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Germany - No Truly Self-Sustaining Upswing: Upwards
Germany - No Truly Self-Sustaining Upswing: Upwards
Germany - No Truly Self-Sustaining Upswing: Upwards
Friday Notes
Contents
Germany – no truly self-sustaining upswing Research Notes _____________________________ 2
Data Monitor_______________________________ 13
FI Outlook_________________________________ 20
■ Upwards. Germany’s economy posted exceptionally strong growth at the FX Outlook ________________________________ 21
beginning of the year with 1½% qoq. It has finally reached its pre-crisis CIB View _________________________________ 24
GDP level again (see chart). For 2011 on average, we have therefore revised CIB Forecasts _____________________________ 25
Calendar__________________________________ 28
up our GDP forecast to 3½% from 2¾%.
■ Broad-based. Along with the weather-related catch-up process in the CIB MACRO FORECASTS
construction sector, final domestic demand is increasingly contributing to yoy (%) 2010 2011 2012
growth. The upswing has become much more robust and will continue! GDP EMU 1.7 2.1 1.7
CPI EMU 1.6 2.7 2.0
■ Question marks. This notwithstanding, we have doubts about a truly
self-sustaining recovery. A complete decoupling of the European growth GDP Germany 3.5 3.5 2.0
locomotive from global economic developments is unlikely. CPI Germany 1.1 2.2 1.8
■ Consumption. Our analysis of truly self-sustaining upswings (1975-1980 & GDP Italy 1.2 1.1 1.2
1982-1989) shows that they are driven primarily by private consumption. CPI Italy 1.5 2.6 2.0
Despite the tailwind from the labor market, German consumers' willingness GDP US 2.9 2.5 2.7
to spend will likely be curtailed this time around. CPI US 1.6 3.2 2.7
■ Differences. The obstacles are rather moderate wage growth, the loss of CIB FI/FX FORECASTS
purchasing power due to higher energy and food prices as well as the fact 2011/12 30-Jun 31-Sep 31-Dec 31-Mar
that a strong decline in the personal savings ratio is not in the pipeline EMU 3M (%) 1.50 1.75 2.10 2.30
(as was the case during the periods mentioned above; page 2-6). EMU 10Y (%) 3.25 3.50 3.65 3.70
■ Global economy. Germany therefore remains dependent on the global US 3M (%) 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.55
economy, which is, however, weakening over the medium term. This will US 10Y (%) 3.45 3.70 4.00 4.15
dampen German GDP growth – albeit without stalling the upswing
EUR-USD 1.50 1.53 1.55 1.52
("soft patch") since there are still no signs of typical late-cycle tensions.
USD-JPY 81 82 83 84
1
+0.1%
0 Global Head of Research & Chief Strategist
Thorsten Weinelt, CFA (UniCredit Bank)
-1 +49 89 378-15110
-0.8% thorsten.weinelt@unicreditgroup.de
-2
-3
Germany Editor
-4.0%
-4 Nikolaus Keis (UniCredit Bank)
France +49 89 378-12560
-5 nikolaus.keis@unicreditgroup.de
Italy -5.1%
-6 Editorial deadline
Spain Friday, 27. May., 12:00H
-7
-8 Bloomberg
1Q 08 3Q 08 1Q 09 3Q 09 1Q 10 3Q 10 1Q 11 UCGR
Internet
Source: Datastream, UniCredit Research www.research.unicreditgroup.eu
■ The rise of 1½% qoq in real GDP at the start of the year is 1
+0.1%
a combination of special circumstances and sound 0
The sustainability question Growth contribution by GDP components (1Q11), in percentage points
Private consumption also contributed to GDP growth (+0.2 Furthermore, the current recovery has already turned out to
percentage points), increasing for the fifth consecutive time be stronger than the (short-lived) upswings in the 1990s
on a quarterly basis. The last time this occurred was (cf. chart). However, caveats should be taken into account.
in 1996/97. Furthermore, the reading for 4Q10 was revised The recession after the Lehman collapse was brutal and
upwards from +0.2% to +0.6%. The renewed increase in unprecedented. The latest GDP rebound could therefore
consumer expenditures at the start of 2011 indicates that the partly be a yo-yo effect, i.e. "what goes down must come up".
positive impulses stemming from the labor market outweigh For instance, companies cut their inventories massively during
the loss in purchasing power caused by rising energy and the recession before restocking them again. In the last 40 years,
food prices. We stick to our view that private consumption there were two long-lasting and strong recoveries which deserve
will rise 2% in 2011 as a whole and hence at the fastest pace the label 'sustainable', in our view. From 1982 to 1989, the
since 2000. The current "rebalancing" does not only make German economy managed to grow comparatively steadily
Germany less dependent on the well-being of the global without a recession taking place.1 From peak to trough, the
economy, but also raises the hope that a further and cumulated increase in real GDP was about 20% (cf. chart).
sustainable increase in internal demand will transform Germany From 1975 to 1980, the total rise in economic activity was
into a long-lasting growth locomotive for other European comparably strong with nearly 19%. These two recovery
countries. To answer the question about the sustainability of phases served as a benchmark for comparison in the following.
the current recovery, we pursued a two-step approach as follows.
First, we examined economic upswings in Germany over the (II) HISTORICAL RECOVERIES
last 40 years and identified the ingredients of long-lasting
recoveries; and second, we examined if, and to what extent, Total real GDP increase during past recoveries, in %
the pre-conditions for sustainability are currently met.
1993-95
Lessons from the past or:
1996-98
Consumer is king
1999-01
In order to have an historical yardstick, we calculated how
the current recovery compares with historical ones over the 2009-11
at this stage of the business cycle. Only in the 1970s, after the 1982-89
first oil price shock, had economic activity been even 9% higher.
0 5 10 15 20 25
In % (real GDP loss from peak to trough; real GDP increase after 8
quarters starting from trough) What are the economic ingredients for making an upswing
long-lasting? Looking at the composition of growth in the
10
1970s and 1980s gives an unambiguous answer: the consumer
9 GDP loss
will ultimately decide. According to our calculations, private
8 GDP increase (8 quarters after hitting trough)
consumer expenditures contributed more than half to GDP
7
growth in each cycle (cf. chart on the next page). From 1975
6
to 1980, growth contribution was 11½ percentage points;
5
from 1982 to 1989, it was 10 percentage points. In contrast,
4
the importance of net exports and investment activity were,
3
on average, comparatively subdued. In the case of the recovery
2
in the 1970s, growth contribution from net exports was even
1
virtually zero.
0
1974-77 1980-84 1992-95 1995-98 2002-05 2008-11
1
Recessions are defined as at least two consecutive quarters with shrinking
real GDP. The recovery period from 1982 to 1989 contains single quarters in
which real GDP declined. However, special circumstances – such as weather-
related drops in construction activity – played an important role here.
Of course, this does not mean that the global economy Inside the current recovery
played no role in triggering and supporting past German
upswings in general. At least in the beginning, exports are Since the start of the upswing in 2Q09, the recovery has become
crucial before internal demand takes over the role of "growth increasingly broader. Besides net exports, internal demand
locomotive". The "classic" business cycle in Germany consists has picked up as well. However, growth contribution from
of three – sometimes overlapping – stages: consumer expenditures has still been rather subdued in
comparison to net exports and investment activity (cf. chart
– An upswing in the global economy increases German exports. above). Since 2Q09, net exports contributed 3.6 percentage
The trade balance widens, as internal demand remains points to cumulated GDP growth of 7¼% since hitting its
comparatively sluggish in the beginning. recessionary trough (investment in machinery & equipment:
+1½pp). In contrast, a still comparatively meager plus of
– The impulses from abroad increasingly carry over into 0.8pp stemmed from private consumption. As explained
investment activity. Given rising capacity utilization, above, such a pattern is not unusual, given the various
companies become more optimistic and spend additional stages of the German business cycle. Rather, the decisive
money on machinery and equipment. In the beginning, a question is: if, and to what extent, consumer spending will
replacement scheme typically takes place, i.e. old accelerate in the further course of this and next year? In the
machinery is replaced by new. If the positive impulses following, this question will be discussed in more detail by
from the global economy continue over a longer period of working through the three transmission channels again. A
time, companies then start expanding their capacities and special focus will be on differences between the past two
employ additional people. Activity in the commercial sustainable cycles and the current one. In our view, the
construction sector kicks in. impulses from the global economy will remain brisk over the next
– The additional number of jobs leads to more optimism few months. However, in line with leading indicators, a lessening
among private households and rising consumer expenditures. of momentum at the turn of the year 2011/12 is in the pipeline.
Hence, in the end the consumer is king. By opening his The forward-looking Ifo business expectations component passed
wallet, the consumer determines whether the recovery its peak recently. The OECD Leading Indicators for various major
will be self-sustaining and long-lasting. Rising consumer countries also point to softening growth dynamics in the
expenditures then become self-fueling, triggering a positive medium-term. This should be especially true for emerging
cycle consisting of higher spending, further rising GDP, markets, given substantial inflation pressure, a related loss in
declining unemployment and renewed spending activity. purchasing power and interest rate hikes increasingly feeding
In addition, residential construction gathers momentum. through into the real economy. In the last three years, German
exporters have become more and more dependent on Emerging
Asia, especially China. Nearly 11% of German exports were
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
shipped to Emerging Asia in 1Q11 (China & HK: 6.6%). Hence,
impulses from exports carrying over into investment activity will
Composition of GDP growth during recoveries, in percentage points
continue, albeit at a lower pace from the turn of the year onwards.
25
The good news is that capacity utilization is currently higher
Rest than compared to the two cycles in the 1970s and 1980s.
20 Net exports
72
70
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5Q 6Q 7Q 8Q 9Q 10Q 11Q 12Q
Hence, although plunging to historically low levels after the However, given the further strong and sustained rises in
Lehman collapse (cf. chart above), companies have made up companies' hiring plans across sectors, we expect permanent
substantial ground in the last few quarters. This in turn bodes employment to markedly increase as well (cf. chart). In
well for additional job creation. Furthermore, employment is manufacturing, construction and retailing, hiring plans are
reacting more strongly in the current recovery than in previous currently two standard deviations above their long-term average.
ones. The number of dependent employees has risen 1.2%
since the start of the upswing, whereas job creation in the COMPANIES' HIRING PLANS RISING
1970s (+0.7%) and 1980s (+0.1%) was more subdued at this
stage of the business cycle. Employment expectations (standardized, 3-month moving average)
3
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AGAIN
Manufacturing
Starting Real dispos- Oil price (%; 2 Construction
point of Employment Savings able income domestic Wholesale
recovery (%)* ratio (pp)* (%)* currency)* 1 Retail
3Q1975 +0.7 -4.1 +4.4 +19
4Q1982 +0.1 -0.5 +3.0 -0.5 0
2Q2009 +1.2 +0.1 +1.8** +122
-1
*8 quarters after real GDP hitting its trough; **Estimate
-3
Germany is now reaping the rewards of structural reforms 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
2
Cf. A. Rees, The return of (perceived) inflation, Friday Notes, 28 January 2011.
1970s, the savings ratio fell rapidly by more than four percentage (I) UPSIDE RISK
points within just two years. Recently, however, the increased
House prices adjusted for variations in consumer prices
life expectancy and the low birth rate have increased Germans'
(indices year 1995=100)
awareness of the need for private old-age provision. This will
keep the savings ratio structurally high despite the strong 100
improvement on the labor market. 95
90
Bottom line: Germany is no longer on the drip feed of the 85
global economy. The recovery has undoubtedly become 80
broader and hence more robust. Besides the pick-up in 75
overall investment activity, private consumer spending has 70 Western Germany
been rising as well. However, a completely self-sustaining 65 Eastern Germany
recovery independent of the well-being of the global economy is 60
not in the cards. The German consumer will not take off as 55
he did in the 1970s and 1980s. At the turn of the year, signs 50
of an export-driven slowdown will increase. We expect GDP 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Italy: S&P’s negative outlook – This led to Italy posting a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 4.6% at the
end of 2010 vs. 6.0% in the eurozone, and the outperformance is
a wake-up call for the government likely to continue also this year.
-3
■ A rating downgrade is not our core scenario. We think that
S&P’s move should be interpreted mostly as a wake-up call for -4
Market impact
The BTP/Bund spread has been under pressure in recent
weeks, although more moderately than in other peripheral
countries as, so far, Italy has been the only country in the
periphery group whose rating had remained unscathed during
the crisis. The yield spread between BTP Sep 21 and DBR
Jul 21 is currently 182bp, up about 12bp from Friday. We
regard this reaction as mainly emotional rather than driven by
fundamentals. As a reference, the BTP/Bund spread touched
200bp in Nov 10 and Jan 11, during periods of particularly
high market tensions. We do not expect pressure on Italy to
be long-lasting: the negative outlook does not necessarily
imply a downgrade, and S&P sees a one-in-three chance
that the rating could be lowered within the next 24 months.
Switzerland: Imported deflation In combination with strong growth, inflation rates have risen
most strongly there (see chart) and are already compelling
gives SNB breathing space the central banks to implement decisive tightening measures.
In the industrialized countries, the rise in inflation thus far has
■ Commodity prices remain at very high levels and are exerting been more moderate overall. But here, too, inflation expectations
upward pressure on consumer prices around the globe. are pointing clearly to the upside. Hence, despite the unresolved
This holds true primarily for emerging markets. In Switzerland, problems in the EMU debt-crisis countries, the ECB initiated
in contrast, the strong Swiss franc is in some cases even its tightening cycle in April.
resulting in pronounced price declines.
CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION, IN % YOY
■ Although price expectations of Swiss wholesalers are now
also pointing north, in 2011 as a whole, inflation looks set
to edge steadily but only moderately higher – also because 12 Emerging markets
the wage dynamic remains under control. 10
Industrialized countries
Switzerland
0
Commodity prices keep inflation
-2
pressure high around the globe Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
100 15
10
0
Jan-00 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 5
0
Source: Feri, UniCredit Research -5
-10
Even without further price spikes, the steep upward trend in -15
commodity prices – triggered by the global economic
-20
recovery – will probably result in tangible, indirect price Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11
increases – with a time lag in the further course of the year.
As a result, inflationary pressure from commodity markets Source: BfS, UniCredit Research
remains high around the globe. This is impacting emerging
markets in particular, where the share of commodity costs in
end-consumer prices is the highest.
After the winter sale, this has resulted in a considerable distortion Prices for capital goods and intermediates (capital goods)
of the annual headline rate. April then brought the technical have also declined appreciably. This is helping companies in
counter-reaction. Headline inflation even fell to 0.3%. The the manufacturing sector to cushion some of the negative
change in the way apparel prices are recorded can still result competitive effects because of the firm Swiss franc. Moreover,
in heightened volatility in consumer prices until the end of food prices have fallen, despite new record high prices for
the year. agro commodities.
Apart from that, inflation in Switzerland remains rather low in Wage dynamic under control
an international comparison, although it is one of a small
number of industrialized countries reporting a V-shaped economic Alongside the currency-induced lower direct and indirect
recovery after the financial crisis. In the eurozone, inflation commodity price effects, the Swiss wage dynamic also remains
was running at 2.8% in April. And in the economically-ailing under control. The temporary economic slump triggered by
United Kingdom, the inflation rate hit a very high 4.5%. the financial crisis resulted in very moderate wage growth of
+0.8% for 2010, only marginally above the inflation rate. With
the strong improvement in the economic situation, tangibly
Imported deflation higher wage increases were agreed for this year, but the
Alongside tax hikes to consolidate public finances in the settlements in the individual sectors are in most cases in the
United Kingdom, the decisive factor behind the enormous range of 2% to 3%. From the wage side, we therefore see no
divergence in inflation dynamic is the development of danger of tangible second-round effects in 2011.
exchange rates. While sterling has weakened considerably
against the commodity currency USD since the beginning of NOMINAL WAGES, IN % YOY
the financial market crisis, the Swiss currency has appreciated
strongly in the same timeframe. As a result, the British are
having a hard time with considerable imported inflation. In 7.0
1.0
40
35 Germany Source: BfS; SGB, UniCredit Research
30 Switzerland
25
20 Steady, but only moderate rise
15
in inflation
10
5 Overall, the inflation situation remains relatively relaxed at
0 the moment. Accordingly, the SNB inflation projections,
-5
which do not show a disturbing upward trend in the short
-10
Energy Total Food Capital goods Durable term, do not come as a surprise – despite the assumption of
consumer unchanged low interest rates for the projection horizon. In
goods
the current projections released in March, the 2% mark is not
expected to be exceeded until the second half of 2013
Source: Thomson Datastream, UniCredit Research
(see chart next page). The persistently strong currency has
clearly delayed the projected upward trend of the inflation
While import prices for energy have also risen strongly yoy in path compared to the projection released mid-2010. The
Switzerland, the rate of price increase was less than half as surge in commodity prices is therefore expected to push the
strong as for its neighbor to the north. Above all import prices headline rate for Swiss consumer prices up only temporarily.
for consumer durables have fallen markedly for Switzerland.
SNB INFLATION PROJECTIONS, YOY (%) In our view, however, the probability of such a scenario is on
the low side, since the safe-haven function of the Swiss currency
3.5
has probably strengthened on a lasting basis since the
March 11
3.0 beginning of the financial crisis. The unstable fiscal situation,
June 10
not only in the EMU periphery but also in all important currency
2.5
areas, stands in stark contrast to the development of
2.0 Switzerland’s creditworthiness (see chart).
1.5
OVERALL BUDGET BALANCE, IN % OF GDP (2010)
1.0
0.5 2
0.0 0
II/10 IV/10 II/11 IV/11 II/12 IV/12 II/13 IV/13
-2
-6
In any case, inflation expectations are now rising in Switzerland
-8
as well. Most wholesale companies are planning price
increases for the coming months, albeit by no means as strongly -10
as in the United Kingdom or Germany for example (see chart).
-12
US UK Japan EMU Switzerland
1.45
"Safe-haven crunch" 1.40
Emergence of EMU ECB rate hike
debt crisis
The biggest upside risk for inflation is a rapid and pronounced 1.35
trend reversal for the Swiss franc. A massive depreciation 1.30
would increase inflationary pressure in Switzerland considerably. 1.25
1.20
Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11
Monday, 30 May
SPAIN, CONSUMER PRICES PRICE PRESSURE TO CONTINUE
-1
-2
01/00 07/01 01/03 07/04 01/06 07/07 01/09 07/10
Tuesday, 31 May
EMU, CONSUMER PRICES PRESSURES TO CONTINUE
methodology, we would expect a 0.5% mom increase. -3 consumer spending (in % mom) -6
consumer spending (in % yoy, RS)
-4 -8
01/06 01/07 01/08 01/09 01/10 01/11
Wednesday, 1 June
UK, MANUFACTURING PMI THE TREND IS POINTING DOWN
60
After falling to the lowest level in seven months in April,
we expect the index to remain broadly stable in May (54.5). 55
Manufacturing PMI
35
Services PMI
30
01/99 01/01 01/03 01/05 01/07 01/09 01/11
Friday, 3 June
UK, SERVICES PMI SERVICES PMI TO SLOW FURTHER
45
Services PMI
40
3M moving average
35
01/99 01/01 01/03 01/05 01/07 01/09 01/11
Tullia Bucco (UniCredit Bank Milan) Chiara Corsa (UniCredit Bank Milan)
+39 02 8862-2079 +39 02 8862-2209
tullia.bucco@unicredit.eu chiara.corsa@unicredit.eu
Alexander Koch, CFA (UniCredit Bank) Mauro Giorgio Marrano (UniCredit Bank Milan)
+49 89 378-13013 +39 02 8862-8222
alexander.koch1@unicreditgroup.de mauro.giorgiomarrano@unicredit.eu
Chiara Silvestre (UniCredit Bank Milan) Marco Valli (UniCredit Bank Milan)
chiara.silvestre@unicredit.eu +39 02 8862-8688,
marco.valli@unicredit.eu
Tuesday, 31 May
S&P/CASE SHILLER HOME PRICE INDEX HOUSE PRICES CONTINUE TO FALL
Wednesday, 1 June
ISM MANUFACTURING THIRD DECLINE IN A ROW
Friday, 3 June
MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT REPORT LATE EASTER TO REDUCE EMPLOYMENT GAINS IN MAY
300 4
In April, private payrolls rose at the fastest pace in more 150 5
than 5 years, as retail employment jumped 57,000 – the 0 6
highest increase in eleven years. We suspect that this
-150 7
acceleration was due to the unusually late Easter holiday,
-300 8
for which seasonal factors did not correct properly. If this
-450 9
assumption is correct, retail employment should have Non-farm payrolls
-600 (monthly changes in thousands) 10
declined again by about 25,000 in May. And while payrolls
in other sectors most likely continued to rise at the same -750 11
01/97 01/99 01/01 01/03 01/05 01/07 01/09 01/11
pace as in the previous months, this payback in retail
would slow overall employment growth to less than Source: Thomson Datastream, UniCredit Research
200,000. Moreover, the hurricanes that hit the South earlier
this month pose some downside risk to our outlook. The
unemployment rate likely stayed at 9% after rising by
0.2pp in April. But, as repeatedly highlighted, forecasting
the unemployment rate has become more of a psychological
rather than an economic exercise. If more frustrated
workers should decide to leave the labor force (i.e. stop
to actively look for work), the rate would fall. Vice versa,
if frustrated job seekers should decide to return to the
labor market, this would inevitably push the unemployment
rate higher again.
Review Europe The impetus from foreign demand will likely decline further in
the months ahead. But German business activity indices remain
at very high levels overall. The order backlog is record-high
Ifo: Still very optimistic in many sectors. And unchanged strong employment and
The Ifo business climate showed resilience in May. The index investment plans underpin the strengthening in domestic
remained unchanged at 114.2. Expectations were down for demand. Accordingly, although firms are likely to shift down
the third consecutive month from 107.7 to 107.4. In contrast, a gear in terms of growth dynamic, the coming months can
the current situation component increased once again from be expected to show a continuing solid growth performance.
121.0 to 121.4. Among sectors, manufacturing and wholesale We expect GDP to rise 0.6% qoq in 2Q and 3Q each.
trade posted declines, construction improved marginally and
Alexander Koch, CFA (UniCredit Bank)
retail trade was up significantly. +49 89 378-13013
alexander.koch1@unicreditgroup.de
The third consecutive decline in the forward-looking business
expectations and the latest strong decline in the advance
PMI's new order component from 61.0 to 56.9 point in the
same direction: The exceptionally strong growth dynamic we
have observed at the beginning of this year cannot be sustained.
This week the Federal Statistical Office confirmed the annualized
1Q GDP growth rate of 6.1%. This compares to an estimated
potential growth rate of below 2.0%. But at the same time the
renewed rise in current business assessment confirms the
solid state of the German economy. The current level is just
shy of the all-time high reached during the reunification boom
(see chart). Despite softening business indicators worldwide
the Ifo even reported a slight increase in export expectations
in May. The export outlook remains very positive. Moreover,
the latest outperformance in sentiment in construction and
especially retail trade underscores the broadening of the
German upswing.
125.0 Climate
120.0 Situation
115.0 Expectations
110.0
105.0
100.0
95.0
90.0
85.0
80.0
75.0
Jan-85 Jan-88 Jan-91 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09
Fixed Income Outlook Against this backdrop, it is astonishing that 10Y Bund yields
have not yet fallen below 3% on a lasting basis. Looking forward,
there are – besides the key rate normalization by the ECB –
Lulled, startled, overreacted few reasons to expect a rapid trend reversal to the recent
It is not only the Icelandic volcano Grimsvötn that is on the verge peak yields. The second big topic – the Fed’s termination of the
of triggering a renewed exodus in European air transportation; Treasury purchase program on 30 June – does not necessarily
the rating agencies are also firing a broadside at the already mean that global yields will rise. It can have a contrary effect
heavily-listing "aircraft carrier" EURO. At times, there is a if risky asset classes were to be brought to their knees. And
temptation to “buy into” conspiracy theories. When a US rating even the pace of ECB normalization will likely be a subject of
agency assigns Italy a “negative outlook“ on a Saturday at discussion due to the – rather intensifying – credibility erosion.
0:27 hours due to chronic growth weakness, the question is Ultimately, the ECB raises, with each key rate hike, the refi-
legitimate whether this was really necessary or whether nancing costs of every single country in the eurozone
massive frictions have built up between US rating agencies (presupposing the traditional pattern of a bear flattening in
and European countries. Admittedly, S&P had leveled the the event of a tightening cycle). Furthermore, key rate hikes
same warning at Japan and the US. But this takes on a by a relevant central bank, with US monetary policy on hold at
completely different quality for the already skittish eurozone the same time, have an inflationary impact in the short term.
bond market, as demonstrated by the massive opening price The widening interest rate differential strengthens the EUR-USD
losses on Monday in Bunds and in EUR-USD. The new hunting exchange rate and an, in turn, weakening external value of the
season on EGBs appears to have opened. Fitch and Moody's USD is still one of the decisive impulses for rising commodity
held their fire in the case of Italy, but they trained their guns prices, the main driver behind the global rise in inflation.
elsewhere. Belgium, together with Italy the next usual suspect
after Spain, received a negative outlook from Fitch. Given this short-term interaction, nobody would like to be in
the ECB’s shoes. In the short term, it will probably forge
ahead with the key rate normalization, and there is little
TROUBLE IN PARADISE: "THE NEXT USUAL SUSPECTS"
(10Y YIELD GOVERNMENT BONDS) doubt that money market rates will edge steadily higher, at
least until the end of the year. The development at the long
end, however, largely depends on the rating agencies. In
6
Spain Italy Belgium Germany light of the political inability to bring calm to the discussion
5.5
(the vested interests of 17 sovereign states also make this a
5
physical impossibility), expectations of sharply rising yields in
4.5
the core countries are off the table for the time being.
4
3.5 Michael Rottmann (UniCredit Bank)
3 +49 89 378 15121
michael.rottmann1@unicreditgroup.de
2.5
2
1/1/2008
4/1/2008
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10/1/2008
1/1/2009
4/1/2009
7/1/2009
10/1/2009
1/1/2010
4/1/2010
7/1/2010
10/1/2010
1/1/2011
4/1/2011
7/1/2011
But to remain fair, it was not only the rating agencies. In the
case of Spain, home-made problems, first and foremost the
youth unemployment (<25 years) rate of over 44%, were also
responsible for a resounding defeat of the ruling Socialists at
the regional elections. And the situation was not much better
in Germany. Even though elections in Bremen – Germany’s
smallest state – are normally not considered a benchmark let
alone important, the fact that the election result for the FDP
(Free Democratic Party) was even below the 10Y Bund yield
(2.4% vs. 3.0%) raises fears that the FDP will close ranks in
the fall and – to make its mark – oppose the ESM.
1.40 98
What else other than the eurozone debt crisis could have
1.30 94
moved FX markets this week? Widespread discussion about
1.20 90
the handling of the Greek drama and neologisms regarding this
1.10 86
topic like "large restructuring", "soft restructuring", "rescheduling"
or "reprofiling" have continued to unsettle euro investors, let 1.00 82
Long-term average 1.1958 (weekly basis)
alone rumors that Premier Papandreou intends to resign with 0.90 78
subsequent snap elections. And with S&P cutting the rating 0.80 74
While we cannot rule out further losses due to the tricky JPY: Strong again
Greek situation, which in the meantime has also developed a With respect to USD-JPY we do not expect much more leeway
strong grip on the global risk picture as is reflected in sliding to the upside, even though the dollar might keep its current
equities, lower Bund yields and subdued or weaker commodity status as a safe-haven currency. Astonishingly, JPY has also
prices, we would still like to emphasize that the Greek drama received strong demand from investors abroad (right chart
alone won't bring the euro to its knees. Admittedly, a similar below), which can be expected to continue next week, totally
serious state of Portugal and/or Ireland could severely ignoring weak Japanese data. In the case of a disappointing
scratch the euro's reputation, but talking about a real euro US unemployment report on the other hand, USD-JPY may
crises would, from our point of view, only be appropriate if even develop strong downward potential to around 80.50.
Spain were also on the brink of collapse, which is not yet the Either constellation would not bode well for EUR-JPY. To the
case, as can be seen by the stable sideways movement of upside, levels above 117.50 will be almost out of reach, while
Spanish bond yields. a slide toward 112 may occur rather rapidly.
CIB View – Our Global Picture ■ We expect further mini-moves on a quarterly basis, which
will see the refi rate raised to 1¾% at the end of 2011.
Global economy The exceptional measures, however, above all the full
allotment of its short-term tenders, will be retained for several
■ After softening last summer, real global GDP growth
more months to come. For 2012, we expect further hikes
re-accelerated again at the turn of the year. But more recently,
adding up to 100bp.
economic headwind forces have increased again (ongoing
EMU debt crisis, higher oil prices/rising inflationary pressures,
intensifying geopolitical risks as well as the catastrophe Government bond markets
in Japan). For 2011, we expect real GDP to increase ■ Despite continuing US economic risks as well as the Fed's
4¼% on a PPP basis (2012: +4½%). ZIRP, yields should tend to rise over the medium term.
The upcoming end of Quantitative Easing 2 coupled with
■ Economic activity in industrialized countries should grow only
investors starting to price in the first Fed rate hike should
below-average at 2¼% and 2½%, respectively. China and
send 10Y Treasuries yields higher reaching 4% at the end
Emerging Asia, which were first to achieve a trend reversal
of 2011. The US debt discussion will be a further burden.
after the financial market crisis, will clearly remain at the
top of the global growth league (2011/12: +6½%). ■ Bund yields should follow their US counterparts, rising
to 3¾% twelve months from now.
US
■ After re-accelerating in 2H 2010, real GDP growth started Exchange rates
2011 on a weak note. Despite the additional support of an ■ The ECB’s ("announced") key rate reversal combined with a
additional huge tax package, real GDP should grow by a still reluctant Fed acted as a mighty tailwind for the euro –
meager 2.5% on average this year (2012: +2.7%). despite the ongoing debt crisis in EMU's periphery. Besides
short-term fluctuations (Japanese catastrophe) EUR-USD
■ A hike of the Fed Funds Target Rate any time soon is out
is, therefore, expected to rise further and tackle 1.55 by
of the question. Ongoing economic risks coupled with still
the end of 2011.
high unemployment (core) inflation in check seem to
"guarantee" that Quantitative Easing 2 will be executed as ■ The JPY should weaken in 2H11, bringing USD-JPY back
planned. We do not expect the first hike of the target rate to 83 at the end of the year.
(currently at 0%-0.25%) before early 2012.
■ The fear of inflation expectations to resurface in the wake of OUR FI/FX & OIL PRICE FORECASTS
rapidly rising oil and agro prices led the ECB to hike its refi
2011/12 30-Jun 31-Sep 31-Dec 31-Mar
rate hike after 23 months of a record-low 1% figure – despite EMU 3M (%) 1.50 1.75 2.10 2.30
the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, doubts concerning the EMU 10Y (%) 3.25 3.50 3.65 3.70
soundness of European banks, as well as economic
US 3M (%) 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.55
divergences within the EMU.
US 10Y (%) 3.45 3.70 4.00 4.15
Macro Forecasts
GDP, real (%, yoy) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f
World economy * 4.3 5.0 5.0 2.8 -0.6 4.8 4.3 4.4
Industrialized countries * 2.5 2.8 2.5 0.2 -3.3 2.9 2.3 2.4
US 3.1 2.7 1.9 0.0 -2.6 2.9 2.5 2.7
Euro area 1.8 3.2 2.8 0.3 -4.1 1.7 2.1 1.7
Germany 0.9 3.6 2.8 0.7 -4.7 3.5 3.5 2.0
France 1.9 2.7 2.2 -0.2 -2.6 1.4 2.3 1.8
Italy 0.8 2.1 1.4 -1.3 -5.2 1.2 1.1 1.2
Spain 3.6 4.0 3.6 0.9 -3.7 -0.1 0.8 1.4
Austria 2.5 3.6 3.7 2.2 -3.9 2.0 2.8 1.8
UK 2.2 2.8 2.7 -0.1 -4.9 1.3 1.5 2.0
Switzerland 2.6 3.6 3.6 1.9 -1.9 2.6 2.4 1.7
Sweden 3.1 4.6 3.4 -0.8 -5.3 5.3 4.0 2.4
Japan 1.9 2.0 2.3 -1.2 -6.3 4.3 1.0 2.5
Developing countries * 7.0 7.9 8.3 6.0 2.5 7.1 6.4 6.5
Asia 9.0 9.8 10.6 7.7 7.2 9.5 8.4 8.4
China 10.4 11.6 13.0 9.6 9.2 10.3 9.6 9.5
India 9.1 9.7 9.3 6.4 6.8 10.4 8.2 7.8
Latin America 4.7 5.7 5.7 4.3 -1.7 6.1 4.7 4.2
Brazil 3.2 3.8 5.7 5.1 -0.6 7.5 4.5 4.1
Central and Eastern Europe 6.1 7.2 6.9 4.0 -5.9 3.5 3.8 4.2
Russia 6.4 7.7 8.1 5.6 -7.9 3.4 4.3 4.1
Consumer prices, CPI (%, yoy) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f
US 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.8 -0.3 1.6 3.2 2.7
core rate (ex food & energy) 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.0 1.4 1.9
Euro area, HICP 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.0
core rate (ex food & energy) 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.7
Germany 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.6 0.3 1.1 2.2 1.8
France 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.8 0.1 1.5 2.1 1.7
Italy 2.0 2.1 1.8 3.3 0.8 1.5 2.6 2.0
Spain 3.4 3.5 2.8 4.1 -0.3 1.8 3.5 2.5
Austria 2.3 1.5 2.2 3.2 0.5 1.9 2.7 2.1
UK 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.1 3.3 4.1 2.5
Switzerland 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.4 -0.5 0.7 1.0 1.1
Sweden 0.5 1.4 2.2 3.5 -0.3 1.3 2.5 1.5
Japan -0.3 0.2 0.0 1.4 -1.4 -1.0 -0.3 0.4
GDP, real (%, qoq) I/10 II/10 III/10 IV/10 I/11f II/11f III/11f IV/11f
US (annualized) 3.7 1.7 2.6 3.1 1.8 2.6 3.2 2.8
Euro area 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.4
Germany 0.5 2.1 0.8 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
France 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.4
Italy 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3
Spain 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Austria 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3
UK 0.2 1.1 0.7 -0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5
Switzerland 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3
Sweden 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
Japan 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
Consumer prices, CPI (%, yoy) I/10 II/10 III/10 IV/10 I/11f II/11f III/11f IV/11f
US 2.4 1.8 1.2 1.2 2.2 3.3 3.6 3.6
core rate (ex food & energy) 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.7
Euro area, HICP 1.1 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.8
core rate (ex food & energy) 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.5
Germany 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4
France 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.3
Italy 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.7
Spain 1.3 2.3 2.0 2.5 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.6
Austria 1.4 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.6
UK 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.4 4.3 3.8
Switzerland 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.3
Sweden 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.9 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.3
Japan -1.2 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Comments: *The GDP shares used for aggregation are based on the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDPs
GDP = Gross Domestic Product, HICP = Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, CPI = Consumer Price Index, f = forecast
US Treasury Market
Fed funds target rate 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
3M USD Libor 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.55
2Y 0.48 0.70 0.90 1.25 1.50
5Y 1.73 2.08 2.40 2.78 2.98
10Y 3.07 3.45 3.70 4.00 4.15
30Y 4.24 4.50 4.70 4.90 5.00
10Y swap spread (in bp) 9 5 0 0 0
Japan
Target rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
3M JPY Libor 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.25
10Y JGB 1.13 1.20 1.10 1.10 1.15
United Kingdom
Repo rate 0.50 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25
3M GBP Libor 0.83 0.90 1.05 1.30 1.55
10Y Gilt 3.30 3.85 4.00 4.25 4.50
Switzerland
3M CHF Libor mid target rate 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
3M CHF Libor 0.18 0.50 0.80 1.05 1.30
10Y Swissie 1.83 2.10 2.30 2.50 2.60
USD-JPY 81.06 81 82 83 84
GBP-USD 1.6425 1.69 1.74 1.78 1.79
USD-CHF 0.8565 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.88
Norway
Key rate 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00
3M rate 2.84 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.35
10Y yield 3.39 3.70 4.00 4.25 4.35
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 41 20 50 75 85
Canada
Key rate 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.75
3M rate 1.20 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.00
10Y yield 3.04 3.40 3.70 4.00 4.25
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 6 0 50 50 75
Australia
Key rate 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.50
3M rate 4.96 5.40 5.75 5.75 5.85
10Y yield 5.23 5.65 6.00 6.20 6.30
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 224 250 270 270 280
New Zealand
Key rate 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75
3M rate 2.77 2.75 2.85 3.00 3.05
10Y yield 5.09 5.50 5.80 6.00 6.00
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 210 225 235 250 250
Fri, 27 May '11 14:30 US PCE core inflation (in % mom) Apr 0.2 0.1
14:30 US Personal expenditures (in % mom) Apr 0.5 0.6
14:30 US Personal income (in % mom) Apr 0.4 0.5
15:55 US University of Michigan consumer confidence Jun 72.4 72.4
16:00 US Pending home sales (in % mom) Apr -1.0 5.1
Mon, 30 May '11 3:00 JP Tankan survey small business May 36.1
15:30 EC ECB Announces Bond Purchases
Wed, 01 Jun '11 9:30 SZ Manufacturing PMI (index) May 57.8 58.4
9:45 IT Manufacturing PMI (index) May 55.5
9:50 FR Manufacturing PMI (index) Jun 55.0 55.0
9:55 GE Manufacturing PMI (index) Jun 58.2 58.2
10:00 EMU Manufacturing PMI (index) Jun 54.8 54.8
10:30 UK Mortgage approvals (in thousands) Apr 47.9 47.6
10:30 UK Manufacturing PMI (index) May 54.5 54.0 54.6
12:59 UK House price (HBOS, in % 3M yoy) May -3.9 -3.7
13:00 US MBA mortgage applications May 27 1.1
14:15 US ADP employment index (change in thousands mom) May 177.5 179.0
15:00 EC ECB's Trichet Speaks in Aachen, Germany
16:00 US Treasury Secretary Geithner Testifies to House Committee
16:00 US Construction spending (in % mom) Apr 0.4 1.4
16:00 US ISM manufacturing (index) May 57.0 58.0 60.4
18:00 IT New car registration (in % yoy) May -2.2
19:00 IT Budget balance (EUR bn) May -8.8
23:00 US Auto sales (in mn) May 12.8 13.1
Thu, 02 Jun '11 14:30 US Unit labor costs (in % qoq annualized) Q1 0.8 1.0
14:30 US Non-farm productivity (in % qoq annualized) Q1 1.8 1.6
14:30 US Initial jobless claims (in thousands) May 27 424
16:00 US New orders (in % mom) Apr -0.8 3.4
*Asterisked releases are scheduled on or after the date shown; sa = seasonal adjusted, nsa = not seasonally adjusted, wda = working day adjusted
Tue, 07 Jun '11 9:15 SZ Consumer price index (in % yoy) May 0.3
11:00 EMU Retail sales (volume, in % mom) Apr -1.1
12:00 GE Industrial orders (in % mom) Apr -4.0
21:00 US Consumer credit (net change in USD bn) Apr 6.016
Fri, 10 Jun '11 8:45 FR Industrial production (in % mom) Apr -0.9
10:00 IT Real GDP (in % yoy) Q1 1.0
10:00 IT Real GDP (in % qoq) Q1 0.1
10:30 UK Producer price index, manuf. products (in % mom) May 0.8
10:30 UK Industrial production (in % mom) Apr 0.2
14:30 US Import prices (in % mom) May -0.2 2.2
20:00 US Federal budget (USD bn) May -40.49
*Asterisked releases are scheduled on or after the date shown; sa = seasonal adjusted, nsa = not seasonally adjusted, wda = working day adjusted
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act as investment and/or commercial bankers for issuers of such securities; (c) act as market makers for such securities; (d) serve on the board of any issuer of such securities;
and (e) act as paid consultant or advisor to any issuer.
The information contained herein may include forward-looking statements within the meaning of U.S. federal securities laws that are subject to risks and uncertainties. Factors
that could cause a company’s actual results and financial condition to differ from expectations include, without limitation: political uncertainty, changes in general economic condi-
tions that adversely affect the level of demand for the company’s products or services, changes in foreign exchange markets, changes in international and domestic financial
markets and in the competitive environment, and other factors relating to the foregoing. All forward-looking statements contained in this report are qualified in their entirety by this
cautionary statement
This document may not be distributed in Canada or Australia.
UniCredit Research*
Thorsten Weinelt, CFA Dr. Ingo Heimig
Global Head of Research & Chief Strategist Head of Research Operations
+49 89 378-15110 +49 89 378-13952
thorsten.weinelt@unicreditgroup.de ingo.heimig@unicreditgroup.de
Chiara Corsa Vladimir Osakovsky, Ph.D., Head of Strategy and Research, Russia
+39 02 8862-2209 +7 495 258-7258 ext.7558, vladimir.osakovskiy@unicreditgroup.ru
chiara.corsa@unicredit.eu Rozália Pál, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Romania
Dr. Loredana Federico +40 21 203-2376, rozalia.pal@unicredit.ro
+39 02 8862-3180 Kristofor Pavlov, Chief Economist, Bulgaria
Loredana.Federico@unicredit.eu +359 2 9269-390, kristofor.pavlov@unicreditgroup.bg
Mauro Giorgio Marrano Goran Šaravanja, Chief Economist, Croatia
+39 02 8862-8222 +385 1 6006-678, goran.saravanja@unicreditgroup.zaba.hr
mauro.giorgiomarrano@unicredit.eu
Pavel Sobisek, Chief Economist, Czech Republic
Alexander Koch, CFA +420 2 211-12504, pavel.sobisek@unicreditgroup.cz
+49 89 378-13013
alexander.koch1@unicreditgroup.de Dmitry Veselov, Ph.D., Economist, EEMEA
+44 207 826 1808, dmitry.veselov@unicredit.eu
Chiara Silvestre
chiara.silvestre@unicredit.eu Vladimír Zlacký, Chief Economist, Slovakia
+421 2 4950-2267, vladimir.zlacky@unicreditgroup.sk
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Fax +49 89 378-18352
*UniCredit Research is the joint research department of UniCredit Bank AG (UniCredit Bank), UniCredit CAIB Group (UniCredit CAIB), UniCredit Securities (UniCredit Securities),
UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş. (UniCredit Menkul), UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank and ATFBank.