RULE 65

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

OSCAR R. AMPIL vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.

G.R. No. 192685, July 31, 2013

FACTS:

ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project
Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of "The Malayan Tower." wherein the latter shall
provide the real property while former would construct and shoulder the cost of construction and
development of the condominium building. Due to financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its
obligations to MICO. Thus, MICO and ASB executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), allowing
MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The Malayan Tower.
The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower
representing their investments.

On 11 March 2005, two sets of Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) were issued by Espenesin for
38 units and the allotted parking spaces in Malayan Tower. The first was in the name of MICO and the
second in the name of ASB. The second set of CCTs was issued upon the instruction of Serrano an officer
of MICO. Ampil, unsecured creditor of the ASB charged Espenesin with violation of Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ombudsman dismissed Ampil’s complaint on the ground of lack of probable cause for the alleged
commission of falsification. Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court before the appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s
resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ombudsman’s discretionary power to determine the existence of probable cause may be
assailed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

HELD:

The Supreme Court have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the
prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the
ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so
grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, on several occasions, the court have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in
determining probable cause: (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c)
When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it
is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated
by the lust for vengeance.

The fourth circumstance is present in this case. Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the
CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-
affidavit. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.
As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for Serrano’s new
instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He heads the Office of
Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of records of instruments affecting
registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city wherein such office is situated." He should
not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and
innocuous error. Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an
authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO.
His actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides
mistake.
 A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. EMMA MONDEJAR
G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before
the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23,111.71 which represented her unpaid
water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.

On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in
finding that petitioner failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the
latter to pay the full amount sought to be collected.

On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the
said petition was only filed to circumvent the nonappealable nature of small claims cases as provided
under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a decision on a complaint falling under small claims cases may be questioned via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 when the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that decisions
rendered in such case is final and unappealable.

HELD:

The answer is in the affirmative. Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the
above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately
move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the
case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was held that:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law."

Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an
absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one
which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not
merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned.
 MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR) G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino which was operated by respondent PAGCOR. Due to an
altercation with a customer, Petitioner was charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer. He was
later on found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day
suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a
reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as
charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. His Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, before the CA. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe
the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day
suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is
not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of
official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand.

In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CA held that the
CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for certiorari filed directly before the CA assailing a decision for which the law
provides no remedy of appeal may be dismissed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there
is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and
(14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.29
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and
unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross
abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., et al. G.R.
No. 208290, December 11, 2013

FACTS:

Private respondents were charged before the CTA for misdeclaration of goods. Subsequent to the filing
by prosecution of its Formal Offer of Evidence, Private Respondent filed their Omnibus Motion to File
Demurrer to Evidence which was granted by the CTA.

Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. in its March 26, 2013
Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to
the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the prosecution showing that the certified true copies of
the public documents offered in evidence against both accused were in fact issued by the legal custodians.

The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CTA, stressing, among
others, that to grant it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition for certiorari,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA

ISSUE:

Whether or not a final decision in a criminal complaint may be assailed by way of petition for certiorari.

HELD:

The answer is in the affirmative. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. In this case, a perusal of
the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its
part or denial of due process. The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively
participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to

lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in accordance with the rules on
evidence and existing jurisprudence.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN G.R.
No. 110280, October 12, 1993

FACTS:

Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the UP College of Law, applied for Socialized Tuition Fee and
Assistance Program (STFAP).

U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT). SDT rendered a decision finding him
guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information in his STFAP application about the income
of his mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico, which
is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies.

As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to
reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement. The
Executive Committee affirmed the decision of the SDT. Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR).
BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR
decision.

In the morning of March 29, 1993, the BOR found Nadal guilty and imposed upon him the penalties of
suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral
character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had
received with 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records
until he has settled his financial obligations with the university.

Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M.
Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an
injunction and alleged that RTC judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on
Nadal.

Private respondent opposed the petition and argued that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by the
Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition,
not being the "Board of Regents" nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not real parties in
interest who should file the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a respondent to a petition for certiorari may assail the legal standing of the petitioner
when the former had specifically named the latter in a petition for mandamus for which the injunction
was issued and is assailed in the certiorari petition.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest."

Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its
power to impose disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline by withholding information in connection with his application for STFAP
benefits, which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the
financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have the effect of subverting a
commendable program into which the University officials had devoted much time and expended precious
resources, from the conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme of
tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public funds allocated to the State
University.
Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he
filed below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant petition.
Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process"
against the BOR shall be served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance with these
legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University
President and member of the BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and
every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an action may be
entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the naming
of the party would be but a formality. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear
and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.
 DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE and the COMMISSION
ON AUDIT G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a "copy of the latest financial and audit report" of the
MECO invoking, for that purpose, his "constitutional right to information on matters of public concern."
In reply to the said letter, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum referring the
petitioner’s request to COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M. Espina for "further disposition." In this
memorandum, however, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the MECO was "not among the
agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector."

Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an admission that the COA had never audited and examined
the accounts of the MECO, the petitioner filed the instant petition for mandamus on 8 September 2010.
Petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as "taxpayer, concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar
and law book author." He impleaded both the COA and the MECO.

Petitioner posits that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA is neglecting its duty under
Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide GOCC or
government instrumentality. It is the adamant claim of the petitioner that the MECO is a GOCC without
an original charter or, at least, a government instrumentality, the funds of which partake the nature of
public funds.

COA argues that the instant petition already became moot when COA Chairperson Maria Gracia M.
Pulido-Tan (Pulido-Tan) issued Office Order No. 2011-69850 on 6 October 2011.51 The COA notes that
under Office Order No. 2011-698, Chairperson Pulido-Tan already directed a team of auditors to proceed
to Taiwan, specifically for the purpose of auditing the accounts of, among other government agencies
based therein, the MECO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for mandamus may be denied on the ground of mootness despite allegation of
violation of the constitution and involving paramount public interest.

HELD:

No. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.

An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal duty, coupled with the pressing public
interest in the resolution of all related issues, prompts this Court to pursue a definitive ruling thereon, if
not for the proper guidance of the government or agency concerned, then for the formulation of
controlling principles for the education of the bench, bar and the public in general. For this purpose, the
Court invokes its symbolic function.

Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true, Office Order No. 2011-698
does not offer the strongest certainty that they would not be replicated in the future. In the first place,
Office Order No. 2011-698 did not state any legal justification as to why, after decades of not auditing the
accounts of the MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it state any determination
regarding the true status of the MECO. The justifications provided by the COA, in fact, only appears in
the memorandum it submitted to this Court for purposes of this case.