1. G.R. No.

L-13505 February 4, 1919

GEO. W. DAYWALT, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

1. In the year 1902, Teodorica Endencia, an unmarried woman, resident in the Province of Mindoro, executed a
contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt, a tract of land situated in the barrio of
Mangarin, municipality of Bulalacao, now San Jose, in said province. It was agreed that a deed should be
executed as soon as the title to the land should be perfected by proceedings in the Court of Land Registration
and a Torrens certificate should be produced therefore in the name of Teodorica Endencia.

2. They had several contracts to this effect. The Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia, but
in the course of the proceedings relative to the registration of the land, it was found by official survey that the
area of the tract inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract was about 1.248 hectares of 452 hectares as
stated in the contract. In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole
tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had been
misinformed as to its area.

3. (Supreme Court) This attitude of hers led to litigation in which Daywalt finally succeeded, upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, in obtaining a decree for specific performance; and Teodorica Endencia was ordered to convey
the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to the contract of October 3, 1908, which contract was declared to be
in full force and effect. This decree appears to have become finally effective in the early part of the year 1914.
The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation, with its domicile in the city
of Manila. The same corporation was at this time also the owner of another estate on the same island immediately
adjacent to the land which Teodorica Endencia had sold to Geo. W. Daywalt. When the Torrens certificate was
finally issued in 1909 in favor of Teodorica Endencia, she delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant
corporation, and it was then taken to Manila where it remained in the custody and under the control of P. Juan
Labarga the procurador and chief official of the defendant corporation, until the deliver thereof to the plaintiff
was made compulsory by reason of the decree of the Supreme Court in 1914. As Teodorica still retained
possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle
belonging to the defendant corporation were pastured upon said land during a period extending from June 1,
1909, to May 1, 1914. Under the first cause stated in the complaint in the present action the plaintiff seeks to
recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P24,000, as damages for the use and occupation of the land
in question by reason of the pasturing of cattle thereon during the period stated.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. Trial Court - defendant corporation was liable for damages by reason of the use and occupation of the premises
in the manner stated; and fixed the amount to be recovered at P2,497.00 plaintiff seeks to recover from the
defendant corporation the sum of P500,000, as damages, on the ground that said corporation, for its own selfish
purposes, unlawfully induced Teodorica Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale
of the land.

ISSUE: whether the damages allowed should be increased due to the alleged unjustified interference

RULING:
No. Damages assessed are sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the land during
the whole time it was used.

Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or
negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage so done. Ignoring so much of this article
as relates to liability for negligence, we take the rule to be that a person is liable for damage done to another
by any culpable act; and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when judged by accepted
legal standards. The stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of
the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess
of those that could be recovered against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once
grotesque and unjust.

Damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts, namely,
(1) the ordinary, natural, and in a sense necessary damage; and
(2) special damages.

The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is an instance of ordinary damage. Special damages are
found in case where some external condition, apart from the actual terms to the contract exists or intervenes, as
it were, to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promisor, without actual notice of that
external condition, could not reasonably be expected to foresee.

The damages in question are special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made, and secondly, because said damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. This
conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the plaintiff to recover such damages from the defendant
corporation, for, as already suggested, by advising Teodorica not to perform the contract, said corporation could
in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principle in the contract. To our mind a fair conclusion
on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that the contract
cold not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or
assistance which they may have given was, therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive.

1. DAYWALT VS. CORPORACIÓN DE PP. AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS

FACTS:

Geo. W. Daywalt seeks to recover from la corporación de los padres recoletos the the sum of p500,000, as
damages, on the ground that said corporation, for its own selfish purposes, unlawfully induced teodorica
endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of a tract of land and to withhold delivery
to the plaintiff of the torrens title, and further, maliciously and without reasonable cause, maintained her in her
defense to the action of specific performance which was finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in this court.

ISSUES:

Whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes himself liable for damages to the
vendee, beyond the value of the use and occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the
effort to resist an action for specific performance.

Whether the damages which the plaintiff seeks to recover under this head are too remote and speculative to be
the subject of recovery.

HELD: Yes, a stranger to a contract can make himself liable for collusion with the obligor for breach thereof. In
this case, the damages ordinarily recoverable against a vendor for failure to deliver land which he has contracted
to deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully withheld.
The defendant corporation is liable in this action for the damage resulting to the plaintiff from the wrongful use
and occupation of the property has also been already determined. It is enough that defendant used the property
with notice that the plaintiff had a prior and better right article 1902 (now article 2176) of the civil code declares
that any person who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall
be liable for the damage so done.

The damages recoverable upon breach of contract are, primarily, the ordinary, natural and in a sense the
necessary damage resulting from the breach. Other damages, known as special damages, are recoverable where
it appears that the particular conditions which made such damages a probable consequence of the breach were
known to the delinquent party at the time the contract was made. This proposition must be understood with the
qualification that, if the damages are in the legal sense remote or speculative, knowledge of the special conditions
which render such damages possible will not make them recoverable. Special damages of this character cannot
be recovered unless made the subject of special stipulation.
 2. RECEIVER FOR NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC. VS. YBANEZ

FACTS:

Pedro V. Ybdfiez and Rosario V. Ybanez are the brother and sister, respectively, and immediate heirs of Cesar
V. Ybafiez who was one of two persons who died as a result of the collision between the car, where said Cesar
V. Ybafiez was riding and being driven by Gil Dominguez, and train No. 5, owned by the North Negros Sugar
Company, Inc. A civil action based on culpa aquiliana was instituted by Pedro V. Ybanez and Rosario V. Ybaiiez
against Primitivo Gustilo, Loreto Perez, and their employer, North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. seeking to
recover damages for the death of their brother. The Court of First Instance dismissed the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the lower court and held the North Negros Sugar Company, Inc.
liable for the death of Cesar V. Ybafiez, ordering it to pay plaintiffappellant Pedro V. Ybanez damages.

ISSUE:

Is the Court of Appeals correct in awarding moral damages to Ybanez?

HELD:

NO. The brother or sister of a deceased cannot claim moral damages.

It may well be said that culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, is punished both by the old Civil Code —the previous
legislation—and by the new Civil Code. But a less severe sanction, or penalty, for culpa aquiliana is provided
for in the new Civil Code. It follows, therefore, that Article 2206 of the new Civil Code—which provides that
only the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased caused by quasi-delict—should be applied in the case at bar.
Hence, petitioner herein, who claims moral damages for the death of his brother Cesar V. Ybanez caused by
quasidelict, is not entitled to, and should not have been awarded, moral damages, by the Court of Appeals (Heirs
of Gervacio Gonzales v. Alegarbes).

Moreover, Article 1902 of the old Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission, characterized
by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage done. A person is liable for
damage done to another by any culpable act; and by culpable act is meant any act which is blame-worthy when
judged by accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortuous acts likely to be developed in any society (Daywalt v. Corporacion
de PP-Agustinos Recoletos, et al).
 3. RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting
iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but
one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one
another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails
lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides.
According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the
water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the
plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable.

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal
effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:

First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and

Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or
behind it.

The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail
was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen
testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side
of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On
this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent
of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself
in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion
for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his
employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative
primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed
to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his employee of a fellow-

servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule,"
exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the
employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
 4. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO,
ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

Facts:

Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable for the death of Carlitos Bautista,
a third year commerce student who was stabbed while on the premises of PSBA by elements from outside the
school. Private respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the school and its officers’
negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during, and after the attack on the victim.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.

Ruling:

NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools
and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures.
This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
 5. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 112576, October 26, 1994

ROMERO, J.: (Bank’s Negligence as Source of Liability)

FACTS: Isabel Katigbak, president and owner of 65% shares of Rural Bank of Padre Garcia, Inc., maintains a
current accounts with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. MBTC received from Central Bank a credit memo
that its demand deposit account was credited with P304k for the account of RBPG, representing loans granted
by the CB. On the basis of credit memo, Katigbak issued several checks against its account with MBTC, two of
which were payable to Dr. and Mrs. Roque. The checks were deposited with Philippine Banking Corp. however
the same bounced when they were forwarded to MBTC. It was twice dishonored. Dr. Roque went to RBPG for
the bounced checks. RBPG paid Dr. Roque an amount of P50k representing the checks. Katigbak, who was on
vacation in Hongkong with her family, received overseas call from Mrs. Maris Katigbak-San Juan at her
residence in Makati that Mr. Dungo, Asst. Cashier of MBTC, berating her about the bounced checks and saying
“Nag-issue kayo ng tseke, wala naming pondo”. Mrs. San Juan was instructed by Katigbak to check and verify
regarding the credit memo of CB for P304K in favor of RBPG as she was certain that the checks were covered by
the credit memo. Mrs. San Juan another insulting phone call from Mr. Dungo (“Bakit kayo nag-iisue ng tseke na
wala namang pondo, P300K na”). He also brushed aside the request to check and verify the credit memo, telling
her sarcastically that he was very sure that no such credit memo existed. Katigbak had to cut short her vacation
and went back home. She then called MBTC and she was able to talk to Mr. Dungo who arrogantly said “Bakit
kayo magagalit, wala naman kayog pondo?” This shocked Katigbak which caused her blood pressure to rise to
a dangerous level and she had to undergo medical treatment at the Makati Medical Center for two days. MBTC
did not only dishonored the check, it also issued four debit memos representing service and penalty charges for
the returned checks. Katigbak filed the civil case in RTC Lipa against MBTC for damages. RTC rendered decision
in favor of petitioner. The same was affirmed by CA with deletion as to temperate damages,and deduction as to
amount of moral damages.

ISSUE:

Is there a basis as to negligent act of MBTC as the ground for the awarding of damages in the civil suit of
Katigbak?

HELD:

YES. The presence of malice and the evidence of besmirched reputation or loss of credit and business standing,
as well as a reappraisal of its probative value, involves factual matters which have been determined by the lower
court. There is no merit in petitioner’s argument that it should not be considered negligent, much less be held
liable for damages on account of inadvertence of its bank employee as Art. 1173 of the Civil Code only requires
it to exercise the diligence of a good pater familias.

The dishonoring of the respondent’s checks committed through negligence by the petitioner was rectified nine
days after receipt of the credit memo. MBTC was remiss in its duty and obligation to treat private respondent
account with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The bank is under
the obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. Responsibility arising from negligence
in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable.

While the bank’s negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused
serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled to recover
reasonable moral damages. Insult was added to injury by petitioner bank’s issuance of debit memoranda
representing service and penalty charges for the returned checks, not to mention the insulting remarks from its
Asst. Cashier.

Moral and temperate damages which are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation are not awarded to penalize
the petitioner but to compensate the respondents from injuries suffered as a result of the former’s fault and
negligence. AFFIRMED.
 6. G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
Lesson Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her, own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH,
BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO.,
INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
▪ December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big Bang
Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay
▪ Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her
minor children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge
of the firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard
Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury
▪ Superguard:
▪ Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed
with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.

civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
▪
Revised Penal Code
▪ CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even if Benigno
Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits
▪ Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action ,
reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused
▪ Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
▪ Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate
civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary
▪ extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
▪ It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the
latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.
 7. G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987

VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON, respondents.

Facts:

A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to
petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private respondent Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage
assessed at P53,024.22.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally
with Traveller’s Insurance and Surety Corporation, the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as
moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs.

The insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability
under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

Held:

It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar.

These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof.

According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then
it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another
bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo
truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect.

Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence
on his part in the selection and supervision of his driver.

Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was negligence on the part of the petitioner,
the petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in awarding private respondent actual, moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs, is untenable.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.

 8. AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.
(37 Phil 809) G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

FACTS:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union When Smith
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile with rate of speed of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts,
as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning signals. Being perturbed by the rapid approach of the
vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the left. The bridge is about 75 meters and a width of only 4.80 meters. The vehicle approached without
slowing down. Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of
the railing where it as then standing; but due to the automobile’s close proximity to the animal, the animal
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as
struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.

The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:
Whether Smith was guilty of negligence and liable for civil obligations

HELD:
Yes. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to
bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.

A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant
was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.

Test of Negligence:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

“last clear chance” rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot
extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position
becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note
especially Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.)
 9. GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE et al vs. IAC et al

G.R. No. 70493

May 18, 1989

NARVASA, J:

FACTS:

Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached a bridge going
towards the direction of Davao City. At about that time, the cargo truck, Zacarias coming from the opposite
direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck
and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical
injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the
left side of the jeep,\ was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the
asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.

A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo against the driver
and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI of Bohol.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of evidence”

The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on the plaintiffs’ appeal, reversing the
decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to be negligent and his negligence “gave rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and solidary.” It therefore ordered “the
defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs

The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a reversal of the judgment of the IAC
which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established facts

ISSUE:

1. WON the decision o fthe IAC was erroneous

2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case

HELD: , the appealed judgment of the IAC is hereby REVERSED

1. YES

The SC found Calibo negligent instead, because of the following:

1. it is alleged that at the time of the collision, the truck was occupying 25 cm of the jeep’s lane. However it was
found out that the center stripe of the road is misaligned and with the correct calculation of the width of the road,
the truck on still on its proper lane and it was actually the jeep who is intruding the truck’s lane.

2. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Zacarias had acted negligently in applying his brakes
instead of getting back inside his lane upon the coming of the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane,
as has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep’s way as said Court would have had him
do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still
30 meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent action.

3. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police, Calibo’s companions, Roranes
and Patos, who suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so investigated or give statements to
the police officers is a “telling indication that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias’
negligence or fault.” 7

The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are also quite a few significant
indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibo’s negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias
had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed in his written statement at the
police headquarters that the jeep had been “zigzagging,” which is to say that it was travelling or being driven
erratically at the time. The other investigator also testified that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked on the
jeep’s “zigzagging.” There was also testimony that Calibo was drunk while driving the jeep.

2. YES

Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent
negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was,
the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of
the last clear chance.

Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other’s vehicle from a distance of 150
meters. The truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the
logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last
clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his
turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability today as it did
when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar state of facts.

Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and co-petitioner) George
Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latter’s additional defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there
is such evidence in the record which has not been controverted.

NOTES:

It must be pointed out, however, that IAC also seriously erred in holding the petitioners Agad and Felix Lim
solidarily liable for the damages awarded in its appealed decision, as alleged owners, with petitioner George Lim,
of Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, employer of petitioner Zacarias. This manifestly disregarded, not only
the certificate of registration issued by the Bureau of Domestic Trade identifying Glan People’s Lumber and
Hardware as a business name registered by George Lim, but also unimpugned allegations into the petitioners’
answer to the complaint that Pablo S. Agad was only an employee of George Lim and that Felix Lim, then a child
of only eight (8) years, was in no way connected with the business.

In conclusion, it must also be stated that there is no doubt of this Court’s power to review the assailed decision
of the IAC under the authority of precedents recognizing exceptions to the familiar rule binding it to observe and
respect the latter’s findings of fact. Many of those exceptions may be cited to support the review here undertaken,
but only the most obvious — that said findings directly conflict with those of the Trial Court — will suffice. In the
opinion of this Court and after a careful review of the record, the evidence singularly fails to support the findings
of the IAC which, for all that appears, seem to have been prompted rather by sympathy for the heirs of the
deceased Engineer Calibo than by an objective appraisal of the proofs and a correct application of the law to the
established facts. Compassion for the plight of those whom an accident has robbed of the love and support of a
husband and father is an entirely natural and understandable sentiment. It should not, however, be allowed to
stand in the way of, much less to influence, a just verdict in a suit at law.
 10. EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-Litem of
minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and EDERIC, all surnamed
BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses
JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and
ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA and MA.
COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE, petitioners,

VS

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND EDILBERTO

MONTESIANO,respondents

G.R. No. 89880 [February 6, 1991]

Facts:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel and sand
truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT
259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the
body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the
driver’s seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and
died as a result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each
other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the passengers. It could not be
determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was the proximate
cause of the collision. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be
solidary. The Court of Appeals ruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance
to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the
proximate cause of the collision.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of
whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the
latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third
persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action
which could have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at
bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs
of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the
respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
 11. Pantranco North Express, Inc. V. Maricar Baesa (1989)

FACTS:
▪ Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger
jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the
Baesa spouses
▪ While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
▪ As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico,
died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions
for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
▪ PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and
invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver.
▪ CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
▪
ISSUE:

W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the collision negligent
in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.
▪ Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense
to defeat claim for damages
▪ For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has
the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with
exercise of due care, have been aware of it
▪ there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger
▪ When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he
did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must
have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the
jeepney approaching form the opposite direction
▪ Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the
actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
▪ last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered
 12. Philippine Bank Of Commerce V. CA (1997)

FACTS:

▪ May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash
totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the
current accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
▪ They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-
01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas
▪ Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and
confidence on PBC
▪ Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always
validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad :
o original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number -
retained by the bank
o duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account
holder was left blank
▪ After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate
copy and change the account number to RMC's account number
▪ This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge
▪ Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and later
on filed in the RTC
▪ RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
▪ CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees

ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by not exercising
the proper validation procedure-YES
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES

HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC

1. YES.
▪ The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits
should not relieve the PBC of responsibility
▪ The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of the
account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
▪ Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
▪ Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-
President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know
that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures until 7
years later
▪ last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril
▪ where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than
that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof
▪ antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
▪ Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee,
yet it cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to
avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-
imposed validation procedure.
▪ Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks, however, the
degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary
 nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their
clients with the highest degree of care

2. YES.
▪it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its
monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series
of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have
ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little
vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which
shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent
▪ Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded
 13. CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ, Petitioners, v.
ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHNARNEL RAMOS, and KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS, Respondents

FACTS:

Respondents alleged that in the morning of April 22, 1995, Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep heading
north on the national highway in Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur in a reckless, careless, and negligent
manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and
bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his
death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance. Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep.

Respondents sought to recover actual damages for medical expenses in the sum of P33,513.00 and funeral
expenses in the sum of P30,000.00, as well as moral and exemplary damages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. In their Answer, petitioners denied respondents allegation that Benigno Valdez overtook a
motorcycle and bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that on April 22, 1995, Benigno
Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south
and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road.

To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the
owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep.
Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which
he very well knew had a mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had no cause of action against petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a result of the vehicular
accident.

HELD:

Petitioners contend that Arnulfo Ramos own negligence in knowingly driving a mechanically defective vehicle
was the immediate and proximate cause of his death, and that the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to
this case. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or
failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. Seeing that the owner-type jeep was
wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez
was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution
by immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right
shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding southward; hence, the collision
occurred.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to
take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances
and which proximately caused injury to another. On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty
of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would
know that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at risk for driving a
mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent man would have had the owner-type jeep
repaired or would have stopped using it until it was repaired. Ramos was, therefore, grossly negligent in
continuing to drive on the highway the mechanically defective jeep, which later encroached on the opposite lane
and bumped the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence
as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property.It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.

The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued
to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not
immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. The doctrine of
last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was Benigno Valdez who had
the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger
jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. The Answer of petitioners stated that when
the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez maneuvered his vehicle
towards the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos
continued to move to the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Thus, petitioners assert
in their Petition that considering that the time the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time
of impact was only a matter of seconds, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Although the
records are bereft of evidence showing the exact distance between the two vehicles when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, it must have been near enough, because the passenger jeep driven
by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision.
Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case. In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno
Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to
prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of
Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages
pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
14. ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (Formerly CONSOLIDATED ORIX
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION), vs. MINORS: DENNIS, MYLENE, MELANIE and
MARIKRIS, all surnamed MANGALINAO y DIZON, MANUEL M. ONG, LORETO LUCILO, SONNY LI,
AND ANTONIO DE LOS SANTOS

FACTS: This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the death of
all the passengers in one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spousesa and a sibling of the surviving orphaned
minor heirs. An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the minor children of the Mangalinao
spouses through their legal guardian against the registered owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks that
collided with their parents’ Nissan Pathfinder. The children imputed recklessness, negligence, and imprudence
on the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister and parents; while they hold Sonny and Orix equally liable for
failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their respective
drivers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants are jointly and severally liable.

HELD:

The finding of negligence of petitioners as found by the lower courts is binding. Negligence and proximate cause
are factual issues. Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts, and the concurrence of the findings of
fact of the courts below are conclusive.

"A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should include only questions of law -
questions of fact are not reviewable" save for several exceptions, two of which petitioners invoke, i.e., that ‘the
finding is grounded on speculations, surmises, and conjectures,’ and that ‘the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.’ Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso Truck is liable to the heirs of the victims of
the mishap.

Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract
of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused. It
has already been explained: Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the
supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to
respond financially for the damage or injury done.

A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person
actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor
Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become
illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.

Besides, the registered owners have a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that they
may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff, which Orix rightfully acknowledged by
filing a third-party complaint against the owner of the Fuso, Manuel. While the net income of the Mangalinao
spouses had not been sufficiently established, the Court recognizes the fact that the Mangalinao heirs had
suffered loss deserving of compensation.

What the CA awarded is in actuality a form of temperate damages. Such form of damages under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code is given in the absence of competent proof on the actual damages suffered. "In the past, we
awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is
plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured party’s actual income."
In this case, Roberto Mangalinao, the breadwinner of the family, was a businessman engaged in buying and
selling palay and agricultural supplies that required high capital in its operations and was only 37 at the time of
his death.

Moreover, the Pathfinder which the Mangalinaos own, became a total wreck. Under the circumstances, we find
the award of P500,000.00 as temperate damages as reasonable. Moral damages, it must be stressed, are not
intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she had undergone
due to the other party’s culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. While the
children did not testify before the court, undoubtedly, they suffered the pain and ordeal of losing both their
parents and sibling and hence, the award of moral damages is justified. However, the amount must be reduced
to P500,000.00. "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence." It is given by way of example or correction for the public good.
Before the court may consider such award, the plaintiff must show his entitlement first to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages, which the respondents have. In the case at bench, the reckless driving of the two trucks
involved caused the death of the victims. However, we shall reduce the amount of exemplary damages to
P200,000.00.

Lastly, because exemplary damages are awarded and that we find it equitable that expenses of litigation should
be recovered, we find it sufficient and reasonable enough to grant attorney’s fees of P50,000.00.
 15. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-47379; May 16, 1988;

Third Division; Justice Gutierrez, Jr.

If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article
1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
In this case, NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of
typhoon “Welming” when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also
undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. Thus, NPC cannot escape
liability.

FACTS:

On August 4, 1964, Engineering Construction, Inc. (ECI)executed a contract with the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), whereby ECI undertook to furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and materials
(not furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed 2nd Ipo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and
Appurtenant Structures, and Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to complete said works within
eight hundred (800) calendar days from the date the Contractor receives the formal notice to proceed.

The project involved two (2) major phases: the first phase comprising the tunnel work covering a distance of
seven (7) kilometers, passing through the mountain, from the Ipo river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where
the Ipo Dam of the National Power Corporation (NPC) is located, to Bicti; the other phase consisting of the
outworks at both ends of the tunnel.

By September 1967, the ECI already had completed the first major phase of the work, namely, the tunnel
excavation work. As soon as the ECI had finished the tunnel excavation work at the Bicti site, all the equipment
no longer needed there were transferred to the Ipo site where some projects
were yet to be completed.

Record shows that on November 4, 1967, typhoon ‘Welming’ hit Central Luzon, passing through NPC’s Angat
Hydro-electric Project and Dam at Ipo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project area, and heavy
rains intermittently fell. Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising
perilously at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the dam, NPC
caused the opening of the spillway gates.

The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court that the evidence preponderantly established the fact
that due to the negligent manner with which the spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary
large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit the
installations and construction works of ECI at the Ipo site with terrific impact, as a result of which the latter’s
stockpile of materials and supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and accessories were either washed
away, lost or destroyed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the destruction and loss of the ECI’s equipment and facilities were due to force majeure.

RULING:

No, the destruction and loss of the ECI’s equipment and facilities were not due to force majeure.

It is clear from the appellate court’s decision that based on its findings of fact and that of the trial court’s, NPC
was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon
“Welming” when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the
same gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days
before it actually struck. And even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force majeure,
NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

As the SC has ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals:

“Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
“The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of
the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence
is thereby humanized, as it was, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
“Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss,
such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God.
To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been occasioned.”
 16. Air France v. Carrascoso PONENTE: Sanchez, J.
Case Date: Sept 28, 1966

Case Summary:

Carrascoso bought a round-trip first-class passenger ticket from Manila to Rome. On the way to Rome, however,
the Manager of Air France made Carrascoso give up his first-class seat for another person (a ‘white man’
according to witness Cuento) and transfer to a tourist-class seat. Carrascoso filed a complaint for breach of
contract and award of damages. Court ruled in favor of Carrasco and awarded him moral damages based on
quasi-delict. The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. Rule of Law: Art. 21, Civil Code: Any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage Art. 2219(10), Civil Code: Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases: (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Detailed Facts:

Carrascoso bought a first-class ticket from Philippine Air Lines, agent of Air France.  From Hongkong to Saigon
and Saigon to Bangkok, Carrascoso only received firstclass accommodations from Air France after Carrascoso
protested and argued with Air France’s employees.  From Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, Carrascoso
was ‘compelled’ to give up first-class accommodations to a ‘white man’ whose better right to the same had not
been established either then or in Court. Carrascoso was already seated at the time.  Air France’s own witness
testified that, based on the “O.K.” marks on Carrascoso’s ticket, there was space for Carrascoso.  Lower court
and CA ruled in favor of Carrascoso.

Issue:

W/N Carrasco is entitled to damages arising from tort – YES

Ruling:

The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. In this case, when Air France breached its contract of carriage,
it also became liable for a tortious act which gave rise to payment of damages in favor of Carrasco.  A contract
to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation… it generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages…  Petitioner insists the first-class ticket was no guarantee to first-class
accommodations, as the same “would depend upon the availability of first class seats.”

First, Air France could not have the “indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all”.

Second, Air France’s own witness, Rafael Altonaga said that the “O.K.” mark in Carrascoso’s ticket meant that
space is confirmed.

Passengers do not merely contract for transportation, but have a right to expect kindness, respect, courtesy, and
due consideration from the carrier’s employees.  The act of petitioner’s employee in forcing respondent to
vacate constituted the breach of the contract, attended with evident bad faith.

Therefore the contention of petitioner that there was no bad faith fails: though bad faith was not alleged
expressly, it may be implied from the airline’s actions. As employer, petitioner airline was held liable.

Ruling: CA decision affirmed.

 17. AFRICA v CALTEX (1966)
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966 THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and
the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO
BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street
and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground
storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to
and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners,
among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged
owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them
was attributed as the cause of the fire. the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and
cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which
is submitted herewith. it appears in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which
according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the
gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) CFI – Manila : dismissed petitioners’ second amended complaint against respondents. petitioners failed to
prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees.
(2) CA: affirmed CFI.

ISSUE:
(1) whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should
apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees.

(2) Whether Caltex is liable

RULING:
(Evidence) There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information. The reports in question do not constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official
information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

(Torts)

(1) Yes, the doctrine applies.

Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the
other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act of man.

The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread
to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were
appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without assistance, was transferring the
contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before loading the
underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were people who went to
drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank."
He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his
back turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent
omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the
flames from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it
consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to
intense heat.

"The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent
cause in the resulting injury."

(2) Yes, Caltex is liable with Boquiren being considered as agent of the company:

(1) Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex;

(2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the equipment therein;

(3) Caltex exercised control over Boquiren in the management of the state;

(4) the delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of CALTEX painted on it; and (5)
the license to store gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees.

Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein, but claims that the business
conducted at the service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present
any contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. There must
have been one in existence at that time.
Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren. These provisions
of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was
virtually an employee of the former.
18. F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as substituted by his wife
LUZ ALMONTE MABLE and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA, ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME,
ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all surnamed MABLE, respondents. (WENCESLAO)

Insurance company is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract.
If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled
to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

DOCTRINE: Upon payment of the loss incurred by the insured, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any
right of action which the insured may have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss.
Under Art. 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the indemnity received by the insured is the insurer. The law is
clear and needs no interpretation. On the other hand, the insurer may seek reimbursement of the amount it indemnified
private respondents from petitioner. This is the essence of the right to subrogation under Art. 2207. Upon payment of the
loss incurred by the insured, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated to any right of action which the insurer may have
against the third person whise negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. (Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co.)

FACTS:
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of private
respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz,
petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents'
residence.
The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire
broke out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire,
but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were
razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation
found specimens from the burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable substances.
Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof.
On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner, praying for a judgment
in their favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) CFI - renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the defendant.

(2) CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages.

ISSUE:
Whether the of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.

RULING:
Yes. Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing itself speaks”).

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care, negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its
employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall
between its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could
have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop;
and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop.

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in accordance
with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.

In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to
construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with
the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had
been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.

Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company
for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company is
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract. If the
amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.]
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are
only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.
 19. THE SPOUSES AFRICA et al vs. CALTEX et al

G.R. No. L-12986

March 31, 1966

MAKALINTAL., J.:

FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila.
It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening
of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted (a lighted matchstick was thrown by a stranger
near the opening, causing the fire). The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses. Their owners,
among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of
the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was
attributed as the cause of the fire.

The trial court and the CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as
to presume negligence on the part of appellees

HELD: the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants,

Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that
“as to (its) applicability … in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not
prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such
doctrine.”

The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine has actually been applied in this
jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co

The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread
to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were
appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent
omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the
flames from leaping over it.. Defendants’ negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire
but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
 20. GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997

FACTS:

Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST
hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was
the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however,
Florencio died of complications of “unknown cause,” according to officials of the UST Hospital.

Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to conduct an autopsy on her husband’s body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio’s death was due to
lack of care by the attending physician in administering anesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI
recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself
because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. The case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G.
Leono who was, however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner. The case was then referred to Prosecutor
Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and
that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.

Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that
Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R.
Dimagiba, who endorsed that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding
information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings
of Prosecutor Dimagiba. Pending the resolution of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor
Dimagiba’s resolution, the investigative “pingpong” continued when the case was again assigned to another
prosecutor, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was
transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any
wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City
Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against
Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of
evidence. In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the
recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults the
Ombudsman for, allegedly ingrave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold
public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether there was negligence on the part of the physicians which resulted to the death of Petitioner’s husband

HELD:

Yes. No less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence on the part
of the attending physicians in administering the anesthesia

RATIO:

The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be passed
upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case
without extensive investigation, research, evaluation and consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the City
Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass judgment on such a technical matter, especially when there
are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases of a party’s accusation and defenses are better ventilated at the
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.

There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.

Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient relationship
was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, they will employ such
training, care and skill in the treatment of their patients.

They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to
treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their
improper performance, by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes
actionable malpractice. Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care
or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.

Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert
testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff, have been applied in actions
against anaesthesiologist to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under excessive or
improper anaesthesia. Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of
the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently
departed from this standard in his treatment.

Causal connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim’s death after the negligent act of the
anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the
appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI
deduced that the attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the
operation. It appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been averted had the proper drug been
applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote
was readily available to counteract whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. Why these
precautionary measures were disregarded must be sufficiently explained.