North Korea: Another Country.

by Albina Apkina (2020230087, Department of International Studies)

 North Korea is one of the most mysterious and hidden countries on the planet. For most
states, it is an outcast, its political regime is considered anti-human, and a potential war with North
Korea is one of the most popular subjects for video games. However, the country's leadership
prefers to call its state a paradise on earth without any hesitation. Unfortunately, many
misconceptions about North Korea are ingrained in the public consciousness. As Northeast Asia
teeters on the brink of a conflict that could escalate beyond anyone's control, it is more important
than ever to be well-informed about North Korea and go beyond the usual caricatures of the
country and its leader, Kim Jong Un. It is important to understand that North Korea is like other
countries, with its history and culture. There are plenty of people who hear horrors like the shooting
of officials with a flamethrower, the slave status of workers, the shortage of food, the rejection of
new technologies. This research paper demolishes all the most common myths and proves that the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is like any other state on Earth.

Seventy years after the start of the Korean War, North Korea is close to acquiring the game-
changing capability to target the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon. Should war again break
out on the Korean peninsula, the threat is real. The North became a nuclear weapon state in 2006,
and in the subsequent years, it not only has developed and tested an intercontinental ballistic
missile, but also (per U.S. intelligence) mastered the ability to miniaturize a warhead to fit atop it.

The vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack is the precipitant of the current crisis
with North Korea. In 2017, President Trump tweeted, “It won't happen,” and called North Korean
dictator Kim Jong Un “a madman.”

President Trump also characterized North Korea as a “rogue” state – a unilateral American
political term, without standing in international law, that entered the U.S. foreign policy lexicon
after the Cold War. The policy lumped a disparate group of adversarial states – the Kim family’s
North Korea, as well as Saddam’s Iraq, Qaddafi’s Libya, and the Ayatollahs’ Iran – whose regimes
pursued weapons of mass destruction and supported terrorism.
 The “rogue” designation has carried an important connotation—that these are essentially
crazy states. As during the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, the imputation of irrationality has been
central to the argument for preventive military action to deny “rogue” regimes nuclear weapons.
In 2017, when North Korea was conducting nuclear and long-range missile tests and Washington
and Pyongyang were trading threats (such as Trump’s “fire and fury” tweet), then National
Security Advisor H.R. McMaster asserted that “classical deterrence theory” does not “apply to a
regime like the regime in North Korea.”

Yet North Korea’s leadership is not irrational. Its policies, which include the strategic use
of brinkmanship, are based on an inner logic whose paramount interest is regime survival.

Though North Korea is not a crazy state, it is not an ordinary country. The North’s
estimated GDP of $40 billion is dwarfed by South Korea’s $1.7 trillion. The country’s estimated
caloric intake per capita of 2100 calories a day is below the 2500 recommended by the United
Nations. The consequences are startling: the average five-year-old boy in North Korea is now nine
centimeters shorter than his counterpart in the South.

North Korea’s long-running economic crisis has played out against the backdrop of two
changes of leadership – Kim Il-sung, the founder of the North Korea state, to his son, Kim Jong Il,
in 1994, and then to his grandson, Kim Jong-un, in 2011. North Korea’s dynastic rule is essentially
a family cult. And yet North Korea – by many socio-economic indicators a failed state – is on a
possible trajectory by the early 2020s to acquire a nuclear stockpile one-half the size of Britain’s
or France’s arsenal!

In March 2018, then-CIA Director Michael Pompeo asserted that “the thing that is most
dangerous” about North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities is “the character who
holds the control over them today.” The surprise Singapore summit between President Trump and
“Dear Leader” Kim Jong-un in June 2018 changed the psychology of the nuclear crisis with North
Korea. The initiation of a diplomatic track pushed off consideration of a U.S. military option. Kim
Jong-un was now Trump’s partner in diplomacy, not the “madman” of his tweets.

Though the summit meeting yielded a joint statement in which the Kim regime pledged its
commitment to “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,” North Korea and the United States
have contending definitions of denuclearization. For Pyongyang, denuclearization would
essentially require the end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea and Japan, as well as the
end of the bilateral security agreement between Washington and Seoul. For Washington, it entails
the transformational goal of “CVID—complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization” of North
Korea. But after the U.S-led wars of regime change in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, zero nuclear
warheads will simply not be on the table as long as the Kim family rules in Pyongyang.

It has been 70 years since the beginning of the Korean War. Perhaps it is still a “forgotten
war,” but the two Koreas have become the center of world attention, albeit for different reasons.

The Republic of Korea, aka South Korea, is regarded as a mecca of 21st Century popular
culture. The world has embraced K-Pop, K-Movie (including Academy Award winner Parasite),
K-soap opera, Samsung mobile phones, Hyundai cars and K-test kits for coronavirus.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, aka North Korea, is called the “Hermit
Kingdom.” It is known for its nuclear weapons, human right abuses and its young leader, Kim
Jong Un.

Korea was divided into South and North in 1948. This partition set in motion what we
know as the Korean War – one of the most tragic conflicts in the history of the peninsula. Korean
War historiography developed as a part of the Cold War historiography. It has traditionalists,
revisionists and post-revisionists. The opening of primary sources in China and Russia since the
early 1990's has helped create new studies on the Korean War, introducing new aspects of the
conflict. It has also helped us see uniquely Korean aspects of the war that go beyond viewing it
merely as a proxy war between superpowers.
 What common misconceptions of the Korean War still linger? Let me dispel two key myths.

First, we remember 2020 as the 70th anniversary of the Korean War.

But the conflict did not start on June 25, 1950. And the invasion that is being remembered
this year did not come as a shock to Koreans.

The typical narrative of the Korean War is that shelling by the Korean People's Army
(KPA)'s field artillery on that day 70 years ago was a tactical move that surprised the Korean
people. This is wrong. The invasion made the Korean people feel not shock, but desperation. It
was the misery of knowing that conventional war had finally arrived.

Historians such as Allan Millett define the Korean War in three stages: a first war was from
1948 to June 25, 1950; a second war was from June 25, 1950 until the intervention of Chinese
Volunteer Forces in late 1950; and a third war from that intervention to the armistice on July, 1953.
Historian Bruce Cumings' excellent insight about the trajectory of the conflict is key: the Korean
Peninsula was already in a state of war long before June 25, 1950, and battling internal problems
including pro-Japanese collaboration, land reform and other issues.

To extend this point further: The Korean people had already suffered many casualties and
conflicts for two years before June 25, 1950. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans lost their lives in
diverse conflicts after the 1948 partition, including the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion in October
1948, the Jeju uprisings in 1948 and 1949, and numerous conflicts near the 38th Parallel.

Survivors remember the Yeosu-Suncheon rebellion as a greater nightmare than the Korean
War itself. More than three thousand people, including young children, died in it. Sixty thousand
people, including more young children, died during the Jeju uprisings. Neither one of these events
was conflict on a small scale. Nor did they have a smaller death toll than many battles in the Korean
War. So the KPA invasion in June 1950 was no surprise. Not in the least.

The second myth is about North Koreans. Films, novels and newspapers are filled with
images of the KPA as ideological robots – armed with weapons from the Soviet Union and
brainwashed by Kim Il Sung's dictatorship and Marxism.

Again, this is a serious misconception. It is true that most of commanders' positions in the
KPA were filled by veterans of the Korean Volunteer Army – soldiers with firm ideological beliefs
who had fought with Mao's Army against the Chinese Nationalists in China. These high-ranking
officers had rich experiences before they entered the KPA, where they developed ambitions and
made political connections.
 But most of the KPA was comprised of young Korean recruits. They were ordinary sons
of poor peasant families who wanted middle class jobs. How do we know? You can find their
letters to their parents, and application forms, including their family and education background
and personnel notes in National Archives Record Group 242 in the U.S. National Archives.

The U.S. Army captured these documents and sent them to Washington DC when they
advanced north to Pyongyang and beyond. These primary sources are a window into the personal
stories and backgrounds of young KPA soldiers. What did they want from their lives? What were
their dreams? Marxism and Leninism were new to them, and they did not care about ideology.
These ordinary young soldiers regarded the KPA as a job to feed their families.

The Korean War is not ended. The Korean Peninsula is the final stage of the Cold War.
Recent denuclearization talks are significant because they give a voice to forgotten ordinary
victims. They reveal people as human beings, outside the politicization of history. Unfortunately,
Cold War rhetoric still dominates in films, novels, scholarship and media about the Korean War.
It is time to focus on the stories of human beings, without using an ideological lens.

Let us analyze the myth of the semi-slave status of the worker in the DPRK. The minimum
wage in North Korea is between 5,000 and 10,000 North Korean won per day, which corresponds
to 135 to 270 thousand won per month. Here, however, the irrelevant dollar exchange rate appears.
At the 2015 exchange rate ($1 – 6,000 won), the factory worker's salary is about 300,000 won; at
the same time, miners have recently earned 700,000 won due to difficult conditions and risks. An
employee of, say, an institution for cultural relations with foreign countries or an association of
social sciences earns a little less (500-600 thousand won). The income of a scientist can be over a
million won. At the same time, these formal recalculations at the "black market" rate are
misleading. The "black" rate made sense when imports entered the country at the early beginning
of the 2000s. Living in the country is quite cheap. Also, there is the card system: the system of
state distribution of food products by cards is a thing of the past, but formally it is preserved as a
kind of tribute to tradition. The card system is becoming irrelevant because it has become possible
to buy products outside the card system for real money ("$10/a day" in essence means stable
prosperity).

The country has the right to an 8-hour working day. Depending on the production, it can
be reduced to 7 and 6 hours primarily in hazardous industries, working underground and in other
difficult conditions, as well as for women with several children (three or more). At the same time,
do not forget about the presence in the calendar of the DPRK of a large number of non-working
holidays, which give about twenty more days off a year. Paid leave is 15 working days in regular
production, from 21 to 36 days in heavy and harmful production. The right to work implies the
creation of safe hygienic and cultural conditions, with priority given to occupational safety and
health. It is constantly improving and improving. Child labor is prohibited; employment is allowed
from the age of 18.

Since the DPRK is not a member of the International Labor Organization, some of its legal
norms differ from other foreign countries. However, in most cases, Korean law guarantees workers
the same rights, and in some cases, broader rights than those recommended by the ILO conventions.
It includes a longer period of payment of temporary disability benefits (up to six months), longer
paid maternity leave, free treatment, and maintenance of disabled workers in nursing homes for
the elderly and disabled.

Those who speak of an 84-hour working week, as well as of an "unofficially working

Sunday," are greatly exaggerating. For example, the average working week in the Kaesong
Industrial Region (including overtime, officially 48 hours) was 55.2 hours per week in 2006, and
61.6 hours per week in 2012, but Kaesong is a special economic zone with foreign capital (that is,
it was such before it was closed in 2016). The working week is slightly longer than the Russian
one, for example, it is 6 days. There are also so-called "weeks of impact work", but they are laid
down in advance in the production calendar at each enterprise. At the same time, employees
receive an increased salary (overtime is paid), although the possibility of providing additional days
off is not implied. Construction workers (both civilian and army) work in 3 shifts, each for 8 hours.
Today, the interval of 40-60 hours per week is much closer to the truth, taking into consideration
all elements of the situation with the duration of the working day. It is difficult to guess what kind
of work accounts for more overtime, but we must not forget that it was only a couple of years ago
that we managed to sum up the results of the "difficult approach" and turn their eyes to the future.
The party and the government have celebrated it at the end of 2015 by paying a state award of 100%
of the salary to all workers including soldiers and students, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary
of the founding of the Workers' Party of North Korea. Accommodation is provided by the state as
well, and there are proves that it is sufficiently spacious.
 In the DPRK, nine branch trade unions are part of the Defense Industry (The Federation of
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)): heavy industry, light industry and trade, timber industry and
construction, fishing, transport, communication workers, education workers, health workers,
cultural workers. Since 1947, the Defense Industry has become a member of the World Federation
of Trade Unions. The association does not include the independent Union of Agricultural Workers
of Korea, established in 1965, and has 1.4 million members. It consists of both employees of state-
owned rural farms and cooperative farmers. The program tasks include carrying out a technical
and cultural revolution in the countryside, promoting the modernization of agricultural labor, the
implementation of advanced technologies, and improving the educational and cultural level of the
peasants. Both unions publish their media.

The Regulations on Labor Relations in enterprises with Foreign Investment and the Labor
Rules in Economic Development Zones contain a special provision on the right of employees to
engage in trade union activities and prescribe that the employer finance the activities of a trade
union organization. Even in a small enterprise, there is no trade union organization, at least one
representative of the staff must be elected. Collective agreements ("labor contracts") are concluded
between the trade union and the employer, and it is stipulated that a contract "concluded through
coercion or fraud" is not valid. The collective agreement must define the criteria for labor
protection, the amount of payment, cultural and sanitary conditions of work, working and rest
hours, the procedure for labor discipline, incentives and penalties. The consent of the trade union
organization to dismiss the employee is required.

A non-governmental organization such as the Korean Federation for the Protection of the
Disabled is also involved in labor protection activities. Its tasks, in addition to work on social
protection and social rehabilitation of disabled people, include the prevention of disability,
"creating conditions for zero disability".

A significant difference from international practice is the absence in Korean legislation of

a guaranteed right of an employee to leave at will-only the right to choose a profession and work
that corresponds to their abilities and interests is spelt out. This norm is due, on the one hand, to
the mobilization nature of the economy of the DPRK, and on the other, it is worth remembering
that in neighboring countries, with a different economic structure, the practice of lifelong
employment is also traditional, unusual for foreigners, but quite consistent with the Eastern
understanding of loyalty. Adopted in 1999. The Regulations on labor relations in enterprises with
Foreign Investments and the Rules on Labor in Economic Development Zones of 2013
demonstrate a departure from such practices.

The laws of the DPRK do not mention the right to strike, since workers allegedly have
enough other levers of influence on the management of enterprises. However, the Law on
Complaints and Petitions provides for the right to appeal to the authorities and the media, "to make
appeals and proposals to improve the work of state bodies, enterprises, organizations and officials.

A citizen, if he has reasons and grounds for this, can file an appeal or petition to an official,
organization, company, or authority, including the supreme power. In the DPRK, a complaint or
petition is the voice of the masses and a reflection of public opinion, and therefore, the evaluation
and processing of a complaint or petition are considered an important work to meet the needs and
protect the interests of the masses."

Legal regulation of labor relations:

• 1946 – the Law on Labor of Workers and Employees and the Law on Social Insurance is
adopted. Approximately at the same time, the equal rights of women, including in the labor
sphere, were enshrined in law. In the early years of the people's power in the DPRK, private
property was preserved, and laws were adopted precisely taking into account the labor relations
of employees and trade unions with the private owner.
• 1978 – The Law on Socialist Labor, with the latest additions of 1999, in force today.
• 1999 – Regulation on Labor relations in Enterprises with Foreign Investments.
• 2009 – Labor Rationing Act.
• 2013 – Labor regulations on the Economic development Site in the DPRK (also the Labor
Protection Law applies).

The rights of workers are also reflected in the Constitution:

• The State provides every worker with all the necessary conditions for obtaining food, clothing
and housing. (Article 25).
• Workers should be gradually freed from monotonous, physically heavy, tedious work, and the
distinction between physical and mental work should be reduced. (Article 27, paragraph 2).
• The State undertakes, at its own expense, to build industrial buildings for agricultural
cooperatives and modern houses in rural areas. (Article 28, paragraph 2).
• The responsibility of managers for subordinates is also regulated by articles 235 (Abuse of
Official Authority), 236 (Exceeding Official Authority), 239 (Violation of Order of Treatment
of Complaints and Petitions) of the DPRK Criminal Code.

The ‘crazy Kim’ hypothesis

In the 2004 comedy film Team America, Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il, is illustrative of
a popular view of North Korea that both feeds and is fed by the perception that the Kim regime is
irrational, crazy and evil. This caricature is a poor foundation on which to build a North Korea
policy. Proponents of this view point to the Kim regime’s horrendous human rights record and the
Orwellian social controls put in place to maintain the Kims at the head of North Korea’s unique
authoritarian political system. While the regime’s coercive arms have been responsible for crimes
against the North Korean people that could be considered “evil”, this does not suffice as an
explanation for why it engages in these practices.

The “why” is important. It feeds information into risk analyses and pinpoints leverage points
for strategic interactions with North Korea. We don’t have to like this logic or agree on its strategic
utility to see there is rational strategy at work. We need to locate Kim and his regime within the
context of the complex incentives and constraints of North Korea’s interwoven political, economic,
cultural and ecological systems.

It’s useful to step back from the whirlwind of recent developments to place the current situation
in the broader context of North Korea’s regime survival strategy. The regime’s brutal human rights
record is a result of measures to consolidate its internal power.
 Over time, the Kim family has become adept at “coup-proofing” its rule by playing off
potential institutional rivals against each other and purging individuals when they become too
prominent within the institutional hierarchy.

The tentacles of the regime’s coercive power reach all the way from institutions to people’s
everyday lives through surveillance, social controls and ideological indoctrination. It is a brutal
reality that these kinds of oppressive measures are the rational and predictable way politics is
practised in authoritarian dictatorships.

The ‘irrational Kim’ hypothesis

This also means we should pause before equating North Korea’s human rights abuses with any
perceived irrationality in the country’s external relations. Here one needs to understand the unique
logic of North Korean foreign policy. To this end, it sees hard military power as the only reliable
means of guaranteeing its security.

North Korea’s foreign policy behavior generally emphasizes the utility of military force as its
only credible security guarantee in what it perceives to be a strategically hostile environment. Its
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities are the ultimate practical expressions of this
worldview.

When we analyze North Korea’s behavior from its own perspective, we can recognize the logic
of their actions. That does not mean that we agree with that logic. But it does give us a more
informed foundation upon which to respond to those actions.

Coverage of North Korea and its nuclear program often seems to take place in a parallel
universe, where the overwhelming military power disparity between it and the US does not exist.
The Trump administration’s position appeared to view the North Korean leadership as evil and
unpredictable, buying into the logic of the “crazy Kim” idea. It sees a clear and imminent threat to
the US in North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and in propaganda that
consistently threatens the US with annihilation.

It is easy to be fearful of the worst-case projections of the “crazy Kim” hypothesis. However,
the strategic logic of that position just doesn’t add up. Korean Central News Agency and associated
propaganda organs of North Korea have a long history of threatening the US, South Korea and
Japan with destruction. But we should bear in mind that inflammatory rhetoric is a tool of weakness,
not strength.
 North Korea’s other lever of power projection is its nuclear weapons program. Here the key
point is to emphasize that military capabilities do not automatically equate to the intention to use
them. We need more information beyond the raw capabilities of North Korea’s military
technologies to perform a thorough risk assessment. North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile
launches can be understood from the perspective of deterrence.

Analysis of North Korean strategy over a long period suggests its leadership is overwhelmingly
concerned with survival and sees needing nuclear weapons as necessary to secure itself in a hostile
strategic environment. A North Korean first-strike against the US or its regional allies would
inevitably invite an overwhelming retaliation from the US that would end the regime.

Unfortunately, some media outlets unwittingly misrepresent this context when they show maps
of concentric rings illustrating the operational ranges of North Korea’s various different ballistic
missiles, without explaining the strategic context in which those missiles are deployed. For
example, while Chicago and Los Angeles are theoretically in range of North Korea’s Unha-3
multi-stage intercontinental ballistic missile, so too are Beijing, Mumbai, Moscow and Darwin.
Those cities have no strategic value as potential targets for North Korea. However, non-experts
could be forgiven for not grasping that from missile range maps alone.
 Media coverage of North Korea that focuses on Kim ironically echoes official propaganda
from North Korea that equates the leader to the entire country. The reality of North Korea is far
more complex.

The gulag system and human rights abuses of the Kim regime are well documented. However,
not everyone in North Korea is starving or in a detention camp. The lifestyles of Pyongyang
residents and those of the other larger cities is relatively high by North Korean standards. This
functions as an incentive for citizens to follow the rules and do their jobs well.

There is a diversity of life experiences across North Korea, lived by ordinary people who are
trying to get on the best they can in the society in which they find themselves.

Those life experiences are being reshaped by dynamic social change processes. Rather than
economic sanctions, it has been North Korea’s connection to the Chinese economy that has done
more to alter the life circumstances of ordinary North Koreans and the country’s domestic politics.

The continuing marketisation of the North Korean economy has created noticeable changes in
popular culture and consumption habits in urban centers. These changes have been funneled
through North Korea’s special economic zones. The supply chain networks of suppliers and clients
undergirding market activities provide an avenue for social organisation outside of official social
controls. The rise of a class of nouveau riche North Koreans is changing the dynamics of the
nation’s economy and reshaping the relationship between the government and the people.

The assumption is that Pyongyang desperately needs economic assistance from the outside
world and the only way to get it is for the North to give up its nuclear weapons. It is wrong. North
Korea did come close to being a failed state during the 1990s because of mass starvation. But
Pyongyang weathered that storm. The regime is firmly in the saddle and its new leader has enacted
measures to vitalize party control. The economy has stabilized and even improved. Despite
sanctions, trade has expanded significantly, not just with China but also with South and Southeast
Asia, Africa, and Europe to the point where the North may have even enjoyed a current account
surplus in 2011. But conditions in Pyongyang are better and improving, certainly compared to
stagnation in the countryside, where periodic and chronic food shortages persist. There is no
comparison between the North and developed countries like South Korea. But it fits in if compared
to developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

To completely clear the perception, let us deal with the other fake news and where they
are coming from.

To do this, we will conduct a brief analysis of some of the most resonant news that shook the
world in recent years.

“Terrible news comes from the DPRK. The leader of the most closed country in the world,
Kim Jong-un, burned the Minister of Public Security, Oh Son-hong, with a flamethrower. The
official was guilty of being close to the uncle of the head of state, Jang Song Thaek, whom he
executed last winter, the Daily Mail reports.”
 In general, it is quite possible to believe that with the widespread corruption in the DPRK, the
deputy minister could well stand at the top of the corruption pyramid. And against the background
of the purge that has begun, which some perceive as a fight against corruption, and others as the
destruction of Jang's supporters as part of a power struggle (in my opinion, these versions are quite
complimentary), Oh Sang Hong could become its victim. Such purges take place not only in the
DPRK but also in China.

All journalists refer to the Daily Mail, the Daily Mail refers to Chosun Ilbo, well known for its
anti-North Korean stance and a large number of previously released fake news about the DPRK,
and Chosun Ilbo once again refers to an unnamed source. There is no fact that this source
potentially exists. But the DPRK remains under review of propaganda. The mass audience loves
horror and sensationalism, and the combination of this with the closeness of North Korea and its
reputation forces editors to spread more of that kind of news.

In 2013, soon after a young Kim Jung-un came to power, when The Chosun Ilbo, a
conservative newspaper in South Korea, reported the execution of North Korean singer Hyon
Song-wol for violating the countries pornography laws. According to the report, the singer was
“executed with machine guns while the key members” of her orchestra watched. The report,
however, turned out to be false. A few months later Hyon was seen on state television and, recently,
has taken up the role of Vice Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, a high-profile
job within the Korean Worker’s Party which gives her authority over how the regime presents
itself to the public and the outside world.

Recently, another rumor made the rounds of South Korean conservative media. On May 31,
The Chosun Ilbo circulated a rumor that Kim Jung-un executed Kim Hyok-chol, his main nuclear
negotiator, along with four other Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel via firing squad for alleged
wrongdoings after the Hanoi Summit. As expected, the news quickly made international headlines,
with western experts urging caution until the story could be confirmed. Again, the story turned out
to be false; One of the “purged” officials appeared days later in state media and recent reporting
has revealed that Kim Hyok-chol is alive in North Korea.

What spurs the spread of such news? Stories about the DPRK attract a lot of attention. It is
easy to understand why editors like them – you can publish unreliable and sensational information,
justifying that North Korea is a closed country, and there is no way to verify the information. It
also adds an unpleasant choice of editors – you can wrap a curious story, what if it is true? The
development of the Internet has also played a role: it is easier to extract information, but it is more
difficult to verify its authenticity. After a series of repostings, the source becomes lost, and the
news itself gets additional details according to the principle of a telephone game. However, in the
presence of a large audience, any horror stories successfully distributed. The image of North Korea
is formed both from real actions and as a result of a broad campaign of demonization that is why
any news of the corresponding direction will be perceived uncritically. As the Telegraph's Tim
Stanley notes, "The North Korean regime is so mad and violent that it's hard not to believe any of
the stories that are being told about it." Even if it's news that North Korea is using kittens as targets.
American journalist Isaac Stonefish of the Foreign Policy newspaper even jokingly formulated the
rule that American journalists can write anything about North Korea, and it is taken for the truth.
Labels applied to North Korea, such as "Hermit State", "secretive", and "unpredictable, " create
catchy headlines and sell easily. Stories about North Korean madness are always on the front pages,
but in fact, the portrayal of the DPRK regime as irrational is deliberately false and provocative.

Did you know that North Korea sends hundreds of students overseas for educational and
business training? Thousands of North Koreans work in China, in Mongolia where they produce
goods for popular British clothing brands, in Kuwait where they work on construction projects,
and in Russia where they labor in logging camps. A North Korean construction company is
currently completing a museum near Cambodia's famed Angkor temples featuring computer-
generated simulations of the ancient monuments. Inside North Korea, just to give a few examples,
the information technology sector is an outsourcing destination for other countries, even
developing software and apps for the iPhone. Pyongyang's sophisticated cartoon industry is
reported to have been involved in the production of "The Lion King." The German Kempinski
group has been hired to operate Pyongyang's largest hotel expected to open this spring. And
residents and visitors to Pyongyang can now find Viennese coffee at the appropriately named
"Viennese Coffee Restaurant." Of course, North Korea is not an integral part of the international
community, but neither is it a "hermit kingdom."

Often, information is distributed in the following way: intelligence informs South Korean
politicians who transmit information to the media, allowing various inaccuracies, especially
necessary for journalists who are hungry for sensationalism. South Korean officials regularly
inform the media anonymously, so they are not responsible if the information turns out to be
incorrect. In addition, the NIS (South Korea's National Intelligence Service) is accused of
spreading unverified information, such as, for example, a false report on the execution of General
Lee Yong-il, which describes North Korea as a dangerous and unstable country. According to the
American historian Bruce Cumings, the special services of the Republic of Korea for a long time
misinformed foreign journalists. The popular media in South Korea deliberately do not talk about
the positive aspects of the DPRK, so that they are not perceived as supporting the North Korean
government. Journalists explain that when assessing any source who speaks about the DPRK while
in South Korea, one should take into account the local law on state security. According to this,
almost any positive review of the DPRK can be interpreted as propaganda in the interests of the
enemy with quite serious consequences. And precedents have already taken place among ordinary
bloggers and university professors.

It is impossible not to say that the methods and approaches of North Korean propaganda are
still outdated. What worked in the 1950s or continues working well inside the DPRK. The language
of diplomacy has changed dramatically. The vocabulary that is unusual for diplomatic statements
in conjunction with an extraordinary expression diverts attention to themselves that the meaning
of a message is lost. People remember how North Korea threatened to turn the South into a" sea
of fire" while at the same time forgetting about the context in which this threat was made. And as
a result, the perception that North Korea is constantly threatening someone is reinforced, as one
vivid image impacts another. The propaganda of the DPRK could attract a large number of neutral-
minded people by changing its approach.
 Books and films about the DPRK are not always true ones.

At the end of 2014, a scandal broke out around the testimony of Shin Dong-hyuk who co-
authored the bestseller "Escape from Camp 14" with American journalist Harden Blaine: the North
Koreans published materials according to which Shin served time, but not there, and was not born
in the camp; his father was not executed; traces of torture turned out to be traces of an industrial
injury; he fled the country after a criminal case was brought against him; Sin began to criticize
other defectors, and then even Harden Blaine said that almost all the vivid details are for the sake
of creating a dramatic effect. Barbara Demick's book is more complicated. There were also
consultations with Koreanists, and a survey of defectors, but all this was wrapped up in an artistic
and dramatic style of narration, which is well perceived by the average reader.

In the DPRK, foreign citizens are not imprisoned for no apparent reason.

For the first time, a precedent with the arrest of a foreigner occurred in 1996: an American
Evan Hunziker swam across the Yalu River border with China in a state of alcoholic intoxication
and was detained by border guards. Hunziker was accused of espionage but got put in a decent
hotel, for which his family later had to pay. The American delegation led by the US Permanent
Representative to the UN, Bill Richardson, eventually managed to secure Hunziker's release.
Another trespasser had to be rescued by Jimmy Carter. Since then, the North Korean authorities
have arrested US citizens under the pretext of violating the rules of conduct or crossing the border;
the arrest followed by a trial and a sentence implying a long time in prison. Obviously, they would
not have to serve their sentence for a long time: even before the trial, the North Korean side began
to hint to the Americans that in order to release the citizen, Washington should send a delegation
to Pyongyang, headed by a high-level politician, possibly retired, but well-known.

Arrested foreigners were not sent to ordinary prisons but were kept in specially arranged rooms,
where they are treated quite politely and provide an acceptable level of comfort by European
standards. This attitude makes political sense: from the very beginning, it is envisaged that
foreigners will be released fairly quickly, therefore, stories about the conditions of their prison life
will affect the image of the DPRK in Western public opinion. The purpose of such arrests is
twofold. First, the authorities want to remind the guests that in the DPRK, they should behave
appropriately to their name and status. Second, and more importantly, the arrests are used for
internal propaganda purposes. Each release of another detained alien is accompanied by a visit
from a high-ranking official, who has to apologize for the real or fictional actions of the released
person.

On the eve of 2016, before entering the University of Hong Kong, Otto Warmbier entered
North Korea as a tourist. Apparently, Warmbier, being not quite sober, tried to steal a propaganda
poster but failed. He told about it at the wrong time: he was pulled out of the queue and taken away.
What was later announced as a confession is more like a conversation between spies: an alleged
acquaintance from the Protestant church offered him some extra money and said that if he steals a
large poster and brings it, he will receive 20 thousand dollars (or in case of problems, his family
receive 200 thousand dollars). However, the moment of pulling off the poster was captured on
CCTV cameras. In addition, the case involved the testimony of witnesses and fingerprints.
 At the court hearing, Warmbier was sentenced to 15 years in prison (article 70 of the Criminal
Code of the DPRK – "Antagonism against the Korean People"). The content of Article 70 of the
Criminal Code of the DPRK: "A foreign national who violates the person or property of a Korean
national who is residing or staying overseas or stirs ethnic disharmony with the purpose of showing
hostility to the Korean people shall be sentenced to a term of reform through the labor of more
than 5 years and less than 10 years. In particularly grave cases, he or she shall be sentenced to a
term of reform through the labor of more than 10 years. " In fact, according to such an article, you
can ride some bloggers that call for the DPRK to be wiped off the face of the Earth if they decide
to visit the DPRK, and the receiving party will be aware of their creativity. Based on European
ideas, the sentence looks wild, and at the same time, the wildness of one region in another can be
perceived as completely adequate punishment. You can recall how in countries like Singapore, a
bag of marijuana accidentally "forgotten" in your pocket becomes a reason for a similar prison
term or the death penalty of a Western tourist. A similar fate would have awaited Otto Frederick
if, while in Thailand, he had tried in the same way to tear off a poster with the image of the king
as a souvenir: the local laws on insulting the majesty are significantly superior to the North Korean
ones in terms of possible rigidity. On the other hand, in the United States, you can get a similar
sentence for a photo that may be considered unacceptable. In some cases the reaction to such a
sentence comes down to "What the hell is that!", and in another to "these are national and cultural
peculiarities, it's unpleasant, but we must comply with the laws". The point in such a case is not
hooliganism but sacrilege.

If a high-ranking North Korean official disappears from the news and chronicles, he is
not necessarily killed or imprisoned.

South Korean conservative media has been very eager to spread this image by releasing thinly
sourced reports on possible purges of high-ranking officials in the Kim regime for seemingly petty
offenses. There is a high probability that the official fell into disgrace and was demoted in rank,
sent for re-education. After working for several years as an ordinary collective farmer or the
director of a sawmill, a person pops up again – at an equivalent or lower post, and the list of such
people who have been temporarily disgraced is quite large. In recent years, there have been escapes
of representatives of the bureaucracy, but this has largely been the result of the anti-corruption
campaign. The fugitives were distinguished themselves by having access to significant amounts
of foreign currency and commodity smuggling.

Family life in North Korea is not a model of patriarchy.

In the North, they see the family as a unit of society with appropriate rhetoric. The priority of
the partners' moral obligations is constantly emphasized as well as the revolutionization of women
by freeing them from heavy domestic labor and attracting them to work outside the home. Mothers
have five months of paid maternity leave in the country: two months before giving birth and three
after which is more than in some highly developed countries. Then, as a rule, children are sent to
a nursery and then to kindergartens. Education in this way falls on the nursery and kindergartens,
where the children stay all week. Let us not forget that it is desirable to get married only after
receiving a higher or professional education (at the age of 26-27 years). By this age, a person has
time to serve in the army or get special education. The combination of family life with higher
education is not welcome. In general, from the North Korean point of view, the recording of the
civil status act is intended to record not a certain level of relations between a man and a woman,
but the emergence of a new independent family as a unit of society.

We should not think that there are no new information technologies in the DPRK at all.

The state is trying to develop information technologies, combining this with strict control of
access to them (on the principle of a "mosquito net"). To access the global network, you need to
select the necessary resource from the catalogue, after which access will be granted to it. For school
students and university students, the local Intranet (An intranet is a computer network for sharing
information, collaboration tools, operational systems, and other computing services within an
organization, usually to the exclusion of access by outsiders. The term is used in contrast to public
networks, such as the Internet, but uses most of the same technology based on the Internet Protocol
Suite) is accessible from the library building of Kim Il Sung University or the Temple of Science
and Technology, which is not only an analogue of the Polytechnic Museum but an electronic
library with access to several databases. The schools have a mandatory computer science course
and computer classes, the equipment which is at the Pentium 4 level, and the operating system is
Windows 2000, but its localization. Access to the Intranet and the Internet have 2-3 computers in
a separate room. There is also social life on the Intranet, chats, bulletin boards, an analogue of a
social network and dating websites.

Orascom, an Egyptian telecommunication company had partnered with Korea’s state owned
KPTC to launch the DPRK’s very first 3G Koryolink service in 2008. In 2013 the service was first
offered to foreigners travelling or working in North Korea which was then quickly restricted to
only foreigners working in North Korea.

The 3G service that is provided in North Korea is stable. It is relatively fast, and it covers any
area in Pyongyang and most of the rural cities.
 The 3G sim-card is locked to the cellphone registered using IMEI so swapping the card out
into another international mobile phone, or to a local phone will not work. Preventing North
Koreans from having access to the internet with their local 3G service.

It is estimated as many as six million North Koreans, about a quarter of the population, now
have mobile phones. The cellphones they have accessed to are locally made North Korean phones
and will only work inside the DPRK. They are able to connect the intranet which gives them access
to news, weather, online dictionary, games, a local Wikipedia and beauty apps.

Entry into the country is carried out in two ways – a tourist trip, or as part of a scientific or
humanitarian delegation. North Korea is very keen on encouraging tourists. In 2015, Kim Jong Un
welcomed the idea of initiating new tourism projects to help increase foreign tourist numbers of
up to two million visitors each year. Although figures from 2019 show tourism numbers reached
as high as 300,000 for Chinese tourists and a little over 4,000 for western tourists. There is still a
long way to go. What does help though is the DPRK visa process is very simple. The only people
who have trouble getting visas are journalists – which may be why some media outlets continue
to perpetuate this myth.
 This is a common misconception especially for westerners. The only nationalities restricted
from travel to North Korea are tourists travelling on South Korean (Republic of Korea) and United
States of America (USA) passports. All other nationalities are legally allowed to visit the DPRK.

You can not only visit Pyongyang and the DMZ, or a few places near Pyongyang.

This myth is one of the more understandable ones as it is common for many tours to North
Korea to have similar itineraries. The real reason for this is the same reason why lots of tour
programs to other popular destinations like Beijing, Paris or London all look relatively similar.
Tourists want to see certain highlights when they travel to particular destinations.

Most tourists wanting to travel to North Korea want to visit Pyongyang, the capital city and
see the unique sites such as the Juche Tower, Korean War Museum, Arch of Triumph, Ryugyong
Hotel, the Mausoleum, Kim Il Sung Square, the Pyongyang Metro, and so on.

In Pyongyang there are bicycle tours, marathon tours, culinary tours, farming tours, Korean
language study tours where you can experience being an expat in Pyongyang, and a lot more.

It is possible to travel to eight out of the nine provinces of the DPRK. There are tours to visit
North Hamgyong province – the largest and most rural province in the country, Rason Special
Economic Zone, Mt. Kumgang in Kangwon province, Samjiyon & Mt. Paektu in Ryanggang
province, Hamhung – DPRK’s second largest city located in South Hamgyong province, Sinuiju
in North Pyongan province, and much more.
 Trips to Korea are not eternal monitoring.

A guide from a travel company meets you immediately at the airport and accompanies you to
the hotel, but first, there is a tour of the capital. Transportation between remote cities takes place
by minibus; similarly, between remote areas within the same city, but in the city, it happens by
walking. The schedule of excursions is busy. In the evening/at night/in the morning, it is also not
forbidden to go for a walk from the hotel to the city in general; similarly, there are no prohibitions
on movement and restrictions on entry/exit hours in the hotel itself, there is no monitoring of
oneself. To continue from above’s North Korean tourism myth, it is commonly believed that the
Korean guides are there to spy on you and monitor your reactions to things, collect information,
etc. The reality is they work for the government in the same way most people in North Korea do;
they work for a state-owned enterprise that largely runs itself and is primarily interested in
remaining as a sustainable business.

Local guides are hired for travel companies within North Korea to pursue their interests and
career in tourism. They are hired based on their leadership, communication, knowledge, problem
solving and people skills.
 The majority of North Korean guides are fresh out of Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies,
Tourism University, Kim Il Sung University or Commercial University after obtaining a
bachelor’s in foreign language or tourism.

Some guides around the age of 30 years of age might be switching jobs as their previous jobs
may have involved foreign trade, translating, or working aboard. There has been a rise in this
recently as UN sanctions have prevented most North Koreans from continuing work in this field
and are left to aid the growing tourism sector.

Older guides around 40 years+ may be ex-military. The ones we have met were previously a
translator, radio communications, a driver or someone with more of an interesting position with
fascinating stories to share. As odd as it seems for an ex-military personnel to join tourism, it does
make sense as most locals serve in the military.

The local Korean guides are there to ensure you do not wander off away from the group on
your own as it is against local law, and to ensure tourists stay out of trouble. The same goes for
tour guides in most countries. Generally, though the most successful Korean guides are the ones
who love their job, are incredibly eager to guide you around their country and enjoy meeting new
people from around the globe.
 There is no doubt Pyongyang is the best city in the country, but its purpose wasn’t to be built
just to deceive the very few foreign visitors it receives each year into thinking the place is without
problems.

As mentioned earlier it’s very simple to travel well beyond Pyongyang so it would pretty much
automatically defeat the purpose of trying to fool us foreigners. Feel free to begin a discussion
with your local guides and they will usually be quite open to talk to you about the problems the
country faces and why they feel these problems exist.

Pyongyang is a functioning city, people do ride the metro to work, they live in the apartment
buildings, and they go about life every day. It may not be possible for everyone to live in
Pyongyang, but the city and the people in it are still people trying to make a living.

You cannot take photos in North Korea.

This is another outdated myth of North Korea. In the early years of tourism, it wasn’t
possible to take photos outside of Pyongyang, or during your bus ride within Pyongyang. As
tourism grew in the DPRK, officials and locally owned tour operators became more relaxed with
this regulation and now photography is certainly possible to take in the country during your tour.
The only requirements of photography are no photos of military personnel or construction sites.
Photos of soldiers at the DMZ within certain sections are totally fine.

Life in North Korea.

Birth.

Parents are required to register the birth of a baby, with information about the the new
citizen kept in three places: at the local town hall, with the police and with the secret police.

The first thing a newborn gets from the state is its songbun – one of the five social statuses
allocated to all North Koreans. Depending on the status of its father, the infant will be classified
as either “special”, “nucleus”, “basic”, “complex” or “hostile”.

A policeman will stamp the songbun on the baby’s new file, establishing where this North
Korean will be allowed to live, which university it will be able to enter, where it might work and
whether it will be able to join the Korean Worker’s party.

The newborn becomes entitled to access the Public Distribution System of goods, which,
theoretically, will provide everything it needs. In practice, the system has largely been
dysfunctional since the 1990s.

Soon after birth the baby is inoculated against tuberculosis.

 When a child turns five, she usually goes to kindergarten, where her education begins.

Schooling.

The North Korean school system consists of two stages. Primary school is called “people’s
school” and secondary is “middle-high”.

The curriculum consists of classes such as Korean language, mathematics, literature and
“socialist ethics” – which may be a remnant of the Japanese colonial age. Imperial Japan was fond
of teaching ethics in school. Foreign languages are taught from secondary school. The most
common one is English. British English is taught as a standard.

The best North Korean schools are known as Number One schools. A small town usually
has one of these, while Pyongyang has several.

At 10 all children join the Children’s Union – there are no exceptions. The admission is
usually done in three stages. First, the best pupils in the class are admitted, then the average ones
and then the rest. The Children’s Union members have a distinctive trait of wearing red neckties,
a custom that comes from the USSR. So, the Children’s Union is the first of many organizations a
North Korean will join in their lifetime. Other possible ones are the Youth League, the Korean
Workers Party, the Women’s Union, a labor union, and the Farmers’ Union. These groupings run
regular “organizational life” seminars for members, instructing them in the official ideology. i.e.,
regular ideological sessions, among its members.

You become a legal adult in North Korea at 17 and immediately receive one of two types
of documents – identifying you as either a resident of Pyongyang or not.

This is also the age when all North Koreans will join the youth league, officially named the
Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League. This organisation is a copy of the Soviet komsomol, however,
unlike the USSR, membership is universal.

Party people.

If you live in North Korea, the single most important factor that will determine the course
of your life is whether or not you become a party member.

Rather than a normal political party, it is a huge bureaucratic structure which strives to
oversee the country’s economy and society in its entirety.

All members of the North Korean elite, including all the officers in the army, police and
secret police, are party members. In fact, becoming a party member is the only way to aspire to a
high social position.
 The party’s structure is quite similar to the Communist party of the Soviet Union: every
administrative unit has a committee which serves as the local government. The country as whole
is ruled by the Central Committee, which is presided over by the Politburo.

Unlike the USSR, there is one more step: the Politburo’s Standing Committee, which, like
in China, is the highest ruling body in the country. And, finally, the head of state in First Secretary
Kim Jong-un. The procedure for admission into the party has been copied from the Soviet Union:
an applicant needs two recommendations from existing members and approval from the local
organizing committee. If accepted, the applicant is first admitted as a candidate member and is
eligible to become a full member after a year. Entrants receive a a membership card, which is
actually a a small book with a few pages. The party booklet is fetishized in communist countries;
losing it is considered a serious offence. Immediately, after admission a new party member is
granted access to the lowest-level classified documents that are “for party members only”.

The party is huge, with more than five million members. Since the population is 24 million,
a motivated person with an acceptable songbun (social stature) has a good chance of being
admitted.

The most secure way to gain acceptance to the party is to join the military. Although this
requires a long term of service, 10 years for men and three to six years for women, many North
Koreans decide that party membership is worth the sacrifice.

Political officers decide on admission to the military, so the shortest way to achieve party
membership is to be an exemplary student at political training sessions and have good relations
with the political officer of your unit.

Higher education.

The army also provides opportunities to those who wish to go to university: after four years
of service, you can sit an internal exam and those who pass are allowed to apply to study. They
will then sit a university exam and, if successful, gain admission.

All North Koreans, regardless of whether they serve four or 10 years in the army (or do not
serve at all, as bribes can overcome every hurdle), are able to choose to study further.

About a sixth of the population does go to university. Of course, universities have their
own hierarchy. The most prestigious institution is the Pyongyang University of Science and
Technology (Pust), which was created by Kim Jong-il and has some strange traditions. All courses
are taught in English by professors who are all foreigners. The majority of North Korea’s Number
One university professors are Christian fundamentalists, whose trips are sponsored by their church.
 Kim Il-sung University and Pyongyang University of Foreign Languages compete for the
second place. Formally, Kim Il-sung University is considered superior but in practice foreign
languages are better taught in the University of Foreign Languages. Graduates are usually fluent
in one foreign language and have some knowledge of another. The next level is occupied by other
prestigious institutions such as the University of Foreign Relations, Kim Chaek University of
Technology and Pyongsong University of Science. The rest follow somewhere behind.

Songbun is an important factor in a potential student’s chances of success, and someone

with a good bloodline will have relatively few problems gaining admission.

Higher education usually lasts five years, as there is no Master’s degree in North Korea.
Rather there are two senior academic degrees: “candidate” and “doctor”.

Family life.

North Koreans typically marry between 27 and 30 and have several children.

These days it is usually the father who takes care of the children while the mother works
all day in a market or the private sector.

Apart from work and child-rearing, adults have to attend to regular ideological sessions in
their local organizations. However, under Kim Jong-un, these sessions are less regular and less
vigorous than in the Kim Il-sung age.

But life is not only about work and politics. People do rest, spending their free time with
their friends and relatives. North Koreans like cinema, especially Soviet films. Just like
everywhere else in the world, North Koreans like visiting each other, dancing – often in the open
air – and strolling.

Working life.

The most prestigious careers are party, military, diplomatic and academic placements.

Those choosing a military career stay in the army after their conscription term is over. As
there are many applicants not everyone is able to become an officer, but a persistent person with
acceptable songbun can expect to eventually rise to the rank of colonel.

The first step necessary for a diplomatic career would be a diploma from a university like
the Pyongyang University of Foreign Languages or the University of Foreign Relations.
 The best graduates are offered a choice: you could join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or
become a guide who works with foreigners, for example. Those who choose the former and pass
all inspections are given a red diplomatic passport and sent to an embassy to work.

For a successful academic career, one is required to publish articles.

Market forces.

Not everyone is able to rise up the ranks. Some people become bureaucrats; others are
employed by a state-run enterprise. But the majority of the middle class are in some way connected
with markets. Since virtually everything from food and clothes to appliances and books is bought
and sold there, the North Korean middle class mostly consists of market traders. The lower classes
in North Korea are workers and farmers.

Later years.

An important event for Koreans from both North and South is a parent’s 60th birthday
(known as hwanggap). Children are expected to throw a party and lay on good food for guests,
partly as a way to show their parents how successful they have become.

For some time, the North Korean authorities tried to suppress this custom but in 1972, when
Kim Il-sung turned 60, hwanggap became a respected tradition instead of vestige of feudalism.

North Korea, being a communist country, has a pension system.

When a North Korean dies, the state provides relatives with a special allowance of rice and
some alcohol, as well as a small sum of money. People are often buried in the mountains,
considered the most appropriate final resting place under Korean tradition.

Conclusion.

As we can see, North Korea is normal country with its culture, politics, and daily life. Like
in any other countries North Korea has some features. Unfortunately, many people have
misunderstandings and misconceptions about this isolated country, but this paper explains that all
myths are lie.
References

1. https://www.theguardian.com/international
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea
3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/north-korea
4. https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cywd23g0gz5t/north-korea
5. https://wikitravel.org/en/North_Korea
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tourism_in_North_Korea