Mendoza vs.

Court of Appeals July 14, 1978

[GRN L-36637 July 14, 1978*]
GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix DIEGA DE LEON
VDA. DE MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS. DANIEL
GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES MENDOZA, respondents.

Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the
land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person
to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of
time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree
of title, thus -
"SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be
dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of
deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title. in the same manner as if no
application had been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments
to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of
deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application,
and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the
encumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in
the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been con, veyed by said
instruments. x x x (Italics supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows the land, subject
matter of an application for registration. to be "dealt with", i.e., to be disposed of or
encumbered during the interval of time between the filing of the application and the
issuance of the decree of title, and to have the instruments embodying such disposition or
encumbrance presented to the registration court by the "interested party" for the court to
either "order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said instruments,
or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to
whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.17 The law does not require
that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the "person
to whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that
the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the
case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only
requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the
interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar
facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been
complied with.

17. See- Government of the Philippines v. Abad and Molina, G.R. No. L8317, May
23,1958,103 Phil. 725; Director of Lands v. Abiera, et. al., G.R. No. L-11834,
July 26,1960,108 Phil. 943.
Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, such uninterrupted, adverse, open possession for
thirty (30) years by the defendants regardless of their title or good faith upholds said
defendants' right over the property. (Parcotillo vs. Parcotillo, 12 SCRA 435, 440)

Declaration of ownership for taxation purposes, or assessment declaration and tax

receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership. They are only prima facie evidence of
possession. (Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil.
562) However, if the holder of a (sic) land presents a deed of conveyance in his favor
from the former owner thereof to support his claim of ownership, the declaration of
ownership and tax receipts relative to the property may be used to prove good faith on his
part in occupying and possessing the same. (Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384)
And while it is true that tax receipts do not prove titled (sic) to a land, nevertheless when
considered with the actual possession of the property by the applicant, they constitute
evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title of ownership by prescription.
(Viernes vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil, 286; Land Registration and Mortgages by Ventura, pp.
125-126)

Figuracion vs. Cortez February 28, 1974

[GRN L-27146 February 28, 1974]
MARCELA FIGURACION and JOSE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs. JUSTO
CORTEZ, respondent.

Section 20 of C.A. No. 141 partly reads:

"Sec. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application, and before the patent is
issued, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has
complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his homestead,
through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and
improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the conveyance is not made for
purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval of the Director of
Lands, may transfer his rights to the land and the improvements to any person legally
qualified to apply for a homestead, x x x."
Section 118 of the Public Land Act speaks of a five-year prohibition against alienation or
encumbrance "from the date of the approval of the application" for the very logical
reason that before the application is approved there is nothing that the applicant may
alienate or encumber
Gonzaga, et al. vs. CA et al June 28, 1973
[GRN L-27455 June 28, 1973]
ANA GONZAGA, SERVILLANO IGNACIO and ANASTACIA SAN JUAN,
petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BONIFACIO EVANGELISTA,
JOSE EVANGELISTA CHUA, PAULINO EVANGELISTA, PEDRO TRINIDAD,
FORTUNATA TRINIDAD, RUPERTA DE ROSAS, ANASTACIA DE ROSAS,
PATRICIA EVANGELISTA, and JUANA EVANGELISTA, respondents-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; HOMESTEAD; SALE THEREOF WITHOUT
THE APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES BEFORE ISSUANCE OF TITLE, VOID.- Both the lower court and
respondent Court of Appeals were agreed that considering the express and categorical
language of Section 20 of the Public Land Act, the sale on April 21, 1956 by Juan
Evangelista to Anastacia San Juan and Servillano Ignacio of the land in question, the title
to which as homestead was not issued by the Bureau of Lands until November 28,1958,
i.e., after the death of said Evangelista, "shall be null and void" there being no "previous
approval" of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It could not have been
otherwise, for there is nothing in the stipulation of facts that would, in any way, take this
transaction out of the operation of that legal provision. It has been repeated time and time
again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts
to do except to apply it.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUE THAT APPLICATION WAS NOT FOR HOMESTEAD
NOT HAVING BEEN RAISED BEFORE LOWER COURT, CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.- The point raised by petitioners is that the
requirement in Section 20 of the Public Land Act regarding the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the proposed sale of the rights of one
seeking a free patent, does riot apply unless the application deals with a homestead. They
now allege that the parcel of land involved was not applied for as a homestead but as a
free patent. Held. Outside of such an assertion lacking support in the facts as found by
respondent Court, to which this Court accords deference, there is another obstacle to its
being considered. Such an issue was not raised before the lower court. It was not even
brought to the attention of respondent Court of Appeals. For the appellate tribunal to
consider a legal question, it must be raised in the lower court below. (Arangco vs. Baloso,
L-28617, Jan. 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 296)
3. ID.; ID.; LAND ACQUIRED THRU FREE PATENT; LIMITATION ON
ALIENATION THEREOF.- There is an attempted distinction by petitioners between the
limitation placed on the grantee after the free patent is issued and the absence thereof
prior thereto, except if the application is for a homestead. Petitioners again labor under a
misapprehension. Section 118 of the Public Land Act is a clear expression of the state
policy to assure that the original grantee, even if he were minded otherwise, is deprived
for a period of five years of his freedom of disposition. He is protected from his own
weaknesses or temptation to sell, or lack of business acumen, the purpose being, to keep
and preserve for him "or his family the land given to him gratuitously by the State."
Considering that such is the policy, does it riot logically follow that he is precluded from
disposing of his rights prior even to his obtaining the free patent? No such distinction
should therefore be made.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE; PLENARY POWER OF STATE TO
DETERMINE FAVORED RECIPIENTS OF PUBLIC LANDS.- The state is possessed
of the plenary power as a persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients
of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL Eustaquio P. Sio. Domingo, Severino C Dominguez,
and Manolo E Tolentino for petitioners-appellants.
Isabelo V Gandionco & Teresita Gandionco Oledan for respondents-appellees.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
It must have been well-founded doubts about the strength of the original position taken
by petitioners both in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and subsequently in respondent
Court of Appeals, that in this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the latter tribunal,
a novel aspect is sought to be introduced by them. It represents a last-ditch effort in their
thus far hopeless quest for excluding private respondents, nephews and nieces of the late
Juan Evangelista, from any share in that portion of his estate sold by his widow,
petitioner Ana Gonzaga, to the other petitioners. The point raised by them, not previously
passed upon by this Court, is that the requirement in Section 20 of the Public Land Act,1
couched in absolute terms, of the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources for the proposed sale of the rights of one seeking a free patent, does
not apply unless the application deals with a homestead .2 It is their contention that if
such interpretation be adopted, then the decision adverse to them, both in the lower court
as well as in respondent Court of Appeals, should be reversed. We do not feel called upon
to rule squarely on such an issue, as the factual basis thereof is completely lacking, not
only as shown in the decision of respondent Court sought to be reviewed, but also as
reflected in the answer of petitioners in the lower court as well as in their brief with the
respondent Court. Such an omission has consequences fatal to their belated claim. What
is more, the approach followed by petitioners is not in conformity with our past
pronouncements, which had indicated the fullness of the power of the state as to how
public lands may be acquired and under what conditions, as well as the restrictions
imposed on original applicants, who could thus legally be prevented from being
victimized as a result of improvidence or even poor judgment, by requiring such
approval. As thus viewed, it would clearly appear that this appeal by way of certiorari
lacks merit. We affirm.
There was a stipulation of facts before the lower court which.
was quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Thus: " 1. That on October 13, 1958,
Juan Evangelista died intestate, leaving among others, a parcel of land situated in Barrio
Darangan, [Municipality] of Binangonan, [Province] of Rizal, covered by [Original
Certificate] of Title No. 183 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and Tax [Declaration] No.
12131 of the [Provincial] Assessor of Rizal, which parcel is now the subject of this
litigation; 2. That said Juan Evangelista was survived by the defendant, Ana Gonzaga and
plaintiffs, the latter being the sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters of the
deceased; 3. That during the lifetime of - Juan Evangelista, he and said Ana Gonzaga on
April 21, 1956 sold for valuable consideration several parcels of land to the spouses,
Anastacia San Juan and Servillano Ignacio (defendants herein) including that parcel of
land described in the foregoing paragraph (1) and as a consequence of which sale, the
corresponding tax declaration was transferred (to) said vendees; that at the time of said
sale, there was a pending application of Juan Evangelista and Ana Gonzaga over the land
in question with the Bureau of Lands, but the title thereto was not issued until November
28, 1958, i.e., after the death of Juan Evangelista; 4. That on April 21, 1962, defendant
Ana Gonzaga alleging to (be) the surviving spouse of the deceased Juan Evangelista,
executed an Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of the same parcel of land in question in
favor of the same vendees, herein defendants, Servillano Ignacio and Anastacia San Juan;
5. That in a series of subsequent transfers and conveyances, the same parcel of land was
sold on March 6, 1963 by the spouses Servillano Ignacio and Anastacia San Juan to the
defendant R & R Realty Co., Inc. and the latter, together with other properties owned by
it, mortgaged the same to the Continental Bank; that it was by reason of these subsequent
conveyances that defendants Filipinas Agricultural & Realty Co., R & R Realty Co., Inc.
and the Continental Bank were impleaded as party defendants. "3 On the above facts, the
lower court relying on the aforesaid Section 20, declared the 1956 sale void and
consequently ruled in favor of the successional rights of private respondents as heirs of
the deceased, Juan Evangelista. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed.
As set forth at the outset, there is no legal basis for reversing the decision of respondent
Court.
1. Petitioners are well aware and therefore cannot deny that unless the sale made by the
deceased Juan Evangelista in his lifetime of the disputed lot was valid, then the rights of
private respondents as his heirs should be respected. Both the lower court and respondent
Court of Appeals were agreed that considering the express and categorical language of
Section 20 of the Public Land Act, such sale "shall be null and void" there being no
"previous approval" of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
It could not have been otherwise, for there is nothing in the stipulation of facts that
would, in any way, take this transaction out of the operation of that legal provision. It has
been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally,
there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the
scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that
effect.4 Now petitioners before this Court apparently would try to extricate themselves
from what for them is an untenable situation by alleging that it was not a homestead that
was applied for by the deeeased. Such a contention does not carry persuasion. There was
no such allegation in their answer filed before the lower court.5 There was nothing to that
effect in the stipulation of facts. After losing in the lower court, there was not even a
motion for reconsideration filed. The matter was immediately taken to respondent Court
of Appeals. In their brief before respondent Court of Appeals, again, such a defense now
interposed is conspicuous by its absence, the two paragraphs devoted to that point merely
confining itself to the assertion that the Public Land Act does not prohibit an applicant
from selling his rights and interests during his application for a free patent .6
Apparently realizing the weakness that characterized their vain effort to prevent private
respondents from enjoying their successional rights, an attempt is made by petitioners in
this appeal by way of certiorari as well as in their brief, to mitigate its shortcoming by
raising what in effect is a new matter, namely, that the application was not for a
homestead. Outside of such an assertion lacking support in the facts as found by
respondent Court, to which we must accord deference, there is another obstacle to its
being considered. Such an issue was not raised before the lower court. It was not even
brought to the attention of respondent Court of Appeals. What was said, therefore, in the
recent case of Arangco vs. Baloso7 has relevance. Thus: "As far back as 1904, in Tan
Machan vs. Trinidad, for the appellate tribunal to consider a legal question, it must be
raised in the court below. Such a principle has been consistently adhered to. As was
categorically announced in City of Manila vs Roxas by Justice Hull, 'the rule is almost
universal, and it has been repeatedly followed by this court x x X."8 It cannot be said
then that respondent Court erred in affirming the decision of the lower court, declaring
the nullity of the sale dated April 21, 195 6 executed without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus is the first assigned error disposed
of 2. The principal argument, thus exposed as devoid of any persuasive force, was sought
to be strengthened in the second assignment of error by an attempted distinction between
the limitation placed on the grantee after the free patent is issued and the absence thereof
prior thereto, except if the application is for a homestead That, in effect, is the error
imputed to respondent Court under this category. Petitioners again labor under a
misapprehension. Section 118 of the Public Land Act9 reads: "Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and
for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall
they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said
period; but the improvements or crops of the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations. " Is it not a clear expression then of the
state policy to assure that the original grantee, even if he were minded otherwise, is
deprived for a period of five years of his freedom of disposition? Thus is he protected
from his own weaknesses or temptation to sell, or lack of business acumen, the purpose
being, in the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Artates vs. Urbi,10 to keep and preserve
for him "or his family the land given to him gratuitously by the State, so that being a
property owner, he may become and remain a contented and useful member of our
society."11 Considering that such is the policy, does it not logically follow that he is
precluded from disposing of his rights prior even to his obtaining the free patent? Both
policy and reason, therefore, unite in the conclusion that no such distinction should be
made. Then, too, it is not to be forgotten that the state is possessed of the plenary power
as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of
obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership?'12
3. The third assigned error impugning the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in
favor of appellees before it now private respondents, being a logical consequence of the
foregoing, need not be discussed at all.
WHEREFORE, the decision of February 24, 1967 is affirmed. With costs against
petitioners.
Makalintal, Acting C.J, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
1. Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936).
2. According to Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 141: "If at any time after the
approval of the application and before the patent is issued, the applicant shall prove to the
satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all the requirements of the
law, but can not continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a
bona fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and that
the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], may transfer
his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a
homestead, and Immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead
application to the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in his
rights and obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the
purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may again apply for a new
homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and [Natural Resources] shall be null and void and shall result in the
cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent."
3. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals, Appendix A to Brief for Petitioners-
Appellants, 22-23.
4. Cf. People vs. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen &
Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968,22 SCRA 917; Dequito vs.
Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla vs. City of Pasay, L-24039,
June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349; Garcia vs. Vasquez, L-26808, March 28,1969,27 SCRA
505; La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. Capapas, L27948 and 2800 1-11, July 31,
1969,28 SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil Phil. Inc. vs. Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30,1969,29
SCRA 656; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA I
11; Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., L-27489, April 30, 1970, 32
SCRA 553; Republic Flour Mills, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-28463, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 269; Maritime Co. of the Phil. vs. Reparations Commission, L-29203,
July 26,1971,40 SCRA 70; Allied Brokerage Corp. vs. Commissoner of Customs, L-2764
1, Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 55 5.
5. Cf. Answer, Record on Appeal 47.
6. Cf. Brief for defendants-appellants in the Court of Appeals, 6-7.
7. L-28617, Jan. 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 296.
8. Ibid, 303. The cases cited in Arangco follow: United States v. Dinglasan, 5 Phil. 695
(1906); Alvaran v. Marquez, 11 Phil. 263 (1908); Perlas v. Ehrman, 53 Phil. 607 (1929);
Ramiro v. Graño, 54 Phil. 744 (1930); Toribio v. Decasa, 55 Phil. 461(1930); Viuda de
Echegoyen v. Collantes, 58 Phil. 518 (1933); City of Manila v. Roxas, 60 Phil. 215
(1934); San Agustin v. Barrios, 68 Phil. 475 (1939); Amor v. Florentino, 74 Phil. 403
(1943); De Leon v. Padua, 75 Phil. 548 (1945); Roque v. De los Santos, L-218 (1946);
Vda. de Saludes v. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 754 (1947); Elks Club v. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272
(1948); Coingco v. Flores, 82 Phil. 284 (1948); People v. Canlas, 82 Phil. 783 (1949);
Suarez v. Santos, 96 Phil. 302 (1954); Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc. v. Cua Hian Tek, 102
Phil. 948 (1958); Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, 107 Phil. 253 (1960); Medel v.
Calasanz, 109 Phil. 348 (1960); Ng Cho Cio v. Ng Diong, L-14832, Jan. 28, 1961, 1
SCRA 275; Republic v. Aricheta, L-15589, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 469; Zambales
Chromite Mining Co. v. Robles, L-16182, Aug. 29, 1961, 2 SCRA 1051.
9. Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936).
10. L-29421, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 395.
11. Ibid., 401. Cf. Eugenio vs. Perdido, 97 Phil. 41 (1955); Angeles vs. Court of
Appeals, 102 Phil. 1006 (1958); Cadiz vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1032 (1958);
 Santander vs. Villanueva, 103 Phil. I (1958); Felices vs. Iriola, 103 Phil. 125
(1958); Del Rosario vs. Abad, 104 Phil. 648 (1958); Republic vs. Garcia, 105
Phil. 826 (1959); Baje vs. Court of Appeals, L-18783, May 25,1964, 11 SCRA
34-, Republic vs. Ruiz, L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348.

Angeles, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. January 31, 1958

[GRN L-11024 January 81, 1958]
ALFONSO ANGELES, ET AL., petitioners vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
GREGORIO STA. INES and ANASTACIA DIVINO, respondents.
1. HOMESTEAD; SALES; RECOVERING; HOMESTEAD, ILLEGALLY SOLD;
PRINCIPLE OF "IN PARI DELICTO.-Where a homestead was illegally sold in violation
of the homestead law, the principle of in pari delicto is not applicable. Reason for the rule
is that the policy of the law is to give land to a family for home and cultivation and the
law allows the homesteader to reacquire the land even if it has been sold; hence the right
may not be waived. In the case at bar, the sale of the homestead by the deceased
homesteader within five years from the issuance of the patent was null and void and his
heirs have the right to recover the homestead illegally disposed of.
2. LIMITATION OF ACTION; ACTION TO RECOVER HOMESTEAD ILLEGALLY
SOLD; DOES NOT PRESCRIBE.-Where the sale of a homestead, is null and void, the
action to recover the same does not prescribe because mere lapse of the time cannot give
efficacy to the contracts that are null and void and inexistent.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VALUE OF PRODUCTS GATHERED; USEFUL AND NECESSARY
EXPENSES.-Although the rule of in pari delicto should not apply to the sale of the
homestead, because such sale is contrary to the public policy enunciated in the homestead
law, the loss of the products realized by the defendants and the value of the necessary
improvements made by them on the land should not be excepted from the application of
said rule because no cause or reason can be cited to justify an exception. In the case at bar
the heirs of the homestead should be declared to have lost and forfeited, the value of the
products gathered from the land and so should the defendants lose the value of the
necessary improvements that they have made thereon.
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ernesto Angeles and Ildefonso M. Bleza for petitioners. Pedro D. Maldía for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No, 631, entitled Alfonso
Angeles, et al., vs. Gregorio Santa Ines, et al., and dismissing the complaint and
counterclaim, without pronouncement as to costs.
On March 12, 1935, homestead patent No. 31613 was issued for a parcel of land in the
municipality of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 13.6696 hectares
more or less. Pursuant to the issuance of this homestead patent, original certificate of title
No. 4906 was issued to the patentee Juan Angeles on March 28, 1935. On May 28, 1937,
Juan Angeles sold the above land to defendants Gregorio Santa Ines and Anastacia
Divino, who thereupon took possession thereof. Juan Angeles died in the year 1938, and
thereafter his heirs, the petitioners herein, sought to recover the land from the defendants
on the ground that the sale was null and void (Sec. 116, Act No. 2874). The defendants
refused to return the land, so said heirs, petitioners herein, brought this action in the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
In the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs the allegation is made that defendants'
possession of the land was by virtue of a sale which is against the law and therefore did
not convey title to them. It is also alleged that the homestead produces an average of 200
cavans per year as share for the owner. Prayer is made that the defendants be ordered to
vacate the land and the possession thereof returned to the plaintiffs, and that the
defendants be condemned to pay damages at the rate of 200 cavans of palay per year
from 1938, valued at P12 per cavan, until the return of the land. Defendants answered the
amended complaint alleging that the purchase was for a valuable consideration, in utmost
good faith, and that the defendants took possession of the land with the knowledge,
consent and acquiescence of plaintiffs. They denied that the harvest of the land is 200
cavans per year for the owner and that the alleged price is P12 per cavan. As special
defenses, they alleged that the plaintiffs are guilty of laches for having allowed 12 years
to pass, after the death of the original homesteader, before they brought the action; that
the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed; that more than five years had elapsed from
the date of the final approval of the homestead, when the sale was made on May 28,
1937; etc. It is, therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the sale be declared
valid and defendant's be declared owners of the property; and that the certificate of title
be cancelled and one issued in the name of the defendants. As an alternative remedy, it
was prayed that should the court declare the sale null and void the defendants be
reimbursed in the amount of P6,000 which they incurred in cleaning the land, etc.
That trial court found that when the sale was made by the deceased Angeles, five years
had not passed from the issuance of the certificate of title to the homestead; that both
vendor and vendee knew that the sale was void because the five-year period prescribed
by law had not yet elapsed; as a consequence of this bad faith of both parties, they should
be considered as having acted in good faith (Art. 364, Civil Code of Spain), and that
defendants are entitled to the fruits of the land. The court further held that the right of
action of plaintiffs had already prescribed before the complaint was filed on June 12,
1950, in accordance with Section 40 of Act No. 190. The trial court also found that the
land was levelled and a dike was built thereon at a cost of P3,000.00 to prevent it from
being flooded every year; that defendants paid P2,500.00 for the homestead. Wherefore,
the court declared that the sale of the homestead is null and void and ordered plaintiffs to
return the price of the land of P2,500.00 to the defendants and to reimburse the latter in
the amount of P3,000, for expenses incurred in levelling the land and the construction of
the dike thereon. The court ordered the defendants to return the homestead to the
plaintiffs upon the payment to the defendants of P2,500.00 and that the P3,000.00, value
of the improvements, should constitute a lien on the land.
The case having been appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter held that Article 1306,
paragraph 1 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides:
"* * *When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have given
by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the undertaking of the other
party;"
which legal provision is founded on the principle of in pari delicto, is applicable. In
accordance with said principle, it held that none of the parties should be given any
remedy due to the fact that they did not only violate the prohibition contained in the
Public Land Law but because they knowingly tried to cheat the prohibition (by the
insertion of a provision for the execution of another deed of sale after five years). The
decision of the lower court was, therefore, reversed and the action dismissed.
In this Court it is claimed by the petitioners that the application of Article 1306, par. 1, of
the Spanish Civil Code is null and void; and that the heirs of the homesteader should be
declared entitled to the possession of the homestead and the fruits of the same.
The most important issue raised in the appeal is whether the doctrine of in pari delicto is
applicable to sales of homesteads. This question was squarely decided in the case of
Catalina de los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al., 94 Phil. 405; 50
Off. Gaz. 1588, in the negative. In that case we held that the principle of in pari delicto is
not applicable to a homestead which has been illegally sold, in violation of the homestead
law Reason for the rule is that the policy of the law is to give land to a family for home
and cultivation and the law allows the homesteader to reacquire the land even if it has
been sold; hence the right may not be waived. This principle was again confirmed in the
case of Acierto, et al. vs. De los Santos, et al., (95 Phil. 887) in which, through Mr.
Justice Alex. Reyes, we said:
"Appellants, however, contend that the voiding provision of the Act may not be invoked
in favor of plaintiffs as their predecessor in interest was in pari delicto, and that, since the
same provision says the illegal sale shall have the effect of annulling the grant and cause
the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State, plaintiffs may no longer
claim the homestead. Similar contentions were made in the case of Catalina de los
Santos, es. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap et al., 94 Phil., 405, 50 Off. Gaz. 1588,
but they were there overruled, this Court holding that the pari delicto doctrine nlay not be
invoked in a case of this kind since it would turn counter to an avowed fundamental
policy of the State that the forfeiture of the homestead is a Matter between the State and
the grantee of his heirs, and that until the State has taken steps to annul the grant and
asserts title to the homestead the purchaser is, as against the vendor or his heirs, 'no more
entitled to keep the land than any intruder."
Consistent with the above decisions, we must hold that in the case at bar the sale of the
homestead by the deceased homesteader was null and void and his heirs have the right to
recover the homestead illegally disposed of.
It now becomes necessary to determine if the defense of prescription raised in the answer
to the amended complaint can be sustained, it appearing that when the action was brought
in the year 1950, about 13 years had elapsed since the date of the sale. The precise
question was also passed upon by Us adversely to the defendants-respondents in the case
of Eugenio, et al. vs. Perdido, et al., 97 Phil., 41. In that case we held, thru Mr. Justice
Bengzon:
"There is no question that the sale in March 1932 having been made within five years
from 'the (late of the issuance of the patent' was 'unlawful and null and void from its
execution', by express provision of sections 116 and 122 of Act No. 2874 (Now Com.
Act No. 141).
"Under the existing- classification, such contract would be 'inexistent' and 'the action or
dcfense for declaration' of such inexistence 'does not prescribe% (Art. 1410 New Civil
Code). While it is true that this is a new provision of the New Civil Code, it is
nevertheless a principle recognized since Tipton v. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67 that 'mere lapse of
time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void'."
Having found that the sale of the homestead is null and void, and that the action to
recover the same does not prescribe, we now come to the effects of these rulings on the
price paid for the sale and the value of the improvements made on the homestead and of
the products realized from the homestead by the buyer. The stipulation of the parties (pp.
39-40, R.O.A.) shows that the deed of sale was to be renewed after the expiration of five
years, and that this fact was explained by the notary to the parties. The notary must have
informed the latter that renewal of the deed was necessary to avoid the prohibition against
the sale of the homestead within five years after the issuance of the title. This
circumstance shows that the parties to the sale were aware of the existence of the
prohibition and that they entered into the contract of sale notwithstanding such
knowledge. As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeals predicated its decision on the
finding that the parties to the sale were both guilty of bad faith.
The question that now poses is whether the return of the value of the products gathered
from the land by the defendants and the expenses incurred in the construction of the dike-
all useful and necessary expenses-should be ordered to be returned by the defendants to
the plaintiffs. While we believe that the rule of in pari delicto should not apply to the sale
of the homestead, because such sale is contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
homestead law, the loss of the products realized by the defendants and the value of the
necessary improvements made by them on the land should not be excepted from the
application of the said rule because no cause or reason can be cited to justify an
exception. It has been held that the rule of in pari delicto is inapplicable only where the
same violates a well-established public policy.
"* * * But we doubt if these principles can now be involved considering the philosophy
and the policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari
delicto as known here and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It
recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs
counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the
Rellosa case, 'This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever
public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the
transaction." (Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827; 49 Off. Gaz. 4315.)" (De los
Santos Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 40.5; .50 Off. Gaz. 1588).
We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should be declared to have
lost and forfeited the value of the products gathered from the land, and so should the
defendants lose the value of the necessary improvements that they have made thereon.
With respect to the price that the defendants had paid for the land P2,500, in view of the
rule that no one should enrich himself at the expense of another, the return of the said
amount by the plaintiffs should be decreed, before the plaintiffs may be allowed to
recover back the possession of the homestead, subject to the action.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and judgment is hereby entered
declaring the sale of the homestead null and void, ordering the defendants to return the
same to the plaintiffs upon payment by the latter to them of the sum of P2,500. The claim
of plaintiffs for the value of the products of the land and that of defendants for the
expenses in the construction of the dike are both dismissed. Without costs in this appeal.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed.

Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Second Judicial Region
BRANCH 06
Aparri, Cagayan

ORLANDO “HADJI”
HERNANDEZ
AND NONA P.
HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiffs, CIVIL CASE NO. II-3086

- versus - FOR:

SPS. ALLANGENE CATRAL AND “QUIETING OF TITLE

AND
JANET CATRAL, PEDRO CASAUAY, DAMAGES WITH
PEDRO SICCUAN, SR., MILAGROS APPLICATION FOR THE
COSTALES AND ATTY. ALEXANDER ISSUANCE OF T.R.O. OR
SIMEON. PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
Defendant.
x------------------------------------------------------------
-x
 ANSWER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS

COME NOW, the defendants, SPOUSES ALLANGENE CATRAL and

JANET CATRAL, through the PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE by the
undersigned counsel, and unto the Honorable Court respectfully alleges:

1. That defendants admit the material allegations contained in

paragraphs 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of the complaint;

2. That they deny the allegations in paragraph 3 of the complaint on

the ground that they have no knowledge and information regarding the said
sale. Moreover, the alleged sale was executed within the prohibitory period of
five (5) years from the issuance of the Free Patent;

3. That they deny the allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the

complaint on the ground that the defendants have no knowledge of said fact;

4. That they deny the allegations in paragraph 6 of the complaint on

the ground that they have no sufficient knowledge as to their possession
thereof;

5. That they deny the allegations in paragraph 7 of the complaint

considering that in the tax receipt, PEDRO CASAUAY is the declared owner
thereof and the plaintiffs only paid the taxes due thereon;

6. That they specifically admit the allegations in paragraph 8 of the

complaint that the OCT No. P-64674 was posted as bail bond in criminal case no.
2325 and 9045, respectively. BUT specifically deny the allegations that defendant
PEDRO CASAUAY gave his conformity considering the fact that when PEDRO
CASAUAY moved for the withdrawal of said bail bond, he alleged that he has
no knowledge how the title was taken and used by the accused as his bail bond.
Moreover, he alleged that the signature of the bondsman appearing on the bail
bond is not his signature. A copy of the Motion to Withdraw Bail bond is hereto
attached and marked as Annex “A” and made an integral part of this Answer;

7. That they specifically admit the allegations in paragraph 10

particularly the fact that the land in suit was sold by PEDRO CASAUAY to the
herein-defendants. But specifically deny the fact that the sale was attended
with fraud and malevolent bad faith as the herein-defendants are buyers in
good faith and for value. A copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto attached and
marked as Annex “B” and made an integral part of this Answer;

8. That they deny the allegations in paragraph 11 of the complaint

considering that when the sale was executed, the only annotation at the back
of the title was the fact that the title to the land in suit was posted as bail bond
in the above-mentioned criminal case and the registered owner PEDRO
CASAUAY promised to withdraw the same, as it was posted without his
knowledge and conformity. Moreover, the alleged sale made by PEDRO
CASAUAY in favor of the plaintiffs was not annotated at the back of the said
title;

9. That they deny the allegations in paragraph 12 of the complaint

considering that defendants MILAGROS COSTALES and PEDRO SICCUAN
merely signed as witnesses to attest that PEDRO CASAUAY affixed his signature
on the Deed of Sale;

10. That they deny the allegations in paragraph 13 of the complaint

on the ground that they have no sufficient knowledge as to the truth of matter
and moreover, the same are mere hearsays;
 11. That they admit the allegations in paragraph 14 of the complaint
that they have caused the registration of the instrument of conveyance before
the Register of Deeds. A copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-147007 is
hereto attached and marked as Annex “C” and made as an integral part of this
Answer;

12. That they deny the allegations in paragraph 15 of the complaint

considering that, assuming but not necessary admitting, that there was a sale in
their favor, the same is void ab initio considering that the sale was executed within
the prohibitory period of five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the Free
Patent. The plaintiffs cannot now seek affirmative reliefs before the Honorable
Court considering that in legal contemplation, there was no sale or conveyance
made as the same was void ab initio;

13. That they deny the allegations in paragraphs 16, 17, 18 and 19 of
the complaint on the ground that they have no sufficient knowledge as to the
truth of matters set forth therein;

14. That they need not comment to the allegations in paragraphs 20,
21, 22 and 23 as the relief for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
was withdrawn during the hearing of said motion on October 25, 2004.

AND ALLEGES BY WAY OF:

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

15. That the plaintiff has no cause of action as the land in suit, subject
of the alleged sale, was executed on December 2, 1990 is void ab initio as it was in
violation of Sections 118, 119, 121 as amended by PD No. 763, 122 and 124 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Notably, the Free Patent was issued on July 2, 1987
or four (4) years and five (5) months after the issuance of the Free Patent.

16. Since the sale is void ab initio and the parties to the said sale are in
pari delicto, and neither of the parties may be entitled to relief under the law
considering that there is an inexistent contract and the said sale is unenforceable.
Therefore, the plaintiffs have no title that they are seeking to remove any cloud
or to be quieted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

17. That assuming but not necessarily admitting that there was a
double sale of the land in suit made by PEDRO CASAUAY, the law and
principle of double sale should be applied;

18. That assuming further that a valid sale was consummated by

PEDRO CASAUAY and the plaintiffs, the defendants has a better right over
the land in suit considering that they are buyers in good faith and for value
and were the first to register their Deed of Sale and subsequently issued TCT
No. T-147007;

19. The plaintiffs never caused the registration of the sale despite the
allegation that they were already in possession of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy
of OCT No. P-64674 after the lapse of six (6) years from the date of the sale or
in 1996.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

 20. The in the Complaint, a prayer for the issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction was prayed for but the same
was withdrawn during the hearing thereon on October 25, 2004;

21. In the mind of the defendants, the said ploy was merely availed
of to avoid the compulsory arbitration process before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Centro, Camalaniugan, Cagayan for possible amicable
settlement;

22. The certificate of title of the defendants was issued on October

1, 2004 and the Complaint was filed on October 11, 2004. The plaintiffs were
already aware, when they filed this instant complaint, that a title was already
issued and the availment of the provisional remedy has become moot and
academic, but despite such fact, they still pursued their prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction in order to avoid referring
the case for compulsory arbitration;

23. For failure to refer the case before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the
Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter for failure of the
plaintiffs to comply with this condition precedent.

AND ALLEGES BY WAY OF:

COUNTERCLAIM

24. That by reason of the unjustified filing of this case by the

plaintiffs, the defendants have incurred expenses in the procurement of
pertinent documents, transportation and will continue to incur other
incidental expenses until the termination of this case, and
 25. That by reason of the unjustified filing of this case by the
plaintiffs, the defendants have suffered moral damages in the form of mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, a just and reasonable assessment of which will not be less than
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS

26. That to deter the public from committing similar unwarranted acts,
plaintiffs should likewise be held liable to pay exemplary damages at the
discretion of the Honorable Court.

AND FURTHER ALLEGES BY WAY OF:

MOTION TO DISMISS

THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAS NO

CAUSE OF ACTION CONSIDERING
THAT THE CONTRACT OF SALE
WITH PEDRO CASAUAY IS VOID
AB INITIO.

27. That the defendants reproduce their allegations in paragraphs 15

and 16 of this Answer to support this motion to dismiss.

28. Deed of Sale of patented lands perfected within the prohibited

five (5) year period are null and void and no title passes which could be
validly transferred. Applying the doctrine of Nemo dat quod non habet
(nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him). During this
prohibitory period, the vendee, PEDRO CASAUAY was not in any position to
convey and sell the land to the herein defendants as the land is ‘technically’
owned by the State as the latter could still assert its title by reversion
proceedings.
 29. In Torres versus Ventura, 187 SCRA 96, the Supreme Court laid,
that:

“the sale of the homestead by the

homesteader is null and void and his heirs have the right
to recover the homestead illegally disposed of. The
contract of sale, being void ab initio, must be given no
effect at all. The parties in such a case are to be placed in
status quo which was the condition prevailing prior to
the execution of the void sale.”

29. The Supreme Court likewise elaborated in Egao versus Court of

Appeals, 174 SCRA 484:

“The parties to the transactions with

knowledge of its invalidity cannot seek affirmative relief
to the courts for they are in pari delicto. However, this
doctrine has certain exceptions. The rule of pari delicto
non oritur action (where two persons are equally at fault
neither party may be entitled to relief under the law) does
not apply to an inexistent contract, such as sale void ab
initio under the Public Land Act, when its enforcement or
application runs counter to the public policy of
preserving the grantee’s right to the land under the
homestead law.”

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS

NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THIS CASE CONSIDERING
THAT A CONDITION PRECEDENT HAS
NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

30. That the defendants reproduce their allegations in paragraphs 20,

21, 22 and 23 of this Answer in their motion to dismiss for failure of the
plaintiffs to comply with the condition precedent.
PRAYER
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing, judgment
be rendered in favor of the defendants as follows, to wit:
a) Dismissing the instant case for utter lack of merit, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint
states no cause of action;
b) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay actual, moral and exemplary
damages;
c) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the cost of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.
Aparri, Cagayan, October 28, 2004.

PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE
Department of Justice
Aparri, Cagayan

By:

ATTY. WINDELL C.
URDAS
Public Attorney II
Counsel for
Defendants
ROLL NO. 44276
IBP OR No 554726
Issued on
January 6, 2004

EXPLANATION
 A copy of this petition was sent to the Office of the Counsel for the
Plaintiffs through registered name considering the distance of Aparri,
Cagayan to Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.

ATTY. WINDELL C. URDAS

VERIFICATION

Under oath, We, ALLANGENE CATRAL and JANET CATRAL do

hereby depose and state that:

1. We are among the defendants in this instant case;

2. We caused the preparation of the said Answer;

3. We have read the allegations contained therein and the same are true
and correct to the best our own personal knowledge and belief.

ALLANGENE CATRAL JANET CATRAL

Defendant Defendant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of October 2004 at

Aparri, Cagayan.

ATTY. NICANOR S. PASCUAL, JR.

Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2003
Public Attorney‘s Office
IBP Lifetime OR NO. 490597
 December 27, 2002

Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2004.

Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Second Judicial Region
BRANCH 06
Aparri, Cagayan

ORLANDO “HADJI”
HERNANDEZ
AND NONA P.
HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiffs, CIVIL CASE NO. II-3086

- versus - FOR:

SPS. ALLANGENE CATRAL AND “QUIETING OF TITLE

AND
JANET CATRAL, PEDRO CASAUAY, DAMAGES WITH
PEDRO SICCUAN, SR., MILAGROS APPLICATION FOR THE
COSTALES AND ATTY. ALEXANDER ISSUANCE OF T.R.O. OR
SIMEON. PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
Defendant.
x------------------------------------------------------------
-x

MEMORANDUM
(ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS)

Defendants, SPOUSES ALLANGENE CATRAL and JANET CATRAL,

through the PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE by the undersigned counsel, and
unto the Honorable Court respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of
their Motion to dismiss.

THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAS NO CAUSE OF

ACTION CONSIDERING THAT THE CONTRACT
OF SALE DATED DECEMBER 2, 1990,
EXECUTED BY PEDRO CASAUAY IS
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

1. Plaintiffs anchored their cause of action on an alleged Deed of Sale

executed by PEDRO CASAUAY in favor of the plaintiffs on December 2, 1990.

2. The Free Patent issued to PEDRO CASAUAY, described under

OCT No. P-64674 was issued on July 2, 1987.

3. The Deed of Sale that was signed by PEDRO CASAUAY in favor of

the plaintiffs was executed after three (3) years and five (5) months from the
issuance of the Free Patent.
4. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 456, provides:

“FROM THE DATE OF THE APPROVAL OF THE

APPLICATION AND FOR A TERM OF FIVE (5) YEARS FROM
AND AFTER THE DATE OF ISSUANCE OF THE PATENT OR
GRANT, LANDS ACQUIRED UNDER FREE PATENT OR
HOMESTEAD CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO ENCUMBRANCE OR
ALIENATION, NOR SHALL THEY BECOME LIABLE TO THE
SATISFACTION OF ANY DEBT CONTRACTED PRIOR TO
THE EXPIRATION OF SAID PERIOD, EXCEPT IN FAVOR OF
THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS BRANCHES, UNITS OR
INSTITUTIONS. THIS EXCLUDES THE IMPROVEMENTS OR
CROPS OF THE LAND WHICH MAY BE MORTGAGED OR
PLEDGED TO QUALIFIED PERSONS, ASSOCIATIONS OR
CORPORATIONS.”

5. The reason for the prohibition, as well for the right to repurchase, is
based on the fundamental policy of the State to preserve and keep in the family
of the public land grantee that portion of the public domain which the State has
gratuitously given to him. (Gonzaga versus Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 381).

6. Although the government has the right to pursue reversion

proceeding if the above-mentioned condition is violated, the Supreme Court had
the chance to rule in De Los Santos versus Roman Catholic Church, et.al., G.R.
No. L-6088, February 25, 1954, that failure on the part of the government to
undertake such a remedy, the vendee is considered a mere intruder:

“While the government does not take steps to assert its title, by
reversion, to a homestead sold in violation of the Public Land
Law, the vendor or his heirs is better entitled to the preservation
of the land, the vendee being in no better situation than as
intruder”.

7. The foregoing prohibition is mandatory, violation of which renders

the conveyance null and void ab initio, thus cannot acquire validity through the
passage of time. This prohibition is embracing and covers and extends even to
sales to the homesteader’s own son or daughter or descendants. Gayappanao
versus Intermediate Appellate Court, 199 SCRA 309). Likewise in the case of
Yabot versus Lonto, et.al., No. 34188-R, July 16, 1965, 63 O.G. No. 1 pp. 78,
citing Articles 1409 and 1410 of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held:

“Such sale is void (referring to the sale under Section

118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141), inexistent, and could
not be ratified, and mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to it.”

8. Considering that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of the

plaintiffs is null and void ab initio as it perfected within the prohibited five
(5) year period, no title passes which could be validly transferred. Applying
the doctrine of Nemo dat quod non habet (nobody can dispose of that which
does not belong to him), the vendee, PEDRO CASAUAY was not in any
position to convey and sell the land to the herein defendants as the land is
‘technically’ owned by the State as the latter could still assert its title by
reversion proceedings.

9. The Supreme Court likewise stressed in Egao versus Court of

Appeals, 174 SCRA 484:

“The parties to the transactions with

knowledge of its invalidity cannot seek affirmative relief
to the courts for they are in pari delicto. However, this
doctrine has certain exceptions. The rule of pari delicto
non oritur action (where two persons are equally at fault
neither party may be entitled to relief under the law) does
not apply to an inexistent contract, such as sale void ab
initio under the Public Land Act, when its enforcement or
application runs counter to the public policy of
preserving the grantee’s right to the land under the
homestead law.”

10. Since the law provides and as it is indicated on the face of the
certificate of title the land described thereat could not be alienated within five (5)
years after the issuance thereof, the parties to the said sale are in pari delicto, and
neither of the parties may be entitled to relief under the law considering that
there is an inexistent contract and the said sale is unenforceable. In legal
contemplation, the plaintiffs do not have any title to speak about and therefore
there is no cloud to be removed on the title of the defendants.

11. In Torres versus Ventura, 187 SCRA 96, the Supreme Court laid,
that:

“the sale of the homestead by the

homesteader is null and void and his heirs have the right
to recover the homestead illegally disposed of. The
contract of sale, being void ab initio, must be given no
effect at all. The parties in such a case are to be placed in
 status quo which was the condition prevailing prior to
the execution of the void sale.”

12. The only remedy left to the plaintiffs, who is a transferee in a void
sale was properly pointed out by the Supreme Court in Labrador versus de los
Santos, 38 O.G. 1840; 66 Phil 549, to wit:

“If a person who obtained land by way of

homestead, sold it within five (5) years from the issuance
of the homestead patent or title, the sale is void and upon
his death, the purchaser can only recover the price which
he has paid by filing his claim against the decedent’s
estate.”

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Aparri, Cagayan, October 28, 2004.
PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE
Department of Justice
Aparri, Cagayan

By:

ATTY. WINDELL C.
URDAS
Public Attorney II
Counsel for Defendants
ROLL NO. 44276
The Clerk of Court
RTC – BRANCH 06
Aparri, Cagayan

Greetings:

Please submit the foregoing Memorandum for the kind consideration of

the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof.

ATTY. WINDELL C. URDAS

 EXPLANATION

A copy of this Memorandum was sent to the Office of the Counsel for
the Plaintiffs through registered name considering the distance of Aparri,
Cagayan to Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.

ATTY. WINDELL C. URDAS

Copy Furnished:

ATTY. ROBIN JAMES A. GUNNACAO

MEYNARD GASOLINE STATION
Diversion Road, Pallua
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
3500