G.R. No.

L-61236 January 31, 1984

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS

OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING
OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD
PRODUCTS, respondents.

Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.

Issue:

Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required
respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on
Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was
issued, "directing respondent Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his
agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July 20, 1982; and to
restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise
case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of
the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas
Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor
Code, which now reads: '(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12

On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original
jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in
excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a
Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarely the issue of whether or not respondent
Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instant
petition has merit and should be given due course."

He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the
decisions issued by this Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original
wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied
by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978,
however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided
"that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain
claims for moral and other forms of damages." 17 The ordinary courts were thus vested
with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of
employees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story,
for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending Article
217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide
"3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits
provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from
employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by tills Code." 19 An equally
conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a
regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor
Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded
thus: "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment." 20 This is to be compared with the former phraseology "(2) unresolved
issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be noted that Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations.

Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition.
certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the
matter.

1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of
a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court
of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the
scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for
damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the
express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been
the constant ruling of this Court even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913
decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience.
Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the lapse of
sixty years. 24

2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has
spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of
the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive
jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in the
ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive
jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of
unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages — the court of general jurisdiction or
the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was
categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court;
and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in
words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is
derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential
Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ...
Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of
workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims
arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this
Code." 28 That same month, two other cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De
Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30

3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982,
was not followed by private respondent when it filed the complaint for damages on July
9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On this point, reference may be made to our
decision in National Federation of Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In that case, the question
involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood Products,
Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order
of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission the labor
dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. It was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face
of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would not comply with such
order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration came from it. It ignored this
notification by the presidents of the labor unions involved to its resident manager that
the striking employees would lift their picket line and start returning to work on August
20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as
the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion
for Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g),
mandates that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of Labor and
Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and
a strike has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall
immediately return to work and the employees shall immediately resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike." '
" 33 No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration
vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims
for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article
217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with
competence to act on the matter.
4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages
would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were
not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was
referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management &
Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co.,
Inc.  34 as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to
be drawn"35 between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the
unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has
been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the
choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor Code is
even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest
of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often
onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages
that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or
controversies arising from employer-employee relations.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by
respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted
and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to
which this case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any further action on Civil Case No.
716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. The temporary restraining order of
August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent .

G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION,

INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.

Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant.

Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "...

(1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an
agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages
payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the
amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the
member to the co-operative.

(2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a
request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make
the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative.

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such
decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more
specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the
provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to
deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the
agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand
owing from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if
so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of
it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative." 1

To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the
following: "Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by
credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees'
wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove
quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel
the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit
unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act
2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees'
credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of the
employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something
into the law which does not appear. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to
compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to
the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first
priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first
priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law
would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and
2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. 2

Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief,
succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top
priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in
issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of priority of payment
out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of
Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, implemented the said
provision of law. 3

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would
appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity.
As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower
court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a
function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals:   "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there
4

is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation,
must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently born to that effect.  .5

2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very
law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis
would have prevented him from instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v.
Montesa,   this Court held. "Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the
6

part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful
exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled.   The opinion continued in
7
this wise:"According to former Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus
if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the
petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright  was
cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be
enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and
that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to
perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well establish
that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be
certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same effect is the
formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful
cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed."   So it has been since then.   The latest reported
8 9

case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission,   this court speaking through Justice Concepcion
10

Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the
imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.  11

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and KAYUMANGGI RADIO NETWORK
INCORPORATED, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:

This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) which ordered petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Incorporated (RCPI) to
desist from operating its radio telephone services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

Petitioner has been operating a radio communications system since 1957 under its legislative
franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036 which was enacted on June 23, 1957.

In 1968, the petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. In 1971, another
radio telegraph service was put up in San Jose, Mindoro followed by another in Catarman, Samar in
1976. The installation of radio telephone services started in 1971 in San Jose, Mindoro; then in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983.

In a decision dated June 24, 1980 in NTC Case No. 80-08, private respondent Kayumanggi Radio
Network Incorporated was authorized by the public respondent to operate radio communications
systems in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro.

On December 14, 1983, the private respondent filed a complaint with the NTC alleging that the
petitioner was operating in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro without a certificate of public
covenience and necessity. The petitioner, on the other hand, counter-alleged that its telephone
services in the places subject of the complaint are covered by the legislative franchise recognized by
both the public respondent and its predecessor, the Public Service Commission. In its supplemental
reply, the petitioner further stated that it has been in operation in the questioned places long before
private respondent Kayumanggi filed its application to operate in the same places.

After conducting a hearing, NTC, in its decision dated August 22, 1984 ordered petitioner RCPI to
immediately cease or desist from the operation of its radio telephone services in Catarman Northern
Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that under Executive Order
No. 546, a certificate of public convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of
communication utilities and services including radio communications.

On September 4, 1984, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an order
dated September 12, 1984.

On October 1, 1984, the present petition was filed raising the issue of whether or not petitioner
RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a
certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations
including radio telephone services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro;
and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

The petitioner's main argument states that the abolition of the Public Service Commission under
Presidential Decree No. 1 and the creation of the National Telecommunications Commission under
Executive Order No. 546 to replace the defunct Public Service Commission did not affect sections
14 and 15 of the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act. No. 146, as amended).

The provisions of the Public Service Law pertinent to the petitioner's allegation are as follows:

Section 13. (a) the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over
all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties, and in the
exercise of its authority, it shall have the necessary powers and the aid of public
force: ...

Section 14. The following are exempted from the provisions of the preceding section:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Radio companies except with respect to the fixing of rates;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15. With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no
public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and
subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of
public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case
may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do
business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. ...

We find no merit in the petitioner's contention.

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23,1972, reorganizing the executive branch
of the National Government, the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were
transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board
of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred were still
subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as amended.
With the enactment of Executive Order No. 546 on July 23, 1979 implementing P.D. No.1, the Board
of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions
were transferred to the National Telecommunications Commission (Sec. 19(d), Executive Order No.
546). Section 15 of said Executive Order spells out the functions of the National
Telecommunications Commission as follows:

Sec. 15. Functions of the Commission.-The Commission shall exercise the following
functions:

a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications

utilities and services, radio communications petitions systems, wire or wireless
telephone or telegraph system, radio and television broadcasting system and other
similar public utilities;

b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of

public service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates
pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases
where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of
which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the
Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;

c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph
systems and radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and
radio and television broadcasting systems;

d. Sub-allocate series of frequencies of bands allocated by the International

Telecommunications Union to the specific services;

e. Establish and prescribe rules, regulations, standards, specifications in all cases

related to the issued Certificate of Public Convenience and administer and enforce
the same;

f. Coordinate and cooperate with government agencies and other entities concerned
with any aspect involving communications with a view to continuously improve the
communications service in the country;

g. Promulgate such rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require,
to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in
these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible;

h. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications

facilities;

i. Undertake the examination and licensing of radio operators;

j. Undertake, whenever necessary, the registration of radio transmitters and

transceivers; and
 k. Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.

It is clear from the aforequoted provision that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer exists
because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders.
The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground
that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.

A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the
hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by
every authority since (State v. Twin Village Water Co., 98 Me 214, 56 A 763 (1903)). Today, a
franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its
existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its
administrative agencies. We ruled in Pangasinan transportation Co., Inc. v. Public Service
Commission (70 Phil. 221) that:

... statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the
State of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in
operation ...

Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the
Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by
its provisions. The petitioner cannot install and operate radio telephone services on the basis of its
legislative franchise alone.

The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can
operate a radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous. Section 1 of
said statute reads:

Section 1. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and to the provisions, not
inconsistent herewith, of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and forty-six,
entitled.' An Act providing for the regulation of radio stations and radio
communications in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes;' Commonwealth
Act Numbered One hundred forty-six, known as the Public Service Act, and their
amendments, and other applicable laws, there is hereby granted to the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, its successors or assigns, the right and privilege
of constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the Philippines, at such
places as the said corporation may select and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications may approve, radio stations for the reception and transmission of
wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephone, including both coastal
and marine telecommunications, each station to consist of two radio apparatus
comprising of a receiving and sending radio apparatus. (Emphasis supplied).

Section 4(a) of the same Act further provides that:

Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be
exercised by the grantee until the Secretary of Public works and Communications
shall have allotted to the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and
issued to the grantee a license for such case. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where
it desires to operate. It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to
the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. (Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 381).

The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works
and Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San
Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and
necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such
certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations (See executive Order No. 546,
sec. 15, supra.; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. City of Davao, 15 SCRA 75; Olongapo
Electric Light and Power Corp. v. National Power Corporation, et al., G.R. No. L-24912, promulgated
April 9, 1987.)

It was well within the powers of the public respondent to authorize the installation by the private
respondent network of radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro.
Under the circumstances of this case, the mere fact that the petitioner possesses a franchise to put
up and operate a radio communications system in certain areas is not an insuperable obstacle to the
public respondent's issuing the proper certificate to an applicant desiring to extend the same
services to those areas. The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature
nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even
repeal by the legislature when the common good so requires. (Art. XII, sec. 11 of the 1986
Constitution). There is an express provision in the petitioner's franchise which provides compliance
with the above mandate R.A. 2036, sec. 15).

In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent's findings of fact, and
conclusions of law insofar as the private respondent was authorized to operate in Catarman, Samar
and San Jose, Mindoro. As a rule, the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive upon this Court. We may modify or ignore them only when it clearly
appears that there is no evidence to support reasonably such a conclusion. (Halili v. Daplas, 14
SCRA 14). The petitioner has not shown why the private respondent should be denied the authority
to operate its services in Samar and Mindoro. It has not overcome the presumption that when the
public respondent disturbed the petitioner's monopoly in certain areas, it was doing so pursuant to
public interest and the common good.

WHEREFORE, the challenged order of the public respondent dated August 22, 1984 is hereby
AFFIRMED. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.