months imprisonment and a fine of P
13,542.00.
General Instructions
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MODULE 2
RULE 110
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
Sec. 1. Institution of Criminal Offenses
Reodica v. CA
8 July 1998
Abella
CASE PRINCIPLE: Art. 48 RPC: when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a
means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.
FACTS:
● Isabelita Reodica was allegedly
recklessly driving a van and hit
Norberto Bonsol causing him physical
injuries and damage to property
amounting to P8,542.00. Three days
after the accident, a complaint was
filed before the fiscal’s office against
the petitioner. She was charged of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Slight
Physical Injury." After pleading not
guilty, trial ensued.
● RTC of Makati rendered the decision
convicting petitioner of "quasi offense
of reckless imprudence, resulting in
damage to property with slight physical
injuries" with arresto mayor of 6
● Petitioner made an appeal before the
CA which re-affirmed the lower court’s
decision.
● In its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner now assails that:
1. The court erred in giving its
penalty on complex damage to
property and slight physical injuries
both being light offenses over which
the RTC has no jurisdiction and it can’t
impose penalty in excess to what the
law authorizes.
2. Reversal of decision is still
possible on ground of prescription or
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is a complex
crime applying Article 48 of the RPC?
2. Whether or not the duplicity of
information may be questioned for the
first time on appeal?
RULING:
1. NO. Art. 48 on penalty for complex
crime provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is
necessary a means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. Both
offenses cannot constitute a complex
crime because reckless imprudence
resulting to slight physical injuries is
not either a grave or less grave felony.
Therefore, each felony should be filed
as a separate complaint subject to
distinct penalties.
2. NO. Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that when two or more
offenses are charged in a single
complaint and the accused fails to
object against it before the trial, the
 court may convict the accused to as
many offenses as charged and impose
a penalty for each of them.
Complainant failed to make the
objection before the trial therefore the
right to object has been waived.
Francisco v. CA
122 SCRA 538
Beluan
CASE PRINCIPLE
Failure to move to quash other information,
deemed a waiver thereof. The accused can
therefore be convicted of as many crimes
charged in the Information.
FACTS
The accused-appellant herein were charged
with 4 separate crimes of grave oral
defamation committed in 4 different instances.
This case delve much more on the ability of the
accused to apply for probation.
The matter which is relevant to the subject is
the failure of the accused to file a motion to
quash the for the other information of grave
oral defamation filed against him.
ISSUE
The case heavily talked about probation. When
it is proper and if the accused-appellant
qualifies for such. Since, this case does not fall
under the topic of probation, I did not bother
to include it in the text. ALL ISSUES TALKED
ABOUT PROBATION
RULING
The accused-appellant was not able to file a
motion to quash before arraignment and it
therefore operated as a waiver on his part to
be charged and convicted of as many crimes
charged in the information. The court
mentioned that at the outset, petitioner, in
accordance with Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, should have moved to
quash as each of the four (4) Informations
filed against him charged four (4) separate
crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on
four (4) separate days. His failure to do so
however may now be deemed a waiver under
Sec. 8 of the same Rule and he can be validly
convicted, as in the instant case, of as many
crimes charged in the Information.
Domingo v. Sandiganbayan
20 January 2000
Cagnan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Computation of prescriptive period when law
violated is a special law: if the commission of
the crime is known, the prescriptive period
commences on the day the crime was
committed. However, if the violation of the
special law is not known at the time of its
commission, the prescription begins to run only
from the discovery thereof.
FACTS:
PNB filed a complaint against former Pres.
Marcos and 2 other respondents, Domingo as
past President of PNB, was subpoenaed, but
the same was returned unserved. He was
impleaded and an information for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended was filed
against petitioner. The information alleged that
petitioner, being then the president of PNB,
while in the performance of his official
functions and with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, conspired and confederated
with his co-accused in giving favorable loan
accommodations to CDCP by facilitating the
passage of PNB Board Resolution No. 144
which caused undue injury and prejudice to
PNB in the amount of US$29 Million. A petition
for reinvestigation, treated as motion for
reconsideration, was filed by petitioner. The
same was denied as well as his motion to
quash the information. The motion was
grounded on prescription and that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute an offense.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the information should be quashed
(NO)
Whether the period of prescription have
already lapsed (NO)
RULING:
A motion to quash on the ground that the
allegations do not constitute the offense
charged should be resolved on the basis of the
allegations alone whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. In the case at bar, the
facts alleged in the information constitute a
violation of RA 3019 so the motion to quash
must fail.
Since the law alleged to have been violated,
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law,
the applicable rule in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides that if the
commission of the crime is known, the
prescriptive period shall commence to run on
the day the crime was committed. However, if
the violation of the special law is not known at
the time of its commission, the prescription
begins to run only from the discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, since the anomalous
transactions could only have been discovered
after the EDSA revolution, hence, the counting
of the prescriptive period would commence
from the date of discovery of the offense,
which could have been between February 1986
after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987
when the initiatory complaint was filed.
Whether the running of the prescriptive period
was tolled when DOMINGO was impleaded as
an accused or when the information against
him was filed with the Sandiganbayan, is
immaterial; for only about one or six years,
respectively, has elapsed from the date of the
discovery of the alleged offense. Thus, the
prescriptive period, whether ten years as
provided in R.A. No. 3019 or fifteen years as
provided in the amendatory Act, has not yet
lapsed. The motion to quash on the ground of
prescription was, therefore, correctly, denied.
Domondon v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 129904 | March 16, 2000
Dela Rosa
CASE PRINCIPLE
While the Ombudsman has full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the
case has been filed with said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.
FACTS
● Four separate informations were filed
at the Sandiganbayan against officials
of the PNP due to the discovery of a
chain of irregularities within the PNP
Commands. Petitioner was included for
violations of the Anti-Graft Law.
● Sandiganbayan issued an order
deferring action on the motion for
consolidation considering the
uncertainty of the Court in proceeding
the case at this time and that only one
of the 15 accused filed a motion for
consolidation.
● Petitioner alleges that respondents
Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with
grave abuse of discretion in denying
his motion for consolidation since all of
the pertinent cases have been
remanded by the Sandiganbayan to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor
under the Office of the Ombudsman for
reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has
revested" in the latter and "…it is grave
abuse of discretion to refuse to
perform the duty of consolidating these
cases.
ISSUE
WON Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from
proceeding with the hearing and other
incidents of the case against the petitioner
during the pendency of the petition. (NO)
RULING
Well settled is the rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained, either
through a preliminary or final injunction or a
writ of prohibition, except in the following
instances:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which
is sub-judice;
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority;
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over
the offense;
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution;
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by lust for vengeance;
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied;
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by
the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners.”
Corollary to the rule, the courts cannot
interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or
Ombudsman to determine the specificity and
adequacy of the averments of the offense
charged.
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed, this Court is not precluded
from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when
there is an abuse of discretion, by way of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
While the Ombudsman has full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the
case has been filed with said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman, which has full control of the case
so much so that the information may not be
dismissed, or in the instant case, may not be
consolidated with other pending cases, without
the approval of the said court.
Ong v. People
GR No. 140904 | 09 October 2000
Diez
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Denial of a motion for Demurrer of evidence
can only be corrected by an appeal. The
exception to that if the denial was done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
● Petitioners were charged with Estafa.
The only evidence provided by the
prosecutor are photocopied documents.
● After the prosecution was done
presenting evidence, the petitioners
filed for a demurrer of evidence since
the evidence presented are
inadmissible.
● MeTC denied the motion. The
petitioners then filed a petition for
certiorari in the RTC
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for certiorari is the right
remedy when denial of demurrer of evidence is
attended by grave abuse of discretion (Yes)
RULING:
● certiorari does not lie to review a trial
court's interlocutory order denying a
motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which
is equivalent to a demurrer to
evidence, filed after the prosecution
had presented its evidence and rested
its case. An order denying a demurrer
to evidence is interlocutory. It is not
appealable. Neither can it be the
subject of a petition for certiorari
● if the denial of the demurrer to
evidence is attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the denial may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari
● The court ruled that in the case there
was no sufficient evidence to sustain
an indictment since presented evidence
are only photocopies. Demurrer should
have been granted.

Samson v. Guingona
GR No. 123503 |14 Dec. 2000
Ejem
CASE PRINCIPLE
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs
of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With
more reason will injunction not lie when the
case is still at the stage of preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation. However, in
extreme cases, there are exceptions.
FACTS:
On July 13, 1995, at Quezon City, patrolmen of
the Central Police District Command posted at
the intersection of Scout Reyes St. and Mother
Ignacia St. flagged a taxi cab, with Datu Gemie
Sinsuat as a passenger. Instantly, the
patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat in different parts
of the body, inflicting upon him multiple
gunshot wounds, causing death. The Court
finds that at the time of the filing of the
information for murder based on the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation
and Resolution dated Setp. 29, 1995, the Court
finds no probable cause for reconsideration of
the order. However, before the Department of
Justice could conduct a reinvestigation, on Feb.
6, 1996, petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court the instant petition to enjoin respondents
from further proceeding with the
reinvestigation of the case or from resolving
the same.
ISSUE
Whether the Court may enjoin the SOJ from
conducting a reinvestigation of the charges
against petitioners as ordered by the trial court
for determination of probable cause.
RULING
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs
of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With
more reason will injunction not lie when the
case is still at the stage of preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation. However, in
extreme cases, we have laid the following
exceptions:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused;
(2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question which
is subjudice;
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority;
(5) where the prosecution is under an invalid
law; ordinance or regulation;
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over
the offense;
(8) where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution;
(9) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
(10) when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.
As a rule, the Court does not interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in
the exercise of determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish
probable cause for the filing of information
against an offender.
Arambulo v. Laqui
G.R. No. 138596, 2000
Macaraeg
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The filing of the complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation,
should and does interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even
if the court where the complaint or information
is filed cannot try the case on the merits.
FACTS:
● December 21, 1993: Petitioner
circulated a letter containing allegedly
malicious imputations against the
respondents
● February 2, 1994: Respondents filed a
joint complaint-affidavit for libel
against the petitioner before the Office
of the Prosecutor of Quezon City
● May 18, 1994: Information for libel
was filed before the MTC
● November 9, 1996: MTC ruled that it
had no jurisdiction over the case and
ordered that the case be forwarded to
the RTC
● November 29, 1996: The case was
forwarded to RTC
● January 3, 1997: Petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and prescription of
the offense
● April 2, 1997: RTC dismissed the case,
stating that the offense has not
prescribed and ordered to refile the
case to the RTC. The case was refiled
on April 27, 1997.
● June 17, 1997: Petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense of libel has
prescribed in the case at bar (NO)
RULING:
The filing of the complaint with the MTC, even
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, interrupts the
period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits.
Reasons laid out by the SC:
First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code “shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information” doesn’t distinguish
whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits.
Second, even if the court where the complaint
is filed may only proceed to investigate the
case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender.
Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party
the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.
Zaldivia v. Reyes
2 July 1992
Case Principle
If there is a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the RSP
prevails as it is a special law.
If there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the RCP, the RCP must yield
because SC is not allowed to "diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights" under
the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive
right.
Facts
Petitioner is charged with quarrying for
commercial purposes without a mayor's permit
in violation of a municipal ordinance of the.
(May 11, 1990 – Date of Commission of
Offense; May 30, 1990 - Referral-complaint of
the police was received by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of; October 2, 1990 -
information was filed with the MTC Rodriguez)
Petitioner argues that the charge against her is
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure
which governs violations of municipal/city
ordinances and that prosecution shall be either
by complaint or by information filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, which states
that the prescription for violations of municipal
ordinances shall begin from the date of the
commission/discovery and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment and shall prescribe after two
months.
Prosecution contends that the prescriptive
period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
Issue
Whether the action has prescribed
Ruling
Petitioner is correct. The prescriptive period for
the crime commenced from its alleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
months thereafter, on July 11, 1990. It was
not interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor as
this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the
period was the filing of the information with
the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this
was done only on October 2, 1990, after the
crime had already prescribed.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corp V. Judge
Lidua
G.R. No. 169588 | October 7, 2013
Solis
PRINCIPLE:
The period of prescription for violation of a
special law or ordinance shall be interrupted
only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court.
FACTS:
Pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000,
Jadewell, a private parking operator, was
authorized to render any motor vehicle
immobilized by placing its wheels in a clamp if
the vehicle is illegally parked.
On May 7, 2003, the respondents dismantled,
took, and carried away the clamps attached to
the wheel of the vehicles.
On May 23, 2003, Jadewell filed a complaint
for robbery against the respondents with the
Office of the City Prosecutor. However, two
criminal Informations were filed with the MTC
on October 2, 2003.
Respondents then filed a motion to quash on
the ground of extinguishment of criminal action
due to prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolled the prescription period of the
commission of the offense. NO.
RULING:
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides
that only the filing of an Information tolls
the prescriptive period where the crime
charged is involved in an ordinance.
When the petitioner filed the Complaint before
the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued
to run until the filing of the Information.
They had two months from the discovery and
commission of the offense to file the
Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the
MTC.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the
Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
2003, the period had already prescribed.
Thus, respondent Judge Lidua did not err when
he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents.
Sec. 2. The Complaint or Information
City of Manila v. Rizal
March 9, 1914
Tan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Criminal actions where the accused are
charged with violations of a municipal
ordinance of the city, for which punishment by
fine or imprisonment is prescribed, must be
brought in the name of the United States and
not in the name of the city.
FACTS:
Herein defendant was convicted in the
municipality court of City of Manila of a
violation of a municipal ordinance against
gambling. Defendant appealed to the CFI of
Manila.
A court of demurrer to the information was
sustained on the ground that the action was
brought in the name of the city of Manila, and
not in the name of the United States as
requited by provisions of Sec. 2 of General
Orders, No. 58.
This appeal is brought in behalf of the
Government from the order sustaining the
demurrer.
ISSUE:
WON prosecutions charging violations of the
municipal ordinances of the city of Manila may
be brought in the name of the City of Manila.
(NO)
RULING:
NO. Section 2 of General Orders, No. 58,
provides that in this jurisdiction "all
prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the
name of the United States against the persons
charged with the offenses." Violations of
municipal ordinances for which punishment by
fine or imprisonment is lawfully prescribed are
public offenses as that term is used in the
above-cited section of the order, and
prosecutions for such violations of municipal
ordinances must therefore be instituted in the
name of the United States. |||
Here, there is no express authority granted to
the city of Manila in its charter to institute
criminal actions in its own name, and that in
this jurisdiction actions instituted to enforce
penalties of fine or imprisonment prescribed
for the violation of municipal ordinances are
purely criminal actions and are in no sense civil
in nature.
Ngo Yao Tit vs. Sheriff of Manila
G.R. Nos. 9619 & 9620 | March 28, 1914. ||
|
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Where there is some evidence to support a
conviction in a criminal case, habeas corpus
will not lie in favor of the accused imprisoned
by virtue of such conviction.
HABEAS CORPUS; CONVICTION OF RELATOR
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. — In a decision
convicting several persons of having visited a
house where opium was smoked in violation of
section 3 of Ordinance No. 152 of the city of
Manila, it affirmatively appeared that opium
was being smoked in the house in question at
the time the accused were arrested and that
they were there present. Held: That the
judgment was not wholly without support in
the evidence, and that habeas corpus would
not lie to relieve the accused from restraint
under such conviction, although it also
appeared from said decision, by fact and
inference, that the accused were lawfully there
and that the house was not a place where
opium was generally or habitually smoked.
FACTS:
Herein petitioners were charged for violation of
Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 152. The Section3 of
said ordinance reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Visiting places where opium is
smoked or dealt in prohibited. — No
person shall visit or present at or in
any place where opium, or any of its
derivatives or compounds, is smoked
or otherwise used in or upon the
human body, or unlawfully sold, given
away, or otherwise disposed of.
Upon a final judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila convicting them on a new trial, following an appeal
from the municipal court of said city, of a violation of
section 3 of Ordinance No. 152, the petitioners herein are
detained under a commitment issued and sentencing each
one of them to pay P100 fine, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of non-payment.
In support of their Application for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, petitioners contend that, the
Supreme Court having already held in the case
of United States vs. Ten Yu that before a
conviction can be had under section 3 of
Ordinance No. 152, "the defendants may
prove, if the fact exists, that they visited the
place described in the complaint lawfully and
not in violation of the provisions or the spirit of
said ordinance," and that, in effect, it must be
shown, to sustain a conviction under said
ordinance that, the house visited was one
generally used for the smoking of opium. And
it appearing by an affirmative statements in the
decision of the Court of First Instance that the house in
question was a Chinese Club and was not destined or
generally used for the smoking of opium, and there being
no finding that the accused were unlawfully there, the
judgment of conviction has nothing to sustain it and is,
therefore, absolutely void.
That such being the case, a writ of habeas
corpus will lie, it is contended, as
imprisonment under a judgment absolutely
void is an illegal imprisonment.
The petitioners also cite authorities, among
them cases of this court, which declare that a
finding with nothing to sustain it is arbitrary
and useless and is a nullity.
ISSUE:
WON Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is the
proper remedy to be availed of by the
petitioners? NO.
RULING:
While the authorities cited sustain the propositions
advanced, neither the one nor the other applies, in our
judgment, to the case before us. It is admitted that the court
had jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and that it
had jurisdiction to try a person accused of violating section
3 of Ordinance No. 152. There was, therefore, jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter. It is equally
undoubted that, if the acts of the petitioners constituted the
crime defined in that ordinance, they were properly
convicted. It having been demonstrated by the evidence, as
stated in the decision of the trial court, that the petitioners
were found in the club house in question and that opium
was being smoked therein, it became the duty of the court
to determine, by the exercise of its judicial functions,
whether such acts constituted the crime defined by the
ordinance. This was a judicial determination admittedly
within the jurisdiction and authority of the court to make.
That being so, the exercise of that jurisdiction would not
result in void judgment, provided the court kept within the
limits thereof. In the determination of the case before it, it
is clear that the court kept fully within the limits of its
jurisdiction and, exercising the authority which it had a
right to exercise within that jurisdiction, determined the
question whether the acts developed by the evidence fell
within the prohibition of the ordinance. This same question
is one which is passed upon by a court every time it tries a
criminal cause. That is one of the necessary adjudications.
If it is to be held that a wrong determination of that
question deprives the court of jurisdiction, then the
correctness of a judgment of conviction in a criminal case
will nearly always be determined by a writ of habeas
corpus. This, of course, is not the function of the writ and
makers of the legislation and constitutions which preserve
the writ, never intended that it should be used in that
manner and for that purpose.
It is urged that, in view of the decisions of this
court in the case of the City of Manila vs.Rizal,
the action should have been in the name of the
United States and not the City of Manila; and
that, the action having been wrongly entitled,
the court acquired no jurisdiction of the person
or the subject matter of the action and that its
judgment of conviction was absolutely
void.This being the case, it is argued, habeas
corpus will lie as the imprisonment is illegal.
We cannot agree with this contention.
The bringing of the action in the name of the City of
Manila instead of the United States is an error merely and
not a jurisdictional defect. It is not similar to the case
where, as claimed by petitioners, an information is filed by
a person who is not authorized in law to file it. The fact that
the city of Manila was the plaintiff in the action does not
signify that said city was the person who signed and filed
the information. The accused were prosecuted by the
same officials, before the same court, and in the same
manner as they would have been if the action had been
brought in the name of the United States, and they received
the benefits of the same rights and the same privileges
which they would have received if the action had been
properly entitled. They have been in no sense injured or
prejudiced. The defect is one which could have been cured
at any stage of the trial by an amendment on the motion of
the court itself or upon the motion of any person interested
in the prosecution. Defects of that character which are not
taken advantage of in the court below in the manner
prescribed by law cannot be raised for the first time here,
and especially in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
writ of habeas corpus was not intended and cannot be used
to correct mere errors or defects in proceedings, and
accordingly does not lie in the present application.
Sec. 4. Information defined
People v. Mendez
 G.R. No. L-27348 | July 29, 1969
Beluan
CASE PRINCIPLE
Applications for continuances are addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. In this
respect, it may be said that the discretion
which the trial court exercises must be judicial
and not arbitrary.
FACTS
Appellants Miguel Mendez and Segundo Gianan
were two of several persons accused of the
crime of slander by deed. The initial hearing
set for 26 March 1962 was postponed upon
motion of the complainant on the ground that
he would take his oath as director of the
League of Liberal Party Legal officers in Manila.
Reset for 3 May 1962, It was again postponed
upon motion of the complainant on the ground
that he would appear as counsel in a certain
administrative case. These were not the only
instances where the court granted the
appellants request for
postponements/continuance due to trivial
matters (7 request for postponements). Come
January of the following year, the court made a
statement that if the accused-appellants still
fail to adduce evidence and make the
necessary appearance before the court, the
case will be submitted for decision. The case
was submitted for decision due to the non-
appearance of the accused. **TN: there were
instances wherein one of the accused is
present and the other is not***
Accused-appellants now question the decision
of the lower court of holding them guilty of the
crime charged against them. They averred that
they were denied due process in considering
the case submitted for decision without their
evidence having been heard and duly
appreciated; and unlawful promulgation of
judgment insofar as Miguel Mendez is
concerned.
ISSUES
Won the accused-appellants were denied of
due process? NO
Won there was grave abuse of discretion? NO
RULING
Applications for continuances are addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. In this
respect, it may be said that the discretion
which the trial court exercises must be judicial
and not arbitrary.
In the instant case, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the Justice of the
Peace Court of Virac. The lower court was, in
fact, too liberal in its grant of motions for
postponements and continuances. Even
applications based on the most trivial causes
which were usually not only unsubstantiated
but also prayed for only on the eleventh hour
were granted. If the court had decided to put a
stop to this anomalous practice, its action
should be, and it ought to be, upheld
Appellants were duly notified in court of the
trial set for 23 January 1963. Aware of the
dozen postponements and continuances that
had interrupted the proceedings, the court
even warned said appellants that it would no
longer allow further delay and would deem the
case submitted for decision should attempt in
this direction be made. This warning was
ignored. Appellants absented themselves in an
obviously vain effort to force a continuance.
Their flimsy excuses that they thought that the
trial was on the 24th, that their bondsmen
were not notified, and that they suddenly got
sick on the very day of the trial unmasked their
scheme to defeat the speedy and expeditious
determination of the case.
Instead of moving for a motion for
reconsideration or prayed for an opportunity to
submit evidence, another request for
postponement was made by the accused’s
counsel. The court refuses to take part in the
reprehensible trifling with the orderly
administration of justice. JUDGEMENT FOR
CONVICTION AFFIRMED.
Regarding the promulgation of the decision of
the absentee accused, wherein the ROC
requires his personal appearance in order for
the decision to be binding upon him, such is
remanded to the lower court for due execution
of the said decision.
Tam Wing Tak v. Makasiar
G.R. No. 122452 | January 29, 2001
Cagnan
CASE PRINCIPLE: Only a public officer
described the by the Rules of Court as a
“prosecutor” is authorized to subscribe to the
information.
FACTS:
Sometime before November 1992, Vic Ang
Siong issued a check to Concord-World
Properties, Inc. The check amounted to P83.5
million. The check however bounced. In
November 1992, Tam Wing Tak filed an
affidavit-complaint for violation of the Anti-
Bouncing Checks Law against Ang Siong. The
fiscal did not file a criminal information against
Ang Siong because apparently Concord-World
and Ang Siong are settling out of court (in fact
Ang Siong already paid P19 million); and that
Tam Wing Tak was not authorized by the
Board of Directors of Concord-World to sue
Ang Siong. Tam Wing Tak then filed a petition
for mandamus to compel the fiscal to file the
information. Judge Ramon Makasiar dismissed
the petition.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the petition should be
granted. (NO)
(2) Whether or not the suit be considered a
derivative suit where the Board’s authorization
may not be had. (NO)
RULING:
(1) In general, mandamus may be resorted to
only where one's right is founded clearly in law
and not when it is doubtful. The exception is
where mandamus is available to compel the
performance by the public prosecutor of an
ostensibly discretionary function, where by
reason of grave abuse of discretion on his part,
he willfully refuses to perform a duty mandated
by law. However, respondent Chief State
Prosecutor in refusing to order the filing of an
information for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against
Vic Ang Siong did not act without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Concord-World is the named payee in the
check that bounced. As payee, Concord-World
is the injured party hence only Concord-World
can file the criminal case against Ang Siong but
it did not do so because it chose to amicably
settle the issue with Ang Siong. Where a
corporation is an injured party, its power to
sue is lodged with its board of directors or
trustees. This can be delegated but Tam Wing
Tak never proved that he was authorized by
the Board of Concord-World.
(2) For a derivative suit to prosper, it is
required that the minority stockholder suing for
and on behalf of the corporation must allege in
his complaint that he is suing on a derivative
cause of action on behalf of the corporation
and all other stockholders similarly situated
who may wish to join him in the suit. In this
case, this was not complied with. Hence, Tam
Wing Tak cannot sue Ang Siong.
Sanchez vs Demetriou
G.R. No. Nos. 111771-77 | November 9, 1993
Dela Rosa
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Rule 110, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court:
“Duplicity of offense. A complaint or
information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses.”
Rape with homicide comes within the exception
under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayor, along with others, was
alleged to be involved in the killing of Allan
Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmienta. Petitioner was not present during
the preliminary investigation but was
represented by his counsel.
He was invited to the investigation in Camp
Vicente and was identified by persons who
executed confessions implicating him as a
principal in the said crimes. He was then put
on “arrest status” and was taken to DOJ. The
respondent prosecutors immediately conducted
an inquest upon his arrival.
Following the hearing, a warrant of arrest was
served and was taken to the detention center.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge
the order of the respondent judge denying his
motion to quash the information for rape with
homicide filed against him and six other
persons on the ground that he is being charged
with seven homicides arising from the death of
only two persons.
The petitioner submits that the seven
informations charging seven separate
homicides are absurd because the two victims
in these cases could not have died seven
times.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acted properly on
denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on
the grounds that he is being charged with
seven homicides arising from the death of only
two persons. (YES)
RULING:
Where there are two or more offenders who
commit rape, the homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of each rape, must be
deemed as a constituent of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide.
Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape
with homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies
the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to
the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed
on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its
character as an independent offense, but
assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance.
However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape
to constitute an constituent element of a
special complex crime of rape with homicide
with a specific penalty which is in the highest
degree. The petitioner and his six co-accused
are not charged with only one rape committed
by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each
one of the seven accused is charged with
having himself raped Sarmenta instead of
simply helping Sanchez in committing only one
rape. In other words, the allegation of the
prosecution is that the girl was raped seven
times, with each of the seven accused taking
turns in abusing her with the assistance of the
other six. Afterwards, all seven of them
decided to kill Sarmenta. Every one of the
seven accused is being charged separately for
actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her
instead of merely assisting the petitioner in
raping and then slaying her. The separate
information filed against each of them allege
that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of
Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The
separate rapes were committed in succession
by the seven accused, culminating in the
slaying of Sarmenta.
People v. Oso
GR No. L-42571|10 October 1935
Diez
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The elements of a crime must be properly
alleged in the complaint as every accused has
the right to be duly informed of the nature of
the accusation and allegations in the complaint
are also jurisdictional in character.
FACTS:
● Solovida was allegedly abducted and
raped by Oso.
● Oso was then charged for the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape.
● In the complaint filed, it only alleges
facts of the crime of abduction, but no
allegation on the facts for the crime of
rape
ISSUE:
Whether Oso can be held liable for the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape when the
complaint only alleged the facts pertaining to
the abduction (No)
RULING:
● Every accused has the right to be duly
informed of the nature of the
accusation and this legal requisite has
not been complied with in this case.
● Allegations are also jurisdictional in
character and cannot be corrected at
the latter stages of the proceedings.
● The appellant should not therefore be
convicted of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape, but only
of forcible abduction.
People v. Arojado
G.R. No. 207041| 2015
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An information is a pleading since the
allegations therein, which charge a person with
an offense, is basically the same as a
complaint in a civil action which alleges a
plaintiff's cause or cause of action.
FACTS:
In an Information, Jesus Arrojado was charged
with the crime of murder by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz.
Arrojado filed a Motion to Dismiss The
Information filed against him on the ground
that the investigating prosecutor who filed the
said Information failed to indicate therein the
number and date of issue of her Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate
of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No.
1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was promulgated
by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated
June 3, 2008.
The People of the Philippines (The People),
represented by the office of the City
Prosecutor, filed its Comment/Opposition to
Arrojados Motion to Dismiss. The RTC
dismissed the subject Information without
prejudice. The People filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the trial court denied. The
People then filed a petition for certiorari and/or
mandamus with the CA. The CA denied The
People’s petition and affirmed the questioned
RTC Orders. Hence, he filed a petition for
review on certiorari in the SUpreme Court .
The People contends that: (1) the term
“pleadings” as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not
include criminal Informations filed in court; (2)
the failure of the investigating prosecutor to
indicate in the Information the number and
date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of
Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not
a valid ground to dismiss the subject
Information which is otherwise complete in
form and substance.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the term “pleadings” does not include
criminal Information filed in court;
RULING:
The term “pleadings” include Informations.
Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, defines pleadings as the written
statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court
for appropriate judgment. Among the
pleadings enumerated under Section 2 thereof
are the complaint and the answer in a civil
suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule
110 of the same Rules, an information is
defined as an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court. In
accordance with the above definitions, it is
clear that an information is a pleading since
the allegations therein, which charge a person
with an offense, is basically the same as a
complaint in a civil action which alleges a
plaintiff's cause or cause of action. An
information is, for all intents and purposes,
considered an initiatory pleading because it is a
written statement that contains the cause of
action of a party, which in criminal cases is the
State as represented by the prosecutor,
against the accused. Like a pleading, the
Information is also filed in court for appropriate
judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information
falls squarely within the ambit of Bar Matter
No. 1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850.

Quisay v. People
G.R. No. 216920, 2016
Macaraeg
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior
written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts. The
absence of such approval renders the
information defective and, therefore, subject to
quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of
the same Rules.
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City
issued a Pasiya or Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner for violation of RA7610
otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid
Sakdal or Information was filed before the
charging petitioner of such crime.
The petitioner moved for the quashal of the
Information against her on the ground of lack
of authority of the person who filed the same
before the RTC. Nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya
and Pabatid Sakdal would show that these had
prior written authority/approval from the City
Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the
Information against her.
The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion, and
was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing petitioner's motion to quash (NO)
RULING:
Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior
written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts. The
absence of such approval renders the
information defective and, therefore, subject to
quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of
the same Rules.
The Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before
the RTC, showed no approval by either the City
Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-
Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors.
All it contained was a Certification from ACP De
La Cruz which was bare and self-serving.
Hence, the information suffers from an
incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed
the same before the RTC had no authority to
do so. The Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed,
resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case
against the petitioner.
Sec. 5. Prosecution of Private Crimes
Visbal v. Judge Ramos
29 March 2001
Case Principle
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure:
SECTION 5. Who must prosecute criminal
actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts
or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the
prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is
not available, the offended party, any peace
officer, or public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated may prosecute
the case. This authority shall cease upon actual
intervention of the prosecutor or upon
elevation of the case to the Regional Trial
Court."
Facts
A case was filed before the respondent judge
who issued an order directing him to appear
for the prosecution even when he has already
delegated his prosecutory authority to the
Station Commander. He cites the Rules of
Court which provides that although criminal
cases must be prosecuted by the public
prosecutor, his authority may be delegated to
a private prosecutor under his
control/supervision or to the Chief of Police in
the MTC when a regular prosecutor is not
available. In the instant case, no regular
prosecutor is available in respondent Judge's
sala since complainant is officially and
regularly assigned to RTC of Tacloban City,
forcing him to delegate the prosecution of the
case to the 'police investigator'.
Respondent judge denies any liability. He
maintains that the police chief's authority to
prosecute ceases upon actual intervention of
the prosecutor.
Issue
Whether the prosecutor validly delegated the
authority to prosecute on his behalf
Ruling
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the control and direction of
the prosecutor. As an exception, when the
assigned prosecutor is not available, cases
before the MTC and the MCTC may be
prosecuted by the offended party, any peace
officer or any proper public officer. The Rules
further provides that such authority, which
properly belongs to the government's
prosecutory arm, ceases upon actual
intervention of the prosecutor or upon the
elevation of the case to the RTC. In People v.
Ramos, the Court held that the aforesaid
exception must be applied strictly.
In this case, a prosecutor had already
intervened in the case. Prosecutor had actively
handled the prosecution which was, however,
transferred to complainant when the former
was hospitalized. Hence, a prosecutor was
available; there was no reason for the
delegation of the prosecutory authority to the
police chief of the municipality. (Prosecutor
was wrong but judge was still charge for undue
delay.)
Bravo v. CA
G.R. No. 48772 | May 8, 1992
Solis
PRINCIPLE:
The presence of public prosecutor during the
last hearing of this criminal case and his active
participation in the hearing has the effect of
confirming his previous authority granted to
the private prosecutor to handle the
prosecution of the case during some of his
absences in court and further ratifying all the
acts of the private prosecutor pursuant to such
authority.
FACTS:
Private respondent Vina sued petitioner Pastor
Bravo with a civil suit which judgment was in
Vina's favor.
A writ of execution was issued followed by
seizure of properties which led the petitioner in
filing a complaint for robbery.
Petitioner furnished copies of the complaint to
several governmental agencies for purposes of
ruining and damaging Vina’s reputation. The
trial court and CA found petitioner guilty of
libel.
Petitioner contends that there was no fiscal
who was physically present during the
proceedings of the libel cases since the entire
evidence for the prosecution was presented by
a private prosecutor who had no express
authority from the fiscal to represent the
State, thereby rendering the entire trial invalid.
ISSUE:
Whether the entire trial court proceeding was
invalid as the evidence for prosecution was
presented by a private prosecutor lacking
express authority from the fiscal to represent
the State. (NO.)
RULING:
Petitioner is wrong in citing People vs. Beriales
because the fiscal in that case did not appear
in all of the trial court's proceedings, and it
was only the private prosecutor who handled
the case without the authority and active
participation of the prosecuting fiscal.
But in this case, Fiscal Juanson personally
appeared and represented the prosecution on
the first day of the trial, which in effect gave
authority to the private prosecutor, Atty.
Grecia, to handle the prosecution under his
(fiscal's) direct control and supervision.
The presence of Fiscal Juanson during the last
hearing and his active participation in the said
hearing has the effect of confirming his
previous authority granted to handle the
prosecution during some of his absences in
court and further ratifying all the acts of the
private prosecutor pursuant to such authority.
Chua Burce v. CA
27 April 2000
Tan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Parties are bound to adopt their agreement
during the pre-trial conference when the same
is reduced to writing and signed by the parties.
FACTS:
The Metropolitan Bank in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, conducted a physical bundle count of
cash inside its vault. It was discovered that
there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the
person primarily responsible for it was the
bank's cash custodian, herein petitioner.
The bank filed a civil case, then a criminal case
against petitioner as the trial court ruled that
there was no prejudicial question. During the
pre-trial conference of the estafa case, the
parties agreed to adopt their respective
evidence in the civil case as their respective
evidence in the criminal case. Later, the trial
court rendered a consolidated decision finding
petitioner guilty of estafa and liable for
P150,000.00 in the civil case. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid trial of the criminal
case? (YES)
RULING:
YES. Sec. 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the ROC
provides that during pre-trial conference, the
parties shall consider “such other matters as
will promote a fair and expeditious trial.”
ITCAB, the parties agreed during the pre-trial
conference to adopt their respective evidence
in the civil case to the criminal case in
accordance to the above rule pf ROC. Further,
the parties reduced such agreement in writing
in compliance to Sec. 4 of Rule 118. Hence,
petitioner is bound by the rpetrial agreement
and she cannot now belatedly disavow its
contents.
People v.Tanada
G.R. No. L-32215 | October 17, 1988
Abella
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The rule of "complaint-filed-in-court"
enunciated in People vs. Santos to the effect
that unless the same is filed in court, a
"salaysay" or sworn statement of the offended
party, which prompted the fiscal to conduct a
preliminary investigation and then to file an
information in court, is not the complaint
required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. When it is said that the requirement in
Article 344 that there should be a complaint of
the offended party or her relatives is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the
complaint that starts the prosecutory
proceeding. It is not the complaint which
confers jurisdiction on the Court to try the
case.
FACTS:
The case involves the setting aside of the
dismissal decreed in the Order dated May 4,
1970 of respondent Judge Santiago O. Tañada
in Criminal Case No. V-13048 entitled "People
v. Postrero" of the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu City, Branch V.
An information charging Romulo Postrero of
raping Victoria Capillan was filed. Such
information reads:
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of
the City of Cebu, upon sworn complaint
originally filed by the offended party,
Victoria Capillan, attached hereto and
made part hereof and marked as
Annex "A" — accused Romulo Postrero
of the crime of RAPE, committed as
follows:
"That in the evening
of August 15, 1968,
(sometime past 6:40 p.m.
thereof) at the Queen Hotel
of this city, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of, or
sexual intercourse with the
complainant Victoria Capillan,
through the expediency and
by means of depriving the
latter of her reason and
otherwise facilitating the
carnal knowledge by
rendering said complainant
tired, weakened and semi-
conscious the accused having
previous thereto offered and
given Victoria Capillan a
beverage to drink (seven-up)
and from the partaking of
which said complainant felt
physical weakness and still
much later deprived of
reason, thus the accused
brought about this condition
on the complainant to ravish
the complainant with
impunity.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Annex A is the sworn letter-complaint of
Capillan which reads:
"Sir:
"I am filing a criminal charge
of RAPE against Romulo
Postrero of 183-D B.
Rodriguez Street, Cebu City
committed as follows:
"'That on or about 6:40
p.m. or so, on August
15, 1968, in the City of
Cebu, one Romulo
Postrero invited me for a
snack at Quiapo
Restaurant of this City
and he ordered me to
consume my soft drink
(seven-up) at once and,
thereafter, I felt sleepy,
drowsy, dizzy and very
weak. Then he brought
me to Queen Hotel, and
then and there raped me
and have carnal
knowledge with me and
while I was still half
conscious as if I was
drugged, to my own
damage and prejudice.'
"I hope that a preliminary
investigation be conducted
immediately preparatory to the
filing of a criminal complaint.
"Sincerely yours,
"(Sgd.) VICTORIA A.
CAPILLAN
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
to before me this 16th day of
September, 1968, at the City
of Cebu, Philippines.
"(Sgd.) JOSE BATIQUIN
Asst. Fiscal, City of Cebu"
Accused filed a motion to dismiss the
information on the ground that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the offense
charged, as the information filed by the fiscal
is not a complaint signed by the offended party
as required by the provisions of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts
of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party”.
Respondent Judge granted the motion and
dismissed the case for lack of valid complaint.
Respondent judge relied upon our decision in
People v. Santos to the effect that unless the
same is filed in court, a "salaysay" or sworn
statement of the offended party, which
prompted the fiscal to conduct a preliminary
investigation and then to file an information in
court, is not the complaint required by Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
WON the offended party sufficiently complied
with the requirements provided in Art. 344 of
RPC and Sec. 4, Rule 110 of ROC? YES.
RULING:
In overruling the lower court's reliance on
People v. Santos in dismissing the case, the
Court correctly emphasized that the overriding
consideration in determining the issue of
whether or not the condition precedent
prescribed in Article 344 has been complied
with is the intent of the aggrieved party to
seek judicial redress for the affront committed.
Secondly, as we pointed out in the Ilarde case,
the "salaysay" executed by the complainant in
Santos was not considered the complaint
contemplated by Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code because it was a mere narration of
how the crime of rape was committed against
her. However, in the letter-complaint
submitted by Victoria Capillan, the latter not
only narrated the facts and circumstances
constituting the crime of rape, but she also
explicitly and categorically charged accused
Romulo Postrero with the said offense.
Clearly, the letter-complaint filed by the
offended party Capillan contains all the
elements of a valid complaint as it "states the
names of the defendants, the designation of
the offense by the statute, the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party, the
approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.”
Upon these premises alone, it is evident that
the respondent judge erred in finding that
there was no valid complaint filed by the
offended party in the charge of rape.
People v. Bugtong
G.R. No. 75853 | January 31, 1989
Beluan
CASE PRINCIPLE
Jurisdiction of the court is governed by the
Judiciary Act of 1948. The complaint required
in said Article is merely a condition precedent
to the exercise by the proper authorities of the
power to prosecute the guilty parties.
FACTS
This a case of rape of a mentally challenged 15
year old child. The said horrendous act was
committed by the child’s neighbour, Andres
Bugtong. The lower court found the accused
guilty. Now, the accused come before this
court to appeal such decision contending,
among others, that
he must be prosecuted upon a complaint filed
by the offended party, rape being a personal
offense. By virtue thereof, the trial court erred
in assuming jurisdiction over the instant case
on the basis of the Information signed by the
fiscal alone.
ISSUE
Won the lowered court erred in taking
jurisdiction of the case? NO
RULING
While it is true that crimes like rape shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended party or her parents, the
provision does not determine, however, the
jurisdiction of our courts over the offences
therein enumerated. It could not affect said
jurisdiction, because the same is governed by
the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised
Penal Code. The complaint required in said
Article is merely a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power
to prosecute the guilty parties. The appellant's
insinuation that the Information should have
been signed and sworn to by the complainant
is incorrect for it is not necessary for the
complainant to sign and verify the Information
for rape filed by the Fiscal and as shown in
Exhibit B, the complaint was filed by the
mother of the victim.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116 | June 30, 1989
Cagnan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended spouse.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent is a German national.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed
by a separation de facto between them, and
such connubial disharmony eventuated inn
private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany while
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action
for legal separation. The Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses.
Five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a
certain William Chia and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both
criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon, and as a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings, however, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment. A
motion to quash was also filed in the same
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
which motion was denied by the respondent
judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge has
acquired jurisdiction to try petitioner for the
crime of adultery? (NO)
RULING: Under Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. The law specifically provides that
in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody
else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
to the offended spouse to institute the action,
it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing
of the criminal action.
As cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that
there would no longer be a family nor marriage
vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a
danger of introducing spurious heirs into the
family, which is said to be one of the reasons
for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, since there would henceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance
of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other. To put it in
simpler terms, he can no longer have standing
to initiate the complaint of adultery which can
only be filed by the aggrieved husband, since
at the time he filed the complaint, he is no
longer considered the husband of petitioner via
the divorce decree of the Federal Republic of
Germany, such requirement is jurisdictional
which insufficiency thereof results in the court
being bereft of jurisdiction.
People vs Schneckenburger
G.R. No. L-48183 | November 10, 1941
Dela Rosa
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case,
if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
FACTS:
Schneckenburger married Elena Cartagena and
after seven years, they executed a document
agreeing to live separately from each other.
Schneckenburger, without leaving the
Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from a
civil court in Mexico. He contracted another
marriage with Julia Medel in the justice of the
peace court of Rizal, and lived together as
husband and wife in Manila. Because of the
nullity of the divorce decree, Cartagena
instituted an action for bigamy and
concubinage against the accused.
The charge of bigamy culminated in the
conviction of the accused. On the trial for the
offense of concubinage, accused interposed the
plea of double jeopardy, and the case was
dismissed. CA remanded the case to the trial
court where accused was convicted of
concubinage through reckless imprudence.
ISSUE:
WON the accused should be acquitted of
concubinage in view of the agreement
executed by Rodolfo and Elena upon their
separation. (Yes)
RULING:
The document executed by and between the
accused and the complaint while illegal for the
purpose for which it was executed, constitutes
nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage. The second paragraph of article
344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case,
if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
Our view must be taken only to mean that an
agreement of the tenor entered into between
the parties herein, operates, within the plain
language and manifest policy of the law, to bar
the offended party from prosecuting the
offense. If there is anything morally
condemnatory in a situation of his character,
the remedy lies not with us but with the
legislative department of the government.
Fernandez v. Lantin
GR No. L-44759 | 17 December 1976
Diez
CASE PRINCIPLE:
if the defamation consists in the imputation of
a crime against chastity, such as adultery,
concubinage, rape, seduction and acts of
lasciviousness, a complaint by the offended
party is required.
FACTS:
● The City Fiscal filed a complaint of libel
against Fernandez. Fernandez
supposedly committed libel by
imputing a certain Tandiama had illicit
affairs with Hector Valdeleon.
● Fernandez Filed a motion to quash the
complaint as the complaint was signed
by the Fiscal. He argues that a
complaint, where the defamation
consists of imputing a crime such as
adultery, can only be filed by the
offended party.
● City fiscal argues that the imputation
does not consist of imputation of a
crime but only imputations of an “illicit
affair”. It further argues that “illicit
affairs” does not mean adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether the fiscal can sign and file a complaint
for defamation where the malicious
imputations only refer to the offended party
having an “illicit affair” (No)
RULING:
● "illicit relationship" is used to describe
the relationship between a married
woman and a man other than her
husband.
● "illicit relationship" when used in a
complaint for abduction had been
 construed to mean clearly the
existence of an unlawful sexual
intercourse.
● It can then be construed that “illicit
relationships” when used to describe a
relationship between a married woman
and a man not her husband means
that they are sexual intercourse.
● In the case at bar the imputations of
having an illicit affair is construed to be
imputations of the crime of adultery.
Therefore, only the offended party can
file a complaint.
● This can be cured by having the
offended party file a verified complaint.
Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank
G.R. No.126210 | 9 March 2000
Ejem
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Judges cannot just decide because of
recommendations from SOJ.
The trial judge must himself be convinced that
there was indeed no sufficient evidence against
the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived
at only after an assessment of the evidence in
the possession of the prosecution.
What was imperatively required was the trial
judges own assessment of such evidence, it
not being sufficient for the valid and proper
exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept
the prosecutions word for its supposed
insufficiency.
FACTS:
Private respondent owns Hagonoy Rural Bank
which employed Perez as Officer in Charge,
Cashier and Teller, along with several others
(Fabian et. Al.) Private respondent filed a case
for estafa against the said employees and 2
outsiders (Jordan and Mangahas). This was for
anomalous withdrawals unearthed by the
auditing firm in the course of tis audit of the
company.
Finding a prima facie case to file a case for
estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, the fiscal recommended that on
information be filed against in Court. The
charges for Jordan and Mangahas were
dismissed.
The private respondent for her part, moved to
reconsider the dismissal of charges of Jordan
and Mangahas. The fiscal granted the private
respondents Motion for Reconsideration. The
SOJ then ordered the fiscal to dismiss the
charges against Perez, for insufficient
evidence.
The fiscal, acting on such orders, moved to
dismiss the case against Perez, and to amend
the information to exclude Perez. Private
respondents moved to reconsider, but such
was denied by the trial court on the ground
that the private respondent had no legal
personality to question the dismissal of
charges against Perez. On appeal, the CA
reversed the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Judge Masadao committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to dismiss the criminal case against
petitioner filed by the prosecutor.
(2) WON Respondent Hagono has the legal
personality to question the dismissal by the
trial judge of the criminal charges against the
petitioner upon the motion filed by the
prosecutor.
RULING:
Petition was denied.
(1) Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the prosecutors motion
to dismiss the criminal charges against the
petitioner on the basis solely of the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Judge Masadaos reliance on the
recommendation on the dismissal of the case
against the petitioner was an abdication of the
trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine
a prima facie case, in blatant violation of this
Court's pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul as
reiterated in the later case of Martinez v. Court
of Appeals, to wit:
"…The trial judge must himself be convinced
that there was indeed no sufficient evidence
against the accused, and this conclusion can be
arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution.
What was imperatively required was the trial
judges own assessment of such evidence, it
not being sufficient for the valid and proper
exercise of judicial discretion merely to
accept the prosecution's word for its supposed
insufficiency…”
(2) Respondent Hagonoy had legal personality
to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
against the petitioner on the ground that the
order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Cited in the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of
Appeals, which says:
"In a special civil action for certiorari filed
under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the
petition may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties
are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest
in the civil aspect of the case so he may file
such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the
complainant should not bring the action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The
action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the
said complainant."
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that
may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the
People or State in criminal proceedings
pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, the private offended party retains the
right to bring a special civil action for certiorari
in his own name in criminal proceedings before
the courts of law.
Also, the very nature of the offense charged in
this case is estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, which connotes
damages for which the accused may be held
civilly liable in case of conviction. It follows,
therefore, that if the private respondent in this
case may file a special civil action for certiorari,
then with more reason does it have legal
personality to move for a reconsideration of
the order of the trial court dismissing the
criminal charges against the petitioner.
People v. Dela Cerna
G.R. No. 136899, 2002
Macaraeg
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement,
executed by a complainant in a criminal or
administrative case, that he or she is
discontinuing or disavowing the action filed
upon his or her complaint for whatever reason
he or she may cite.
A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the
court attaches no persuasive value to a
desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought.
FACTS:
For sexually violating his 15-year old daughter
Irene dela Cerna, on January 15, 1989,
December 26, 1993, March 3, 1996, August
25, 1996, February 10, 1997 and March 5,
1997, accused-appellant was convicted of six
counts of rape and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and death.
Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the
trial court. He mainly relied on the affidavit of
desistance executed by private complainant
claiming that said affidavit created a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an affidavit of desistance by
the petitioner can be a ground for the dismissal
of the case at bar (NO)
RULING:
Affidavits of retraction can all too easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses,
usually through intimidation or monetary
consideration. Thus, there is always the
probability that they will later be repudiated
and there will never be an end to criminal
litigation.
It is also a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimony solemnly taken before courts of
justice simply because the witness who gave it
later changed his or her mind for one reason or
another. This will make a mockery of solemn
trials and put the investigation of crimes at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
NOTES (may be relevant to the topic based on
the syllabus):
(1) Article 344 of the RPC provides for the
extinction of criminal liability in private crimes.
For the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness, two modes are
recognized for extinguishing criminal liability —
pardon and marriage. The pardon must come
prior to the institution of the criminal action.
After the case has been filed in court, any
pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness
stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability.
It must be stressed that private complainant in
this case filed her complaint on May 16, 1997
and even testified against accused-appellant
on March 25, 1998. On the other hand, she
executed her affidavit of desistance only on
July 3, 1998. Clearly, the pardon extended by
the victim to her father was made after the
institution of the criminal action. Consequently,
it cannot be a ground to dismiss the action in
these cases.
(2) It is worthy to note that the rape incidents
in this case occurred prior to the effectivity of
RA 8353, "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which
took effect on October 22, 1997 and classified
the crime of rape as a crime against persons.
Such being the case, we shall apply the old law
and treat the acts of rape herein committed as
private crimes.
Chiok v. People
Case Principle:
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and
violation of BP 22, without need of election by the
offended party. There is no forum shopping because both
remedies are simultaneously available to the o ffended
party.
Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal
case in which the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may
be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only
by the State through the Solicitor General. As
a rule, only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such appeal.
Facts:
Chiok was charged with estafa. Allegedly,
Chiok received in trust from Rufina Chua the
amount for him to buy complainant shares of
stocks which she misappropriated it as her own
CA acquitted Chiok for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The CA found that the RTC
conviction did not contain findings of fact on
the prosecution's evidence but merely recited
the evidence of the prosecution as if such
evidence was already proof of the ultimate
facts constituting estafa. Instead of relying on
the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the
trial court relied on the weakness of the
defense. However, declared him still civilly
liable for the amount received
The OSG did not file a motion for
reconsideration on the ground of double
jeopardy. Chua, on the other hand, filed a
motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the acquittal should have the effect of
dismissing his civil liability as well otherwise it
would amount to double jeopardy
Issue:
Whether Chua has a legal personality to file
and prosecute this petition.
Ruling
Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to
question the CA Decision because it is only the
OSG, on behalf of the State, which can bring
actions in criminal proceedings before this
Court and the CA.
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect
may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the
State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such appeal. Further, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the institution of
a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of
BP 22, without need of election by the offended party.
There is no forum shopping because both remedies are
simultaneously available to the offended party.
In this case, the OSG neither appealed the
judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its
conformity to Chua's special civil action for
certiorari and mandamus. Hence, Chua may
not appeal the his acquittal from CA.
People v. Alapan
G.R. No. 199527 | January 10, 2018
Solis
CASE PRINCIPLE:
In a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability arising therefrom.
FACTS
Respondent Salvador Alapan and his wife were
charged with 8 counts of violation of BP 22
after they borrowed ₱400,000.00 and issued 8
postdated checks in favor of petitioner.
The MTC convicted Alapan of the said charge
with a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.
After a writ of execution was issued, the writ
was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose
Subsidiary Penalty of imprisonment for
respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Alapan may undergo
subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the
fine. (NO)
RULING
Jurisprudence has already settled that the
interest of the private complainant is limited
only to the civil liability arising from the crime.
In this case, respondent was convicted of 8
counts of violation of BP 22 for which he was
imposed the penalty of fine instead of
imprisonment pursuant to Administrative
Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13-2001. Thus, the
penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof
pertain to the criminal aspect of the case.
On the other hand, the indemnification for the
face value of the dishonored checks refers to
the civil aspect of the case. Consequently,
petitioner could not appeal the imposition of
fine as penalty which was not even questioned
by the People through the OSG.
To do so would be tantamount to giving the
private prosecutor the direction and control of
the criminal proceeding, contrary to the
provisions of law.
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of
Complaint/Information
Peopele v. Bayya
10 March 2000
Tan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An accused cannot be convicted of any offense,
not charged in the Complaint or information on
which he is tried or therein necessarily
included.
FACTS:
Lodrigo Bayya, herein appellant, was charged
before the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela for raping his
own daughter, who at the time was only 12
years old. Bayya pleaded not guilty.
The lower court, after trial on the merits,
rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing
Bayya to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review by the SC.
ISSUE :
WON the trial court erred in imposing the
capital punishment on him as the information
was silent about the applicability of RA 7659.
(YES)
RULING:
YES. Sec. 6, Rule 110 of ROC provides that –
“a complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
ITCAB, the information does not allege the
minority of the victim (daughter of appellant-
defendant) although the same was proven
during the trial borne by the records. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to allege the age of
the victim has effectively removed the crime
from the ambit of Sec. 11 RA 7659 prescribing
death penalty. Appellant is guilty only of simple
rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
People v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 160619 | September 9, 2015
Abella
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The purpose of an Information is to afford an
accused his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. It is
in pursuit of this purpose that the Rules of
Court require that the Information allege the
ultimate facts constituting the elements of the
crime charged. The rule that evidence must be
presented to establish the existence of the
elements of a crime to the point of moral
certainty is only for purposes of conviction. It
finds no application in the determination of
whether or not an Information is sufficient to
warrant the trial of an accused.
FACTS:
Castillo was elected mayor of the Municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite in May 1998 elections. In
2000, an information was filed against him in
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, in relation to
the alleged illegal operation of the Villa
esperanza dumpsite located in Cavite.
According to the information, Castillo, while in
performance of his official functions as Mayor,
gave unwarranted beenfits to his co-accused
Melencio and Emeranciano Esperanza by
allowing the latter to operate the Cilla
Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite
Environmental Compliance Certificate and
permit from the Environmental Management
Bureau.
An administrative complaint was filed against
Castillo and the Office of ombudsman found
him guilty.
CA set aside the Ombudsman’s decision and
held that Castillo did not violate the DENR
notice.
After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo filed a
Motion to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings
with the Sandiganbayan. He contended that
the case against him had been decriminalized
by Sec 37 of RA 90038 and that the CA has
absolved him of his administrative liability.
Further, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to
Quash the information on the ground that the
same does not charge an offense, claiming that
a public officer may only be held liable for
violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 if he caused
undue injury to the government or any private
person.
ISSUE:
WON an Information alleging the grant of
unwarranted benefits and existence of undue
injury must state the precise amount of the
alleged benefit unduly granted as well as
identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury
to the point of moral certainty? NO.
RULING:
A motion to quash an Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense should be resolved on the basis of
the allegations in the Information whose truth
and veracity are hypothetically admitted. The
question that must be answered is whether
such allegations are sufficient to establish the
elements of the crime charged without
considering matters aliunde. In proceeding to
resolve this issue, courts must look into
three matters: (1) what must be alleged in a
valid Information; (2) what the elements of
the crime charged are; and (3) whether these
elements are sufficiently stated in the
Information.
Sec. 6 and 9 of ROC states that:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of
complaint or information.
— A complaint or
information is sufficient if it
states the name of the
accused; the designation of
the offense given by the
statute; the acts or
omissions complained of
as constituting the
offense; the name of the
offended party; the
approximate date of the
commission of the offense;
and the place where the
offense was committed.
When an offense is
committed by more than
one person, all of them
shall be included in the
complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. Cause of the
accusation. — The acts or
omissions complained of as
constituting the offense
and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and
not necessarily in the
language used in the
statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a
person of common
understanding to know
what offense is being
charged as well as its
qualifying and
aggravating
circumstances and for
the court to pronounce
judgment.
Castillo is charged with violation of Section 3
(e) of RA No. 3019, the elements of which
are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
SC finds that the foregoing Information
sufficiently alleges the essential elements of
the violation. The Information specifically
alleged that Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor,
Cavite who, in such official capacity, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and
conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted
benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal
operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to
the undue injury of the residents and students
in the area who had to endure the ill-effects of
the dumpsite's operation.|||
ultimate facts constituting
For as long as the
the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section
3 (e) of RA No. 3019 need not state, to the
point of specificity, the exact amount of
unwarranted benefit granted nor specify,
quantify or prove, to the point of moral
certainty, the undue injury caused. We have
consistently and repeatedly held in a number
of cases that an Information need only state
the ultimate facts constituting the offense and
not the finer details of why and how the crime
was committed.
Enrile v. People
G.R. No. 213455. August 11, 2015
Beluan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Under the Constitution, a person who stands
charged of a criminal offense has the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. This right requires that
the offense charged be stated with clarity and
with certainty to inform the accused of the
crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable
him to prepare his defense.
Ultimate facts is defined as "those facts which
the expected evidence will support. The term
does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which
these material elements are to be established."
It refers to the facts that the evidence will
prove at the trial.
Evidentiary facts , on the other hand, are the
facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts;
they are the premises that lead to the ultimate
facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting
the existence of some other alleged and
unproven fact.
FACTS:
A case for plunder was filed in the
Sandiganbayan against, herein petitioner, Juan
Ponce Enrile. Before the arraignment, Enrile
filed a motion for bill of particulars which was
denied. Because of the said denial, Enrile
claims that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion
for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and
insufficiency of the Information Bled against
him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a
serious violation of his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to
speculate on what his specific participation in
the crime of plunder had been. He posits that
the Information should have stated the details
of the particular acts that allegedly constituted
the imputed series or combination of overt acts
that led to the charge of plunder.
People of the Philippines countered that the
Sandiganbayan did not exercise its
discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner. Even assuming that the
Sandiganbayan's denial of Enrile's motion for
bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did
not amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It
further maintains that the assailed
Sandiganbayan rulings were arrived at based
on the procedures prescribed under Section 2,
Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information
already contained the ultimate facts; matters
of evidence do not need to be averred.
ISSUE/S:
Won the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the motion for
bill of particulars filed by Enrile? PARTLY YES.
As not all matters he prayed to be
specified was granted.
RULING:
The constitutional right of the accused to
be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who
stands charged of a criminal offense has the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. This right requires
that the offense charged be stated with clarity
and with certainty to inform the accused of the
crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable
him to prepare his defense. The objective, in
short, is to describe the act with sufficient
certainty to fully appraise the accused of the
nature of the charge against him and to avoid
possible surprises that may lead to injustice.
Otherwise, the accused would be left
speculating on why he has been charged at a
Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense, signed by
the prosecutor and Bled with the court.
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically
require certain matters to be stated in the
Information for its sufficiency. The requirement
aims to enable the accused to properly prepare
for his defense since he is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts
constituting the offense charged.
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an
information must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions
constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further
specification of the charges or claims in an
action , which an accused may avail of by
motion before arraignment, to enable him to
properly plead and prepare for trial. In criminal
cases, a bill of particulars details items or
specific conduct not recited in the Information
but nonetheless pertain to or are included in
the crime charged
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of
particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:
Section 9. Bill of particulars. — The accused
may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and
prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information
and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe
the offense with sufficient particularity to
apprise the accused of the crime charged with
and to enable the court to pronounce
judgment. The particularity must be such that
persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what the Information
means.
The general function of a bill of particulars,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to
guard against surprises during trial. It is not
the function of the bill to furnish the accused
with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the
prosecutor shall not be required to include in
the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the
elements of the offense charged or how the
people intend to prove any item of factual
information included in the bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to
supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the accused
to properly plead and prepare for trial. It
presupposes a valid Information, one that
presents all the elements of the crime charged,
albeit under vague terms.
RE: Grave abuse of discretion vis a vis
a) the requested details of Enrile’s PDAF
(NOT GRANTED)
petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars
for specifics sought under the questions.
Exact amounts of Enrile's yearly PDAF
allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010 need not
be pleaded with specific particularity to enable
him to properly plead and prepare for his
defense.
b) The details of the COA Audits (NOT
GRANTED)
The details of the "COA audits or Beld
investigations " only support the ultimate fact
that the projects implemented by Napoles'
NGOs, and funded by Enrile's PDAF, were non-
existing or fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary
in nature and do not need to be spelled out
with particularity in the Information.
c) Other Sources of Kickbacks and
Commissions (NOT GRANTED)
We also deny Enrile's plea for details on who "
the others" were from whom he allegedly
received kickbacks and commissions. These
other persons do not stand charged of
conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore
be stated with particularly, either as speciBc
individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot
second-guess the prosecution's reason for not
divulging the identity of these "others" who
may potentially be witnesses for the
prosecution.
d) The Overt Acts constituting the "
Combination" or " Series" under the Plunder
Law (GRANTED)
Plunder is the crime committed by public
officers when they amass wealth involving at
least P50 million by means of a combination or
series of overt acts. Under these terms, it is
not sufficient to simply allege that the amount
of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at
least P50 million; the manner of amassing the
ill-gotten wealth — whether through a
combination or series of overt acts under
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 — is an
important element that must be alleged.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase
"combination or series of overt or criminal
acts." Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten
wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a
person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
plunder if this resulted from a single criminal
act . This interpretation of the Plunder Law is
very clear from the congressional
deliberations. Thus, the several (i.e., at least
2) acts which are indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy must not be generally
stated; they should be stated with enough
particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to
be able to prepare the corresponding refuting
evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient , too, to merely allege that a
set of acts had been repeatedly done (although
this may constitute a series if averred with
sufficient definiteness), and aver that these
acts resulted in the accumulation or acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The
Information should reflect with particularity the
predicate acts that underlie the crime of
plunder, based on the enumeration in Section
1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
Amounts involved, or at their ball park figures ,
should be stated;
e) Approximate dates of Commission of
Kickbacks (GRANTED)
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved — six
years — will pose difficulties to Enrile in the
preparation of his defense and will render him
susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be
left guessing and speculating which one/s from
among the numerous transactions involving his
discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010,
are covered by the indictment.
f) The Projects Funded and NGOs
Involved (GRANTED)
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying
the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled
with the name of Napoles' NGO (e.g.,
Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to
sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular
transactions referred to.
Be it remembered that the core of the
indictment is:
(1) the funding of non existing projects using
Enrile's PDAF;
(2) Enrile's endorsement of Napoles' NGOs to
the government agencies to implement these
projects; and
(3) Enrile's receipt of kickbacks or commissions
in exchange for his endorsement.
In these lights, the " identified project " and "
Napoles' NGO " are material facts that should
be clearly and definitely stated in the
Information to allow Enrile to adequately
prepare his defense evidence on the specific
transaction pointed to.
g) The Government Agencies Serving as
Conduits (GRANTED)
The government agencies to whom Enrile
endorsed Napoles' NGOs are also material facts
that must be specified, since they served a
necessary role in the crime charged — the
alleged conduits between Enrile and Napoles'
NGOs . They were indispensable participants in
the elaborate scheme alleged to have been
committed.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan's
ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare
and file a bill of particulars. Significantly, the
Court held that the particulars prayed for, such
as: names of persons, names of corporations,
dates, amounts involved, a specification of
property for identification purposes, the
particular transactions involving withdrawals
and disbursements, and a statement of other
material facts as would support the conclusions
and inferences in the complaint, are not
evidentiary in nature . The Court explained
that those particulars are material facts that
should be clearly and definitely averred in the
complaint so that the defendant may be fairly
informed of the claims made against him and
be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold
that the Sandiganbayan's denial of the
petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, on
the ground that the details sought to be
itemized or specified are all evidentiary —
without any explanation supporting this
conclusion — constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
People v. Bayabos
G.R. No. 171222 | Feb. 18, 2015
Cagnan
CASE PRINCIPLE: A complaint or information
is deemed sufficient if it contains: (b) the
designation of the offense given by the
statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense
FACTS:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a
probationary midshipman at the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to
reach active status, all new entrants were
required to successfully complete the
mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation
Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June
2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were
criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan
as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing
Law.
The information against Bayabos, et.al.,school
authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy (PMMA) for violation of the Anti-
Hazing Law merely stated that psychological
pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim. However, aside from a reference to the
word “hazing”, no allegation of that the
purported acts that were employed were
prerequisites for admission or entry into the
organization (one of the elements of the same
crime).
Before they were arraigned, the
Sandiganbayan quashed the Information
against them on the basis of the dismissal of
the criminal case against the principal accused
and the failure to include in the Information
the material averments required by the Anti-
Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was
filed before this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.
ISSUE:
Is the quashal of the information warranted?
(YES)
RULING:
There is no allegation that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for admission
or entry into the organization. Failure to aver
this crucial ingredient would prevent the
successful prosecution of the criminal
responsibility of the accused, either as principal
or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain
reference to a technical term — in this case,
hazing — is insufficient and incomplete, as it is
but a characterization of the acts allegedly
committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly states that the information must
include, inter alia, both "the designation of the
offense given by the statute" and "the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the
offense." Thus, the Information must be
quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do
not constitute the crime of accomplice to
hazing.
People v. Taundo
G.R. No.207816 | February 24, 2016
Dela Rosa
CASE PRINCIPLE:
He was sufficiently informed of the crime he
was accused of. This is clear from the defense
that he mounted, i.e., that the victim is his
sweetheart and that they treated each other as
spouses.
FACTS:
The 13 year-old victim AAA came home from
school, Tuando offered her softdrinks, which
she accepted and drank. After consuming it,
she felt dizzy and Tuando pulled her inside the
bedroom where he raped her and thereafter
threatened to kill her whole family if the victim
ever told her mother, BBB, about what
happened. Since then, Tuando continued
raping her with threats to kill her family.
Upon finding out her pregnancy, AAA revealed
to BBB that Tuando raped her. After giving
birth, AAA told BBB that she was raped again
by Tuando after visiting her brothers in her old
house.
BBB filed a complaint before the barangay
official which Tuando was then transferred to
the NBI. He insisted that it was consensual and
was committed out of love and his right to be
informed was violated as he was convicted of
qualified rape which is under a different
criminal information from the one he pleaded
and was charged with. CA affirmed the
conviction.
ISSUE:
1. WON the appellate court gravely erred
in convicting the accused-appellant
under a different criminal information
thereby violating his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him. (NO)
2. WON the prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence to convict him of
qualified rape. (NO)
RULING:
We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit. He
was able to present evidence proving where he
was on January 2006 when the crime was
committed. In fact, he was able to present
evidence based on sweetheart defense in that
he and AAA were lovers and that they had
consensual sexual intercourse on the said date.
During trial, he testified that he and AAA were
in a secret relationship as husband and wife
and he was surprised when he was charged
with rape.
He was sufficiently informed of the crime he
was accused of. This is clear from the defense
that he mounted, i.e., that the victim is his
sweetheart and that they treated each other as
spouses. In short, Tuando was not denied of
his constitutional right and was given every
opportunity to answer the accusation against
him.
2. The prosecution was able to prove that
Tuando had sexual intercourse with AAA, the
then 13 year old daughter of his common-law
wife, against her will. The prosecution was able
to present the evidence to support conviction
for qualified rape: that (1) the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim under 18 years
of age at the time of rape; (2) said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force,
when he boxed her hand while inserting his
penis into AAA's private organ, (b) through the
threat of killing AAA's family and (c) through
intimidation being the common-law spouse of
the victim's mother.
Sec. 7. Name of the accused
People v. Ramos
GR No. L-1990 | March 15, 1950
Diez
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An uncorroborated testimony of the victim as
to the identity of an accused which has been
weakened by testimony of another witness,
creates a doubt as to the accused's identity.
Such doubt must necessarily be resolved in
favor of the accused, it being preferable to
acquit a guilty person rather than convict an
innocent one.
FACTS
● On the evening of March 7, 1947 6
armed robbers entered the house of
Primitiva Pagaduan.
● During the robbery, Primitiva was
raped by the robbers and her husband
was also killed by gunshot to the head.
 ● She identified the robbers, as Leonilo
Ganal, Arcadio Ramos among others to
police who questioned her.
● Later on Primitiva then identified
Casimero Clemente as one of the
robbers.
● Clemente then claims that Primitiva is
not sure about his identity as he was
only named after the first interview of
the police.
ISSUE:
Whether Clemente should be acquitted when
there is doubt in his identity as one of the
robbers (Yes)
RULING:
● Primitiva only identified Leonilo Ganal
and Arcadio Ramos as the robbers
when she was interviewed by the
police.34654
● The police testified to this fact and was
not contradicted by Primitiva’s
testimony.
● She did not provide a reason why she
failed to identify Casimero Clemente
right away.
● Such testimony creates a doubt on the
identity of the accused and therefore
should be resolved in favor of the
accused.
People v. Perreras
G.R. No. 139622 | 31 July 2001
Ejem
CASE PRINCIPLE:
For the maximum penalty to be appreciated,
the information must contain all qualifying and
aggravating circumstances in the crime
charged
FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the trial court
convicting accused Perreras of murder and
sentencing him to death. In his appeal before
the Court, accused maintains that the trial
court erred in giving credence to the testimony
of the prosecution witness Salazar. He pointed
out several inconsistencies in his testimony
such as the ocular inspection of the area was
east of the shed was inconsistent with
Salazar's testimony that he was facing west
when the event transpired. Second, the
location of the electric post which illuminated
the vicinity was not 20 meters in front of the
house as Salazar claimed, but on its southern
direction 100 meters away. Third, it was
impossible for him to have asked directions to
the house of Manoling Pastoral because he
personally knew Pastoral and the location of
his house.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty of murder and
whether or not the imposition of the death
penalty on the accused is proper
RULING:
The trial court was correct in convicting the
accused of murder. But as to the penalty of
death imposed on him, the Court found the
same to be improper as not all the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances were alleged in
the complaint. This is in light of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure were given
retroactive effect to benefit the accused. Thus,
for the maximum penalty to be appreciated,
the information must contain all qualifying and
aggravating circumstances in the crime
charged. Since dwelling was alleged in the
information, it cannot be considered to raise
the penalty to death.
With regard to the alleged inconsistencies in
Salazar's testimony, the Court found them to
be minor, which would not affect his credibility
as a witness. The court gave credence to the
ocular inspection which settled all doubts
regarding the positions of the structures within
the crime scene. Said findings are entitled to
great respect as the trial court judge had the
opportunity to observe and examine the
witnesses' demeanor.
People vs. Amodia
G.R. No. 173791, 2008
Macaraeg
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A mistake in the name of the accused is not
equivalent, and does not necessarily amount
to, a mistake in the identity of the accused
especially when sufficient evidence is adduced
to show that the accused is pointed to as one
of the perpetrators of the crime.
FACTS:
Pablo Amodia was indicted for conspiring and
confederating together with other three
accused, while armed with a piece of wood and
bladed weapon, taking advantage of their
superior strength and employing means to
weaken the defense, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon one FELIX OLANDRIA y
BERGAÑO, by beating him on the head and
stabbing him repeatedly on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon him fatal
stab wounds which directly caused his death.
Pablo was arrested and thereafter prosecuted.
The other accused remained at large. Pablo
moved to quash the information on the ground
of mistaken identity and the staleness of the
warrant of arrest issued on March 4, 1997. The
RTC denied his motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the eyewitnesses committed a
mistake in identifying Pablo as one of the
assailants since his name was allegedly Pablito
Amadio, and not Pablo (NO)
RULING:
The RTC and CA found the identification made
by the eyewitnesses to be clear, categorical,
and consistent. No evidence was presented to
establish that these eyewitnesses harbored any
ill-will against Pablo and had no reason to
fabricate their testimonies. The weight of
jurisprudence is to accept these kinds of
testimonies as true for being consistent with
the natural order of events, human nature and
the presumption of good faith.
The SC state in this regard that positive
identification pertains essentially to proof of
identity and not necessarily to the name of the
assailant. A mistake in the name of the
accused is not equivalent, and does not
necessarily amount to, a mistake in the
identity of the accused especially when
sufficient evidence is adduced to show that the
accused is pointed to as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. In this case, the
defense's line of argument is negated by the
undisputed fact that the accused's identity was
known to both the eyewitnesses.
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense
People v. Labado
Case Principle:
It is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in his defense
on the merits. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts allegedly in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If
he did, it is of no consequence to him, either
as a matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts co the crime which those acts
constitute.
Facts
Paulino Labado, accompanied by his five co-
conspirators who are still at large, entered the
dwelling on Engracia Baclas, hogtied her
husband and son and forcefully took away their
properties and on the occasion of such
robbery, appellant and 2 of his 2 of his co-
conspirators raped Engracia successively, one
after another.
Paulino executed an affidavit [extrajudicial
confession] admitting that he did the crimes
under force and threat at gunpoint by his
companions, without benefit of counsel
Paulino was convicted of Robbery with Rape
with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and that the crime was committed in band with
no mitigating circumstances and the penalty of
Death.
Issue:
Whether the imposition of death penalty was
correct when RPC does not mete out the
penalty of death, only reclusion perpetua
Ruling:
The fact that Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code is not mentioned in the information is
unimportant and did not deprive the appellant
of his constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation against him.
It is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in his defense
on the merits. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts allegedly in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If
he did, it is of no consequence to him, either
as a matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts co the crime which those acts
constitute.
People v. Torres
G.R. No. 76711. September 26, 1988
Solis
PRINCIPLE:
It is not the technical name given by the Fiscal
in the title of the Information that determines
the character of the crime but the facts alleged
in the body of the Information.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Marvin Torres appeals from
the decision of the RTC convicting him of
Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide.
The designated offense in the Amended
Information was that of "Violation of P.D. No.
532 (Anti-Highway Robbery)" but the Court a
quo convicted the accused of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in
convicting the accused of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide when the
designated offense in the Amended
Information was Anti-Highway Robbery. (NO)
RULING:
The RTC correctly convicted the accused of
Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide considering that the facts described
therein unmistakably constituted the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide and pursuant to the well-settled rule
that it is not the technical name given by the
Fiscal in the title of the Information that
determines the character of the crime but the
facts alleged in the body of the Information.
Under the attendant circumstances, accused-
appellant cannot be held guilty of the separate
offenses of Homicide and Theft.
The plan to commit robbery and its eventual
commission by accused-appellant and Salas is
beyond question. That Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide were committed on the occasion of
the robbery is neither debatable.
People v. Nunez
8 July 1999
Tan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A decision based on an irregular plea may
nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is
supported by other adequate evidence on
record.||
FACTS:
● Demetrio Nuñez was charged with
raping his 14-year old daughter.
● When arraigned, Nuñez entered a plea
of "not guilty."
● During the trial, he changed his plea to
"guilty." The prosecution continued
presenting its evidence while the
defense waived its right to present
evidence.
● Hence, the case was submitted for
decision and the trial court convicted
the accused with the crime of rape,
and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death.
● Appellant argued that the trial court
gravely erred in accepting his plea of
guilty to a capital offense when there
 was failure to conduct a searching
inquiry to fully determine whether he
fully understood the consequences of
his plea.|||
ISSUE:
WON the trial court gravely erred in accepting
accused-appellant’s improvident plea of guilty
to a capital offense.(YES)
RULING:
YES. A plea of guilty may only be considered
as mitigating when: 1) seasonably interjected,
that is, before prosecution presents its
evidence; and 2) the penalty of death is
indivisible and is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
ITCAB, even if the plea of guilt was
improvidently made, it did not work to
effectively vacate the findings of guilt made by
the trial court. The same was supported by
other adequate evidence on record. The Court
was convinced that the accused's guilt has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. However, the penalty of death
cannot be automatically imposed as the fact of
minority and relationship were not alleged in
the information or complaint.
People v. Nava
G.R. No. 130509-12| June 19, 2000
Abella
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The special circumstances of rape introduced
by Republic Act 7659 partake of the nature of
qualifying circumstances for they increase the
penalty for rape. Consequently, these
circumstances should be properly pleaded in
the information in order to be appreciated as
having qualified the crime.||
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Marcelo Nava, Jr.
was charged with four (4) counts of Rape
under four (4) separate informations for raping
her daughter Maribeth A. Nava. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellant enters a plea
of not guilty to each one of these informations
and interposed the defenses of alibi and denial.
During the trial, Maribeth claimed that she was
raped several times by accused-appellant. The
first incident of rape took place in the morning
of Thursday in January 1996, while her mother
and eldest sibling were in Manila. While the
rest of the siblings were playing outside their
house, accused-appellant forced himself on
Maribeth. Accused-appellant, armed with a
knife, forced her to undress and to part her
legs and sexually assaulted her. He threatened
to kill her if she revealed the incident to
anyone. In the evening of that same day,
Maribeth was again raped by accused-
appellant. The third incident of rape took place
in the evening of Monday in the same month of
January 1996 while the fourth incident
happened in the evening of August 9, 1996, at
the house of her paternal grandmother.
Maribeth acceded to her father's bestial
advances for fear of being harmed.
The Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan found accused-appellant guilty of
the crime of rape in all the four cases and
sentenced him in each case to suffer the
penalty of death and to indemnify the private
complainant and pay moral and exemplary
damages. Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant attacked the credibility of
private complainant by pointing out
inconsistencies in her testimony.
ISSUE:
WON the imposition of death penalty by the
court is correct? NO.
RULING:
The Court did not agree with the imposition of
the death penalty by the court a quo. The
special circumstances of rape introduced by
Republic Act 7659 should be properly pleaded
with information in order to be appreciated as
having qualified the crime. In the present case,
the concurrence of the minority of the private
complainant and her relationship to the
accused-appellant should have been
specifically alleged in the information in order
to afford the latter of his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Although the complaint
sufficiently established the age as well as the
relationship between the private complainant
and accused-appellant, the indictment on
which he was arraigned failed to reiterate the
same. Hence, accused-appellant can only be
held liable for simple rape and the penalty in
each case was reduced to reclusion
perpetua.|||
Roallos v. People
G.R. No. 198389 | Dec. 11, 2013
CASE PRINCIPLE
The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble
of the information, or from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information
FACTS
Roallos was charged in an Information for the
crime of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610. After trial of the
merits of the case, the lower court rendered a
decision finding Roallo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
He filed an appeal to CA which affirmed the
decision of the lower. In his MR to the CA, he
claims, among others, that the CA erred in
affirming his conviction considering that the
Information filed against him was defective
since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
ISSUE
whether the CA erred in affirming Roallos'
conviction for the offense of sexual abuse
under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610
RULING
Roallos' claim that the Information filed against
him is duplicitous as it charged him with the
commission of two crimes is plainly untenable.
The designation of the crime in the Information
is clear — Roallos was charged with the crime
of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5
(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The mention
of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the
Information does not mean that Roallos was
charged with the felony of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC.
In any case, "the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
the facts in the complaint or information."
The recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the Information that was led
against Roallos clearly makes out a case for
the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5
(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
People v. Jugueta
G.R. No. 202124 | April 5, 2016
Cagnan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
In designating the offense, the complaint or
information shall specify the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances of the offense. It is
in order not to trample on the constitutional
right of an accused to be informed of the
nature of the alleged offense that he or she
has committed.
FACTS:
In the evening of June 6, 2002 at around 9
o’clock, Ireneo Jugueta, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the
said firearms the house occupied by the family
of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by
overt acts.
Norberto testified that the appellant is his
brother-in-law. He recounted that in the
evening of June 6 his entire family lay down on
the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep,
the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly
stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo
fences remained. With the covering of the wall
gone, the three men responsible for the deed
came into view. Norberto clearly saw their
faces which were illuminated by the light of a
gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto
identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel. The 3 men
ordered Norberto to come down from his
house, but he refused to do so. When the
volley of shots ceased and the three men left,
Norberto saw that his two young daughters
were wounded. His wife went out of their
house to ask for help from neighbors, while he
and his older daughter carried the two
wounded children out to the street. His
daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the
hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital
despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.
On the other hand, appellant was only able to
proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Finding
appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing
more credence to the testimony of Norberto,
the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly
established that appellant, together with two
other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the
family of Norberto. The evidence on record
fully supports the trial court's factual finding,
as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in
concert with two other individuals, all three of
them carrying firearms and simultaneously
firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two
young daughters.
ISSUE: W/N the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances attendant to the case must be
included in the complaint or information (YES)
RULING:
The commission of an offense has a two-
pronged effect: one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon
the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused (criminal liability)
and by an award of additional damages to the
victim (civil liability).
Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Designation of the offense. — The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 57
requires aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the
complaint or information. It is in order not to
trample on the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature of the
alleged offense that he or she has committed.
A criminal complaint or information should
basically contain the elements of the crime, as
well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating
circumstances, for the court to effectively
determine the proper penalty it should impose.
People v. Torrecampo
GR No. 139297 | February 23, 2004
Dela Rosa
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying
or generic, must be alleged in the information
before they can be considered by the court.
FACTS:
Renato and Rene Torrecampo were charged
with murder for the killing of Jovito Gaspillo.
The accused, conspiring and confederating with
Nora Torrecampo Y Leyte, all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to
kill, taking advantage of superior strength
and/or with evident premeditation willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab
in the different part(s) of his body and even
cut off his head with a bladed weapon, one
Jovito Gaspillo, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds, which directly
caused his death.
On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the
trial court found Renato and Rene Torrecampo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
sentenced them to death. Appellants contend
that the decision of the trial court is not
supported and contrary to the evidence
adduced during trial.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in holding the
appellants guilty of murder. (YES)
RULING:
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever
there is inequality of forces between the victim
and the aggressor. This assumes a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor and selected
or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. The evidence does
not show that appellants took advantage of
their number in order to overpower the victim.
The evidence against appellants is merely
circumstantial.
Nor was evident premeditation proved. There
is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time
when appellants determined to commit the
crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating
that they clung to their determination to
commit the crime; and, (c) the lapse of
sufficient period of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime,
to allow appellants to reflect upon the
consequences of their act. Hence, this
circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated.
Erlinda testified that Jovito was asleep prior to
the arrival of appellants but she did not say
that he was still sleeping when the attack
commenced. Even assuming that treachery
was proved, it could not be considered a
generic aggravating circumstance.
Aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying
or generic, must be alleged in the information
before they can be considered by the court.
Appellants can only be convicted of the crime
of homicide.
People v. Lapore
G.R. No. 191197 | June 22, 2015
Diez
CASE PRINCIPLE:
● for qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be appreciated, it
must be alleged in the complaint or
information.
● This is in line with the constitutional
right of an accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
FACTS:
● AAA was raped by Lapore when her
parents were out of town.
● Lapore was in their house as he was a
pastor doing ministry works.
● Lapore was found guilty by the lower
court for the crime of Qualified Rape
● Lapore claims that he can only be
punished for simple rape as the
qualifying and aggravating
circumstances were not alleged in the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether Lapore can be held liable for Qualified
Rape when the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances were not alleged but was duly
proven during trial. (No)
RULING:
● Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provide
that for qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be appreciated, it
must be alleged in the complaint or
information.
● although the prosecution has duly
established the presence of the
aforesaid circumstances, which,
however, were not alleged in the
Information, this Court cannot
appreciate the same.
Sec. 9. Cause of Accusation
US v. Chan Toco
G.R. No. 3851 | 17 Dec. 1908
Ejem
CASE PRINCIPLE:
As a rule, an exception in a statute by which
certain particulars are withdrawn from or
excepted out of the enacting clause thereof
defining a crime concerning a class or species,
constitutes no part of the definition of such
crime, whether placed close to or remote from
such enacting clause
FACTS:
Chan Toco was charged with an infraction of
Sec. 4 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippines
Commission when he smoked opium in the
store of Liangco in Santo Niño, Samar on
October 23, 1906 without securing a
certificate.
His counsel's contention was that it was not
alleged in the information that the use of
opium had not been prescribed as a medicine
by a physician. They further contended that
where the enacting clause in a statute
described an offense with certain exceptions,
the exceptions should be negative in the
indictment, complaint, or information.
ISSUE:
Whether exceptions should be negated in the
complaint or information
RULING:
Section 4 of Act No. 1461 is as follows:
(a) Except when prescribed as a medicine by a
duly licensed and practicing physician, it shall
be unlawful for any person to smoke, chew,
swallow, inject, or otherwise consume or use
opium in any of its forms unless such person
has been duly registered as provided in section
two hereof and has secured the certificate
therein prescribed. Except when prescribed as
a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing
physician, no registered confirmed user of
opium shall smoke, chew, swallow, inject, or
otherwise use or consume opium except in his
own residence.
b) Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos, or by
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six
months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
The evident intent and purpose of the statute
is to prohibit and penalize the smoking of
opium. The legislators however decided that
the operation of said statutes should not apply
to a limited number of smokers such as those
who smoke opium under the advice and
prescription and licensed physician What the
accused should have done is to set up the
defense that he smoked opium under the
advice of the physician and not impose the
burden upon the prosecution the burden of
alleging and proving the fact that each person
using opium does so without the advice of a
physician for that would result to absurdity and
impracticability. The doctrine laid down in the
case of US vs. Nelson stating that "as a rule,
an exception in a statute by which certain
particulars are withdrawn from or excepted out
of the enacting clause thereof defining a crime
concerning a class or species, constitutes no
part of the definition of such crime, whether
placed close to or remote from such enacting
clause” should be followed.
Decision of the trial court is affirmed.
People v. Canceran
G.R. No. 206442, 2015
Macaraeg
CASE PRINCIPLE:
No less than the Constitution guarantees the
right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him.
It is fundamental that every element of which
the offense is composed must be alleged in the
complaint or information to enable the accused
to suitably prepare his defense.
FACTS:
The records disclose that Canceran, together
with Vequizo and Diaz, was charged with
frustrated theft. The information provided the
following:
● That the accused conspired, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, willfully and
unlawfully take, steal and carry away 14
cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream
valued at P28,627.20, belonging to
Ororama Mega Center (OMC)
● That they performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime
of theft as a consequence but,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
that they were discovered by the
employees of OMC who prevented them
from further carrying away the items, to
the damage and prejudice of OMC
RTC found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of consummated theft as there is no
crime of frustrated theft. Canceran appealed to
the CA where he raised the issue of double
jeopardy for the first time.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Canceran should be
acquitted in the crime as it was not charged in
the information (partially meritorious)
(2) Whether or not there was double jeopardy
(NO)
RULING:
(1)
A careful reading of the allegations in the
Information would show that Canceran “was
charged with "frustrated theft" only.
However, there can be no crime of frustrated
theft. The information can never be read to
charge Canceran of consummated Theft
because the indictment itself stated that the
crime was never produced. Instead, the
information should be construed to mean
that Canceran was being charged with theft
in its attempted stage only. Necessarily,
Canceran may only be convicted of the
lesser crime of Attempted Theft.
An accused cannot be convicted of a higher
offense than that with which he was charged
in the complaint or information and on which
he was tried. It matters not how conclusive
and convincing the evidence of guilt may be,
an accused cannot be convicted in the courts
of any offense, unless it is charged in the
complaint or information on which he is tried,
or necessarily included therein. To convict
him of an offense higher than that charged in
the complaint or information on which he is
tried would be an unauthorized denial of that
right.
(2)
Note: This discussion is not within the topic
under this module (so you may just want to
skip on this hehe) but was nonetheless
highlighted in the case.
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran
never raised the issue of double jeopardy
before the RTC. Even assuming that he was
able to raise the issue of double jeopardy
earlier, the same must still fail because legal
jeopardy did not attach. First, he never
entered a valid plea. He himself admitted that
he was just about to enter a plea, but the first
case was dismissed even before he was able to
do so. Second, there was no unconditional
dismissal of the complaint. The case was not
terminated by reason of acquittal nor
conviction but simply because he posted bail.
Absent these two elements, there can be no
double jeopardy.
Sec. 10. Place of commission of the
offense
Navaja . De Castro
G.R. No. 182926 | 2015
Case Principle
In determining the venue where the criminal
action is to be instituted and the court which
has jurisdiction over it, Section 15 (a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:
Place of commission of the offense. — The
complaint or information is sufficient if it can
be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular
place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
Facts
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification
of private document before the MCTC of Jagna-
Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol by private respondent
DKT Philippines, Inc., alleging that while she
was still its Regional Sales Manager, she
falsified a receipt by making it appear that she
incurred meal expenses in the amount of
P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of
P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and
claimed reimbursement for it.
Navaja contends that the case for falsification
of private document against her was filed with
the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to
wrong venue
Issue
Whether MTC of Bohol have jurisdiction over
the instant criminal case.
Ruling
In cases of falsification of private documents,
the venue is the place where the document is
actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the
intent to prejudice a third person, regardless
whether or not the falsified document is put to
the improper or illegal use for which it was
intended.
Contrary to Navaja's argument, the allegations
in the Information and the complaint-affidavit
make out a prima facie case that such crime
was committed in Jagna, Bohol. Guided by the
settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information and not by the result of proof,
the Court holds that Navaja's case for
falsification of private documents falls within
the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna,
Bohol.
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense
People v. Gianan
G.R. Nos. 135288-93 | September 15, 2000
Solis
PRINCIPLE:
It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its
commission. (Sec 11, Rule 110)
FACTS:
Complainant Myra Gianan, then 15 years old,
filed a criminal complaint for multiple rape
against her father, accused-appellant Jesus
Gianan. The trial court found the latter guilty of
multiple rape.
In accused-appellant’s appeal, he argued that
the information against him was void because
it did not allege with certainty the dates of
commission of the rapes, as a result of which
he was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to
defend himself.
ISSUE:
Whether the information against the accused-
appellant is void for failure to allege with
certainty the dates of commission of the rapes,
depriving him the opportunity to defend
himself. (NO)
RULING:
The time of the commission of rape is not an
element thereof.
Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that as long as it
alleges that the offense was committed "at any
time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed," an information is
sufficient.
In this case, the allegation in the information
that accused-appellant committed multiple
rape "sometime in November 1995 and some
occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto"
should be deemed sufficient compliance with
the requirements that the five counts of rape
were committed within the statute of
limitations and before the criminal action was
commenced in the trial court.

People v. Magbanua
3 December 1999
Tan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
1) Failure to specify the exact dates
or time when the offense occurred
does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face.
2) An information can withstand the
test of judicial scrutiny as long as it
distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive
thereof
FACTS:
● Appellant Charito Isug Magbanua was
charged with the crime of rape of his
own daughter that was committed
sometime in 1991.
● Pblica Magbanua testified that in 1991,
she was only thirteen years old and not
having her menstrual period yet, when
she was first sexually abused by
appellant.
● Since then until 1995, appellant
continuously sexually abused her
several times a month. As a result, she
became pregnant.
● During trial, the expert witness admits
that Poblica’s hymen was no longer
intact and found an infection of the
cervix as a result of sexual intercourse,
although pregnancy was not negated
as a cause.
● Contrarily, the appellant interposed
denial as a defense. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court convicted the
appellant of the crime charged and
imposed upon him the penalty of
death.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court gravely erred in not
considering the information insufficient to
support a judgment of conviction for its failure
to state the precise date of the offense, it
being an essential ingredient of the crime
charged. (NO)
RULING:
NO. Sec. 11, Rule 110 of ROC states that “It is
not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the
offense was committed except when the time
is a material ingredient of the offense, but the
act may be alleged to have been committed at
any time as near to the actual date at which
the offense was committed as the information
or complaint will permit.
ITCAB, although the information did not state
with particularity the dates when the sexual
attacks took place, the SC is of the opinion
that the allegations therein that the acts were
committed "on (sic) the year 1991 and the
days thereafter" substantially apprised
appellant of the crime he was charged with
since all the essential elements of the crime of
rape were stated in the information.|||
People v. Ladrillo
G.R. No. 208354 | December 8, 1999
Abella
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The failure of the prosecution to allege with
particularity the date of the commission of the
offense and, worse, its failure to prove during
the trial the date of the commission of the
offense as alleged in the Information, deprived
accused-appellant of his right to intelligently
prepare for his defense and convincingly refute
the charges against him.
FACTS:
Edwin Ladrillo was accused of raping then 5-
year old Jane Vasquez. The crime was alleged
in the information to have been committed “on
or about the 1992”.
Accused-appellant claims that in 1992, the
year he allegedly raped Jane, he was still
residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, and
did not even know Jane nor her mother at that
time. Further, he alleged that it was only in
1993 when he moved to Abancio, Puerto
Princesa City.
ISSUES:
WON the acquittal is proper because the date
alleged in the information is not particular?
YES
RULING:
· The peculiar designation of
time in the Information clearly
violates Sec. 11, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court which requires hat
the time of the commission of the
offense must be alleged as near to
the actual date as the information
or complaint will permit.
· The Information is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as
to time to inform the accused-
appellant Ladrillo of the date which
the criminal act is alleged to have
been committed.
· The statement “on or about the
year 1992” encompasses not only
the 12 months of 1992 but includes
the years prior and subsequent to
1992. The failure of the
prosecution to allege with
particularity the date of the
commission of the offense deprived
Ladrillo of his right to intelligently
prepare for his defense.
· Citing US vs Dichao: “the
statement of the time when the
crime is alleged to have been
committed is so indefinite and
uncertain that it does not give the
accused the information required
by law.
People v. Bacus
G.R. No. 208354 | August 26, 2015
Beluan
CASE PRINCIPLE
Conviction of the accused-appellant does not
solely lie on the preciseness of dates of the
commission of the crime but on the veracity
and credibility of the witnesses' testimonies
which the court a quo has adjudged to be with
truthfulness, spontaneity and
straightforwardness.
FACTS
The accused-appellant herein raped his
daughter. The victim was interviewed by a
Social Welfare Officer to which the said officer
indicated in her social case study that crime
was committed on Dec 31. This is where the
accused-appellant anchor his argument. He
argued that AAA's testimony lacked credibility
due to inconsistencies as to what weapon was
used during the incident. He added that AAA
fabricated things and perhaps AAA's motive to
press charges against him was due to her
anger because he brought her home from the
place of his in-laws, and, yet, he finds nothing
wrong with such act.
ISSUES
Won the lower courts erred in convicting him
on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
purportedly due to inconsistencies in the
testimony of AAA (witness). NO
RULING
The alleged inconsistency in the victim's
testimony as to the date of the commission of
the offense does not necessarily downgrade
her credibility as witness. This steadfast rule is
corroborated by the fact that the alleged
disparity or inconsistency in the dates was
corrected in open court by the assigned Social
Worker who prepared the Social Case Study
Report where the alleged inconsistency was
reflected, and she admitted that such
erroneous entry was attributable to her.
Our consistent ruling is that the conviction of
the accused-appellant does not solely lie on
the preciseness of dates of the commission of
the crime but on the veracity and credibility of
the witnesses' testimonies which the court a
quo has adjudged to be with truthfulness,
spontaneity and straightforwardness — criteria
needed by the Court to suitably convict an
accused.

Sec. 13. Duplicity of the offense
People v. Jugueta
G.R. No. 202124 | April 5, 2016
Cagnan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
As a general rule, a complaint or information
must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective. This is to give the accused
the necessary knowledge of the charge against
him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for
his defense. The State should not heap upon
the accused two or more charges which might
confuse him in his defense.
FACTS:
In the evening of June 6, 2002 at around 9
o’clock, Ireneo Jugueta, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the
said firearms the house occupied by the family
of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by
overt acts.
Norberto testified that the appellant is his
brother-in-law. He recounted that in the
evening of June 6 his entire family lay down on
the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep,
the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly
stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo
fences remained. With the covering of the wall
gone, the three men responsible for the deed
came into view. Norberto clearly saw their
faces which were illuminated by the light of a
gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto
identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel. The 3 men
ordered Norberto to come down from his
house, but he refused to do so. When the
volley of shots ceased and the three men left,
Norberto saw that his two young daughters
were wounded. His wife went out of their
house to ask for help from neighbors, while he
and his older daughter carried the two
wounded children out to the street. His
daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the
hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital
despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.
On the other hand, appellant was only able to
proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Finding
appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing
more credence to the testimony of Norberto,
the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly
established that appellant, together with two
other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the
family of Norberto. The evidence on record
fully supports the trial court's factual finding,
as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in
concert with two other individuals, all three of
them carrying firearms and simultaneously
firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two
young daughters.
ISSUE: W/N the Information filed were
defective (YES)
RULING:
The facts, as alleged in the Information, shows
that the appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the
crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the
killing of the victims was not the result of a
single act but of several acts of appellant and
his cohorts. As to the other case, appellant is
also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of
Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted
Murder.
As a general rule, a complaint or information
must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective. Non-compliance with this
rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule 117 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The reason for
the rule is stated in People of the Philippines
and AAA v. Court of Appeals, thus: To give the
accused the necessary knowledge of the
charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State
should not heap upon the accused two or more
charges which might confuse him in his
defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a
ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint
or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise
the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not
guilty during arraignment and failed to move
for the quashal of the Informations, he is
deemed to have waived his right to question
the same. When two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information
but the accused fails to object to it before trial,
the court may convict him of as many offenses
as are charged and proved.
Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution
Crespo vs Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373 | June 30, 1987
Dela Rosa
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court.
FACTS:
Crespo was accused of Estafa in the Circuit
Criminal Court. During the arraignment, the
accused filed a motion for defer arraignment
on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the SOJ. Justice
Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment
was deferred at a later date to afford time for
the petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial
court to refrain from proceeding with the
arraignment until further orders of the Court.
arraigning the accused until the DOJ resolves
the petition for review.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Macaraig Jr.,
resolved the petition for review, reversed the
resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal
and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. The provincial fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence attaching
a copy of the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig, Jr. the private prosecutor was given
time to file an opposition thereto.
Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of
the case and set the arraignment. The accused
then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with petition for the issuance
of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA
dismissed the order and lifted the restraining
order.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court, acting on a motion to
dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and
insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits. (YES)
RULING:
Once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.

The SolGen filed a comment recommending

In order therefore to avoid such a situation
the petition be given due course. CA granted
whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
the writ and restrained the judge from
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed
in Court. The matter should be left entirely for
the determination of the Court.
Dimatulac v. Villon
G.R. No. 127107 | 12 October 1998
Diez
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Section 1 of DOJ Order No. 223 states that
Only resolutions of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Provincial State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
dismissing a criminal complaint may be the
subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
except as otherwise provided in Section 4
hereof.
FACTS:
● Mayor Yabut and his cohorts were
accused of killing PO3 Dimatulac.
● Private prosecution claims that the
killing was murder as there was
treachery and other qualifying
circumtsances that attended the killing
of Dimatulac
● During the preliminary examination it
was determined that murder has been
committed and subsequently warrants
of arrests were issued.
● The prosecutor on it own accord
conducted a re-investigation and
reduce the crime from murder to
homicide.
● The heirs of Dimatulac then filed an
appeal on the resolution of the
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice.
● Pending the appeal to the SOJ the
prosecutor then filed a complaint of
homicide against the accused.
Subsequently they were arraigned.
● The Heirs then filed a motion to set
aside the arraignment as they have a
pending appeal to the SOJ.
● Accused claim that they could not be
arraigned twice as it violates their right
against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
● WON the prosecutor erred when it
motu proprio re investigated the case
when warrants of arrest were already
issued against the accused (Yes)
● Won the prosecutor erred when it filed
an information of homicide knowing
that an appeal on its resolution has
been brought up to the SOJ (Yes)
RULING:
● The prosecutor garvaley abused her
discretion when no facts from the
records and evidence that would
contradict the finding of murder
● The accused was not in the custody of
law but the prosecutor still motu
proprio decided to re-investigate the
case. The prosecutor created a
mockery of the law in this case.
● As for the filing of the information for
homicide, the prosecutor gravely
abused her discretion knowing fully
that an appeal was brought up to the
SOJ. SOJ exercising supervision and
control over state prosecutors has the
power to reverse any of their
resolutions.
● Here the prosecutor instead of waiting
for the decision of the SOJ hastily filed
the information in court.
Dungog v. CA
G.R. No. 77850-51|25 March 1988
Ejem
CASE PRINCIPLE:
After trial has commenced, it is the court and
not the fiscal who has control over the case.
The case cannot be withdrawn without the
consent of the Court.
FACTS:
Provincial Fiscal Ucat issued a resolution
finding a prima facie case to file an information
for estafa against a certain Pantaleon del
Rosario (Pantaleon), for alleged
misappropriation of proceeds of the sale of 24
heads of cattle.

The resolution was approved by the Chief
Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol. The private
respondent then filed a motion for
reinvestigation that there is no prima facie
case to charge Pantaleon with estafa. So the
fiscal moved to withdraw the information
before the RTC, but the trial court denied the
motion. On appeal to the CA, it granted the
motion and enjoined the Judge from
proceeding with the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecutor can impose his
opinion on the Court once an information is
filed in Court
RULING:
No. The fiscal has quasi-judicial discretion,
direction and control of the prosecution and if
he finds reason to do so, may even
reinvestigate a case and move for its dismissal
should the reinvestigation show no sufficient
evidence to indict the accused. But when a
case is already filed in court, whatever
disposition the fiscal may have should be
addressed to the court. Once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case based on the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
court.
After trial has commenced, it is the court and
not the fiscal who has control over the case.
The case cannot be withdrawn without the
consent of the Court. The RTC decision was
reinstated. The prosecutor or any other person
assigned is directed to continue with the
prosecution of the case.
Gabionza vs. CA
G.R. No. 140311, March 30, 2001
Macaraeg
CASE PRINCIPLE:
After the accused enters a plea, amendments
to the Information may be allowed, as to
matters of form, provided that no prejudice is
caused to the rights of the accused.
The test as to when the rights of an accused
are prejudiced by the amendment of a
Complaint or Information is when a defense
under the Complaint or Information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the Complaint or the
Information as amended.
FACTS:
Petitioner was accused in an information for
failure to remit to the SSS contributions for
SSS, Medicare and Employee Compensation
during the period from January 1991 to May
1993.
After four years, the public prosecutor filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to Amend
Information, to change the material dates
stated in the information from “January 1991
to May 1993” to “January 1991 to May 1992”.
Saying that this is substantial in nature,
petitioner contends that to allow the same
would be a violation of his right to be informed
of the cause and nature of the accusation
against him, and would prejudice defenses that
were otherwise available to him.
The RTC granted the motion and allowed
amendment of the information, ruling that the
amendment pertained only to matters of
formed. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an information can be
amended to change the material dates of the
commission of the offense after the
arraignment of the accused (YES)
RULING:
After the accused enters a plea, amendments
to the Information may be allowed, as to
matters of form, provided that no prejudice is
caused to the rights of the accused. The test as
to when the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint
or Information is when a defense under the
Complaint or Information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence
the accused might have, would be inapplicable
to the Complaint or the Information as
amended.
It is clear that the questioned amendment is
one of form and not of substance. The
allegation of time when an offense is
committed is a matter of form, unless time is a
material ingredient of the offense. It is not
even necessary to state in the Information the
precise time the offense was committed unless
time is a material factor. It is sufficient that
the act is alleged to have been committed at
any time as near to the actual date at which
the offense was committed as the Complaint or
Information will permit.
PERTINENT PROVISION AND NOTES:
SECTION 14, RULE 110. Amendment. — The
information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court at
any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters
of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Jurisprudence allows amendments to
information so long as: (a) it does not deprive
the accused of the right to invoke prescription;
(b) it does not affect or alter the nature of the
offense originally charged; (c) it does not
involve a change in the basic theory of the
prosecution so as to require the accused to
undergo any material change or modification in
his defense; (d) it does not expose the
accused to a charge which would call for a
higher penalty; and, (5) it does not cause
surprise nor deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment.
Leviste v. Alameda
Case Principle
A substantial amendment consists of the recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
All other matters are merely of form. The test
as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence the defendant might
have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other.
Order granting the motion by the
complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial court
issued the other order that admitted the
Amended Information for murder and directed
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner
questioned these two orders before the
appellate court.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to
plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not
guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed
an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex
Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court
granted on the ground that the evidence of
guilt of the crime of murder is not strong.
Issue
Whether the amendment of the Information
from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it
not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to
ask for a preliminary investigation.
Ruling
An amendment to an information which does
not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of
form and not of substance. here is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both
are conducted in the same manner and for the
same objective of determining whether there
exists sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed

Facts
on guard to defend himself from the charge of
Information was filed against Leviste charging
murder after the claimed circumstances were
him with homicide for the death of Rafael de
made known to him as early as the first
las Alas before RTC. The private complainants-
motion. Petitioner did not, however, make
heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus
much of the opportunity to present
Motion praying for the deferment of the
countervailing evidence on the proposed
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to
amended charge. Despite notice of hearing,
re-examine the evidence on record or to
petitioner opted to merely observe the
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
proceedings and declined to actively
proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the
participate, even with extreme caution, in the
reinvestigation.
Mayor Amado Corpus v. Judge Pamular
G.R. No. 186403 | September 5, 2018
Solis
PRINCIPLE:
The test of whether an accused is prejudiced
by an amendment is to determine whether a
defense under the original information will still
be available even after the amendment is
made and if any evidence that an accused
might have would remain applicable even in
the amended information.
FACTS:
Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto when
he shot Angelito Espinosa resulting in his
death. Thereafter, Samonte was arrested.
Provincial Prosecutor Florendo filed a motion to
amend information before the RTC to include
Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused in the crime
charged which the court granted.
Petitioners argued that due to the theory of
conspiracy in the amended information,
Samonte will have an additional burden of
setting up a new defense particularly on any
acts of his co-accused since "the act of one is
the act of all.”
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judge Pamular committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he admitted the
Amended Information to include Corpus as co-
accused. (NO)
RULING:
An allegation of conspiracy to add a new
accused without changing the prosecution's
theory that the accused willfully shot the victim
is merely a formal amendment.
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that before an
accused enters his or her plea, either formal or
substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of
court.
Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or
her plea, Section 14 prohibits any substantial
amendment especially those that may
prejudice his or her rights and have him put
twice in jeopardy.
The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the
amended information are similar to that of the
original information except as to the inclusion
of Corpus as Samonte's co-accused and the
insertion of the phrase "conspiring and
confederating together." The allegation of
conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of
the prosecution that Samonte willfully and
intentionally shot Angelito. Hence, the
amendment is merely formal.
The records of this present case show that the
original information for murder against
Samonte was dated June 5, 2008. Based on
Lozano's affidavit dated on June 30, 2008,
Corpus was implicated as the one who
instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. This
prompted the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation, which resulted in the filing of
the amended information.
Sec. 15. Place where the action is to be
instituted
Parulan v. Dir. Pf Prisons
Feb. 17, 1968
Tan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Deprivation of any fundamental or
constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction of the
court to impose the sentence, or excessive
penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas
corpus.
FACTS:
Petitioner was confined in the state
penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal, served a
sentence of life imprisonment which, however,
was commuted to 20 years by the President of
the Philippines.
He was transferred to the military barracks of
Fort Bonifacio in Makati, Rizal. While still
serving his prison term, he effected his escape
and was recaptured in the City of Manila. He
was then prosecuted for the crime of evasion
of service of sentence, penalized under Art.
157 of RPC, before the CFI of Manila and was
found guilty thereof.
ISSUE:
WON the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try
and decide the case and to impose the
sentence upon the petitioner (evasion of
service of sentence). (YES)
RULING:
YES. Sec. 6 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that one of the instances when
a person may be validly arrested without
warrant is where he escaped from
confinement.
For, as long as he continues to evade the
service of his sentence, he is deemed to
continue committing the crime, and may be
arrested without warrant, at any place where
he may be found. |||
In this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is
a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a
single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however, long it may be.
People v. Grospe
G.R. No. L-74053-54 | January 20, 1988
Abella
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Section 14 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which has been carried over in
Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically provides: "SEC.
14. Place where action is to be instituted. —
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense
was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place." In other
words, a person charged with a transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or province where the offense was in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses
in which some acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and some in another, the
Court of either province has jurisdiction to try
the case, it being understood that the first
Court taking cognizance of the Case will
exclude the others.
FACTS:
Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale
dealer of San Miguel Corp (SMC). He was
charged with BP 22 at the RTC for issuing a
dishonored check in 1983 in favor of SMC (for
insufficiency of funds) and, in spite of repeated
demands, failed and refused to make good said
check to the damage of SMC. He was also
charged with Estafa for issuing another check
for payment of the beer he purchased and
refused to redeem said check despite repeated
demands
Trial court of Pampanga dismissed the case
because it said, that deceit and damage, the
elements of the crimes did not occur in
Pampanga, therefore, this court has no
jurisdiction. The checks were made in
Guiguinto, Bulacan, and delivered to SMC also
in Bulacan. Were deposited in Planter’s Bank
(drawee bank) at Santa Maria, Bulacan and
was received by BPI at San Fernando,
Pampanga for clearing purposes.
The Solicitor General points that 2 checks are
involved. That Parulan issued PDB’s check
(Bulacan) and was received by SMC at
Bulacan. Then it was forwarded to SMC San
Fernando, Pampanga where it was received by
the Finance Officer and deposited with BPI San
Fernando Branch then the SMC depository
bank received a notice of dishonor for
"insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank,
the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This check
was the subject of Estafa. For Violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the
elements of deceit and damage are not
essential nor required. An essential element of
that offense is knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds, it being mala
prohibitum
ISSUE:
WON the venue, RTC Pampanga, is proper?
YES. (for both Estafa and BP 22)
RULING:
Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides: (a) In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or
province wherein the offense was committed or
any one of the essential ingredients thereof
took place.
In other words, a person charged with a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or province where the offense was
in part committed. However, if the acts
material and essential to the crime and
requisite of its consummation occurred in one
municipality or territory, the Court of that
municipality or territory has the sole
jurisdiction to try the case
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check,
may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its
basic elements of deceit and damage may
arise independently in separate places. In this
case, deceit took place in San Fernando,
Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in
Bulacan where the cheek was dishonored by
the drawee bank in that place. Jurisdiction
may, therefore, be entertained by either the
Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
For while the subject check was issued in
Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely
drawn thereat, but in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where it was uttered and
delivered.Because although the check was
received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at
Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery
in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC.
What is of decisive importance is the delivery
thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the
final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the
offense also appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that the offense is committed
by the very fact of its performance, and that
the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only
the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act
of making or drawing and issuance of a
bouncing check. The case, therefore, could
have been filed also in Bulacan.
However, it is likewise true that knowledge on
the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a
continuing eventuality, whether the accused be
within one territory or another
Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga.
Sto. Tomas v. Salac
G.R. No. 152642 | Nov. 13, 2012
Beluan
CASE PRINCIPLE
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.
— (a) Subject to existing laws , the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
FACTS
Respondent Salac filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction against petitioners. They
sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order
10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum
Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the
DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing
the same and from further issuing rules and
regulations that would regulate the recruitment
and placement of overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply
with the policy of deregulation mandated under
Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
ISSUE
WON Section 9 of the said law wherein it
allowed the filing of criminal actions arising
from "illegal recruitment" before the RTC of the
province or city where the offense was
committed or where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense is constitutional
RULING
There is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in
Congress fixing an alternative venue for
violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs
from the venue established by the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15 (a),
Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows exceptions
provided by laws. Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as
an exception to the rule on venue of criminal
actions is, consistent with that law's declared
policy 15 of providing a criminal justice system
that protects and serves the best interests of
the victims of illegal recruitment.
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.
— (a) Subject to existing laws , the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
Because there is a law providing for another
venue, then such will be held as valid.
Union Bank v. People
G.R. No. 192565 | Feb. 28, 2012
Cagnan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
As a rule, criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory (a) where the offense was committed,
or (b) where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.
FACTS:
Desi Tomas executed and signed a false
narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. Then, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC
(perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath in
the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the
second complaint that she did not commence
any other action or proceeding involving the
same issue in another tribunal or agency”. The
Certification was notarized in Makati City but
was submitted and used in Pasay City, while
the Information against Union Bank and Tomas
was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued
that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City Court (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was submitted and
used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the
perjury case. The MeTC-Makati City denied the
Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction
over the case since the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.
The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their petition on the
rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v.
Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction
should be in the place where the false
document was presented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court (MAKATI CITY)
RULING:
The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-
Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court
to take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners.
The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas
of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Article 183 of
the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the
basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath
in cases in which the law so requires.” The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of a
false affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed
and sworn before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, SC held that its
ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183
of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for
the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of
perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at
the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or
her affidavit since it is at that time that all the
elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
the crime is committed through false testimony
under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal
nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony
under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to
the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement
is submitted, venue may either be at the place
where the sworn statement is submitted or where
the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the
crime committed. In all cases, determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended
party in criminal section
Diel vs Martinez
G.R. No. L-247 | March 14, 1946
Dela Rosa
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Prosecution of offenses is a public function.
This function can be performed not only by
fiscals not also by private attorneys in cases
where they are allowed to intervene as private
prosecutors. Lawyers are also officers of the
court and assume public and official
responsibilities.
FACTS:
An information for illegal practice of medicine
was filed against petitioner. The respondent’s
lawyer was permitted to appear in the case as
private prosecutor over the petitioner’s
objection and the fiscal turned the trial of the
case over to the private prosecutors. The
petitioner objects such intervention by Atty.
Sotto, the private prosecutor because no
offended party was named in the information
and Atty. Sotto expressed reservation to file a
separate civil action against petitioner. The
respondents counter that they are the offended
parties and that Atty. Sotto withdrew his
previous statement of reservation.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge committed abuse of
discretion or any legal error in permitting the
intervention of respondent attorney as private
prosecutor in the case in question (NO)
RULING:
The Judge in this case did not err in permitting
the intervention of Atty. Sotto as a private
prosecutor. The fact that Atty. Sotto
expressed his intention to reserve the right to
file a separate civil action should not matter as
he subsequently withdrew such statement.
Prosecution of offenses is a public function.
This function can be performed not only by
fiscals not also by private attorneys in cases
where they are allowed to intervene as private
prosecutors. Lawyers are also officers of the
court and assume public and official
responsibilities.
Liong v. Lee
GR No. 181658 | August 07, 2013
Diez
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Sec. 16 or Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that Where the civil action
for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.
FACTS:
 ● Liong Lee (a.k.a Paul Lee) is the civil liability not so much because it is a
president of Centillion Holdings Inc. crime but because it caused damage to
(CHI). CHI was under intra corporate another.
disputes between Paul Lee and his ● Hence, Chin Lee can intervene in the
sister Chin Lee. prosecution of Paul Lee
● Paul Lee then filed a petition for the
reconstitution of title for one of the
properties owned by CHI. He claims
that the original title was in his
possession but lost and could no longer
recover it.
● RTC approved the reconstitution of
title. Subsequently Chin Lee then filed
a complaint with the prosecutor for
perjury against Paul Lee. She claims
that Paul Lee perjured himself when he
testified that the title was in his
possession and that he lost it, when in
fact the title was in the possession of
Chin Lee as the treasurer of the
company.
● A criminal case was then filed by the
prosecutor and with Chin Lee
intervening in the case as private
prosecutors.
● Paul Lee alleges that there is no need
of a private prosecution as the crime of
perjury is a public offense.

ISSUE:
WON Chin Lee can intervene when the crime
committed is a public offense (Yes)

RULING:
● All persons that are criminally liable
are also civilly liable.
● Sec. 16 or Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that
Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the
offense.
● In the case at bar, the statement of
Paul Lee regarding the possession of
the title, if proven to be perjured, is
injurious to Chin Lee’s credibility and
reputation as the treasurer of CHI.
● An act or omission is felonious because
it is punishable by law, it gives rise to