JAPAN'S ASEAN POLICY: REACTIVE OR PROACTIVE IN THE FACE OF A RISING CHINA IN

EAST ASIA?
Author(s): Sueo Sudo
Source: Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2009), pp. 137-158
Published by: Lynne Rienner Publishers
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 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2009, pp. 137-158.

JAPAN'S ASEAN POLICY:

REACTIVE OR PROACTIVE IN THE FACE
OF A RISING CHINA IN EAST ASIA?

Sueo Sudo

Since the announcement of the Hashimoto Doctrine in

1997, Japan's proactive response to ever-changing Southeast
Asia has been a main factor in advancing a new regionalism in
East Asia. However it is believed that China-ASEAN relations
have outpaced Japan-ASEAN relations due to the uniformity of
China-ASEAN's regional policies and the inconsistency of
Japan-ASEAN's regional integration policies. Given these
opposing views ; this article examines the current state of Japan-
ASEAN relations and especially focuses on the recent explicit
efforts to strengthen a strategic partnership. Clarifying the
changing nature of Japanese foreign policy toward ASEAN
since the late 1990s , the article contends that Japanese initiatives
are neither exceptional nor sporadic in nature. Indeed between
1997 and 2007 Japan was an ideational facilitator to promote
multilateral order in the region through strategic networking.

Key words: Japan- ASE AN relations, Japanese foreign policy,

regionalism - East Asia, China

Introduction

The end of the cold war has renewed interest in regional

approaches to development and security. Apart from the obvi-

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138 Sueo Sudo

ous case of Europe with its economically integrated Euro

Union (EU), East Asia appears to be one of the most dyn
regions among developing countries. The Association of S
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) itself has especially played a l
role in activating closer regional interactions, as exemplif
the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the A
Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the ASEAN+3 (APT). It is
quite remarkable that these multilateral efforts are being ca
out by ASEAN, whose very survival was questioned until r
ly. Even after the unprecedented financial crisis that occurre
Thailand in July 1997 and soon engulfed Northeast and South
Asian countries, ASEAN's regional role has been strengthe
the institutionalization of the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 20
Against this background, Japan has also shown some no
initiatives in its foreign policy. For the first time Japan has i
fied itself as part of East Asia. In particular, it was unpreced
that the Japanese government, despite American objections,
posed the formation of an East Asian version of the Internat
Monetary Fund in order to deal with the contagious financia
of 1997-1998. To follow up, Japan offered the so-called Miya
plan and initiated the Japan- ASEAN summit meeting, wh
to the formation of a regularized APT forum. As an extensio
Japan's proactive policies, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo promis
August 2007 to consolidate Japan's strategic partnership
ASEAN.
How do we interpret these policy initiatives by the Japanese
government? We might argue that they were undertaken within
the traditional parameters of Japanese foreign policy, which is
exceptionally reactive due to the nature of the Japanese state
conditioned by mercantile realism1 or due to the rise of China.2
We could also argue that these initiatives could bode well in

1. See, for instance, Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, "Mercantile

Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International Security , vol. 22, No. 4
(1998), pp. 171-203.
2. See, especially, Brad Glosserman, "Japan-ASEAN Summit: Playing Catch-
Up with China?" PacNet, No. 52, December 18, 2003; Bronson Percival,
"Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Playing Catch-Up with China," Compara-
tive Connections , vol. 8, No. 3, October 13, 2006; Won Lai Foon, "China-
ASEAN and Japan- ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era," Chi-
nese Journal of International Politics , vol. 1, No. 3 (2007), pp. 373-404.

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 Japan 's ASEAN Policy 139

modifying Japanese policy orientation, as a small group of schol-

ars has come to underscore a quiet but steady development of a
new style in Japanese foreign policy since the end of the cold war,
most typified by various multilateral initiatives in recent years.3
The purpose of this article is to clarify the changing nature of
Japanese foreign policy toward ASEAN in the post-cold war
period of the late 1990s and the early 21st century, and contend
that the above-mentioned policy initiatives toward ASEAN are
not exceptional, nor sporadic in nature, and are therefore deserv-
ing of special scrutiny. Indeed, when we closely examine the
unique developments of Japan-ASEAN relations between 1997
and 2007, we witness the emerging foreign policy of Japan as an
ideational facilitator to promote multilateral order in the region
through strategic networking.

A New Departure: The Hashimoto Doctrine of 1997

Japan has developed its interdependence and forged close

political and economic ties with ASEAN, accentuated by the Fuku-
da Doctrine in 1977 and the Takeshita Doctrine in 1987. Before
1997, however, Japan's ASEAN policy was deadlocked due to a
lack of new initiatives and inputs that could overcome the lin-
gering after-effects of the East Asian Economic Caucus debacle.4
In January 1997, despite problems associated with the hostage cri-
sis in Peru, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro visited several
ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei) and
proposed the formation of a top-level forum between Japan and
ASEAN. Furthermore, in Singapore, Hashimoto delivered a policy
speech, "Reforms for the New Era of Japan and ASEAN," which
underscored Japan's consistent policy toward ASEAN since 1977.5

3. David Potter and Sueo Sudo, "Japanese Foreign Policy: No Longer Reac-
tive?" Political Studies Review, vol. 1, No. 3 (2003), pp. 317-32; Park Chang-
Gun, "Japan's Policy Stance on East Asian Neo-Regionalism: From Being
a 'Reluctant' to Becoming a 'Proactive' State," Global Economic Review,
vol. 35, No. 3 (2006), pp. 285-301.
4. For early Japan- ASEAN relations, see Sueo Sudo, International Relations of
Japan and South East Asia (London: Routledge, 2002), especially chapter 3.
5. Hashimoto Ryutaro, Reforms for the New Era of Japan and ASEAN: For a
Broader and Deeper Partnership (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

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140 Sueo Sudo

Most importantly, he proposed the following three policies:

mote broader and deeper exchanges between Japan and A
at the top as well as at all other levels; to deepen mutual u
standing and to expand cultural cooperation in order to co
date Japan-ASEAN friendship; and to jointly address var
problems that the international community faced as a whole
ASEAN in 1997, however, was facing a critical transit
The end of its third decade was a mixed blessing for the mem
countries, thereby necessitating a big stimulation for the fo
decade of the organization. Especially to consolidate regi
policies, ASEAN needed stronger outside assistance at the
ning of the fourth decade. In response, Hashimoto dis
Japan's comprehensive policy at the ASEAN-Japan summ
December 1997. In particular, he announced that in view
Asian economic turmoil, Japan would cooperate with AS
toward stabilizing Asian currencies and financial market
would also assist ASEAN in achieving stable and sust
development through economic structural reform.6
As such, what the Hashimoto administration attempt
1997 would suggest a clear departure from traditional bila
ism to the new regionalism. What has drawn attention i
Hashimoto's two visits to the region symbolize Japan's gr
shift toward an independent and active role in Southeas
Particularly, his second visit to Kuala Lumpur seems to be cr
in that Hashimoto attended the first summit meeting of Nor
(China, Japan, South Korea) and Southeast Asian (ASEA
leaders, known as "APT." Furthermore, Japan's cultural re
with ASEAN have been stressed far more than they wer
Hashimoto's predecessors. For instance, the Japanese gover
has worked out a special program, the "multilateral cu
exchange program," to be jointly conducted with Singapo
in all, these major initiatives in 1997 and early 1998 hav
strengthened Japan's diplomatic leadership, despite Hashi
resignation in August 1998 due to domestic problems.7

Studies, 1997).
6. ASEAN, "Joint Statement of the Meeting of Head of State /Gover
of the Member States of ASEAN and the Prime Ministers of Japan
Lumpur, 16 December 1997," Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.
7. Sueo Sudo, Evolution of ASE AN -J apart Relations (Singapore: Inst

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 Ja pan 's ASEAN Policy 141

Consolidation of Top-Level Relations Since 1998

Since the announcement of the Hashimoto doctrine, Japan

has pursued its active diplomacy, consolidating top-level rela-
tions with ASEAN, especially in two aspects: prime ministers'
visits to ASEAN and the institutionalization of summit meetings
through the ASEAN+3 venues.

Prime Ministers' Visits to ASEAN Countries

In January 2000, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo visited Laos,

Cambodia, and Thailand. The main purposes of the visits to these
three countries were to demonstrate the stance that Japan would
continue to provide support for the development and prosperity
of the expanded ASEAN, and to explain Japan's approach to the
upcoming G-8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit meeting and listen to the
opinions of the ASEAN countries so that the views of Asian coun-
tries would be reflected at the summit meeting.8 At the meetings
with national leaders, Prime Minister Obuchi laid out concrete
plans for Japan's support of the three countries, following his
announcement at the November 1999 APT Summit meeting in
Manila. Obuchi also disclosed Japan's intention to take the initia-
tive in developing human resources and correcting economic dis-
parities among ASEAN countries. Toward the Cambodian and
Laotian prime ministers in particular, Obuchi expressed Japan's
firm support for the two countries, which had just joined ASEAN
and were vigorously undertaking domestic reforms. He also said
that Japan would provide every possible assistance in such areas
as policy formulation and human resources development.9
In January 2002, visiting five of the ASEAN countries (the
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore), Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro (Obuchi's successor) explained Japan's
strategy of making maximum use of the APT framework. Koizumi
proposed building up concrete regional cooperation as a means of
creating a "community that acts together and advances together,"
while stressing that promoting open regional cooperation in a

Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).

8. Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 11, 2000, online ed.
9. Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 13, 2000, online ed.

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142 Sueo Sudo

form that is transparent to extra-regional countries woul

tribute to the peace and prosperity of the region.10 In Singa
Koizumi proposed several new initiatives for cooperation,
ing the designation of 2003 as the Year of ASEAN-Japan Exc
reinforced cooperation in education and human resources
opment, solidification of security relations, an ASEAN-J
Comprehensive Economic partnership, and the Initiative
Development in East Asia. As he averred:

Our goal should be the creating of a community that acts toget

and advances together. And we should achieve this thr
expanding East Asia cooperation founded upon the Japan- A
relationship. While recognizing our historical, cultural, ethnic
traditional diversity, I would like to see countries in the re
become a group that works together in harmony.11

Prime Minister Abe also visited Malaysia and Indones

August 2007. In Indonesia, Abe delivered a policy speech
tled "Japan and One ASEAN that Care and Share at the He
Dynamic Asia" in which he stressed three policies to
ASEAN: realization of the Economic Partnership Agreem
promotion of the Mekong River region; and assistance in
building. Furthermore, Abe underscored the importance
closer relationship:

I mentioned earlier that ASEAN and Japan want to maintai

further nurture their 'care and share' relationship. ASEAN
over the coming decade, be working to undergo a fundam
transformation. It aims at creating a community by 2015, a
will be critical that ASEAN continue to sit in the driver's seat in
the East Asia Summit and other regional cooperation frameworks
that are expanding and overlapping, being both the hub and the
driving force of East Asian cooperation. The development of
ASEAN is therefore in and of itself in the interests of Asia and the
interests of Japan. I am pleased to be able to take this opportunity
to tell you that to advance these interests, in the years ahead Japan
will continue to be unsparing in providing help.12

10. Yomiuri Shimbun, January 15, 2002.

11. Koizumi Junichiro, Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Part-
nership (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002).
12. Abe Shinzo, "Japan and One ASEAN that Care and Share at the Heart
of Dynamic Asia/' Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007.

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 Ja pan 's ASEAN Policy 1 43

Institutionalization of Summit Meetings through the APT

In addition to top-level visits to the region, it is remarkable

that a Japan- ASEAN summit meeting has become institutionalized
as a result of Hashimoto's endeavor, reminding us of the fact that
the Japan- ASE AN foreign ministers' meeting became the Post-
Ministerial meeting in 1979. As Table 1 below shows, Japan and
ASEAN leaders have met every year since 1998 as part of the APT
gatherings.13

Table 1. Networks of Japan- ASE AN Relations, 1997-2007

Prime _ . Foreign Economic Japan-

^ . , Summit . , . A JL A ^ T
^ Minister . , s . , Ministers Ministers . ASEAN A A ^ T
Meeting .
visit Meeting Meeting Forum
1997 Hashimoto Hashimoto 20 th 6 th 15 th
1998 Obuchi 21st 16th
1999 Obuchi Obuchi 22nd
2000 Mori 23rd 7th
2001 Koizumi Koizumi 24th 8th 17th
2002 Koizumi 25 th 9 th 18 th
2003 Koizumi 26th 10th 19th
2004 Koizumi 27th 11th 20th
2005 Koizumi 28th 12th 21st
2006 29th 13th 22nd
2007 Abe Abe 30th 14th

It is notable that from the fift

Minister Koizumi represented J
proactive ASEAN policy with a
China. For instance, at the 2002 A
Declaration on the Comprehens

13. Of course, Japan is not the only

and South Korea followed suit, but J
tionalization before 1997, such as th
and the Foreign Ministers' Meeting s
two summits with ASEAN while
1977 and 1987.

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144 Sueo Sudo

was signed. Its objectives are five-fold: to strengthen econo

integration between Japan and ASEAN through the creation
CEP; to enhance the competitiveness of Japan and ASEAN in
world market through strengthened partnership and linkages;
progressively liberalize and facilitate trade in goods and serv
as well as create a transparent and liberal investment regime
explore new areas and develop appropriate measures for furt
cooperation and economic integration; and to facilitate the m
effective economic integration of the newer ASEAN members a
bridge the development gap among the ASEAN members.1
the same time, Japan and Singapore signed an agreement fo
New Age Economic Partnership 0SEPA) on January 13, 2002
aimed to promote freer trans-border flows of goods, people, se
vices, capital, and information to reduce economic borders and
contribute to the promotion of an economic partnership in a ra
of areas. In terms of the regional economic agenda, Japan
quick to respond to China's 2001 overtures to ASEAN for a Chin
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to be established by 2
Obviously China's actions precipitated Japan's own responses
Japan-China competition has become one important driving for
for greater Japanese participation in regional affairs.15
Most important was the ASEAN-Japan summit meeting
Tokyo in December 2003, the first summit meeting ever held o
side Southeast Asia. At the commemorative meeting, the To
Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan- ASEAN Partn
ship in the New Millennium was adopted. The Tokyo Declara
stressed the following principles and values: Japan and ASE
will further deepen and broaden their relationship; Japan
ASEAN will enhance their cooperation through closer consu
tion; Japan and ASEAN will contribute to the creation of an
Asia region; Japan and ASEAN will forge common visions
principles, including respect for the rule of law and justice, pur
of openness, promotion and protection of human rights, and f

14. Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan), "Joint Declaration o

Leaders of Japan and ASEAN on the Comprehensive Economic P
nership," Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002.
15. Sueo Sudo, "It Takes Two to Tango: The Conflict as lapan Sees I
lames C. Hsiung, ed., China and Japan at Odds: Deciphering the Perpe
Conflict (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 43-58.

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 Japan 's ASEAN Policy 1 45

damental freedoms of all peoples; Japan will give high priority to

ASEAN' s economic development and integration efforts as it
strives to realize the ASEAN community; Japan and ASEAN will
collectively promote the development of regional and trans-
regional frameworks; and Japan and ASEAN will address regional
and global issues, keeping in mind their special relationship based
on equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit.16
After the Koizumi administration, a new Japanese leader-
ship attempted to resume normal relations with China and began
to strengthen Japan- ASE AN relations. At the tenth meeting in
January 2007 in Cebu, for instance, the joint statement acknowl-
edged the overall progress in the Plan of Action to implement
the Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan
Partnership in the New Millennium adopted in Tokyo in Decem-
ber 2003. Both ASEAN and Japan acknowledged the establish-
ment in March 2006 of the Japan- ASEAN Integration Fund QAIF),
Japan's fresh grant of $52 million to help bridge the development
gap in ASEAN through the promotion of the ASEAN-Japan
Comprehensive Economic partnership, Japan's assistance to the
development of the Mekong region as well as Japan's new initia-
tive to expand its ODA (official development assistance) to the
Mekong region for the next three years, and Japan's large-scale
youth exchange initiative totaling $315 million over the next five
years, which would include the invitation to 6,000 young people
annually from ASEAN and other EAS member countries to
Japan.17
The eleventh meeting was held in November 2007. Both
ASEAN and Japan referred to the longstanding friendship
between ASEAN and Japan, and reaffirmed the importance of
the ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership for peace, stability, and
prosperity in the region and the world. Both sides also noted that
2007 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the Fukuda Doctrine,
which enshrines Japan's policy of a "heart-to-heart" relationship

16. Gaimusho, "Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-
ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium/' Tokyo: Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, 2003. The first commemorative summit between ASEAN
and China was held in October 2006.
17. ASEAN, "Chairman's Statement of the Tenth ASEAN-Japan Summit,
Cebu, January 14, 2007/' Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

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146 Sueo Sudo

with ASEAN on the basis of an equal partnership.

The joint statement from that meeting underscore
steady progress made in the Plan of Action. Especially,
welcomed the successful conclusion of the negotiations
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJ
Agreement and the establishment of the Economic Re
Institute of ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), which will prov
intellectual foundation for exchange of ideas and recomm
tions to further regional integration and strengthen partner
between ASEAN and Japan.18

Japan's Provision of Policy Ideas

Over the years ASEAN and Japan have deepened and b

ened their cooperation to ensure peace, stability, and pros
in the region through various established mechanisms und
ASEAN-Japan dialogue. These include summits, minis
meetings, senior officials' meetings, and meetings at the
levels as well as multilateral frameworks initiated by A
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Prime Ministeria
ference, and the APT process. Focusing on Japan's provis
policy ideas, we will examine two major areas of cooperat
more detail.

Political and Security Cooperation

Ever since its first leadership role in a United Nations peace-

keeping operation (PKO), in Cambodia in 1993, Japan's political
and security involvement in Southeast Asia has grown steadily.
In this respect, Japan's accession to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia on July 2, 2004 has added
to the importance to the TAC as a code of conduct governing
relations among countries and as a diplomatic instrument for
the promotion of peace and stability in the region. Let us see
how Japan's proactive policies have worked on two issues: East
Timor and piracy.

18. ASEAN, "Chairman's Statement of the Eleventh ASEAN-Japan Summit,

Singapore, November 21, 2007," Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

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 Japan's ASEAN Policy 147

East Timor sits in the geopolitically important area that

divides Asia and the Pacific. Recognizing that a stable East Timor
should contribute to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific
region, Japan has placed an emphasis on assisting East Timor by
dispatching three civilian police officers to the United Nations
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which conducted the direct
balloting in 1999 on whether East Timor would remain part of
Indonesia. In addition, upon request of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), air transport units of the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were dispatched and trans-
ported humanitarian relief goods to East Timor for the refugees
resulting from the violence and confusion in the wake of direct
balloting.19
The most telling story is that Japan provided needed finan-
cial support upon request from ASEAN leaders to undertake
their PKO missions in East Timor.20 Since then, Japan has been
actively providing assistance to East Timor for reconstruction
and development and in humanitarian areas. In 1999, for
instance, Japan hosted the First Donor's Meeting for East Timor
in Tokyo. At the meeting, Japan pledged assistance that totals
$130 million for three years, with particular emphasis on infra-
structure, agriculture, and human resources development. Japan
has been supporting Japanese nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that are active in East Timor with financial assistance
totaling $1.46 million under the grassroots grant aid scheme.21
Currently, as an operation based on the International Peace
Cooperation Law, Japan has dispatched 680 Ground Self-Defense
Force (GSDF) personnel in Engineer Units and ten peacekeeping
headquarters personnel to UNTAET. Those dispatched are car-
rying out logistic support operations for UNTAET, such as the

19. Paulo Gorjao, "Japan's Foreign Policy and East Timor, 1975-2002," Asian
Survey , vol. 42, No. 5 (2002), pp. 754-71.
20. Surin Pitsuwan, "Fukuda Dokutorin no konnichiteki imiwo kangaeru
(Fukuda Doctrine: Impact and Implications on Japan- ASEAN Relations),
Kokusai Mondai , No. 567 (2007), pp. 46-54.
21. Geoffrey Gunn, "Japan, Postcrisis Indonesia, and the Japanese Role in
East Timor Development," in Rolando Tolentino, Ong Jin Hui, and
Hing Ai Yun, eds., Transglobal Economies and Cultures : Contemporary Japan
and Southeast Asia (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 2004),
pp. 35-51.

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148 Sueo Sudo

maintenance and repair of roads and bridges. These ope

are expected to provide assistance for the economic activiti
daily lives of the East Timorese people. The current disp
SDF personnel, the largest ever to a UN peacekeeping op
is an extraordinary initiative that makes Japan's assist
East Timor more multifaceted. Having gone through v
conflicts and confrontations, East Timor is now making
for reconciliation among its citizens, as well as reconst
and development of the country. Japan sees such effor
important initiative for conflict resolution and nation buil
the international community. As East Timor faces man
lenges, Japan as an Asian nation will continue to active
port East Timor.22
With regard to piracy, Japan has a long history of co
tion with the littoral states of the Malacca Strait in nav
safety, survey work, and equipment provision and tra
the Southeast Asian coastal patrol authorities.23 In Apr
Japan hosted the "Regional Conference on Combating P
and Armed Robbery against Ships" with the participat
ASEAN, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Republic of K
China, and Hong Kong. At the conference, the partic
countries agreed to strengthen regional cooperation in o
tackle piracy and armed robbery against ships, wh
becoming more brutal and organized.24 Soon after the c
ence, in September 2000, Japan dispatched the "Miss
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in order
sult with these coastal countries about more specific mea
assistance and cooperation. Furthermore, Japan hosted a
conference on combating piracy in Tokyo in October 2
order to discuss medium- and long-term visions con

22. Gen Kikkawa, "Japan and East Timor: Change and Develop
Japan's Security Policy and the Road to East Timor/' Japanese
vol. 27, No. 3 (2007), pp. 247-61.
23. Greg Chaikin, "Piracy in Asia: International Co-operation and
Role," in Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, eds., Piracy in Sou
Asia: Status , Issues , and Responses (Singapore: Institute of Southea
Studies, 2005), pp. 122-42.
24. Gaimusho, "Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and
Robbery against Ships," Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006

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 Ja pan 's ASEAN Policy 1 49

regional cooperation framework. At this conference, all the par-

ticipants shared the view that it was necessary to explore a new
approach in order to solve the piratical problems and to consider
developing a regional cooperation agreement for the more effec-
tive implementation of countermeasures to deal with piracy and
armed robbery against ships.
Japan's anti-piracy efforts have also promoted multilateral
institution building in die region. Under the terms of the "Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Rob-
bery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)," Japan has financed efforts
of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to track and
study incidents of piracy. At a meeting of the IMO in September
2006, Japan proposed voluntary cost sharing for safety, security,
and environmental protection of the Malacca and Singapore
Straits among the three littoral states, user states, the shipping
industry, and other stakeholders. Japan's offer of three patrol
ships to Indonesia in 2006 was a symbolic event in this respect.
Overall, Japan's maritime security assistance to Southeast
Asia has been favorably received by the recipient states. Despite
some shortcomings in its assistance programs and heavy focus
on the Malacca Strait, Japan's capacity-building assistance in the
region meshes well with the broader maritime security priorities
of the Southeast Asian governments and Japan's principal allies
in the region, the United States and Australia.25

Economic Cooperation

The second major area is economic cooperation, in which

traditionally Japan's role has been regarded as predominant. For
instance, statistics of trade, investment, and aid amply suggest
Japan's leading role in the region, although recent developments
underscore a significant change, as Table 2 below amply sug-
gests.26 Notwithstanding this traditional relationship, Japan's

25. Yoichiro Sato, "Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime

Security Cooperation/' Brief Analytical Reports, Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, U.S. Department of Defense, 2007.
26. For a comparison, see Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South : China
and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport: Praeger Security Interna-
tional, 2007), especially chapter 6 on China- ASEAN economic relations.

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150 Sueo Sudo

Table 2. Japan's Economic Relations with ASEAN ($US millio

ODA Investment Trade

1997 1,354 (14.4%) 7,780 (29.8%) 120,689 (15.8%)

1998 2,356 (22.1%) 4,454 (18.0%) 85,994 (12.8%)
1999 3,920(32.2%) 1,032 (4.6%) 88,873(12.1%)
2000 3,126(23.1%) 207 (0.6%) 127,773 (14.7%)
2001 2,108 (21.4%) 4,013 (10.4%) 111,294 (14.7%)
2002 1,747(20.9%) 4,256(13.1%) 109,097(14.4%)
2003 1,488(16.7%) 432 (1.4%) 119,715(14.0%)
2004 897(10.0%) 2,800 (9.0%) 143,096(14.0%)
2005 1,968 (14.9%) 5,002 (11.0%) 153,949 (13.7%)
2006 703 (6.2%) 6,923(13.8%) 165,444(13.4%)
Sources: Gaimusho, Japan's ODA, various issues; JETRO, Japan's Trade and
various issues.

proactive policy toward Mekong River development is worth

elaborating on here.
Ever since hosting the "Ministerial Meeting of the Forum for
Comprehensive Development of Indochina" in Tokyo in Febru-
ary 1995, Japan has conducted major projects, including a Forum
for Comprehensive Development of Indochina; a Task Force for
Strategies for Development of the Greater Mekong Area; a seminar
held in Indochina; and Japan's Cooperation on the Initiative for
ASEAN Integration.27 In order to further contribute to Mekong
development, Japan has been extending bilateral assistance to
the new member countries of ASEAN. Especially, Japan actively
cooperates with ASEAN in efforts to assist the CLMV (Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) countries by utilizing the Japan-
ASEAN General Exchange Fund (JAGEF). More specifically,
Japan provides information technology and other assistance to
the CLMV countries' ministries of foreign affairs, to the ASEAN
Secretariat for Junior Diplomats, to the human capacity-building
workshop for ministry of foreign affairs and other personnel,
and to the workshop to formulate a workplan for the integration
of CLMV into ASEAN.
As a positive step forward, Japan dispatched a joint mission

27. Gaimusho, "Japan's Cooperation for the Mekong Subregion Develop-

ment, November 2001," Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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 Japan's ASEAN Policy 151

with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to the countries con-

cerned (CLMV and Thailand) in July 2001. Based on the findings
of the mission, Japan put priority on the East-West Corridor pro-
ject (Maulamyaing-Mukdahan-Da Nang) and the 2nd East-West
Corridor project (Ho Chi Minh City-Phnom Penh-Bangkok). In a
similar vein, Japan extended its assistance program to the CLMV
countries to other ASEAN member countries (Singapore, Thai-
land, and the Philippines). For instance, there is a joint program
for building the human resources of the developing countries,
the cost of which is borne by Japan and Singapore on a fifty-fifty
basis. Under the "Japan-Singapore Partnership Program for the
21st Century," nearly twenty training courses are offered every
year, accepting trainees from neighboring countries.28
In January 2007, the Japan-Mekong Region Partnership Pro-
gram was adopted with special emphasis on three priority areas:
enhanced Japan-Mekong region partnership; sustainable econom-
ic growth of the Mekong region; and life with dignity for the peo-
ple in the Mekong region and fulfillment of their potential. The
program also has three goals: expansion of ODA to the Mekong
region; bilateral investment agreements with Cambodia and Laos;
and convening of the Japan-Mekong region ministerial meeting.
More specifically, Japan made a number of commitments. Regard-
ing the Mekong region as a priority area, Japan will expand its
ODA to each CLV country as well as to the region as a whole for
the next three years. Out of Japan's new assistance totaling $52
million for promotion of Japan- ASE AN economic partnership,
approximately $40 million will be allocated to the CLMV. Of this
amount, approximately $20 million will be used to assist the CLV
"Development Triangle." Finally, in order to substantially expand
joint assistance projects for the Mekong region, Japan will consult
more closely with the rest of the ASEAN countries.29

28. Masaya Shiraishi, "Mekon saburijon no jikken" (Experiment of the

Mekong Subregion), in Yamamoto Takehiko and Amako Satoshi, eds.,
Aratana chiikikeisei (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2007), pp. 67-92.
29. Gaimusho, " Japan-Mekong Region Partnership Program/' Tokyo: Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, 2007.

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152 Sueo Sudo

Policy Implications for East Asian Regionalism

The above analysis suggests that new themes have eme

in promoting regionalism in East Asia.30 We will examin
Japan's role as an ideational facilitator and then Japan's
ing-up with China.

Japan's Role as an Ideational Facilitator

ASEAN's apparent response to the financial crisis w

forge a new regionalism in East Asia. Since neither ASEA
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) p
able to deal with the financial crisis, Asian leaders turned to
Asian cooperation instead of an Asia-Pacific alternative.
then, Japan has provided policy ideas explicitly or implic
direct regional discourses, as exemplified by the Asian M
tary Fund, the New Miyazawa Initiative, and the Chiang
Initiative. Especially, given the comprehensive nature of J
ASEAN policy, ASEAN-Japan relations have come to be
a common strategic perspective, as Singapore's Deputy P
Minister Lee Hsien Loong explained:

In 1977, ASEAN was in a precarious position not long after the

of Indochina. Japan's support to ASEAN at a time of need
deeply appreciated. Now ASEAN is again going through a
cult period. Japan's assistance to the crisis economies has no
assisted the countries with their economic problems, but produ
positive political impact by helping to stabilize the region
has earned Japan goodwill and respect as a long-term player
an enlightened understanding of its own interests.31

Seizing this opportunity, Japan began to formulate its st

gic relationship with ASEAN in 2003. As the last attemp
Prime Minister Koizumi, it was stressed that Japan and A
should form a strategic partnership at the ninth summit me

30. Yeo Lay Hwee, "Japan, ASEAN, and the Construction of an East
Community," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 28, No. 2 (2006), pp. 2
31. Lee Hsien Loong, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asia," speech
Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore at the Japan Institute of In
tional Affairs, Tokyo, May 25, 1999.

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 Japan 's ASEAN Policy 153

in December 2005. Reflecting Koizumi's proposal, the joint state-

ment of the ASEAN-Japan summit, "Deepening and Broadening
of ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership," underscored the follow-
ing: supporting ASEAN community building efforts, strength-
ening the economic partnership, reforming the ASEAN-Japan
Center, combating transnational crime and terrorism, enhancing
disaster management, addressing infectious diseases, enhancing
energy cooperation, promoting exchanges and people-to-people
contact, deepening East Asia cooperation, and responding to
international issues.32
It is interesting to note here that the strategic partnership
reflects bilateral relations as well. On the occasion of the state visit
of the Indonesian president to Japan in November 2006, for
instance, Prime Minister Abe and President Yudhoyono under-
lined that the strategic partnership between Indonesia and Japan
would be a significant means to deepening and mutually expand-
ing beneficial bilateral ties. The strategic partnership would also be
a primary means for exploring new opportunities to promote con-
crete bilateral cooperation. It should also foster closer partnership
to address new challenges and non-traditional security threats
such as the danger of infectious diseases such as avian influenza,
terrorism, natural disasters, and transnational crimes. As the state-
ment succinctly put it: "The two leaders reaffirmed that Japan and
Indonesia share such basic values as freedom, democracy, human
rights and rule of law and also share a commitment to the stability
and development of the Asia-Pacific region. They also affirmed
that they would strengthen the strategic relationship in addressing
political and security issues, as well as reinforced their long-stand-
ing economic relations."33
Another illustration of the importance of Japan's policy ideas
is the formation of a developmental regime. Since the 9th ASEAN-
Japan Summit Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on December 13,
2005, for instance, ASEAN and Japan have reaffirmed their com-
mitment to implement the Plan of Action as a guideline to future

32. ASEAN, " Joint Statement of the Ninth ASEAN-Japan Summit, Kuala
Lumpur, 13 December 2005," Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.
33. Gaimusho, "Japan-Indoneshia Joint Statement: Strategic Partnership for
Peaceful and Prosperous Future/' Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2006.

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154 Sueo Sudo

developmental regionalism in East Asia. There would b

major areas of specialization. First, the Japan- ASEAN Integr
Fund, to which Japan has contributed $70 million, was
lished in March 2006 to support ASEAN' s effort to establ
ASEAN Community by 2020. Efforts to reduce the develo
gap in ASEAN have continued under the Initiative for A
Integration, for which Japan has extended assistance to tw
four projects (which are worth over $4 million) in the a
human resource development. Concerning Mekong region
opment and the Human Resource Development Total Plan,
eration reached a new high with the realization of Japan'
mitment to extend assistance of $1.5 billion to various pr
within three years dating from December 2003.34
Second, the Initiative for Development in East Asia (ID
proposed by Prime Minister Koizumi in January 2002, sig
the joint efforts to achieve further development in light of
challenges facing the region. East Asian cooperation ove
IDEA has continued to expand in various areas. For ins
ASEAN agreed to a proposal for a track-two study on a p
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia. ASEA
agreed to Japan's proposal to establish an Economic Rese
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, and asked Japan to d
this proposal further with the ASEAN Secretariat. Wo
closely with the Asian Development Bank, Japan's pursui
regional development regime could bring favorable resu
East Asia.35

Japan's Catching-up with China?

Is Japan just reacting to the rise of China while paying lip-

service to East Asian regionalism? Our discussion above sug-
gests at least two related issues, the first of which is related to
the rise of China.
During the Koizumi administration, both Japan and China

34. ASEAN, "Third Executive Report Progress of Implementation of the

ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action," Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2007.
35. Christopher Dent, "The Asian Development Bank and Developmental
Regionalism in East Asia," Third World Quarterly , vol. 29, No. 4 (2008),
pp. 767-86.

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 Japan 's ASEAN Policy 155

embarked on attempts to exert regional economic leadership.

China's political and economic influence is fast rising within
East Asia at a time when that of Japan is declining, which expe-
dited changes in regional economic and industrial structures. In
this respect, newly-elected Prime Minister Abe's reconciliatory
trip to China in 2006 may have helped produce a thaw in the
troubled relationship between Japan and China. Although the
Japan-China confrontation has waned since then, the controver-
sy over the modality of the East Asia Summit still needs to be
resolved amicably. Although ASEAN set up three qualifications
for admission to the summit - namely, that states be dialogue
partners with ASEAN, be engaged economically in East Asia,
and be signatories to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Coopera-
tion - rivalry between groups of countries close to either China
or Japan might be a stumbling block for the new regionalism
attempts. As a Southeast Asian scholar cogently put it: "If Japan
is clouded with relative gains considerations vis-à-vis China, it
might well play the spoiler role and slow down the pace of
progress."36
The second issue is ASEAN's expectations for Japan's role in
East Asia. Should ASEAN and Japan constitute a core group pro-
moting a new regionalism in East Asia, their mutual perceptions
of each other need to be congenial. A recent opinion poll conduct-
ed by the Japanese government confirmed that historical memory
has diminished as a determining factor and that ASEAN coun-
tries have a positive expectation for Japan's role.37 A recent move
by both Japan and China to offer their joint assistance for Mekong
area development is likely to improve ASEAN's perception of
Japan.38

36. Tang Siew-Mun, "Japan's Vision of an East Asian Community/' Japanese

Studies, vol. 26, No. 2 (2006), p. 209.
37. Gaimusho, "Opinion Poll on Japan in Six ASEAN Countries/' Tokyo:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008.
38. Gaimusho, "The First Japan-China Policy Dialogue on the Mekong
Region, April 25, 2008," Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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156 Sueo Sudo

Conclusion

With the Hashimoto Doctrine as a turning point in ASEAN-

Japan relations, we can see the beginning of Japan's dynamic
diplomacy in close collaboration with ASEAN. In tandem with
Hashimoto's principle of regional peaceful coexistence, Japan
has sought to strengthen top-level dialogue with ASEAN politi-
cally and economically. Thus, contrary to the traditional reactive
nature of Japan's foreign policy, we can conclude that its policy
was assertive and dynamic during the past decade. Japan's atti-
tude toward ASEAN has become proactive especially since the
Tokyo summit in 2003. The formation of a strategic partnership
is a noteworthy example. Japan's political and security role
retains a low profile, but significantly contributes to stability in
Southeast Asia, thus stretching beyond a mere economic role.39
This article has argued that it is China that is reacting to the
fast-changing regional environment, not Japan. The advent of
East Asian regionalism could not be realized without the dynamic
and vibrant Japan- ASE AN partnership, constituted by Japan as
an ideational facilitator and with ASEAN as the driver. This
unique experience of successful new regionalism in East Asia
could shed some light on the possibility of developing countries'
new quest for regional governance. As a Japanese diplomat put it,
"I believe the Japan- ASEAN relationship should be the engine for
the creation of the EAC [East Asian Community] because we have
accumulated, for more than thirty years, a solid foundation of
regional cooperation. We should promote East Asia cooperation,
utilizing the Japan- ASEAN cooperation model."40

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