Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Compilation of Case Digests For Law On
A Compilation of Case Digests For Law On
A Compilation of Case Digests For Law On
PONENTE AQUINO, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Executive Order No. 626-A was already
effective at the time when the confiscation of the carabaos of the
Pensigans on the evening of April 2, 1982?
GR NUMBER L-62243
DATE 1984-10-12
PONENTE Relova
NATURE/KEYWO Petition for certiorari, Art. 2 of NCC, When Laws Take Effect
RDS
FACTS - On or about and during the 2nd week of May 1979, private
respondent Benito Go Bio issued a BPI check amounting to
P200,000 to Filipinas Tan, which was dishonored for the reason
of insufficient funds. He was charged with violation of Batasang
Pambansa 22, also known as Bouncing Checks Law at the CFI
Zambales presided by the respondent judge.
- Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash, pointing out that
at the time of issuing the check, BP 22 has not yet taken effect.
- The prosecution opposed, contending that the date of the
dishonor of the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the
date of the commission of the offense. BP 22 took effect on
June 29, 1979.
- Go Bio submits that what BP 22 penalizes is not the dishonor
of the check, but its issuance without sufficient funds.
- Respondent judge resolved the motion, saying that BP 22
cannot be given retroactive effect, that Go Bio cannot be held
liable for bouncing checks prior to its effectivity.
- Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioner
contending that BP 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue
of the Official Gazette, which 15 days therefrom would be April
24, 1979, days before Go Bio issued the check.
- Respondent Go Bio argues that while it was published on April
9, it was only released on June 14, 1979.
RULING(S) NO. Even though BP 22 was printed on the April 9, 1979 issue
of the Official Gazette, it was only officially released for
circulation on June 14, 1979. BP 22’s effectivity clause states
that, “This Act shall take effect 15 days after the publication in
the Official Gazette.” Hence, it took effect on June 29, 1979.
The order of the respondent judge is affirmed.
GR NUMBER L-63915
PONENTE ESCOLIN
4.MRCA v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 344 , December 19, 1989 _ ANTONA
FACTS The petitioner prays to set aside the CA decision dismissing the
complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees for
failure to specify the amounts of moral & exemplary, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered, and left
them "to the discretion of the Court" or "to be proven during
the trial."
Invoking the case of Manchester Development
Corporation vs. CA, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court in
dismissing the complaint, hence, this petition. Petitioner argues
that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published
in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling
therein was ineffective; may not be given retroactive effect
because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the
dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it
should not apply to the present case because the petitioner
herein had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the
proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case where
enormous amounts were claimed in the body of the complaint,
but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees.
Important Dates:
Manchester case’ promulgation - May 7,1987,
Complaint in this case – March 24, 1988
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., vs. Asuncion - February
13, 1989, a case that was already
pending before Manchester was promulgated.
PONENTE Grino-Aquino, J
GR NUMBER 179579
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the
requirements for the Revised Administrative Code? Whether or
not the content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement of the
equal protection clause of the constitution?
7.Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
DATE 2013-06-05
PONENTE
GR NUMBER 46623
PONENTE IMPERIAL, J:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
· Respondents seek to recover from the petitioner a parcel of
land in the province of Bataan together with its improvements.
· Under Act. No. 496, Section 122, the said property was granted
by way of homestead to the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio whose
children and heirs are the respondents.
· On May 16, 1932, while Emiliana Ambrosio was still alive, she
entered to a mortgage contract with Marcial Kasilag. The content
of such contract pertains to the improvements on the parcel of
land aiming to secure payment on the loan of P1000 with 12%
per annum interest payable to the latter within 4 ½ years.
The Court of Appeals held that the mortgage deed was actually
an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and
declared that the deed, including the subsequent verbal contract,
was void and without any legal effect. However, the CA
ordered the respondents to pay petitioner the loan of P1,000 with
legal interest at 6% per annum from the date of the decision.
Thus, this appeal.
Yes. Gross and inexeusable ignorance of the law may not be the
basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be
such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with
the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage
of the improvements, he proceeded on the well-grounded belief
that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation
of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that
the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by section 116. Thus, the petitioner's ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith.
C. Retroactivity
GR NUMBER L-4963
DATE 1953-01-29
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
RULING(S) No, the illegitimate children cannot inherit under the new civil
code. Since, it will impair the VESTED RIGHT of the lawful
spouse, Maria Uson. The Retroactive Effect of the NCC can only
be applied when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or
acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides
that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code,
it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred
under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the
same origin."
DATE 1989-01-31
FACTS Facts:
● Petitioner Jose F. Puzon filed a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the then First Civil Cases Division
of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
● On October 10, 1977, petitioner acquired through
auction one of the lands owned by oppositor-appellee
Alejandra Abellera, now deceased and substituted by her
only child Tomasa Domondon, because of oppositor-
appellee’s failure to pay real property taxes for the years
1971 – 1977. To confirm said sale, petitioner filed a suit to
consolidate his ownership over the property.
● The lot in question was reverted to the public
domain, which theoppositor-appellee acquired through
Republic Act No. 931, when Presidential Decree No. 1271
took effect on December 22, 1977, with the title "An act
nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of title
covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case
No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211 pursuant to Republic Act No.
931, as amended, but considering as valid certain titles of
such lands that are alienable and disposable under certain
conditions and for other purposes."
● While trying to avail of the provisions of PD 1271,
oppositor-appellee found out that the two lands he owned
had been auctioned off. She then filed her opposition to
petitioner Puzon's petition for consolidation to which the
lower court ruled in favor of, declaring null and void the
aforesaid auction sale and illegal the assessment made
regarding the taxes.
● Hence this present petition where petitioner in
concluding that the assessments made for the years 1971
to 1977 were legal contended that that PD 1271 is curative
in nature and that titles so issued are validated upon
compliance with certain requirements and subject to realty
tax.
GR NUMBER L-44466
FACTS Facts:
● On January 8, 1962, Petitioner Acosta filed an action
publiciana with the CFI of Isabela against respondent
Maglay. The complaint was amended on August 25, 1971 to
implead the Dept. of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Bureau of Lands
● On October 3, 1975, the complaint was dismissed. A motion
for reconsideration (MR) was filed thereafter.
● On December 12, 1975, the MR was denied
● On December 22, 1975, a motion for leave to appeal as
paupers was filed and was granted by the Trial Court.
● Believing that as pauper litigants, they did not have to
submit a record on appeal, they waited for the Trial Court
to elevate the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals as provided in Sec 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
● On June 16, 1976, the Judge dismissed the appeal for the
failure to file a record on appeal. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the petition of
certiorari.
ISSUE Whether or not BP 29, being procedural in nature, providing that
a record of appeal is not needed to perfect an appeal shall be
given retroactive effect.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Contention of Parties:
These turn of events, prompted the petitioners to file a
petition certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the
Supreme Court against the Secretary of Justice, Gonzales
(respondent), assailing him of grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the Department Order and Memorandum. The former
(DO No. 182) was opined as an obstruction of justice, violating
their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law,
right to speedy disposition of the cases, and the rule against the
enactment of laws with retroactive effect, while the latter
(Memorandum dated March 2, 2009) was challenged as
unconstitutional for violating their right to equal protection under
the constitution.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the Gonzales (respondent), maintains the validity
of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and
prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not the assailed issuance of Department Order
No. 182 by the DOJ can be given retroactive effect and thus be
applied to pending cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et. al.
E. Waiver of rights
PONENTE NACHURA, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Certiorari/Waiver Of Rights/Second Division
RDS
FACTS On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asain Cathay Finance and Leasing
Corporation (ACFLC) extended a loan of ₱800,000.00 to respondent
Cesario Gravador, with respondents Norma de Vera and Emma
Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers.
The respondents filed a suit before the Regional Trial Court Branch
9 of Bulacan for annulment of real estate mortgage and promissory
note, and alleged that they were deceived into signing the loan
documents which do not have the maturity date of the loan, the
interest rate, and the mode of payment; and that it illegally
imposed liquidated damages.
RULING(S) No, CA’s decision to invalidate the respondent’s waiver of the right
of redemption and the interest rates imposed on his loan were
affirmed by SC.
Waiver of Rights
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it
must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a
right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
F. Repeal of laws
DATE 1991-04-22
PONENTE GANCAYCO, J.
The 1990 budget total was P233.5 Billion, with P86.8 Billion in
automatic appropriation for debt service. In comparison, the
appropriation for the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports was only P27 Billion.
ISSUE(S) WON the subject laws were impliedly repealed upon the passage
of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING(S) NO, subject laws were not impliedly repealed. Well-known is the
rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon.
Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the
Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete
in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards
are indicated therein.
H. Applicability of custom
DATE 1910-12-27
PONENTE MORELAND, J.
RULING(S) The judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the
evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is
the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the
kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the
manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all
cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The
public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection.
I. Legal periods
GR NUMBER 50654
DATE 1989-11-06
RULING(S) NO. The Court considered the day as synonymous with the
date. Consequently, the 5th day shall be the 15 days after the
appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted.
The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise
specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law
to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and
including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it
shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by
order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of
the act, event or default after which the designated period of time
begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so
computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal
holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next
day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday."
GR NUMBER 29 SCRA 70
PONENTE Concepcion; CJ
November 21, 1955: A copy of the decision was served upon the
defendants.
The case was filed December 21, 1965. The Plaintiff forgot the
1960 and 1964 were leap years and so, more than 10 years have
passed. A year having 365 days each (Art 13, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
J. Binding effect
GR NUMBER 37048
PONENTE Hull, J
Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8, and
6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being
represented by attorneys, continued for several months,
whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her
support and that of her children, P500 monthly; this amount to
be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain
properties to be put in her name.
Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook
himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an
absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree
was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant
moved to California and returned to these Islands in August
1928, where he has since remained.
RULING(S) While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial
matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this
jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On
the record here presented this can not be done. The public
policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set
forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court:
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation
until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all
prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly
indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine
Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change
of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our
law.
PONENTE REYES
NATURE/KEYWO ART.15 OF NCC (Nationality Rule) - Laws relating to family rights
RDS and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of person
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
After some time Vicenta left for the United States. In 1950, she
applied for and was granted a decree of divorce by the court of
Nevada against Pastor Tenchavez on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character".
The lower court did no decree the legal separation, but freed the
plaintiff in supporting his wife and to acquire property to the
exclusion of his wife.
ISSUE(S) W/N the decree of absolute divorce obtained from the court of
Nevada should apply to the marriage of Tenchavez and Escaño?
RULING(S) No. The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
Law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the
wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character". At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act. No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Nationality Rule:
ISSUE(S) (1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each
of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on
conjugal properties.
RULING(S) 1. As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still
considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
2. The private respondent, as he is bound by the decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, has no legal
standing in the Philippine court as husband of the petitioner, as
the divorce legally dissolved their marriage, to sue Alice Van Dorn
to exercise control over conjugal assets. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.
PONENTE REGALADO
ISSUE(S) Whether or not adultery can still be charge to the petitioner given
the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
RULING(S) NO. The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery
and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse. In this case, the fact that the
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in relation to his nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus, under the
same consideration and rationale, the private respondent is no
longer the husband of the petitioner, therefore, has no legal
standing commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit.
K. Human Relations
The following morning the accused left after paying the children.
Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted something in
her vagina. Sometime the following day, Jessie asked Rosario
whether the object was already removed from her body and
Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie claimed that on the evening
of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of
pain in her vagina and when he asked her, she said that the
foreign object was not yet removed.
PONENTE Peralta, J.
FACTS FACTS: Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente
own a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City
and on June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in favor of Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit
at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00.
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the
name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed until
on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma.
Theresa was cut off.
Petitioner requested for the water disconnection. Petitioner claims
that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of
COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the
Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's
account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name.
RULING(S) HELD: Yes. Petitioners abuse their rights and they are liable to pay
damages.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require
the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account
with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to
cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In the present
case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when
she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water
supply without warning or informing the latter of such request.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the
Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Generally,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
be proper.
L. Prejudicial Question
27. Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441, April 15, 1988 21.
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
GR NUMBER L-22579
DATE 1968-02-23
PONENTE Fernando
FACTS - On Feb. 1963, petitioner Landicho was charged before the CFI
of Batangas, presided by the respondent judge, with the offense
of bigamy by Elvira Makatangkay, his wife. Said petitioner
contracted second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.
- On March 1963, Fe Lourdes Pasia filed an action seeking to declare
her marriage with petitioner null and void ab initio on grounds of
his bigamous character and use of force, threats, and intimidation.
- On June 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case filed a third-
party complaint against third-party defendant Makatangkay, the
first spouse, seeking to declare their marriage null and void on the
grounds of force, threats, and intimidation, and that she compelled
him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of
the Peace in Makati.
- Thereafter, on Oct 1963 petitioner moved to suspend the hearing
of the criminal case while the civil suits on the nullity of two
marriages involved are pending, raising prejudicial question as a
defense.
- Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Landicho
filed a motion for reconsideration, but was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition with a preliminary injunction to restrain the judge from
further proceeding with the bigamy case. A petition for certiorari
was also filed to include the People of the Philippines as another
respondent.
ISSUE(S) W/N the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage
of the second wife against petitioner, and the petitioner filing a
civil suit for the annulment of marriage with the first spouse,
constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending criminal suit of
bigamy against him.
RULING(S) NO. The court ruled that even assuming that even the first
marriage was declared null and void, it is not material to the
outcome of the criminal case. There is no prejudicial question
since situations in cases are different. At the time the petitioner
was indicted bigamy on Feb 1963, he had already contracted
two marriages. Then on March 1963, it was the second spouse,
not the petitioner who filed an action for nullity. It was also
sometime later on June 1963 that petitioner sought for the
nullity of his first marriage. Respondent judge answered that
only competent courts have authority to declare marriages null,
and not the parties to a marriage. A person who contracts a
second marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. Hence, the respondent judge did not abuse his
discretion in failing to suspend the motion sought by the
petitioner. The petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of
preliminary injunction is dissolved.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Prejudicial question – one raised in a criminal case by the accused
which if decided favorably in a civil case, will cause the supposed
crime to disappear. The prejudicial question must be determinative
if the case before the court, and, that jurisdiction to try said
questions must be lodged in another tribunal. For this reason, the
criminal case must be suspended until the determination of such
question in a civil proceeding.
GR NUMBER
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that
they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed and
protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
John and Mary Doe was a childless couple. Mary was suffering
from "neural-chemical" and physician advised her to avoid
pregnancy until her condition improved She discontinued using
birth control pills because of her condition but if she should
become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy
by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician
under safe, clinical conditions.
Dissent.
Justice Rehnquist: The right to an abortion is not universally
accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently
involved in this case.
Discussion.
The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all
abortions except in the case of a lifesaving procedure on behalf
of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to
privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription
of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a
compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or
the viable fetus. The court declined to address the question
of when life begins.
Other Issue: Whether a plaintiff still has standing to bring a
case based on her pregnancy once she has given birth.
Holding: Yes. The mootness doctrine does not bar her case
from being heard, even though this individual plaintiff's position
would no longer be affected, and she did not have an actual
case or controversy. This situation fits within the exception to
the mootness rule that covers wrongs that are capable of
repetition yet evading review. Most cases are not heard through
to appeal in a period shorter than a pregnancy, so strictly
applying the mootness doctrine would prevent these issues
from ever being resolved.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/410/113/#F22
DIVISION EN BANC
NATURE/KEYWO Petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the
RDS husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
ISSUE(S) W/N an action for pecuniary damages for the death of a person
covers an unborn fetus not endowed with personality and whether
such right accrued to its parents?
RULING(S) No. An action for pecuniary damages for the death of a person
does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed
with personality being incapable of having rights and
obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account
of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child under Art. 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive. In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from the maternal womb.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb. The prevailing
American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally
held that recovery cannot be had for the death of an unborn
child. In the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife. The lower courts have found that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are, that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken
no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even
after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem
to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been
directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment
for an "indemnity” claim.
PONENTE REYES, J
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the conceived child has personality and thus has
the right to support from the defendant
RULING(S) YES. The child is given provisional personality. Article 40 of the Civil
Code provides that a conceived child, although unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
to it. In effect, the child may receive donations under Article 742
of the Civil Code. At the time of the first complaint, petitioner has
cause of action for damages hence the lower court erred in its
ruling.
Petitioner is also entitled for compensation under Article 21 and
Article 2219 of the same code.
GR NUMBER L-39110
PONENTE STREET
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the unborn child has rights under this case;
33. Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 April 27, 1948
PONENTE AQUINO, J:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS · On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. filed a
case Against Pedro Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbog, and Juana Darang.
RULING(S) The lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
judgment against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land is also void.
No. Oria, upon his death, had no more civil personality and his
juridical capacity which made him capable of legal relations was
lost through death. In the first place, he was not, and he could
not have been, validly served with summons. (Arts. 37 and 42,
Civil Code).
35. Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 May 17, 1990
GR NUMBER 85140
DATE 1990-05-17
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
DATE 1953-05-29
FACTS The case at hand is a petition for review on the decision of the
Court of Appeals which modified that of the Court of First Instance
regarding the summary settlement of the estates of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased, particularly the
sequence of their deaths. The Court of Appeals, compelled to fall
back to statutory presumption, declared Joaquin Navarro, Jr. to
have survived his mother, applying Rule 123, section 69(ii) of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The decision of the CA radically affected the right of
succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child
of the deceased spouses, and of Antonio C. Navarro, respondent,
son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
ISSUE(S) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in applying Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court instead of Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 on
the assumption that there is total lack of evidence?
RULING(S) No. The Supreme Court held that neither of the two provisions
was applicable because where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls and for the reasons to be presently set forth.
Both provisions, Rule 123, section 69(ii) of the Revised
Rules of Court and Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889, now article
43 of the New Civil Code, as their language plainly implies, are
intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be available
when there are facts. The SC held that the preceding testimony
by a survivor contained facts quite adequate to solve the problem
of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
and keep the statutory presumption out of the case.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son
cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility was
entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction
from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., according to the testimony, was killed while running,
in front of, and 15 meters from, the burning German Club where
Mrs. Angela Navarro was left behind, alive and unhurt. Still in the
prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he
dashed out of the building. The testimony also provided that the
collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after
Joaquin Navarro Jr. was shot in the head and dropped dead, and
that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. Gauged
by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases
are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
The particular circumstances from which the parties and
the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen,
undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or
incorrectness of those conclusions raised a question of law, not
of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. The
question of whether upon given facts the operation of the
statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
Thus, the Supreme Court was constrained to reverse the
decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the
decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put
forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's
death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
GR NUMBER 15574
PONENTE J. Malcolm
PONENTE J. Willard
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
ISSUE(S) Whether or not that the subject property wherein the said
church situated were own by the government or by the Catholic
Church having the capacity as Juridical Personality
RULING(S) The court decided to hold its decision in favor of the Catholic
Church because of its Juridical Personality here in the
Philippines. The Church belongs to God and therefore the use of
the church should be to glorify God which is the Catholic Church
used to do. The public properties are the Roads and other
properties wherein the public should have. The ownership of the
Churches in the Philippines is not covered by the treaty of Paris
which were contracted between US and Spain.
It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church
has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This
suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates
by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe,
and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in
Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of
Mecca," does not require serious consideration
NOTES: Catholic Church has the capacity to own properties.
39. Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil. 363 July 25, 1911
RULING(S) No. SC agrees with Trial Court in saying that that a person's
believing himself to be what he is not is not a positive proof of
insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Capacity to
act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not
previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved. And this has not been proved in this case. It is very
evident that on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva
subscribed the obligation now contested, he possessed the
necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect
to the bond which he freely executed.
· Medico-legal doctrine:
o Supported the conclusion that such monomania
of wealth does not necessarily imply the result
that the defendant Villanueva was not a person
capable of executing a contract of bond.
· No proof to the claim alleged by the wife.
o It was not shown whether monomania was
habitual and constituted a truthful mental
perturbation in the patient; that the bond
executed by the defendant Villanueva was the
result of such monomania, and not the effect of
any other cause; and that the monomania
existed on the date when the bond was executed.
· Bond was executed December 1908, and his incapacity
was not declared until July 24, 1909 (a year after executing the
bond).
● Testimonies given by physicians and CFI Judge
○ Testified to the sanity of Villanueva particularly
during the time of the execution of the bond.
PONENTE ROMUALDEZ, J.
FACTS Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura was the sole heir of the deceased
Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura and thus was the owner of the land
which was allegedly purchased by Genoveva Muerong.
ISSUE(S) W/N the sale of the land was valid considering that the seller was
a minor and the sale was unregistered
RULING(S) No. The land was not sold to the defendant by the plaintiff because
the latter was a minor and the sale was unregistered
Minority
The contract of purchase and sale of real property executed by a
minor is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards said minor.
The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs.
Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped
from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be of
age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff
did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the
purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the
plaintiff's first cedula to be used in the acknowledgment of the
document.
Registration
A contract of purchase and sale of real property registered in
accordance with the Torrens system, does not bind the property if
it is not registered and is only valid between the parties and as
authority for the register of deeds to make the proper registration.
Therefore, the purchaser, by virtue of the deed of sale alone, does
not acquire any right to the property sold and much less if the
vendor is a minor.
Purchase
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to
have given the plaintiff and her son in 1922 as the price of the land,
the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given to
the alleged vendors in said year.
The sum of P663.40 is arrived at, approximately, by taking the
P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding
thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent per annum.
43. Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil. 669 March 4, 1950
PONENTE PARAS, J
NATURE/KEYWO Minority
RDS
RULING(S) NO, the respondent cannot use minority at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale as valid ground to invalidate the
Contract.The circumstance that, about one month after the date
of the conveyance, the respondent informed the petitioners of his
minority, is of no moment, because respondent's previous
misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the
contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference
that the petitioners in fact did not know that he was a minor on
the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes his bad faith,
when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said
information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from
the petitioners the sum of P500.
44. De Braganza v. De Villa- Abrille, 105 Phil 456 April 13, 1959
PONENTE BENGZON, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Minority as limitation on capacity to act
RDS
ISSUE(S) W/N Guillermo and Rodolfo had the capacity to act when they
signed the promissory note
DATE 1914-03-13
NATURE/KEYWO Insanity
RDS
PONENTE Arellano, CJ
FACTS December 15, 1908 - Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara
del Pino, as principals, and Aipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva
and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as surities sign a bond in favor of
plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of Php 3,305.76,
three months from date, with interest of Php 1.00 per month.
April 5, 1909 - The plaintiff sued the debtors regarding the bond
sign and they were summoned. The record shows that Villanueva
received his summons.
May 12, 1909 - Villanueva did not appear and was declared in
default.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that
at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the
appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The
witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane
periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but none
at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15,
1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to
legally deprive her husband management over his estate knowing
full well that he was insane.
GR NUMBER 54135
PONENTE Feliciano, J
NATURE/KEYWO Insanity
RDS
FACTS Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then CFI
of Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape of
complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount P10,000 by way
of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the
insanity defense, it was only in People vs. Formigones that the
Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this
exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
NATURE/KEYWOR ART.50 OF NCC - For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment
DS of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of
their habitual residence.
The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court (SC) which affirmed
the ruling on the pre-proclamation but reversed the dismissal on the
Disqualification Case and ordered the Comelec to
proceed with the hearing.
Hence this petition seeks to review the decision and resolution of the
Commission on Elections.
ISSUE(S) W/N Larrazabal lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for
the position of governor of Leyte?
RULING(S) Yes. The COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the
required residence on the evidence of record to the effect that
despite protestations to the contrary made by the petitioner, she has
established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the present
and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly change her
residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga,
Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province
of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident
of Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise,
the reliance on the provisions of the Family Code was proper and in
consonance with human experience. The petitioner did not present
evidence to show that she and her husband maintain separate
residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City.
The Civil Code is clear that for the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the
place of their habitual residence.
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside
the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in
grave abuse of discretion.
VII. MARRIAGE
PONENTE Bengzon
Extra:
ISSUE:
Who can sue using the “breach of promise to marry”?
RULING:
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the
defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement.
One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another,
the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to
marry".
DATE 02-08-1916
PONENTE JOHNSON
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.
RULING(S) YES. The court ruled that a contract such as the one relied upon
by the plaintiff in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing.
Paragraph 3 Section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil
Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be
valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable
to prove it. Said section provides that the contract shall not be
enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note
or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by
which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does
not declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not been
reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph
5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid
contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If
it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot
be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to
evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it
does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause,
make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be
proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding
upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
FACTS FACTS:
● Complainant Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School and later on she became a life
insurance underwriter in Cebu. The petitioner was almost
ten (10) years younger than she. They used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
● One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies,
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot.
● In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954. Referring now to
the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain (Articles 43 and 44) permitted the recovery
of damages for breach of promise to marry.
● On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court
of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner,
as well as for support of said child and moral damages for
alleged breach of promise.
● Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the later, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.
● The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay,
by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was,
on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual
and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral
damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees
● CA affirmed this decision.except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
● Francisco filed a petition for review by Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE(S) Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
RULING(S) Ruling: 1. NO. Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
RULING(S)
HELD: Yes. A mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
Defendant urges that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be
totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends
that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
Erlinda’s parents are now suing Virgilio’s parents for damages. They
had already bought Erlinda a wedding gown and sandals, and
prepared some animals for slaughter. The CFI ruled in favor of the
Sps. Ephan, awarding them P20,000 in moral damages P10,000 in
exemplary damages, P1,000 in attorney’s fees, and P400 in wedding
reparations. Hence present appeal.
ISSUE(S) WON the Ephan’s are liable for the breach of promise to marry?
RULING(S) No, the Ephan’s are not liable.
As a general rule, a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. The Supreme Court, however laid down a certain
exceptions, as in the case of Wassmer v Valdez. Under Art. 21 of
the Civil Code, the SC found that “to formally set a wedding and go
through the preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different from a mere
breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be answerable
for damages in accordance with Art. 21.
The Court differentiated the present case from Wassmer in that the
parents of both contracting parties connived Virgilio into marrying
Erlinda. In Wassmer, the contracting parties themselves entered into
the agreement to marry.
The Court then opined that Erlinda should suffer for her libertarian
conduct. She entered into it with “eyes wide open and with mutual
passion.” Virgilio shouldn’t suffer alone. If Virgilio felt that he was
not prepared for marriage in the first place then he should not go
through with it. It will only make him a bitter husband and
consequently an inept father, which do not make for a good family
life.
VII. MARRIAGE
PONENTE Bengzon
NATURE/KEYWOR Breach of Promise to Marry
DS
FACTS 1. In the court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his
son Geronimo sued the respondents Matias Auxilio and his
daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from respondents’'
refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between
Socorro and Geronimo.
2. The complaint alleged, in short;
(a) that respondents promised such marriage to the petitioners,
provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud
and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride;
(b) that relying upon such promises, the petitioners made the
improvement and spent P700; and
(c) that without cause, the respondents refused to honor their
pledged word
3. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
the contract is just an oral agreement and there’s no written
agreement that was executed.
**Under the former rules of procedure: Rule 123, Sec 21 states
that “Oral evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement made
upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to
marry”
4. The court dismissed the case. It should be observed preliminarily
that when the complaint did not state whether the contract sued on
was in writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no ground for
the respondent.
***Under the new Rules "defendant may now present a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if
such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact
may be proved by him."
5. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the petitioners
reproduced their complaint and the respondents reiterated their
motion to dismiss.
Extra:
ISSUE:
Who can sue using the “breach of promise to marry”?
RULING:
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the
defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement.
One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another,
the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to
marry".
DATE 02-08-1916
PONENTE JOHNSON
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.
RULING(S) YES. The court ruled that a contract such as the one relied upon
by the plaintiff in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing.
Paragraph 3 Section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil
Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be
valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable
to prove it. Said section provides that the contract shall not be
enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note
or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by
which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does
not declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not been
reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph
5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid
contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If
it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot
be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to
evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it
does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause,
make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be
proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding
upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
FACTS FACTS:
● Complainant Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School and later on she became a life
insurance underwriter in Cebu. The petitioner was almost
ten (10) years younger than she. They used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
● One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies,
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot.
● In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954. Referring now to
the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain (Articles 43 and 44) permitted the recovery
of damages for breach of promise to marry.
● On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court
of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner,
as well as for support of said child and moral damages for
alleged breach of promise.
● Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the later, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.
● The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay,
by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was,
on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual
and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral
damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees
● CA affirmed this decision.except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
● Francisco filed a petition for review by Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE(S) Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
RULING(S) Ruling: 1. NO. Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
PONENTE Reyes
RULING(S) - NO. The Court looked into the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature to support the draft of the
Civil Code, and found out that Art. 21 of the Civil Code connotes
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded, that the essential feature is seduction, and not just
mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry.
- Examining Santos’ complaint, the Court concluded that such
conducts of the respondent, being a woman of an adult age, is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
voluntariness and mutual passion in her acts. Hence, no case is
made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code. No error was committed
by the CFI in dismissing the complaint.
ADDITIONAL NOTE:
The promise to marry has no obligatory force; therefore, as a
rule, its breach cannot give rise to liability for damages.
(Tolentino, under Art. 19 of the NCC)
55. Baksh v. CA, G.R. 97326 Feb. 19, 1993
GR NUMBER 97336
NATURE/KEYWO APPEAL by certiorari to review and set aside the decision of the
RDS Court of Appeals.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose?- YES
W/N a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public?
- YES
RULING(S) YES! The contract was executed when the Spanish Penal Code
was in force. However, more liberal provisions RPC should be
given application, it is provided that the consent by the offended
party constitutes a bar to prosecution for adultery or
concubinage. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of
the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still
remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be
instituted if the offended party consented to the act of the
offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not matter
for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the
contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and public
order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
PONENTE LAUREL, J
ISSUE(S) ISSUE:
Whether or not a married couple may terminate their marriage
through a contract of separation
Whether or not the defendant’s act of executing a contract of
separation of marriage valid and if not, the said act may
constitute as malpractice of law
PONENTE Aquino
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
DATE 1990-06-06
· Macaria also raised the defenses that she signed the Letter-
Agreement because of her fear that Slyvia would take her
inheritance rights.
PONENTE QUISUMBING, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
GR NUMBER 138322
2nd issue:
No, since according to Australian divorce decree it contains a
restriction that reads:
“A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.”
This provision bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce
ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.
*WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
GR NUMBER No 7037
FACTS Petition:
Appeal from a decision of CFI Davao declaring the two
marriages celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949 null
and void on the ground of plaintiff’s consent was obtained
through force and intimidation employed upon her by her father
Facts:
On April 28, 1949, two marriages of Juanita Sison and Te Lay Li
were celebrated: a civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of
MC of Davao in the morning, and remarried in accordance with
rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T. Mih in office
in Davao City in the afternoon.
Defendant’s claim:
1. Marriages were regular and legal
2. Entered into marriage freely and voluntarily
3. Plaintiff not kept a prisoner
4. Plaintiff would everyday ask her father in law to give her
and her husband their own house and business
5. She slapped her—only when she ran away with P1200 and
when asked where she came from she
PONENTE Puno, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Formal Requisites of Marriage; Authority of Solemnizing Officer;
RDS Marriage License
Facts:
Mercedita Aranes (Petitioner) charged Judge Occiano
(Respondent), Presiding Judge of the MTC of Balatan, Camarines
Sur, with Gross Ignorance of the Law for solemnizing Aranes’
marriage to her late groom, Dominador Orobia (1) outside his
territorial jurisdiction at Nabua, Camarines Sur and (2) without
marriage license. As a result, the marriage was a nullity and her
right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not
recognized and she was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions
of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
68. Macua V. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014 (Llovit)
PONENTE Perez, J.
FACTS This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to
have been validly married to the same man now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido instituted on 11 November 1998,
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina
Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla),
is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage
certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted has been
aptly delineated in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, thus: It
should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown
by the very evidence they have disregarded.
The Court has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by anyone who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.”
GR NUMBER 183896
DATE 2013-01-30
Later on, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Syed, alleging that
he married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura, during the
existence of their marriage. And to avoid the bigamy case, Syed
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria, testified that Syed
is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing
their signatures as proof. She and her mother sought the help of
Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to
be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for
them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who
gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that
she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.
Syed in return, presented a certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its
number, indicated in their marriage contract was never issued to
them but to someone else.
The RTC held that given the lack of a valid marriage license, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed was void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the RTC. The CA held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could
not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance
with all the requisites laid down by law.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not valid marriage license has been issued to the
parties.
GR NUMBER 198780
PONENTE Mendoza, J
FACTS
1) On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before a judge in Mandaluyong City.
2) On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio.
3) Albios contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage only
to enable her to acquire American citizenship and in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000. After the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways but she did not pay him the $2,000
because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and inexistent.
Ratio:
1) Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. For consent to be valid,
it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage.
2) Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.
3) Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
4) Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
5) Their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage.
6) A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such
as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, as
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
7) Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage
of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse
it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
GR NUMBER L-28248
PONENTE Makalintal, C. J.
They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by
the defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that
the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional
rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The
defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court
erred in declaring (1) the 5 children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat to be legitimate; (2) that Lucio Perido was the exclusive
owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and in not
declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of
Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.
RULING(S) The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of
Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that
said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three
were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's
first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were
not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In
support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in
1905, after the first three children were born, that as late as 1923
Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the
certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido
married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as
allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora
Perido.
FACTS Dominga Fiel lived in a common law relationship for 25 years with
Natalio Banawa, a widower and with no children, the said
relationship started during the early part of the year 1945 up to
his death on June 29, 1970. Upon the death of Natalio Banawa,
he was survived by his brothers and nephews, the respondents
herein. Natalio Banawa died, a victim of robbery and murder.
Dominga Fiel herself admitted in open court that she was legally
married to another man who was still alive when Banawa was
robbed and killed and who is apparently alive until the present.
The lower court rendered its decision ordering the plaintiff and
the defendants to divide the properties which the Court found to
be owned in common by Dominga Fiel and Natalio Banawa, one
half to Dominga Fiel and the other half to the heir of Natalio
Banawa.
The defendants in their appeal raised that the lower court erred
in not giving force and effect to the deed of partition executed by
the parties, not declaring null and void the donations made by
Natalo Banawa to Dominga Fiel, not finding that there was no
informal civil partnership between Natalio Banawa and Dominga
Fiel and in not dismissing the compliant.
Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the
appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by
a competent court.
Also, the cited People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, invoked by the
Solicitor General is essentially different, because the defendant in
the case, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for
lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his
factual contention to be without merit.
DATE 1957-02-28
PONENTE LABRADOR, J
ISSUE(S) ● Whether or not the third marriage entered into is null and
void?
GR NUMBER L-43905,
GR NUMBER L-53703
PONENTE Paras, J.
FACTS Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage celebrated in July 1978 in Makati with Lilia Olivia Wiegel
on the ground that Lilia has previous existing marriage with
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on
June 25, 1972 in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted the existence of the said prior subsisting marriage
but claimed that it’s null and void as it was vitiated by force and
that the first husband was already married to someone else.
Petitioner wanted to present evidence of her alleged first void
marriage but was denied at the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City; hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S) What’s the status of the first marriage and the second marriage?
RULING(S) The first marriage is not void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil
Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has
yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she
was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent(second marriage) is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. Accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.
RULING(S) YES. Under Art. 40 of the Family Code, it says that, "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." Even if the 1st marriage
is void, there is still a need for a summary proceeding declaring
such marriage void ab initio. Thus, if a 2nd marriage is
contracted without first securing the declaration of nullity with
regard to the 1st marriage, then the 2nd marriage is also void.
Plus, bigamy is also committed.
Respondent was thus disbarred for his "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for his actions.
PONENTE BRION, J.
RULING(S)
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four
(4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all
the requisites are present. Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief "
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. The law did
not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." Its
determination depends upon the circumstances on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one). In the present case, efforts of the respondent fell
short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence. Also, it has not escaped this Court's
attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by
the lower courts.
82. Republic vs. Granada, 672 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 187512_Agoncillo
GR NUMBER 187512
PONENTE SERENO, J.
NOTES.
No appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
(Republic vs. Tango, 594 SCRA 560 [2009])
PONENTE CONCEPTION, J
Principle:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For
the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III,
paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
PONENTE Panganiban J.
FACTS Facts:
• A year after their marriage in 1985, Reynaldo Molino was
not anymore completely fulfilling his responsibility as a husband
to his wife Roridel Molina and a father to his children which are
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility.
• Reynaldo and Roridel's relationship was strained after an
intense argument. This led to Roridel quitting her job and living
in Baguio City with her parents a year after. A few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child.
• Reynaldo was deemed psychologically incapable because
he spent more time and money with his friends rather than his
family, his parents still provided him with financial assistance,
and he was not honest in providing Roridel with information
about his spending.
• Reynaldo contended that their frequent quarrels were due
to Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends, her refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals and her failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
• The CA affirmed his marriage void in the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Solicitor General insists that CA made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case.
• The petitioner argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a
defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
GR NUMBER 143376
PONENTE Panganiban, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Void Marriages - Psychological Incapacity
RDS Family Code, Article 36
FACTS FACTS:
· On March 15, 1981, Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa were married
and then bore two children, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.
· Respondent (husband) filed before the RTC of Negros Occidental
a complaint for the annulment their marriage.
· On November 8, 1993, he filed an Amended Complaint for the
nullity of their marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity.
· After the respondent submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits
petitioner (wife) filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)
· RTC denied the petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
the respondent established a quantum of evidence that the
petitioner must controvert.
· Likewise, her Motion for Reconsideration was denied leading her
to elevate the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari.
· CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory
and that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.
· Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
to the SC
No. The court is convinced that the evidence against Leni Choa
is insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity
that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
PONENTE Carpio, J.
FACTS · The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana
were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a
whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached
to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon
City. The union begot five children.
GR NUMBER 170022
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin and insisted
that she is not psychologically incapacitated and she left
their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.
Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified
that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and
their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with
Alvin. Also, he presented the psychological evaluation
report on Lolita and found that Lolita was "not suffering
from any form of major psychiatric illness, but had been
"unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a
good and lasting marital relationship.
DATE 2017-10-11
Facts:
Yolanda Garlet (petitioner) and Vencidor Garlet
(respondent) became intimately involved upon partying and
drinking liquor which resulted to the latter getting pregnant.
Vencidor doubted if he fathered the child, refused to provide
support, and even urged Yolanda to have an abortion.
Disagreeing with the proposed abortion, she gave birth to
(Michael) out of wedlock and worked in Japan as a cultural
dancer to support their son. Sometime in 1992, Yolanda
instructed Vencidor to scout for a real property for
investment to which a 210-square meter lot was bought in
Morong, Rizal. The title, however, was registered under
Vencidor’s name. He also sold a 69-square meter portion of
the same property to his in-laws without consent and
mortgaged the property, forcing Yolanda to redeem it for
50,000 php.
RULING(S) No. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish
respondent's psychological incapacity. Yolanda imputes
almost every imaginable negative character trait against
Vencidor, but not only do they not satisfactorily constitute
manifestations of psychological incapacity as contemplated in
the Family Code, but are also riddled with inconsistencies that
are sometimes contradicted by her own evidence.
94. Fujiki V. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 (Llovit)
TITLE Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara,
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and The Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of The National Statistics Office
PONENTE Carpio, J.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
It was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity. To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would
be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to
sue.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition and argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void.
RULING(S) 1. Yes. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the
proceedings.
GR NUMBER 189121
DATE 2013-07-31
RULING(S) Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a
void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of right, such that any interested party may attach the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
DATE 2014-02-10
PONENTE PERALTA, J.
RULING(S) YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements
set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. More importantly,
trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified.
Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial
court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued
identification cards. The court thus made a categorical
conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly,
it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no
such marriage was celebrated.
The Court still maintained their decision in Fujiki v Marinay
where a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry, but stated that in allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
GR NUMBER 145226
PONENTE Quisumbing, J.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to
the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
RULING(S) NO. Lucio did not commit bigamy as his first marriage was
declared void ab initio or legally inexistent. Under the eyes
of the law, Lucio was never married to Lucia. His defense of
good faith is now moot and academic.
100. Tenebro, v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 150758 | February 18, 2004
PONENTE YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
ISSUE(S) 1.W/N the validity of marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes was
sufficiently proved by presentation of marriage contract?
2.W/N there is a valid marriage between Tenebro and Ancajas?
PONENTE PERALTA, J.
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
DATE 2013-07-17
PONENTE PERALTA, J
ISSUE(S) 1. WON the marriage between Sally and Benjamin which was
solemnized without a license shall be void.
2. WON the Benjamin is liable for Bigamy.
3. WON the properties acquired by Sally and Benjamin
during their cohabitation should be acquired by them in
common proportion.
RULING(S) 1. YES. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued
to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35
which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts
under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
and non-existent.
2. NO. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in
this case. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case,
there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and
Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
3. YES. According to Article 148, the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
But Sally failed to prove that she has monetary
contribution in most of the properties. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can
be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
GR NUMBER L-23433
RULING(S) No. The court rule that before it can pass upon plaintiff's
prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted
marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and
subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary requirement to
establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the
motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his
marriage declared as having been brought about by force and
intimidation, was also denied, the court finding indications of
collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the
nullification of said marriage.
The court is satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations
correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the
first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
PONENTE MAKASIAR, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS Romulo Tolentino (petitioner) was married to Helen Villanueva
(private respondent) under the solemnization of Quezon City Judge
Mariano Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Romulo on April 26,
1962, filed a petition for the annulment of the said marriage
alleging his consent was obtained through fraud and that he
discovered his wife was pregnant even though they had no sexual
relations prior to the said marriage and that they didn't live as
husband and wife immediately. He also stated that his wife left his
house and that he only learned of her whereabouts in January of
1962.
Helen, even after the serving of the subpoena and the copy of the
complaint did not submit a response with regards to the suit. Due
to that fact, with the motion of Romulo, the court has declared the
respondent in default and have referred to the City Fiscal office to
conduct an investigation within 60 days in order to know if there is
a collusion between parties in accordance with Art. 88 and 101 of
the new civil code.
Romulo only filed a copy of the complaint to the fiscal office and
refused to submit himself to interrogation even after the City Fiscal
have already summoned him thru subpoena. Due to his non-
compliance to such, the respondent Judge on November 6, 1962,
denied his filed motion to set the date for the reception of his
evidence in the light of the failure of the City Fiscal to submit a
report of his findings despite the lapse of 60 days from July 10,
1962.
The court ordered on July 29, 1963, to dismissed the said complaint
in the view of the fact that the petitioner is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City fiscal pursuant to the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil
Code.
As stated by the Court, Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for
annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-
appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties
exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus,
Articles 88 and 101 state:
The Supreme Court has thus affirmed the order dated July
29, 1963, and dismissed the petition with costs against the
petitioner.
___________
PONENTE AQUINO, J
RULING(S) No. The Court did not find any proof that she concealed her
pregnancy, if she did so, plaintiff would’ve noticed considering
he is a law student and she is already under very advanced
pregnant condition.
- Marriage is a very sacred institution: it is the foundation on
which society rests. To cancel it, clear and reliable
evidence is necessary. In this case there are no such
proofs.
The petitioner was then was able to secure birth certificate and
petitioned to reopen the case for reception of additional
evidence, which is the birth certificate, however, it was denied.
RULING(S) The court ruled that the concealment of the respondent of the fact
that she was pregnant at the time of marriage with another man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage.
Since the respondent was naturally plump, the petitioner could not
have known the former was pregnant at the time of marriage.
Based on medical opinion, the enlargement of the woman’s
abdomen only becomes apparent on the sixth month of pregnancy.
Evidences presented are Affidavit of Cesar Aquino who admitted as
father of respondent’s first born and the petitioner’s brother, birth
certificate of the child showing it was born within 180 days after
the date of marriage.
**court a quo – the court from which an appeal has been taken.
Further discussions
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that
at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the
case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought
to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not
even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in
an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their
marriage.
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got
married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement,
however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification
in the record.
GR NUMBER No 7037
Two days before the wedding, Juanita ran away and went to the
office of the Fiscal. Her father convinced her to go back home with
a promise that he will no longer forcer her to marry the
respondent against her will. After such return, she was kept
locked in the house and on the morning of her wedding day, her
father handed her a knife and made her choose between losing
her life or his if she did not marry Te and because of this, Juanita
consented to marry Te Lay Li.
ISSUE(S) W/N The consent to marry given by Juanita was obtained through
force and intimidation
W/N Even supposing that that marriage was void due to lack of
consent, that it was ratified through cohabitation
RULING(S) HELD:
1. YES. Based on the testimonies given by the petitioner and the
Judge as corroborated by Mr. Teng, it is evident that that Juanita
did not want to marry Te but only did so due to force, threat and
intimidation given by her father. Te Lay Li and Juanita’s father did
not deny nor refute the Juanita’s claim of objection to the marriage
(Father was never presented as witness). Mere words without
any corresponding intention will not create the marriage
relation. Notwithstanding that the formalities indicating
consent have been complied with, there is no valid marriage
where the parties do not intend to enter the marriage.
Ponente Bengzon, J.
Nature of Action the Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force”
or "violence"
Rulings No. When defendant was invited to go with them and marry Pelagia,
he had some fears that he might be subjected to bodily harm in
retaliation for the dishonour inflicted upon her family. Appellant
would make it appear that that afternoon Ruiz was practically
kidnapped by Pelagia's relatives until after the marriage ceremony.
That cannot be true. He had many occasions to escape, as pointed
out in appellee's brief. He had companions in the house whom he
could have asked for help. There was even the policeman.
GR NUMBER L-12790
PONENTE PADILLA, J.
ISSUE(S) WON the court can enter a decree to annul the marriage on
the grounds of presumption of impotence in the refusal of
the respondent to take part in the proceeding and in the absence
of an evidence ordered by the court?
RULING(S) No. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must
be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a
marriage. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
to have been satisfactorily established, bec. from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
had abstained from taking part therein. From such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.
FALLO: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Issues W/N the parties can use Art. 47, Para. 4 of the
Family Code as a ground for Annulment?
Rulings NO. On the merits, that the Court of Domestic
Relations correctly denied the motion for
summary judgment in view of the first paragraph
of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition
of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition
for summary judgment practically amount to these
methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
FOR THE FOREGOING, this proceeding is hereby
dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the
appellant.
PONENTE MAKASIAR, J
FACTS Petitioner Romulo Tolentino prays for the nullification of the order
by respondent Judge on November 6, 1962, which denied
petitioner’s suit for the annulment of his marriage unless he
submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the
latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the
parties pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge
dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not
willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal. His
motions for reconsideration were denied, thus present petition to
annul said order and to compel the respondent Judge to receive
his evidence.
ISSUE WON a stipulation of facts is enough ground for a decision in suits
for annulment of marriage and legal separation?
RULING No. The court held that Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in
suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that
in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the
plaintiff.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is
predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the
family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the
State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have
vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties
or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a
marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the
fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the
parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear,
the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds (De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107
Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia
de Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs.
Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is
without merit. WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963
IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
PONENTE CONCEPTION, J
RULING(S) 1. Yes. For the celebration of civil marriage, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
The absence of Arthur Jones should be counted from
January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning him was received, and from said date to May 6,
1927, more than nine years elapsed.
Decision:
Facts
Petitioner, Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with
spouse Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the
Paco Catholic Church in Manila. On December 27 of the
same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel
and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent
search made by her. She also inquired about him from his
parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his
whereabouts and they have no knowledge if he is still alive.
Petitioner believes he is already dead because he had been
absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to
marry again, she desires that her civil statues be defined in
order that she may be relieved of any liability under the
law.
Judgment Affirmed
Ponente Montemayor, J.
(State division or en
banc)
PONENTE AQUINO, J.
Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extra-judicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction
was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs.
Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15).
2. Yes. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of
a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extra-judicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for
notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of
marriage and the family
PONENTE JOHNSON, J:
PONENTE PADILLA, J.
137.
DATE 1972-07-29
PONENTE FERNANDO, J
NATURE/KEYWOR Legal Separation; Action for Legal Separation
DS
FACTS ● The petitioner filed in the sala of respondent judge for legal
separation, concubinage as the ground and an attempt by him
against her life being alleged
● She likewise sought of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
for the return to her of what she claimed to ber her paraphernal and
exclusive property, then under the administration and management
of respondent Clemente Ramos
● Opposition to this hearing invoking Art 103 of the CC—if motion is
heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become
dim. Art 103 dictates that no hearing on an action for legal
separation shall be held before the lapse of six months from filing
of the petition.
CFI: AFFIRMATIVE. Ordered the suspension, upon the plea of the other
respondent, the husband, of the hearing on a motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction filed by petition at the same time the suit for legal
separation was instituted
ISSUE(S) Whether or not Art. 103 bars the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction over properties?
RULING(S) No. Art. 103 does not bar the court from hearing questions regarding
property management between the spouses. Art. 103 provides that “the
husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but
if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said
property.” This basis is enough for allowing the court to resolve issues
regarding management of property even before the six-month cooling off
period has been lifted.
A suit for legal separation is something else—the hope that the parties
may settle their differences is not all together abandoned-hence the
interposition of a 6-month period before an action for legal separation is
to be tried—the court should remain passive at this time; it is precluded
from hearing the suit. There is a recognition that the question of
management of their respective property need not be left unresolved
even during the 6-month period. There is justification then for the
petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction should
not be ignored by the lower court—to prevent husband for continually
managing her paraphernal properties.
GR NUMBER 37720
DATE 1933-03-07
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the husband, Mr. Ventura has the right to file a
criminal case of adultery against the respondents.
RULING(S) Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a
mere pose when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse,
we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his
conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous
relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not
authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
DATE 1941-11-10
PONENTE MORAN, J p
RULING The court held no. The accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and
the complainant in which they agreed to be "in complete freedom of
action in any act and in all concepts," while illegal for the purpose for
which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the
act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised
Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party
clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other.
As previously ruled by the court in People vs. Guinucod that
the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a criminal
prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly
or impliedly after the crime has been committed. We are now convinced
that this is a narrow view in no way warranted by the language, as well
as the manifest policy, of the law. We, therefore, hold that prior consent
is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.
Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted,
without costs.
Ponente J. REYES
(State division or en
banc)
Judgment affirmed.
PONENTE Concepcion, J.
PONENTE TIJAM, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS 1. Respondent Virginia Dy Aramburo (Virginia) is Corazon Aramburo
Ko's (Corazon) sister-in-law, the former being the wife of the
latter's brother, Simeon Aramburo (Simeon). Corazon and Simeon
have another sibling, Augusto Aramburo (Augusto), who
predeceased them. Virginia's co respondents are the heirs of
Augusto, while the petitioners in the instant case are the heirs of
Corazon who substituted the latter after she died while the case
was pending before the CA.
2. On November 26, 1993, Virginia, together with her co-respondents,
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership with Declaration of
Nullity and/or Alternatively Reconveyance and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against Corazon
3. Subject of this case are seven parcels of land located in Tabaco
City, Albay
4. The complaint alleged that Virginia and her husband Simeon
(Spouses Simeon and Virginia), together with Corazon and her
husband Felix (Spouses Felix and Corazon), acquired the subject
properties from Spouses Eusebio and Epifania Casaul (Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania) through a Deed of Cession dated April 10,
1970
5. On April 13, 1970, Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix
and Corazon executed a Deed of Cession in favor of Augusto's
heirs, subject of which is the one-third pro-indiviso portion of the
subject properties.
6. However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon
was able to have the entire subject properties transferred
exclusively to her name, depriving her co-owners Virginia and
Augusto's heirs of their pro-indiviso share, as well as in the
produce of the same
7. For her part, Corazon admitted having acquired the subject
properties through cession from their uncle and auntie, Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania. She, however, intimated that although the
said properties were previously registered under Spouses Eusebio
and Epifania's name, the same were, in truth, owned by their
parents, Spouses Juan and Juliana Aramburo (Spouses Juan and
Juliana). Hence, when her parents died, Spouses Eusebio and
Epifania allegedly merely returned the said properties to Spouses
Juan and Juliana by ceding the same to their children, Corazon
and Simeon. She further averred that the said properties were
ceded only to her and Simeon, in that, her husband Felix's name
and Virginia's name appearing in the Deed were merely
descriptive of her and Simeon's civil status, being married to Felix
and Virginia, respectively.
8. Corazon alleged that she and Simeon thought of sharing a third of
the subject properties with the heirs of their brother Augusto who
predeceased them, hence they executed a Deed of Cession on
April 13, 1970 but later on decided to recall and not implement
the same. In fine, thus, Corazon insisted that only she and Simeon
share one-half portion each of the subject properties.
9. Corazon further alleged that on December 14, 1974, Simeon sold
and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned properties
in her favor. Hence, Corazon became the sole owner thereof and
consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the same to her
name. Corazon argued that the subject properties belong to
Simeon's exclusive property, hence, Virginia's conformity to such
sale was not necessary.
10. The CA also correctly observed that the forgery, as found by the
RTC, is evident from the admitted fact of strained marital
relationship between Simeon and Virginia and the fact that at the
time the question Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, Simeon
had been living with Corazon in Tabaco City, Albay, while Virginia
and her children were living in Paco, Manila
11. Accordingly, without Virginia's conformity, the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed on December 14, 1974 between Simeon and
Corazon purportedly covering one-half of the subject properties is
voidable.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not declaring the parties as co-owners of the subject
properties may allow the subject titles to be nullified and transferred to
the parties as to their respective portions?
RULING(S) The petition is partly meritorious. At the outset, let it be stated that the
law which governs the instant case is the Old Civil Code, not the Family
Code, as the circumstances of this case all occurred before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
The courts a quo found that the said deed, ceding a third of the subject
properties to Augusto's heirs, was in fact implemented as evidenced by
Corazon's testimony that she was merely administering the said
properties for Augusto's heirs as her nephews and nieces were still
minors at that time.
We are not convinced of Corazon's bare assertion that the said document
was cancelled merely because she and her brother . Simeon decided not
to implement it anymore. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the
testimony of respondent July Aramburo, one of Augusto's heirs, which
was notably quoted by the petitioners in this petition, it is clear that he,
together with his co-heirs, are co-owners of the subject properties along
with Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix and Corazon, by
virtue of the Deed of Cession executed in their favor. The said testimony
clearly stated that Simeon was also merely administering the subject
properties.
DATE 1914-10-24
PONENTE JOHNSON, J.
ISSUE W/N the defendant was entitled to recover from the plaintiff the jewelry
described in her answer?
RULING The court held yes, the defendant was entitled to the possession of said
jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to return the same to her and in case
of the plaintiff's failure to return said jewelry to the defendant, then and
in that case, he shall pay to the defendant, for such failure, the sum of
P6,000. It is admitted that the jewels in question, before the possession
of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant
personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The
record further shows that before the death of Domingo Franco he
borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for
the payment of said sum the jewelry described in the complaint.
The defendant positively denies the plaintiff’s contentions
that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she
promised to redeem the same by paying the amount
due. Said exhibit states that the jewelry was contained in a box. It was
also found that the key was in the possession of the defendant.
In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the
jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from
her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that
they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal
property she exercised dominion over the same, until and unless she
had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public. In absence of
proof that she delivered the same to her husband, she could not be
deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent,
and without compliance.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant is
entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value, amounting to
P6,000.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby
affirmed, with costs.
DATE 1907-01-11
NATURE/KEYWORDS an appeal from the order of CFI Zamboanga in distributing the estate of
the deceased, Hilario Lim; FC, 109, para. 3.
FACTS · Hilario Lim died intestate sometime in the year 1903, leaving a
widow and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000
pesos.
· The trial court was of opinion that the entire estate as shown in the
inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property, except a
house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000
pesos and the 700 pesos for the purchase price paid for a certain lot, which
it had been brought to the marriage by the said Hilario Lim.
ISSUE(S) Whether not the said lot was a separate property of the appellee
RULING(S) Yes, since, the trial court did not prove that was acquired as a part of her
dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption that it
was and continued to be a part of her separate estate (paraphernalia)
which never acquired the "dotal" character. No error was assigned by
either party touching the amount of the usufructuary interest in the estate
of her husband allowed to the widow by the trial court, and we cannot,
therefore, review the action of the trial court in this connection.
The judgment of the trial court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twelve
days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days
thereafter the record remanded to the court below for proper action. So
ordered.
CONCLUSION
PONENTE MAKALINTAL., J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS 1. On November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant
Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a
sum of money.
2. On June 23, 1959, the court rendered a judgment in favor of Maramba
and ordered Lozanos to pay the total sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos and Seven Centavos (P3,500.07), with legal interest thereon from
date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid.
3. On August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land in the name
of Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction was published in
accordance with law and scheduled for September 16, 1960.
4. On September 16, 1960, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a
partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount P2,000.00, and
requested for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960.
5. On October 17, 1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14,
alleging that on November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case,
defendant Pascual Lozano died. She ruled that the property levied upon
was her paraphernal property, and praying that her liability be fixed at
one-half (½) of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the
resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from
carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960.
6. On October 26, 1960, the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of
Nieves de Lozano which has been levied upon was sold to the judgment
creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the balance
of the judgment debt.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds
of the properties sold at public auction in view of the presumption that it
is conjugal in character although in the of only one of the spouses?
RULING(S) No. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property
acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no
showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence the
fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative.
Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in
question is paraphernal.
CONCLUSION The foregoing petition of May 18, 1967 alleges facts which occurred after
the perfection of the present appeal and which should therefore be
submitted to and passed upon by the trial court in connection with the
implementation of the order appealed from, which is hereby affirmed,
with costs
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS 1. On July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses
Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging that, on October 1,
1952, said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera,
for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described,
and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province
of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within
five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957
2. The plaintiff contends that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code
require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land
acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order
be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to
the aforementioned property.
3. Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January
6, 1954, that the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not
hers and contends that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever
executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor" a.
4. Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss stating that there is a "necessity
of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record." Presently,
or on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order appealed from,
reading:
ISSUE(S) Is there a need for an earnest effort toward a compromise in this case?
RULING(S) No. According to Art. 222 of the Civil Code that provides:
“No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035.”
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or
defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of
Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of
such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre
Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision,
with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
TITLE Carmen Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio Sy
GR NUMBER L-30977
GR NUMBER L-48889
PONENTE Gancayco
NATURE/KEYWORDS Charges upon Obligation in CPG, with consent
RULING(S) Yes: Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such
administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this
case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory
note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the
conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
The petition was granted and the decision of the City Court
of Iloilo City was reinstated.
GR NUMBER 86355
DATE May 31, 1990
PONENTE Gancayco
GR NUMBER 86302
PONENTE
Cruz, J.
GR NUMBER L-45616
FACTS In a civil case no. 3199, plaintiffs, Josefa Diego and Mario
Sanchez claimed for support from Feliciano Sanchez. Josefa
alleged that they are the wife and child of the defendant. She
alleged that the defendant refused and still refuses to give
support since 1932.
In defense, Francisco alleged that Josefa abandoned the
conjugal home on October 7, 1930 without his consent and
that she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez with whom
she had, as a result of that illicit relations a child, Macario
Sanchez.
The following month, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel
the defendant to give them support by way of allowance the
sum of P50.00 monthly. In opposition, Francisco claimed that
Mario is not his legitimate child.
In view of these facts, the defendant filed a petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals against the judge of
the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the
defendant comes to this court on certiorari.
GR NUMBER L-31065
PONENTE Grino-Aquino, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Petition for certiori review the order of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Br. Marcos, J.
FACTS On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private
respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of
Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen;
that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on January
29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang
Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a
daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 in
the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her
daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary
Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's
father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used
the name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic
School where she studies.
Further, she alleges that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang
Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has
grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz,
as her own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname "De
la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her full
name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la Cruz gave
his conformity to the petition by signing at the bottom of the
pleading; that the petition was not made for the purpose of
concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not
committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she
has never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to
cause damage or prejudice to any third person. She prayed that
her daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias
Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
On February 12, 1969, respondent Judge Pio Marcos of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet granted the petition.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary
to law.
PONENTE FELIX, J.
FACTS · Felicidad Muňoz and Jose Del Barrio were married civilly at
the Municipal Court of Manila on September 24, 1942 and again
canonically on October of the same year. Since their marriage,
the couple lived together as husband and wife for the ensuing six
months in the house of the husband’s father at Rizal Avenue,
Manila, and then moved their residence to the municipality of
Bulacan.
FACTS On March 16, 1952, Elena Contreras married Cesar Macaraig. Cesar
was employed at MICO Offset owned by Elena’s father, where he
met Lily Ann Alcala. After elections of 1961, Cesar resigned at MICO
to be a special agent at Malacanang. He was rarely home thereafter
due to ―series of confidential missions.
On April 1963, rumors that Cesar was seen with a pregnant woman.
On May 1963, Elena again refrained from asking so as not to
precipitate a quarrel and drive Cesar away.
Elena received reports that Lily Ann had already given birth. To
verify the report Elena sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father’s
employee. Felicisima saw Cesar carrying a baby in his arms. She
went to the parish priest and inquired about the child of Cesar and
Lily Ann. Lucilo Macaraig, Cesar’s father, interceded to convince
Cesar to go back to his wife, but to no avail.
ISSUE 1. Whether the period of one year provide for in Article 102 of
the Civil Code should be counted from September 1962 or
from December 1963.
2. WON the legal separation case will prosper.
RULING 1. From December 1963 because the only time Elena really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the
early part of December 1963 when she went to see Cesar
and beg for his return. It is only on December 1963 that
Cesar admitted that he was living with Lily Ann and would
not return to his legitimate wife.
2. Yes, the decision of the court is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and
another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled
to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint; and the
case is hereby remanded to the lower court for appropriate
proceedings in accordance with law.
GR NUMBER 10033
PONENTE FELIX, J.
PONENTE FELIX, J.
KEYWORDS Nature of Action: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance [CFI] of Manila [Tan. J.]
Topic: Legal Separation; Defenses; Recrimination: FC 56 (3)
FACTS On July 14, 1955, Petitioner Brown filed suit in the CFI
Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife, Respondent
Yambao. He alleged under oath that his wife engaged in
adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl while he was interned by the Japanese
invaders and as further fact, he had learned of his wife's
misconduct only in 1945. Upon his release, the spouses lived
separately and later executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the
erring wife as her share.
Yes. Supreme Court has ruled that there are at least two well
established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought
(commission of similar offense by petitioner and
prescription of the action).
ISSUE Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through
conjugal partnership?
GR NUMBER L-45038
RULING NO.
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara
Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be
said that the sale which was entered by the private respondent
and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of
Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on
behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only consummated after her
death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly
disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the
paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda
and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being
neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such
being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification
by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.
Ponente J. Johnson
(State division or en
banc)
174. Magallon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282, Dec 16, 1986 (Llovit)
PONENTE Narvasa, J.
TITLE ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSELACSON and THE COURT
OF APPEALS
Ponente J. CASTRO
(State division or en
banc)
Nature of Action Appeal by Certiorari from a decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals
Facts The Issue arises from three cases involving the same parties.
Petitioner herein and Respondent Carmen San Jose-Lacson were
married on February 14, 1953 which to them were born 4 children.
On January 9, 1963. Respondent spouse left the conjugal home and
filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for
custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.
However the spouses succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement
respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of
property and on April 27. 1963 they filed a joint petition in the CFI
of Negros Occidental. The amicable settlement indicate that;
Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as required by
Article 191 of the Civil Code subject to particular terms and
conditions, including Carmen’s waiving of rights with the properties,
custody of their 2 elder children to be awarded to Alfonso and the
younger children to carmen and monthly allowance to be paid by
Alfonso to Carmen for the support of children in her custody and
reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of each
other. On April 27, 1963 the CFI approve the foregoing joint petition
to “conformable to law” and incorporating in toto to their
compromise agreement, that the petitioner spouse delivered all the
four children to the respondent house and remitted money for their
support.
Carmen then later on prays for relief from the agreement, arguing
that signing it was the only means through which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children. Alfonso opposed the said
motion and moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of res
judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC issued an order sustaining
Alfonso’s opposition and dismissed the case.
Carmen then filed before the CFI a motion for reconsideration of its
judgment with regard to the custody and visitation rights over her
minor children, praying that she be relieved from the compromise
agreement. Alfonso opposed with a motion for execution. The CFI
denied Carmen’s Motion for Reconsideration, and granted Alfonso’s
motion for execution. It further held that should Carmen fail to
return her two older children to Alfonso at the end of the summer,
she may be held liable for contempt.
Carmen appealed both the HDRC and CFI judgments to the CA. The
CA held that the compromise agreement is null and void insofar as
it pertains to the custody and visitation rights over Enrique and
Maria Teresa. The CA also nullified he order granting Alfonso’s
motion for execution. Alfonso thus appealed to his Court.
Issues 1. Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid.
Rulings YES. The compromise agreement and the judgment thereon are
valid insofar as the separation of property and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership. The Law allows the separation of the spouses’
property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, provided
judicial sanction is secured beforehand. The NCC provides:
ART 190 (4), The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife,
as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified any petition
for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
PONENTE Makalintal, J.
The trial court, ruled that the second marriage was void ab
initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for its
nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his
interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate
of the deceased second wife.
228. Chua Keng Giap v. IAC, 158 SCRA 18, Feb 17, 1988 (Llovit)
TITLE CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN KING, respondents.
FACTS Chua Keng Giap, the petitioner filed on May 19, 1983, a petition
for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The motion to dismiss the case was denied by the RTC, who
held that the case invoked decided the paternity and not the
maternity of the petitioner.
RULING(S) 1. No, the issue of his claimed filiation has long been settled,
and with finality, by no less than the Supreme Court. That issue
cannot be resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in
Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals. In that case Sy Kao flatly and
unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's
mother.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled
in a motion to dismiss based on lack of a cause of action is the
sufficiency of the allegation itself and not whether these
allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted. That is correct. He also submits that an order denying
a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore
reversible not in a petition for certiorari but on appeal. That is
also correct.
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap
was really her son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who
could say — as indeed she has said these many years — that
Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
CFI ruled that the validity of the adoption could not be assailed
collaterally in the intestate proceedings.
SC's ruling:
1. Negligent and careless failure to perform the duties of
parenthood is a significant element of abandonment, regardless
of actual intention. And as to the element of time, far from
being immaterial, it is recognized that: “A strong basis for a
finding of the parents’ abandonment of his or her child is found
in the case where the parent has left the child permanently or
indefinitely in the care of others, given it to another, or
surrendered it entirely.”
2. It cannot be stressed too much that the parental
consent required by the law refers to parents who have not
abandoned their child. And from the findings of the adoption
court, it is rather something remarkable that the natural
parents of the children herein involved paid no heed to the
sanctity and nobility of parental ties for almost twenty years.
3. Simplicio Santos may likewise be deemed to have
signed in behalf of Julian Reyes, as her representative. Personal
signature by the petitioner of the petition to adopt is not among
the requisites of the law. At any rate, any defect on his has
obviously been cured by Juliana Reyes’ subsequent prosecution
of the adoption case.
4. The dispositive portion ought to be read together with
relevant discussions in the body of the decision, especially the
last sentence immediately preceding it: “The same holds true
as long as the adoption must be—as in the instant case—
considered valid.” Should respondents, therefore, succeed by a
direct attack in invalidating the adoption, the dispositive portion
of this Court’s decision herein shall not be deemed to hinder
their rights thereunder.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
282. Naldoza v. Republic, G.R. No. L-55538, March 15, 1982 (Llovit)
TITLE In the Matter of the Change of Names of DIONESIO
DIVINAGRACIA, JR., and BOMBI ROBERTO DIVINAGRACIA to
DIONESIO NALDOZA and BOMBI ROBERTO NALDOZA,
respectively. ZOSIMA NALDOZA, as natural guardian and
guardian ad litem of said minors, petitioner-appellant, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE FERNANDO S. RUIZ
of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, respondents-
appellees.
RULING(S) 1. No, the minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are
presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the
surname Divinagracia, their father’s surname (Art. 364, Civil
Code).
The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and
reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of
Court).
The child should, and in the course of time must, know of his
parentage. If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and
is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his
mother’s surname only and to avoid using his father’s surname,
then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname.
Concurring Opinion:
· Barredo, J., concur. At the worst, Dionesio Jr. and
Bombito should be considered as natural children by legal
fiction having the same status, rights and obligations of
acknowledged natural children, (Art. 29, Civil Code), among
which is the right to bear the surname of their father. (Art. 28
(1), Civil Code).