Galagala, Virginia G.

E. Quo Warranto (R- 66)

4. Araneta vs. Comelec 683 SCRA 105 (2012)

DOCTRINE/S:
In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. This is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court as to procedures. While quo
warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. A cancellation
case is brought before the elections, while a quo warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a Certificate of Candidacy
cancellation case was not filed before elections.

5. De Castro vs. Carlos 696 SCRA 400 (April 16,2013)

DOCTRINE/S:
“A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and
to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been
forfeited.” Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

6. Velasco vs. Belmonte 779 SCRA 81 (2016)

DOCTRINE/S:
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where
the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a
right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the
determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear
legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo
warranto.
 Galagala Virginia G.

F. Expropriation (R – 67)

1. City of Manila vs. Serrano, 359 SCRA 231 ,20 June 2001

DOCTRINE/S:

Upon compliance with the requirements for expropriation, issuance of writ of possession becomes ministerial.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its
acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of
private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In
this case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of
possession.

2. National Power Corp. vs. CA, GR No. 106804, 12 August 2004

DOCTRINE/S:
The Court pointed out that a government agency could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s property, and then
just decide not to proceed with the expropriation. It cannot avail of the automatic dismissal right given to plaintiffs in ordinary civil
actions because expropriation as a manifestation of the State’s power of Eminent Domain are still subject to limitations.
Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner. However,
when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do
so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.

In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the
landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiffs right in expropriation cases to dismiss the
complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions. The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the
1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of
just compensation and there is due process of law. If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is
subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in
the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the
court that the expropriation is not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action. However, when
the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose
the defendants right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action.

3. Republic vs. Andaya 524 SCRA 671, 15 June 2007

DOCTRINE/S:
Taking, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses
the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the
value of his property.
 4. Asias Emerging Dragon vs. DOTC , 552 SCRA 59 (2008)

DOCTRINE/S:
Only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that
the writ will not issue in cases where the right is doubtful.
The rights or privileges of an original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project are never meant to be
absolute; An unsolicited proposal is subject to evaluation, after which, the government agency or local government unit (LGU)
concerned may accept or reject the proposal outright.
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) does not possess any legal personality to interfere with or restrain the activities of the
Government as regards Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
It must be emphasized that under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for prohibition
and mandamus, such as in the instant case, can only be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for
the party in the ordinary course of law.
As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed. Reasonable time for filing a petition for mandamus should likewise be for the same period. The filing by the
AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months after its supposed right to the project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and
negates any claim that the said petition for the extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy remedy available to AEDC.
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation. Thus, for expropriation to be valid, the following requirements must be met: (1) the taking must be for public use and
(2) just compensation must be paid to the owner of the private property.
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term “public use” has evolved over time in response to changing
public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual “use by the public” has
already been abandoned. “Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare”
and “public convenience.” It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The State, through expropriation proceedings, may take private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to
another private party as long as there is a public purpose to the taking. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court held in Kelo v.
New London that promotion of economic development qualifies as a public use even if private parties are benefited.
As we stated in Agan (which we likewise recognized in Gingoyon), compensation must conform not only with law but equity as
well. This means that the expropriation court is not confined to strictly following the formula spelled out in the law and instead is
given latitude in its determination of the compensation due to PIATCO. After all, the determination of just compensation is a judicial
function.

5. Abad vs. Fil-homes Realty, 636 SCRA 247 (2010)

DOCTRINE/S:

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions
on social justice.
When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or
chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for
such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in
which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the
tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for
ejectment has been instituted.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the Local Government Code (LGC).—A local
government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That
the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of the property.
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint .
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.” This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners . It is only
upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete until
payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the
expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final
just compensation.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the
lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had
been made in favor of respondents prior to the City’s possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.

6. NPC v YCLA Sugar Development Corporation, GR No. 193936, 11 December 2013

In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government.
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such
as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape,
and location. But before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary
evidence.The amount of just compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of
the condemned property. A commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly
hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.