El Niño: An Adaptive Response to Build Social and Ecological Resilience

Author(s): Peter B. Urich, Liza Quirog and William G. Granert

Source: Development in Practice , Aug., 2009, Vol. 19, No. 6 (Aug., 2009), pp. 766-776
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Oxfam GB

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27752117

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 II Taylor
Routledge
Development in Practice, Volume 19, Number 6, August 2009 & Francis Group

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Experience from adaptive and community-based resource management suggests that build
resilience into both human and ecological systems is an effective way to cope with envir
mental change. El Nino phenomena are increasingly signalled in advance of their ons
argue that it is beneficial to heed warnings of potential harm and to intervene in society
foster adaptations that might avert extreme negative ecological and social impacts
can trigger socio-political stress and widespread human suffering. The El Nino of 2
the island province of Bohol in the Philippines is used as an example of a success
intervention.

Key Words: Environment; Governance and Public Policy; East Asia

The problem
Global environmental change has been established in the scientific community as one of the
greatest threats to human well being. While acknowledging that this is a strongly anthropo
centric view, it is necessary to associate current change clearly and unambiguously with the
activities of our species. With such widespread recognition of the problems we face, it is
perhaps timely to shift at least some energy away from ascertaining the causes of the current
situation and begin to cast forward to examine the potential interventions required in society
to foster sustainable adaptation under climate change and the plethora of related changes.
Drought events related to El Nino Southern Oscillation in the Western Pacific Basin occur
about every four to seven years and can last between 6 and 18 months. They are part of the
Earth's climate system and have been affecting the region for thousands of years. They form
just one of a number of cyclical climate phenomena of the Pacific Basin which include the
Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). While El Nino events could be considered unrelated to
anthropogenic climate change, the intensity of the events could be exacerbated by global
environmental change in two fundamental ways: (1) by incremental increases in the tempera
tures associated with the dry element of the El Nino event, characterised by drought in the
Western Pacific Basin; and (2) the stress imposed on ecological systems by global warming
and the reduced resilience of these highly modified, anthropogenic landscapes.

766 ISSN 0961-4524 Print/ISSN 1364-9213 Online 060766-11 ? 2009 Oxfam GB

DOI: 10.1080/09614520903026991 Routledge Publishing

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 El Nino: an adaptive response

In this article we address the issue of social and ecological resilience in the context of El Nino
Southern Oscillation-related drought. The response of society to the diminishing resilience of the
ecological systems on which they have become reliant is paramount in adaptation studies.
We address this increasingly important issue because action is, we believe, required in these circum
stances. Lessons need to be learned and documented in order (1) to improve the quality of interven
tions designed to stave off the most deleterious effects of climate change while mitigation strategies
presumably evolve, and (2) to begin to build resilience in the social system, represented by thicken
ing social capital. We contend that, with growing societal resilience, the opportunities for enhancing
ecological resilience improve. We address this issue through the exploration of an intervention pro
gramme designed in an ad hoc, opportunistic manner, as a result of social systems and institutions
recognising the threat posed to society by an El Nino event. In part, this intervention represented
'development out of control', yet the outcome, as it was based on personal relationships and
mutual trust, was both effective and efficient and is largely reproducible in other contexts.

Ecological resilience
Ecological systems and their resilience can be defined in several ways. In general, it is under
stood that resilience is related to the way in which a system functions as a whole, not to whether
individual components or populations within the system are stable, or to the overall ecological
state of the system. It is recognised that ecological systems change and evolve, and populations
cycle and are recycled. This type of functioning is not easily observed, nor is there agreement
between a system's degree of diversity and its resilience. For example, tropical forest systems
may have great diversity and stability but may have low resilience, for instance to temperature
or precipitation regimes. Conversely, temperate forests may have relatively low diversity but
substantially greater resilience.
There are two broad ways of defining ecological resilience:

the ability of a system to ameliorate perturbations, i.e. absorb extreme events before the
system changes its structure by changing its composition and behaviour;
how quickly and effectively a system can recover from an extreme event - which hence high
lights the difference between resilience and resistance.

Resilience is thought to be key to biodiversity and agrodiversity conservation, because diversity

enhances resistance to disturbance and stability and contributes to vibrant ecosystem functioning.

Social resilience
Social and ecological systems are linked, and increasing evidence to support this is being found
through the study of social collapse. In many, but not all cases, there are weak to occasionally
strong links between collapse of societies and ecological dysfunction. Diamond (2005) has
popularised this theme and has identified five factors:

environmental change
climate change
hostile neighbours
loss of trading partners
society's response to its environmental problems.

The latter point is the focus of this article. However, in this case we are examining a contem
porary and emerging response to environmental and climate change. This response clearly is in
reaction to ecological change and a perceived shift in ecological resilience. Social resilience

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Peter B. Urich, Liza Quirog, and William G. Granert

parallels ecological resilience by having at its apex the stability of populations - with the caveat
that populations are not static, in that they evolve and transform but do not become extinct, at
least in the short term. Their capacity to transform and evolve can in fact forestall their extinc
tion; hence the desire to enhance their resilience. Social resilience is challenged by the reliance
of societies and communities on a narrow range of resources that can lead to social and econ
omic stresses. With upheaval and stress (for example, the effects of El Nino), social resilience,
composed of social capital and ecology, is tested. The specialisation of economic activity can
further narrow social resilience. The phenomena can be examined by identifying the positive
and negative aspects, such as social inclusion/exclusion and either the thickening or thinning
of social capital (Evans 1996). As Tompkins and Adger (2004) stated: 'resilience depends on
the diversity of the ecosystem as well as the institutional rules which govern the social systems'.
Assessments of societies facing acute and unambiguous effects of global environmental
change require the identification of the manner in which a society responds to the initial
signs of change and how it perceives them (Adger and Kelly 2000: 254). Therefore it is impor
tant to consider the range of adaptive responses that could substantially alter any initial impacts
On the subject of social resilience, two stages have been described in the context of
evolution of knowledge and the value of that knowledge in policy formulation and interven
tion. The first involves gathering information on the scale of the problem in order to determine
the magnitude of the threat and then transform this into information that can be used to marshal
support and motivate institutions and communities to take action. The second focuses on the
gathering of information regarding potential consequences to communities. With this infor
mation it is envisaged that more appropriate remedial means can be promoted to limit
impacts. As Adger and Kelly (2000) noted, the latter point can lead to the identification of
win-win situations, whereby actions taken to limit the impacts of climate change can have
immediate and positive benefits for a community. This can be extended and further refined
in the context of El Nino and the Philippines, whereby interventions can potentially assist
in averting severe socio-political stress that can threaten peace and security and wider econ
omic and diversified development goals. For example, limiting the impacts of El Nino on
the agrarian sector can potentially limit rural social unrest which, if it was fomented by El
Nino, could disrupt the wider social milieu to the point that coastal tourism could be under
mined. Moreover, investment in averting the worst effects of El Nino could either ameliorate
or limit post-catastrophe relief, which can be expensive and divert limited and valuable
resources that could attain greater social returns if invested in activities that promoted resili
ence in the system.
In this study of an intervention strategy in the Philippines, we link ecological and social
resilience and view them as intertwined and complementary, rather than exclusive and exclusion
ary. Few interventions have been thoroughly documented in the case of El Nino and its link with
aridity, seasonal and otherwise, in the Western Pacific Basin. Throughout this article we draw
links between institutions and associations and communities and individuals. The intervention
described forms a rich tapestry of actors and agents. By documenting the intervention, we
hope to shed light on the complexity of the task of championing social resilience, which we
argue is integral to ecological resilience, and must prevail before the latter can be enhanced.

The study area

Bohol is a roughly circular island, centrally located in the Visayan island group of the Philippine
archipelago. Covering 411,000 hectares, the island is divided into two approximately equal
sized components in the north and the south. The soils, rainfall patterns, and development
trajectories of each unit have influenced social development.

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 El Nino: an adaptive response

Rainfall is extremely variable across Bohol. Coastal areas generally receive between 1500 and
1800 mm of rainfall a year, and elevations between 100 and 300 m receive between 1800 and
2200 mm per year, whereas at 300 to 600 m annual rainfall may total 3500 mm, depending on
exposure to the south-west and north-east monsoons. Rainfall is highly seasonal, with a markedly
drier season from March to June, followed by a slightly wetter July and a marginally drier August.
Peak rainfall occurs between September and February. Longer-term and cyclical variations in
climate result in periodic droughts, often associated with El Nino events.
Ecologically, the interaction between the wet lowland valleys and the uplands is critical.
Differentiation between the soils of the two areas becomes particularly important during
periods of drought, when the upland soils maintain higher moisture levels and are increasingly
exploited agriculturally. The distribution of water resources also limits most wet rice production
to areas above 200 m in elevation and several kilometres from the coastal plain. Much of the
agricultural and associated history of Bohol has, for this reason, been focused on the interior
of the island's south and south-west (Urich 1997). Approximately 75 per cent of Bohol's popu
lation of 1.2 million lives in the southern half of the island.
In the northern half of Bohol, highly acidic soils and also low organic-matter soil content
predominate. The area has until recently been dominated by cogon grass. El Nino has a
severe impact on these acidic and low-carbon soils and severely constrains dryland agriculture.
The resilience of Bohol's irrigated agriculture has similarly been severely degraded since
1945. The demineralisation of the inherently highly fertile soils and comparatively highly pro
ductive wet limestone valleys of southern Bohol has been further compromised by rampant
deforestation of the uplands. This has led to hydrological destabilisation; perennial springs
have dried, and other springs, many used for irrigation, have become intermittent and/or
flashy and difficult to manage (Urich 1996).

The El Nino of 2004

On 8 October 2004 the first warning of an impending El Nino was e-mailed to members of the
Bohol Research Consortium, the Bureau of Soil and Water Management (hereafter BSWM) in
Manila, and the Bohol Provincial Planning and Development Office (hereafter PPDO). It was
based on the 7 October 2004 ENSO Diagnostic Discussion issued by the Climate Prediction
Center/NCEP. The e-mail noted:

The NOAA operational definition for El Nino [Oceanic Nino Index (ONI), a three-month
running mean of the Nino 3.4 index, greater than or equal to +0.5? C] was satisfied for the
period June-August 2004, with an ONI value of +0.7?C. Based on the recent evolution of
oceanic and atmospheric conditions and on a majority of the statistical and coupled model
forecasts, it seems most likely that SST anomalies in the Nino 3.4 region will remain
positive, at or above +0.5?C, through early 2005. (Urich 2004a)

While the Philippines were not listed in the bulletin, Indonesia was, and it was noted that 'drier
than-average' conditions were to be expected through early 2005. When this e-mail was read by
members of the Bohol Research Consortium, action was initiated by its members, including the
Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist in collaboration with other concerned NGO members,
with the specific measures detailed below.
It rained periodically across Bohol throughout December 2004, and some local confusion had
therefore set in regarding the reality of an El Nino affecting the province. The El Nino events of
2002 and 2004 were preceded by typhoons or inter-tropical storms, so it was difficult to con
vince the public that drought was potentially imminent. The El Nino Task Force experienced
some internal apathy in the awareness-and-preparedness phase of the planned intervention.

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Peter B. Urich, Liza Quirog, and William G. Granert

However, it was successful in its lobbying, as more of the province's government agencies
responded to the directive of the Governor. As a result, although the farmers indeed suffered
some losses, these would have been greater had they not been warned and reacted favourably.
In December 2004 the Climate Prediction Center's warnings persisted. This message was
also conveyed to consortium members and BSWM in Manila and PPDO in Bohol. Again it
was noted that 'drier-than-average' conditions would continue in Indonesia. Furthermore, it
was stated that there could be 'week-to-week and month-to-month variability' - hence the
rains in Bohol in December - but also that 'it seems most likely that weak warm episode
(El Nino) conditions will persist through early 2005. However, there is considerable uncertainty
concerning future developments.' It is important to note that although this was forecast to be a
weak El Nino event, it has been found in previous weak El Nino events that drought can occur in
parts of the Western Pacific Basin. Uncertainty abounded, and this was noted in communication
to leaders in Bohol.

What we are dealing with here is uncertainty. Therefore a decision made in good faith
today may prove to be either right or wrong with the passage of time. I can understand
that BohoVs farmers are confused. They are told about an impending El Nino and then
it rains. What would you think if you were a farmer? It is important to tell farmers
about uncertainty. I think that we promise farmers too much sometimes - that we know
more than we actually do and this can lead to mistrust. I encourage everyone who talks
to farmers about El Nino to emphasise the imprecise nature of the science and that
despite perceptions it CAN RAIN during an El Nino phase. I have stated on this
list repeatedly that El Nino is a regional and very localized thing; it can rain in one
place and not in the next. I realize that this can be a difficult concept to express to
farmers but the alternative (not trying to do so) can, I believe, be far more damaging to
relationships. (Urich 2004b)

By early December 2004 an intervention programme was well underway, as exemplified by the
following e-mail:

Whether it's coming or not, I have put preparations in place. We obtained funds to publish
a guide for the farmers and fishermen to follow to prepare for El Nino, obtained funding
for upland rice seeds to be dispersed to the farmers, vegetable seeds of drought tolerant
varieties, funding for cloud seeding. It is discussed in the radio programs already. I go
onboard many times during the week and grant interviews with the local media.
(Quirog 2004)

The e-mail from Quirog in early December requires explanation. While it may appear that
matters were well in hand and preparations were going smoothly, it is critical that the scene
be set. Various actors and agencies and institutions and individuals played a part in providing
Quirog with the space to expand social capital to fill the need that she and others had identified
across the province as a result of an impending El Nino event.

Actors and agents

Devolution of the Philippine governance structures, begun in 1993 and still evolving, was
instrumental to the implementation of an El Nino intervention programme for Bohol. Little
has been written about the role of devolution in disaster preparedness in the Philippines. We
do acknowledge the important work conducted in assessing the 1998 El Nino and the role of
governance in that disaster. However, that assessment delved only as deep as regional govern
ance, not the provincial, municipal, and local governance (Jegillos 1999; Glantz 2000).

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 El Nino: an adaptive response

Resources tended to flow for disaster preparedness and response, when the President took
an interest in El Nino and set up an Interagency Task Force. However, local-level
responses are increasingly seen as most effective in reducing the impacts of El Nino.
The country is frequently affected by a wide range of natural disasters, but El Nino
induced drought has had the largest impact to its economy, which is largely dependent
on agriculture. Early forecasts of El Nino 's onset are critical in providing warning to a
government with regard to both short-term emergency conditions and to long-term econ
omic prospects. (Glanz 2000: 25)

However, Jegillos (1999: 5) put forward a number of critical recommendations as a result of the
assessment of the Philippine government response to the El Nino of 1998:

Many Filipinos perceive that the national government has to provide the solutions and
resources to disasters, although local and community-based solutions are also effective in
minimizing the impacts of El Nino (emphasis added).
Local communities cannot depend on the national government for assistance during an El
Nino. They must also rely on their own efforts.
There is a need for more accurate forecasts of El Nino and of its impacts as well, in order to
improve societal responses. Extensive information dissemination about El Nino to a wider
stakeholder body and public involvement in El Nino responses are needed.

In Bohol, the Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist was instrumental in initiating activities at
the Provincial and local levels (see Table 1). However, the knowledge of the impending El Nino
was passed by way of e-mail to a discussion group known as 'Bohol Research', established as
part of a development-assistance programme sponsored by New Zealand Aid. That programme
was designed to empower and integrate Bohol's research community and to focus research
activities to inform development policy for poverty alleviation and environmental sustainabil
ity. El Nino updates were distributed to the list each month, with additional commentary on
their relevance to conditions in the Philippines. It was on the initiative of members of the
research consortium and particularly the Provincial Agriculturalist, who is a member of the
research consortium, that action began.
It is recognised that there is a top-down hierarchical bureaucracy in the Philippines. Devolu
tion began with the passing of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, affecting the devolution of many basic services, including agriculture. However,
pre-existing hierarchies that extended from the local level all the way to Manila are still in place
locally. As a result, before the Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist could develop an inter
vention programme, approval had to be given by the Provincial Governor. Under the Bohol
Environment Code, enacted by a forward-thinking Governor of the early 1990s, Bohol had
the provision in place for establishing a Task Force for El Nino. It had been activated in the
1990s for the serious El Nino of 1997-1998, but the current Governor had not needed
to enact it during his term. In support of this was an important piece of policy passed in
2004, when the 2004-2009 development plan for Bohol was ratified by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, with statements referring to the Province's desire to implement climate
adaptation strategies.
PAGASA is the national agency charged with El Nino monitoring and the generation and
distribution of warnings. In this case they were not used. The chief reason for this was the
timeliness of information and the fact that e-mail updates were available from the International
Global Change Institute, with interpretation for local consumption: i.e. the science was trans
lated for practical application and interpretation, within hours of the El Nino update's release
from the Climate Prediction Center/NCEP.

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Peter B. Urich, Liza Quirog, and William G. Granert

Table 1: Actors and agents in the El Niho 2004 initiative

Communication
CODE Actor/Agency linkage Input
Farmers end-users, innovators
International Global 2,3,12,10 technical assistance, communication,
Change Institute policy
Office of the Provincial 2,4,5,6,7,8,9,11, 12 coordination, technical information
Agriculturalist dissemination, seed sourcing/distribution,
extension, public awareness, policy
recommendation, monitoring
Office of the Governor 3,5,6,8 policy directives, Task Force coordination
Office of the Vice-Governor 3,4 funds, legislative support
Department of Agriculture 3, 4 extension, technical support
Municipal Agricultural 3, 8,11 extension, monitoring
Officers
League of Municipalities 3,4,5,7 local policy support
of the Philippines - Bohol
9 AusAid 4,3,12 Funds
DISOP/NZAid 2,12 Funds
11 Provincial Agrarian Extension
Reform Office
12 NGOs, Soil and Water 3,6,2 technical support, extension, policy
Conservation Foundation
13 PAG-ASA Monitoring
14 Bureau of Soils and Water 2, 4, 6, 15 funds, technical provision
Management
Philippine Air Force 2, 4, 14 use of aircraft

Letters were written to various member agencies of the Task Force, asking them to help to
gather support and official recognition for time and resources to be devoted to an intervention
programme. With the assistance of the Vice-Governor, who was also the Chairman of the
Provincial Committee for Agriculture, the Task Force was immediately mobilised. The Gover
nor's power in the Local Government Code provided the necessary clout to call all agencies
operating in the province for assistance to tackle a province-wide event. It took only a week
to disseminate the information to the member agencies and convene a meeting. This was a criti
cal first step that legitimated subsequent activities of various actors and agencies. Importantly,
this approval was granted without respect to either regional or national authorities, especially
the Department of Agriculture. It represented a devolved system addressing a local concern.
However, this type of independent initiative comes at a cost, because without a central or
regional government mandate, funds from those levels of government cannot be easily procured.
For example, the Department of Agriculture still takes directives from regional and national
office. Regardless, funds were obtained from other sources and the programme was initiated.
It is important to stipulate that the Department of Agriculture and the Office of the Provincial
Agriculturalist do, when called upon by the Governor, collaborate on activities. The El Nino of
2004 was a case in point. The Department of Agriculture functions as the primary research arm

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 El Nino: an adaptive response

for agriculture in the Province, with important facilities such as The Bohol Agricultural Pro
motion Center, which was initially funded by JICA. They also maintain research farms and
thus have access to land. The Department of Agriculture was asked to provide land and tech
nical support so that drought-resistant rice seeds could be developed for dispersion during
the El Nino, while the Vice-Governor provided the upland seeds for post-El Nino planting.
On the other hand, the Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist cultivated root crops (sweet
potato) so that cuttings could be distributed post-El Nino. In previous El Nino events it was
recognised that seed sources and tuber cuttings were in extremely short supply and constituted
a serious constraint to post-El Nino recovery. Similarly, the office of the Provincial Agricultur
alist co-ordinated the distribution of information, seeds, and planting materials through its
effective mechanism of Municipal Agricultural Officers and extension agents. While all
these initiatives were taken by the various agencies, the Governor also personally directed
the cloud-seeding operations.
Working in parallel to the Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist and Municipal Agricultural
Officers were NGOs. Bohol has a well-developed and increasingly sophisticated and well
trained NGO community which is both committed and reasonably well resourced and has
access to many of the poorest rural communities of Bohol. These NGOs were also instrumental
in educating farmers and effecting adaptation. The NGO activities complemented those of the
Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist, such as the planting of improved and drought-resistant
napier and guinea grasses. The additional, drought-resistant forage meant that small-scale agri
culturalists could maintain their limited livestock and were not forced to sell them at low prices
at the tail-end of the drought, when the market is typically flooded with stock being sold off
owing to a lack of feed. NGOs have also been strong advocates of organic agriculture, with
implementation in stages. It has been found that organic practices improve soil conditions
and hence the soil's moisture-holding capacity and resilience. This is part of a longer-term strat
egy to improve the province's overall resilience and ecological health. Conversions and behav
ioural change have intensified as the cost of fertiliser have risen.
NGOs that sit on the Provincial El Nino Task Force also engaged with the information
dissemination process. Bohol had received substantial grants from AusAid for rural develop
ment in socially and ecologically depressed barangay (villages). Several NGOs assisted in
distributing information, first on the impending El Nino with measures that included educating
farmers about what constituted an El Nino, and second on what preventive measures could be
taken. This was all conducted in the local language, seizing every opportunity when groups of
farmers congregated. A regular NGO-produced local-language newsletter included extensive
coverage of El Nino-related activities and adaptation strategies.
Many of the adaptation strategies proposed to farmers were based on local practice, rather
than radical deviations from previous methods. In Bohol, root crops are integral to the agricul
tural system. Therefore slight alterations in the planting cycle were proposed, in conjunction
with shifts in varietal selection (in favour of more drought-tolerant varieties). Slightly improved
mounding techniques were also proposed and demonstrated. For the rice sector, drought-toler
ant varieties were widely disseminated, and alternative methods for the application of irrigation
water were advocated. As noted previously, seed banks were initiated early in the preparation
phase. Previous experience was that farmers consumed much of their seed and cutting stock
during drought and delayed planting until the rains returned rains - a trend which extended
the impact of an El Nino.
Communication was paramount throughout the intervention. From the initial warning to
dissemination of information, co-ordination was largely managed through the Office of the
Provincial Agriculturalist. NGOs and government agencies were aware of the co-ordinating
role being played by the office. Donors also were co-ordinated by the Office; this was funda

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Peter B. Urich, Liza Quirog, and William G. Granert

mental, as funds were needed quickly and without rivalry between contending institutions. The
role of the donors cannot be underestimated, because without the formal acknowledgement of
local activities by National government agencies, funds were largely unavailable from this tra
ditional source.
By February 2005 official warnings were signalling the end of the weak El Nino that started
in late 2004. However, this was also the early phase of the taas-tinginit (literally - long, hot
season) of the Visayas and Bohol, and in fact this dry period did ensue and resulted in continued
engagement by the El Nino Task Force.

Some good news. It appears that the risk of a full blown El Nino is waning. A movement
toward neutral conditions has been predicted over the next three months. However, I
encourage vigilance as it has been dry in some areas over the last couple of months
and the traditional dry season (March, April, May) is just about to emerge in the
Visayas. (Urich 2005)

More regular and widespread rain did eventuate with the habagat (south-west monsoon) that
arrived in June of 2005. With planting materials readily available, recovery was relatively
quick.

Issues in El Nino forecasting and impact monitoring

A key activity of an El Nino task force, whether it is local or national in jurisdiction, is the
monitoring and evaluation of the extent of damage related to the associated drought. At
first, damage was assessed only for agricultural crops. However, the link between terrestrial
rainfall patterns and the productivity of coastal fisheries was profound, with productivity
diminishing with El Nino. Therefore the fishery sector was subsequently assessed in the
same manner as agriculture.
The figures submitted by the monitoring team of the El Nino Task Force (Table 2) are still
hotly debated by policy makers, the mayors, the Governor, and the members of the Sanggu
niang Panlalawigan headed by the Vice-Governor. Issues included the authenticity of the
reports, discrepancies in the standards of measurement used in the assessment, and the extent
of support that the government could afford in order to buffer the impact of the losses sustained
by farmers and fisherfolk. The policy bodies, in general, are very sensitive to issues of losses
quantified in peso terms, as it can become a politically divisive and explosive issue if govern
ment cannot respond to the needs of the people.
In Table 2 it appears that the damage to people's agricultural livelihood is not correlated to
the duration of the drought. The difference in the figures shown in Table 2 damage reports for
1998 and 2002 requires explanation. The National El Nino Task Force created by then President

Table 2: Summary of El Nino phenomena in the Province of Bohol showing, the estimated damage to
agricultural livelihood and the approximate duration (1998, 2002 and 2004)

Year Estimate damage (millions) Approximate duration (months)

P120 (US$2.8) 12
2002 P443 (US$8)
2004 P61 (US$1.1)
Source: (Provincial Planning and Development Office 1998; Office of the Provincial Agriculturalist 2002;
The Bohol Chronicle 2005; PAGASA 2006).

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 El Nino: an adaptive response

Ramos and the Department of Agriculture claimed that the 2002 El Nino inflicted heavy losses
on the agriculture sector; however, losses were not as severe as those experienced in 1998
(PCARRD 2002). But in Bohol, the 2002 drought resulted in more damage, although the
number of dry months was fewer than in 1998.
It is difficult to forecast the duration of an El Nino event. Moreover, it is currently impossible
to accurately measure the duration of dry months (< 100 mm) in Bohol, as PAGASA uses rain
fall data obtained only from Tagbilaran City, and climate forecasts are based on national, not
regional or local figures. Rainfall, even in as small a province as Bohol, is highly variable
from place to place: a rain shadow in south-east, coastal Bohol contrasts with the north-east,
which is open to Pacific Ocean-derived tropical cyclones.
Damage reporting is as erratic as an El Nino itself. Bohol's government agencies continue to
explore methodologies for improving the accuracy of impact assessments and to develop the
people's social and natural capital to improve resilience.

Summary and conclusions

The preparations made by the El Nino Task Force in response to the 2004 forecast were success
ful, although this is difficult to measure on the basis of the damage report, which was only P61
million for an El Nino of only six months' duration. Nevertheless, one point was proved correct:
the El Nino forecast had a high level of accuracy. And furthermore, although it was a mild El
Nino, drought still occurred and was, in part, ameliorated by intervention and adaptation.
Although scientists agree that it is difficult to forecast the duration of the actual drought, the
fact is that drought did come and the most vulnerable sectors in society, the farming and
fishing sectors, were given considerable attention by support agencies such as the government
and NGOs. Paramount also was the Governor's acknowledgement of the threat and action to
activate the El Nino Task Force. Lessons learned from the 2004 El Nino event can be used
for the next event, which if forecasts prove correct could this year mirror very closely the devel
opments that occurred at this very same time in 2004.
Short-term interventions similar to that described in this article are critical, and so too are
longer-term strategies. Hence the identification of climate change as a 'stand-alone' issue in
the 2004-2009 provincial development plan. With this status in the provincial development
plan, action can be taken immediately to obtain funding support and to devise management
strategies for adaptation processes. With devolution, the alignment of local development
plans with donor-agency initiatives is paramount. The longer-term strategies include organic
agriculture and replanting of marginal and degraded uplands with timber and fruit trees.
The Bohol experience likewise provides a glimpse of how local governments in the Philip
pines, under devolution, could manage preparedness and respond to disasters in micro-areas.
This could also be a model for local governance in archipelagic states which are vulnerable
to natural calamities.
Timely communication was achieved in 2004. However, it must be emphasised that while
communication may be of a high standard, what is paramount is the capacity of the people
and institutions receiving the information. Without a strong and vibrant civil society, the best
plans and interventions are destined to fail. All the personnel involved in the intervention
in 2004 were enthusiastic and deeply committed to helping the province's farmers and
fisherfolk. They were repaid by an equally engaged populace. It is the goal of all the parties
concerned that the lessons learned in 2004 be applied to future El Nino events, and that with
time and appropriate resources such activities be mainstreamed into the development plans
of the province. The test of success will be the monitoring and evaluation of the impact of sub
sequent El Nino events, and the expression of resilience in ecological and social institutions.

Development in Practice, Volume 19, Number 6, August 2009 775

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Peter B. Urich, Liza Quirog, and William G. Granert

References
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The authors
Dr Peter B. Urich (corresponding author) is the Managing Director of CLIMsystems Ltd in Hamilton,
New Zealand; a Research Associate of the International Global Change Institute of the University of
Waikato; and an Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of the Sunshine Coast in Queensland, Aus
tralia. Contact details: University of Waikato - International Global Change Institute, PB 3105, Hamilton
3105, New Zealand; <pbu@waikato.ac.nz>
Liza Quirog is the Head of the Provincial Agriculture Office of the Province of Bohol in the Philippines;
the Manager of the Provincial Farmers Information and Technology Services Center; and the Executive
Officer of LIFE Philippines Foundation-Bohol, Inc. Contact details: 44 Visarra St., Tagbilaran City
6300 Bohol, Philippines. <lizamquirog@hotmail.com>
William G. Granert is the Executive Director of the Soil and Water Conservation Foundation, Inc, a
non-government organisation engaged in integrated rural development and natural resources conservation
based in Cebu City, Philippines. Contact details: Soil and Water Conservation Foundation, Cebu City,
Cebu, Philippines.

776 Development in Practice, Volume 19, Number 6, August 2009

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