Hector TreÑas

vs.
People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 195002; 25 January 2012
Ponente: Justice Sereno

Facts:

Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo from her niece

Elizabeth, in which, the process for titling of the property in the name of Margarita
was entrusted to Hector TreÑas. Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued
a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared a Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue
Official Receipts. However, when she consulted the BIR, she was informed that
the receipts were fake. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money and to settle
his account, Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check in the
amount of P120,000.00 with P30,000.00 deduction for from P150,000.00 as
attorney's fees.

When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Elizabeth then filed an
Estafa case before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The court rendered
judgement against Hector as guilty of Estafa for failure to attend the hearing
allegedly due to old age and poor health, and in fact that he lives in Iloilo City.
Hector then filed a petition to question the jurisdiction of the court on his case
which did not happen in Makati City.
Issue:

Whether or not the RTC of Makati had jurisdiction of the case

Ruling: Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of
estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "subject to existing
laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred."

This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move
to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was
committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses
and other evidence in another place. The Petition is granted and the criminal case is
dismissed. The case is referred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
 ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS
v.
JOEL R. PEDRO.
G.R. No. 173588. April 22, 2009.
FACTS:

Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without
authorization from the COMELEC a day before the elections. Pedro, then
filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did
not materialize. The RTC granted the quashal The RTC reopened the case
for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8 on
provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.

The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to
reopen the case saying that the provision used applies where both the
prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case,
or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the
dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was
quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the
prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date.

Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
RTC’s mandated reopening. The CA, at first granted the reopening of the
case but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument that a
year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the CA's decision
was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

RULING:

The SC granted the petition and gave the case to the RTC.
The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal.
Primarily, they are two separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the
Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the
Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash
results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no
merit on the ground that there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's
offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and
provisional dismissal.
 JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION
vs
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR. ET AL.,
G.R. No. 169588; October 7, 2013
Ponente: MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking
operator duly authorized to operate, manage the parking spaces. The
company is also authorized to have the vehicle immobile when it is
illegally parked. Its General Manager Norma Tan and personnel
Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay filed complaints against the
respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia, Ramon Ang and two
John Does for robbery. They forcibly removed the attached clamp of
their vehicle although it was illegally parked and was unattended
to.Respondents were alleged to have removed the clamp held material
damages and the fines for illegal parking and declamping which were
not paid by the respondents on the day of May 7,2003. In response to
the case filed against them, the respondents filed a case charging the
Company President and four of its employees with grave coercion.
These were filed under the City Prosecutor of Bagio City on May
23,2003 and the criminal information s were filed on October 2, 2003.
Respondents, in their counter-affidavit then denied that the car was
parked illegally. Benedicto Balajadia, in behalf of the respondents,
argued that the clamping of the vehicle was illegal and admitted that
he removed said clamp. He further said that he did not intend to steal
such clamp but removed such to allow him and his family to use the
vehicle. He then kept the clamp as evidence to support his complaint.
The Provincial Prosecutor of La Union, Mario Anacleto Banez said to
have found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority
against Jadewell. The robbery complaint however was deemed to have
no probable cause as the respondents had no intent to gain. They,
however, failed to pay for the fines of illegally parking.
The two criminal informations were then filed against the respondents
on Oct. 2,2003 basing from the complaint filed earlier indicating that
they pay the fees and for the clamp. The respondents then filed a
motion to quash the cases against them indicating that the prescription
of the crime has ended and that their liability is extinguished. The
motion was then approved by the respondent judge, dismissing the
case. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion for consideration
arguing that the crime has not yet prescribed alleging R.A. 3326 as
their jurisprudence. The petitioner further alleged that the Judge erred
in his judgement in granting the Motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the respondent has prescribed.
Ruling:
The offenses charged had prescribed by law. It stated in the Article 91
0f the RPC “The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information” and at the case at bar, the information was
filed on October 2,2003 while the crime was then committed on May
7,2003 and that complaint was filed on the 23rd of May of the same
year.
The court dismissed the petition alleging that Art. 3326 section 2
states that the prescription begins on the time the violation was
committed; “Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment.”
Hence,when the petitioner filed the complaint, the prescription then
was ongoing until the filing of the information before it prescribes.
Therefore, the prescriptive period started from the date of the
commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after
on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the cases as it has passed the prescription
period.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662; June 13, 2012
Ponente: JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Facts:
Complainant, Virginia C. Malolos filed a complaint of estafa in violation of
BP22 against the respondent. Complainant alleged that the she issued nine checks
amounting to (₱9,658,592.00) that was then dishonored upon its presentation. The
responded then filed a civil case for the recovery of commercial documents,
accounting and for the enforceability of the contract and performance of the
complainant on December 5,1997. After 5 days, the respondent filed a petition to
suspend the proceedings of the case due to prejudicial question. This petition was
then recommended by the city prosecutor on March 2, 1998. On 5 January 1999,
Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the city. He then ordered the
filing of informations for violation of BP 22 against respondent for the issuance of
the checks (Trust check valued at 4,129,400php and RCBC check valued at
4,475,000php) amounting to 8,604,000php. Seven other checks were then included
in the filing of the complaint of estafa and violation of BP 22 on September
16,1997 but was dismissed.

Two counts for violation of BP 22 dated November 18,1999, were filed against the
respondent on Feb. 3,2000. In response the respondent filed a motion to quash and
defer the warrant of arrest, alleging that her criminal liability is extinguished due to
the prescription ending. The court however ruled that the prescription was not yet
prescribed as the court received the file on June 7,2000. The RTC disapproved of
the motion but was however reversed by the Court of Appeals on March 2002. The
CA said that according to Act 3326 that the prescription period of the crime
committed was four years from the filing of the information. Pursuant to the Act’s
section 2, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person such is seen in the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes. Petitioner further
contends that the CA erred in that judgement.

Petitioner argued that the CA allegedly failed to consider the jurisprudence

surpassing the ruling. Petitioners said that the filing of a complaint for preliminary
investigation suspends the prescription period which gave them allowable period to
file the criminal case of BP 22 in agreement with the said Act. Respondent replies
that the filing of the complaint of the preliminary investigation did not interrupt the
prescriptive period as the offense is a violation of a special law.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation of estafa
and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent suspended the period of
prescription.

Ruling:

Yes, the filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation suspends the
prescriptive period. Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the
institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, this Court ruled that the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. As laid down in Olarte,it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.
 SORIANO
v.
PEOPLE
591 SCRA 244
February 1, 2010

FACTS:

The Office of Special Investigation of the BSP transmitted a

letter to the DOJ, which was attached with five affidavits, which would
allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to PD No. 1689, and
for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795, against
petitioner Hilario P. Soriano. These five affidavits, along with other
documents, stated that spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have
an outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc.
but had never applied for nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who
was then president of RBSM who had ordered, facilitated, and received the
proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been authorized
by RBSM’s Board of Directors and no report thereof had ever been
submitted to the Department of Rural Banks, Supervision and Examination
Sector of the BSP.

Petitioner moved to quash these information. The petitioner theorized that

the characterization of possession is different in the two offenses in two
same informations. The trial court denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash for
lack of merit. The MR was denied as well.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which was
also denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two judges correctly denied the Motion to

Quash. 

RULING:

Yes as there were more than one offense charged which was the violation of
DORSI rules and the case of estafa by falsification of documents. Both
RTC’s correctly denied the Motion to Quash.

The first violation would establish the essential elements of the crime
against DOSRI rules. In Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for violation of
DOSRI rules, the information alleged that petitioner Soriano was the
president of RBSM; that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan from RBSM
by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico Carlos

Second is estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. In Criminal

Case No. 237-M-2001 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents,
the information alleged that petitioner, by taking advantage of his position as
president of RBSM, falsified various loan documents to make it appear that
an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of P8 million from RBSM; petitioner
succeeded in obtaining the loan proceeds; that he later converted the loan
proceeds to his own personal gain and benefit.
 Arsenia Garcia vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 157171; 14 March 2016
Ponente: Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing

Facts:

Arsenia Garcia is an election officer in the Municipality of Alaminos,

Province of Pangasinan, Philippines. He was charged for violation of an
election law by decreasing the number of votes of a senatorial candidate
Aquilo Pimentel, JR. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’
judgment is erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and conjectures,
instead of substantial evidence and there was no motive on her part to reduce
the votes of private complainant. She also stated in her motion for
consideration that the reduction of the votes of candidate Pimental was
clearly not willful or intentional.

Issue:

Whether or not an election offense is a mala in se or mala prohibita. Could

good faith and lack of criminal intent a valid defense?

Ruling:

Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of
public policy. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: In addition
to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and
262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty
of an election offense: (b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or
board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received
by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes
an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus,
whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its
existence.