GSIS vs. Kapisanan NG Mga Manggagawa Sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, Dec. 6, 2006

4/6/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 510
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
*
G.R. No. 170132. December 6, 2006.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)

and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS
President & General Manager, petitioners, vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Civil Service Law; It should be stressed

right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and
agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the
GSIS, or those cre-
_______________
14 Id., at p. 345.
* SECOND DIVISION.
623
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 623
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng

mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
ated by special law—as such, employees of covered GOCCs are

part of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules
and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on
discipline, attendance and general terms/conditions of
employment, inclusive of matters involving self-organization,
strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions.—It should be
stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000178a736c525597cf327003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/21
controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the

GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, employees of
covered GOCCs are part of the civil service system and are subject
to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general
terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving
self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted
actions. In fact, policies established on public sector unionism and
rules issued on mass action have been noted and cited by the
Court in at least a case. Among these issuances is Executive
Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines for the
exercise of the right to organize of government employees.
Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules
on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector.
Same; Same; In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister
of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1 [1983]), a case decided
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution, an en banc Court
declared that it would be unfair to allow employees of the
government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the
ever present threat of a strike to wring benefits from Government.
—In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, (124 SCRA 1), a case decided under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be
unfair to allow employees of government corporations to resort to
concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike to wring
benefits from Government. Then came the 1987 Constitution
expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization to complement the provision
according workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”
Same; Same; Public Officers; Employees in the public service
may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized
stoppage
624

of work; that the right of government employees to organize is

limited to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.—It was against the backdrop of the
aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court
resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619 (1997). In
it, we held, citing Manila Public School Teachers Association

(MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr., 200 SCRA 323 (1991), that employees in
the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.
Same; Same; Same; Public employees going on disruptive
unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.—
And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals, 444
SCRA 51 (2004), the Court defined the limits of the right of
government employees to organize in the following wise: It is
relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this
jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass
action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service. The right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike, adding that public employees going
on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass
actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “prohibited
concerted activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees’
organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions,
economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets
and acts of similar nature.—With the view we take of the events
that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members
launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike
or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited
concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity”
refers to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees’
organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands or
625
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 625

force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves,

walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four
straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS
employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass
protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS
main office building. The record of attendance for the period
material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851
employees, or forty-eight percent (48%) of the total number of
employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during
office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., leaving the other employees to
fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take
place every business day. On the second day, 707 employees left
their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass
action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but
by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
Same; Same; The principle of accountability demands that
every erring government employee be made answerable for any
malfeasance or misfeasance committed.—To be sure, arbitrariness
and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave abuse of
discretion on the part of petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically
inferred from the sheer number of those charged as well as the
gravity or the dire consequences of the charge of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as the
appellate court made it to appear. The principle of accountability
demands that every erring government employee be made
answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And
lest it be overlooked, the mere filing of formal administrative case,
regardless of the gravity of the offense charged, does not overcome
the presumptive innocence of the persons complained of nor does
it shift the burden of evidence to prove guilt of an administrative
offense from the complainant.
Same; Same; Judgments; The assailed decision and
resolution, if allowed to remain undisturbed, would likely pave the
way to legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil servants,
regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest of the public
they have sworn to serve with loyalty and efficiency.—We close
with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution, if
allowed to remain undisturbed, would likely pave the way to the
legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil servants,
regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest of the public
they have sworn to serve with
626

loyalty and efficiency. Worse still, it would permit the emergence

of a system where public sector workers are, as the petitioners
aptly put it, “immune from the minimum reckoning for acts that
[under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful.” This
aberration would be intolerable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Andrew F. Ammuyutan for petitioners.
Barbers, Molina and Molina for respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and its President and General Manager Winston F.
Garcia (Garcia,
1
for short) assail and seek to nullify the
Decision dated June 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) 2
in CAG.R. SP No. 87220, as reiterated in its Resolution of
October 18, 2005 denying Garcia’s motion for
reconsideration.
The recourse is cast against the following setting:
A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration,
rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in front of the
GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it
all. Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004
mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among
them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng
Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”), a
public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.
Contingents from other government agencies joined causes
with the GSIS group. The mass ac-
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurred in

by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Aurora Santiago-Lagman,
Rollo, pp. 78-98.
2 Id., at pp. 101-105.
627
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 627

tion’s target appeared to have been herein petitioner

Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of
Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of
the participating GSIS3
employees was not covered by a
prior approved leave.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS
Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131
union and non-union members to show cause why they
should not be charged administratively for their
participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel,
Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said
directive on the ground, among others, that the subject
employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience
to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for
reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the
filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges
against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct 4
and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
What happened next is summarized by the CA in its
challenged decision of June 16, 2005, albeit the herein
petitioners would except from some of the details of the
appellate court’s narration:
“Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert

Velasco, commenced the instant suit on November 2, 2004, with
the filing of the Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground
that its members should not be made to explain why they
supported their union’s cause, petitioner [KMG] faulted
respondent [Garcia] with blatant disregard of Civil Service
Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for
Prohibited Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts government
agencies to “harness all means within their capacity to accord due
regard and attention to employees’ grievances and facilitate their
speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance
machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law
and existing civil service rules.” Two supplements to the foregoing
petition were eventually filed by KMG.
_______________
3 CA Decision, p. 2; Id., at p. 79.

4 Id., at p. 80.
628

The first, . . . apprised [the CA] of the supposed fact that its
Speaker, Atty. Molina, had been placed under preventive
suspension for 90 days and that the formal charges thus filed will
not only deprive its members of the privileges and benefits due
them but will also disqualify them from promotion, step
increment adjustments and receipt of monetary benefits,
including their 13th month pay and Christmas bonuses. The
second, x x x manifested that, on December 17, 2004, respondent
[Garcia] served a spate of additional formal charges against 230 of
KMG’s members for their participation in the aforesaid grievance
demonstrations.
In his December 14, 2004 comment to the foregoing petition,
respondent [Garcia] averred that the case at bench was filed by
an unauthorized representative in view of the fact that Albert
Velasco had already been dropped from the GSIS rolls and, by
said token, had ceased to be a member—much less the President
—of KMG. Invoking the rule against forum shopping, respondent
[Garcia] called [the CA’s] attention to the supposed fact that the
allegations in the subject petition merely duplicated those already
set forth in two petitions for certiorari and prohibition earlier filed
by Albert Velasco . . . . Because said petitions are, in point of fact,
pending before this court as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86130 and 86365,
respondent 5 [Garcia] prayed for the dismissal of the petition at
bench . . . .” (Words in bracket added.)
It appears that pending resolution by the CA of the KMG

petition for prohibition in this case, the GSIS management
proceeded with the investigation of the administrative
cases filed. As represented in a pleading before the CA, as
of May 18, 2005, two hundred seven (207) out of the two
hundred seventy eight (278) cases filed had been resolved,
resulting in the exoneration of twenty (20) respondent-
employees, the reprimand of one hundred eighty6
two (182)
and the suspension for one month of five (5).
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 79-81.

6 Garcia’s Motion for Reconsideration of the [CA’s] Decision dated June
22, 2005, pp. 8-9; Annex “G,” Petition, Id., at pp. 44-45.
629
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 629

On June7 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed

decision holding that Garcia’s “filing of administrative
charges against 361 of [KMG’s] members is tantamount to
grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of
the writ of prohibition.” Dispositively, the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition [of KMG] is

GRANTED and respondent [Winston F. Garcia] is hereby
PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from implementing the issued
formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising
from the same facts and events.
SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis in the original)
Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported

speculative factual and erroneous legal premises holding it
together, petitioner Garcia8 sought reconsideration. In its
equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2005, however,
the appellate court denied reconsideration of its decision.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious
errors on the appellate court in granting the petition for
prohibition absent an instance of grave abuse of authority
on their part.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
It should be stressed right off that the civil service
encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
9
(GOCCs) with original charters,
10
like the GSIS, or those
created by special law. As such, employees of covered
GOCCs are part
_______________
7 Supra note 1.
8 Supra note 2.
9 GSIS exists pursuant to PD 1146, as amended by RA No. 8291, or the
Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997.
10 Constitution, Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); SSS Employees Association v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989, 175 SCRA 686; Home
Development Mutual Fund v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 142297,
June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 126.
630

of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules

and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) on discipline, attendance and general
terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters
involving self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and
like concerted actions. In fact, policies established on public
sector unionism and rules issued on mass action have 11
been
noted and cited by the Court in at least a case. Among
these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of
1987, providing guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC
Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited
concerted mass actions in the public sector.
There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges
against the 278 affected GSIS employees—a mix of KMG
union and non-union members—having arose from their
having gone on unauthorized leave of absence (AWOL) for
at least a day or two in the October 4 to 7, 2004 stretch to
join the ranks of the demonstrators/rallyists at that time.
As stated in each of the formal charges, the employee’s act
of attending, joining, participating and taking part in the
strike/rally is a transgression of the rules on strike in the
public sector. The question that immediately comes to the
fore, therefore, is whether or not the mass action staged by
or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a
strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If in the
affirmative, then the denounced filing of the administrative
charges would be prima facie tenable, inasmuch as
engaging in mass actions resulting in work stoppage or
service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the
punishable offense
12
of acting prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. If in the negative, then such filing would
indeed smack of arbitrariness and justify the issuance of a
corrective or preventive writ.
_______________
11 G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 657.

12 Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997, 276
SCRA 619.
631
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 631

Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are

but a natural consequence of the service-disrupting rallies
and demonstrations staged during office hours by the
absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate
issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the
other hand, the CA, agreeing with the respondent’s
argument, assumed the view and held that the organized
demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their
grievances 13in the exercise of their “broader rights of free
expression” and are, therefore, not amenable to
administrative sanctions. For perspective, following is what
the CA said:
“Although the filing of administrative charges against

[respondent KMG’s] members is well within [petitioner Garcia’s]
official [disciplinary] prerogatives, [his] exercise of the power
vested under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291 was tainted
with arbitrariness and vindictiveness against which prohibition
was sought by [respondent]. xxx the fact that the subject mass
demonstrations were directed against [Garcia’s] supposed
mismanagement of the financial resources of the GSIS, by and of
itself, renders the filing of administrative charges against
[KMG’s] member suspect. More significantly, we find the gravity
of the offenses and the sheer number of persons . . . charged
administratively to be, at the very least, antithetical to the best
interest of the service. . . .
It matters little that, instead of the 361 alleged by petitioner,
only 278 charges were actually filed [and] in the meantime,
disposed of and of the said number, 20 resulted to exoneration,
182 to reprimand and 5 to the imposition of a penalty of one
month suspension. Irrespective of their outcome, the severe
penalties prescribed for the offense with which petitioner’s
members were charged, to our mind, bespeak of bellicose and
castigatory reaction . . . . The fact that most of the employees
[Garcia] administratively charged were eventually meted with
what appears to be a virtual slap on the wrist even makes us
wonder why respondent even bothered to file said charges at all. x
x x.
Alongside the consequences of the right of government
employees to form, join or assist employees organization, we have
already
_______________
13 CA Resolution, p. 4; Rollo, p. 104.
632


mentioned how the broader rights of free expression cast its long
shadow over the case. x x x we find [petitioner Garcia’s] assailed
acts, on the whole, anathema to said right which has been aptly
characterized as preferred, one which stands on a higher level
than substantive economic and other liberties,
14
the matrix of other
important rights of our people. x x x.” (Italics and words in
bracket added; citations omitted.)
While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so,

the CA equated the right to form associations with the
right to engage in strike and similar activities available to
workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate
court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not
barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’
organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate
charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies
and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive
effect of such mass action. Citing what Justice Isagani
Cruz said in Manila Public
15
School Teachers Association
[MPSTA] v. Laguio, Jr., the appellate court declared:
“It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution

No. 021316 that employees of the GSIS are not among those
specifically barred from forming, joining or assisting employees
organization such as [KMG]. If only for this ineluctable
16
fact, the
merit of the petition at bench is readily discernible.”
We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture.

For, let alone the fact that it ignores what the Court has
uniformly held all along, the appellate court’s position is
contrary to what Section17
4 in relation to Section 5 of CSC
Resolution No. 021316 provides. Besides, the appellate
court’s invoca-
_______________
14 CA Resolutions pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 103-104.

15 G.R. Nos. 95445 & 95590, August 6, 1991, 200 SCRA 323.
16 CA Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 87.
17 Sec. 4. Limitation on the Right to Self-Organization.—The
right to self-organization accorded to government employees as described
in the foregoing section shall not carry with it
633
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 633


tion of Justice Cruz’s opinion in MPSTA is clearly off-

tangent, the good Justice’s opinion thereat being a dissent.
It may be, as the appellate court urged¸ that the freedom of
expression and assembly and the right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances stand on a level
higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion,
however, about these rights as including the right on the
part of government personnel to strike ought to be, as it
has been, trashed. We have made this abundantly clear in
our past determinations. For instance, in Alliance of
Government 18 Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, a case decided under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be
unfair to allow employees of government corporations to
resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat of
a strike to wring benefits from Government. Then came the
1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first
time, the right
19
of government personnel to
selforganization to complement the provision according
workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted
activities,
20
including the right to strike in accordance with
law.”
It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions
of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved
Bangalisan v.
_______________
the right to engage in any form of prohibited concerted activity or mass

action causing or intending to cause work stoppage or service disruption,
albeit of temporary nature.
Sec. 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action.—As used
in this Omnibus rules, the phrase “prohibited concerted activity” shall be
understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organizations, with
the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to
realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise, from
their respective agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
18 No. L-60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1.
19 Art. IX(B), Sec. 2 (5).
20 Art. XIII, Sec. 2.
634

21
Court
22
of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio,
Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage
in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of
work; that the right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike. 23
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals came next and there we
explained:
“Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves

was positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals
Employees vs. Ferrer-Calleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights
of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for
allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of
the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national
security . . . .
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies
its exercise with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a
clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of
this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive
Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly
endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
government service shall be observed.” (Emphasis and words in
bracket added; citations omitted)
24
And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals,
the Court defined the limits of the right of government
employees to organize in the following wise:
_______________
21 G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 619.

22 Supra note 15.
23 Supra note 11.
24 G.R. Nos. 123562-65, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 51.
635
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 635

“It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this
jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass
action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service. The right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike,
adding that public employees going on disruptive

unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may
be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
Significantly, 1986 Constitutional Commission member
Eulogio Lerum, answering in the negative the poser of
whether or not the right of government employees to
selforganization also includes the right to strike, stated:
“When we proposed this amendment providing for self

organization of government employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they25
have also the right
to strike. That is a different matter. x x x”
With the view we take of the events that transpired on

October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members launched or
participated in during that time partook of a strike or,
what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited
concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted
activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their
employees’ organization, with the intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves,
26
walkouts, pickets and acts of
similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days,
participating KMG members and other GSIS
_______________
25 Bernas, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY, 337 (1st ed., 1988).
26 CSC Res. No. 021316, Sec. 5; Supra note 17.
636


employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a

mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of 27
the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance
for the period material shows that, on the first day of the
protest, 851 employees, or forty-eight percent (48%) of the
total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to 28
the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,
leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an
office where a host of transactions take place every
business day. On the second day, 707 employees left their
respective work stations, while 538 participated in the
mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306
employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the
fourth day activity.
To say that there was no work disruption or that the
delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency
at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of
massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to
understate things. And to place the erring employees
beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be
to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the
compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil
servants by the Code of Conduct 29
and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
The appellate court made specific reference to the
“parliament of the streets,” obviously to lend concurrence to
respondent’s pretension that the gathering of GSIS
employees on October 4-7, 2004 was an “assembly of
citizens” out only to air grievances, not a striking crowd.
According to the respondent, a strike presupposes a mass
action undertaken to press for some economic demands or
secure additional material employment benefits.
We are not convinced.
_______________
27 Annex “C” and Annex “I,” Petition, Rollo, p. 107 and 173,
respectively.
28 Id., at p. 267.
29 Rep. Act No. 6713.
637
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 637

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day

mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact remains
that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-
crippling activities during their free time, had taken a
disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were
specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in
front of the GSIS main office building during office hours
and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince
others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage
and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be
forestalled by the 30prohibition against strikes by
government personnel.
The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest
rally and gathering in question did not involve some
specific material demand. But then the absence of such
economic-related demand, even if true, did not, under the
premises, make such mass action less of a prohibited
concerted activity. For, as articulated earlier, any collective
activity undertaken by government employees with the
intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in
order to realize their demands or force concessions,
economic
31
or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass
action and doubtless actionable administratively.
Bangalisan even went further to say the following: “[i]n the
absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to
engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.”
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager
of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility, under
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997,
to remove,32 suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel
for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or
causing the filing
_______________
30 Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22.

31 CSC Resolution No. 021316, Sec. 5.
32 SEC. 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General Manager.—
x x x The President and General Manager [of the GSIS], subject to the
approval of the Board, shall appoint the personnel of the GSIS, remove,
suspend or otherwise discipline them for cause, in accordance with
existing Civil Service rules and regulations . . . .
638

of administrative charges against the absenting

participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely
performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law.
Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he
signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as
legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.
It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS
employees concerned were proceeded against—and
eventually either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a one-
month suspension, as the case may be—not for the exercise
of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition for
redress of grievance, but for engaging in what appeared to
be a prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less
admitted that its members and other 33
GSIS employees
might have disrupted public service.
To be sure, arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of
power or, in fine, grave abuse of discretion on the part of
petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred from the
sheer number of those charged as well as the gravity or the
dire consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as the
appellate court made it to appear. The principle of
accountability demands that every erring government
employee be made answerable for any malfeasance or
misfeasance committed. And lest it be overlooked, the mere
filing of formal administrative case, regardless of the
gravity of the offense charged, does not overcome the
presumptive innocence of the persons complained of nor
does it shift the burden of evidence to prove guilt of an
administrative offense from the complainant.
Moreover, the Court invites attention to its holding in
MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a case involving over 800 public
school teachers who took part in mass actions for which the
then Secretary of Education filed administrative
complaints on assorted charges, such as gross misconduct.
Of those charged,
_______________
33 KMG’s basic petition for prohibition, p. 13; Rollo, pp. 121 et seq.
639
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 639

650 were dismissed and 195 suspended for at least six (6)
months The Court, however, did not consider the element
of number of respondents thereat and/or the dire
consequences of the charge/s as fatally vitiating or
beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of Education’s
challenged action. Then as now, the Court finds the filing
of charges against a large number of persons and/or the
likelihood that they will be suspended or, worse, dismissed
from the service for the offense as indicating a strong and
clear case of grave abuse of authority to justify the issuance
of a writ of prohibition.
The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first
taping existing grievance machinery and other modes of
settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG Collective
Negotiations Agreement (CNA) 34
before going full steam
ahead with his formal charges.
The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CA’s
angle on grievance procedure but for the fact that it
conveniently disregarded what appears to be the more
relevant provision of the CNA. We refer to Article VI which
reads:
“The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to

promote the principle of shared responsibility . . . on all matters
and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and interests of all
GSIS employees . . . . Accordingly, . . . the parties also mutually
agree that the KMG shall not declare a strike nor stage any
concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS
management shall not lockout employees who are members of the
KMG during the term of this agreement. GSIS Management shall
also respect the rights of the employees to air their sentiments
through peaceful concerted activities 35
during allowable hours,
subject to reasonable office rules . . . .” (Italics added)
If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone

for non-exhaustion of less confrontational remedies, it
should be at the respondent union for spearheading a
concerted mass
_______________
34 CA Decision, pp. 17-18; Id., at pp. 94-95.

35 Petition, p. 41; Id., at p. 43.
640


action without resorting to available settlement

mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty. Alberto
Velasco, which opened fire first. That none of the parties
bothered to avail of the grievance procedures under the
GSIS-KMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. At
best, both GSIS management and the Union should be
considered as in pari delicto.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it
unnecessary to discuss at length the legal standing of
Alberto Velasco to represent the herein respondent union
and to initiate the underlying petition for prohibition.
Suffice it to state that Velasco, per Joint Resolution No. 04-
10-01 approved on October 5, 2004 by the KMG Joint
Executive-Legislative Assembly, had ceased to be member,
let alone president, of the KMG, having previously
36
been
dropped from the rolls of GSIS employees. While the
dropping from the rolls is alleged to have been the subject
of a CA-issued temporary restraining order (TRO), the
injunction came after Atty. Velasco had in fact been
separated from the service and it appears that the TRO
had already expired.
As a final consideration, the Court notes or reiterates
the following relevant incidents surrounding the
disposition of the case below:
“1. The CA had invoked as part of its ratio decidendi a

dissenting opinion in MPSTA, even going to the
extent of describing as “instructive and timely” a
portion, when the majority opinion thereat, which
the appellate court ignored, is the controlling
jurisprudence.
2. The CA gave37prominence to dispositions and rattled
off holdings of the Court, which appropriately
apply only to strikes in
_______________
36 Annex “D,” Petition; Id., at p. 108.

37 Allied Banking Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 116128, July 12, 1996, 258 SCRA 724; Lapanday Workers Union
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, September
7, 1995, 248 SCRA 95; International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 98295, April 10, 1996, 256
SCRA 134.
641
VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 641

the private industry labor sector, and utilized the

same as springboard to justify an inference of grave
abuse of discretion. On the other hand, it only gave
perfunctory treatment if not totally ignored
jurisprudence that squarely dealt with strikes in
the public sector, as if the right to strike given to
unions in private corporations/entities is
necessarily applicable to civil service employees.
3. As couched, the assailed CA decision perpetually
bars respondent Garcia—and necessarily whoever
succeeds him as GSIS President—not only from
implementing the formal charges against GSIS
employees who participated in the October 4-7,
2004 mass action but also from issuing other formal
charges arising from the same events. The
injunction was predicated on a finding that grave
abuse of discretion attended the exercise of
petitioner Garcia’s disciplinary38
power vested him
under Section 45 of RA 8291. At bottom then, the
assailed decision struck down as a nullity, owing to
the alleged attendant arbitrariness, not only acts
that have already been done, but those yet to be
done. In net effect, any formal charge arising from
the October 4-7, 2004 incident is, under any and all
circumstances, prejudged as necessarily tainted
with arbitrariness to be slain at sight.
The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the

foregoing situations are not lost on the Court.
We close with the observation that the assailed decision
and resolution, if allowed to remain undisturbed, would
likely pave the way to the legitimization of mass actions
undertaken by civil servants, regardless of their deleterious
effects on the interest of the public they have sworn to
serve with loyalty and efficiency. Worse still, it would
permit the emergence of a system where public sector
workers are, as the petitioners aptly put it, “immune from
the minimum reckoning for acts that [under settled
jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful.” This aberration
would be intolerable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the writ of prohibition issued by that court is NULLIFIED.
_______________
38 Supra note 32.
642

People vs. Aguila
No Cost.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., On Leave.
Assailed decision and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The right of government employees to organize

is limited to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike. (Gesite vs. Court of
Appeals, 444 SCRA 51 [2004])
To grant employees of the public sector the right to
strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative
authority therefore. (Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, 276
SCRA 619 [1997])
——o0o——
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GSIS vs. Kapisanan NG Mga Manggagawa Sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, Dec. 6, 2006

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GSIS vs. Kapisanan NG Mga Manggagawa Sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, Dec. 6, 2006

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4/6/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 510

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)

Administrative Law; Civil Service Law; It should be stressed

VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 623

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng

ated by special law—as such, employees of covered GOCCs are

controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng

of work; that the right of government employees to organize is

it, we held, citing Manila Public School Teachers Association

VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 625

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng

force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves,

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng

loyalty and efficiency. Worse still, it would permit the emergence

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurred in

VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 627

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

tion’s target appeared to have been herein petitioner

“Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert

3 CA Decision, p. 2; Id., at p. 79.

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs.

It appears that pending resolution by the CA of the KMG

5 Id., at pp. 79-81.

VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 629

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

On June7 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition [of KMG] is

Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules

11 G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 657.

VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 631

Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are

“Although the filing of administrative charges against

13 CA Resolution, p. 4; Rollo, p. 104.

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs.

While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so,

“It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution

We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture.

14 CA Resolutions pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 103-104.

VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 633

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs.

tion of Justice Cruz’s opinion in MPSTA is clearly off-

the right to engage in any form of prohibited concerted activity or mass

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves

21 G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 619.

VOL. 510, DECEMBER 6, 2006 635

adding that public employees going on disruptive

“When we proposed this amendment providing for self

With the view we take of the events that transpired on

25 Bernas, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs.