Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Ma. Belen Flordeliza C. Ang-Abaya, Francis Jason A. Ang, Hannah Zorayda A. Ang, and Vicente G. Genato Eduardo G. Ang G.R. No. 178511 December 4, 2008 Ponente: Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
Ma. Belen Flordeliza C. Ang-Abaya, Francis Jason A. Ang, Hannah Zorayda A. Ang, and Vicente G. Genato Eduardo G. Ang G.R. No. 178511 December 4, 2008 Ponente: Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes, the Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the
Secretary of Justice exceeded his authority when he conducted an inquiry on
the petitioners’ defense of improper use and motive on Eduardo’s part. As a
necessary element in the offense of refusal to honor a stockholder/member’s
right to inspect the corporate books/records.
Peña claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not
actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI. The City Prosecutor rules in favor of Peña and concluded that
the petitioners were guilty of crime of introducing falsified documents, subsequently,
information were filed with the MTCC of Bago City, Negros, Occidental. The Judge
subsequently issued warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and insisted that they were denied due
process because they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavits. And
avers that since they were not afforded to submit their counter -
affidavit, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of
the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners
further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to submit counter-affidavit before a warrant of
arrest shall be issued against them.
RULING:
No. The prosecutor may take the appropriate action based on the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means that the prosecutor may
either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case
or file the information if he finds probable cause.
Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits, without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
Although the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses he shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause;
Manuel Isip
vs.
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
Manuel Isip and his wife Marietta received jewelries from Leonardo A Jose for the
purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the
sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or
converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the same. The
accused issued bounced checks in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received
from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the drawee bank for
payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Leonardo filed criminal charges of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law in the RTC of Cavite City.
Although The complainant has residence in in the Towers Condominium in Manila
but testified that the trasanctions were happened in his ancestral house in Cavite
while the defendants contested that such transactions really happened in the
Towers Condominium.
The RTC in Cavite rendered judgment in favor of Leonardo Jose, charged the
accused-petitioner guilty of the crimes and the court found out that the crime
happened in the ancestral house of the coplainant when he was on leave of absence
from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected since the defendants failed to
substantially proved that such transactions occured in Manila.
Issues:
Ruling:
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that
the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had
sufficiently shown that the transaction took place in his ancestral home in Cavite
City when he was on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs.
Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to
prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in
Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder of Rafael
de las Alas but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide.
He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he filed an application for
admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend
bail during appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for
bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under
the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than
20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent,
bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue:
No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion Perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Furthermore, petitioner failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his
claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III,
ATTY. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY and
REBECCA B. TAN
Facts:
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from
detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an amended
information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas,"
"Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas
retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas,
petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The
trial court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but
directed the City Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation to grant the accused all the opportunity to present whatever
evidence he has in support of his defense.
Issue:
Whether the Fiscal have the jurisdiction to determine the probable cause of
the accused in the preliminary investigation conducted
Ruling:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court believes that the filing of this Information must be in
conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of
Rule 112 which states that “No complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor”.
Facts:
October 13, 1979, Felipe Garcia, his wife Felicidad, Bernardo Venture,
Cresencio Garcia, Emma Ventura, Margarita Ventura, Annong Garcia, Abba
and Tony Arellano, a farmhand, were taking their supper inside the kitchen
at the ground floor of Felipe's house located in Sitio Macugay, Barangay
Abulug, Cagayan. Lamps were placed on top of the dining table, one on
each end of the table and the third at the center, Antonio "Tony" Arellano
was seated on a bench immediately facing Felipe Garcia whose back was to
the door. Suddenly, the kitchen door opened. Since Tony Arellano was
facing the door to his north, he immediately saw the face of the intruder. It
was Berting Arellano whom he had already known for about nine (9) years.
About one (1) meter behind Berting was Danilo Lazo who was holding a
carbine rifle.
Then, Danilo fired his rifle in two successive bursts at the occupants. The
first shot hit the kitchen wall while the second shot hit Felipe Garcia after
which it grazed the left leg of Tony Arellano. Felipe shouted, "I am shot"
and then fell on the floor. Stunned, Tony could only stare at the two
assailants. The others, who were either too old or too young, were petrified
with fear. It was Tony who carried the mortally wounded victim to the
second floor of the house. Subsequently, Felipe was rushed to a hospital in
nearby Ballesteros where he died seven or eight hours after an emergency
operation. It was only on the following morning, October 14, 1979 that Tony
Arellano revealed the identities of the assailants to the victim's widow,
Felicidad Garcia, at the hospital. They were Danilo Lazo and Berting
Arellano. On that same day, Tony reported the fatal shooting to the members
of the Integrated National Police of Abulug, Cagayan, who immediately
proceeded to the scene of the crime.
Danilo assailed the trial court for giving credence to the unreliable testimony
of alleged eyewitness Tony Arellano, for not appreciating his defense of
alibi and in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt. For his part, Berting
contended that he was denied due process of law when the information for
murder with frustrated murder was filed against him in the absence of a valid
preliminary investigation and representation by counsel. He likewise
maintained that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes, in the case at bar Berting and Danilo were duly informed of their right
to preliminary investigation and to counsel but it was they who chose to
forego with the second stage of the proceedings. It must be stressed that the
right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is a personal right and can
be waived expressly or by implication. The preliminary investigation should
be thoroughly don’t by the presiding judge and should determine the
probable cause of the crime. Hence preliminary investigation is a privilege
of the accused that can be waive when they implied to.