Africa et. Al vs.

Caltex
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
J, Makalintal

Facts:

Private respondent Caltex (Phil) is the owner of a gasoline station. Sometimes in March 18, 1948 a fire
broke out in its service station in Manila. The fire started while the gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose
was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties
and effects inside them. One of the property owners is the petition in this case. They filed an action is for
damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code alleging that the negligence of Caltex was
the cause of the fire. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence on the part of the respondent hence the latter cannot be held liable for damages. No proof was
offered to prove the origin of the fire because the reports of the investigation officer were rendered in
admissible by the lower courts. Both the lower RTC and the CA refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
liquitor in this case. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

In the absence of the proof as to the origin of the fire, may the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor be applied in
this case such that the defendant can be presumed negligent?

Held:

Yes,

The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor provides that while it is the rule, that in case of noncontractual
negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause
of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principal that "where the thing
which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant
and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from
defendant's want of care. And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed
due care and diligence. This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for
itself).

The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who
knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of
want of care.

Gotesco Investment Corp vs. Chatto

G.R. No. L-87584 June 16, 1992
J, Davide Jr.

Facts:
Petitioner gotesco investment corporation is the owner of the Superma theater cinema. Sometime on June
4 1982, Private respondent Gloria Chatto together with her daughter went to see the movie “mother dear”
in said theater. After entering the theater, ceiling of its balcony collapsed. As a result of such collapse
respondents suffered physical injuries. Thereafter, she filed and action for damages against the petitioner.
The petitioner however disclaims any liability arguing that the collapse was due to force majeure. The
trial court granted the prayer of the respondent in award damages in her favor. The Court of Appeal a firm
in toto the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling of the theater was due to force majeure.

Held:

No, it is not,

As defined by jurisprudence, Force majeure means:

Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible;
such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death
of a person. (2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 122; Story in Bailments, sec. 25.)

Forced majure refers to any accident due to natural cause, directly, exclusively without human
intervention such as could have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pain and care
reasonably to have been expected (Bouvier).

The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by lightning,
earthquake, tempests, public enemy, etc.

It is settled that:

The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the
doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. 

This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:

Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that
caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper
care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant. 

That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.

Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the
collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence,
which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's
elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised
care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.

Batiquin vs. CA
G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
J, DAVIDE, JR

Facts:

Petitioner Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete
City. Sometimes on September 21, 1988, Petitioner Dr. Batiquin performed a simple caesarean section
upon private respondent Mrs. Villegas. Soon after she leave the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer
abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She then went to Dr. Batiquin and the latter
prescribed her some medications. As the pain persist, Mrs. Villegas went to another doctor Dr. Ma. Salud
Kho. The latter performed operation upon Mrs. Villegas and she found a foreign body which she
described as rubber glove. Dr. Kho concluded that this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the
ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery on September
21, 1988. The private respondent then filed an action for damages against the petitioner but the lower
court ruled in favor of the petitioner holding that the testimony of Dr. Kho is less worthy of belief than
those of Dr. Batiquin. The CA however, reversed the trial court ruling and hold that Dr. Batiquin is guilty
of negligence. The CA ruled that had she exercised due diligence, appellee Dr. Batiquin would have
found the rubber and removed it before closing the operating area.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor finds application in this case.

Held: Yes.

Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive testimony [that a piece
of rubber was indeed found in private respondent Villega's abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony
in favor of the petitioners.

As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has had occasion to delve into the nature
and operation of this doctrine:

This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen in those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care." Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:

Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does
not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby
negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the]
accident happened provided [the] character of [the] accident and circumstances attending
it lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence it would not have occurred
and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under [the] management and
control of [the] alleged wrongdoer. . . . Under [this] doctrine
. . . the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff
produces substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the
occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.

The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not
a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not
intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence
on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the
duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings
of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object
finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless
through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private respondent
Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear
in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section
performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for
negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the
adverse effects thereof.

Consunji vs. CA
G.R. No. 137873       April 20, 2001
J, Kapunan

Facts:

Jose Juego, worked as a construction worker at D. M. Consunji, Inc., own by the petitioner. While
performing his work as a carpenter, Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board
fell. It was established that the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety
lock. The wife of Juego then filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Juego’s
wife. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and applied the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor. Hence this
appeal, Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur,
but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."

Issue:

Whether or not the presumption of negligence provided under the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor arises even
if the defendant was able to prove that it exercises due care to avoid the accident.

Held:

Yes.

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
 negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the
injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control
or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendant’s want of care.

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available,
provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred. when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by
other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into
play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.
Macalinao vs. Ong
G.R. No. 146635 December 14, 2005
J, Tinga

Facts:
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver respectively at the (Genetron) owned and
operated by Sebastian. Sometime On 25 April 1992, Macalinao and Ong was instructed by Sebastian to
some heavy piece of machinery to Angat Bulacan. While they traversing the road, the truck then drove by
Ong hit and bumped into a private Jeepney which resulted to the death of Macalinao. An action for
damages was then filed against Ong before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a decision
awarding damages in favor of the Macalinao and declared that Ong was negligent and that Sebastian is
also negligent when he failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Ong. The CA reverse the decision of the RTC and declared that the evidence presented by
petitioners was woefully scant to support a verdict of negligence against Ong.
Issue:

Whether or not the evidence on record conclusively establish fault or negligence on the part of Ong and
justify the award of damages in favor of Macalinao’s representatives.

Held:

Yes.

Contrary to the above conclusion of the appellate court, the evidence on record coupled with the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently establishes Ong's negligence.

Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus,
it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present
along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an
inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that
there was no negligence on his part.

The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.
Under local jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:

(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;

(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant

or defendants; and

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.

We are convinced that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar.

No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is
negligent, thus, the first requisite for the application of the doctrine is present. Ong was driving the Isuzu
truck which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with the private
jeepney. Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact which shows
that the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence could be attributed to Macalinao
relative to the happening of the accident since he was merely a passenger in the Isuzu truck. Respondents'
allegation that Macalinao was guilty of contributory negligence for failing to take the necessary
precautions to ensure his safety while onboard the truck is too specious for belief particularly as
respondents did not even present any evidence to prove such allegation. The last requisite is, therefore,
likewise present.
Martinez vs. William Buskirk
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
J, MORELAND

Facts:

While riding a carromata on the left side of the road, the plaintiff saw a delivery wagon belonging to the
defendant coming towards her on the opposite side of the road. Instead of passing by the horse and wagon
ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff which causes serious physical injuries upon the latter.
Disclaiming liability, the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and
reliable cochero. The lower court found the defendant guilty of negligence. It appears from the undisputed
evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six
months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they
were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been,
therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the
merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who
delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant
on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.

Issue:
Whether or not, the defendant is guilty of negligence
Held:
No.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise
reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or
inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues.
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be
held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed, the very reason why they have been permitted
by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result
from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that,
because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The
fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in
any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case,
and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was
performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of  res
ipsa loquitur disappears.

Layugan vs. IAC

G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988

J, SARMIENTO

Facts:

Issue

Held

 
Rodriguez vs. CA
G.R. No. 121964 June 17, 1997
J, DAVIDE JR.

Facts:
On March 15, 1989, a fire broke out which razed two apartment buildings, owned by plaintiffs-appellants.
The plaintiffs then filed an action for damages against the respondent. They alleged that by reason of the
gross negligence and want of care of the construction workers and employees of the defendants-appellees,
the bunkhouse or workers' quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning the
adjacent buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants. On his part the respondent disclaim liability and
contended that he cannot be held responsible even if there was negligence on the part of the employees
for he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
workers. The lower court that the fire was not caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
defendants (private respondents) and award damages in favor of the respondent. On appeal to the CA, the
latter affirmed the lower court’s decision, but it deleted the award of damages in favor of the respondent.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to damages.
Held:
In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded
and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to
the payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. 11 Neither may exemplary damages be awarded where there is no evidence of the other party
having acted in [a] wanton, fraudulent or reckless or oppressive manner. 12 Since the award of exemplary
damages is unwarranted, the award of attorney's fees must necessarily be disallowed. 13 We find the award
of damages to be without adequate evidential [sic] basis.