PSBA vs. CA, 205 SCRA 729 G.R. No.
84698 February 4, of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
1992
Facts:
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
A stabbing incident on August 1985 prompted private
respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its
officers liable for the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third-
year commerce student who was stabbed while on the
premises of PSBA by elements from outside the school.
And that the private respondents alleged that the incident
was due to the school and its officers’ negligence,
recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during,
and after the attack on the victim.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the
suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably
sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint
states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence
on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the
afore-stated article.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. The Court
discussed that this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of
Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had
been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides
that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to
be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in
its custody. However, this material situation does not exist
in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants
negligence in providing proper security measures. This
the school could be made liable would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied by
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
the trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-
delicts.
Ruling: NO.
Because the circumstances of the present case present a
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, which are not governed by the rules on quasi-
delict. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express
or implied.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are
bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools
and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order
within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s
Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 G.R. No. 74761 November
6, 1990
DOCTRINE: it must be stressed that the use of one’s
property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code providType equation here .es that “the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS
Facts: Petitioner-spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, water paths
and contrivances (including an artificial lake) were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land; caused a young man to drown; damaged
petitioners' crops and plants; washed away costly fences;
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons; and exposed plants and
other improvements to destruction.
Issue:
Whether or not a corporation, which has built water paths,
water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby
causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held:
A careful examination of the complaint shows that the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil suffered.
Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict
are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.
Clearly, the water paths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the
land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a
causal connection between the act of building these water
paths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action, if proven, constitutes fault or negligence which may
be the basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights
and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of
an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
Wright vs. Manila Electric, 28 Phil 122 G.R. No. L-7760
October 1, 1914
One’s state of intoxication is generally irrelevant in the
determination of his negligence, but it is a factor that may
be considered.
FACTS:
Manila Electric operates electric street railways, one of
which runs along the street in front of Wright’s residence.
On night, as Wright passes Manila Electric’s railways in his
calesa, the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell,
causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails with great
force. Wright was thrown as a result sustaining injury.
Wright filed a civil complaint for damages against Manila
Electric contending that it was negligent in maintaining its
railways; that at the night of the accident, the rails were
above-ground at around 5-6 inches, given that the ties
upon which the rails rested also projected out of the
ground.
Manila Electric, on the other hand, said that Wright was
also negligent, being intoxicated at the time the accident
happened.
The trial court found both parties guilty, but the Manila
Electric’s negligence is greater than that of Wright. The SC
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Wright’s intoxication is the primary cause
of his injuries.
HELD:
No. Manila Electric, and as even ruled by the lower court, and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober
argued that had Wright been sober, he would have not man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to
been thrown off the calesa. This is mere guesswork and is draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation
not given credence by the SC because it’s just a and guesswork.
presumption that a sober man could have avoided such
accident. Intoxication is not negligence per se. It is the
general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk
or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be
imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required
than by a sober one. If one’s conduct is characterized by a
proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial
whether he is drunk or sober.
As a general rule, it is immaterial whether a man is drunk
or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be
imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required
to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own
protection than ‘by a sober one.
Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere
fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is
but a circumstance to be considered with the other
evidence tending to prove negligence.
The conclusion [by the trial court] that if Wright had been
sober, he would not have been injured is not warranted by
the facts as found. A horse crossing the railroad tracks
with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves
above-ground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing
and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such
force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw
a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition;
Bernal vs. House, 54 Phil 327 G.R. No. L-30741 January
30, 1930
Facts:
On April 10, 1925 the procession of Holy Friday was held
in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal came by to attend the religious
celebration. After the procession was over, Fortunata and
Purification passed along the Gran Capitan street. While
passing by, Purification is walking in advance but in a short
distance from her mother. Meanwhile, when in front of
the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction which
frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result
that she fell into the street ditch. At that time there was
hot water in this ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of
J.V. House. Hence, the child was immediately rushed into
the hospital. Unfortunately, the child died at that same
night. Dr. Benitez, the resident physician, certified that the
cause of death was the "3rd Degree Burn of the whole
Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion
of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen". Thus,
the petitioners filed an action for damages against the
private respondent.
Contentions raised before RTC: The private respondent
contended that it is not liable because the hot water was
permitted to flow down the side of the street of Gran
Capitan with the knowledge and consent of the
authorities; and that the cause of death was other than
the hot water, is the contributory negligence of the
mother and child.
RTC’s decision: The trial judge ordered for the dismissal of
the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs.
Issue: Doctrine: In determining the proximate cause of the
accident, distinction must be made between the accident
Whether or not the plaintiffs are guilty of contributory
and the injury, between the event itself, without which
negligence.
there could have been no accident.
Ruling:
Negative. The mother and her child had a perfect right to
be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the
evening when the religious procession was held. There
was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to walk along a
few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee
the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with
hot water. The sudden death of the child was due
principally to the extensive burns from the hot water. As
enunciated in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co., in determining the proximate cause of the
accident, distinction must be made between the accident
and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident. In the instant case, had
there been no hot water in the ditch, the falling of the
child in it could have probably resulted into mere physical
injuries. Thus, Article. 2176 is applicable, which explicitly
provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter. Also, assuming that the plaintiffs were guilty
of contributory negligence, the trial court would still be at
fault in dismissing the action for damages because the
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if
any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but could only
result in reduction of the damages.
Southeastern College vs. CA, GR No. 126389, 292 SCRA
422 (July 10, 1998)
Facts:
Private Respondents Dimaano are owners of a house in
College Road, Pasay City while petitioner Corporation,
South Eastern College, owns a four-story school building
along the same road. In October 1989, a powerful typhoon
called “Saling” hit the Metro. Buffeted by very strong
winds, the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped
off and blown away, landing and destroying portions of the
roofing of Dimaano’s house. An ocular inspection was
conducted by a team of engineers. They found that one
factor and perhaps, the most likely reason for the
dislodging of the roofing structural trusses is the improper
anchorage of the trusses to the roof beams, thus
recommending the building to be declared a structural
hazard
Respondents filed a complaint based on culpa aquiliana,
alleging that the damage to their house rendered the same
uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in other
houses. The Dimaanos sought to recover actual, moral and
exemplary damages, including attorney’s fees and costs
from petitioners. In their answer, Southeastern averred
that the building withstood several devastating typhoons
and other calamities in the past without its roofing giving
way, and that typhoon Saling was an act of God.
In giving credence to the ocular inspection, the Trial court
ruled in favor of the Dimaanos and ordered the
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from private
Southeastern to pay the decreed damages sought. The
respondent’s city building official, Jesus Reyna, that the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but reduced the
original plans and design of petitioner’s school building
award of moral damages.
were approved including the certificate of occupancy.
Issues: Having obtained both, these are, at the least, prima facie
evidence of the regular and proper construction of a
Whether or not the Southeastern College is liable for the
subject school building.
damage.
Held: No.
approved including the certificate of occupancy. Having
The antecedent of fortuitous event it is an event which
obtained both, these are, at the least, prima facie evidence
takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
of the regular and proper construction of a subject school
In order that a fortuitous even may exempt a person from
building.
liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by reason which the loss may
have been occasioned
As to the damages, it is not enough that the damage be
The typhoon being a fortuitous event, a natural capable of proof but must be actually proved with
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts
despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. At the that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
outset it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages are borne.
damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of fault or negligence. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence, not merely by
presumption or conclusions without basis of fact. The
Dimaanos merely relied on the ocular inspection, however
by this basis, the relationship of cause and effect has NOT
been clearly shown.
Pilipinas Bank vs. CA, 234 SCRA 435 (105410) (1994)
FACTS:
As payments for the purchased shoe materials
and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued postdated
checks to Winner Industrial Corporation for P20,927.00
and Vicente Tui, for P11,419.50, with due dates on
October 10 and 12, 1979. To cover the face value of the
checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB
Money Shop’s manager Mike Potenciano to effect the
withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his savings account therein
and have it deposited with his current account with
Pilipinas Bank(Filman Bank).Roberto Santos was requested
to make the deposit. Mike Potenciano then inquired from
the teller of Pilipinas Bank the current account number of
Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was
accomplishing. He was informed that it was “815” and so
this was the same current account number he placed on
the deposit slip below the depositor’s name FLORENCIO
REYES. Nothing that the account number coincided with
the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current Account
Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, though it was for Florencio
Amador who owned the listed account number. Thus, he
posted the deposit in the latter’s account not NOT
NOTICING THAT THE DEPOSITOR’S SURNAME IN THE
DEPOSIT SLIP WAS REYES. When the time of payment
came, all the delivered checks were dishonored due to lack
of funds. Furious over the incident, Florencio Reyes
immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an
immediate verification for his account. Upon verification,
the bank noticed error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in
the account of Florencio Amador was immediately
transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by
Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the
amount P32,000.00. on the basis of these facts, the trial
court ordered petitioner to pay to the private
responedent: (1) P200,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P25,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and (4) the costs of suit. CA affirmed the
ruling RTC.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Court of Appeals erred on a
matter of law, in not applying Article 2179, New Civil Code,
in view of its own finding that respondent Reyes’ own
representative committed the mistake in writing down the
account number.
RULING:
In determining the proximate cause of the injury,
it is first necessary to determine if defendant’s negligence
was the cause in fact of the damage to the plaintiff. In the
case, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of
petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash
deposit of private respondent in the name of another
depositor who had a similar first name.
the bank employee is deemed to have failed to exercise
the degree of care required in the performance of his
duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the
cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his
assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the
ledger without, however, going through the full name, is
the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should
have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which
was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear
certainty, considering the amount involved and the
repercussions it would create on the totality of the person
notable of which is the credit standing of the person
involved should a mistake happen.