TORTS AND DAMAGES

MODULE 1: TORT
- Derived from the Latin term “Torquere” or “Tortus”
(twisted or crooked)
- Synonymous to WRONG
- Origin: Anglo-American Law

Concept of Tort
- Tort is an unlawful violation of the private rights not created
by a contract, which gives rise to an action for damages.
(Common Law)
- A private or civil wrong or injury, other than a breach of
contract for which the court will provide a remedy in the form
of an action for damages.
- PHILIPPINE CONCEPT OF TORT: CULPA AQUILIANA OR
QUASI-DELICT
- Art. 2176, NCC – “Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict.

History and Development of Philippines Law on Torts

- Civil Code of 1889
- Philippines Independence in 1946 – Inculcated Anglo-
American Law

REASONS:
1) The Philippines is a rightful beneficiary of Roman Law;
2) Elements of American culture has been incorporated into
Filipino life;
3) Economic relations between the Philippines and the USA;
4) American and English courts have developed certain
equivalent rules that are not recognized in the present Civil
Code; and
5) The concepts of right and wrong are essentially the same
throughout the civilized nations.

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Kinds of Tort Liabilities
1) Intentional Torts – The actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act or believes the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.
2) Negligence – involves voluntary acts or omissions that result
in injury to others, without intending to cause the same. The
actor fails to exercise due care in performing such an act or
omission.
3) Strict Liability Torts – the person is made liable independent
of fault or negligence upon submission of proof or certain
facts.
4) Kindred Torts – Failure to apply that degree of care and skill
which is ordinarily employed by the profession, under similar
conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances.
5) Special Torts – To expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically
in statutory law.

Expanded Scope of Quasi-Delict

• Art. 2176 – Quasi-Delict
- Limited concept of tort.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

• Special Torts
- The expanded concept of Tort
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

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Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy, and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause,
to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial, or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffers damage.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of the
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any

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declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained
of.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition
the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any
form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

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(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against
one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the

defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter
be instituted), and maybe proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages

may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge

unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code
or other penal statute.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses
or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to
life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for
damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefore. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of
any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent

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civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice
of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action
for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's
motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify
the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, information should be
presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Criminal Negligence
Art. 365, RPC: Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit
an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if
it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

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In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of
the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in the degree to those provided for in this
article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
(As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).

Sources of Philippine Tort Law

1. New Civil Code of the Philippines;
2. Roman Law
- “Juris praecepta sunt haec, honeste vivere, alterum non
laedere, suum, cuiqui tribuere”.
- The precepts of law, to live honestly, to hurt no one, to give
everyone his due.

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Purposes of Tort Law
1) To provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties
that might otherwise take the law into their own hands;
2) To deter wrongful conduct;
3) To encourage socially responsible behavior;
4) To restore injured parties to their original condition, in so far
as the law can do, compensating them for injuries; and,
5) Reduce the risks and burden of living in the society and to
allocate them among the members of society.

Interest being Protected by Tort Law

a) Physical integrity;
b) Dignity and Reputation;
c) Personal Freedom;
d) Enjoyment of property; and,
e) Commercial interest

Fundamental Principles of Tort Law

a) Equity and Justice
b) Democracy
c) Human Personality Exalted

Justification of Tort Law/Liability

- “Alterum non Laedere” (To hurt no one by deed or
word)
1) Moral Perspective – there is no wrong without a remedy.
2) Economic Perspective – allocation of the risks of loss due
to the destruction of property or injury to persons created by
those activities.
3) Social Perspective – Reflection of social responsibility

Persons who can sue and be sued for tort

Plaintiff/s
- Person/s who are entitled to damages.
- Any person who had been injured by reason of tortious
conduct can sue the tortfeasor.
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- Natural Person
- Artificial Person

Q: May an unborn child be entitled to damages?

A: No. An unborn child is not entitled to damages. Although

the bereaved parents may be entitled to damages, all such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the
unborn child, his right to life, and physical integrity. Birth
determines personality and for civil purposes, the foetus is
only considered born at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb.

A) Defendant/s
- Person/s who may be held liable
▪ Natural
▪ Artificial
▪ State

MODULE 2: QUASI DELICT AND NEGLIGENCE

Quasi-Delict
- Art. 2176, NCC
- “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict, and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.”
- Those obligations which do not arise from (1) law, (2)
contracts, (3) quasi-contracts, or (4) criminal offenses.

Kinds of Civil Negligence

1) Culpa Contractual – fault or negligence of obligor by virtue
of which he is unable to perform his obligation arising from a
pre-existing contract.

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2) Culpa Aquiliana – fault or negligence of a person, whose
failure to observe the required diligence to the obligation
causes damage to another.
3) Culpa Criminal – fault or negligence which results in the
commission of a crime.

Elements/Requisites of Quasi-Delict
1. There must be an act or omission constituting fault or
negligence;
2. Damage caused by the said act or omission;
3. Causal relation between the damage and the act or
omission; and,
4. There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties.

Cases:
1) Barredo v. Garcia (74 Phil 607)
- Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or
‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon
this principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of
the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.
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Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98)
- The law clearly stated that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child according to Title X of the
Family Code; Emancipation and Age of Majority,
emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor. However,
such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although
married, was living with his father and still dependent from
the latter. Art. 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
Therefore, Art. 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC
however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is
already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only –
as a matter of equity.

Cinco v. Canonoy (90 SCRA 369)

- Rule 111, Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action.

Baksh v CA (219 SCRA 115)

- Though, the existing rule is that breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. The Court held that when
a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a women to
consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and
wilfully injures the woman. In that instance, the Court found
that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to
surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Dulay v CA (243 SCRA 220)

- Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
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selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1998]). The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792
[1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.

Garcia v. Florido (52 SCRA 420)

- Elements of Quasi-Delict are present.
- Violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of
said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of
others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the
injury on petitioners.

Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195)

- It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that
“the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE
TUO UT ALIENUM NO LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so
as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that
they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner
or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.

Taylor v. Manila Electric Company (16 Phil 8)

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- While we hold that the entry upon the property without
express invitation or permission would not have relieved
Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred,
without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable
to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
received.
- He was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for
the exercise of that degree of caution which would have
avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been
the direct and immediate result of his own wilful and reckless
act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not
have been incurred but for the negligence act of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and
principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

Tayag v. Alcantara (98 SCRA 723)

- All the essential averments for a quasi-delict action are
present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or
negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage
caused by the said act or omission; (3) direct causal elation
between the damage and the act or omission; and (4) no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties.

Distinctions
Quasi-Delict v. Delict
a) Delicts affect eh public interest, while Culpa Aquiliana are
only private concerns;
b) The RPC punishes or corrects criminal acts, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage;
c) Delicts are not as broad as Quasi-Delicts, because the former
are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them. While in Quasi-Delict, it includes all acts in which any
kind of fault or negligence intervenes; and,

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d) The liability of the employer of the actor-employee is
subsidiary in crimes, while his liability is direct and primary in
Quasi-Delict.
Effect of Acquittal
a) Failure to prove the guilt of the accused reasonable doubt.
b) The fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Civil Liability Ex Quasi-Delicto
- These civil actions (Arts. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 2176) are
no longer deemed instituted and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in
the criminal action.
Limitation
- Art. 2177, NCC. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
- Double Recovery
- The Plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the Defendant.

Situation: Buknoy, a five-year-old boy, was run over by a passenger

jeepney, resulting ot his death. X is the owner/operator of the jeepney
while Y is the driver of the jeepney.

Q: The parents of Buknoy want to sue. What are their options?

They can sue Y, the driver alone, for homicide through reckless
imprudence.

Q: Can Y be convicted of Homicide through reckless imprudence and

at the same time, be ordered to indemnify the parents of Buknoy with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency?
A: Yes, Every person criminally liable is civilly liable.

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Q: Suppose the guilt of Y is not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
and he is acquitted, can the parents of Buknoy still sue for culpa
aquiliana?
A: Yes. The acquittal of Y is not a bar to a subsequent civil action.
This is so because the evidence in the criminal case may not be
sufficient for a conviction but sufficient for a civil liability, where mere
preponderance of evidence is enough.

Q: Can the parents of Buknoy sue X and Y for culpa aquiliana?

A: Yes, but X can interpose the defense that he exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of Y. If X proves this, he will
be excused from civil liability.

Q: Suppose X was able to prove that he exercised due diligence in

the selection and supervision of Y, can X still be held liable?
A: Yes, if it was proven, for instance that X was also in the vehicle at
the time of the accident, and he could have, by use of diligence,
prevented, but he did not. (Art. 2148, NCC).

Q: If Y is convicted in the criminal case and a writ of execution was

issued against him with respect to the civil liability, but it turned out
that Y is insolvent, can the writ of execution be enforced against X?
A: Yes. The guilt of Y is automatically the civil guilt of X, if Y is
insolvent.
They can sue X and Y for culpa aquiliana

Q: What proof is needed to prove their case against X and Y?

A: The proof needed is a mere preponderance of evidence. As
against Y, the parents of Buknoy should prove the fault or negligence
of Y (Quasi-delict). As for X, the parents of Buknoy should prove that
X has not exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
Y.

Q: Can X be excused from liability?

A: Yes, provided he proves that he exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Y.

Q: Can X still be held liable even if he proves due diligence in the

selection and supervision of Y?

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A: Yes, if it is proven that he is inside the vehicle as of the time of the
incident, and he could have by use of diligence prevented the
misfortune, but which he did not exercise.

Cases:
Cruz v. CA
- The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his
life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not
able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to
the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner
carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the
circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those
left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the
loss of their mother up to the present time and this Court is
aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor
words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt
for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are
proper in the instant case.

Philippine Rabbit v. People (2004)

- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated
from that if the employee.

People v. Ligon (152 SCRA 419)

- It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is
also free from civil liability. While the guilt must be established
beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action.
- On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies
of both prosecution and defense witness at the trial and
applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find
that a preponderance of evidence established that Gabat by
his act and omission with fault and negligence caused

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damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage
done.

Quasi-Delict v. Breach of Contract

- GR: Art. 2178, NCC. By definition, the pre-existing contract
between the parties BAR the applicability of the law on quasi-
delict.
XPN: The mere existence of a contract does not
automatically negate the existence of quasi-delict. (Air
France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [Doctrinal Case])

CASES:

Air France v. Carrascoso

- Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They
have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal conduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter and action for damages against
the carrier.
- The act that breaks the contract is TORT.

Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil 768)

- Negligence by employee attributable to employer even in
contractual breach.
- In contractual undertaking, proof of the contract and of its
non-performance is sufficient prima facie to warrant recovery.
The negligence of employee cannot be invoked to relieve the
employer from liability as it will make juridical persons
completely immune from damages arising from breach of
their contracts. Defendant was therefore liable for the injury
suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to
be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual.

NEGLIGENCE

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- Art. 1173, NCC defines negligence as the omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
persons, time and place.
- Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances.
It is a relative or comparative term, and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstance reasonably
impose.

Test of Negligence:
- Picart v. Smith (37 Phil 809)
- “Did the Defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.”
Foreseeability
- Indispensable Requirement
- Determination of negligence is a question of foresight on the
part of the actor.
- The court will place itself in the position of the actor and see
if a prudent man could have foreseen the harm that would
result if the conduct is pursued.
Degrees of Negligence
a) Slight Negligence – failure to exercise great or extraordinary
care.
b) Ordinary Negligence – want of ordinary care and diligence,
that is, such care and diligence as an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances.
c) Gross Negligence – consists the entire absence of care or
an absence of even slight care or diligence; it implies a
thoughtless disregard for consequences or an indifference to
the rights and welfare of others.
Factors to be considered in determining negligence
a) Employment or occupation;
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b) Degree of intelligence;
c) Physical condition;
d) Circumstances regarding TIME;
e) Circumstances regarding PLACE;
f) Ordinary Human Experience; and,
g) Laws of physics and nature.
Other factors:
A. Violation of Statutes and Ordinances
- A circumstance which establishes a presumption of
negligence;
- Negligence per se; or
- A circumstance that should be considered together with
other circumstances as evidence of negligence.

* Accepted view in the Philippines: A violation of a statutory duty

constitutes negligence or negligence per se.

XPN: Violation is NOT negligence per se

- When unusual conditions occur, strict observance of
the statute or ordinance may defeat the purpose of
the rule and may even lead to adverse results.
B. Violation of Administrative Rules
- Not negligence per se but it may be evidence of
negligence.
C. Violation of Private Rules of Conduct
- Possible evidence of negligence.
Standard of Conduct
- Pater Familias
- What is reasonable to a good father of a family.
- “GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY” – refers to a
reasonable man, man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence or ordinary reasonable prudent man.
- “MAN OF THE CLAPHAM OMNIBUS”
Exceptions/Qualifications

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A. Children
- The care and caution required of a child is according
to his maturity and capacity only and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances
present.
- If a minor is mature enough to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his
actions, he will be considered negligent if he fails to
exercise due care and precaution in the commission
of such acts.
JARCO Marketing Corp, et. al. v. CA
- RA 9344 as amended by RA No. 10630, Sec. 6
- The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
- Culpa Aquiliana – the minority of the actor does not free him
from responsibility for damages.
B. Experts and Professionals
- An expert should exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular field that he is in.
- Those who undertake any work calling for special
skills that are required not only to exercise
reasonable care in what they do but also possess a
standard minimum of special knowledge and ability.
- NB: when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skills,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit
the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempted to do.
- “IMPERITIA CULPAE ADNUMERATOR”
*IMPORTANT
1. Formal education is not necessary.
2. Nature of the activity is material.

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C. Intoxication
- Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does mere
fact of intoxication establish want of ordinary care. It
is but a circumstance to be considered with the other
evidence tending to prove negligence.
- Intoxication is of little consequence in negligence
cases if it was not shown that such drunkenness
contributed to the accident or that the accident would
have been avoided had he been sober.

Case: Wright v. Manila Electric – it does not matter if the

victim is intoxicated. A road or a train tracks should be safe
not only to those who are sober but also to those who are
drunk.
- “A drunken man is much entitled to a safe street
as a sober one, and much more in need of it”
- *Instance where intoxication may be considered
negligence per se: Drunk driving.
D. Insanity
- The insanity of a person does not excuse him or his
guardian from liability based on quasi-delict. This
means that the act or omission of the person suffering
from mental defect will be judged using the standard
test of a reasonable man.
Bases for holding a permanently insane person for his
tort:
a) Where one of two innocent persons must suffer
a loss, it should be borne by the one who
occasioned it;
b) To induce those interested in the estate of the
insane person to restrain and control him; and,
c) The fear that an insanity defense would lead to
false claim of insanity to avoid liability.
Proof of Negligence
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
A. Burden of Proof
Rule 131, Sec. 1, ROC
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claims or
defenses by the amount of evidence required by law.
RULE: The burden of proving negligence that is the proximate cause
of quasi-delict is on the one alleging the same. A person claiming
damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
✓ Prove affirmative, factual, and substantial factual evidence
that there is negligence.
✓ Prove that the 4 elements of quasi-delict is present
- Negligence must be established. If not established,
there can be no claim for damages.

Presumption of Negligence
1. Art. 2184, NCC
In motor vehicle, mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the
use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty
of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice
within the next preceding two months.
- If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article
2180 are applicable.
2. Art. 2185, NCC
- Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
- E.g. over speeding, driving with an expired or no license, driving
alone with a student license (not accompanied by someone with
a valid license)
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
- *Arts. 2184 and 2185 are only applicable on motorized
vehicles. It is not applicable on vehicles not operated by
engines.
3. Art. 2188, NCC
- There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison,
except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in
his occupation or business.
4. Arts. 1734 & 1735, NCC
- Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:
1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
natural disaster or calamity;
2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil;
3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods;
4) The character of the goods or defects in the
packaging or in the containers;
5) Order or act of competent public authority.
- Article 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article
1733.
TRAFFIC RULES AND LAW OF THE ROAD
- Traffic regulations under Articles 2184 and 2185 include violation of
specific provisions of the LTO and Traffic Code and other traffic laws
and ordinances. In all the following cases, negligence on the part of
the person violating the law or ordinance shall be presumed:
1) Violation of Section 37 thereof requiring motorist to drive on the
right side of the road and providing rules on overtaking;
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
2) Speeding in violation of law providing for restriction on speed;
3) Speeding in an intersection;
4) A vehicles failure to signal while making the u-turn;
5) The driver escaped and abandoned the victims and his truck;
6) Driving without the license or driving alone with only a student’s
license;
7) A motorcycle driver was not wearing protective headgear at the
time of the accident;
8) Overtaking in a no-overtaking zone, particularly the place where
there are two contiguous yellow lines at the center of the
highway which is part of internationally recognized pavement
regulation known as the double yellow centerlines regulation;
9) Overtaking in an intersection;
10) Violating of the MMDA ordinance prohibiting a vehicle coming
from a particular street from crossing another specified street or
avenue;
11) The common carrier traversing the road out of its allowed route.
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor
- “The thing speaks for itself”
- This is not part of substantive law. It is more of a
procedural convenience for the plaintiff. Requisites must
be present before this doctrine can be invoked.
- Function: to aid the plaintiff in proving the elements of
negligence case by circumstantial evidence.
- The happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence that injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under the exclusive control and
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence
was such that in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if reasonable care had been used.
- Contract of Instrumentality: That which cause the
damage is the fundamental element.

Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitor

(Ramos vs CA)
A. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone’s negligence;

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
B. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant/s;
C. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make
the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

(Professional Services v. Agana, January 31, 2007):

a) The occurrence of an injury;
b) The thing which caused the injury was under the control
and management of the defendant;
c) The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things, would not have happened if those who had control
or management used proper care; and,
d) Absence of explanation by the defendant.

- Resort to the doctrine may be allowed only when:

a) The event is of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the
absence of negligence.
b) Other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by
evidence; and,
c) The indicated negligence is within the scope of
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.

- Doctrine is not applicable:

1) If there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence;
or,
2) Culpa Contractual
- Why? Negligence is presumed in a breach of contractual
obligation.

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Module 3: Causation, Proximate Cause and
Defenses
Causation
- Corrective justice presupposes that the defendant has
caused harm to the plaintiff.
- There must be a CAUSAL LINK
- Defendant’s conduct = Plaintiff’s loss
- Important: Without the proof of CAUSATION, the action for
damages based on torts FAILS.

Proximate Cause
- That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
- Dominant, Immediate and Efficient Cause
- The cause that necessarily sets the other causes in
operation
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
- In order to hold a person liable for quasi-delict, there must
be a direct relation of cause and effect between fault or
negligence and damage.
- The fault or negligence of the defendant must be the
proximate cause in producing the injury.

DISTINCTIONS:
A) Remote Cause
- That cause which some independent force merely
took advantage of to accomplish something not that
natural effect thereof.
- A remote cause cannot be considered the legal
cause of the damage.
B) Nearest Cause

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- The last link in the chain of events.
- Proximate cause is not necessarily the cause
nearest in time, distance or space.
Rodrigueza v. Manila Railroad Company
Facts: Manila Railroad Co. operates a line through the district of
Daraga. As one of its trains passed over the line, sparks were
emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was
communicated to four houses nearby, and they were entirely
consumed. All of these houses were of light construction except
that of Rodrigueza’s, which was of strong materials, though the
roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The fire occurred
immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was
blowing it. It doesn’t appear whose house caught fire first, though
Manila railroad claimed that it was first communicated to
Rodrigueza’s house and spread to the others. The plaintiffs claim
that Manila Railroad was negligent in the following manners: a. in
failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees in
charge of the locomotive; b. in allowing the locomotive which
emitted these sparks to be operated without having the
smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks; c. in
using in its locomotive Bataan fuel, a fuel of known inferior quality
which upon combustion, produces sparks in great quantity. Manila
Railroad, on the other hand, argued that Rodrigueza’s house
stood partly within the limits of the land owned by it, though exactly
how far away from the company’s track does not appear. It also
claimed of notifying Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the
company, and that Rodrigueza did not comply.
Issue: Who should be liable?
Held: Manila Railroad should be liable. Whether or not the fire may
have been communicated through Rodrigueza’s house, or directly
from the locomotive is immaterial. With regards to the position of
Rodrigueza’s house, there is no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully
intruded upon the railroad’s property in the act of building his
house. Rodrigueza may have assumed the risk of loss that might
have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant’s
locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he
cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might

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result from the unlawful negligent acts of Manila Railroad. Nobody
is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible
negligence of another. The circumstances cannot be imputed to
him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action
because, a) that condition was not created by himself, b) his
house remained on the ground by toleration and therefore with the
consent of the Railroad co., and c) even supposing the house to
be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant
company in negligently destroying it.

C) Concurrent Cause
- The proximate cause is not necessarily the sole cause of the
accident. The defendant is still liable in case there are
concurrent causes brought about by acts or omissions of third
person.
- Several causes combine to produce the loss or injury/ies.
- Rule: Concurrence of Efficient Causes
- In order to render a person liable, negligence need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that
his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient
causes other than the plaintiff’s, is the proximate
cause of the injury.
Proof of Causation
- There must be proof of the CAUSAL CONNECTION before the
alleged tortfeasor may be made liable.
- Possibility is not an actual fact, probability is not certainty and
certainty requires proof.
Test to Determine Proximate Cause
a) “But for Test” or Sine Qua Non Rule
- The defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event,
if the event would not have occurred without it.
- An act or omission is not the proximate cause of an
injury UNLESS, had it not happened, the injury would
not have occurred.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
- The omission to perform a duty constitutes the
proximate cause only when the doing of the said
omitted act would have prevented the injury.
PLDT v. CA, September 29, 1989
FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth
and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken
by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
The Spouses Esteban’s complaint alleged that Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because
of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.
Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and
face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent-husband suffered cut lips. The windshield of the jeep
was also shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the
injuries sustained by Spouses Esteban were the result of their own
negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible,
if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor
which undertook the said construction work. The trial court ruled
in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the Estebans can claim damages from
PLDT.
Held: NO. A person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban
and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of
petitioner PLDT. The jeep was running along the inside lane of
Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not
have hit the accident mound. That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside
lane before it swerved to hit the accident mound could have been
corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of
the accident mound. Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25
kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
could have stepped on the brakes the moment it struck the
accident mound.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his
wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident,
as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right
to recover damages.
b) Forseeability Test
- Where the particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at
the time of defendant’s misconduct, his act or omission is the
legal cause thereof.
Picart v Smith
Facts: Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on Carlatan Bridge, San
Fernando. He pulled his pony over the bridge’s railing on the right
instead of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly approaching.
His pony was unfortunately frightened when the automobile
passed so close to them. The horse was struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a
result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days. Picart seeks to render the sum of
Php31,000 as damages. CFI- La Union absolved Smith.
Issue: Whether or not defendant was negligent and if the concept
of last clear chance is attributable to him?
Held: The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under the
doctrine of last clear chance even though the plaintiff was on the
wrong side of the bridge. Defendant has had the opportunity to
avoid the accident after realizing that the negligence by the
plaintiff could not have placed him in a position of better safety.
The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the
automobile. It was his duty to bring the car to an immediate stop
or upon seeing no other persons were on the bridge to take the
other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision.
Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost

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upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this
danger he was negligent in the eye of the law. Under the
circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and
rendered judgment that Picart recover of Smith the sum of P200,
with costs of both instances. The court held that the sum awarded
was estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses
of Picart, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel,
and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.

c) Substantial Factor Test

- The negligent conduct in fact is the cause of the damage if it
was a SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR in producing the injuries.
- If the accident would not have occurred had there been no
negligence on the part of the defendant, the defendant’s
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the damage
or injury.
- This test is important in case where there are concurrent
causes.
Philippine Rabbit v.IAC
Facts: On the eve of Christmas 1966, seven passengers boarded
a jeepney bound for Pangasinan via Dau. Manalo drove the jeep
owned by Magune and Carreon. Reaching Tarlac, the right wheel
of the jeep was detached resulting to its 180 degree turn invading
the other lane with the jeep’s front facing south. The bus driven by
Del Rosario collided with the jeepney resulting in the death of
three passengers and physical injuries to some. Manalo was
convicted of Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries.
Manalo did not appeal. Three Civil Cases fro Damages docketed
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
1136; 39-40 was filed anchored on the contractual liability of the
jeepney owner and Philippine Rabbit’s liability based on
quasidelict. Trial court decided against the jeepney operator as
well as the joint liability of his Insurance Agency for Actual and
Moral Damages. The Trial Court based its decisions on the
following:
(1) Testimony of passenger Pascua alleging that the driver was
running really fast. (2) Unrebutted testimony of Police Inspector on
the sharp angle track marks of the jeep; the observation of the skid
marks. (3) Manalo’s Conviction on the Criminal Compalint
(4)Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor, attesting to the collision
happening on the right of way of the bus.
CA reversed decision. It ordered Plaintiff bus operator and driver
to pay jointly and severally the damages awarded. It based its
decisions primarily on 1.) the doctrine of last clear chance. 2.)
presumption of the responsibility of the vehicle on the rear end to
avoid collision with the vehicle in front. 3.) the substantial test
concluding Bus driver negligent by not making an effort to avoid
accident and being the physical force causing the injury and death
of passengers.
Issue: Who has liability over the injuries and death of victims?
Held: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
the jeepney operator for failure to exercise precautions needed.
The carrier is presumed to have been at fault unless it is caso
fortuito or that he has observed extra-ordinary diligence as
provided in Articles 1733, 55-56. Negligence was proven based
on the testimony-evidences adduced by the trial court.
Last clear chance cannot be applied. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility under culpa contractual. A
negligent driver and its owner cannot be exempted on the ground
that the other party was likewise guilty of negligence. The
substantial factor test is testing whether the actor’s conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. THE FACT
THAT THE ACTOR NEITHER FORESAW NOR SHOULD HAVE
FORESEEN THE EXTENT OF HARM OR MANNER IN WHICH
THE EVENT OCCURRED DOES NOT PREVENT HIS
LIABILITY. However, this test does not apply. The court does not
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fault Reyes for not having avoided such since no other options are
available to him. The other lane even though empty was narrow
and covered with tall grass. The wheels of the bus were also clear
of the roadway except the outer left that hit the jeep. This clearly
shows the attempt to hit the jeep. Inability to avoid the jeep must
have been due to the limitations of options.
IAC decision is set aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated
with Modification that only the Operator and the Insurance
Company is liable for the victims and heirs. The driver cannot be
held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in Breach of
Contract as provided in Article 2180 and to make driver jointly and
severally liable is to make the carrier’s liability a personal one and
not explicit.
d) Natural and Probable Consequences Test
- The defendant is liable only if the harm suffered is the
natural and probable consequence of his act.
e) The Cause of Condition Test
- Traditionally: Courts distinguish “cause” from “condition”
maintaining that the defendant’s act or omission is not
considered the cause if it merely created a “PASSIVE
STATIC CONDITION”
- Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA 353: It is no
longer practicable to distinguish between cause and
condition. Not the distinction between cause and condition
which is important but the nature of the risk and the character
of the intervening cause.
Dangerous Conditions
- Those that are inherently dangerous
- Those where a person places a thing which is not
dangerous in itself, in a dangerous position; and,
- Those involving products and other things which are
dangerous because they are defective.
f) Cause-in-Fact and Policy Test

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
- Cause-in-Fact: In determining the proximate cause
of the injury, it is first necessary to determine of the
defendant’s negligence was the cause-in-fact.
- Policy Test: Determination of the extent of legal
liability.
Eggshell-Skull or Thin Skull Rule
- The eggshell skull rule, also known as the thin skull rule, says
that the frailty, weakness, sensitivity, or feebleness of a
victim cannot be used as a defense in a personal injury
claim. Attorneys often use the eggshell skull rule when an at-
fault driver’s negligence aggravates a victim’s pre-existing
injury or condition.
- The rule says you must “take the victim as you find them”
and cannot speculate about what might have happened if the
victim did not have a condition that predisposed them to a
severe injury. This rule protects victims from their own
vulnerability, something over which they have no control. The
eggshell skull rule says the plaintiff bears no fault for their
condition and that the defendant must take full responsibility
for the injuries he or she caused.
Efficient Intervening cause
- An efficient intervening cause is one that DESTROYS the
causal connection between the negligent act and injury
thereby negates liability.
Novus Actus Interviens
- The intervening cause will be regarded as the proximate
cause as too remote, where the chain of events is so
broken that they become independent and the result
cannot be said to be the consequence of the primary
cause.
Test of Sufficiency of Intervening Cause
- The nature and manner in which it affects the continuity
of operation of the primary cause or connection between
it and the injury.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
- Such intervening cause must be new and independent,
not under the control of the original wrongdoer, or one
which by the exercise of reasonable foresight and
diligence, he should have anticipated and guarded
against it.
- It must break the continuity of causal connection between
the original negligent act or omission and the injury so
that the former cannot be said to have been the efficient
cause of the latter.
Situation: If A throws a hot object to B who in turn threw it to C,
there is an intervening cause in the absence of which, C would
not have been injured. Nevertheess, A is liable because he had
wrongfully set in motion a force which continued to operate until
it cause the injury. If A had thrown the object in a secluded place
where it would not have caused injury and B had taken it up anew
on its errand of mischief, there would have been a new cause,
not dependent upon the first. Consequently, there is an efficient
intervening cause in this last example.
Cause not considered as an Efficient Intervening Cause
1. If the cause is already in operation at the time the
negligent act is committed.
2. Foreseeable Intervening Cause P. 20
Sufficient Intervening Cause
1. Medical Treatment
- GR: A tortfeasor is liable for the consequences of
negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of a physician or
surgeon whose treatment aggravated the original injury.
The same is considered normal and foreseeable risk.
- Additional Harm:
i. A part of the original injury;
ii. The natural and probable consequence of
the tortfeasor’s original negligence; or

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
iii. The normal incidence of medical care
necessitated by the tortfeasor’s original
negligence
- Medical Treatment Efficient Intervening Cause: If the
injured failed to exercise reasonable care in securing the
services of a competent physician or surgeon.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts: Petitioner, Filomeno Urbano quarreled with Marcelino
Javier because the latter opened the irrigation canal which caused
the flooding of the place where Urbano's palay was stored.
Urbano hacked the right palm of Javier with a bolo and caused an
incised wound that was later treated. Urbano and Javier agreed
on an amicable settlement and petitioner paid for the hospital bills.
22 days later, Javier was rushed to the hospital, he had a locked
jaw and was having convulsions, caused by tetanus toxin. The
doctor noticed that the wound was infected. The next day, Javier
died. Petitioner was charged with homicide and was later found
guilty by the trial court. The IAC affirmed the conviction. Petitioner
filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the barangay
captain that Javier was found catching fish on the irrigation canal,
10 days prior to his death.
Issue: Whether or not the inflicting of the wound by petitioner was
only a remote, and not a proximate, cause.
Held: The inflicting of the wound is only a remote cause and
petitioner cannot be held liable therefor. A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated and efficient cause of injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the circumstances, which result in injury

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
The incubation period of tetanus, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within
14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent. (NOTICE that it took Javier 22 days,
from the time of the hacking, before he had symptoms of Tetanus)
In the case at bar, the evidence on record does not clearly show
that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at
the time of the hacking. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus.
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear. There
is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection (failure to take the necessary precautions
against tetanus) may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death.
2. Unforeseen and Unexpected Act or Cause
- GR: The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected
act or cause is considered as a sufficient intervening
cause.
- XPN: The intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected
cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly
and proximately cooperated with the independent cause
in the resulting injury.
Africa v. Caltex, March 31, 1966
FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline
was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right
at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted (a lighted matchstick was thrown by a stranger near the
opening, causing the fire). The fire spread to and burned several
neighboring houses. Their owners, among them petitioners here,
sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Boquiren, the first as
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alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of
operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as
the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the CA found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume
negligence on the part of appellees
HELD: the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-
appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants,
Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the
doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that “as to (its) applicability
… in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite,” and that
while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in
the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.”
The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The
doctrine has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case
of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal
force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment
and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were
appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of
defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high
enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.. Defendants’
negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the
fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring
houses.

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There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer
to the second amended complaint that “the fire was caused through
the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or permission of
answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and
negligently threw a lighted match in the premises.” No evidence on
this point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to be true —
certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken
against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision
of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the
present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here. “It is the
rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a
degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate
with a danger involved … we think it is the generally accepted rule as
applied to torts that ‘if the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct
actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the
fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the
effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the
actor from liability.’ Stated in another way, “The intention of an
unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a
wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence
directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in
the resulting injury.”
3. Negligence of the Defendant
- The plaintiff may be negligent but the defendant’s
negligence pre-empted the effect of such negligence.
Mckee v IAC (1992)

Facts: A cargo truck driven by Ruben Galang and owned by private

respondents Tayag and Manalo was travelling southward from
Angeles City to San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Manila. On the
other hand, a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, was on its way to
Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was
about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2
boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane
of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether
to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.

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Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered
the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision
occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the
said bridge. The said collision resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim
Koh McKee, and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee, and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort. In the statement of Ruben Galang to
the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, he
admitted that he was travelling at 30 miles per hour (48 kph).

Two civil cases for damages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga.
The first civil case was for damages for the death of Jose Koh. The
second civil case, on the other hand, was for the damages for the
death of one and a half year old Kim Koh McKee and the physical
injuries sustained by George and Araceli. About a month later, a
charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide,
physical injuries and damage to property was filed against Ruben
Galang and was raffled in the same court where the second civil case
was assigned. In their Answer with Counterclaim for the first civil
case, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car
which "invaded and bumped the lane of the truck driven by Ruben
Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of attorney's fees,
actual and liquidated damages, moral damages and business losses.

In the second civil case, private respondents first filed a motion to

dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action and failure to
implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they
also filed a motion to consolidate the case with the first civil case
pending before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by
the plaintiffs. Both motions were denied by Judge Capulong. In the
criminal case, a judgment of conviction was rendered against Ruben
Galang. Subsequently, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the
two civil cases and awarded the private respondents moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Ruben Galang appealed
the judgment of conviction but it was affirmed. Plaintiffs (McKee) on
the other hand, appealed the dismissal of the civil cases to the
appellate court.
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The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. The
decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings
that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the
law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private
respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and
supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants
did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the
said employee. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging improper appreciation of facts and on the basis of which,
respondent court affirmed the trial court's decision in dismissing the
civil cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Koh's negligence was the proximate

cause of the accident.

Held: NO. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision
occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of
the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed
negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was
Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause
of the collision.

This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners

convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because
as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted
across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. Jose
Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid
what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril-death or injury to
the two boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent. No
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this
would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate
peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle
in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very
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well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the
oncoming car.

Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who

suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence." Although it may be said that
the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain
of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries
and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening
cause, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual
cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck
would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car
an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down
and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck
driver continued at full speed towards the car.

Moreover, the truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He

himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per
hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly,
therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to
take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the
collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to
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avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.

4. Negligence of the Plaintiff

- The plaintiff’s negligence is not merely contributory but it
is the only cause, that is, it is necessary and sufficient to
produce the result.
Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
Facts: Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or thirty
fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite scattered
in the premises behind its power plant. Fifteen-year-old David
Taylor is a son of a mechanical engineer. Two years before the
incident David spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on
interisland transport. Later he took up work in his father's office,
learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. It
appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence,
taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most
boys his age.
David, along with Manuel, a 12-year-old, entered the premises of
the defendant without permission. While playing, the boys saw the
fulminating caps, picked some pieces, and brought them home. In
the presence of Jessie, a 9-year-old girl, The two boys made a
series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the
wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. Next,
they tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then
opened one of the caps with a knife and finding that it was filled
with a yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held
the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys and
to Jesse. This action was brought by the plaintiff, through his
father, to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
Issue: Whether or not the company was liable for the injury
sustained by plaintiff.
Held: The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the
negligence of the defendant of leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury. When the
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immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the
plaintiff’s own acts, he cannot recover damages for the injury.
The immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiff’s
injury, was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the
cap. True, David Taylor may not have known and probably did not
know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected
from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did
not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred, but he well
knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which
he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the
cap; that his age and his experience qualified him to understand
the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to
have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would
not have been incurred but for the negligence of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's
own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident
which inflicted the injury.
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance
- Doctrine of Supervening Negligence, Doctrine of Discovered
Peril, Known-Danger Rule, or the Rule of Davies v. Mans
(Doctrine was first given expression in the USA)
- The doctrine presupposes a perilous situation created or
existing through the negligence of both parties, but assumes,
and makes it a condition of the application of the doctrine,
that there was a time after the negligence occurred when the
defendant could have, and the injured person could not have
averted the accident.
- Plaintiff was guilty of antecedent negligence, the defendant is
still liable because he had the last clear chance of avoiding
injury.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
- A person who has the last clear chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without prior reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
- Elements and Conditions:
a. That the plaintiff was in a position of danger and, by
his own negligence, become unable to escape from
such position by the use of ordinary care, either
because it became physically impossible for him to
do so or because he was totally unaware of the
danger;
b. The defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a position
of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of
ordinary care, should have known, that the plaintiff
was unable to escape therefrom; and,
c. That thereafter defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care
but failed to exercise such last clear chance, and the
accident occurred as a proximate cause of such
failure.
When the Doctrine is INAPPLICABLE:
- It does not apply if the plaintiff was not negligent, that is,
only the defendant was negligent;
- It does not arise where the plaintiff demands
responsibility from the defendant to enforce contractual
obligations;
- The doctrine cannot apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if, the injury cannot
be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered;
- Does not apply to a case where a building collapses and
causes damage to another. (Roy v. CA, Jan. 29, 1988)

Defenses
- May either be COMPLETE or PARTIAL.

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1. Art. 2179, NCC
First Sentence: “When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.”
- Complete Defense
Second Sentence: “But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.”
- Partial Defense
- Definition: A conduct on the part of the plaintiff which
falls below the standard to which he should conform
for his own protection and which is legally contributing
cause, cooperating with the negligence of the
defendant in bringing about plaintiff’s harm.
2. Art. 1174, NCC
- A person is not liable if the cause of the damage was
fortuitous, an event which could not be foreseen, or which
though foreseen was inevitable
- Complete Defense
Elements of Fortuitous Event
a) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or
of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must
be independent of the human will;
b) It must be impossible to foresee the events which constitutes
the “caso fortuito”, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid;
c) The occurrence must be of such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and,
d) The obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

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XPN: Defendant will not be excused from liability if the fortuitous
event is not the sole cause of the injury.
- Liability: Partial Defense
- Mitigates the liability of Defendant
3. Volenti Non Fit Injuria Neques Dolos (Assumption of
Risk)
- “Those who consent may not be injured”
- One who voluntarily assumes the risk may not later ask for
damages.
- Complete Defense: If all the requisites are present
- Refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
precludes recovery of damage by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.
Requisites of Assumption of Risk:
a) Knowledge on the part of the plaintiff: The plaintiff
must know that the risk is present;
b) He must further understand its nature; and,
c) His choice to incur it is free and voluntary.
XPNs to the Doctrine: EMERGENCY RULE
1. An emergency is found to exits;
2. The life or property of another is in peril; and
3. When he seeks to rescue endangered property.
XPNs:
a) Not available to an employer in cases covered by the
WCC/ECC.
b) Emergency Rule
c) Human Relations, if the cause of action is founded
under Article 19, 20, 21 of the CC of the Philippines.
We have the abuse of rights and acts that are
contrary to morals, good customs, public policy and
public order.

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CASE: NIKKO HOTEL vs AMAY BISAYA
4. Due Diligence
- For persons held vicariously liable, the proper defense is
the exercise of diligence of a good father of a family.
- It is a complete defense if you can prove it.

Art. 2180, NCC:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task is done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
- Art. 219, FC:
Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental
authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper
diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this, and the preceding articles shall
be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
- The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that
diligence which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise
taking into consideration present circumstances and factors.
5. Prescription
- Art. 1146, NCC:
- The following actions must be instituted within four years:
1. Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
2. Upon a quasi-delict;
- An action for quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4)
years.
- Reckoning period: The prescriptive period begins from the
day the quasi-delict is committed.
- Complete defense
6. Double Recovery
- Art. 2177, NCC: Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
- The offended party cannot recover damages twice under
both types of liability.
- Rule: Plaintiff should choose the highest.
7. Death of the Plaintiff or Defendant

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Rule:
Death of Defendant: It will not extinguish the obligation based on
quasi-delict. An action survives even if the defendant dies during the
pendency of the case if the said case is an action to recover for an
injury to persons or property by reason of tort committed by the
deceased. The case will continue through the legal representative
who will substitute the deceased.
Death of the Plaintiff: If the plaintiff died during the pendency of the
trial and before her presentation of her evidence because the burden
of proof lies to the plaintiff, will result to the dismissal of the case. But
if the plaintiff dies after the presentation, then there will only be
substitution.

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