Pahad D.

Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Valdes vs. Republic

GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
J, Nachura
Facts:
On January 11, 1971, petitioner married Sofio. Sometime in March 1972, the two quarreled and Sofio left
the conjugal dwelling. After three years or on October 1975 they meet each other and executed an
agreement to the effect that they will live separately. On June 20, 1985, the petitioner married Virgilio.
When the application of Virgilio for naturalization in the US was denied on the ground that the
petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting, the petitioner filed a petition before the RTC seeking the
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the petitioner
failed to prove a “well-founded belief” the Sofio was already dead as required under the Family Code of
the Philippine specifically under Article 41.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court is correct in applying the provision of the Family Code in this case
considering that the concern marriage was contracted and celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.
Held: No, the lower court is incorrect.
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove
a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead.

It is readily apparent, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June
20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed
for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,
Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

Considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner
could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect
at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this
conclusion.
Doctrine:
Unlike the Family Code, no decree of presumption of death for purposes of settlement of estate can be
granted under the Civil Code because such presumption arises by operation of law.

Butiong vs. Plazo

G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
J, Peralta

Facts:

Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife,
respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties. Sometimes in March
1991, the respondents learned that their co-heir Benita, the former wife of the deceased sold the properties
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

to petitioners without the respondents’ consent. Thus, the respondent file an action for Judicial Partition
with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession against the petitioners. Ruling in favor of the
respondent, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses
Bondoc on the ground of irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s as well as
the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Th CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence this appeal. The petitioner attacks the validity of the decision of the RTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the
cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement of
estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition
with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of
general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was sitting
merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of
special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. 

Issue:

Whether or not the fact that respondents' complaint for partition which also prayed for the annulment of
title and recovery of possession strips the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Held: No, it does not.

As can be gleaned from the allegations of respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact,
mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro
died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of
one who is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs
enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real
properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as
rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of
intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial
partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of
the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no· debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort
for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate
among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision
does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be
noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if
the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either
in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.

Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate as law expressly permits the same. That the complaint contained
allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not. Mean that there was a prohibited joined
of causes of action for questions as to the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their
status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in
partition proceedings alone. In fact, a complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the
partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy
9f partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. 

Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of
possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Doctrine:

An action for judicial partition coupled with a prayer for the annulment of title and recovery of possession
does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction because asking for 'the annulment of certain transfers of
property could very well be achieved in an action for partition.
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Salgado vs. Anson

G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016
J, Reyes

Facts:

Respondent Luis Anson filed a complaint with petitioner Salgado seeking the annulment of the three
Unilateral Deeds of Sale executed by Severina and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the latter’s
Estate. Luis Anson alleged that he was married to Severina and the properties covered by the unilateral
Sales pertains to the conjugal property which was not yet partitioned. It was shown that during the period
of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement in which divided their
properties between them without court intervention. Luis Anson claimed that such partition is void for having
been made without judicial approval arguing that under the law the separation of property is not effected by the
mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same.
When Severina died, Maria Luis executed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement adjudicating herself as
the sole heir of the deceased. Respondent Luis claimed that because of the such acts of Severina, he was
divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir. In their
answer to respondent claims, petitioners denied the existence of marriage between Luis and Severina and
what they all know is that the two lived as common law wife and prior to Severina’s death, they executed
a Partition Agreement. To prove the existence of their marriage, Luis presented as evidence a marriage
contract which on its face stated that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer
considering that the marriage was under exceptional circumstances. Spouses Salgado on the other hand
disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne
out by the marriage contract. The RTC rendered a decision declaring that the marriage of Lusi and
Severina as valid and consequently ordered the nullification of the Deed of Sales executed by Severina.
The CA affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Whether or not the marriage of Luis and Severina was valid despite the categorical stipulation in the
marriage contract that no marriage license was presented during the celebration of their marriage and
consequently if the marriage was valid will invalidate the Partition Agreement between Luis and
Severina.

Held: No, the marriage of Luai and Severina is not valid. Consequenlty, the Partition Agreement between
Luis and Severina was valid.

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its
celebration on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence
thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3).

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their
cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license,
Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like absence of a marriage license. "Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry  shall be governed by the rules on equal  co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."'

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties
co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is
the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The
thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil
Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x
x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same,
the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

Doctrine:

When two persons cohabit as common law wife and during their cohabitation, they acquired properties,
their properties are govern by the civil code on co-ownership, thus for its partition, no judicial approval is
required, the parties may partition the properties by mere agreement.
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Fule vs. CA
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
J, Martin

Facts:

Fule filed a petition for letter of administration before the RTC Calamba alleging that Amado Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba Laguna died intestate in the City of Manila leaving several real properties in
Calamba Laguna and other places within the jurisdiction of the said court. She also files a motion ex
parte for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. The RTC granted said motion. Preciosa
B. Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration for said order of the court alleging that the court issued the
order without jurisdiction and improper venue.

During the hearing before Judge Malvar, Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B.
Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition
and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the proceeding before Judge
Malvar. The CA annulled the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. However, even before Fule could
receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, over the same intestate
estate of Amado G. Garcia. Judge Vicente G. Ericta of RTC Quezon City granted the motion and
appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix. Fule then filed a "Special Appearance to Question
Venue and Jurisdiction"

Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April
26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence
of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in
other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado
G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

Issue:
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

1. Whether or not the petition of Fule should be granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC Quezon City.
2. Whether or not Amado Gracia was a resident of Queszon City at the time of his death, thus
making the RTC Quezon City and not RTC Laguna the proper venue.

Held 1: No.

Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption
of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have
been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by
procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly
exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of
the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the
court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural
law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 

Held 2: Yes

We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia,
which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that
his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this,
the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two
parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of
Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna,
show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule
is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case
before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule
fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

Doctrine:
For purposes of settlement of estate of a deceased person the words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Under the
rule, the residence of the deceased determines the venue but venue is not jurisdictional it is a long-settled
rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.

Cuenco vs. CA
GR No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

J, Teenhakee
Facts:
Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the
petitioner in this case and their children. He was also survived by his children form his first marriage
Lourdes Cuenco, respondent in this case. Upon his death, respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu alleging that Mariano Jesus Cuenco died
intestate. Petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco also filed a petition before the RTC Quezon City for the
probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased. Upon learning of the petition in Cebu Court, the
petitioner filed an opposition thereto and a motion to dismissed the same. The Cebu court issued an order
holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate. Respondent, then also filed an opposition to
the petition before the Quezon City RTC alleging that the latter court is without jurisdiction in view of the
fact that an exclusive jurisdiction on the matter was vested in Cebu court where the petition was first
filed. The Quezon City RTC denied respondent motion as well as her motion for reconsideration. Quezon
City court then issued an order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix.
The respondent then filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
with Court of Appeals. The CA issued an order in favor of the respondent and issued a writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission
to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament Hence this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeal is correct in rendering the assailed order.
2. Which between the Cebu court and the Quezon City court, has acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter?
Held:
1. No, the Court of Appeal is not correct in issuing such order.
2. It is the Quezon City court.

The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over
"all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of
the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in
order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume
jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate
petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-
ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also  first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating
that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and
hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the
petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court.
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City
court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would
thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City
court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the
Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time
of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed
by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of
the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a
negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon
City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must  first
take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts,
which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule
of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the
estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed

jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court
should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to
probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court
cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate
the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.

Doctrine:

For purposes of acquiring exclusive jurisdiction of the estate of a deceased person, the determining factor
is which court first take cognizance of the case and not which court the petition was first filed.
Cognizance means to take action to.

Rodrigues vs. Borja

GR no. 21993 June 21, 1966
J, Reyes, J.B.L

Facts:

Father Celestino Rodrigues died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 8, 1963, petitioners filed a petition for leave of court to allow them
to examine the alleged will however later withdraw the same. However, on March 12, 1963, petitioners
filed before the Court of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging
that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that
Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix. On March 12, 1963 private respondents
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition before the court of Bulacan for the probation of
the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for
probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. The petitioners, on the other hand, take the
stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them
of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has
precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963. The RTC Bulacan denied the movants motion.
Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on
Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Issue:

Which between the court of Bulacan and Quezon City Rizal is entitled to assume exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter to the exclusion of all other court?

Held: It was the court of Bulacan.

The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the
will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until
later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a
will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's
testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after
the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since
the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight
days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other,
that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of
wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins
that:

The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that
Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.

Doctrine:

Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to
the time when the will was delivered. That court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court.
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Guevara vs. Guevara

GR No. L-48840
December 29, 1943
J, Ozaeta
Facts:

On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will instituting several devises and legacies. On
September 27, 1933, Victorino died and his last will and testament, however, was never presented to the
court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his
estate. Rosario Guevara who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did
nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator
acknowledged her as his natural daughter. But a little over four years after the testor's demise, Rosario
commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose of claiming her
inheritance; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the
purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged
her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment, she claimed her share of the inheritance
from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated,
for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that
theory and declared that the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.

Issue:

Whether or not the action or procedure adopted by the Rosario Guevara was legal and has basis in law
and the Rules of Court.

Held: No, the procedure adopted by Rosario is not sanctioned by law or the rules.

We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in our opinion in
violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the
decedent.

Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a decedent
"without securing letter of administration." It does not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs
and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the
court for probate. The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two
different things, altho both may be made in the same case. the allowance of a will precedes the issuance
of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated without
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration. We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in
relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the
estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the
probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as
may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the
heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had
received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the
will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of
the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution
of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without
first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that "no will
shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second,
because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by
any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the
rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the
publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve
and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any
more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary
action for reinvindicacion or partition.

We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does not
sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent.

Doctrine:
Probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the
testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law.
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Roman Catholic Bishop of Tueguegurao vs. Prudencio

G.R. No. 187942, 7 September 2016
J, Jardeleza
Facts:
Petitioner's title over the Cagayan lot was derived from the title of Spouses Cepeda, who in turn obtained
their title from Teodora. Teodora, meanwhile, gained title over the entire Cagayan lot on the basis of the
Extra-Judicial Partition. It appears that Felipe Prudencio (Felipe) married twice during his lifetime. With
his first wife, Elena whome he got 5 children and his second wife Teodora whom he got two children,
Prudencio Jr. and Leonora. During the subsistence of his marriage with Elina, they acquired parcel of land
in Cagayan. When Elena died, Felipe and their children became co-owners of the property. Felipe then
died intestate during his second marriage with Teodora. Subsequently, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of Felipe with Waiver of Rights in favor of
Teodora. While the Extra-Judicial Partition acknowledged that the Cagayan lot was acquired during the
marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated that Felipe and Elena did not have any children who could inherit
the property; hence, Teodora and her children with Felipe are the only living heirs by operation of law.
The Extra-Judicial Partition also provided that Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora waived their rights over the
Cagayan lot in favor of their mother Teodora. Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to respondents Spouses Isidro
Cepeda who in turn sold the same to petitioner. On September 15, 1972, respondents-appellees filed a
Complaint for Partition with Reconveyance against the petitioner, Spouses Cepeda and Teodora,
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora before the RTC. They alleged that they are the children and grandchildren of
Felipe by his first marriage. They further argued that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful
shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when the Extra-Judicial Partition declared Teodora as
the sole owner of the Cagayan lot. RTC ruled in favor of respondents and declared the Deed of Extra
Judicial Partition of the Estate of Felipe Prudencio with Waiver of Rights executed by Prudencio Jr. and
Leonora as null and void.
Issue:

Whether or the extra-judicial partition executed by Prudencio and Leonora with waiver of rights in favor
of their mother Teodora was valid thus effecting the valid passing of ownership of the Cagayan lot to
Teodora so that in turn she had the right to sell the entire lot to the petitioner?

Held: No, the extra-judicial partition is not valid.

Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) state that all the children of
the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should participate in the settlement of his/her
estate.

Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that “Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs.–If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition”. 

Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor participation in the Extra-Judicial
Partition, the same is a total nullity. It is not binding upon them.

It is well-settled that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.

Thus, the Extra-Judicial Partition is void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. As a consequence, it has no force
and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and it cannot be validated either by time
or ratification.
Pahad D. Cadalay Block B
Atty. Michelle Villa-Real Basmayor
Special proceedings
06 February 2022

Doctrine:
To be valid, the extra-judicial partition must be executed with the participation of all the heirs, otherwise
it will be considered as total nullity and will not bind the obliterated heir.