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    Historical Look at The Alamo

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    Andrew Smith

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    A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE ALAMO by Greg Novak While lan Weekley is an excellent builder of models and such, asa bictorian he ie somewhat of a falore. Tp his article “The Alama — Revised”, once again one finds the same historical myths about the “Alamo, repeated from Texas Historians who should know beter. ts, [perhaps time to look atthe realityof the Alamo, and to strip away the ‘tion that surrounds it Historical myths are not unique to any country or period of time. ‘They exist when we find it necessary to forget a biter experience in ‘our history, and so rather than ignore the facts, we create new fctsto bend reality to a better picture that we can live with. Two recent ‘examples in history are the British Retreat from Dunkirk, and the Retreat ofthe American th Army from the Yalu in 195. Inthe frst ‘ease, we ignore the fact that itwas the Destroyers ofthe Roval Navy ‘which brought the men back, and put the emphasison the fact thatthe ‘small boats were thee. The myth ofthe small boat saving the armyis thorn, and we forget about that army's Uefeat snd the fat that alt all of its heavy equipment was left Dehind. Inthe second case, the retreat ofthe 8th Army from the Yalu~a mith of "Chinese Hordes” is created to explain the fat that superior force in manpower and firepower was thrown back by a. primitive army by Western standards, but one which was totally superior in tacis to the 8th ‘Army. Myths, once ereated, tend olive on, while reality becomes an ‘unwanted stepchild and is driven out ‘The myth of the Alumo, and the need for the Texicans to scanomize” its defenders, can be found in the events of carly 1836. ‘What had started as part of the ongoing conflict in Mexico between, the Federalsts andthe Centalsts ad now become something ele ‘The forces of General Cos at San Antonio de Bexar had been forced tosurrender, and sent hack to Mexico under parole in December of 1835, The native elements of the Texas Army, the Texicans (Texas citizens of American descent) and the Tejanos (Texas citizens of ‘Mexican descent) returned to their homes forthe winter leaving the various American volunteer companies, and small Texas Regular ‘Army, alin the Bold. A Provisional Goverment had been formed ‘under Governor Henry Smith, and a Provisional Counc setup til, ‘such time as a constitutional assembly could be called in late Februarylearly March. "To the South, President Santa Anna, ruler of Mexico, was ‘threatening to move north in the spring an reconquer Texas. With {his threat looming on the horizon, one would have assumed that the “Texas government would stand together and face their common foe. Instead, the tof Texas nearly collapsed as Smith fred al ‘of the members of the Counel, and the Connell in ten uated 10 Jmpeach Smith, By January of 1836, Santa Anna was no Tonger seen ‘asa threat, 2s pro-Smith amd anti-Smih Texans struggled for control ofthe government Sonith and his military commander, Sam Houston wanted to hold ‘wat forces ey could on the southern fan, andawalr Sana Anta’, attack in the spring. Others on the counei and in Teaas polities, ‘argued for a Texas atack on the Rio Grande valley and the port of Matamoros, in some cases prompted by the fact that they were landowners in that area. The American volunteer companies, not ‘wanting to stand idle at San Antonio de Bexar, moved down river to Goliad which was to be the jumping off point for the attack south ‘There, Colonel James Fannin, the second senior officer ofthe Texas Regular Army (only Houston in his rank of Major General was, ‘Scios), (0k shatye ofthese commands aie duiled his fovees befove launching his attack inthe spring. By February Ist Fannin had over 600 men under arms at Goad, ineluding such units asthe Georgia Battalion, the Alabama Red Rovers, the Mobile Greys, most ofthe Istand 2nd Companies of the New Orleans Greys, and other units ‘One advantage that Fannin had was that Goliad was close to the ‘mouth ofthe San Antonio River, and supplies could be brought far easier to Goliad than to San Antonio de Bexar, a fact which helped tencourage the volunteers to shift thei base of operations to there. Fennin, a Grorgian who hed been at West Point for 2 years, was considered a trained military officer by most Texans, and seems 10, hhave been very popular with hismen. Hisommand spent a good deal of time drilling and fortifyng the Goliad area, as well as preparing for the march south into Mevien ae ean ae the sping orate wae ip AS ‘member of the anti Smith faction of Texas politics, andthe second ‘Senior officer in the Texas Military establihsment Fannin had astrong claim to become the overall Texican commander if Smith and Houston were removed from offic. When one looks atthe events of March and Apa 1836, tis fact becomes more and more important. ‘Left to hold San Antonio de Bexar was a small company of the ‘Texas Regular Army under Lieutenant Colonel James C. Nell—who ‘on paper commanded the Ist Battalion of Fannin’s Corps Artillery, ‘and a somewhat larger uit of Texas volunteers under Tim Bowie. (Overall the force totalled about 100men, and seems tohavebeen part ‘ofthe pro Smith faction of Texas politics (when the garrison voted on February 7th for it delegates tothe convention at Washington onthe Brazos it picked two pro Smith candidates). When Cos had been forced 4 Surrender bt December of 1835, nwo of his wana ‘weapons and equipment had been surrendered andleft atthe Alamo, ich Cosh fried spar ois plan or odin San Antoni de ‘Neil's command consisted of about 30 men, under Lieutenant Almeron Dickerson. Though mos often referedto as “Captain”, the records of the Texas Army shows his commission as that of Ist Lieutenant It was made up of Regulars, and with the help of Green, Jameson, a sl-taught mlitary engineer, it worked onthe defences of ‘he Alamo. Bowie's command was made up of volunteers, and was ‘based in San Antonio de Bexar. Ithad 70-80 members and scouted, watched, helped out at the Alamo, and did what it wanted. Jim Bowie, is commander was an American who had marred into the ‘Tejano community in 1801 ~the daughter ofthe Vice-Governor no Jess and served through much of this period as abridge berwecn the ‘twocommunities, The death of his wife and two children in 1833 From, cholera had a devastating impact on him, one which he not yet, ‘recovered ftom, His land-holding inthe ares, which he had gotten, from his wifeand his Her to the Tejano community did not endear him to newly arrived Americans, who tended to look upon all Mexicans as being the enemy. ‘On February 3rd, 1836, reinforcements arsived at San Antonio de ‘Bexar — Lieutenant Colonel William B. Travis ~ the commander of the Texas Army's Cavalry Corps ~ arrived with 30 men of his ‘command, Travis had orders from Houston to evacuate all military ‘supplies from the Alamo and San Antonio de Bexar, and to destroy all military works inthe area. While this course of action had been joved by Governoe Sith embers ofthe Connell wee tottand had demanded thatthe orders be cancelled. Four day ater, ‘The Tennessee Company of Mounted Volunteers, commanded by Colonel David Crockett, arrived in town. With thee reinforcements ‘some 150 men were now stationed inthe San Antonio de Bexar area, ‘while individuals ame and let ona dally bass. ‘On February 11th, Nel took 20 days sick leave ~ turned command ‘overto Travis, and eft San Antonio de Bexar. Travis took command ‘of the Regulats, and Bowie remained in command of the volunteers. Here lies one of the questions ofthe Alamo ~ why did Travis decide not to carry out his orders 10 evacuate the post ~ and instead concentrate on attempting to holt. Many answershave been given~ few make sense other than perhaps the fact that Travis, a relative amateur at war, allowed himself tobe convinced tha the Alamo was Sloe post isi actlly was. “The Alamo had begun fea the Mission of San Antoniode Valero = bult in 1750. In 1793, the Presidential troops from San Carlos de Paras del Alamo in northern Mexico were qransferred there, and it ‘became a military outpost for frst New Spain, and then Mexico. The ‘name Alamo from the troops was then attache to the name of ther base. As such it remained in use throughout this period. When (General Cos had attempted to hold San Antonio de Bexar in the fall and winter of 1835 itonly made military sense tohold the Alamo, and infact it became the core of Bis defences, With the original defences built with an eye towards Keeping off the occasional Indian aid, Coss ‘men built a nomber of batteries and reinforced the works. When he 30 ‘marched out in December, he lft behind as spoils of war some 60) ‘muskets andes of equipment, as wells21 cannon, The vast umber ‘of cannon was due in part to the basic belief thasta cannon keeps Pains Indians away ~ a belie held by many frontersmen of ths period. Justlook atthe ciferent accounts ofthe mountain men during this period and note how many expeditions drag along a cannon oF two. Most ofthese guns were not on wheeled eld carriages, but rather mounted on trucked garrison carriages for fortress use. Toning atthe Alamo today, one fail to ralie the sao of the place. Today only the hospital arca and the chapel remain, andso one ‘snot.given a tue view ofthe place. The barracks square hada sie of ‘$50 eet by 20 feet, and enclosed three acres land. The church and ‘hospital (convent) complex added an area 207 feet by 274, including the corrals. Below isa rough mapofthe complex. Itisinteresting that, ‘no two maps ofthe complex agres onal details. <———220'__, conven errapen, YARD 4 Sigree- a ss0t | aes, chuaen (One note about the Alamo that needs to be realised is that the ‘overall length of the perimeter is over 190 feet, ora third of a mule. ‘Totransate these distances into 25mm terms true scale model of the ‘Alamo would need an area for the fortified area 103" ong, and 83° ‘wide across the front. Contrast these measurements with the 66” by GF used by lan Weekley ~ Ivalice for model purpose nent 10 ‘compress scale but the difference in size can be important, ‘The confusion gets even worse when one attempts to locate the ‘actual numbers of cannon mounted and their positions. All accounts, ‘agree onthe three 12prgunsin the church eft thereby the Mexicaas, fn he 18p1 gun in dhe sguivest corner which bore on San ARCOM de Bexar. After that everyone has their ow plan some acount or example show the gun atthe northwest comer oftheeatle pen while ‘thers moveit south fo the northwest comer ofthe convent yard. The locations and numbers of batterie on the north wall varies as well Potter only shows 3 guns ~ Lord shows 4, other accounts show 5. ‘There were 21 guns in the works, of which 16 appear to have been ‘mounted on the outside walls, and another two were placed in an interior citadel. (Much ofthis confusion can be sid to have occurred ‘due to the foct thatthe Alamo was held by the Mexican, thea the ‘Texicans, and ater being taken, reheld by the Mexicans again. Each, ‘map may be correct in that it dates from a diferent time of ‘ccupation) "Assuming that each gun neededa crew of 4men gun commander, Jouder, ammo runner, and the rewman totend the ent -a total of 4 ‘men were needed to man all guns. Since the crews would be firing ‘annister fr the most part ~ both the training ofthe crews and the ‘numbers could be assumed to be equal to the task, (The statement above is based on the author's {year of experience on a Revolution ary gun crew manning weapons from a 3pr gun up to 12pr'son truck and field carriages.) However, with 64 men needed forthe guns anda garrison of about 150 men in late February, one would sve left a force of $0 men to hod 1900 feet of perimeter or one man per 20 odd Feet of wall 18, this fact that makes Travs's decision to hold the Alamo so strange — ‘until you take into account his hope that Fannin would send reinforcements from Goliad to his aid. Fannin had areal army at this time some 60 tained men under arms ~ and the arival ofa good. ‘part of that force would make the Alamo a much more defensible pos. Even 10, one wonders why he even attempted to hold the Pine the Texas potcans were ghing among themselves, the ‘Commander in Cit of the Mexican Army, His Excelleney Major General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, was bisy taking eps fo trash the rebelion in Tess. A reoransition ofthe Mestan Army adbcen cared out and whatever trope could be spared fom other dts were bing huried north: Wile the Texans knew that Santa ‘Anne would come they did not expect tim oieave Mex tl ater tail March only then woud the rae fe mp. an te pra Store the Texans fd been unable to move south dt the Tack of rs, they decided that Santa Anna would be unable o mone noth othe same reason, Yet on February 12h, the day after Travis tk ‘command ihe Alamo, the advance gardof the Mescan Army was {re Rio Grande a veryeten jena syst serve Kept ne ‘Texasinformed of his advane in ot the rport of he croang of the Rio Grande reach San Antonio de Bexar on February 1th 8th ‘and 20h only oe ignored by not only Travs and Bowie, tthe ‘Teas govemment aswell Right upto the arial ofthe Mexican Advance Guard on February 25, the parson dismissed the Sts Anns plan of aac was based on number of ois. Fist toe had some 6332 men and 21 guns under fis command ~but the efor wes not preset yet anes of cas ull aching wh Scrssnothcr Meni. Second the next problem asthe loston of the Tesas frees ~ with Fannin’ command of 600 trained men st Gola posing a teat to Matamoros that command needed fo be covered while Santa Anna operated agaist San Antonio de Bexar — baton San Antonio de Bexar had fallen x cows campaign would Ieneeded alow for sappy ofthe Mevsean Army ty sea Last, there tras need tocarry outs campaign quickly, fr fear that apc ‘val woud are while Sata Anna ws sway from the set of power. "To sar operations agains Gan Antonio de Bex the Advanced Guard Brigade would advance under the personal command of Senta ‘Ana, wile a spec son’ would operate against Goliad under Brigadier General Jose Urea. The Ist and 2nd Tnfatey Brigades, andthe Cavalry Brigade would advance to Sin Antonio, ndbe pve ‘tderalter aval. The force that Santa Anna feito San Antonio de Bexar on Febuary 23rd was made wp of be flowing kment Santa Ana's Personal Headquarters: 0 offices and men ‘Atached Aron to Vaopetrd Brigade atfers to men. Two fp, to pr: wo Spe gum two 7 hows ores Catal Regiment: 285 offers and en Detachment, Verses Cavalry: 9 oer nd men Detachment, Coahuila Cavalry: Soffer and men Presta Cavan 9 omer. and men Jimenez Infantry Batalion: 340 officers and men, includes 25 ‘oiuteer Matamoros Inaney Bataion: 370 offers and men, includes 78 volunteers ‘Sin Las Potosi fate Batalion: 495 ofers and men this was a miliaertonl unit a opponed to the other two which Were Replat Mexican Army. ‘Total Forcis Present—Febrsary 1 HO: SOotticersand men, ‘Arillery: 65 officers and men, 8 guns. ‘Cavalry: 379 officers and men, Infantry: 1,649 officers and men. “The march north before the gras was up had the effects that one ‘would expect onthe Mexican Cavalty by the ime they reached San Antonio the lack of forage had destroyed their usefulness. Most ofthe ‘cavalry, including «500 strong cavalry brigade stil ioving nth wil be returned to Mexico to refit, The volunteers were ded to flesh out the ranks of the infantry battalions ofthe egular army, Fifteen Mill MILITARY BOOKS ‘181 BITHAM LANE, BURTON-ON-TRENT, FOR STAFFS DE13 OHB. (0283) 67792 Tue-Sat, 10-6 WARGAMERS Minifigst; Essex-Anc, Col, Nap; TTGECW, Fan, Museum*, Dixon*; Donnington-Anc: Front Rank*: Chariot; Roundway-Jacobite: /500 (MOD); ‘20 (WW2} Osprey; Plaka; Marbeth': Mainly Military “+ SECOND HAND BARGAINS Mail order welcome 15mm Painting Rates P&P — Below £5~ 50p Foot 35p Basing 5p Over $5 — Post free Mounted location map in W.L14 ("FULL range) ‘while the men of San Luis Potosi were tained, though lacking the experience of the other two battalions. ‘While Santa Anna was starting his operations against San Antonio de Bexar, Brigadier General Urrea had the task of screening Fannin at Goliad, His command isa great example of a pick up force, and is best explained by the fact tat he was out of favour with Santa Anna. His, ‘command had: Yucatan Infantry Battalion ~260 officers and men. Pickets and lnfanty Detachments 40 officers and men, ‘Cuautla Cavalry Regiment ~148 officers and men. Detachments: Tampico Cavalry Regiment ~64 officers and men: Durango Cavalry Regiment ~21 officers and men, Gunsjoanas Cavalry Regiment 35 officers tnd men, TamaulipasNueve Leon Cavalry Regiment ~35 officers and men Presiial~ 8 officers and men, one 4pr gun ‘The force had 300 infantry, 293 cavalry, 8 gunners and 1 gun, and ‘was to prevent Fannin from operating agains the Rio Grande Valley ‘orcoming to the aid ofthe Alamo. Moving upsiowly in support were the following units: 1st Infantry Brigade ~ 5 battalions of infantry ~ 1686 officers and ‘men. 6 guns, 0 officers and gunners. 2d tasty Digade 5 aanty Daalons, 1.778 ofcis ant men, | Stee Siena ‘Cavalry detachment 22 officers and men, 6 guns, 60 gunners. Sreceaeee eatin Cavalry Brigade ~2 regiments Cavalry, 437 afcers and men, RZSR iat acacia "While the siege ofthe Alamo fs sud to have started on Febuary Se 2rd, in realty there was no siege, Santa Anna ever woried about | {23 mrag. nnn cre ence an atempt by Fannin to relive the Alamo, the need to colt Supplies and without the needed manpower di ile more tha 10 invest the Alamo ats datnce. While on February 25th a clash developed south ofthe Alamo in vhich 2 Mexicans were Killed and 6 pounced, aid whic Mesicarbattoea mere placed santo cou the ‘Alamo =the amazing pint that ite happened between Februaty 2rd and March Ist Travis sent mesenger after mesenger trough the Mexican ines aking fr help while Santa Anna caved outa | SERSHESE® ncernernemoennn ie tereatmane lag ceaesbabuimedtieksan Vubconsarbrrcaioce | Sete thets. The placement ofthe Mesican Army a this tine ft pad it renforeements from Fain, who Sata Anna saw asthe man threat spins hi. ‘Strangely enough, the Tera arson was content forthe most part tosit back and wat for bel to arive, and fw sorties wee noted By the Mexicans~ none again! the Mexican batteries in fac. ‘Meanwhilealong the coast, Famin commited the cardinal military sin of dividing hs forees. Smal detachments were sent ot for tferet reasons, andl prey to Urea seofumn. None ofthe actions were very important, but overall ty convinced Fannin st ug st Goliad and ignore Travis demande for id as well as ondes fom Houston o pul bak to Gonzales, “ravis’s appeal fo id were fist answered on the night of March 1stwhen 32 members ofthe Gonales Mounted Valunters avd, bringing the garrison up 10 183 men. Tei interesting fo ote that

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