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faculty-profile-timothy-van-zandt (نسخة)
faculty-profile-timothy-van-zandt (نسخة)
faculty-profile-timothy-van-zandt (نسخة)
CV
CONTACT
EMAIL: timothy.van-zandt@insead.edu
PHONE: +33 1 60 72 48 56
CAMPUS: Fontainebleau
BIOGRAPHY
Timothy Van Zandt is a Professor of Economics (since 1999). Previously he was Dean of Faculty and
Research at INSEAD.
In the early 1980s, Timothy spent four years in Bogotá, Colombia, as an undergraduate student. In
1989, he obtained a PhD in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania, and from 1990 to 1998,
was an assistant professor in the Department of Economics at Princeton University. He held several
one-year research appointments: a post-doctoral member of AT&T Bell Laboratories in New Jersey
(1989-1990); a research fellow at CORE in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium (1993-1994); a visiting research
professor at the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Managerial Science at
Northwestern University (1998-1999); a visiting professor at the Stern School of Business at New York
University (2003-2004); a visiting appointment at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New
Jersey (2003-2004); and a visiting scholar at the Department of Economics at Columbia University
(2010-2011). Timothy has had shorter visits at Yale University and the Universidad Juan Carlos III,
Madrid. He serves as a Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Research Fellow.
Timothy has broad teaching experience at the undergraduate, MBA, and PhD levels. At INSEAD, he
teaches managerial economics (Prices and Markets) and advanced game theory courses in the MBA
programme. In the process of teaching managerial economics at INSEAD, Northwestern University,
and the New York University, he developed a textbook and a web-based platform for imperfect
PUBLICATIONS
The Effect of WTO on the Extensive and the Intensive Margins of Trade
The Effect of WTO on the Extensive and the Intensive Margins of Trade
Hierarchies and the Division of Labor
A Theorem of the Maximin and Applications to Bayesian Zero-Sum Games
Does WTO Matter for the Extensive and the Intensive Margins of Trade?
Theorem of the Maximin and Applications to Bayesian Zero-Sum Games
Setting Price or Quantity: Depends on what the Seller is More Uncertain About
Interim Bayesian Nash Equilibrium on Universal Type Spaces for Supermodular Games
Expected Utility Theory
Setting Price or Quantity: Depends on What the Seller is Uncertain
Expected Utility Theory
Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities
Communication Complexity and Mechanism Design
Interim Bayesian Nash Equilibrium on Universal Type Spaces for Supermodular Games
Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication
Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities
Robustness of Adaptive Expectations as an Equilibrium Selection Device
Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty
Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation with Quadratic Payoffs
Balancedness of Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation
Structure and Returns to Scale of Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation
Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities
Information, Measurability and Continuous Behavior
Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty
Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication
Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing and Returns to Scale
Robustness of Adaptive Expectations as an Equilibrium Selection Device
Information, Measurability and Continuous Behavior
Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly
Rational Agents
Decentralizing Information Processing and the Theory of Organizations
Berge's Maximum Theorem with Two Topologies on the Action Set
Continuous Approximations in the Study of Hierarchies