The Pacific Review

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Japan's security cooperation with the Philippines

and Vietnam

Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning

To cite this article: Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning (2018) Japan's security
cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam, The Pacific Review, 31:4, 533-552, DOI:
10.1080/09512748.2017.1397730

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1397730

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THE PACIFIC REVIEW, 2018
VOL. 31, NO. 4, 533–552
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1397730

Japan’s security cooperation with the Philippines and

Vietnam
Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønninga,b
a
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, Norway; bNorwegian Institute for Defence Studies
(Norwegian Defence University College), Kongens gate 4, P.O. Box 890 Sentrum, Oslo, 0104, Norway

ABSTRACT
Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA,
two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial
security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning
Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following
questions: What are the characteristics of Japan’s maturing security partnerships with
the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent
emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these
maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan’s direction as a
security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese
security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally
driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge
that China’s emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover
argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under
American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative
reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-
strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further
substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security
partnerships.

KEYWORDS Japan; Philippines; Vietnam; security cooperation; China; South China Sea

Introduction
Replacing the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) as the capstone document of
its security policy, Japan issued its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in December
2013. ‘In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security
objectives,’ the document notes, ‘Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative rela-
tionships with other countries […]’ (National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 14). This
statement codifies a recent trend in Tokyo’s foreign policy, namely a push to diversify its
bilateral security ties, long the exclusive purview of the Japan–US alliance. Japan’s
increasingly comprehensive and substantial security cooperation with the Philippines
and Vietnam are two notable examples. These are the topic of this article, which seeks
answers to questions such as these: What are the characteristics of Japan’s maturing

CONTACT Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning bgronning@ifs.mil.no

© 2017 Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Published by Taylor & Francis.
534 B. E. M. GRØNNING

security relationships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and
enabled their recent emergence, and what promotes and constrains their further devel-
opment? What, finally, do they suggest about Japan’s future direction as a security actor
in the region and beyond?
The article argues that Japan’s security cooperation with the Philippines and
Vietnam has their six basic characteristics in common: the ‘Strategic Partnership’ dip-
lomatic superstructure, regularization of strategic dialogues, increasing frequency of
high-level political interaction, diplomatic support in territorial disputes with China,
aid-based maritime capacity building, and increasingly substantial military coopera-
tion. The article moreover argues that Japan’s substantiation of these non-US secu-
rity bilaterals is fundamentally driven by the contemporary power shift in East Asia
and the strategic challenge with which China’s emerging maritime power and
behavior presents Japan. It has been pursued under American auspices and further
invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding
these incentives to further substantiate the two security bilaterals, Japan faces con-
siderable domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counterincentives. For this rea-
son, the article concludes that we are to expect further substantiation, but limited
military significance, from the Japan’s ‘Strategic Partnerships’ with the Philippines
and Vietnam.

Figure 1. GDP of China, Japan, and the USA (International Monetary Fund, 2016).
Notes: GDP of China, Japan, and the USA in USD billion (lines, left Y-axis) and China’s GDP as percentage share of
the USA (bars, right Y-axis), 1990–2020 (estimates after 2015).
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 535

Figure 2. Defense spending of China, Japan, and the USA (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
2017).
Note: Defense spending of China, Japan, and the USA (lines, left Y-axis) and China’s defense spending as percent-
age share of US defense spending (bars, right Y-axis), 1990–2015.

Towards substantive non-US security bilaterals: Vietnam and the

Philippines
Japan’s ambitions of expanding its security cooperative relationships into South-East
Asia can be traced to the 1991 Nakayama Proposal promoting the establishment of a
multilateral regional security dialogue (Midford, 2000). Then, one of Prime Minister
Hashimoto’s 1997 initiatives to strengthen Japan-ASEAN relations advocated bilateral
security cooperation, proposing that Japan ‘strengthen security dialogues and
exchanges, whether they would be in multilateral contexts […] or in bilateral contexts
[…]’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). Both the Philippines and Vietnam made their offi-
cial appearance on Japan’s security agenda in the early 2000s (Kantei, 2001; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2000). It was, however, only around the turn of the decade that substan-
tive security cooperation began to gain traction. Events since then reveal that Japan’s
emerging security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively, have
their six basic characteristics in common.

The ‘Strategic Partnership’ structure

Japan is developing bilateral security relations within its ‘Strategic Partnerships’ with the
Philippines and Vietnam. This diplomatic superstructure is their first basic common
characteristic.
536 B. E. M. GRØNNING

In 2009, a joint statement declared the establishment of a ‘strategic partnership’

between Japan and Vietnam. ‘Regarding security and defense,’ the document noted,
Japan and Vietnam ‘will promote furthermore the exchange at high level and strengthen
consultations at Director-General level’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). Two years there-
after Japan and the Philippines followed suit as their two leaders in a joint statement
declared that also this relationship had evolved into a ‘strategic partnership.’ Venturing
from their previous emphasis on aid and trade (Wallace, 2013, pp. 488–490), the document
revealed that the two states were seeking to strengthen bilateral security relations via
political and military interaction and cooperation in the field of maritime affairs (Kantei,
2011). Both partnerships have since been upgraded to reflect increasing and further pro-
mote bilateral security cooperation. The Japan–Vietnam ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’
was declared in a 2014 joint statement stating their shared intention of further strengthen-
ing defense and maritime cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b). In a 2015 joint
statement the ‘Strengthened Strategic Partnership’ between Japan and the Philippines
was declared. Recognizing the increasing significance of Japan–Philippine relations for
regional peace and stability, the document outlined a broader portfolio of bilateral security
cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b).

Regular strategic dialogues

The second characteristic common to Japan’s budding security cooperation with the
Philippines and Vietnam is the regularization of bilateral high-level strategic dialogues
supplemented with a series of policy dialogues.
In 2010, Japan instituted a vice-ministerial defense and foreign affairs Strategic Part-
nership Dialogue with Vietnam to ‘discuss comprehensively political, diplomatic,
defense and security matters’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, 2011). The annual event
was arranged for the sixth time in December 2015 (Embassy of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam in Japan, 2015). In addition, the parties decided in 2011 to initiate a regular
Defense Policy Dialogue, annually arranged at vice-ministerial level since 2013 (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2011; Vietnamnet, 2015).
The 2011 ‘strategic partnership’ joint declaration stated Tokyo and Manila’s inten-
tions of launching also a Japan–Philippine Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Kantei,
2011). The arrangement was inaugurated in 2012 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012a). In
addition, Japan and the Philippines have established regular Defense Ministerial (2014-)
and Vice-Ministerial (2013-) Policy Dialogues as well as a working level Dialogue on Mari-
time and Oceanic Affairs (2012-) with maritime security and naval cooperation on the
agenda (Ministry of Defense, 2012a, p. 313; Ministry of Defense, 2015b).

High-level political interaction

The third common characteristic is the high frequency of non-regular ministerial level
bilateral interaction with security on the agenda.
Since the establishment of the Japan–Vietnam ‘strategic partnership’ in 2009, Japan’s
prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister have med individually with their
Vietnamese counterparts at least 23 times combined. By official accounts, most of the
bilateral encounters with security on the agenda by official accounts (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2017b). A similar frequency of security cooperation-oriented ministerial level
exchanges is observable in Japan–Philippines relations. State visits and sidelines
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 537

summits combined, Prime Minister Abe (2012-) met with President Aquino seven times
during his first two years in office. Japan’s foreign minister and defense minister met
with their Philippine counterparts seven times combined (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2017a). Within seven months of the Abe government’s inauguration in December 2012,
Manila received in succession visits from Japan’s foreign minister, defense minister and
prime minister for summit meetings with their Philippine counterparts, all stating inten-
tions on deepening bilateral relations in terms of security cooperation (Kantei, 2013b;
Ministry of Defence, 2013a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Diplomatic backing
Japan has also substantiated the two ‘strategic partnerships’ with diplomatic support for
the Philippines and Vietnam in their territorial disputes with China. Publically, this diplo-
matic backing has been framed in terms of opposition to maritime coercion, an oblique
albeit hard to miss criticism of Chinese policies, and support for the Philippines and Viet-
nam’s international law-based approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Prime Minister Abe’s 2014 Shangri-La speech is but one notable example of Japan’s
voicing of such diplomatic support. Adding that Japan supports Philippine and Vietnam-
ese efforts to resolve the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Abe (2014) outlined
and advocated in his speech three principles for the rule of law at sea. These are (1) mak-
ing and clarifying claims based on international law, (2) not using force or coercion in
trying to drive their claims, and (3) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means. Expres-
sions such as these unequivocally position Japan on the side of the Philippines and Viet-
nam against China in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Abe’s Shangri-La speech reflected also a related expression of Tokyo’s territorial dis-
pute diplomatic support to the Philippines and Vietnam, namely Japan’s continued sup-
port for the implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the conduct of parties in the
South China Sea. ‘I strongly hope,’ he stated, ‘that a truly effective Code of Conduct can
be established in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China and that it can be
achieved swiftly’ (Abe, 2014).
Japan has also considered materially upping its diplomatic support by dispatching
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessels to the South China Sea in support of the
US Navy’s declared Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) challenging exces-
sive Chinese sovereignty claims in the area (Lubold & Page, 2015; Reuters, 2016d).
According to a Senior MOFA Official (personal communication, October 20, 2015),
Japan’s National Security Council (NSC) is continuously deliberating Tokyo’s appropri-
ate response, including military options, to Chinese coercive diplomacy in the South
China Sea. In October 2015, Prime Minister Abe suggested to President Obama that
Japan was considering MSDF South China Sea deployments in support of such Amer-
ican operations, although both Defense Minister Nakatani and Foreign Minister Kish-
ida soon expressed attitudes of reservation towards Japan’s military involvement
(Agence France-Presse, 2015).

Aid-based maritime capacity building

The fifth shared characteristic is Japan’s efforts to strengthen Philippine and Vietnamese
maritime paramilitary capabilities through official development assistance (ODA)-
funded capacity building efforts.
538 B. E. M. GRØNNING

Japan initiated an ODA-funded program to enhance the capacity of the Philippine

Coast Guard (PCG) in the early 2000s (JICA, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). These
efforts were very modest prior to the establishment of the ‘strategic partnership,’ featur-
ing joint coast guard tabletop exercises, training of and education for PCG officials, the
supply of three small patrol vessels, and a 609 million yen aid grant to fund enhance
PCG communications (JICA, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008; Samuels, 2007,
p. 103; The Philippine Star, 2007). Prime Minister Abe revealed in 2013 that Japan’s mari-
time capacity building for the Philippine was set to expand considerably. In a meeting
with President Aquino, Abe offered, according to an official account of his office, based
on a request from the Philippines to supply ten 40 meter patrol vessels for the PCG
through a yen loan (Kantei, 2013a). In December that year a 19 billion yen soft loan
agreement between Japan and the Philippines was signed to that effect, while Japan
further substantiated its maritime capacity building efforts towards the Philippines by
committing a more modest 1.152 billion yen in March 2014 to enhance the communica-
tions capabilities of the PCG (Embassy of Japan in the Philippines, 2014; Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency, 2013). The Philippines received the first 40 meter patrol ship
in August 2016 (Reuters, 2016b). Around the same time, reports emerged that Japan
was in negotiations with the Philippines about the construction and transfer of another
two larger 100 meter patrol vessels to the PCG (Mogato, 2016).
Japan ventured into modest capacity building also vis-
a-vis Vietnam prior to ‘strate-
gic partnership’ elevation, featuring seminars and training for Vietnamese Ministry of
Defense (MOD), Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard personnel to enhance their capacity in
maritime security and safety, underwater medicine, PKOs, flight safety, and HA/DR
(Japan Coast Guard Academy, n.d.; Ministry of Defense, 2014). Such efforts were how-
ever not mentioned in a jointly issued document until the 2014 joint declaration on the
‘Extensive Strategic Partnership,’ which expressed their shared intention to advance
cooperation in capacity building (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014c). Japan and Vietnam
accordingly signed an August 2014 agreement granting Vietnam six used maritime
patrol vessels and related equipment ‘for the enhancement of maritime law-enforce-
ment capabilities of Viet Nam’ through a JPY 500 million ODA arrangement (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2014d, 2014e). While modest, this development is notable in lifting Viet-
nam into the same category as Philippines as a recipient of hardware directed towards
maritime capacity building via ODA. Abe revealed in October 2014 that Japan was con-
sidering supplying the Vietnam Coast Guard with additional newly built maritime patrol
vessels, and in November 2015 that Japan had taken initial implementing steps (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, 2015c).

Military cooperation
The sixth and final shared fundamental characteristic is their increasingly comprehen-
sive and substantive military cooperation.
The 2011 joint declaration of the Japan–Philippines ‘strategic partnership’ featured
an agreement to ‘promote exchanges and cooperation between their defense authori-
ties,’ including reciprocal senior naval officer exchanges and naval port calls (Kantei,
2011). The MSDF and the Philippine Navy (PN) have since implemented this new
emphasis on military interaction, the most notable example of which to date is the
much publicized port call by two destroyers and a submarine of the MSDF to the Philip-
pine Subic Bay naval base in 2016 (Johnson, 2016). This particular port call is best
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 539

interpreted as military diplomacy supporting the Philippines in its territorial standoff

with China. MSDF officials reportedly explained the visit by referring to it as necessary
‘to deal with recent developments in nearby waters,’ surely a reference to Chinese asser-
tive behavior in the South China Sea (Sasaki, 2016).
Following the codification of military cooperation in the 2011 ‘strategic partnership’
declaration, bilateral military interaction gained further traction. In 2012, the Japanese
MOD and the Philippine Department of National Defense issued a ‘Statement of Intent
on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges,’ later upgraded to a 2015 Memorandum of
Understanding (Ministry of Defense, 2012b, 2015c). The document declared their inten-
tion of continuing previously outlined defense exchanges but added, most notably, par-
ticipation in each other’s and joint military exercises to the bilateral military cooperation
agenda. The MSDF and the PN proceeded with arranging in rapid succession their first
and second joint naval exercises in mid-2015 (Ministry of Defense, 2015a, p. 287; The
Manila Times, 2015).
Also, the joint statement declaring the ‘Strengthened Strategic Partnership’ in 2014
gave a premonition of further substantiation of military relations. The two sides were
seeking an agreement on bilateral trade in arms, it noted, and they were initiating nego-
tiations to that effect (Kantei, 2015). Such an agreement on Japan’s supply of military
equipment to the Philippines was signed in February 2016, making the Philippines the
fourth non-US partner with which Japan has such a military–industrial exchange
arrangement, but the first East Asian state, the first unequivocally junior partner (i.e.
small power), and the first oriented towards capacity building (Gomez, 2016). Philippine
defense officials are reportedly expressing interest on the transfer of both P-3C patrol
aircraft and retired submarines from Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 2016; Grevatt, 2015). Mean-
while, the TC-90 maritime patrol craft is set to become the first military hardware trans-
fer as Japan struck on agreement on the lease of five such 1900 km range aircraft to the
Philippines in May 2016 (Agence France-Presse, 2016). According to President Aquino,
the Philippines is leasing the aircraft ‘to assist [the PN] in patrolling [Philippine territo-
ries], particularly in the West Philippine Sea’ (Reuters, 2016c).
Further yet bilateral military cooperation is in the works. Japan is strengthening its
daily working level military interaction with the Philippines in 2017 by dispatching addi-
tional defense attaches to its diplomatic mission in Manila (JIJI, 2016b). More impor-
tantly, in 2014, President Aquino revealed that he had discussed with Prime Minister
Abe granting the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) base privileges in the Philippines via
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), noting that ‘[the Philippines] will be initiating all
the diplomatic requirements to come up with a visiting forces agreement’ (Japan Times,
2015). Also, Japan is reportedly preparing a military intelligence sharing pact with the
Philippines and other South-East Asian coastal states, enabling exchange of classified
information on defense equipment and foreign military movements and activities (Nik-
kei Asian Review, 2016). Coupled with the recently struck agreement on Japanese mili-
tary hardware transfer to the Philippines, the implementation of a SOFA and an
intelligence sharing agreement would unequivocally elevate Japan–Philippine ties to a
militarily substantive and significant relationship.
Military cooperation has also incrementally substantiated the Japan–Vietnam ‘strate-
gic partnership.’ Exchanges and cooperation in defense featured in a 2007 Agenda
drafted to move Japan and Vietnam relations towards a ‘strategic partnership.’ The lan-
guage, however, was non-committal, and this military contents were notably absent
from the 2009 declaration of the ‘strategic partnership’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007,
540 B. E. M. GRØNNING

2009). Cooperation between their armed services was publically reintroduced in an

October 2011 Memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges promot-
ing, amongst other, mutual high-ranking defense official visits and reciprocal naval port
calls. In a joint statement issued alongside the memorandum, the parties expressed the
shared view that such military exchanges ‘would contribute to the strengthening of
mutual understanding and trust, and to the peace and stability of the region’ (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2011). The 2014 declaration of the ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’
contained a commitment to implement the military interaction outlined in the 2011
Memorandum (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b). Meanwhile, Japan took a step in that
direction as Defense Minister Onodera visited Cam Ranh Bay, a strategic naval base
housing Vietnam’s young submarine fleet, in September 2013. On the occasion, Ono-
dera noted before the press his ‘expectation […] that the cooperative relationship
between Vietnam and Japan, which includes military-related interactions beyond the
boundary of Cam Ranh Bay, will strengthen’ (Ministry of Defense, 2013a). This led to the
most notable example of Japan–Vietnam military interaction to date, namely the first
naval port call by MSDF destroyers to a Vietnamese naval base in early 2016. Notably,
however, the submarine the two destroyers had accompanied to the previously men-
tioned port call at the Philippine Subic Bay naval base just days earlier did not partake in
the visit (Sasaki, 2016), ostensibly reflecting differences in the maturity of Japan’s secu-
rity partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively.
Bilateral military cooperation between Japan and Vietnam is set to further increase. A
decision has reportedly been made for the MSDF P-3Cs maritime patrol aircraft returning
from anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to start refueling at, amongst other, a Viet-
namese air base (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016). Japan is moreover strengthening its daily
working level military interaction with Vietnam by deploying additional defense attaches
to its diplomatic mission in Hanoi (JIJI, 2016b). Finally, Japan is reportedly preparing a mili-
tary intelligence sharing pact with Vietnam as well, strengthening defense cooperation by
enabling exchange of classified information on defense equipment and foreign military
movements and activities (Nikkei Asian Review, 2016). While much of Japan’s military
interaction with Vietnam has been of the symbolic sorts, the implementation of such an
intelligence sharing arrangement would add a militarily substantial and potentially signifi-
cant element to their bilateral cooperation under the ‘strategic partnership.’

The shifting power balance in maritime East Asia and Japan’s rising threat
perception
Japan’s diversification of security relationships to the Philippines and Vietnam is funda-
mentally informed by the shifting balance of power in East Asia. As Figure 1 reveals,
China, in just a few decades, has eclipsed Japan and is fast catching up to the USA in
terms of economic strength. Japan has both contributed to and benefits from China’s
developing economy via foreign direct investment, ODA, and trade (Jerd en & Hagstro€m,
2012, pp. 230–234). It also, however, presents Japan with a tremendous strategic chal-
lenge, as China has translated economic strength into military power as crudely albeit
tellingly indicated by its rapidly growing defense budget. As Figure 2 reveals, China as
of 2015 outspends Japan in defense two and a half times over, and trend lines suggest
that it is catching up also to the USA (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
2017), some projections indicating that China will overtake the USA as the leading
defense spender by 2030.
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 541

Japan’s NSS recognizes this development, noting, ‘Since the beginning of the twenty
first century, the balance of power in the international community has been changing
on an unprecedented scale’ (National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 6). The mari-
time orientation of this power shift is what makes it a major strategic challenge to Japan.
Japan is an island nation, a maritime nation, and one poorly endowed in natural resour-
ces at that. Its national well-being relies heavily on external trade, virtually all of which
arrives and departs the Japanese archipelago by sea (The Japanese Shipowners’ Associa-
tion, 2014). Most notably, Japan has a near total reliance on crude oil imports, 93% of
which seaborne (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015). This maritime nature
and strategic reliance on the seas make the stability of Japan’s maritime surroundings
and along its sea lines of communications (SLOCs) no less than a national security
imperative (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). Linking this imperative to Japan’s defense doc-
trine, the 2010 NDPG notes that:
Japan, with its vast territorial waters, is a trading nation which heavily depends on imports for the
supply of foods and resources and on foreign markets. Thus, securing maritime security and inter-
national order is essential for the country’s prosperity. (Ministry of Defense, 2010, p. 4)

Since World War II Japan has ultimately vested the security and its safe use of the
seas to a maritime security regime underpinned by US naval dominance supported by
substantial indigenous naval capabilities in the region and along its SLOCS (Bowers &
Grønning, 2017). China’s expanding maritime ambitions and naval power increasingly
challenge the foundations of this maritime security regime. Geopolitical developments
along its land borders have enabled China, traditionally a continental power, to redirect
attention and resources from the Asian continent to the seas of East Asia as the go-to
domain in which to expand and pursue China’s strategic interests. The primary expres-
sion of China’s new maritime orientation is its investment in naval power, replacing and
supplementing antiquated assets with large quantities of modern naval platforms (Cole,
2010; Ross, 2009; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015). As two authoritative studies on
the subject note, China is ‘building a modern and regionally powerful navy’ through a
‘naval modernization effort [that] encompasses a broad array of platform and weapon
acquisition programs’ (O’Rourke, 2016), the result of which is that it now poses a ‘major
threat’ to foreign naval operations within and possibly beyond 1.000 miles of China’s
lengthy coastline (Heginbotham et al., 2015, p. 21).
Chinese displays of expanding maritime ambitions and advances in naval capabilities
have brought its powerful rise to the forefront of Japan’s security anxieties (Grønning,
2014, pp. 10–12). China’s willingness to use its emerging maritime power to pressurize
Japan over conflicting territorial claims in the East China Sea has emerged as the primary
manifestation of the inherent Chinese maritime challenge to Japan’s security (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2017c). However, Tokyo’s particular sensitivities and stakes extend also
into the neighboring South China Sea, as indicated by the MOD compiling and succes-
sive updating of a report on China’s activities in the South China Sea and its implications
for Japan’s security (Ministry of Defense, 2016a). On the level of perception, the recent
blatancy of China’s territorial claims enforcement in the South China Sea has strength-
ened Japan’s convictions about the coercive inclination of an increasingly powerful
China and the challenge it represents to the established regional order. More impor-
tantly, China’s construction of military-grade facilities, including runways and radars, on
land reclaimed from maritime features in these disputed waters significantly extends
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s peacetime ISR capacity and permanent air presence
542 B. E. M. GRØNNING

potential strengthening its bid for maritime influence and dominance in the South
China Sea. This matters greatly to Japan, as it conducts most of its trade, including 81%
of its crude oil imports – 75% of its total supply – through the South China Sea (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2015). In sum, Tokyo perceives China’s mode of con-
duct as a rapidly materializing challenge to a highly favorable status quo (Bowers &
Grønning, 2017), expressions of which are found in Tokyo’s major foreign, security, and
defense policy documents (Ministry of Defense, 2013b, p. 4, 2015a, p. 157; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2015a).
Japan’s once euphemistic references to the rise of China and the security implica-
tions thereof have gradually shed opacity and grown more confrontational (Ministry of
Defense, 2016b, p. 5). Japan has coupled this rhetorical confrontation with an increas-
ingly overt, comprehensive and sustained security policy response. Japan, in short, is
responding by augmenting the aggregate power output of the Japan–US alliance and
by increasing its regional security involvement (Bowers & Grønning, 2017; Grønning,
2014). As part of the latter, Japan’s security policy is decentering from its Cold War era
exclusive focus on the USA as its only security partner, and toward in building it security
partnerships with other US security partners such as the Philippines and Vietnam, and,
notably, with Russia (Grønning, in press, also see the Introduction, and the Wilkins and
Ishibashi articles of this special issue). Like Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam are
regional maritime powers that find themselves at the receiving end of Chinese maritime
coercive diplomacy, as detailed by the Ministry of Defense (2016a). In developing bilat-
eral security cooperative relations with them, Japan is seeking to diplomatically oppose
and tactically complicate what it perceives as Chinese maritime revisionism.

Under American auspices

‘The future of politics will be decided in Asia,’ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posited in
2011. This recognition, broadly shared in the American foreign policy community, forms
the premise of Washington’s ‘rebalancing’ to strengthen the USA economically, diplo-
matically, and militarily in Asia (Clinton, 2011; Department of Defense, 2012). In support
of this campaign, the USA has made efforts to build stronger bilateral security and
defense ties with, amongst other, the Philippines and Vietnam. With Vietnam, the USA
has most notably launched annual bilateral non-combat naval exercises (2010), signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation (2011),
committed 18 million USD in assistance to boost Vietnam’s maritime security capacity
(2013), and, most importantly, partially lifted its embargo on the export of lethal weap-
ons (2014). The USA has committed maritime security assistance to the Philippines,
amounting to 79 million USD in FY2015 alone, while upgrading in 2014 the USA–
Philippine alliance by adopting the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) which,
amongst other, grants the US military rotational access to and use of military bases in
the Philippines (Thayer, 2014).
This reveals that Japan’s budding security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam
is following the US’ lead. Indeed, key elements of Japan’s efforts are explicitly outlined and
have thus been pursued under the auspices of the Japan–US alliance framework.
First, Japan’s maritime capacity building efforts execute alliance policy priorities first
outlined in an April 2012 joint statement of the Japan–US ‘2 + 2’ Security Consultative
Committee. ‘The U.S. Government plans to continue to help allies and partners in the
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 543

region to build their capacity with training and exercises,’ it notes, while ‘the Govern-
ment of Japan […] plans to take various measures to promote safety in the region,
including strategic use of official development assistance, for example through provid-
ing coastal states with patrol boats’ (Security Consultative Commitee, 2012).
Second, promotion of the type of maritime security-oriented partnerships Japan has
pursued with the Philippines and Vietnam was incorporated in the revised Japan–US
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation issued in 2015. ‘Proactive cooperation with part-
ners,’ the bilateral strategy document notes, ‘will contribute to maintaining and enhanc-
ing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate
in capacity building activities […] with the objective of strengthening the capability of
partners to respond to dynamic security challenges’ (Ministry of Defense, 2015c).
Third, US expectations appear to carry weight also in Japan’s deliberations about
potential military involvement in the South China Sea. To date, Washington has made
no official request for Japan’s military support to its FONOPs challenging excessive Chi-
nese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Senior US Navy officials, however, active
and retired, have publically expressed expectations about Japan’s future military contri-
butions (JIJI, 2016a; Kelly & Kubo, 2015; Kinoshita, 2016). According to a Senior MOFA
Official (personal communication, October 20, 2015), the policy position from which the
foreign minister debates the South China Sea issue before the NSC is that ‘Japan has to
do something [militarily] with the U.S. in the South China Sea.’ The defense minister, he
notes, argues from a more reserved position. While there is no indication that Japan will
join in on US-led FONOPs, Japan is demonstrating increasing confidence and willingness
to operate conspicuously its naval forces in the South China Sea. The most recent indica-
tion is the operations, including port calls and joint naval exercises with the USA, of the
JMSDFs largest warship in the South China Sea en route to a USA–India–Japan naval
exercise in the Indian Ocean (Kelly & Kubo, 2017).
What this indicates is that while Japan is developing increasingly substantial and sig-
nificant security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, these cases far from repre-
sent Tokyo’s distancing from Washington. Indeed, the evidence suggests the contrary,
that Japan is building these security partnerships to strengthen the alliance. Tokyo pub-
lically projects this vision too, noting in its 2014 NSS that ‘Japan needs to expand and
deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as
the cornerstone’ (Ministry of Defense, 2013b, p. 5; National Security Council of Japan,
2013, p. 14). Rather, Japan’s push for substantial security ties with the Philippines and
Vietnam appears to answer US calls for Tokyo to take greater responsibility in both
national and regional security matters to support and complement the USA Asia reba-
lancing. Japan’s efforts, in short, are an integral part of Japan–US alliance policies.

Japanese nationalism
While fundamentally informed by the international context, Japan’s push for substantial
non-US security relationships has not been indifferent to domestic forces. The process
has been facilitated by elite nationalism in Japan, featuring ideas about Japanese nor-
malcy and international pre-eminence and the promotion of the JSDF as an instrument
of foreign policy, not least, but far from exclusively, under Prime Minister Abe (Bowers &
Grønning, 2017). Building security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam to resist
China’s further expansion resonates well with these nationalist ideas. Japanese
544 B. E. M. GRØNNING

nationalism, moreover, has on occasion exacerbated Sino–Japanese tensions, in turn

used by the government to legitimize reforms in security and defense, by forcing deci-
sion-makers’ hands. Most notably, the Government of Japan (GOJ) intervened in Tokyo’s
raucously nationalistic Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s planned purchase of the islands at
the center of Japan’s territorial dispute with China, effectively nationalizing the islands
in ‘an effort to minimize any negative impact on [Sino-Japanese] relations’ (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2012b). Tokyo’s official line of reasoning fell on deaf ears in Beijing.
Fighting what it perceived as a strengthening of Japan’s claim, China sought to fortify
its own by infesting the islands’ surrounding waters with paranaval assets. These events
illustrate the dynamics at play between Japanese nationalism, Sino–Japanese tensions,
and the contemporary security reform of which Japan’s push for security relations with
the Philippines and Vietnam is part (Bowers & Grønning, 2017).

Constitutional, legal, and paralegal reforms

The process of developing substantial security relations with the Philippines and Viet-
nam has moreover been promoted by domestic constitutional, security legislative, and
paralegal reforms significantly broadening the legal scope of action of Tokyo’s security
cooperation with Manila and Hanoi.
First, adjustments to the paralegal framework regulating Tokyo’s arms exports signifi-
cantly expand the scope of cooperation in the military–industrial domain. Japan has
replaced its ‘Three Principles’ blanket ban arms exports regime with the new ‘Three Prin-
ciples on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ conditionally permitting
Japan’s foreign exports of arms, defense equipment, and military technology (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2014f). This paralegal adjustment legalizes Tokyo’s substantiation of
the two ‘strategic partnerships’ with military–industrial and military–technological coop-
eration. This type of cooperation that had thus far by exception been the exclusive pur-
view of the USA (Kazeki, 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Moreover, following the
2013 NSS’ declaration of intent on promoting ‘strategic utilization of ODA and capacity
building assistance,’ Tokyo removed its ban on provision of aid to foreign militaries in a
revised official Development Cooperation Charter released in February 2015 (Cabinet of
Japan, 2015, p. 30; National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 30). The ‘Three Principles
of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ coupled with the revised ‘Develop-
ment Cooperation Charter’ constitutes a new Japanese arms exports regime in which
Japan can extend its ODA-based capacity building efforts into the military domain. It
legally enables, in other words, Japan’s strengthening of Philippine and Vietnamese mili-
tary capabilities by donation.
Second, reform of Japan’s security legislative framework vastly expands the legal
scope of military-operational cooperation. In 2014, Japan removed by Cabinet decision
longstanding constitutional barriers to its application of military power. Japan’s parlia-
ment passed corresponding security legislation in September 2015 to the effect of
broadening the legal parameters of the SDF’s use of armed force. Most notably, the new
legal framework allows Japan to conditionally exercise the right to collective self-
defense, previously outlawed by constitutional reinterpretation, in situations in which:
an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a
result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. (Cabinet of Japan, 2014)
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 545

The heated political debate surrounding the passing of the legislation saw both pro-
ponents and opponents voicing narratives focused on military action defending Japan’s
treaty ally the USA. However, the somewhat ambiguous wording of the new legal frame-
work makes it more broadly applicable at Japanese decision and policy-makers’ discre-
tion. Specifically, the new framework legalizes military commitments to and defensive
operations on behalf of states ‘in a close relationship with Japan.’ Vice Admiral (ret.) Y.
Koda (personal communication, September 29, 2015) offers a former MSDF
commanders perspective on the ambiguity inherent in the new constitutional interpre-
tation and security legislation, noting that it enables Japan to legally engage in collec-
tive self-defense whenever and wherever it is considered required. As the ‘strategic
partnerships’ with the Philippines and Vietnam can be defined as such at Japanese deci-
sion-makers’ discretion, the new security legislation permits a broad extension of
Japan’s military-operational cooperation with these countries.

Limitations and constraints

While driven, facilitated, and enabled by both domestic and external forces, Japan’s fur-
ther development of Vietnam and Philippine security relations faces significant limita-
tions and constraints.
Domestic politics and bureaucratic procedures apply constraints to Japan’s further
development of security cooperation with Vietnam and the Philippines. The Japanese
public remains deeply skeptical about military-natured statecraft. Public opinion on the
new security legislation implies political cost for governments moving to exercise the
right of collective self-defense beyond what is publically perceived as necessary to safe-
guard Japan and its citizens. In one such poll, 51% opposed the new legislation while
30% supported it shortly after its passing by the Japanese Diet (Asahi Shimbun, 2015).
Any commitment to militarily defending the Philippines and Vietnam against armed
attack would no doubt be a tough case to sell domestically for the GOJ. Procedural con-
straints on decisions to exercise the right to collective self-defense were moreover
applied by the last minute insertion of a clause on Diet approval to satisfy and secure
the support of the reluctant junior coalition partner Komeito (2015). This prevents an
activist prime minister from passing orders for the JSDF to exercise the right to collective
self-defense without broad political support, although, admittedly, the prime minister
can do so in time-sensitive situations pending Diet approval.
As of 2015, the GDP of Vietnam and the Philippines stood at a mere 4.8% and 7.3% of
Japan’s, respectively, while their military expenditure stood at 9.3% and 7.2% of Japan’s
(International Monetary Fund, 2016; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
2017). Their navies, moreover, have very limited inventories, and hardly dent China’s sig-
nificant quantitative lead over Japan in naval assets. By one account, the Chinese navy
has an inventory of 61 submarines (strategic and tactical) and 74 principal surface com-
batants (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates). The same account attributes
the JMSDF 18 and 74, the PN zero and one, and the Vietnamese Navy six and two,
respectively (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, pp. 242, 261, 286, 297).
This reveals that the power aggregation potential of Japan–Philippine and Japan–
Vietnam relations is severely limited, a more critical constraint of geo-strategic nature
on the further development of bilateral relations. It also means that Japan’s pursuit of
security via these bilateral arrangements is not so much a question of how they can
546 B. E. M. GRØNNING

materially assist Japan, as how Japan can assist them in return for net security gains. This
draws attention to deficiencies in Japan’s own material capabilities.
Notwithstanding recent arms buildup efforts, including growing inventories of sub-
marines and large surface vessels, the SDF remains structured to carry out its primary
missions: the protection of Japanese territory and its SLOCs out to 1000 nautical miles
from Tokyo. This leaves the South China Sea beyond the dimensioning factors of the
SDF. As notes MSDF Vice Admiral (ret.) Y. Koda (personal communication, September 29,
2015), naval deployment beyond these parameters is possible, but such operations
remain outside of the SDFs operational and structural concept, severely limiting its
capacity to undertake such missions. In its current form, in other words, the SDF cannot
readily assume military responsibilities in the South China Sea, whether it be regular
peacetime patrols or contingency response operations, without running the risk of
compromising its core missions.
The above mentioned capacity constraint is exacerbated by the risk of Chinese recip-
rocal naval actions aimed at tying up Japanese resources in the East China. China views
Japan as an external party to the South China Sea disputes and has publically aired its
apprehensions about and admonitions against Japanese interference (Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015; Reuters, 2016a). Vice Admiral (ret.)
H. Kaneda (personal communication, November 12, 2015) notes that China’s ability to
bind Japanese resources in the East China Sea implies that ‘the JSDF is tactically pres-
sured by China.’ In 2014, Prime Minister Abe hinted at this link between Chinese mari-
time maneuvers in the East China Sea and Japan’s capacity to commit resources to the
South China Sea. Before the Diet, Abe noted that Japan was unable to retire Japan Coast
Guard (JCG) vessels intended for transfer to the Vietnamese Coast Guard as early as
expected because its surveillance duties were getting heavier (Reuters, 2014).
This dynamic is in play also in the naval domain. Japan publically deliberated joining
in on the US Navy FONOPs that began in the South China Sea in 2015 (Hayashi & Tsu-
neoka, 2015; Kelly & Kubo, 2015). As the deliberations went on, China dispatched and
maneuvered a large naval intelligence vessel close to the disputed East China Sea
islands (JIJI, 2015). Former Defense Minister S. Morimoto (personal communication,
December 15, 2015) interprets the PLAN operation as a clear-cut political message from
Beijing telling Tokyo to stay out of the South China Sea. Media comments by a high-
ranking MSDF officer similarly notes that the MSDF has its ‘hands full dealing with the
East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, so it is unrealistic to talk about full-scale
patrol and monitoring operations in the South China Sea’ (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). S. Mor-
imoto (personal communication, December 15, 2015) similarly notes that the risk of pro-
voking China into reciprocal actions in the East China Sea restrain, but not altogether
rule out, Japanese military action challenging Chinese maritime claims in the South
China Sea.
Another geopolitical constraint is the extent Manila and Hanoi’s willingness to do so.
Both China and Russia have geopolitical interests in Vietnam. Hanoi might find itself
pressurized by the two great powers if it slips too close to Japan, the number one
regional benefactor of American policies and presence openly opposed by Beijing and
Moscow. As an island nation the Philippines finds itself geographically cut-off from the
Asian mainland and, in this sense, somewhat less susceptible to such geopolitical pres-
sure. Manila’s future receptiveness to Japan–Philippine security cooperation has none-
theless become a topical issue following the geopolitical shift apparently announced by
Philippine President Duterte during a recent visit to Beijing. ‘I announce my separation
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 547

from the U.S. … both in military and economics also,’ Duterte stated (AP/Reuters, 2016),
seemingly declaring Philippine overtures towards China at the expense of relations with
the USA. The implementation of such a shift could have implications for the Philippine
interest in security cooperation with Japan.
Finally, the USA is well aware of the potency of Japan’s security policy stoking
regional tensions, in particular with China (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). Surely, Washing-
ton finds it in its interest to keep a leash on Japan with regards to its security relations in
the South China sea in case security policy activism in Tokyo threatens to develop these
relations to an extent, at a pace, or in a direction that needlessly heighten regional ten-
sion or otherwise undermine broader US regional policy objectives. Tellingly, the USA
has thus far refrained from officially and publically requesting Japan’s military support
for its declared FONOPs in the South China Sea, seemingly vigilant that the geopolitical
costs might outweigh its benefits.

Conclusion
Japan’s security relationships with the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively, have rap-
idly matured with a shared set of fundamental characteristics. In just a few years, Japan
has essentially developed bilateral relations from security talk shops in the direction of
and in some respects crossing over into militarily substantial relationships. This evolu-
tion raises questions not only about its origin, but moreover about the destination of
these increasingly substantial security bilaterals in the context of Japan’s decentering
from its bilateral alliance with the USA: Are we, in essence, witnessing Japanese non-
American military alliances in the making?
This article has chronicled Japan’s security bilaterals with the Philippines and Vietnam
as catalyzed by a mixture of domestic and international factor. While fundamentally
informed by the contemporary regional power shift they cannot be understood without
appreciation for its maritime dimension; the strategic challenge that China’s maritime
rise presents Japan, given Tokyo’s inherent reliance on the seas. They have moreover
been encouraged under American auspices, promoted by domestic nationalism, and
enabled, at least in part, by domestic security legislative reform.
Notably, these factors all continue to promote additional substantiation of Japan’s
Philippine and Vietnam security cooperation. Yet, their further military development is
up against considerable domestic political, geopolitical, and geo-strategic constraints.
Most critical is the inescapable fact that the Philippines and Vietnam have virtually noth-
ing to offer that would fundamentally enhance Japan’s national security, and Japan,
indeed, has not much to offer them. The two ‘strategic partnerships,’ in other words, will
continue to revolve around extending mutual security-focused diplomatic support.
Going forward, this particular constraint will only grow more severe given the disparity
in the latent power at Japan and China’s disposal. From these security relationships,
then, we should at most be expecting more of the same type of military cooperation
that is already in place, rather than significant leaps towards military alliances.
The rapid military maturation of these two Japanese non-American security partner-
ships also yields important lessons about Japan as a regional security actor today and
beyond. Most importantly, they reflect an emerging foreign and security policy activism
on the part of Tokyo that both predated and will outlive Prime Minister Abe, a growing
enthusiasm for first-hand involvement in regional security affairs. When and where
regional security and stability is on the line, we should expect Japan to show up with an
548 B. E. M. GRØNNING

ambition to shape unfolding events in accordance with its national interest. This reflects
Japan’s growing enthusiasm for hard power application, the use of its armed forces and
military policies in general as tools of foreign policy. As such, they are illustrative of
Japan’s steadfast march towards normalcy.

Acknowledgments
The author would like to express gratitude to Professors Paul Midford and Yoneyuki
Sugita for the invitation to take part in the project resulting in this publiation, to Osaka
University and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for their research funding, to the Nor-
wegian Institute for Defence Studies for its institutional support, and to Center for Asian
Security Studies colleagues for enjoyable and invaluable scholarly interaction.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This work was supported by Osaka University and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.

Notes on contributor
Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning is a Centre for Asian Secrity Studies research fellow at the Norwegian Insti-
tute for Defence Studies, Norwegian Defence University College in Oslo, Norway. He holds a Doctoral
Degree (Ph.D.) in Political Science from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
with a dissertation analyzing Japan’s security policy response to the contemporary power shift in China’s
favor. He has served as a trainee at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo, as a visiting research fellow
at Keio University, and as a specially appointed researcher at Osaka University. The topics of his publica-
tions include Japan’s security and defense policy, missile defense, and maritime security. He is the author
of “Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise” (Asian Security, 2014) and co-author
of “Protecting the Status Quo: Japan’s Response to the Rise of China” in Ross and Tunsjø (eds.) Strategic
Adjustment and The Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2017).

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