EN BANC

A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY.

PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A.

Caronan (complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly
assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the
required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the
practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A.
Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975,
while complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their
secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in
19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the
University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in
1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married
Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant
rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11
Store in Muntinlupa.9chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan

ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the
PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he
moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since
then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree.12 chanrobleslaw

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that
the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their
mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he
used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at
St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse
consequences to him.15 chanrobleslaw

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity
when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar
displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not
confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to
support.17 chanrobleslaw

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant
was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon
arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting
his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving
respondent who, at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud
and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to
identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's
records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of
Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of
Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph
under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why
he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for
qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20 chanrobleslaw

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit
unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is
the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with
complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-
member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also
received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how
respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in
Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was
arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang  (BP) 22.25 cralawredchanrobleslaw

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan,"
complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the
subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign
from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of
law.28
chanrobleslaw

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res
judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an
issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which
case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her
spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against
them before the Ombudsman.33 chanrobleslaw

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where
both parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April
20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both parties again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their respective
position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any.37 chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera

(Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation,38 finding
respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and
academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations
against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand,
complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan."41chanrobleslaw

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when
he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics
Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.43 chanrobleslaw

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012
shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that
respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor
of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar;
and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to
institute appropriate actions against respondent.47 chanrobleslaw

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-
607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A.
Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
 The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and

overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent,
whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity,
and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a
law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings
when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio
Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant
submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan,"
among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his
photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55 chanrobleslaw

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used
complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since
complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A.
Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he
had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 6.  Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of
Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the
course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political
science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled
at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged
in 1993 without graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-
law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his
college education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false
assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit
for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification
of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary
Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court
explained the essence of good moral character:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by
the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own
brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear
for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature
of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as
well as between him and the court.62 chanrobleslaw

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his
alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases
against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and
dignity.63 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"

(respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and
take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate
civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any

representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in

the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED;
and  cralawlawlibrary

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in

the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real
name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine
Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno C.J. Carpio,Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, and  Reyes, JJ., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
 Dated October 10, 2013. Rollo, pp. 9-18.

2
 "Porfirio" in some parts of the record.

3
Rollo, pp. 9-10.

4
 Id. at 10.

5
 Id. at 11.

6
 Id. 10
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY.

KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O.

Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since
the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but
they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig
and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in
Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of
Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out
of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his
scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a
foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry
her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and
valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named
Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since
the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about
it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their
union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that
he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.8 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime
later, she came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo
dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into
their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until
such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001,
Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to
an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their
respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He
claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she
was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy
problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship
simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They

then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that
the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever
value it may have and comfort it may provide them.16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a
Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the
divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his
previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he
left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty.
Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out
that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed
that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however
rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate
his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite
being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an

Order24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003,
which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit
their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig
and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD
issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty.
Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which
warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further
opined that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants
fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official
and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous
marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage
to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his
students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second
marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting
marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a
serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which

adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying
solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1
of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by
affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’
testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he
never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted
that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which
would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. cralawred

33
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,  the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also
remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”34 (Citation
omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a

grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral;
it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist
Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his
first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was
then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez,
dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in
the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty.
Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth
just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of
legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from
the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and
Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married
to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint
Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained
valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the
added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr.
Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to
various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig
left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek
the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced
with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part
of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship
with another woman who has borne him a child.38 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of
his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears
to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they
are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted
in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage
with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the
Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of
evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is,
the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation,
an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair
and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required
in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.39 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves
that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between
the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the
supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship
with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves

to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.C. NO. 7136 : August 1, 2007]

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

EALA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for

Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for
"grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
(sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January
to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in
the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he
asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which
he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of
embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that
incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings,
pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the
words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten
letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will
say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but
experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is
it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us? cralaw library

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything
humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own
vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you,
to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more
importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last
me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul,
YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B
11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene
was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or
about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the
above-quoted letter was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP
as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of
September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion
of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture
was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the
phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with

Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members
of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was
concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his

apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of
her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now
they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint

regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral
depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason
being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife]
Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
 xxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws.
The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the

laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his
own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife,
and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the

reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his
purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conductas would
be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to

a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter
Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January

10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the
Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and

Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's
counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-
page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge
against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule

1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to

practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by
Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra v.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. 20 (Italics and emphasis in
the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section
12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason
therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that

there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news
item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent

through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . .,
and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to
his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is

indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
"Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the
father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make
any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous

relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal
Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with
a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her
to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied)
What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was
"low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded
to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to
the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has
been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself
is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of

Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent - a "lawyer," 38 years old - as the child's father.
And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were
affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January
29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave
the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence - that evidence adduced
by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and,
therefore, has greater weight than the other32 - which is the quantum of evidence
needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly
preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with
Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.

─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court

or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted
as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension
uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances."
Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse

with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit
of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the
affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court
in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

x    x    x

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vowsprotected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative
case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit
affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him.39 (Underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice
law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family

and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case
before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the
IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene
had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the
criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based
on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion
to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the Petition
for Review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection
of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally
resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal
has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab
initio  is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was
declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-
marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his Petition for Review before the DOJ, respondent
glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion
to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's
Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair

estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of
adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded
to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did
when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages
to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on
two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover,
Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more
confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in
No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the
church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's
vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came
to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold
office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the
said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest,
to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What
finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks
all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of
the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is
most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de

oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw
his Petition for Review . But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of
adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would
not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on

January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia,
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 7472               March 30, 2010

LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago,
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having
been suspended by the Court.

Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios,
with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from the RTC
staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001,
and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a
civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed
against Miyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his
counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for
her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.

In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She,
however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases.

Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de
Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She
served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Court’s Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to
November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the
Court that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.

A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the
RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to
desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008.
Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law
practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification
with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales’ letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to
some municipalities in Zambales, which "gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to
resume her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is
revoked." Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:

A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) – Respondent’s Urgent Motion for
Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6)
months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001 onwards as
proper is NOTED.

Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have
SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17 November
2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which
she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The
complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright.

In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the
complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty.
De Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1)
Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.

In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which

reads:

2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay
[nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach
ang Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.

3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong

October 10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong
September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.

4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the

Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa
Civil Case No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong
December 14, 2001.

5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -

5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley
Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios
isang (1) araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.

5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr.
Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay
dalawang (2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.

5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista
noong May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c)
isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na
ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.

6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa
aking personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni
Atty. de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty.
de Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.

A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no new
matters raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that "the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty.
Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the
Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court." According to her, the resolution should be
the "final nail to the coffin of this case."

On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Court’s consideration.

The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBC’s reply to
an inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De
Dios.1 Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic,
following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc.
and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose
Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which
states:

The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily shown his
compliance with the Court’s resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for more
than six months. The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period
stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the
period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession.2

Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that
he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the
Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution
lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged
that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios
was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing
through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court,
the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order
of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law. 1avvphi1

The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.

It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s
public responsibilities.3 Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of
the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.4 However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to
discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be
deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed
in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the
Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
 3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement
with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has
desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his
or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to
the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or
her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the
order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On official leave)

REYNATO S. PUNO*
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO** RENATO C. CORONA

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
Footnotes

* On official leave.

** Acting Chief Justice in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno per Special Order No. 826
dated March 16, 2010.

 Letter signed by Atty. James D.V. Navarrete Assistant, Officer-in-Charge, Legal Office,
1

Office of the Court Administrator.

 See A.C. No. 3066, entitled "J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v.
2

Eduardo de Vera, et al.," and A.C. No. 4438, entitled "Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty.
Mervyn G. Encanto, et al."; Memorandum dated November 14, 2008 addressed to Justice
Consuelo Yñares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division.

 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues,
3

B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 209, 216.

4
 Hernandez v. Go, A.C. No. 1526, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 1, 9.

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice
of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to

compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of
his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
1 

a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his
2 

profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.  It is so delicately affected with public
1âwphi1

interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents
in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of

Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good
moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-

MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the
MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After
all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended
that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the

condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-
acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.

** On Leave.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary

1 

notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization as

citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. R-351-RTJ September 26, 1986

ABRAHAM L. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.

A.M. No. R-359-RTJ September 26, 1986

LIWAYWAY B. SAMSON, complainant,
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.

A.M. No. R-621-RTJ September 26, 1986

VICTORIA TORRES, complainant,
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.

A.M. No. R-684-RTJ September 26, 1986

ESPERANZA LAZARO, complainant,
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.

A.M. No. R-687-RTJ September 26, 1986

JESUS ALBA, complainant,
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.

A.M. No. 86-4-9987-RTC September 26, 1986

DESIGNATION OF AN ACTING JUDGE IN BRANCH CXXI, RTC, CALOOCAN CITY.

Bognot, Toledano & Associates counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 359-RTJ.

Romulo T. Santos counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. R-684-RTJ.

Conrado A. Leaño counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 687-RTC.

PER CURIAM:
Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX,
stands charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the
performance of her official duties. The details are as follows:

I. Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ. —

This originated as G.R. No. 71179, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on June 29, 1985
by Deputy Sheriff Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to secure
his release from the Caloocan City jail. Ramirez was ordered arrested on June 27, 1985 by
respondent judge for direct contempt of court consisting in his alleged disobedience to the
writ of preliminary injunction dated January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining
him from demolishing the improvements of the intervenors in said case.

Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of
Branch CXXIII of the same court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to demolish the
improvements of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. C-7380, C-7361, C-7362, C-7363, C-7364,
C-7839, C-7841 and C-7842. Said defendants are the intervenors in Civil Case No. 8682 on
whose motion respondent judge issued the preliminary injunction.

The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a handwritten note of
respondent judge addressed to then superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon orders of this Court, however, Deputy Sheriff Ramirez was released
from jail on July 2, 1985. Thereafter, the court resolved to treat the petition as an
administrative case   and to require respondent judge to comment thereon. 
1 2

Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest of Ramirez.
She justified the arrest as a means of preserving substantial justice so that any decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 8682 may not be rendered moot and academic and as a curative measure to
preserve the greater interest of social justice. The handwritten note, on the other hand, was
explained as a means to preserve the integrity of courts of justice in the enforcement of valid and
lawful orders. She added that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by her in the exercise of
her original jurisdiction, while the Order of January 11, 1985 was issued by Judge Liwag in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which the latter should not have done as she should have
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution.

II. Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ. —

On September 28, 1984, complainant Liwayway B. Samson filed before the RTC of Caloocan City a
complaint for damages against Benecio Urgel, Roberto Exequiel, Shigiro Iwata and Remigio Pasion
docketed as Civil Case No. 11559 and assigned to respondent judge. The summonses were served
on the defendants on October 3, 1984. On October 18, 1984, defendants Urgel and Exequiel filed
their answer with cross-claim against their co-defendants Pasion and Iwata They likewise filed a
motion for leave to file a third party complaint against Imperial Insurance Co. This was granted on
October 22, 1984. On November 12, 1984, within the extension given by the court, defendant Iwata
filed his answer with compulsory counter-claim and cross-claim and answer to cross-claim against
defendants Urgel, Exequiel and Pasion. The latter did not file any answer. Thus, on November 29,
1984, complainant thru counsel moved to declare Pasion in default and to set the case for pre-trial
On January 29, 1985, counsel for complainant filed an ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of
the motion of November 29, 1984. When no action was forthcoming, counsel filed another motion on
March 26, 1985, reiterating his prayer in the motion of November 29, 1984. For alleged failure of
respondent judge to act on the motions, the instant complaint was filed on June 6, 1985.
Required to comment, respondent judge stated that the motion of November 29, 1984 was noted for
study on December 18, 1984 and was actually resolved on March 1, 1985, "well within the period
even for the court to resolved [sic] the same and prior to the receipt ... of the letter-complaint on July
2, 1985; " and that the case could not yet be set for pre-trial on account of the existence of the third-
party complaint. In conclusion, respondent judge said that letter-complaint "is not only malicious but
was intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge   and should therefore be dismissed.
3

Complainant replied to the comment for the purpose of placing in issue respondent judge's allegation
that the motion dated November 29, 1984 was resolved on March 1, 1985. She averred that if this
were true, why is it that notice thereof was received by her counsel only on June 22, 1985 after the
instant complaint had been filed; and why is it that respondent judge failed to resolve the other
motions? She concluded that the only reasonable implication is that the order was antedated to
show some color of performance of duties. She likewise cites respondent judge for failure to order
the service of summons and copy of the third-party complaint on the third-party defendant.

It appears that due to the statement found in respondent's comment that "the letter-complaint is not
only malicious but was intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge complainant moved for
respondent's inhibition from Civil Case No. 11559 and its re-raffling to another sala. This motion was
denied.

Eventually, as manifested by respondent in her Rejoinder, she inhibited herself from hearing Civil
Case No. 11559, which has since been assigned to another judge and has been set for pre-trial In
said rejoinder, respondent judge characterized complainant's so-called implication respecting the
order of March 1, 1985 as being founded on conjectures, assumptions and suppositions.
Furthermore, she said that after the third party complaint had been admitted, it was not her duty to
order service of the summons on the third-party defendant, but that of the counsel who espouses the
cause of the client.

III. Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ. —

In the sworn letter-complaint dated April 28, 1986, Victoria L. Torres charged respondent judge with
ignorance of the law, graft or deliberate distortion of the law for pecuniary motives. She alleged that
respondent judge had indiscriminately issued restraining orders without conducting hearings on the
applications for the issuance of preliminary injunctions and had reiterated restraining orders after the
lapse of the mandatory twenty [20] days; that she issued restraining orders against the enforcement
of the writs of execution in ejectment cases decided by other RTC branches of Caloocan City which
are of co-equal jurisdiction; that she has cited for contempt lawyers and sheriffs of other branches
whom she fancies to have offended her, as in the case of Deputy Sheriff Ramirez [cf. Adm. Matter
No. R-351-RTJ] who was merely complying with the order of Judge Liwag and that she has been
issuing restraining orders in ejectment cases involving the so- called "Maysilo Estate" for
undoubtedly suspicious considerations.

By way of compliance to the court's resolution dated June 19, 1986, respondent submitted her
comment on the letter-complaint on July 16, 1986, branding the allegations found therein as false
accusations as it failed to state specific facts on the matters complained of. She stated that she
issued a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 10526 entitled, "Arturo Salientes, et. al. v.
Alexander Development Corp., et al." but denied having issued an extension thereof. She claimed
having issued a preliminary prohibitory injunction after due hearing.

With respect to the second allegation, respondent explained the issuance of the restraining orders
as a method of maintaining the status quo so that the cases pending before her involving the issue
of ownership may not be rendered moot and academic by the execution of the decisions in the
ejectment cases relating to the same properties.

Respondent reiterated her explanation in Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ in connection with the
Ramirez arrest-incident and asserted that she has been acting on the Maysilo estate cases
objectively on the basis of the law involved and the evidence on hand.

It appears that while the instant complaint was pending evaluation by the Court, complainant Victoria
Torres, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of Alexander Development Co. caused the implementation
of the writ of execution issued by the RTC of Caloocan, Branch CXXX in Civil Case No. 10645,
entitled "Alexander Development Co. v. Jose Chan." The writ of execution was enforced thru the
demolition of a shanty being claimed by Francisco Cruz, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 10526.
Because of this, Torres was ordered arrested for contempt of court by respondent judge in an order
dated May 15, 1986. To challenge said arrest order Torres instituted before the IAC a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as AC-G.R. S.P. No. 09162-SP, wherein respondent
judge was likewise required to comment. On June 5, 1986, respondent judge issued an order
recalling the arrest order for being moot and academic. This was manifested in the comment
submitted in AC-G.R. No. 09162-S.P.

IV. Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ. —

The gravamen of the complaint filed before this Court on July 7, 1986 is the alleged failure of
respondent judge to decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza
Lazaro," despite the case having been submitted for decision for more than 18 months. Complainant
who is the defendant in Civil Case No. C-9831, claims that the case was submitted for decision on
October 2, 1984 with the filing of defendant's memorandum. She further alleges that as respondent
judge had been drawing her salary during the entire time that the case was pending decision,
respondent judge is likewise guilty of falsification in view of the certification required of judges before
they could draw their salaries to the effect that they have decided all cases assigned to them on or
before the end of three months counted from the time a case is submitted for decision.

On July 16, 1986, counsel for complainant Romulo T. Santos, filed a manifestation and motion to
withdraw the complaint on the ground that "certain facts and conditions which heretofore were
unknown to the complainant and undersigned counsel have come to [their] knowledge ... which
affect their resolution to prosecute the complaint.4

Said manifestation, notwithstanding, the court by resolution dated July 24, 1986 required respondent
judge to answer the complaint.

In her answer filed on August 11, 1986, respondent judge states that nothing on the record shows
that the case has been submitted for decision; that defendant in said case [herein complainant]
never appeared in court during the hearing of the case nor during the series of conferences called by
her for the purpose of effecting an amicable settlement between the parties, as per manifestation of
her counsel, complainant and her husband were always abroad; that defendant in fact told the court
interpreter that she did not want to appear in court for the amicable settlement; that it was only after
she received a telephone call from an alleged close relative of an associate of a national official
saying " If you don't decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro you will be removed, but if you decide in
her favor then you will stay," that she looked into the records of the case where she found the motion
of Mrs. Lazaro, received by the court on March 12, 1986, praying for the early resolution of the case;
that because of the telephone calls and with the point in mind that "this is a revolutionary
government," she had no recourse but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro, which she did in a
decision dated July 18, 1986; that in view of complainant's manifestation dated July 7, 1986, the
instant complaint is already moot and academic.

V. Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ. —

Jesus Alba charges respondent judge with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering
an unjust decision. Complainant is the offended party in Criminal Case No. C-23527 [84]
entitled "People v. Cabel" for frustrated murder assigned to respondent's court. The decision
acquitting the accused was promulgated on June 10, 1986, allegedly in the absence of complainant
and his counsel, so that complainant learned about the decision only thru a neighbor. Complainant
challenged the decision as erroneous for the reasons that the testimony of the accused on the
alleged self-defense was not convincing, respondent judge erred in her appreciation of the credibility
of the witnesses for the prosecution as well as in her pronouncement that Cabel had no motive for
stabbing complainant when lack of motive does not preclude conviction.

Upon being required to comment, respondent explained in detail the reasons why she did not give
credence to the version of the prosecution. She ended with the conclusion that the decision in said
criminal case is just and in consonance with the evidence presented by the parties. She views the
complaint as a means to harass her in the wake of the judiciary reorganization.

VI. Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC. —

Civil Case No. C-12172 entitled, "Manchie Sabile Brozo v. Spouses Esmeraldo Quijano and Adelina
Quijano," an appealed case for an unlawful detainer was pending before Branch CXXI of the RTC of
Caloocan City when presiding judge thereof, Judge Salvador J. Baylen, was transferred to the RTC
of Quezon City on November 15,1985. Said judge had previously required the parties to file their
memorandum with. in 30 days from notice of the order dated November 4, 1985, but only the plaintiff
had done so at the time of his transfer.

On January 7, 1986, therein defendants-appellees moved for either the consolidation of Civil Case
No. 12172 with Civil Case No. 11724, entitled "Esmeraldo Quijano, plaintiff versus Manchie Sabile
Brozo, Defendant" pending before Branch CXXX of the same court, or the re-raffle of Civil Case No.
C-12172 to another judge to avoid delay in its disposition; or if re-raffle is not proper, to effect the
transfer of said case to the pairing judge of Branch CXXI for further proceedings. Plaintiff-appellant
opposed the motion.

On January 9, 1986, Executive Judge Oscar M. Herrera referred the motion to Judge Antonia
Corpuz-Macandog of Branch CXX, the pairing judge of Branch CXXI.

On February 19, 1986, Judge Macandog denied the motion of defendants- appellees. However, on
March 13, 1986, she issued another order recalling, rescinding and setting aside the order of
February 19, 1986 and considering the case submitted for decision to her as pairing judge. Counsel
for plaintiff-appellant, Atty. Jose V. Marcella moved for a reconsideration of the order dated March
13, 1986 with a request that the matter be referred to the Court Administrator for determination or
ruling as to which judge-Judge Baylen or Judge Macandog-should decide the case.

Meanwhile, on April 24, 1986, the Court En Banc designated Judge Domingo M. Angeles, RTC,
Branch CXXIX, Caloocan City as Acting Judge of Branch CXXI of the same court "in addition to his
regular duties without additional compensation, effective immediately and to continue until a regular
incumbent is appointed or until further orders from this Court." 5
On May 15, 1986, Judge Macandog rendered judgment in Civil Case No. C-12172 dismissing
plaintiff's appeal Copies of the decision and the order denying his motion for referral were received
by counsel for plaintiff on May 22, 1986. He forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of both the
decision and the order. Pending resolution thereof, he wrote the Court Administrator a letter on June
9, 1985, requesting for a ruling on who, among the three judges; Baylen, Macandog or Angeles, has
authority to decide the case and who, between Judges Macandog and Angeles, should resolve the
pending motion for reconsideration.

Acting on said letter, the Court En Banc resolved on July 8, 1986 to: "[a] DIRECT Judge Salvador J.
Baylen Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City, to decide Civil Case No. C-12172,
considering that before his transfer to another court of equal jurisdiction said case was already
submitted before him for decision and as such all proceedings were totally heard and tried by him
and the greater interest of justice will be better served if he will decide the same; [b] require Judge
Antonia C. Macandog to EXPLAIN within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of notice hereof why
she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for taking cognizance of Civil Case No. C-12172 and
deciding the same against the vigorous objection of the plaintiff and [c] SET ASIDE and declare null
and void the decision rendered by Judge Macandog for lack of authority and the pending motion for
reconsideration and to set aside the decision and the order denying plaintiff's motion to refer the
case to the Supreme Court be recalled and withdrawn."  6

In the explanation submitted on July 18, 1986, Judge Macandog stated that she took cognizance of
Civil Case No. 12172 by virtue of the note/order of Executive Judge Oscar Herrera appearing on the
face of the "Motion to Consolidate and/or to transfer case to the Pairing Judge dated January 7,
1986; which note reads: "Refer to Pairing Judge, Br. 120" and signed, "Oscar M. Herrera 1/9/86;"
that as the thirty-day period granted to the parties within which to file their memorandum under the
order dated November 4, 1985 expired at the earliest only on December 5, 1985, at which date the
case would be deemed submitted for decision, Judge Baylen could not decide the case, the same
not having been submitted to him for decision at the time of his transfer on November 15, 1985; that
she has been authorized by this Court on September 16, 1982 to take cognizance of all kinds of
cases in Branch XIV [now Branch CXXI, RTC, Caloocan City] and that the resolution dated April 24,
1986 in A.M. No. 86-499-87, which impliedly revoked this authority came to her knowledge only
during the first week of June, 1986 when Judge Angeles started taking cognizance of and began
hearing cases in Branch CXXI.

Except for the charges of gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust decision
in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ, which must be dismissed outright for lack of merit, the other
charges brought against respondent are indeed serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy
shadow on respondent's moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence to remain a member of the
Bench.

The complaint in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ is anchored primarily on respondent having
given credence to the exempting circumstance of self-defense offered by the accused in Criminal
Case No. C-23527. In Villa v. Llamas, 84 SCRA 277, where the complainant placed in issue the
wisdom of the respondent judge's decision in a civil case for having believed the testimony of the
plaintiff, an alleged operator and maintainer of houses of ill-repute, this Court ruled that said
circumstance was not an indubitable ground for penalizing a judge administratively. The reason, as
previously stated in the case of Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, is that "to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.

Similarly, in the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaram, 39 SCRA 430, this Court had the occasion to
pronounce that 11 mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to
produce an influence of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust
decision [which circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar], are irrelevant and immaterial in an
administrative proceeding against him. We further stated: "If in the mind of the respondent the
evidence for the defense was entitled to more weight and credence, he cannot be held to account
administratively for the result of ratiocination." 
7

Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of the
promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to notify the
offended party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a judge to do so.

The actuations of respondent judge in Administrative Matters Nos. R-351-RTJ and R-621-RTJ are,
however, administratively censurable. In both cases, she issued preliminary injunctions to stay the
implementation of writs of execution issued by courts of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction, and
issued arrest orders against a deputy sheriff and an attorney-in-fact of a party who proceeded to
enforce the writs of execution despite said unjunctions. To effect the immediate execution of the
order of arrest against deputy sheriff Ramirez, respondent wrote a handwritten note to Brig. Gen.
Alfredo Lim requesting his assistance on the matter.

To our mind, both orders of arrest were improvidently issued. Respondent judge should have been
aware that forcible entry and detainer cases do not interfere with a proceeding where ownership is at
issue. Thus, in Petargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, it was held that "the determination of the respective
right of rival claimants to public land is different from the determination of who has the actual
physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and
breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of
land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in
any illegal manner, can never be 'prejudicial interference' with the disposition or alienation of public
land." Besides, in the case of deputy sheriff Ramirez respondent judge should have taken into
consideration that his duty to enforce court orders and processes is ministerial in character and that
he has no authority to determine the validity of the order placed in his hands to implement. Thus,
whether Judge Liwag can, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, legally issue the writ of execution
is of no moment insofar as deputy sheriff Ramirez is concerned, and he should not have been
punished by incarceration for performing his official duty.

Moreover, the handwritten note of respondent judge to Brig. Gen. Lim is, to say the least, highly
irregular and improper. Her over-zealousness in implementing the order of arrest creates the
impression that she has taken an interest far and beyond that ordinarily expected of judicial officers
with respect to cases pending before them; which, in turn, puts her impartiality in question.

Respondent judge is of the impression that the release of Ramirez from jail and the recall of the
order of arrest against Victoria Torres had rendered the administrative cases against her moot and
academic. Rather than exonerate her, these facts instead serve to strengthen the charges against
her. For one, the release order issued by this Court only proves the impropriety of her act, while on
the other, the recall order demonstrates the impetuosity by which the arrest order was issued in the
first place.

The same attitude is observed in respondent judge in connection with Administrative Matter No. R-
684-RTC which she wants this court to consider moot and academic for the reasons that she has
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 and that the complainant had moved for the
withdrawal of said complaint.

We said in the case of Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10, that a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss the
complaint by complainant, does not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the administrative case
against respondent judge, because "to condition administrative actions upon the will of every
complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of
its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary."

And seriously blunder, respondent did.

While it appears that the complaint was filed under a misapprehension of facts, in that it was not
indubitably established that the case had been submitted for decision as alleged in the complaint,
and dismissal of the charge should have followed as a matter of course, the case had taken an
unexpected twist. In her answer, respondent judge admitted to have succumbed to pressure in
deciding the case in favor of herein complainant, Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro. Thus, "In order to
promote peace so nobody would call me again by telephone telling the same purpose, the
respondent, then decided the case with the point in mind that this [sic] a revolutionary government
and she had nor [sic] recourse but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro,
[Decision dated July 18, 1986, see attached.]"  8

Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice removed
from the national official mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the
telephone is a patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law and
a revelation of her weak moral character. By her appointment to the office, the public has laid on
respondent their confidence that she is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
varied contentions. For this reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to
be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong
enough to resist the temptations lurking in her office. Regrettably, respondent has dismally failed to
exhibit these qualities required of those holding such office.

In Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ, respondent judge failed to act with reasonable dispatch
required of judicial officers. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the date shown on the order
resolving the motion of complainant to declare therein defendant Pasion in default. If it were true that
the motion was resolved as early as March 1, 1985, We do not think that service of the order upon
counsel for complainant at this office in Espana, Manila would take more than three [3] months, and
most conveniently after the present complaint has been filed.

Delay in the administration of justice is the most common cause of complaint and a judge should
endeavor to avoid it. It is thus incumbent upon a judge to manage his court with a view to the prompt
and convenient disposition of its business and he should not tolerate abuses, indifference or neglect
by clerks, sheriffs and other officers of the court. Hence, upon failure of her clerk to serve summons
on the third party defendant, it became incumbent upon her to remind said clerk of such failure.

The explanation given by respondent judge in Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC is

unsatisfactory. Par. VIII, Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974 of this Court provides:

VIII. PAIRING SYSTEM:

A pairing system shall be established whereby every branch shall be considered as

paired with another branch. In the event of vacancy in any branch, or of the absence
or disability of the judge thereof, all incidental or interlocutory matters pertaining to it
may be acted upon by that judge of the other branch paired with it. The latter may
likewise conduct trials or hearings on the merits in criminal cases with detention
prisoners assigned to the other branch, as well as in other kinds of cases, subject to
the conformity of the parties. [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to the above-quoted internal procedure, the referral of Civil Case No. C-12172 to judge
Macandog was solely for the purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate and/or transfer case
to the pairing judge. Such referral did not in any manner empower or authorize her to decide the
case on the merits, particularly in the light of the vigorous objection interposed by therein plaintiff.
The power and authority of one acting as a pairing judge are clearly defined and delineated by said
paragraph and one acting beyond its tenor certainly oversteps his authority.

Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties.   They are
9

likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate
to the scope of their authority. They are dutybound to observe and abide by these rules and
procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Thus,
confronted with a serious challenge to one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the
reasonableness, if not the wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to
this Court. The hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding
Civil Case No. 12172 despite the strong objection against her authority and the reasonable request
for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office warranting disciplinary
sanction.

Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority by this Court on September 16, 1982 to
take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch CXXI, suffice it to say that the same was revoked,
not by our resolution of April 26, 1986, but much earlier, by the implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act on January 17, 1983.

Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her
office. Her removal must perforce be effected.

In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 was rendered
under undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as
may be warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any
branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras
and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Resolution of July 9, 1985, p. 42, Rollo.

2 Resolution of August 22, 1986, p. 56, Rollo.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-89-286             July 11, 1991

ROAN I. LIBARIOS, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS, respondent.

Roan L. Libarios for and on his own behalf.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano
Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative to Criminal Case No. 3464. The
antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the
courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder case against said
Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in the aforesaid criminal case, while
Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as counsel of Macapas. As a result of the killing of
Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder (I.S. No. 88-138) was filed with the City Fiscal's Office of
Butuan City against Pablo Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard
Belarmino Alloco, and (2) other "John Does". Macapas was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.

On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a prima
facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138. 1

On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the investigating Fiscal; however, a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution was filed by respondent Calo, Jr., which delayed the filing of the
Information against Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents.

On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the RTC Butuan City a petition for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to enjoin the
Investigating Fiscal from acting on their aforementioned motion for reconsideration. Then Executive
Judge Vicente Hidalgo issued a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain from acting on the
said motion for reconsideration and from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of the
murder charge against respondent Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents. However the TRO expired after
the lapse of twenty (20) days, without a preliminary injunction being issued.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal Balansag was himself
gunned down in cold blood while on his way to his office. Based on the investigation conducted by
the NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the killing of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint
for murder was filed against Calo. Jr. and four (4) others.

On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending motion for reconsideration,
affirming the 22 June 1988 resolution finding a prima facie case for murder against the respondents
in I.S. No. 88-138.

On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying a
NO BAIL recommendation, was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464. On 14 October 1988, upon motion of the prosecution and with
the approval of the court, the information was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form, the same
having been signed by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing of said
information.

On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO BAIL
recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary supporting affidavits and papers.
The case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City, where the original
information prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or
Opposition to the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative, accused
sought the fixing of bail for their temporary release.  Said motion was set for hearing on 15
2

December 1988.

Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle on 7 December 1988. On said
scheduled date for raffle, accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally filed an opposition to the
holding of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the parties.

On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their sympathizers staged a
rally demanding the immediate arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3464. After their rally in
the afternoon of 8 December 1988, they personally went to see respondent judge in his chamber to
reiterate their demand.

After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent-judge, the latter issued an order of 8
December 1988  in his capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due notice
3

to the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing, in the same order of 8 December 1988,
respondent judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing at the same
time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail was
recommended for the temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail for the
temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they were not charged as co-
principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against them was merely
circumstantial.

On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order of respondent judge, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
16383. In response to the urgency of the petition, a resolution dated 20 December 1988 was issued
by the Court of Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the assailed order, pending
the resolution of the petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988, respondent judge and
Calo, Jr. informed the Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod had already put up their
respective bail bonds of P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that both have been released, thus
rendering the primary objective of the CA temporary restraining order moot and academic.
On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision  setting aside the questioned 8
4

December 1988 order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest as well as the bail bonds filed by the accused in said
Criminal Case No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the court of origin was
ordered to immediately issue and serve new warrants of arrest upon the accused. To determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial court was ordered to
conduct a heating and thus resolve the motion for fixing the bald for the temporary release of the two
(2) accused, Calo, Jr. and Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory
on 23 February 1989. 5

In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of respondent judge in
granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross
ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital
offense can be granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned warrants
of arrest but allowing bail is also questioned on the ground of his "close association" with the
accused Calo, Jr.

In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
which requires a hearing of an application for admission to bail, filed by any person who is in custody
for the commission of a capital offense, is applicable only to cases where the accused is already in
custody, but neither of the three (3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464 was being detained at the
time their application for bail was acted upon by respondent judge. In his capacity as Executive
Judge, respondent judge claims that he merely followed the precedents set by his predecessors, in
issuing warrants of arrest before the raffle of a case in order to avoid delay in the arrest of the
accused.

In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a law partner of accused Calo, Jr.,
claiming that he was a mere employee in the business of said accused, and that he appeared with
accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel in a case, but not as an associate. To justify his finding that the
evidence of guilt is circumstantial against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, respondent judge stated
that —

Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. could have
done the acts of giving a revolver to accused Pablo Macapas outside the courtroom and
pushed Pablo Macapas into the courtroom to shoot Mariano Corvera, Sr., which acts were
allegedly done in the presence of witness (sic) Pacifico Largonita and Fernando Casinao,
who by their own admissions, are security personnel and companions of the late Mayor
Corvera. These acts being attributed to accused Calo as the brain behind the killing do not
appear to be a natural conduct of man. These are stupid acts and accused Calo does not
impress herein respondent as having that kind of mental intelligence. Respondent has
known accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law practitioner and as a person for about
twenty years already.  Respondent finds accused Calo to be of above-average intelligence.
1âwphi1

Thus, when respondent reviewed the findings of the investigating fiscal regarding the
statements of P. Largonita and F. Casinao, respondent entertained some serious doubts.
Questions cropped up in respondent's mind. Respondent asked himself the questions that if
he were the mastermind, would he give, in the presence of some individuals, the gun to the
gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim was to be shot moments before the
appointed time of the killing and pushed the gunman to the place where the victim was?
Respondent's answer was that he would not behave in such manner, otherwise he would
appear to be an inept mastermind and the gunman was reluctant that the latter had to be
pushed to execute the plan. 6
While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 16383 is quite enlightening. That decision, as already mentioned, declared as null
and void the warrants of arrest issued by respondent judge as well as the bail fixed by him for the
temporary release of the accused, all accomplished without a hearing. The Court of Appeals said:

It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the determination as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong in a capital offense rests upon the sound judgment and discretion
of the court which can only be exercised and reached after due or summary hearing. (People
vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55). In that hearing, the fiscal
must be notified and given the opportunity to present his evidence. If the court grants bail
without affording such opportunity to the prosecution, due process is seriously violated.
(People vs. San Diego, supra; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 373). And even where
the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail, the Court may ask the prosecution "questions to ascertain the strength of the state's
evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail." (Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 789).

x x x           x x x          x x x

In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they are no longer in custody of
the law, the respondent court having granted and fixed their bail which they did forthwith
post, the hearing to determine whether or not their guilt is strong is no longer necessary. The
argument sounds but casuistic because in Our judgment the respondent court acted
deliberately with precipitate haste and with grave abuse of discretion, when on December 8,
1988 it issued the order granting and fixing the bail without any hearing at all, even as private
respondents themselves had requested their motion to be heard on December 15, 1988 yet,
when respondent court in the same order directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against
private respondents, the act was nothing more than a superfluous and useless ceremony
because with the grant of bail the accused could and did effectively secure their freedom at
once without even seeing a copy of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there is
nothing in the records before Us to show that warrants of arrest were actually issued against
private respondents. 7

Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in fixing the bail of the accused without a hearing. Generally, a judge cannot be held liable
to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or decision
rendered by him in good faith.  However, good faith may be negated by the circumstances on record.
8

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should
not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment,
yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles.9

In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.  Respondent judge
10

should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary
release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to established
principles of law. A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is
supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of
justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be
accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 11
The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally demanding the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the accused is not a sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of
respondent judge's act of fixing bail without a hearing.

It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital
offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the
temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case
amounted to a violation of due process.  Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence
12

of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a
hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and
Allocod, if bail was at all justified. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by
depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused
was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as
a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded
that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the
evidence against him was merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial
impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to
whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was
bailable. A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
13

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS

(P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as
a judge, and that the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

A.M. No. 90-474 October 4, 1991

CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR., complainant

vs.
JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, RTC, BRANCH 16, NAVAL, LEYTE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:p

In an Affidavit-Complaint, dated 7 March 1990, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in
Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of Service by
making it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the ninety-day period
required by the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5, when actually he had fifteen (15) cases undecided
from five (5) years back or from March, 1985.

On 7 August 1990, the Court directed Deputy Court Administrator Juanita A. Bernad to make an on-
the-spot audit of the cases pending in the sala of Respondent Judge. On 2 October 1990, Deputy
Court Administrator Bernad reported that there were, indeed, eighty seven (87) cases undecided
beyond the ninety(90)-day reglementary period as of 3 July 1990, consisting of six (6) criminal cases
with prisoners, 36 criminal cases without prisoners, and forty-five (45) civil cases. Worse the records
of two (2) criminal cases and twelve (12) civil cases were missing. While the records of six (6)
criminal cases were not in the Court but acknowledged by Respondent Judge to have beenin his
possession.

Deputy Court Administrator Bernad also noted the dismal state of the Courthouse of the RTC,
Branch 16, which he described as "bereft of any dignity as a court of law" showing 'a lack of financial
and moral support of the local authorities," and observed that the Municipal Court was even better
housed.

On 31 October 1990, Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo
Pitao of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for the
accused in Criminal Case No. 959 then pending with the said Municipal Court. We considered the
foregoing as a supplemental charge of undue interest in apending criminal case.

On 23 November 1990, Complainant again brought to the attention of the Court seven (7) additional
cases submitted for decision, at the earliest since April 1986, still unresolved by Respondent (p. 44,
Rollo), even though the transcripts were ready as early as 1984 in one (1) case.

In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more for
harassment and vengeance, otherwise, Complainant would not have filed a criminal case against
him for Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code before the Ombudsman, based
on the same facts alleged in his Complaint before this Court. Respondent further claimed that he
had not violated the 90-day rule since 1 February 1990 when the Court required the adoption of the
continuous trial system. He did not deny, however, that before said date, there were other cases not
decided within the 90-day rule, including those listed in the Complaint allegedly because the
transcripts were incomplete. He added that he had no hand in the preparation of his monthly reports
of pending cases; that after he had ordered the person-in-charge of preparing the Certificates of
Service to explain why she had made it appear that said cases were decided within ninety (90) days
from its submission when actually they were not, she stated that he had nothing to do with the
preparation of the monthly report except to sign after she had prepared them.

On 18 April 1991, acting upon a second Report from Deputy Court Administrator Bernad, the Court
resolved: (1) to refer the supplemental charge regarding undue interest in a particular criminal case
to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation; (2) to order Respondent to decide with dispatch cases still unresolved beyond the
90-day-period; and (3) to inform the Court immediately regarding steps he had taken to retrieve lost
records and to personally put his records in order. To date, Respondent has been unheard from on
those directives.

On 12 July 1991, Complainant followed up with another letter complaint stating that the seven cases
mentioned in his letter of 23 November 1990 remained undecided, adding that five (5) cases
handled by him were unresolved since January 1987, not to speak of cases handled by other
lawyers.

Judging from the Deputy Court Administrator's two Reports, there is validity to Complainant's charge
that Respondent had failed to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period notwithstanding
"Second Ex-parte Motions to Decide Case" flied by Complainant (Annexes A to L, Complaint), and
that Respondent had falsified his Certificates of Service for 2 September 1986,3 October 1987, 3
October 1988, 3 November 1989, and 1 March 1990 (Annexes N to R, Complaint). Respondent's
defense that incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes dissuaded him from deciding those cases
for fear of "rendering an injustice" is controverted by his own stenographic reporter who stated that
the transcripts in some of those cases were ready as far back as 1984 (Comment, Annex "2").

Respondent, however, shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who, he claims,
was inefficient in the management of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that he sits not
only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being
an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, provides:

A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional

competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative
functions of other judges and court personnel.

Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is that:

A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of
public service and fidelity.

As we held in Secretary of Justice vs. Legaspi (A.M. No. 997-CFI, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA
234):

Respondent, as the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision,
particularly those pending for more than ninety days. As a matter of fact, he is supposed to
keep his own record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act on them promptly
and without delay, mindful of the mandate in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 296, also known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948 ... It is expected that he should be more diligent and more
vigilant in attending to cases submitted for decision as well as in the preparation of his
 monthly certificates of service by verifying every now and then whether there are cases
pending decision for more than ninety days; because he could be held accountable for any
error or falsification in his certificates. Thus, respondent cannot now escape liability for
falsification of his certificates of service with the lame excuse that he has no knowledge of
those cases pending decision for more than ninety days at the time he submitted his
certificates of service. Nor could he give the excuse that his attention was not called to the
cases pending decision ninety days because he need not be reminded of his deadlines by a
subordinate court employee like the clerk of court. Court employees are not the guardians of
a judge's responsibilities.

In Nidua vs. Lazaro (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174SCRA 581), we maintained:

It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his Court so that
no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition, particularly those
submitted for decision. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement by Court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much his
responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official
functions.

And in Cipriano vs. Judge Villamor (A.M. No. RTJ-88-207, 22 June 1989, en banc, Minute
Resolution) we ruled,

The Supreme Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now when
there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the problems of congestion and
delay long plaguing our courts. Thus, judges are called upon to exercise the utmost diligence
and dedication in the performance of their duties. It is a measure of a judge's competence as
an administrator that he is capable of delegating to his personnel those tasks which properly
pertain to them, maintaining, likewise, their trust and confidence in him.

A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in fact,
persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's paycheck,
but an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a
speedy disposition of cases.

The people's faith in the administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low
income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial
courts which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation,
could be expected to act with dispatch. (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm. Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30
September 1976, 73 SCRA 110).

Additionally, we have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records
of twelve (12) civil and two (2) criminal cases.

"A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is
no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is
indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true
professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a
judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and
prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out" (Longboan vs. Polig, Adm. Mat. No. 704-
RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557).
We come now to the supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case, subject of
the Investigative Report submitted on 9 August 1991 by Justice Fermin A. Martin, who found the
imputation sufficiently substantiated, and has recommended the on of a fine of P10,000.00.

From that Report, we gather that on 16 July 1987, Respondent, as; Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XVI, Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, designated Judge Dulcisimo Pitao, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, as Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, which was then vacant, with the directive to allocate two (2) session
days a week in his additional sala.

On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, he
received a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of Guillermo
Lipango, the accused in Criminal Case No. 959, which had long been pending trial in the 4th MCTC
of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte.

The note (Exhibit "A"), written on Respondent's letterhead, reads:

Aug. 19, 1987

Dear Tete,

The bearer is the wife of Guillermo Lipango who has a long pending theft case. If you have
jurisdiction hear and decide. If none,remand it to RTC.

Take care because I learned Big Man Egane is taking much interest because accused is
competing with Ms fishing but only in a small scale. Okay? Thanks.

Sincerely,
Ading.

Sometime later, Judge Pitao sought respondent, as the Executive Judge, regarding his application
for leave of absence which had to be coursed through the latter. During their conversation,
respondent mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango," asked Judge Pitao whether the latter had
received the note, and again warned the latter about a certain "Big Man Egane," who was backing
the complainant therein and that he (Judge Pitao) better acquit the accused (Tsn., 15 July 1991, pp.
13-14).

On 25 August 1988, after hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered his decision convicting the
accused, Guillermo Lipango, of the crime of Theft (Exhibit "C") "because the evidence against the
accused was very strong" (ibid., p. 14).

On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding house of Respondent to invite the
latter to a birthday party, and while they were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to Respondent
that he had convicted Lipango "because he could not in conscience acquit him" (ibid., p. 17). Irked,
Respondent directed Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's Court (ibid., p. 18).

On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were elevated to the RTC, Leyte,
Branch XVI, over which Respondent presides, but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5
December 1988.
From 1 to 3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National Convention of Lawyers in Cebu
City. Upon his return, he learned that Judge Meljohn de la Pena had been designated as Acting
Judge of the 4th MCTC Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his designation had been revoked
effective 30 November 1988 (ibid., pp. 18-19).

On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his decision acquitting accused-appellant Guillermo

Lipango of the crime charged (Exhibit "F"). This, despite the fact that the records of the case
disclosed that no notice had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable
them to submit their respective memoranda.

For his part, Respondent opted to rely on his six (6)-page Comment, dated 19 December 1990 (Exh.
H, pp. 78-83, Rollo), as his testimony-in-chief As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, said
Comment contains nothing more than a denial of the charge of falsification and an attribution of ill
motive to the Complainant. He then determined that Respondent is deemed not to have denied:

l) that he sent the handwritten note dated August 19, 1987 (Exhibit "A") to Judge Dulcisimo
Pitao through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango;

2) that when Judge Pitao brought his application for leave of absence to respondent as
Executive Judge, respondent took up the matter of the note he sent and the theft case
against accused Guillermo Lipango which was pending trial before Judge Pitao and even
hurried the remark "better acquit him;" and,

3) that he decided the appealed criminal case and acquitted the appellant Guillermo Lipango
although the record of the case disclosed that no notice had been sent yet by the branch
clerk of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the parties to submit
memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines.

Accordingly, the Investigating Justice came up with the following apt observations and findings:

In sending his handwritten note (Exhibit "A") to Judge Pitao, and through the wife of the
accused Guillermo Lipango, respondent failed to exercise due care. It is true that the
contents of the letter may not have directly exhorted the addressee to decide the case in
favor of one party but to have the wife of the very accused deliver the letter to the municipal
judge who will decide the case and over whom he i respondent) exercised supervision and
wielded a degree of moral ascendancy as Executive Judge was simply a big letdown in the
required circumspection and high ideals expected of a judge. It is a truism that a judge's
official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the
appearance of impropriety (Aleza vs. Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453).

Moreover, respondent Judge, while cautioning Judge Pitao to watch out and exercise care in
handling the case supposedly on account of the interest of persons not parties to the case,
made a side remark for the acquittal of the accused. Such a statement, winch was not
denied, was highly improper and was apt to create the impression that he was for the
exoneration of the accused Guillermo Lipango- It tended to influence the trial judge who was
going to decide the case and thus did violence to the lofty principle that "the office of a judge
exists for one solemn end: to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially"
(Gonzales-Austria vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634, 646).

Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in
any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04).
Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course
or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines
the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). On
this point, Impao vs. Makilala (A.M. No. MTJ-88-184, 13 October 1989, 178 SCRA 541) expounds:

It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all
times be free from the appearance of impropriety [Lugue vs. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; ...]. As held by the Court in the case of De la Paz vs. Inutan,
Adm. Mat. No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 540: ... The judge is the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their
will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests, specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who
have that close and direct contact with the people before nobody else in the judiciary. Thus,
for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for the others to follow.

The Investigating Justice gave one final and pointed observation on respondent's culpability, thus:

The clincher though came when respondent Judge decided the same case which was
appealed to his branch although he knew that no notice had been sent yet by the branch
clerk of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the precaution and
the defense to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines.
Respondent's excuse was that under the rules, it was (and still is) the duty of the clerk of
court to notify the parties of the fact that the original record of the case, together with the
transcripts and exhibits, had been received (Rule 21, paragraph c, Interim Rules and
Guidelines). Respondent overlooked, however, that the same rule provides that the RTC
judge shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs, as may have been filed (paragraph D,
Rule 21, Ibid).

Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent's
mere act of interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative proceedings such as this,
mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges (The Court Administrator vs.
Hermoso, et al., A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269).

Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross inefficiency in
connection with missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifferences to the directives of this Court;
and (2) of serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court
over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated
condition of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, also betrays a lack of management capabilities
desired of a Presiding Judge and an insensitiveness to the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its
name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with his membership in the Bench.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued
retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697             October 15, 2003

EUGENIO K. CHAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch
23, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety, partiality, and inefficiency filed against
respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General
1 

Santos City.

The Facts

In an undated letter, a "concerned citizen" charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon

("respondent judge") with "not wearing [a] black robe during court sessions" and with being habitually
tardy.
2

In another complaint, dated 3 November 2000, complainant Eugenio K. Chan ("complainant")

charged respondent judge with committing "acts of improprieties [and] irregularities." Complainant
alleged that respondent judge —

1. xxx starts his hearings at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon.

2. xxx does not wear his robe despite the requirement of the Supreme Court xxx;

3. xxx entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the absence of the opposing lawyer[s];

4. xxx continued to hear cases despite obvious appearance of impartiality [sic]. He insist [sic]
to hear the case despite the fact that her [sic] daughter being [sic] involved in the defendant
bank;

5. xxx was already reprimanded by the Honorable Supreme Court and he is a subject of
adverse write ups in the newspapers;
 6. xxx does not prepare or study the cases. He reads the cases during the hearing time. 3

The Court required respondent judge to submit his Comment on the complaints. In his Indorsement
dated 5 February 2001, respondent judge controverts the allegations against him as follows:

1. On his refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions. Respondent judge states
that upon his doctor’s advice, he stopped wearing the judge’s robe during court sessions
because doing so allegedly triggers and aggravates his hypertension. He promised to
resume wearing the robe once his blood pressure had stabilized.

2. On conducting hearings behind schedule. Respondent judge admits that he takes breaks
from court sessions at 10 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. to take merienda or attend to personal needs.
However, respondent judge claims that he starts the hearings in his court on time and that
his sessions sometimes even last for more than eight hours in a day. According to
respondent judge, if ever his hearings started late, it was either because he had to attend to
other equally pressing matters such as signing/revising Orders/Resolutions or because the
litigants and/or their counsels were late.

3. On entertaining counsels/litigants in his chambers. Respondent admits entertaining

litigants and their counsels with pending cases in his sala as his "chamber’s two doors are
always open." He claims, however, that he never discusses with his visitors the merits of
their cases and that he has never been "influenced" by them.

4. On "studying" cases during hearings. Respondent judge explains that while he does
consult the records of cases during hearings, it is only to verify contested matters. He states
that this is necessary, as he cannot memorize all the details of cases, especially the
voluminous ones that he had inherited from the previous judge.

Respondent judge claims that complainant, who had sought his inhibition from a case, may have
4 

wanted to get back at him (respondent judge) for his refusal to inhibit himself. Respondent judge
also suspects that complainant’s counsel, a certain Atty. Fontanilla, is the "concerned citizen" who
filed the anonymous complaint against him.  5

On 30 January 2001, complainant withdrew his complaint against respondent judge, stating that he
had "realized that [respondent judge] is only rightly doing his job."
6

On 16 May 2001, respondent judge informed the Court that since February 2001, he had resumed
wearing the judicial robe as his blood pressure had stabilized.7

In his Memorandum of 27 February 2003, respondent judge reiterated the reasons for his earlier
refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

In its Report of 11 March 2002 ("Report"), the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") found
respondent judge liable for violation of Administrative Circular No. 25 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. However, the OCA recommends the dismissal of the other charges against
respondent judge for lack of merit. The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined ₱5,000.
The Report reads:
Complainant herein accuses respondent Judge of starting the hearings late at 10:00 o’clock in the
morning and 2:30-3:00 o’clock in the afternoon. In his comment, respondent Judge denies the same
contending that he conducts hearings [for] four (4) hours, mornings and afternoons. In view of the
absence of proof in support of the accusation against him, respondent Judge enjoys the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty.

As regards the non-wearing of a black robe during trials, respondent Judge should be reminded of
Administrative Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 19[8]9 Re: Use of Black Robes by Trial Judges xxx.

Based on the aforecited circular, trial judges are enjoined to wear the black robe during court
sessions. In the instant case, prudence dictates that respondent Judge should have informed the
[C]ourt, through the Office of the Court Administrator, of his health problems and requested
exemption from said circular. Admittedly, he took it upon himself to dispense with the wearing of a
black robe due to hypertension. Although his reason may be considered in his favor, it could not
entirely exculpate him from administrative responsibility for clear violation of the circular.

As to the charge that respondent entertains lawyers in his sala despite [the] absence of the opposing
lawyer, respondent candidly admits the same by saying that for purposes of transparency he allows
lawyers and litigants to freely enter his chambers to ask about their cases without however
discussing the merits thereof. This is [a] highly xxx improper practice. In-chambers sessions without
the presence of the other party and his counsel must be avoided (Capuno vs. Jaramillo, 243 SCRA
213). The prohibition is to maintain impartiality. Judges should not only be impartial but should
appear impartial (Fernandez vs. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 60). The court should administer justice free
from suspicion of bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties-litigants might lose confidence in the
judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum (Nestle Phils., Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542).

The charge that respondent continues to hear cases despite obvious appearance of partiality must
fail as complainant failed to specify the cases being alluded to and in what manner respondent
appeared to be partial.

Finally, as to the charge that respondent does not prepare for or study the cases and merely reads
the cases during trial, we find his explanation thereon satisfactory because referral to court records
are at times unavoidable.

In sum, respondent is found to have violated Circular No. 25 xxx, but the fact that he had been
suffering from hypertension shall be taken in his favor. He is also found to have violated Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct for his act of allowing in-chamber sessions without the presence of the
other party and his counsel. 8

The Ruling of the Court

Except for the recommended penalty, the Court finds the Report well taken.

On Respondent Judge’s Refusal to Wear the Mandated Judicial Robe

Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, ("Circular No. 25") provides:

Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in order to heighten public
consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, it is hereby directed that beginning Tuesday,
August 1, 1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes during sessions of
their respective Courts.
Respondent judge admits violating Circular No. 25. Nevertheless, he seeks exculpation from
administrative liability for his non-compliance because of his illness. Respondent judge’s plea is
futile.

The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings, which harks back to the 14th century, is 9 

not an idle ceremony. Such practice serves the dual purpose of "heighten[ing] public consciousness
on the solemnity of judicial proceedings," as Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing upon the
judge the exacting obligations of his office. As well put by an eminent jurist of another jurisdiction:

[J]udges [are] xxx clothed in robes, not only, that they who witness the administration of justice
should be properly advised that the function performed is one different from, and higher, than that
which a man discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks of life; but also, in order to impress the
judge himself with the constant consciousness that he is a high priest in the temple of justice and is
surrounded with obligations of a sacred character that he cannot escape and that require his utmost
care, attention and self-suppression. 10

Consequently, a judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of competence and
integrity his robe represents, but also that he wears one in the first place.

While circumstances, such as the medical condition claimed by respondent judge, may exempt one
from complying with Circular No. 25, he must first secure the Court’s permission for such exemption.
He cannot simply excuse himself, like respondent judge, from complying with the requirement.
Neither does the fact that respondent judge, if he is to be believed, has resumed wearing the robe
exculpate him from liability. Such does not alter the fact that at the time the complaints in the present
case were filed, respondent judge was openly violating Circular No. 25. Respondent judge’s medical
condition and his subsequent compliance serve only to mitigate his liability.

On Respondent Judge’s Practice of Entertaining Lawyers and Litigants with Pending Cases in his
Sala

The Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") provides:

Rule 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

Rule 2.01. — A judge should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges play in the promotion of the
people’s faith in the judiciary. Unlike the appellate court justices, they are the so-called "front-liners"
who give human face to the judicial branch at the "grassroots" level in their interaction with litigants
and those who do business with the courts. The admonition in Canon 2 that judges must not only
11 

"avoid impropriety [but also] the appearance of impropriety" is more sternly applied to them. It is in
12 

this light that the Court frowns upon the holding by trial court judges of in-chamber meetings with
litigants or their counsels without the presence of the adverse party. 13

Instead of taking heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge readily admitted transgressing it.
Worse, he reveals his ignorance of the prohibition’s purpose by claiming that his in-chamber
dealings are above-board as nothing illegal or improper transpires during those meetings.
Respondent judge should have realized that his very conduct of entertaining litigants and their
counsels in his chamber without the presence of the adverse party or his counsel constitutes an
impropriety. While judges are not expected to shun the world, neither are they supposed to make
themselves freely accessible under such circumstances as to invite suspicions of impropriety if not
bias. Respondent judge should have borne in mind — and all those in the bench who are similarly
disposed as him are reminded — that:

[N]o position is more demanding as regards xxx uprightness of any individual than a seat on the
Bench xxx. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must
pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times
in such a manner that his conduct, xxx can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks
up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism,
thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be
above suspicion. 14

On the Other Charges Against Respondent Judge

The Court subscribes to the OCA’s finding that complainant failed to substantiate the other charges
against respondent judge. Mere allegation that respondent judge was habitually tardy or had shown
partiality in a case, without more, does not suffice to hold respondent judge administratively liable.
On the other hand, there is nothing improper in consulting case records during hearings to clarify
contested matters. It is usual for judges to do so, especially for lower court judges who, in addition to
their heavy caseloads, have to conduct marathon hearings and thus need to consult the records of
each case more frequently.

On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed Against Respondent Judge

The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined ₱5,000. However, in Gallo v. Judge
Cordero, the Court imposed a fine of ₱10,000 on a judge for impropriety in meeting with a litigant in
15 

his office and for other irregular conduct. Under the circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to
impose similarly a fine of ₱10,000 on respondent judge.

Neither complainant’s desistance nor respondent judge’s retirement precludes the Court from
holding respondent judge liable and imposing on him the penalty of ₱10,000 fine. A complainant’s
desistance from an administrative complaint against a member of the bench will not, by itself,
warrant the dismissal of the case. This is especially true in the instances where, as in the present
16 

case, the respondent judge admits some if not all of the material allegations in the
complaint. Similarly, the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the
17 

mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his
case.18

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, General Santos City guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, Rules
1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent Jose S. Majaducon is
ordered to pay a fine of ₱10,000, the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he is
entitled.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535             March 12, 2004

DR. CONRADO T. MONTEMAYOR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JUAN O. BERMEJO, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The instant administrative case traces its roots from an unlawful detainer case filed by Benjamin and
1 

Desmond T. Montemayor against Lolita Marco. The case was raffled to Metropolitan Trial
Court Judge, Hon. Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. (Judge Bermejo), the respondent herein.
2 

The records reveal that the pre-trial conference was held on May 20, 2002. Finding no possibility of
settlement, Judge Bermejo issued a Pre-Trial Order of even date defining the issues submitted for
decision and the stipulations agreed upon, and directing the parties to submit their respective
position papers within 10 days from receipt of the Order, after which, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision.3

Accordingly, the plaintiffs submitted their Position Paper on June 13, 2002. More than a month later,
they filed a Motion for Early Resolution dated July 30, 2002. The defendant, on the other hand,
submitted her Position Paper only on August 14, 2002.

The plaintiffs then filed another Motion for Early Resolution on September 6, 2002. Acting on this
motion, Judge Bermejo issued an Order dated September 23, 2002 declaring the case submitted for
decision.

On October 10, 2002, Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Copies thereof were sent by
registered mail to the parties and their respective counsels on October 16, 2002.

On December 12, 2002, the plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution and set the same for
hearing on December 16, 2002. However, the motion was not included in the court calendar
because December 16, 2002 apparently was not a motion day.

On December 20, 2002, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ filed a Second Motion for Execution dated December 26, 2002 and set
the same for hearing on January 3, 2003. Concomitantly, Dr. Conrado T. Montemayor (Dr.
Montemayor), the complainant herein and the plaintiffs’ attorney-in-fact, also filed on December 26,
2002 a Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of
the Judgment and set the same for hearing on January 3, 2003. Judge Bermejo did not act on either
4 

motion.
In his Order5 dated January 6, 2003, the respondent Judge gave due course to the defendant’s
appeal and required the latter to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P587,500.00 within 10
days from receipt thereof.

On January 21, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their Third Motion for Execution. On the same day, Dr.
Montemayor filed a Second Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He
Received a Copy of the Judgment. Both motions were heard on January 31, 2003, during which,
6 

Judge Bermejo directed the plaintiffs to submit to the court an Affidavit of Service to the defendant of
the pending motions.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed a Compliance and Manifestation on February 4, 2003 stating, among
7 

other things, that the defendant was served copies of the Motion for Execution, on December 12,
2002; Second Motion for Execution, on December 26, 2002; Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel
to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment, on December 26, 2002; Third
Motion for Execution, on January 21, 2003; Second Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel to
Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment, on January 22, 2003;
and Compliance and Manifestation, on February 3, 2003.

The plaintiffs also filed on February 24, 2003 an Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve All Pending Incidents of
even date. Resolving this motion, Judge Bermejo issued an Order dated March 12, 2003, stating
that the Motion for Execution dated December 12, 2002, was not resolved because the day it was
set for hearing, i.e., December 16, 2002, was not a motion day and because there was no proof that
the defendant had already received a copy of the Judgment dated October 10, 2002. Further,
the Second Motion for Execution dated December 26, 2002, was not acted upon considering
the Notice of Appeal filed by the defendant and the court’s own Order dated January 6, 2003,
requiring the former to post a supersedeas bond. Anent the Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel
to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment, the same was not acted upon
because the court was then conducting a semestral inventory of its pending cases. Finally, the Third
Motion for Execution dated January 31, 2003 was deemed submitted for resolution.

On April 24, 2003, the defendant filed an Urgent Motion for Extension dated April 23, 2003 claiming
8 

that she only had until April 21, 2003 within which to post a supersedeas bond and praying for an
extension of 10 days, or until May 1, 2003, to post the bond. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the
9 

respondent Judge granted the motion and gave the defendant until May 5, 2003 within which to post
a supersedeas bond.

Upon the defendant’s posting of a supersedeas bond, Judge Bermejo issued an Order10 dated May
5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the Regional
Trial Court for further proceedings in connection with the defendant’s appeal.

Incensed by the foregoing proceedings, Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) the instant Administrative Complaint charging Judge Bermejo with gross
11 

incompetence and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In the instant complaint, Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed to decide the case
within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of
Court). He alleges that Judge Bermejo "did not bother to check defendant’s preposterous claim that
she received a copy of the Judgment only on December 5, 2002, even if it was released more than
forty-five (45) days earlier on October 16, 2002." He stresses that even if the defendant received a
12 

copy of the Judgment on December 5, 2002, still, Judge Bermejo should have reckoned the period
to appeal from the time the defendant’s counsel received a copy of the Judgment and not when the
defendant received it herself. What is more, the registry return card showing the date the
defendant’s counsel received a copy of the Judgment was missing from the records.

Dr. Montemayor adds that the Order dated January 6, 2003 giving due course to the defendant’s
appeal and requiring the latter to post a supersedeas bond within 10 days from receipt thereof was
released by registered mail more than one month later on February 11, 2003, and personal service
13 

thereof was made on April 9, 2003, or more than three months after the issuance thereof. The
motive for the belated service was purportedly to give the defendant more time to post a
supersedeas bond. Dr. Montemayor also faults the respondent Judge for granting the
defendant’s Urgent Motion for Extension to post a supersedeas bond in violation of Section 13, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three (3) Motions for Execution and two (2) Motions to
Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment.

Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the records of the case
to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it was only after the respondent Judge received the
defendant’s supersedeas bond that the former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the
Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court. 14

Required to comment, Judge Bermejo vigorously disputes Dr. Montemayor’s allegations.

In his Comments dated August 11, 2003, he explains that he did not act on the plaintiffs’ Motion for
15 

Early Resolution dated July 30, 2002 because there was yet no proof that the defendant already
received the Order of May 20, 2002 requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers,
the affidavits of their witnesses and other documentary evidence. Indeed, after the defendant filed
her Position Paper on August 14, 2002, he issued an Order on September 23, 2002 declaring the
case submitted for decision. Hence, the Judgment rendered on October 10, 2002 was well within the
prescribed period of 30 days under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (Rule on
Summary Procedure).

Judge Bermejo says that he did not act on the first Motion for Execution because the court had not
yet received the registry return receipts of the service of judgment at that time. Furthermore,
December 16, 2002, the hearing date the plaintiffs requested, was not a motion day. He also did not
act upon the Second Motion for Execution and the Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform
the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment both filed on December 26, 2002 because
at that time, the court was conducting a semestral inventory of pending cases, and also because the
defendant had already filed a Notice of Appeal on December 20, 2002.

Judge Bermejo denies that he did not act on the Third Motion for Execution and the Second Motion
to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the
Judgment which were set for hearing on January 31, 2003. He claims that he issued an Order on the
same date requiring Dr. Montemayor to submit to the court an Affidavit of Service of said motions on
the defendant. He further claims that he even advised Dr. Montemayor’s counsel in open court to
find out the registry receipt number of the registered mail containing the court’s Judgment addressed
to the defendant’s counsel to enable Dr. Montemayor to secure a certification from the Philippine
Postal Office regarding the date the defendant’s counsel received a copy of the Judgment. In any
event, the respondent Judge asserts that he resolved the plaintiffs’ Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve All
Pending Incidents in the Order dated March 12, 2003.
Judge Bermejo also denies that the registry return card indicating the date the defendant’s counsel
received a copy of the Judgment was missing from the records. He says that at the time the
defendant filed her Notice of Appeal, the court had not yet received the registry return card.

Respondent Judge admits that he gave due course to the Notice of Appeal of the defendant in
an Order dated January 6, 2003 and required the latter to post a supersedeas bond within 10 days
from receipt of the same. He alleges that to ensure that the defendant would receive a copy of
the Order, he even required the Sheriff to personally serve it to the defendant, and ordered another
copy to be sent by registered mail. The respective counsels of the parties were also furnished copies
of the said Order both by personal service and by registered mail. The Judge does not deny,
however, that when Dr. Montemayor filed the Compliance and Manifestation on February 4, 2003,
the court was still waiting for the defendant to post a supersedeas bond.

Judge Bermejo rationalizes the granting of the defendant’s Urgent Motion for Extension of time to
post a supersedeas bond since the bond had already been processed and was ready for signature,
but the signatories and approving officials of the bonding company were not available because of the
Lenten season. He maintains that the said motion for extension is not a prohibited pleading under
the Rules of Court, and that the granting thereof was made in good faith and in the interest of justice.

He further denies that he prevented the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court.
Given that the defendant had not yet posted the supersedeas bond, and there was no proof to
convince him that the latter had already received a copy of the Order requiring her to file the bond,
the court could not transmit the records.

In his Reply dated August 21, 2003, Dr. Montemayor points out that copies of the Judgment were
sent to the parties by registered mail on October 16, 2002, as certified by the Branch Clerk of Court,
and not on October 11, 2002, as claimed by Judge Bermejo. 16

He also disputes the respondent Judge’s claim that he did not act on the first Motion for
Execution because there was yet no proof of receipt of the Judgment by the defendant’s counsel. Dr.
Montemayor highlights the fact that the first Motion for Execution was already pending at the time
the Notice of Appeal was filed. He also notes that while Judge Bermejo required the plaintiffs to
submit an Affidavit of Service relative to the Second Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel to
Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment, he did not require the same of the
defendant when she filed her Notice of Appeal. Finally, Dr. Montemayor denies that Judge Bermejo
resolved all pending incidents in the Order dated March 12, 2003, because the Judge did not act on
the plaintiffs’ Third Motion for Execution.

On September 11, 2003, the respondent Judge filed a Rejoinder maintaining that Judgment was

rendered well within the 30-day period required under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Thereafter,
he filed a Manifestation asking that the present administrative case be submitted for resolution
without further argument from the parties.

In his Reply to Rejoinder, Dr. Montemayor submits a Certification from the Manila Central Post
Office stating that the defendant received the mail matter containing a copy of the Judgment on
October 17, 2002. Another Certification from the Makati Central Post Office stating that the
17  18 

defendant’s counsel received a copy of the Judgment on October 18, 2002, Dr. Montemayor claims,
contradicts Judge Bermejo’s allegation that the court received no proof that the defendant’s counsel
had received a copy of the Judgment.
Required to evaluate the complaint, the OCA submitted its Report and Recommendation on
November 11, 2003 finding merit in the complaint and recommending that Judge Bermejo be fined in
the amount of P5,000.00 for failing to decide the case within the period fixed by law.

The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition of judgment. In
essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution was issued on
September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory
30-day period.

The Court is not persuaded.

Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a period of 30 days for the court to render
judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This period shall be counted from the receipt
of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

Section 11, Rule 70 echoes Section 10 of the Rule on Summary Procedure which governs unlawful
detainer cases, among others. The latter provision similarly mandates the resolution of such cases
19 

within 30 days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same.

Clearly, the reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment should be
computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the parties, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same, as provided by the Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the
judge deeming the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the
judge. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that
authorized by the law. 20

The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge Bermejo’s Order requiring them to
submit their respective affidavits and position papers. Assuming, however, that the court received
the defendant’s Position Paper on August 14, 2002, as respondent Judge claims, judgment should
have been rendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the decision was dated October 10, 2002, or
nearly a month after the lapse of the mandatory period for rendition of judgment and almost two
months from the receipt of the defendant’s Position Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay
and, thus, administratively liable.

Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to administer justice without delay. Rule
3.05 of the same Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods. The failure to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable, constitutes gross inefficiency and is a ground for the imposition of administrative
21 

sanctions against the defaulting judge. 22

Delay in the rendition of judgment, however, is the least of Judge Bermejo’s administrative
transgressions.

Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, states: "If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to
the time of the judgment appealed from…." The judgment is executed immediately in favor of the
plaintiff, as a matter of right, to prevent further damage arising from the loss of possession.23
The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feeble excuses for his inaction on the
plaintiffs’ Motions for Execution. He claims that the first Motion for Execution prayed that hearing be
set on a date that was not a motion day. Judge Bermejo forgets that while the Rules of Court
requires all motions to be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working
day, in the afternoon of the next working day, the same Rules provides an exception for motions
requiring immediate action. Perhaps, as a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer
24 

case is immediately executory, the plaintiffs believed that their motion came under the exception.
However, if the respondent Judge did not share this view, he could have simply set the motion for
hearing on the next motion day. Instead, he untenably ignored the motion.

Judge Bermejo also rationalizes his failure to act on the motion on the ground that there was no
proof yet that the defendant’s counsel had received notice of the Judgment. In this connection, Dr.
Montemayor alleges that the registry return card indicating the defense counsel’s notice of judgment
is missing from the records, a charge that respondent Judge vehemently denies. By doing so, he
placed himself in a Catch-22. His denial exposes his liability, as the succeeding discussion shows.

Copies of the Judgment were transmitted to the parties on October 16, 2002 by registered mail. The
plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution almost two months later on December 12, 2002. The
fact that the registry receipts of the service of judgment had not yet returned at this point would have
been cause for apprehension for any responsible judge. Yet Judge Bermejo has not conveyed any
semblance of anxiety. He did not inquire from, nor inform, the Clerk of Court about the absence of
the receipts two months after copies of the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead, he found the
lack of registry receipts a convenient reason for tarrying on the motion.

Questioning the timeliness of the defendant’s Notice of Appeal, Dr. Montemayor subsequently filed
two separate motions to require the defense counsel to inform the court of the date of his receipt of a
copy of the Judgment. This is a strange request since that fact could have been easily verified from
the registry return receipts, if indeed they were extant from the records. But Judge Bermejo did not
act on either motion. Stranger still, he admits to advising Dr. Montemayor to secure the registry
receipt number of the notice of judgment to the defendant’s counsel to establish the latter’s date of
receipt when, to repeat, all the respondent Judge had to do was look into the records.

These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two things.

One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge Bermejo is denying it to
cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr.
Montemayor’s allegations, the respondent Judge has not offered in these administrative proceedings
any evidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard of keeping records is
evidence of incompetence and lack of professionalism. The Court has held that:

A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and
official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events… This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.
25

Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which case, he is not only
guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse, bias in favor of the defendant.
On such receipts hinge the answer to Dr. Montemayor’s question: Did the defendant file her Notice
of Appeal on time? A negative answer would have dire consequences for the defendant since it
would preclude any stay in the execution of the adverse judgment.

Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a flimsy justification for his
inaction on Dr. Montemayor’s Second Motion for Execution. According to the respondent Judge, the
court was undertaking its semestral inventory when the motion was filed. Even if the Court were to
admit the adequacy of this obvious pretext, Judge Bermejo, at the very least, should have set the
motion for hearing on the next motion day after the inventory. But again, he disregarded the second
motion.

Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case the defendant does not file any supersedeas bond
or did not make any monthly deposit, the plaintiff would be entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate execution of the inferior court’s judgment. In such a case the execution is mandatory. In 26 

Fernandez v. Español, the Court held:

. . . . Considering these principles, respondent judge should simply have ascertained from
the records the allegations in complainant’s motion for execution and, on that basis, resolved
the motion. Had she done this, she could not have failed to notice that the defendant had not
given a supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution of the judgment and had not paid the
current rents as they fell due. The defendant’s failure to comply with these requisites entitled
the complainant to the immediate execution of the judgment. The court’s duty was simply to
order such execution. 27

In this case, Judge Bermejo did not order the immediate execution of the Judgment. On the contrary,
he even ordered defendant to file a supersedeas bond, which, in any event, should have been
posted within the period to file an appeal. In Chua v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared:
28 

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of
the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the
appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur:
(1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he
periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The
failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and
imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a
supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the
appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within
the period for the perfection of the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]

The records show that on January 6, 2003, Judge Bermejo granted the defendant 10 days from
receipt of the Order giving due course to the Notice of Appeal to post a supersedeas bond.
Assuming that the defendant received a copy of the Judgment only on December 5, 2002, the period
granted was way beyond the 15-day period for perfecting an appeal.

More than three months after, the defendant filed an Urgent Motion for Extension alleging that
"she had until April 21, 2003 to file her supersedeas bond" and asking for 10 more days to post the
same. How service of the Order of January 6, 2003 took so long was not sufficiently explained.
29 

Moreover, the Urgent Motion for Extension was filed only on April 24, 2003 or three days after her
30 

alleged last day to post the bond on April 21, 2003, in violation of the rule that motions for extension
31 

must be filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Compounding the
32 
erroneous admission of said motion for extension, Judge Bermejo, on the same day, issued
an Order allowing the defendant an additional extension of 15 days, more than the 10 days she
initially asked for, and in further violation of the rule enunciated in Chua, supra. In the meantime, the
transmittal to the appellate court of the case’s records was deferred to await the posting of the
supersedeas bond.

Actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer involve perturbation of social order which must be
resolved as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may
cause unnecessary delay should carefully be avoided. This rule lost all significance in the plaintiffs’
33 

unlawful detainer case. Not only did they suffer delay in the resolution of the action and in the
execution of the decision in their favor, but likewise delay in the appeal process.

The Court is not prepared to rule that Judge Bermejo is guilty of the loss of the registry receipts
proving the date of receipt by the defendant’s counsel of the notice of judgment in the absence of the
records of Civil Case No. 171824-CV before us.

Neither is the Court quick to hold respondent Judge guilty of bias and prejudice in the absence of
any showing that his acts stem from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on
some basis other than what the respondent Judge learned from his participation in the case. Judge
34 

Bermejo claims that he was moved by good faith and the interest of justice, particularly in granting
the defendant her motion for extension to post a supersedeas bond, considering that the bond was
ready for signing anyway. The Court is inclined to give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt,
especially in light of his Judgment in the unlawful detainer case, which was in favor of the plaintiffs.

However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in obvious disregard of
the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo
has put in question his partiality. It bears reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be
impartial but maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
35 

Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can
be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. 36

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr., of Branch 3 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment in violation of Rules
1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00.
Respondent Judge is also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is
fined the amount of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Puno, J., on leave.