May 5, 2004
and despite the fact that the records had not yet reached the COMELEC en
banc;34 and (b) there was no prior notice and hearing in violation of Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.35 Roces’s motion for reconsideration of the HRET order was
denied on March 21, 2005. Hence, This petition

Issue:

(1) whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to file
the election protest despite the denial in due course and cancellation of her COC
under COMELEC Resolution No. 6823;

(2) whether or not HRET has jurisdiction to review a resolution or order of the
COMELEC and/or declare the same as void and disregard or set it aside.

Held:

We hold that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss for the
following reasons:

First. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives 38 and has the power to
promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. 39 This exclusive
jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and
determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of
facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the
case legitimately before it.40 Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or
inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject
matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is
necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. 41 One of the three essential
elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present.42 Consequently, the
HRET merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was
a proper party to contest the election of Roces.

Second. There is no dispute that to support his motion to dismiss, Roces offered as

evidence the COMELEC resolutions denying due course to Mrs. Ang Ping’s COC. In
doing so, Roces submitted to the HRET the admissibility and validity of these
resolutions and the HRET cannot be faulted in reviewing the said resolutions
especially for the purpose of determining whether Roces was able to discharge his
burden of proving that Mrs. Ang Ping is not the proper party to assail his election. In
passing upon the COMELEC resolutions especially for that purpose, it cannot be said
that the HRET usurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

On the merits of the HRET ruling, we hold that the HRET did not abuse its discretion
in holding that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to contest the election of Roces.
7. Gatchalian v. CA, 245 SCRA 208 (1995)

Facts:

Danilo F. Gatchalian and Gregorio N. Aruelo, Jr. were rival candidates

for the office of the Vice Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 11, 1992
elections. On May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Gatchalian as the duly elected Vice Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan by a margin of
four votes. On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a verified petition seeking to annul the proclamation of Gatchalian.
On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Malolos, Bulacan, an election protest, Aruelo alleged that the protest was
filed ex abundante cautela, there being a pending pre-proclamation case before
the COMELEC.

On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian received an amended summons from the

clerk of court of the trial court, giving him five days within which to answer.

Instead of filing an answer, Gatchalian filed a motion to dismiss on June 15,

1992 on the following grounds: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there
was a pending pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC, and hence the
protest was premature; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees
and cash deposit upon filing of the petition. Aruelo filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss, to which Gatchalian filed a reply.

Meanwhile, on June 17, 1992, the COMELEC denied Aruelo's pre-proclamation

case. In its Order dated July 10, 1992, the trial court denied Gatchalian's
motion to dismiss and ordered him to file his answer within five days from
notice thereof. Gatchalian's motion for reconsideration was denied on August
3, 1992.

On July 23, 1992, Gatchalian, instead of filing his answer, filed a motion for a
Bill of Particulars. This motion was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
August 5, 1992. On August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of
Appeals, a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28621) alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration.

On November 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision concluding
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying Gatchalian's motion to dismiss. It further ruled that the election
protest was timely filed and that Gatchalian's averment that the election
protest should be dismissed on the ground of non-payment of filing fee was
devoid of merit. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the election protest was filed only on June 2, 1992 or nineteen
days after his proclamation on May 13, 1992 as Vice Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in
violation of Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Held:

Petitioner's contention is without merit.

Said Section 3, Rule 35 provides as follows:

 Period to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within ten (10)
days following the date of proclamation of the results of the
election.

Under the above-cited section, Aruelo had ten days from May 13, 1992 to file
an election protest. Instead of filing an election protest, Aruelo filed with the
COMELEC a pre-proclamation case against Gatchalian on May 22, 1992, or
nine days after May 13, 1992. The filing of the pre-proclamation case
suspended the running of the period within which to file an election protest
or quo warranto proceedings (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 248). Aruelo received the
COMELEC resolution denying his pre-proclamation petition on June 22, 1992.
Hence, Aruelo had only one day left after June 22, 1992 within which to file an
election protest. However, it will be noted that Aruelo filed on June 2, 1992
with the trial court an election protest ex abundante cautela.
8. Pahilan v. Tabalba, G.R. No. 110170, February 21, 1994

Facts:
Petitioner Pahilan and private respondent Tabalba were candidates for
Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin during the local elections held on May 11,
1992. On May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers Proclaimed
Tabalba as the duly elected Mayor of Guinsiliban, the latter having... garnered
1,087 votes as against 806 votes for Pahilan.
Pahilan filed an election protest which he sent by registered mail on May 23,
1992, addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin, attaching thereto P200.00 in cash as payment for docket fees.
In a... letter dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28, informed Pahilan that the
correct fees that were supposed to be paid amounted to P620.00, and that,
accordingly, the petition would not be... entered in the court docket and
summons would not be issued pending payment of the balance of P420.00.
On June 16, 1992, upon receipt of the letter. Pahilan paid the required
balance in the total amount of P470.00... on June 22, 1992, Tabalba filed his
Answer with Counterclaim... alleging as one of his affirmative defenses lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to entertain the election protest for
having been filed beyond the ten-day period... provided by law.
On August 17, 1992, Pahilan filed a Motion for Inhibition, dated August
14, 1992, because of alleged serious and grave doubts that the presiding judge
could impartially hear and decide his election protest with the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge, as the latter allegedly... belongs to and had supported a
political group adverse to the candidacy of petitioner.
On August 18, 1992, the trial court proceeded with the pre-trial
conference, heard the defense on the allegation of lack of jurisdiction for non-
payment of docket fees, and thereafter ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
Tabalba filed his Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defense of Lack of
Jurisdiction,[7] dated September 4, 1992.
Pahilan filed a Memorandum[8] as well as a Motion to Resolve Motion for
Inhibition
Prior to Resolution of Affirmative Defenses.
On October 2, 1992, the trial court issued an Order[10] denying the motion for
inhibition and dismissing the election protest for non-payment on time of the
required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. Pahilan's counsel received a copy
of said order on October 12, 1992 in Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 17, 1992 and within the 5-day period to appeal, Pahilan filed
a verified appeal brief[11] in respondent Commission on Elections, with copies
duly served on the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin and the
counsel for herein private... respondent.
On December 12, 1992, the Comelec Contests Adjudication Department
directed the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Camiguin, Branch 28, to
immediately transmit the complete records of EP Case No. 3(92) which was
being appealed by herein petitioner... the said Clerk of Court informed
respondent Commission that "to this very late date, this office has not received
any notice of appeal from the aggrieved party." As a consequence, respondent
Commission, in... an Order dated January 19, 1993, dismissed Pahilan's
verified appeal for failure to appeal within the prescribed period.
Pahilan filed a motion for reconsideration[14] of the order dismissing his
appeal. Both parties were required by respondent Commission to file their
respective memoranda. Finally, on May 6, 1993, respondent Commission
issued its aforestated resolution... denying Pahilan's motion for
reconsideration.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent Commission validly dismissed the verified
"Appeal" of petitioner which contains all the elements of a "notice of appeal"
and more expressive of the intent to elevate the case for review by said
appellate body, and furnishing copies thereof to the... respondent trial judge
and counsel for the adverse party, aside from the incomplete payment of the
appeal fee;
Whether or not the respondent trial judge validly dismissed the petition
of protest of petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees.
Held:
We find cogency and merit in the petition.
The bone of contention in this petition is the alleged erroneous dismissal
of petitioner's appeal by respondent Commission because of the failure of
petitioner to file a notice of appeal before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin which, in turn, dismissed the election... protest of petitioner for non-
payment of docket fees.
In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the trial court's order
dismissing his election protest on October 12, 1992. herein petitioner, instead
of filing a notice of appeal as required by the rules, filed with respondent
Commission a verified appeal... brief within the five-day reglementary period by
registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 43093, dated October 17, 1992...
however, that on even date, petitioner likewise sent by registered mail copies of
his appeal brief to the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, under
Registry Receipt No. 43091, and to the counsel of herein private respondent,
under Registry Receipt No. 43092. question now posed by the foregoing factual
situation is whether the notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an
appeal brief. We firmly believe and so hold, under the considerations
hereinunder discussed, that the same may be allowed.
First, in cases where a record on appeal is required under the Rules of Court, it
has been consistently held that the filing or presentation and approval of the
record on appeal on time necessarily implies or involves the filing of the notice
of appeal,[16]... because the act of taking or perfecting an appeal is more
expressive of the intention to appeal than the filing of a mere notice to do so.
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule
recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officers may not he defeated by mere... technical objections
An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest
since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice... of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge
the prerogatives of the office within their gift.
it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose
right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately...
cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest,
which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which
protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.
It is true that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid
down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and that the failure
to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the
right of appeal of a party and... precluding the appellate court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case... in some instances, this Court has disregarded such
unintended lapses so as to give due course to appeals on the basis of strong
and compelling reasons, such as... serving the ends of justice and preventing a
grave miscarriage thereof in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
It is our considered opinion that public interest is of far greater importance
than the justifications of substantial justice and equity in seeking an exception
to the general rule. Hence, election cases, by their very nature, should and
ought to merit a similar exemption from a... strict application of technical rules
of procedure.
Second, it has been shown and it is not even denied that the Regional Trial
Court of Camiguin, as well as the counsel for private respondent, was
furnished copies of the appeal brief which were sent by registered mail on
October 17, 1992, within the reglementary period to... appeal
This fact was never refuted by the Solicitor General in his Comment.
Concomitantly, although the Clerk of Court claimed that he had not received
any notice of appeal from herein petitioner, it would be safe to assume, under
the circumstances, that the appeal brief duly... directed and mailed was
received in the regular course of the mail[22] and was therefore, deemed filed
with the trial court as of the date of mailing.
Third, applying suppletorily the provisions of the Rules of Court,[23]
particularly Section 4, Rule 41 thereof, the requirement is that a notice of
appeal shall specify the parties to the appeal; shall designate the judgment or
order, or part thereof,... appealed from; and shall specify the court to which the
appeal is taken.
A perusal of herein petitioner's appeal brief will disclose the following
information: that the parties to the case are Roleto A. Pahilan as protestant-
appellant and Rudy A. Tabalba as protestee-appellee;... that appellant therein
is appealing from the order of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin,
dismissing the petition for election contest in Election Case No. 3(92); and that
the appeal is being made pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7166, that
is, before the
Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, there is no gainsaying the fact that the particulars which ought to
be reflected in the notice of appeal have been specifically and categorically
spelled out in the appeal brief of petitioner. Perforce, and in light of the
foregoing disquisitions, we find and so... hold that petitioner is entitled to the
relief prayed for
We now proceed to resolve the issue anent the dismissal of petitioner's election
protest by the Regional Trial Court for non-payment, or more accurately the
incomplete payment, of docket fees. Ordinarily, with the reversal of the
respondent Commission's questioned order,... this case should be remanded to
said court for adjudication on the merits. Considering, however, the exigencies
of time appurtenant to the disposition of election cases, and considering
further that the issue has at any rate been squarely raised in this petition, it is
now... incumbent upon this Court to act on the propriety of the trial court's
order dismissing the election protest for failure of petitioner to pay the correct
amount of docket fees
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the sum of P200.00 was attached
to the petition mailed to the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin and this fact was
even acknowledged by the Clerk of Court thereof when he requested herein
petitioner to pay the balance of the correct... docket fee. In Malimit, there was
no docket fee paid at all at the time of mailing; in the present case, the docket
fee was paid except that the amount given was not correct. Considering the fact
that there was an honest effort on the part of herein petitioner to pay the... full
amount of docket fees, we are not inclined to insist on a stringent application
of the rules.
9. Enojas v. Gacott, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513, January 19, 2000

Facts: 

Judge Gacott is being administratively charged in this case with serious

misconduct, inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law. This complaint arose when
respondent Judge dismissed an election case on the ground of non-payment of docket
fees, although the case was had been previously admitted and was deemed properly
filed by the original Judge (inhibited himself due to relationship to one’s of the parties)
whom Judge Gacott replaced. Jugde G issued the dismissal order relying on a case
(Manchester vs. CA) which states that – a case is deemed commenced only upon the
payment of the proper docket fees. To his opinion, the required fees in this case was
not yet paid by the protestant. Hence, this complaint charging him primarily with
gross ignorance of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct,

inefficiency, and gross ignorance of the law when it ruled that the Court has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide this case due to the deliberate non-payment by the
protestant of the required or correct fee.

Held:

GUILTY. Based on the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, the

election protest was properly filed. In fact, the original Judge already made an order
that from the deposit given by the protestant for the expenses of reopening the
questioned ballots, an amount shall be allocated for the payment of the required fees.
More importantly, the Court held that the Manchester ruling relied upon by
respondent Judge does not apply to election cases. In a latter case ( Pahilan), the evil
sought to be avoided in the Manchester case does not exist in election cases. Truth is,
the filing fee in an election case is fixed and the claim for damages, to which the
docket fees shall be made to apply, is merely ancillary to main cause of action and is
not even determinative of the court’s jurisdiction.

While it is true that not every error or mistake of a judge renders him
administratively liable, in this case, it is clear that the respondent judge was in utter
disregard of established rules amounting to gross ignorance of the law. The Pahilan
case was decided long before the respondent made a ruling on the election case. Thus,
the respondent judge was duty bound to adhere to, and apply the recent ruling, and
he cannot feign ignorance thereof, because the Code of Judicial Ethics requires him to
be an embodiment of, among other things, judicial competence. On e of the principal
duties of a judge is to be abreast with law and jurisprudence since the administration
of justice requires continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. A perusal of the
challenge order reveals that respondent judge failed to live up to what is expected of
him as a dispenser of justice.
10. Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 352 (1999)

Facts:

On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent
Harry Angping's proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of
Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a petition for  quo
warranto1 before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against
Congressman Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman
Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was not
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional requirement. They prayed
that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or hold office as member
of the House of Representatives and for the candidate who received the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates to be proclaimed the winner.

Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing
fee. On June 10, 1998, however the HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petition
for quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules.
After recieving a copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash
deposit on June 26, 1998 and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for
Reconsideration they filed with the HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules
which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo
warranto cases. Hence, the instant Petition

Issue:

THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN DENYING THE PETITION BELOW DESPITE ACTUAL PAYMENT BY HEREIN
PETITIONER (ALBEIT LATE) OF THE REQUIRED CASH DEPOSIT OF
P5,000.00, THEREBY STRICTLY AND LITERALLY CONSTRUING THE HRET
RULES IN CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 2 (OF THE SAME RULES) ENJOINING
A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION THEREOF.

THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BELOW UPON A MERE TECHNICALITY EVEN
AS THE EVIDENCE AND/OR DOCUMENTS ATTACHED THEREIN CLEARLY
SHOW THE INELIGIBILITY OF RESPONDENT ANGPING TO HOLD AND/OR
CONTINUE TO ASSUME OFFICE AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Held:

Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing
fees, a petitioner in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal.

It is not disputed that petitioners did not initially pay the required cash
deposit; but after their petition was summarily dismissed by the HRET for such
non-payment, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid the Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash deposit, at the same time seeking a
reconsideration of the dismissal.

Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides —

 RULE 32. Cash Deposit. — In addition to the fees prescribed in the
preceding Rule, each protestant, counter-protestant or petitioner in quo
warranto shall make a cash deposit with the Tribunal in the following
amounts:

(1) in a petition for quo warranto, Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos;

(2) if the protest or counter-protest does not require the bringing to

the Tribunal of ballot boxes and other election documents and
paraphernalia from the district concerned, Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos;

(3) if the protest or counter-protest requires the bringing of ballot

boxes and election documents and paraphernalia. Five Hundred
(P500.00) Pesos for each precinct involved therein; Provided, that
in no case shall the deposit be less than Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos;

(4) if, as thus computed, the amount of the deposit does not exceed
Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos, the same shall be
made in full with the Tribunal within ten (10) days after filing of
the protest or counter-protest;

(5) if the deposit exceeds Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00)

Pesos, partial deposit of at least Seventy Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos shall be made within ten (10) days after the
filing of the protest or counter-protest. The balance shall be paid in
such installments as may be required by the Tribunal on at least
five (5) days advance notice to the party required to make the
deposit.

xxx     xxx     xxx

On the other hand, Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET governing summary
dismissal of election contests provides, to wit —

RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. — An election protest

or petition for quo warranto may be summarily dismissed by the
Tribunal without the necessity of requiring the protestee or respondent to
answer if, inter alia:

(1) the petition is insufficient in form and substance;

(2) the petition is filed beyond the period provided in Rules 16 and
17 of these Rules;

(3) the filing fee is not paid within the period provided for filing the
protest or petition for quo warranto;

(4) in case of protests where a cash deposit is required, the cash

deposit or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within ten (10)
days after the filing of the protest;

(5) the petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with
the Tribunal are not clearly legible. (underscoring ours)
Rule 33 of the Rules likewise provides —

RULE 33. Effect of Failure to Make Cash Deposit. — If a party fails to

make the cash deposits or additional deposits herein provided within the
prescribed time limit, the Tribunal may dismiss the protest, counter-
protest, or petition for quo warranto, or take such action as it may deem
equitable under the circumstances.

It may be argued that unlike in the case of election protests, no period is

provided for to make the cash deposit in the case of petitions for quo warranto.
However, the cash deposit required in quo warranto cases is fixed, i.e.,
P5,000.00. It does not vary nor can it be varied; it is required to be paid
together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. It is different from a
protest and/or counter-protest where the amount of the required cash deposit
is yet to be determined since it has to be based on the number of ballot boxes
and other election documents and paraphernalia to be collected and brought to
the Tribunal. Therefore, depending on the amount that may be required for the
collection of the ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia,
the parties are given specified periods within which to pay. Thus, when the
required amount of cash deposits does not exceed P75,000.00, the party
concerned must make the deposit within ten (10) days after the filing of the
protest or counter-protest; otherwise, when it exceeds P75,000.00 he is
required to make a partial deposit of at least P75,000.00 likewise within ten
(10) days and the balance payable in installments as may be determined by the
Tribunal.

Petitioners herein, Peril Garcia, Pat Cruz and Geraldine Padernal, filed their
petition for quo warranto on May 29, 1998. However, the required cash deposit
of P5,000.00 was paid only on June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of
the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days.
Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and
certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET which is
clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based
on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion
can be imputed to the Tribunal.

The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of Congressman Angping

to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives, not being a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. This is a serious charge which, if true,
renders Congressman Angping disqualified from such office. In view of the
delicate nature and importance of this charge, the observance of the HRET
Rules of Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their
objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of the
electorate. Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET or to be
more precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to know and are expected to
properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal
without being formally ordered to do so. They cannot righteously impute abuse
of discretion to the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance of those
requirements it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative justice requires the
proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and
swift dispensation.

Therefore, we find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto.
Accordingly, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper.