14 Intellectual history/history of ideas Beverley Southgate 14.1 Introduction ‘The terms ‘intellectual history’ and ‘history of ideas’ are here used her way, the concept is elusive — potentially all-embracing, 1 pere langer of falling between any number of academic stools. Its bracing nature derives from its subject matter as the history of thought. can include the history of of science, of religious, political has ever ain can prove the conventional braries ie constraints of hhazardot departmental boundaries of academia, or even ‘and bookshops. The subject and its practitioners defy inary structures Mt not always approved by those academic frontier guards who vo keep their sanitized domains free from external intrusions, but it can a thoroughly respectable pedigree. Able to trace its ancestry back at least as 8 he subject quite properly exemplifies the ancient Greek ideal of f, philosophy comprised science ry — in fact, anything to do historians of ideas can be seen as their concerns. the subject's academic promiscuity concern with history Indeed, can constitute a maj and the historical draws both for procedures and fos poetry or prose, provides some of the most important source materi 268, study of ideas: one cannot study the thought of classical antiquity: wit reference to Greck tragedy; nor can one exclude Shakespeare from) consideration of ideas in any forms and uses and effects, plays an inevitably a largely text-based reassessments, as it does in jects as they come to terms with postmode: nputs come from psychology and anthropology, but the history of ideas’ most obviously close relation is chronological although th jere remains considerable overlap of interest of ideas may take some credle conventional history. That economic or so-called ally emphasize the empirical aspects of their discip ied determinedly to profess lack of concern with ‘conceptual’ or ‘theoretical’ issues. Geoffrey Elton was one eminent historian who believed that infection from ‘the virus’ of theory was particularly likely to emanate from the history of ideas, as being a subject that was ‘by its very nature to lose contact wi i 14.2 Antecedents and precursors of the history of ideas is often attributed o the American Arthur Lovejoy ng to identify what he called ‘unit been out of fashion. But nd trace their developm. is basic aim of uncovering ou psychological factors ind he can importantly take credit for the ing Journal of the History of Ideas. 269embarking on his own. He thus provided an invaluable source for pre-Socr thought, but he also incidentally bequeathed a model for much subsequent nificant in the narrat le of inconsequential‘ in a list of significant ind condemned by that sealed. And subsequent srogressive account of intellectual of canonical gute, passing the torch of ind to hand — from Descartes to Locke, from Locke to Hume, and from Hume to Kane’ and so on, as if (in Milan Kundera’s analogy) they were all in ‘a relay-race in which everyone surpasses his predecessor, most understandable. From early modernity and the significantly enti Enlightenment on, the usually preferred narrative projected an ascent — from through the darkness of the Middle Ages, up to the Scientific from his vantage point spearheading the new philosophy, ;plain that, in his review of past developments, ‘were to him, as Hippo had been to Aristotle, irrelevant to his progressive narrative, s0 could safely be consigned to oblivion. sta question of cual areas ~ from physics to biology, to psychology and sociology. 270 Intellectual historyrhistory of ide’ ‘That optimistic approach continues in such 19ch-century intellectual histoties a those of J. W. Draper, who saw progress exemplified by the gradual erosion of religious superstitions at the hands of ration: took no account of anything that failed to and science; so that whole theories and legated, like Hippo and the Arabs, to the historically irrelevant, and individual human beings suffered amputations as they were forced into a Proctustean mould. Thus, for example, the ‘vortex theory’ of Descartes (his attempted explanation of the universe in terms of atomic particles) vwas shunted down a siding, as a part of his*philosophy that «: forgotten; and the more mystical aspects of Newton's thought (including his igs on theology and belief in his own links with an ancient ime, they nonetheless left some impressive achievements in the field of intellectual history. Draper's work cited above incorporates a huge range of cluding what we would now refer to as history of the sciences and of 1e Hitory of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne, W. EH. Lecky similarly sweeps authoritatively over a vast range of hi ‘material, as is indicated in his modestly stared, but hugely ambitious, aim ‘simply to trace the action of external circumstances upon morals, to examine ‘what have been the moral types proposed as ideal in different ages, in what degree practice, and by what causes they have been modified, a lengthy and sympathetic ipates by a hundred years the development of more formal ‘women's history’. Although currently largely ighored, then, Draper and Lecky can, in a number of ways, be seen as important 19th-century precursors of the history of ideas. So too can Leslie Stephen, who published his History of English Thought in the 18th Century in 1876, Taking the history of philosophy as his starting point, he 27‘wating History age ang wily re he Bory of ght ning hes ach nella story of thought’ is re-emphasized ion later by J.T. Merz. In his four-volume A History of European Thought in the 19th Century, he statts from the history of science, but aspires to answer the much wider question of ‘what part the history of our {19th] century’. For him, too, thoug! than just philosophy; and he notes how the ‘history of philosophy has expression of 19th-century doubts and ‘That evaluation of Goethe might stand as a ck preconceived notions which have governed thet insights, then, long pre-dated postmodernist challenges to historical ‘objectivity’, and these 19th-century examples confirm that the history of ideas by no means sprang jgraphers and philosophers had 14.3 Theory 1: Aims and purposes ‘The theoretical aims and purposes of history of ideas (as of most other humanities subjects) tend to be couched in p self justificatory mission-statements i author of a text, to the wider Mark Bevir has recently written, ‘way someone else has made someone else has understood thi (as with Newton and his chronology). let us briefly note the claims that the history of ideas can contribute to a more 272 Intellectual history/history of ide generalized understanding of our cultural environments, and hence of out own good selves. The very term ‘cultural environment or provide physical manifestations of that almost mystical, and certainly elusive, entity, the ‘zeitgeist’. The quest for that idealized construction has, again, long been out of fashion; but that is not to deny that various cultural manifestations might share some qualities, and that an examination of those qualities might provide some ight inco the period in which they were produced, also provide insight into how cultural and intellectual change occurs, nce, for example, have been concerned to account for such -view’ as that occasioned by the early modern Copernican in cosmology; while historians of political theory have considered ts such as that articulated in the works of Machiavelli. In examples of has to be paid to the replacement of one intellectual framework (or ‘paradigm’, or web of what has become ‘customary’), and its associated linguistic structures, by another. The history of ideas chus inevitably broadens out again to encompass a potentially infinite range of study, but can profitably focus on how individuals respond to intellectual challenges and are able (or unable) co adapt and modify and replace theit systems of belief. The point of it all, though, is not to set out in pursuit of some holy grail, or redeeming essence, of even to trace assumed connections in the service of some moral or aesthetic goal. Itis rather to demonstrate contingency — to show that ie, and therefore we, could have been quite different from what it is and what we are. ‘That is to say, cultural environments and the individuals that inhabit them are to bbe understood as historical entities (however different from ourselves). They — and wwe ~ are derived from earlier forms, and are subject to being succeeded by other and both those forms themselves and ¢ otherwise. We may te our own identities by ascribing to them antecedents that make the end result atleast seem che resultant recognition of our own historicity — are ourselves a part of history, nor only a product of past history agent for history in the for promoting such recognition, since it is concerned with the examination not simply of thoughts which have been expressed, but also with those attitudes and presuppositions which we all have, but which are so much a part of us that they may never be consciously formulated. The actual foundations of our thoughts don't need to be expressedIntellectual history/history of ideas they are precisely what is accepted as ‘obvious’, or as ‘common-sense’ at any given time, and therefore simply taken for granted. So the point of questioning those unarticulated foundations isto enhance our own self-awareness — our be confionted by the whole problematic issue of reading and ‘and trying to understand those texts in relation to their (a0 less contexts. Ichas often been assumed that, granted the exercise of due diligence and pro Procedutes, intelectual historians can penetrate to ‘the meaning’ of a texe bac c aning of that ‘meaning’ has become the subject of dispute. Some literary crities have affirmed the need to ascertain ‘in meaning, through careful analysis of the text itself as an autonomous entity, without regaed to any ontext; others have how appears to us. But historians are py the meaning that the at intended the text to convey, so that they come to focus on inte Skinner has affirmed: ‘to know what a writer me entions were in writing and recover the truth of an is original context, has remained a main motive for historians thr modern ‘not worth living’, insisted Socrates, his mantra derived from the Delphi perennially relevant instruction to ‘Know thyself? Self-knowledge and a recognition of our own contingency can be fostered also through the examination of alternatives: by studying the ideas and beliefs of people in antiquity or the Middle Ages or in other cultures, for example, we are forced to confront situations and structures quite different from our own. So we come to realize that we could have had — and could have — altogether differe values and aspirations from the ones we simply take for granted. Viewed from alternative perspective, our own position no longer appears as inevitable and as the necessary outcome of some predetermined historical process. 1 result of ‘numerous contingencies (of things that, by chance, turned out one way rather than another, and affected further events accordingly), and we can see that, for the future, we actually do have a choice. Liberation from the constraints of tunnel vision, then, can be seen as an important aim of the history of ideas: the study of the past can be used 1 = forthe present and the Future. Even in practical terms, the key to current pr may be there, awaiting rediscovery. Early modern thinkers, for example, the newly recovered text of the Roman poet Lucret As Quentin by a particular work fo context’. He goes on *n of the right context (sic] is one that ut one might well ask how, even with an in could po: another context, which is to say for a ‘a few aspects of any totality can ever be selected, and bbe based on some criteria. Skinner has suggested that the texts with ‘tual historians are likely to be concerned can be seen as arguments, as responses to some other text(s); so attempts at contextualization might stare there. But those other texts are not necesarily contemporary, but can date to any period; so that again the context may bs indefinitely extended. Indeed, the whole concepe of context remane highly Where do we stop? How do we determine the foreground and /hat is more important, and what less)? Is anything ever discrete, and separable from everything else? Further difficulties, concerning the text itself, derive from considerations of the intellectual and socio- users, language (and so ‘meaning’) is itself subjece «. We may read words from the past, but do they the author originally intended (assuming, against the odds, i 1g what they mean and intend only a single meaning anyway)? How do we ascertain their ‘tone’ ~ whether direct, or + oF whatever? (The raised eyebrow may need to be sensed, if we to make of words that refer to concepts we no longer even lieve in (such as the long-lived Aristotelian ‘primum mobile, for Bardcular porpos: since only lerpin the new mechanical philosophy; the rediscovered text of Sextus Empiricus in the 16th cet enormously influential in inventor Barnes Walls claimed ro have got his inspiration for a spinning bomb in the Second World War from a 17th-century account of an attempt round comers. Aspects of the past, often long forgotten and ig imaginative reintegration into our own syntheses, 14.4 Theory 2: Methods political power struct to constant change through How, then, do we set about attaining intellectual liberation and. ‘What methods can realize such ambitious aims? The history of ideas is essentially a text-based study: its study of the past is centred on texts and their contexts ~ with varying relative emphasis on those two clements, "Texts’ may include works of art or architec ny artefact or even’ human gesture intended (or not) to express an ideas most part, historians of ideas uti therefore ‘mean the same to us 74.whiting History instance)? And how are we to recognize and interpret those absences and silences, ofen mor pregnant wid mening than our wor, tee punctate ur conversations and our texts? Do they denote a deliberate obfuscation, or refusal to concede an ‘unacceptable’ position, or a (possibly unconscious) lecision about the propriety of certain revelations? No language actual words, nor the manner of through time, and any translation from one language to another ion from that of the past to that of our own in the present) inevit meaning and of understanding, If the ‘meaning’ of a have intended to be taken, as a se: ining, gesturing, of whatever). : tht of core iby na mene cro ane: signal no infec convey ambiguous messages; and messages themselves may be less than decisive or : 7 person waving hie arin the distance may Stevie Smith's poetic fat was presented (in the form of coherently just what However, some knowledge of a context might help us to read the waver’s actual int Maybe, for example, there ate no bul remain impossible, and although it will never be possible to recover any context entirety, it may yet be possible to unearth some context which throws light object of our study — ns are anachroni danger of rere with contemporary debates. Our knowledge nables us to get around in the world — at least to the. Intellectuat historymis 14.5 Practice 1: Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism Originally published in 1960, Richard H. Popkia's. History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes was revised and extended to carry on the story 1979. Ic has proved to be a seminal work in the history of ideas, and practice many of the theoretical points introduced above. There had, of course, been some earlier recognition of the importance of sceptical pl which had originated in ancient Greece and gained in influence after the 1858 had identified igger for scientific investigation, religious toleration and al liberty; and Leslie Stephen in 1876 had noted how scepticism, as sped in particular by David ume, ‘marks gne of the great turning-points possible in the mid-20th century to @ movement that has been almost completely neglected’! and there can be no doubt that Popkin’s work stimulated a veritable academic industry, dealing as it did with a subject that ean now be seen to have had increasingly obvious relevance in the context of postmodernity. iis worth noting that Popkin early acknowledges cts of is study — the sceptics: he is effect He writes elsewhere of the sceptical ct heritage’, and clearly approves of ap intellectual pretensions’. He also wi write to be a history of somethii its author ~a history, not of some obscure and passing i fad, but of an essei opkin's opening chapter already illustrates further important points about the ature of the history of ideas as he sees it its esse inary character: its inevitable fusing of the intellectual with the social and political; and its obvious relevance for our selfunderstanding in the present. By starting with ‘the intellectual crisis of the Reformation’, Popkin indicates how an intellectual trend ‘ean appear in one area of human experience ~ here theology — and ripple out from ach more generally. Luther’implications of that theologic: ge were to prove much more widely unsettling: as Popkin puts it, Luther in 1519 opened a Pandora box that ... was to have the most far-reaching consequences, in theology but throughour man’s entire intellectual realm’ (History of Scepticism, pA) “What escaped from Pandora’ box — what was lost for ever ~ was the confidence that people had in 1 jons to validate ‘the truth’. For better or worse, Luther's repudiation of theological authority was to leave individuals free to make their own judgements: in the assessment of truth, the sole criterion was to become the individual conscience. And if people were to be left to their own resources in on, why should not those resources be similarly utilized in the is case, attempt to assess the characters of their sujet inthe ie cotta hi Ine the aye of hearing sa examples that they use to make their arguments; and they try (not least post. Foucaule) especially to avoid imposing anachronistic categori on people in the past Moncaigne himelf, at aleve underrated thinker whose importan ized by Popkin) Bayle, frvoured fideism ~ a I fom the confined to Sunday- especially once its practical force was underpinned by theoret and Popkin goes on to show hi just such underpinning that was provided by the rediscovery of (especi Empiricus’ account of Pyrtho's sceptical philosophy. The exact chronoloy reintroduction of the current of Greek scepticism into the western ‘mainstream is disputed, and highlights one general difficulty in the .ce. While the publication dates of such its various translations) can of course be ascertained, other works, or diaries, or letters), the extent of actual emi oma ‘The other escape ite was initiated by yet another often neglected figure, identified by Popkin as 1 of the most important figures in the history of modern thought, the French Marin Mersenne. At the centre of an Je embracing, uch luminaries as Descartes, Gated Galileo and Hobbes, Mectnne war well placed to recognize the virtues of the so-called ‘new philosophy’ (embraci Copernican cosmology and mechanistic science) tek bese le arguments of the sceptical philosophy result was a form of ‘mitigated’ or ‘constructive’ scepticism that conceded ultimate unknowability of nature's essences, but nonetheless pragmat id useful knowledge of their appearances. As wi postmodernism, we may no longer lay claim to certainty based foundatio without direct references he believed, one reverts to the certainties of religion. Montaigne is one of many thinkers cited by Popkin who have never attained the respectability of inclusion in the philosophical canon, ‘as being tru ‘significant’ in the history of philosophy; and in this respect The History of, Scepticiom shows how the history of ideas includes within its purview many wl ‘would slip through a historical net designed to catch only figures now considered, | ‘major’. These lesser-known characters can be particularly difficule to assess, owing not least to the dearth of evidence (and its often contradictory nature) about approval of Hume, then, relates wo more than a pi Hume, who contrived in obvious and apparen b very practical lesson for of presuppositions remain av of ideas. Modesty, hus tus goals for the subject. Bwider socio-pol despite the current fashion for more synchronic studies, such diachronic surveys as The History of Scepticism will always have their place in the history oF ideas. This particular example has proved seminal inasmuch as it has acted as a seedbed for much further research; and the importance of its subject matter has become increasingly obvious as scepticism again assumes a dominant position in our own postmodern times. 14.6 Practice 2: Annabel Patterson, Early Modern Liberalism cognizance of postmoderni in making of ita positive virtue. That (as she puts it) of ideas and belies. The story she has chosen to tell was not lying there in the past, ready-made; but she has gone to great trouble to select from the past those relics and memories (in the form of various texts, literary and pictorial) that enable her to make a case that she believes to be of contemporary importance. ‘Thus, Professor Patterson makes ie clear at the outset that she does indeed have rested academic investigation of the past. the missionary position’, seeking support for a liberal agenda in the present. That immediately sets her apart from the tradition of modernist history, with its insistence on authorial detachment in a subject that denies the propricty of any moral or political connections; but it ign her with the committed position earlier adopted, as we have does, of course, but as a philosophy the virtues of which were still to be recommended, so ‘liberalism’ is to be seen as something that still demands our constant cherishing, 280 a%: lectual historymistory of ed Liberalism (a word not actually used at the period in question) is defined terms of human beings being naturally equal and having e such basics as physical and religious freedom, education, and freedom of expression. These are the sorts of thing y prospective readers are likely to simply take for granted, so that one function of the book is to demonstrate how a liberal tradition did not arise naturally at all. On the contrary, it was something that had to be fought for at enormous cost, something that emerged slowly and precariously in the face of authoritarian vested interests and is by implication something that needs to be carefully tended and ‘maintained. Patterson argues, then, that liberalism actually arose as a direct response to perceived injustices. Treason trials, for example, in which men were arraigned on ‘charges at the arbitrary whim of monarchs and their advisers, were early seen as an aff spirited self-defence won acquittal by a jury whose members were themselves then iprisoned and heavily fined. A record of the Throckmorton case was che following century, when charges of treason were made, al authorities but in not dissimilar ways, against the in 1649, Sir Henry Vane in 1662 and Algernon Sidney in 1683. Accounts of their trials, and of the gross injustices they suffered, were surreptitiously written and published; and these unofficial or ‘secret’ histories came to constitute a public memory and tradition of dissent that then gave encouragement in turn to la Annabel Patterson's work, then, no less than Richard Pop! practice a number of the theoretic: particularly it demonstrates how intellectual history might well look in the context of postmodernity. Thus, in the construction of her historical narrative, the author utilizes a wide range of sources — not only such conventional literary texts as official documents, canonical philosophies and court transcript poetry, engravings and writings of lesser-known people retrieved from previous obscurity. As herself an interloper from a literary background, she clearly has lite time for rigid disciplinary distinctions, and she insists on the centrality for her ature’ — including, for instance, the politically infused works of Andrew Marvell and John Milton. She goes on to examine all her chosen texts motives and intentions of their producers, and to their styles and rhetorical devices. Interested as she is in the diffusion of ideas, and the conveyance of a liberal tradition from England to the American colonies, she has also confronted problems relating to the transmission of ideas and causal influence, producing evidence from known personal contact, direct reference andevidence, but itis quite reasonably that they might well throw light on the shad; © conventional history. They can include those who might ‘otherwise remain on the periphery, and provide important evidence of dissident but one example of how ry. Far from. generalizing about abstract ‘ideas’ and ‘influence’, she meticulously reveals how the tradition of i herself makes clear, depends largely ‘on persons — not on extracting thot its context but on putting it back into the heads of real thinkers an (Early Modern Liberalism, locke Buthe walnd that hee wee not us theoretical constructions: hey had developed their theories in practical opposition to political ryra himself was concerned inten to se that historia insight for his own practi purposes on the other side of the Ad Tn that transatlantic transmissio Patterson is Thomas Hollis. Indeed, ideas to the American colonies in the mid defying the constraints of conv story ‘not at the beginning, b ronology by beginning thar ! (Early Modern Liberalism F course well aware of her itposes she cuts into the in order to set up a helps to clarify and illuminate the chronological example, Hollis expressed enor! works he edited, and whose revolutionary tracts he donsted. to Harvard bie ES Intellectual historyhhistory of ideas ity a8 part of a deliberate commitment to transplant the European he context of Milton's established place in tha tradition that Patterson is enabled to analyse diverse interpretations of his sonnets, and reach conclusions of his own ambivalence Above all, though, Annabel Patterson's work is characterized: by a self- ss about its purpose; and that purpose is not only intellectual, in greater awareness of those presuppositions that we ourselves take for is also moral and ps liberalism, and showing how, against all odds, these actually took hold and grew, she reminds us of our indebtedness to brave individuals in the past, and alerts ws to the tenuousness of our own hold on what we may all too often assume are the naturally given ‘rights’ ofa liberal tradition, Writing of John Locke, she point asks (Early Modern Liberalism, p. 250), ‘And what of our own prospects for ler She is concerned, that is, through her history to inspire self-conscious liberally orientated action in the future, and she, thus provides a very posi ‘model for postmodern historical study. 14.7 Conclusion: The future about the past, but able nonetheless pragmatically to practical respects Ic is those practical respects with which ication of postmodernism is concerned: just what is the have suggested above, that is not hard to answer. By lectual developments and transformations in the past ~ the ways that one set of ideas is gradually or more suddenly replaced by another, both at a personal and public level ~ we may gain some insigh thought processes, presuppositions, motivations now. By studying other people at other times and in other cultures, we are confronted by alternatives, and by those who have struggled to assimilace ideas that initially seemed alien, We may, thus, further come to see theit (and our and cor and so be empowered 0 take some ly require an openness to ideas long lectual tradition, Annabel Patterson has writen (Early Modern Liberalism, p. 215) of the need for ‘the combined acts of memory and imagination, thinking backwards in order to think forwards’, and that might well ser the agenda for historieal study in postmodernity284 whiting History In that context, we might return to Geoffrey Elton, who described historians of ideas as ‘a vociferous minority’. That was not intended as a compliment by a man who readily conceded that ‘Good historians are not primarily men of ideas." But it may suggest 2 fitting aspiration for intellectual historians in the 21st century? Guide to further reading Iain lampsher- Monk A Hiory of Moder Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobles te Mare (Oxford, 1992). David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford, 1989). John Hency, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science (2nd ed., Basingstoke, 2002). Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers (Harmondsworth, 1964). c. Fr yn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology. and the Scientific Revolution (San 0, 1980), Annabel Patterson, Early Modern Liberalism (Cambridge, 1997). Richard H. Popkin, The Hieory of Scepeciom fiom Enarmus to Spinosa (Betkeley and Los Angeles, 1979), Roy Porter, The Enlightenment (2nd ed., Basingstoke, 2001). Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberaliom (Cambridge, 1998). James Tully (ed), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge, 1988). Beverley Southgate, Pastmaderniim in Hittory (London, 2003), Notes Many thanks to John tbbett for helpful conversations and constructive comments on an earlier draft. academic Journal of, 1. Justification is provided by the fact that the leadi the History of Ideas has as its subtitle ‘an interdisciplinary journal devoted to intellectual history’. For discussion of such terminology, see Maurice! indelbaum, ‘The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History off Philosophy’, History and Theory 5 (1965), pp. 33-66. AUN ow “4 1 1 1 5 6 7 8 a Intellectual history/history of. Geoffrey Elton, Return to Esser Aristo ials (Cambridge, 1991), p. 27. Metaphysics, Book 1, 98a, ‘phen, History of English Thought in the 18th Century, 2 vols }876), Vol. 1, p. 3 . Milan Kundera, Immortality (London, 1992), p. 136. Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. FH. Anderson (Indianapolis, 1960), p75, J. W. Draper, A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe, 2 vols (London, 1875), Vol. 1, p. 142; Vol. 2, p. 400. J.T. Metz, A History of European Thought in the 19th Century, 4 vols (Edinburgh, London, 1896-1914), Vol. 1, pp. 14, 61, 76. Merz, History, Vol. 1, p.7. Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge, 1999), p. 178 (my emphasis); cf. p. 190. Quentin skinner, “Motives, Intentions and interpretations’, reprinted in James Tully (ed), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge, 1988), p. 76 (emphasis added t’meant’ and ‘intentions’, and removed from Conrad Russel 1990), p. 48. For Wittgenstein’ example, as for much else in this chapter, |am indebted to Quentin Skinner, whose writings on both the theory and practice of history of ideas has been of the first importance during the last four decades. For Stevie Smith, ‘Not Waving but Drowning’, see James MacGibbon (ed.) The Collected Pomes of Stevie Smith (London, 1985), p. 303. Pierre Bayle, Dictionary, art. ‘Pyrrhon’, cited by Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinaza (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979), p. 252, n, 3; Henry Buckle, History of Civilizations in England, 2 vols (London, 1858), Vol. 1, pp. 317, 328; Stephen, History, Vol. 1, p. 43. R. H. Popkin, ‘Berkeley and Pyrthonism’ (1951), reprinted in Myles : Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983) p.394,n. 21 Popkin, History, p. xxi; Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (eds), The High Road to Pyrrhonism (San Diego, 1980), pp. 37, 29, 53, David Hume and John Leland, quoted by Popkin, High Road, pp. 57-8, 206. Elton, Essentials, p. 29; The Practice of History (London, 1969), p. 192 t Gardiner (ed.), The History Debate (London,