Autonomous Self Aware
Acquisition (SCADA), voltage regulation equipment, power
Living Grid
Michael Swearingen, IEEE, Senior Member
Lubbock, Texas USA
michaeltswearingen@gmail.com
Abstract - For over two decades the development of the Smart Grid
has evolved through new technologies and their applications to
create an intelligent power grid. In that time the term “Smart
Grid” has come under scrutiny in determining the components
within a power grid needed in order for it to be classified as a Smart
Grid.
This paper provides the complete framework for an intelligent
power grid that can evaluate its condition, determine its needs and
operate itself autonomously with limited to no intervention by
utilities except to build new lines as needed or serve as an emergency
operator when all other redundancies have failed. As a result, the
Autonomous Self Aware Living Grid (ASALG) provides a more
resilient and reliable national generation and transmission grid and
fulfills the goals of a smart grid.
Keywords – Autonomous, Operational Envelops, Decision Trees,
Transmission System, Transmission Interchange, Generation, Logic,
Distribution Systems, Sets, Engineering Analysis, Relays, PLC,
Control Systems, Cybersecurity
I. INTRODUCTION
The operation of generation and transmission in the current grid
is defined by operation contingencies such as capacity of
transmission lines, the ability of generation units to meet the
current load requirements and market requirements. Factors such
as load curves, generation capacity, transmission capacity and
economic factors all contribute to the flow of power through
today’s grid. To accomplish the balance needed to fulfill the
power requirements of the nation’s power grid system operators
must consider not only capacity but frequency stability, voltage
stability, synchronization of generators, maintenance schedules,
contract requirements and regulatory requirements.
The operation factors mentioned are controlled by Balancing
Authorities (BA) and their operations centers. In some cases, the
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Independent
System Operators (ISO) operate under what is known as a
Consolidated Balance Authority (CBA) where the RTO’s and
ISO’s directly control the operation of all generation and
transmission operations in cooperation with the utilities that own
the equipment. Under this operation structure the RTO’s and
ISO’s assume the regulatory responsibilities. Other RTO’s and
ISO’s have multiple BA’s with defined territories agreed upon by
the utilities operating as the BA.
To accomplish this momentous task within the national grid
several technologies are used such as generation facilities,
transmission interchanges, AC/DC tie stations, distribution
substations, control systems, Supervisory Control and Data
quality monitors and protection stations and equipment.
The control systems such as relays, programmable logic
controllers (PLC), advanced metering equipment and
synchrophasors act as the intelligence of the operating
equipment. These systems can provide coordinated operations
individually or can be controlled by SCADA. SCADA acts as a
central operating center that allows system operators to control
all the intelligent devices within the utilities grid.
Relays, PLC’s, advanced metering equipment and
synchrophasors require programming to define the criteria under
which they will operate. This programming is done so that all
these intelligent devices will operate in a coordinated manner that
fits the operation of the system in which they are installed.
Engineers and technicians design logic diagrams that define how
the intelligent devices will operate the equipment they control
and the way they will coordinate with each other to achieve the
desired operation of the grid. As the requirements of the grid
changes the intelligent equipment’s logic will be modified by
engineers and technicians to meet the new requirements of the
grid.
II. GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION IN THE
AUTONOMOUS SELF AWARE LIVING GRID
With the advent of intelligent devices for the electric grid the grid
can be seen as a giant neural network that can acquire
information and evaluate the information in an intelligent manner
based on operational envelopes, based on the NERC Reliability
Standards [1] and IEEE Standards, that allow the electric grid to
adjust its configuration to avoid comprised reliability or potential
outages.
To accomplish this transmission interchanges can be used as
intelligent nodes that conduct the evaluation of generation and
transmission facilities interconnected to the interchange. These
transmission interchanges throughout the national grid will
communicate with each other acting as automated Balancing
Authorities (BA) to determine the generation needed and the
manner in which the power will flow to meet the load and
reliability needs of the national grid. The state and condition of
every segment is contained in Critical System Information Sets
(CSIS) that is evaluated by the Computer Intelligence and
Analysis System (CIAS).
The CSIS contains the state and condition of each segment
including protective equipment relays, voltage measurements,
load current, Var measurements, capacitor control information,
voltage regulation equipment, control systems, conductor
capacities, power quality measurements and connectivity of the
transmission line being evaluated. The CSIS for generation
facilities contain the state and condition of the generation units
within the generation facilities to include unit availability,
generation capacity, maintenance schedules, fuel availability,
estimated unit commitment and current economics of generation
operation. The
The information of the CSIS is contained in a data platform to be
used by the CIAS software that includes economic analysis,
reliability analysis and engineering analysis. This real time
analysis combined with predictive analysis and game theory
principles determines the best system configuration needed and
through automated SCADA operation issues the necessary
commands to meet the optimal system configuration.
end to end operation test of the control systems, as shown in
figure 3, of the interchanges that are a part of the partial system
isolation. The results of end to end operation tests will be sent to
the appropriate op-center and system operators. The timing
information from the synchronized clocks within the facilities
isolated will be transmitted in a log and coordinated in real time
with the op-centers and system operators.

The process of system evaluation occurs on a continual basis to

maintain system reliability. The determination of what is
acceptable operations is determined by defined Operational
Envelopes (OE) based on past performance and taking into
consideration the best operational practices defined in standards
and criteria used within the industry.

A part of the evaluation includes predictive analysis based on

capacity, system configuration and reliability analysis that
determines the need for additional future transmission facilities,
generation facilities and location of construction within the
system, which is determined by evaluation of the Graphical
Information System (GIS). This information along with the time
frames for each facility to be constructed is communicated to the
appropriate RTO for evaluation and construction. Figure 1 Cut Out Section of Transmission Grid and Generation

III. DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ROLE

The ASALG operates distribution systems like micro-grids

which it will isolate from SCADA control whenever it deems
that the distribution system will have an adverse effect on the
ASALG system’s resiliency and reliability. Should an isolation
from SCADA control be necessary the distribution systems will
still be provided with the necessary generation needed to operate
but the distribution systems substations and associated control
systems will be isolated from ASALG and under the control of
the responsible distribution utility.

IV. ANALOG BACKBONE CONTIGENCY

The operation of the ASALG will not eliminate the op-centers,

system operators and the SCADA of the utilities currently
operating their system. The op-centers will simply be regulated
to a monitoring system of the ASALG until the ASALG Figure 2 Isolated Section of Associated Facilities for Interchange 2 After ASALG
Determined Isolation Needed
determines that the grid needs to be reconfigured due to potential
system breakdown due to cyber-attacks, cyber-intrusions,
physical attacks or some other system irregularity. Should the
ASALG determine that a reconfiguration and partial system
isolation be needed it will send a notification to the local op-
center responsible for the isolated section of the grid that a
change of command and control needs to occur and send
calculations to appropriate system operators concerning the
system balancing, regulation and generation needs based on
current NERC Reliability Standards.

Should the ASALG determine a reconfiguration and partial

system isolation, as shown in figure 2, is needed all automated
adjustments to the control systems will be stopped and the
Figure 3 Protection Zone Tests in End to End Test by ASALG After Isolation
current configuration will be sent to the appropriate op-center
and system operators. In addition, the ASALG will conduct an
When the ASALG isolates a partial part of the system it will send
the information on the condition and state, through the CSIS, that
required the partial system isolation and any information and
analysis that the Active Scan Analysis Threat Evaluation and
Attack System (ASATEAS) found including all possible
solutions to eliminate the threat. The ASALG will return the
isolated locations within the grid, using the GIS for physical
location and the SCADA one-line for electrical system location,
where the operational issues have occurred. The responsible op-
center will proceed with the necessary corrections to the isolated
system as determined from the best solutions sent by the
ASATEAS and physical and electrical examination conducted by
the utility. The information of the progress of all corrections will
be communicated in real time to the Command Center of the
ASALG to allow the proper integration and coordination of the
restored system to the ASALG.
V. COMPONENTS OF THE AUTONOMOUS SELF AWARE
LIVING GRID
A. Control Systems in an Autonomous Self Aware Grid
As described the control systems of the transmission
interchanges serve as the system intelligence center of the neural
network of the Autonomous Self Aware Living Grid. The
process of analysis and command control of the grid is
accomplished with the Communication Interface System (CIS),
the Command and Control Unit (CCU) and the Computer
Intelligence and Analysis System (CIAS).
B. Communication Interface System (CIS)
The CIS is controlled by a joint unit developed by FERC, DOE,
DOD and the U.S. Cyber Command to ensure centralized control
of the national grid communication due to the grid being a
national security asset. The CIS sends and receives information
from other transmission interchanges, generation facilities and
equipment on the national grid in real time. This information is
processed by the CCU and CIAS and the information is acted
upon by the grid through a collaborative effort with the CIS,
CCU and CIAS of the other transmission interchanges within the
system where the information is maintained in a data platform.
The communication systems of the utilities and RTO’s and ISO’s
will operate as a standby system to be used in coordination with
the ASALG Command Center when the Analog Backbone of the
ASALG determines a change of command and control is needed.
This parallel processing of information ensures that the
transmission interchanges maintain the continuity of grid
operation and provides confirmation of analysis. Should one or
multiple transmission interchanges disagree in their analysis
operation will be determined by polling of the transmission
interchanges to determine the scale of the indifference in the
analysis and action will be taken based on the majority consensus
of the transmission interchanges. Should the polling determine a
majority non-consensus of the transmission interchanges then the
grid will determine there is a compromise due to cyber-attack,
physical attack or large scale malfunction of the grid at which
point the grid will reconfigure itself to operate the transmission
interchanges and associated generation facilities independently
according to the Analog Backbone of the ASALG and with the
help of the RTO or ISO responsible for the footprint in which
each facility resides and until it can be determined that the
compromise has been corrected by the responsible utilities, ISO
or RTO.
C. Command and Control Units (CCU)
The CCU consists of relays, PLC’s, synchrophasors, GIS,
SCADA and satellite synchronized clocks. The ASALG
SCADA system acts according to the output of CIAS and
provides the necessary commands to the control systems and
their equipment. In the case where system reconfiguration is
needed the ASALG SCADA system is capable of
reprogramming the necessary control systems with the logic
provided by the CIAS. To determine the new logic will work
according to the desired goal the CIAS will perform a simulated
end to end analysis of the new configuration before it is sent to
the ASALG SCADA system. In cases where a partial system
isolation is conducted by the ASALG any logic changes will be
halted and the current state of the CCU logic diagrams,
programming and end to end test results, as shown in figure 3,
will be sent to the appropriate op-center and system operators.
The satellite synchronized clocks ensure that CIS, CCU and
CIAS operate in sync with each other. The CIAS constantly
evaluates the satellite synchronized clocks to determine that they
remain within sync with each other and within a tight and well
defined margin of error. Should the satellite synchronized clocks
within a facility fall outside the margin of error the system will
be reconfigured so that the facility where the timing error occurs
operates independently, according to the Analog Backbone of the
ASALG, of the grid until the error is corrected.
D. Computer Intelligence and Analysis System (CIAS)
The CIAS uses game theory, decision trees, Ant Colony
Optimization (ACO) [2], reliability analysis and predictive
analysis to determine the state and condition of the facilities and
equipment within the national grid.
The CIAS uses OE’s that define the accepted normal operational
parameters of the grid based on current NERC Reliability
Standards [1] and IEEE Standards. The OE’s are used to define
the normal range and operation of conductor capacities, reactive
components, voltage levels, power flow, protection parameters,
equipment state, equipment temperature, conductor temperature,
ambient temperature, power factor and power quality values.
These operation ranges are defined by IEEE, IEC and accepted
industry practices. The OE’s form the foundation of how the
grid is evaluated by the CIAS.

Figure 4 Graphical representation of Operational Envelops
The CIAS uses the equipment on the grid to evaluate real time
condition and state of all components on the grid. Due to the
vast amount of information contained on the grid the CIAS uses
Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) [2] to find only those points
outside the OE’s parameters. Set members in the CSIS act as
pheromone trails for connectivity. This information is provided
to the data platforms used by the CIAS at the transmission
interchanges.
Figure 5 Critical System Information Set
Figure 6 Decision Trees
The CIAS uses the CSIS information in the data platform to
process decision trees as a part of the CIAS. Game theory and
predictive analysis is used to find potential solutions to the
condition and states of the grid.
Figure 7 Analysis Process
The CIAS provides the potential re-configuration of the grid by
producing solution sets Sn. These solution sets are calculated
against the ideal solution for the grid based on the optimal
condition and state of the grid segments being evaluated. Since it
is the case that most operational solutions to weak points in the
grid usually require accepting acceptable but not ideal grid
conditions it is necessary to find the solution of all solutions that
is closest to the ideal solution. To accomplish this a recursive
relation is done of the calculation of potential solutions Sn against
the ideal solution I to determine the smallest deviation Ԑn which
represents the best solution Sbest. The best solution is what is
used in reconfiguring the grid.
Figure 8 Solution Sets
[S1][I]= Ԑ1
[S2][I]= Ԑ2
[Sn][I]= Ԑn
Figure 9 Calculation of Ԑn Best Solution
 VI. ACTIVE SCAN ANALYSIS THREAT EVALUATION
AND ATTACK SYSTEM
The ASATEAS is new form of cybersecurity developed to
protect the Autonomous Self Aware Living Grid. Within the
CIAS the ASATEAS module uses the system information from
the data platform to create an active cybersecurity framework
The ASATEAS creates a virtual system that appears like the
Autonomous Self Aware Living Grid. However, the system
actively seeks threats and create an environment of surface
exposure to promote a cyber-attack. Once the cyber- attack
happens it immediately evaluates every aspect of the attack and
returns the information to the system through a Threat
Assessment Matrix (TAM).
to reconfigure the necessary equipment of the ASALG and any
operational approach in order to harden the grid against future
cyber-attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The Autonomous Self Aware Living Grid is not the next logical
step for the advancement of the smart grid. It represents the next
generation in how the nation’s smart grid will operate. The
technology available has reached the point where this next
generation grid can become a reality.
The realization of the Autonomous Self Aware Living Grid
requires a massive paradigm shift in the nation’s grid operation,
federal regulations and economics and investment needed to
make this possible. The national grid is no longer a system to
provide service to homes and business but rather the grid has
grown into a national security asset that has a much value to the
nation’s defense as the military and the nation’s nuclear arsenal.
The ASALG in its resiliency and reliability will create a national
grid that fulfills its role as a national security asset.

At the turn of the century it took the vision of Nikola Tesla and
others to create the equipment needed to create an electric system
that could provide electric service on a national scale. The
Autonomous Self Aware Living Grid is the ultimate continuation
of the amazing vision first started by Tesla.

REFERENCES
[1] NERC, United States Mandatory Standards Subject to Enforcement, 2018.
[Online].
Figure 10 ASATEAS Diagram
http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/ReliabilityStandardsUnitedStates.aspx?juris
diction=United%20States
Software written for the purpose of cyber-attack, cyber intrusions
and cyber control of grid infrastructure are complicated and [2] M. Dorigo, T. Stützle, Ant Colony Optimization, MIT Press, 2004.
sophisticated which creates problems in solving the software’s
intentions and purpose. However, the cyber software, whether
compiled or command line in its design, must be translated in to
machine logic or machine code to command the actual digital
components and registers within the system under attack. If we
look at the written code as a set of commands the set containing
the code at the level written would represent a set of commands
so large it would be hard to evaluate mathematically. Let’s
represent this set of commands as SCC (Set of all Current
Commands). However, mathematically there is a set of
commands that could be considered as a subset of SCC that
represents the machine code logic. This subset SMC (Set of all
Machine Code) that contains a more finite set of commands that,
while large in data, can be evaluated, as to its intentions, by the
SMC direct effect on the system logic, registers and components.

ASATEAS would return the SMC for evaluation by the TAM

which would then be simulated as to the direct effect on the VS N
and compared to other results stored within the ASATEAS for
similar results or in determining if the current cyber code is
unique.

Once the TAM evaluates the information the virtual grid

reconfigures itself and eliminates the point of attack. The
information reviewed with the other SMC allows the system to
learn from the different forms of attack and use the information