Sign (semiotics)

In semiotics, a sign is anything that communicates a meaning that is not the sign itself to the interpreter of
the sign. The meaning can be intentional such as a word uttered with a specific meaning, or unintentional,
such as a symptom being a sign of a particular medical condition. Signs can communicate through any of
the senses, visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, or taste.

Two major theories describe the way signs acquire the ability to transfer information. Both theories
understand the defining property of the sign as a relation between a number of elements. In the tradition of
semiotics developed by Ferdinand de Saussure (referred to as semiology) the sign relation is dyadic,
consisting only of a form of the sign (the signifier) and its meaning (the signified). Saussure saw this
relation as being essentially arbitrary (the principle of semiotic arbitrariness), motivated only by social
convention. Saussure's theory has been particularly influential in the study of linguistic signs. The other
major semiotic theory, developed by C. S. Peirce, defines the sign as a triadic relation as "something that
stands for something, to someone in some capacity"[1] This means that a sign is a relation between the sign
vehicle (the specific physical form of the sign), a sign object (the aspect of the world that the sign carries
meaning about) and an interpretant (the meaning of the sign as understood by an interpreter). According to
Peirce signs can be divided by the type of relation that holds the sign relation together as either icons,
indices or symbols. Icons are those signs that signify by means of similarity between sign vehicle and sign
object (e.g. a portrait, or a map), indices are those that signify by means of a direct relation of contiguity or
causality between sign vehicle and sign object (e.g. a symptom), and symbols are those that signify through
a law or arbitrary social convention.

Contents
Dyadic signs
Triadic signs
Classes of triadic signs
20th-century theories
Postmodern theory
Semiotic black hole
See also
Notes
External links

Dyadic signs
According to Saussure (1857–1913), a sign is composed of the signifier[2] (signifiant), and the signified
(signifié). These cannot be conceptualized as separate entities but rather as a mapping from significant
differences in sound to potential (correct) differential denotation. The Saussurean sign exists only at the
level of the synchronic system, in which signs are defined by their relative and hierarchical privileges of co-
occurrence. It is thus a common misreading of Saussure to take signifiers to be anything one could speak,
and signifieds as things in the world. In fact, the relationship of language to parole (or speech-in-context) is
and always has been a theoretical problem for linguistics (cf. Roman Jakobson's famous essay "Closing
Statement: Linguistics and Poetics" et al.).

A famous thesis by Saussure states that the relationship between a sign and the real-world thing it denotes is
an arbitrary one. There is not a natural relationship between a word and the object it refers to, nor is there a
causal relationship between the inherent properties of the object and the nature of the sign used to denote it.
For example, there is nothing about the physical quality of paper that requires denotation by the
phonological sequence ‘paper’. There is, however, what Saussure called ‘relative motivation’: the
possibilities of signification of a signifier are constrained by the compositionality of elements in the
linguistic system (cf. Emile Benveniste's paper on the arbitrariness of the sign in the first volume of his
papers on general linguistics). In other words, a word is only available to acquire a new meaning if it is
identifiably different from all the other words in the language and it has no existing meaning. Structuralism
was later based on this idea that it is only within a given system that one can define the distinction between
the levels of system and use, or the semantic "value" of a sign.

Triadic signs
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) proposed a different theory. Unlike Saussure who approached the
conceptual question from a study of linguistics and phonology, Peirce, the so-called father of the Pragmatist
school of philosophy, extended the concept of sign to embrace many other forms. He considered "word" to
be only one particular kind of sign, and characterized sign as any mediational means to understanding. He
covered not only artificial, linguistic, and symbolic signs, but also all semblances (such as kindred sensible
qualities), and all indicators (such as mechanical reactions). He counted as symbols all terms, propositions,
and arguments whose interpretation is based upon convention or habit, even apart from their expression in
particular languages. He held that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively
of signs".[3] The setting of Peirce's study of signs is philosophical logic, which he defined as formal
semiotic,[4] and characterized as a normative field following esthetics and ethics, as more basic than
metaphysics,[5] and as the art of devising methods of research.[6] He argued that, since all thought takes
time, all thought is in signs,[7] that all thought has the form of inference (even when not conscious and
deliberate),[7] and that, as inference, "logic is rooted in the social principle", since inference depends on a
standpoint that, in a sense, is unlimited.[8] The result is a theory not of language in particular, but rather of
the production of meaning, and it rejects the idea of a static relationship between a sign and what it
represents: its object. Peirce believed that signs are meaningful through recursive relationships that arise in
sets of three.

Even when a sign represents by a resemblance or factual connection independent of interpretation, the sign
is a sign only insofar as it is at least potentially interpretable by a mind and insofar as the sign is a
determination of a mind or at least a quasi-mind, that functions as if it were a mind, for example in crystals
and the work of bees[9]—the focus here is on sign action in general, not on psychology, linguistics, or
social studies (fields Peirce also pursued).

A sign depends on an object in a way that enables (and, in a sense, determines) an interpretation, an
interpretant, to depend on the object as the sign depends on the object. The interpretant, then, is a further
sign of the object, and thus enables and determines still further interpretations, further interpretant signs.
The process, called semiosis, is irreducibly triadic, Peirce held, and is logically structured to perpetuate
itself. It is what defines sign, object, and interpretant in general.[10] As Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1990: 7) put
it, "the process of referring effected by the sign is infinite." (Peirce used the word "determine" in the sense
not of strict determinism, but of effectiveness that can vary like an influence.[11])

Peirce further characterized the three semiotic elements as follows:[12]

 1. Sign (or representamen[13]): that which represents the denoted object (cf. Saussure's
"signifier").
2. Object (or semiotic object): that which the sign represents (or as some put it, encodes). It can
be anything thinkable, a law, a fact, or even a possibility (a semiotic object could even be
fictional, such as Hamlet); those are partial objects; the total object is the universe of
discourse, the totality of objects in that world to which one attributes the partial object. For
example, perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto, but not only about Pluto. The
object may be
1. immediate to the sign, the object as represented in the sign, or
2. dynamic, the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded.
3. Interpretant (or interpretant sign): a sign's meaning or ramification as formed into a further
sign by interpreting (or, as some put it, decoding) the sign. The interpretant may be:
1. immediate to the sign, a kind of possibility, all that the sign is suited to immediately
express, for instance a word's usual meaning;
2. dynamic, that is, the meaning as formed into an actual effect, for example an individual
translation or a state of agitation, or
3. final or normal, that is, the ultimate meaning that inquiry taken far enough would be
destined to reach. It is a kind of norm or ideal end, with which an actual interpretant may,
at most, coincide.

Peirce explained that signs mediate between their objects and their interpretants in semiosis, the triadic
process of determination. In semiosis a first is determined or influenced to be a sign by a second, as its
object. The object determines the sign to determine a third as an interpretant. Firstness itself is one of
Peirce's three categories of all phenomena, and is quality of feeling. Firstness is associated with a vague
state of mind as feeling and a sense of the possibilities, with neither compulsion nor reflection. In semiosis
the mind discerns an appearance or phenomenon, a potential sign. Secondness is reaction or resistance, a
category associated with moving from possibility to determinate actuality. Here, through experience outside
of and collateral to the given sign or sign system, one recalls or discovers the object the sign refers to, for
example when a sign consists in a chance semblance of an absent but remembered object. It is through
one's collateral experience[14] that the object determines the sign to determine an interpretant. Thirdness is
representation or mediation, the category associated with signs, generality, rule, continuity, habit-taking, and
purpose. Here one forms an interpretant expressing a meaning or ramification of the sign about the object.
When a second sign is considered, the initial interpretant may be confirmed, or new possible meanings may
be identified. As each new sign is addressed, more interpretants, themselves signs, emerge. It can involve a
mind's reading of nature, people, mathematics, anything.

Peirce generalized the communicational idea of utterance and interpretation of a sign, to cover all signs:[15]

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there
can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and
a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself,
they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not
merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of
thought should be dialogic.

According to Nattiez, writing with Jean Molino, the tripartite definition of sign, object, and interpretant is
based on the "trace" or neutral level, Saussure's "sound-image" (or "signified", thus Peirce's
"representamen"). Thus, "a symbolic form...is not some 'intermediary' in a process of 'communication' that
transmits the meaning intended by the author to the audience; it is instead the result of a complex process of
creation (the poietic process) that has to do with the form as well as the content of the work; it is also the
point of departure for a complex process of reception (the esthesic process that reconstructs a 'message'").
(ibid, p. 17)

Molino's and Nattiez's diagram:

Poietic Process Esthesic Process

"Producer" → Trace ← Receiver

(Nattiez 1990, p. 17)

Peirce's theory of the sign therefore offered a powerful analysis of the signification system, its codes, and its
processes of inference and learning—because the focus was often on natural or cultural context rather than
linguistics, which only analyses usage in slow-time whereas human semiotic interaction in the real world
often has a chaotic blur of language and signal exchange. Nevertheless, the implication that triadic relations
are structured to perpetuate themselves leads to a level of complexity not usually experienced in the routine
of message creation and interpretation. Hence, different ways of expressing the idea have developed.

Classes of triadic signs

By 1903[16] Peirce came to classify signs by three universal trichotomies dependent on his three categories
(quality, fact, habit). He classified any sign:[17]

1. by what stands as the sign — either (qualisign, also called a tone) a quality — or (sinsign,
also called token) an individual fact — or (legisign, also called type) a rule, a habit;
2. by how the sign stands for its object — either (icon) by its own quality, such that it resembles
the object, regardless of factual connection and of interpretive rule of reference — or (index)
by factual connection to its object, regardless of resemblance and of interpretive rule of
reference — or (symbol) by rule or habit of interpreted reference to its object, regardless of
resemblance and of factual connection; and
3. by how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant — either (rheme, also called seme,[18]
such as a term) as regards quality or possibility, as if the sign were a qualisign, though it can
be qualisign, sinsign, or legisign — or (dicisign, also called pheme, such as a proposition)
as regards fact, as if the sign were an index, though it can be index or symbol — or
(argument, also called delome[19]) as regards rule or habit. This is the trichotomy of all signs
as building blocks in an inference process.

Any qualisign is an icon. Sinsigns include some icons and some indices. Legisigns include
some icons, some indices, and all symbols.
Any icon is a rheme. Indices (be they sinsigns or legisigns) include some rhemes and some
dicisigns. Symbols include some rhemes, some dicisigns, and all arguments.
Lines of joint classification of signs.

Because of those classificatory interdependences, the three Every sign is:[16]

trichotomies intersect to form ten (rather than 27) classes of 1. 2. 3.
signs. There are also various kinds of meaningful
I. Qualisign or Sinsign or Legisign
combination. Signs can be attached to one another. A
photograph is an index with a meaningfully attached icon. and
Arguments are composed of dicisigns, and dicisigns are II. Icon or Index or Symbol
composed of rhemes. In order to be embodied, legisigns and
(types) need sinsigns (tokens) as their individual replicas or III. Rheme or Dicisign or Argument
instances. A symbol depends as a sign on how it will be
interpreted, regardless of resemblance or factual connection to its object; but the symbol's individual
embodiment is an index to your experience of the object. A symbol is instanced by a specialized indexical
sinsign. A symbol such as a sentence in a language prescribes qualities of appearance for its instances, and
is itself a replica of a symbol such as a proposition apart from expression in a particular language. Peirce
covered both semantic and syntactical issues in his theoretical grammar, as he sometimes called it. He
regarded formal semiotic, as logic, as furthermore encompassing study of arguments (hypothetical,
deductive, and inductive) and inquiry's methods including pragmatism; and as allied to but distinct from
logic's pure mathematics.

Peirce sometimes referred to the “ground” of a sign. The ground is the pure abstraction of a quality.[20] A
sign's ground is the respect in which the sign represents its object, e.g. as in literal and figurative language.
For example, an icon presents a characteristic or quality attributed to an object, while a symbol imputes to
an object a quality either presented by an icon or symbolized so as to evoke a mental icon.

Peirce called an icon apart from a label, legend, or other index attached to it, a "hypoicon", and divided the
hypoicon into three classes: (a) the image, which depends on a simple quality; (b) the diagram, whose
internal relations, mainly dyadic or so taken, represent by analogy the relations in something; and (c) the
metaphor, which represents the representative character of a sign by representing a parallelism in something
else.[21] A diagram can be geometric, or can consist in an array of algebraic expressions, or even in the
common form "All __ is ___" which is subjectable, like any diagram, to logical or mathematical
transformations. Peirce held that mathematics is done by diagrammatic thinking — observation of, and
experimentation on, diagrams. Peirce developed for deductive logic a system of visual existential graphs,
which continue to be researched today.

20th-century theories
It is now agreed that the effectiveness of the acts that may convert the message into text (including
speaking, writing, drawing, music and physical movements) depends upon the knowledge of the sender. If
the sender is not familiar with the current language, its codes and its culture, then he or she will not be able
to say anything at all, whether as a visitor in a different language area or because of a medical condition
such as aphasia (see Roman Jakobson).

Modern theories deny the Saussurian distinction between signifier and signified, and look for meaning not
in the individual signs, but in their context and the framework of potential meanings that could be applied.
Such theories assert that language is a collective memory or cultural history of all the different ways in
which meaning has been communicated, and may to that extent, constitute all life's experiences (see Louis
Hjelmslev). Hjelmslev did not consider the sign to be the smallest semiotic unit, as he believed it possible to
decompose it further; instead, he considered the "internal structure of language" to be a system of figurae, a
concept somewhat related to that of figure of speech, which he considered to be the ultimate semiotic
unit.[22][23][24]

This position implies that speaking is simply one more form of behaviour and changes the focus of attention
from the text as language, to the text as a representation of purpose, a functional version of the author's
intention. But, once the message has been transmitted, the text exists independently.

Hence, although the writers who co-operated to produce this page exist, they can only be represented by
the signs actually selected and presented here. The interpretation process in the receiver's mind may
attribute meanings completely different from those intended by the senders. But, why might this happen?
Neither the sender nor the receiver of a text has a perfect grasp of all language. Each individual's relatively
small stock of knowledge is the product of personal experience and their attitude to learning. When the
audience receives the message, there will always be an excess of connotational meanings available to be
applied to the particular signs in their context (no matter how relatively complete or incomplete their
knowledge, the cognitive process is the same).
The first stage in understanding the message is therefore, to suspend or defer judgement until more
information becomes available. At some point, the individual receiver decides which of all possible
meanings represents the best possible fit. Sometimes, uncertainty may not be resolved, so meaning is
indefinitely deferred, or a provisional or approximate meaning is allocated. More often, the receiver's desire
for closure (see Gestalt psychology) leads to simple meanings being attributed out of prejudices and without
reference to the sender's intentions.

Postmodern theory
In critical theory, the notion of sign is used variously.

Many postmodernist theorists postulate a complete disconnection of the signifier and the
signified. An 'empty' or 'floating signifier' is variously defined as a signifier with a vague,
highly variable, unspecifiable or non-existent signified. Such signifiers mean different things to
different people: they may stand for many or even any signifieds; they may mean whatever
their interpreters want them to mean.[25]

Semiotic black hole

A semiotic black hole is the a-temporal destruction of a sign.[26]

See also
Grapheme
Semantics
Semiotics
Semiotic triangle
Sign relation
Triadic relation
Freudian slip

Notes
1. Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron, Analyzing Cultures.
2. Mardy S. Ireland defines a signifier as:

A unit of something (i.e., a word, gesture) that can carry ambiguous/multiple meanings (e.g.,
as U.S. President Bill Clinton once said, "It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is',
is")

Ireland, Mardy S. (2003). The Art of the Subject: Between Necessary Illusion and Speakable
Desire in the Analytic Encounter. Other Press. 159051033X. p. 13.
3. Peirce, C. S., Collected Papers, v. 5, paragraph 448 footnote, from "The Basis of
Pragmaticism" in 1906.
4. Peirce, C.S., 1902, Application to the Carnegie Institution, Memoir 12, "On the Definition of
Logic", Eprint (http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm#m12).
Note that by "logic" Peirce means a part of philosophy, not the mathematics of logic. (See
Classification of the sciences (Peirce).
 5. On his classifications, see Peirce, C.S. (1903), Collected Peirce v. 1, paragraphs 180–202
Eprint (http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm) Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20111105121054/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm) 2011-
11-05 at the Wayback Machine and (1906) "The Basis of Pragmaticism" in The Essential
Peirce v. 2, pp. 372–3. For relevant quotes, see "Philosophy" and "Logic" in the Commens
Dictionary of Peirce's Terms (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html).
6. Peirce, C.S., 1882, "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic" delivered September 1882,
Johns Hopkins University Circulars, v. 2, n. 19, pp. 11–12, November 1892, Google Books
Eprint (https://books.google.com/books?id=E0YFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA11&dq=%22art+of+de
vising+methods+of+research%22). Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 7, paragraphs 59–76,
The Essential Peirce v. 1, pp. 210–14, and Writings of Charles S. Peirce v. 4, pp. 378–82.
7. Peirce, C.S. (1868), "Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man" (Arisbe Eprint
(http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/question/qu-frame.htm)), Journal of
Speculative Philosophy vol. 2, pp. 103–114. Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 5, paragraphs
213–63.
8. Peirce, C. S. (1878) "The Doctrine of Chances", Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 604–15,
1878, reprinted in Collected Papers, v. 2, paragraphs 645–68, Writings of Charles S. Peirce
v. 3, pp. 276–90, and The Essential Peirce v. 1, pp. 142–54. "...death makes the number of
our risks, the number of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result uncertain. The
very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this number is
indefinitely great. .... ...logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. ....
Logic is rooted in the social principle."
9. See under "Quasi-mind (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/quasimind.html)" in
the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms.
10. For Peirce's definitions of sign and semiosis, see under "Sign (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/
commens/terms/sign.html)" and "Semiosis, semeiosy (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commen
s/terms/semiosis.html)" in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms (http://www.helsinki.fi/s
cience/commens/dictionary.html); and "76 definitions of sign by C. S. Peirce (http://perso.nu
mericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/access.htm)" collected by Robert Marty. Peirce's "What
Is a Sign (http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/ep2book/ch02/ep2ch2.htm)" (MS 404 of
1894, Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 4–10) provides intuitive help.
11. For example, Peirce said "determined (i.e., specialized, bestimmt)" in a letter to William
James, dated 1909, see p. 492 in The Essential Peirce v. 2.
12. For Peirce's definitions of immediate object and the rest, see the Commens Dictionary of
Peirce's Terms (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html).
13. Pronounced with the “a” long and stressed: /ˌrɛprɪzɛnˈteɪmən/. See
wiktionary:representamen.
14. In that context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral
acquaintance, all in much the same terms. See pp. 404–9 in "Pragmatism" in The Essential
Peirce v. 2. Ten quotes on collateral experience from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell
can be viewed here (http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=57101) at peirce-l's Lyris archive.
15. Peirce (1906), "Prolegomena To an Apology For Pragmaticism", The Monist, v. XVI, n. 4, pp.
492–546, see pp. 523–4, Google Books Eprint (https://archive.org/details/monist00hegegoo
g/page/n605). Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 4, paragraphs 530–72, see 551.
16. Peirce (1903 MS), "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are
Determined", under other titles in Collected Papers (CP) v. 2, paragraphs 233–72, and
reprinted under the original title in Essential Peirce (EP) v. 2, pp. 289–99. Also see image of
MS 339 (http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg00850.html) (August 7,
1904) supplied to peirce-l by Bernard Morand (http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/) of the
Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Département Informatique.
17. For more as to the definitions, terminology, and development of the classifications, see the
Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.ht
ml)
18. In 1902 Peirce used the word "seme" instead for an index, especially an indexical sinsign.
See Collected Papers v. 2, paragraph 283.
19. Peirce said, "pronounce deeloam, from δήλωμα", Peirce (1906), "Prolegomena to an
Apology for Pragmaticism", The Monist, v. 16, n. 4, pp. 492–546, see 507 (https://archive.org/
details/monist00hegegoog/page/n589). Reprinted in Collected Papers v. 4, paragraphs
530–572, see 538. Eprint (http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/prolegomena.htm)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20070905164710/http://www.existentialgraphs.com/p
eirceoneg/prolegomena.htm) 2007-09-05 at the Wayback Machine.
20. Peirce, C.S. (1867), "On a New List of Categories", Proceedings of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, v. 7 (1868), pp. 287–98. (Delivered orally by Peirce in 1867 and
distributed by him in 1867 as part of an extract).
21. Peirce, Collected Papers v. 2, paragraphs 276–7, written circa 1902. See under "Diagram (ht
tp://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/diagram.html)" in the Commens Dictionary of
Peirce's Terms.
22. Hjelmslev [1943] Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, pp.47, 65, 67, and cf. 6.26, 30
23. Robert de Beaugrande (1991) [Linguistic Theory: The Discourse of Fundamental Works],
section on Louis Hjelmslev (http://www.beaugrande.com/LINGTHERHjelmslev.htm).
24. Nöth, Winfried (1990) Handbook of semiotics (https://books.google.com/books?id=rHA4KQc
PeNgC), pp.66, 70-1 section 3
25. Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The Basics, Routledge 2007, page 78
26. Morrione, Deems D. (2006). "When Signifiers Collide: Doubling, Semiotic Black Holes, and
the Destructive Remainder of the American Un/Real" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/4489250).
Cultural Critique (63): 157–173. Retrieved 2022-01-22. "The semiotic black hole is...the
destruction of the whole sign...that radically transforms the socius, possessing a gravitational
pull that has the power to massively reshape and remotivate ... the semiotic black hole...
[leaves] little or no trace of its influence. ... a collision of a fatal event and a perfect object[.] ...
Temporality is constant motion; to mark a point in time is to freeze only that moment, to
celebrate impression and deny expression."

External links
Signo — www.signosemio.com — Presents semiotic theories and theories closely related to
semiotics (http://www.signosemio.com/)

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