Carino v CHR, G.R. No.

96681 (1991)

Facts:

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to
them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged
at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and
to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.  3

Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

 the latter filed

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6

separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for
issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension
was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also
denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings."   The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December
7

17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and
documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario
Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.  8

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an
attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed

 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named
as G.R. No. 95590." 9

individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly

situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September
27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly
without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 

1
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.:

that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been
replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of
their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while
expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different
from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this
Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

Issue:

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under
the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice,   or even a quasi-judicial 19

agency,   it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear
20

and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil
or political rights.

Ruling:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law.   This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 
21 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication
or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings. 26

2
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood
and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct

 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to

an official inquiry." 27

learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,

deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application
of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;"   "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
28

administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."  29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
 And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . .
. to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not
the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)
whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained

3
of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly
be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope
of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it
appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the
Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon
said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are
adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of
the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its
own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort,
frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to
them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions
contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only
by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was
in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35
 It
cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

 EPZA v CHR, 208 SCRA 125

Facts:

4
On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in
Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For
purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was
bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was
later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises
and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil.
To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-
assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita
Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñez
filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang
Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong").
The CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint.

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May
10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20,
1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer,
accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer
and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by
showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering
postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a
member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor
Remulla!"

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the
happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members
of the Philippine National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers.

On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP
Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of
demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal
before the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla,
again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed
their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order
reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works
and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. 

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining
order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and
harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987
Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to:

a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;

b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

5
 c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;

d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)

Issue:

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed
violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of?

Ruling:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October
1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R.
No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may
seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court
of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction
may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district],
or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the
judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior
court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or
protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose

Simon v CHR, G.R. No. 100150 (1994)

6
Facts:

he case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one
of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to
12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.  Prior to their
1

receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that
their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".  On 12 July 1990, the group,
2

led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang

Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.
The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.  On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an
3

Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as
well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried
out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,  the CHR, in its
5

resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food
under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest."

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that
the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that
the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not
civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."

Issue:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition.

Ruling:

7
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body.  This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v.
23

Commission on Human Rights,  the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
24

Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions
that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way
be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental

law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to
define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe.
In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the
Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand
by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the
following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity.
They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England,
Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of
the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public
officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and
engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education,
employment, and social services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the
sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not
granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They
are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28

8
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that
relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to
closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along
with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost
all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience
under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions
in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented
perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a
respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines,"  observes:
29

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of
Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these
rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held
for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered
released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition
for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure,
except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists.

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"  has been defined as referring —

31

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious
persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32

Political rights,  on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly,
33

in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government. 34

9
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to
the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such
areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not
likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority,
it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently
take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that,
the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a
busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised
rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules
of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information,
or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to
desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,  the Court, speaking
36

through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive

measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be
issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A
writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

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The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid
to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not
only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but,
more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to
initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has
become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been
fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished.   Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet
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to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended,
among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human
Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from
implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued
by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

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