Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Penalties Crim Law 1
Penalties Crim Law 1
is the suffering that is inflicted upon a natural person by the State for the transgression of a law or
ordinance.
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual delinquent, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and
the convict is serving the same. (Art. 22)
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Art. 344 (when the
injured party has pardoned the offender in crimes of adultery, concubinage, and other private crimes; provided that
such pardon is given before the institution of the criminal action); but civil liability with regard to the interest of
the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver. (Art. 23)
3. Suspension from employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.
It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Those mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3,
and 4 of said article are merely preventive measures before final judgment. (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA
383)
4. Fines and corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers, superior
officials may impose upon their subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil law establishes in penal form. (Art. 24)
Classification of Penalties
Principal Penalties are that provided by law for a felony and which is imposed by the court expressly upon
conviction.
Kinds of Principal Penalties:
According to their divisibility:
1. Indivisible – those which do not have fixed duration, like death, reclusion perpetua, perpetual absolute or special
disqualification, public censure.
2. Divisible – those which have a fixed duration and are always divisible into three periods, namely: maximum,
medium and minimum, like prision mayor.
According to their gravity: (Art. 25)
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
1. Death
It shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by lethal injection. The death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons. The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one
(1) year after the judgment has become final. (Art. 81, as amended by RA 7659) The court [of origin] shall
designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be
communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the
expiration of at least 8 hours following the notification but before sunset. (Art. 82)
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except:
a. When the guilty person is below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime.
1. Reclusion perpetua
The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 years and one day to 40 years. (Art. 27, as amended by RA 7659)
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for
life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Art. 41)
If the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the convict may be pardoned after serving the penalty for 30 years.
This is not mandatory. However, the longest term of imprisonment cannot exceed 40 years. (Art. 70)
Although RA 7659 (Heinous Crime Law) in amending Article 27 thereof fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua at
20 years and one day to 40 years imprisonment, said penalty remains as an indivisible penalty as there is no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification. At most, the amendment as to its duration is for the purpose of
applying Section 7, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
regarding the accused’s right to bail. (People v. Reyes, 101127, Aug. 7, 1992)
It is error for the trial court to sentence the accused to reclusion perpetua, whereas the penalty prescribed is life
imprisonment. The penalty of reclusion perpetua, a penalty provided in the RPC with accessory penalties, is
completely different from the penalty of life imprisonment. (People v. Ruedas, 194 SCRA 553)
1. Prision correctional
The duration of the penalty shall be from 6 months and one day to 6 years. (Art. 27, as amended by RA 7659) The
penalty of prision correctional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of
said imprisonment shall exceed 18 months. (Art. 43)
2. Arresto mayor
The duration of the penalty shall be from one month and one day to 6 months. (Art. 27, as amended by RA 7659)
The penalty of arresto mayor shall carry with it that of suspension of the right to hold public officeand the right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence. (Art. 44)
3. Destierro
Any person sentenced shall not be permitted to enter the place(s) designated in the sentence , nor within the radius
therein specified, which shall not be more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated. (Art.
87) The duration of the penalties shall be from 6 months and one day to 6 years. (Art. 27, amended by RA 7659)
LIGHT PENALTIES
1. Arresto menor
The duration of the penalty shall be one day to 30 days. (Art. 27, as amended by RA 7659) The penalty shall be
served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law,
when the court so provided in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons
which may seem satisfactory to it. (Art 88)
2. Public censure
If the accused is acquitted, the court has no authority to censure him, because censure, no matter how light a
punishment it may be, is repugnant and essentially contrary to an acquittal. (People v. Abellera, 69 Phil. 623)
1. Fine
A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it
exceeds P 6,000; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed P 6,000 but it is not less than P 200; and a light
penalty, if it be less than P 200. (Art. 26)
Under this Article, it the fine imposed is exactly P 200 it is correctional. However, under Article 9, a fine imposed
of exactly P 200 is a light felony. To resolve this seemingly inconsistent provisions of the law, the learned authors
has reconcile these in the following manner: If the question at issue is the prescription of a felony, Article 9 will
prevail over Article 26. Thus, a fine imposed is exactly P 200, it is a light felony. On the other hand, if the question
at issue is the prescription of the penalty, then Article 29 will prevail over Article 9, as such fine of exactly P 200
imposed as a penalty will be considered a correctional fine.
2. Bond to keep the peace
The bond to keep peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may determine. (Art. 27, as
amended) It shall be the duty of any person to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who
shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such
offense is committed they will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit
such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee such undertaking. The court shall determine,
according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond. Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as
required, he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed 6 months, if he shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed 30 days, if for a light felony. (Art. 35)
Accessory penalties are that deemed included in the imposition of the principal penalty.
1. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
The penalties of disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
a. Deprivation of the public offices and employment which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election.
b. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for popular elective office or to be elected to such office.
c. The disqualification for the offices or public employment and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraph (b) and (c) of this article
shall last during the term of the sentence.
d. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. (Art. 30)
All of these effects last during the lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence except as regards
pars. (b) and (c) of the above in connection with temporary absolute disqualification. (People v. Abes, 24 SCRA
780)
b. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employment either perpetually or during the term of
the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification. (Art. 31)
The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the
offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to
vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification. (Art. 32)
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling.
If suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, the duration is the same as that of the principal penalty. The
person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his
suspension. (Art. 33)
4. Civil interdiction
Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by
any act or any conveyance inter vivos. (Art. 34)
5. Indemnification
The pecuniary liabilities of the offender:
c. Fine
These pecuniary liabilities must be satisfied in the order mentioned. This article is applied only if the property of the
offender is not sufficient to pay his pecuniary liabilities. If the offender does not have any property, he is to undergo
subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P 8 per day as provided in Article 39, amended by RA 5465, for his failure to
meet the pecuniary liability of fine.
6. Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government unless they be
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall
be destroyed. (Art. 45)
7. Payment of costs.
Cost shall include:
a. Fees
If the accused is convicted, costs may be charged against him. Payment of costs rests upon the discretion of the
Court. If the accused is acquitted, the costs are de officio, which means, each party bears his own expenses. There
is no subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of costs.
If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the temporary penalties, (like suspension) shall be
computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final. If the offender be not in
prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day
that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. (Art. 28)
If the accused is in prison at the time the judgment is promulgated, he is deemed to have submitted himself for the
execution of the said judgment as of the date of its promulgation. (Alvarado, v. Dir. of Prisons, 47 OG 343)
Offender who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting
of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime.
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily. (Art.
29)
If the detention prisoner does not agree, the deduction shall be 4/5 of the time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment. (People v. Abanes, 73 SCRA 44) An accused sentence to life imprisonment is entitled to
the deduction. (US v. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 941)
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he
shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal,
if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he
shall be released after 30 days of preventive imprisonment. (See Art. 29, as amended by EO 214, July 10, 1987)
A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. (Art. 36)
Absolute pardon merely extinguished the criminal liability, removed disqualification to public office if expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon, but does not entitled the accused to reinstatement to her former position
inasmuch as her right thereto had been forfeited by reason of her conviction. Moreover, the pardon does not
extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. (Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191) (Q15, 1994 Bar)