VOL.

312, AUGUST 19, 1999 751

Fortich vs. Corona

*
G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999.

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR

OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

Supreme Court; Constitutional Law; Judgments; Statutory

Construction; Words and Phrases; Reddendo Singula Singulis
Rule; A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the
Constitution reveals the intention of the framers to draw a
distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the
other hand, such that casesare “decided– while matters, which
include motions, are “resolved.––A careful reading of the above
constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the
framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and
matters, on the other hand, such that cases are “decided– while
matters, which include motions, are “resolved.– Otherwise put,
the word “decided– must refer to “cases–; while the word
“resolved– must refer to “matters,– applying the rule of reddendo
singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the
above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other
provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is clear that only cases
are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not obtained–the rule does not apply
where the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a
motion for reconsideration.–With the aforesaid rule of
construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the
Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes
is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in
this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second
sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of “case– and
not “matter.– The reason is simple. The above-

_______________

* SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.

752

752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of

cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to
the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been
decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion
because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided.
There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure
of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the
motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was
the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration; A
second motion for reconsideration is prohibited.–The contention,
therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not
dispose of the earlier motions for reconsideration of the Decision
dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present motions
for reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule
52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions to the Rule Prohibiting a
Second Motion for Reconsideration.–True, there are exceptional
cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily
persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second
motions for reconsideration must be filed with express leave of
court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask
for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been
unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give
due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of
the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc,
the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but
rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been
denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the
allegations contained therein have already been raised before and
passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Due
Process; Vested Rights; While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the “Win-Win– Resolution was grounded on a
procedural rule pertain-

753

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 753

Fortich vs. Corona

ing to the reglementary period to appeal or move for

reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the
protection of the substantive rights of petitioners–the finality of the
OP Decision vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on
petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of
the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the
property.–While it may be true that on its face the nullification of
the “Win-Win– Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for
reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the
protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct
words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban are quoted in the
November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz.: “Just as
a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of his/her case.– In other words, the
finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as
on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who
stand to be benefited by the development of the property. The
issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit.
Judgments; Due Process; Vested Rights; No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is null and void.–Before finally
disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule
once and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case.
In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real
parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued
certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while
they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been
identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property.
These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they have
already been raised in intervenors’ earlier motion for
reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed
in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are
admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or
actual and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as
they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited
only to a just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the “Win-
Win– Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have
yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Absent any definitive finding of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors

754

754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the

controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise,
the issuance of the CLOA’s to them does not grant them the
requisite standing in view of the nullity of the “Win-Win–
Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is
null and void.

MELO, J.,Separate Opinion:

Supreme Court; Statutory Construction; Under the clear

and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the
required majority is not reached in a division, the case
should automatically go to the Court En Banc.–In a
situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th
member having inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a
position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes
would still be required before there can be any valid
decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be
instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied at
2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and
unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the
required majority is not reached in a division, the case
should automatically go to the Court En Banc.
Same; Same; In all instances, whether it be in the
deliberations of a case at first instance or on a motion for
reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote cannot pass
action.–It may be noted that cases taken cognizance of by
the divisions are either petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way
of petition for review on certiorari is not a matter of right.
Thus, should there be a tie in the voting on deliberation of
a “case– by the division, although apparently no action is
passed, a decision may still be rendered–the petition is
thereby DENIED due course, and it is forthwith
DISMISSED. This is definitely in consonance with the
majority’s line of reasoning in the 2-2 vote on motions for
reconsideration. But why is it that, the 2-2 vote in the
deliberation of the “case– at the first instance should still
be referred to the Court En Banc? The reason is simple.
Because the express provision of the Constitution requires
a vote of at least three justices for there to be a valid and
binding decision of the Court. But, why do we not apply the
same rule to motions for reconsideration? Even on this
score alone, it is my view that, in all instances, whether it
be in the deliberations of a case at first instance or on a
motion for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote
cannot pass action.

755

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 755

Fortich vs. Corona

Same; Same; To say that a motion for reconsideration is

lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something
which cannot be sustained by a reading of the
Constitution.–I submit that the requirement of 3 votes
equally applies to motions for reconsideration because the
provision contemplates “cases– or “matters– (which for me
has no material distinction insofar as divisions are
concerned) heard by a division, and a motion for
reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision in a
case that it seeks to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the
required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met, the
matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by
the Court En Banc, as mandated by the Constitution (par.
3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the
division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something which
cannot be sustained by a reading of the Constitution. To
argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a “case– but
only a “matter– which does not concern a case, so that,
even though the vote thereon in the division is 2-2, the
matter or issue is not required to be elevated to the Court
En Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting.
Same; The theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-2
vote or any even vote may be sustained only in cases where
there is no recourse to a higher assemblage.–I humbly
submit that the theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-
2 vote or any even vote may be sustained only in cases
where there is no recourse to a higher assemblage. In the
Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of
5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would result in the motion not
being carried, but only because there is and there cannot be
recourse to the Court of Appeals En Banc which, does not
act on judicial matters. In a legislative body, an even vote
results in the failure of the proposition, only because there
is no higher body which can take over. In our own Court En
Banc, if the voting is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote with 1 slot
vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or disqualifying himself,
the motion shall, of course, not be carried because that is
the end of the line.

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION in the Supreme

Court.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

          Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. Law Offices;Muntuerto,
Almendras & Associates and Emphasis Law Office for
petitioners.

756

756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

          Pimentel, Yusingco, Pimentel and Garcia Law Offices

and Lagman, Mangali and Associates Law Offices for
intervenors.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely,

respondents’ and intervenors’ separate motions for
reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17,
1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this
Court en banc. Respondents and intervenors jointly argue,
in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17, 1998,
wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as
a result of which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not
effectively resolve the said mo-tions for reconsideration
inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the
Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3)
of the Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also
assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we
noted without action the intervenors’ “Motion For
Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The
Court En Banc– filed on December 3, 1998, on the following
considerations, to wit:

“the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress

before the Court after their motion for leave to intervene in this
case was denied in the April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent
motion for reconsideration of the said decision, with a prayer to
resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was also denied in the
November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their
aforesaid motion of December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2,
Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure). The impropriety of movants’ December 3, 1998 motion
becomes all the more glaring considering that all the respondents
in this case did not

757

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 757

Fortich vs. Corona

anymore join them (movants) in1 seeking a reconsideration of the

November 17, 1998 Resolution.–

Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, filed their “Motion For Reconsideration
Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc
(With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining
Order)– on December 3,2 1998, accompanied by a
“Manifestation
3
and Motion– and a copy of the Registered
Mail Bill evidencing filing of the said motion for
reconsideration to this Court by registered mail.
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both
respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred
to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated
April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the
required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not
met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be
decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following
constitutional provision:

“Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved

with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three
of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may 4
be modified or reversed except by the
Court sitting en banc.–

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision,

however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a
distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on
the

_______________

1 Rollo, p. 1310. References to the Rollo pages are omitted.

2 Rollo, p. 1313.
3 Rollo, p. 1319.
4 Article VIII, Section 4 (3).

758

758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

other hand, such that cases are “decided– while matters,

which include motions, are “resolved.– Otherwise put, the
word “decided– must refer to “cases–; while the word
“resolved– must refer to “matters,– applying the rule of
reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the
interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3), but also of the other5 provisions of the Constitution
where these words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is
clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in
this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of
“case– and not “matter.– The reason is simple. The above-
quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition
of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is
no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to
refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case
has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the
division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting
does not leave the case undecided. There is still the
decision which must stand in view of the failure of the
members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie,
the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision
is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.
Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
It is the movants’ further contention in support of their
plea for the referral of this case to the Court en banc that
the issues submitted in their separate motions are of first
impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio
M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for
reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following was
expressed:

______________

5 See Article VIII, Section 15; Article XVIII, Sections 12 to 14.

759

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 759

Fortich vs. Corona

“Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are

matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the
Courten banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power
of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided
by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units
need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive
portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:

‘WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of

the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court’s
order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents’ property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur
to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents’ property from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.
‘x x x      x x x      x x x’ (Emphasis supplied)

“Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived

at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second
Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of
the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new
and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus,
the participation of the full Court in the resolution6 of movants’
motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.–

The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November

17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier motions for
reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is
flawed. Consequently, the present motions for
reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a
second motion for reconsideration which, according to the
clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in
relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited. True, there
are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a
second motion for reconsideration, such as where

________________

6 Rollo, pp. 1243-1244; citation omitted.

760

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then,

we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration7
must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In
this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of
court, but more importantly, they have been unable to
show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due
course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped
of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court
en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing
more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which
have been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
To be sure, the allegations contained therein have already
been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the
said Resolution.
 The crux of the controversy is the validity of the “Win-
Win– Resolution dated November 7, 1997. We maintain
that the same is void and of no legal effect considering that
the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President
had already become final and executory even prior to the
filing of the motion for reconsideration which became the
basis of the said “Win-Win– Resolution. This ruling, quite
understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the
part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties
for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was
that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching
effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality. The
situation, however, is not as simple as what the movants
purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the “Win-Win– Resolution was grounded on
a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to
appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying
consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive
rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban are quoted in the November 17,
1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz.: “Just as a losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period,

_______________

7 Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, et al.,

254 SCRA 234 (1996).

761

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 761

Fortich vs. Corona

the winning party also has the correlative8 right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case.–
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land
in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property. The issue in
this case, therefore, is
9
not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit.
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we
feel it necessary to rule once and for all on the legal
standing of intervenors in this case. In their present
motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in
interest inasmuch as they have already been issued
certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that
while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation,
they have been identified by the DAR as qualified
beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are,
however, nothing new as in fact they have already been
raised in intervenors’ earlier motion for reconsideration of
our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are
admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no
legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject
land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land.
Rather, their right10 is limited only to a just share of the
fruits of the land. Moreover, the “Win-Win– Resolution
itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be
carefully and meticulously
11
determined by the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Absent any definitive finding of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot as yet
be deemed vested with

_______________

8 Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50, 56

(1996).
9 Opinion of Justice Martinez, November 17, 1998, p. 10.
10 Ibid., pp. 12-13, citing the Constitution, Article XIII, Section 4, and
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-
Primer, Third Edition (1997), p. 441.
11 Ibid., p. 13.

762

762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to

intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA’s
to them does not grant them the requisite standing in view
of the nullity of the “Win-Win– Resolution. No legal rights
can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following
incidents, namely: intervenors’ “Motion For
Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The
Court En Banc,– dated December 3, 1998; respondents’
“Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated
November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This
Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For
Issuance Of A Restraining Order),– dated December 2,
1998; and intervenors’ “Urgent Omnibus Motion For The
Supreme Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second
Division’s Resolution Dated 27 January 1999 And
Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For
Reconsideration Filed By The Intervenors,– dated March 2,
1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY. No further motion,
pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.

     Melo, J., Please see separate opinion.

          Puno, J., In the result. I maintain my original
position that the case should go to CA for further
proceedings.
     Mendoza, J., In the result.

SEPARATE OPINION

MELO, J.:

On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice

Puno that this case should be referred to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for
reconsideration, which under the rules is generally
proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its
resolution in regard to cogent procedural points.
763

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 763

Fortich vs. Corona

At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am

bound to abide by the Court En Banc’s Resolution No. 99-1-
09-SC dated January 22, 1999, which settled the issue of
an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to vote
with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in
the abovecaptioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to express
my views on this issue and put them on record, so, in the
event that the Court decides to re-open and re-discuss this
issue at some future time, these considerations may be
referred to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding the
majority’s position regarding an even (2-2) vote in a
division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a
division when the required majority of at least 3 votes in the
division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the
Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article
VIII of the Constitution provides that:

xxx
(3)Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at
least three of such members.When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

disclose that if the case is not decided in a division by a
majority vote, it goes to the CourtEn Banc and not to a
larger division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to the
Banc shall be automatic. Thus,

MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some questions  for

clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.  

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764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

MR. RODRIGO: Under these provisions, there are 3 kinds of

divisions: one would be a division composed of 3 justices in
which case there will be 5 divisions; another division is
composed of 5 justices each, in which case there will be 3
divisions; and the other is composed of 7 members each, in
which case, there will be 2 divisions. Let us take the smallest
division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is less than 3 votes.
Should it immediately go to the court en banc of 15 justices or
should it first go to a bigger division?
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: They immediately go to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division
of 3, the vote is 2-1, automatically it goes to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because the required number of 3 is not
obtained. So, this last phrase would operate
automatically–“WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT
OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED EN BANC.– x
x x  x x x  x x x (V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)
Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3
members must concur in any case or matter heard by a
division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3
votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to be
decided by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members,
the 5th member having inhibited himself or is otherwise
not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum
of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any
valid decision or resolution by that division. There may,
then, be instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the
votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear
and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the
required majority is not reached in a division, the case
should automatically go to the Court En Banc.
765

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 765

Fortich vs. Corona

A distinction has been made between “cases– and

“matters– referred to in the above-quoted constitutional
provision. “Cases– being decided, and “matters– being
resolved. Only “cases– are referred to the Court En Banc
for decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. “Matters– are not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that “cases– would only refer to
deliberations at first instance on the merits of a case filed
with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions,
including motions for reconsideration, are “matters– to be
resolved. To give flesh to this distinction, it is cited that if a
tie occurs in the voting on deliberations of “cases,– no
decision is passed, whereas, if a tie occurs in the voting on
motions for reconsideration, the decision which had already
been passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in
original cases, as opposed to appealed cases, filed with the
Court. However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, the only original cases which are taken cognizance
of by this Court are those wherein it has exclusive
jurisdiction. But, invariably, these cases are all required by
the Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. So,
there will be no instance when a division will be ever
taking cognizance of an original action filed with this
Court.
 It may be noted that cases taken cognizance of by the
divisions are either petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way
of petition for review on certiorari is not a matter of right.
Thus, should there be a tie in the voting on deliberation of
a “case– by the division, although apparently no action is
passed, a decision may still be rendered–the petition is
thereby DENIED due course, and it is forthwith
DISMISSED. This is definitely in consonance with the
majority’s line of reasoning in the 2-2 vote on motions for
reconsideration. But why is it that, the 2-2 vote in the
deliberation of the “case– at the first instance should still
be referred to the Court En Banc? The reason is simple.
Because the express provision of the Constitution requires
a vote
766

766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fortich vs. Corona

of at least three justices for there to be a valid and binding

decision of the Court. But, why do we not apply the same
rule to motions for reconsideration? Even on this score
alone, it is my view that, in all instances, whether it be in
the deliberations of a case at first instance or on a motion
for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote cannot
pass action.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies
to motions for reconsideration because the provision
contemplates “cases– or “matters– (which for me has no
material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned)
heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration
cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks
to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum
majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for
reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as
mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To
say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to
construe something which cannot be sustained by a reading
of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for
reconsideration is not a “case– but only a “matter– which
does not concern a case, so that, even though the vote
thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not
required to be elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage
in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting.
 Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving
the issue hanging on a 2-2 vote or any even vote may be
sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a
higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a
division of 5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would result in the
motion not being carried, but only because there is and
there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En Banc
which, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative
body, an even vote results in the failure of the proposition,
only because there is no higher body which can take over.
In our own Court En Banc, if the voting is evenly split, on a
7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or
disqualifying himself, the motion shall, of course, not be
carried because that is the end of the line.
767

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 767

Public Estates Authority vs. Caoibes, Jr.

But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a

division, and there being recourse to the Court En Banc,
and more so, this being expressly directed by the
Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration
should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.
Motions denied with finality.

Notes.–It was not intended in Section 11, Article VIII of

the Constitution that all administrative proceedings should
be heard and decided by the whole Court. (People vs.
Gacott, Jr., 246 SCRA 52 [1995])
Even vested rights may be taken away by the State in
the exercise of its absolute police power. (Atok Big-Wedge
Mining Company vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 261
SCRA 528 [1996])

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