Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Manila

SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION

MANUEL N. MAMBA, in his CA-G.R. SP No. 165958

capacity as Governor of the
Province of Cagayan, and ATTY.
MARIA ROSARIO MAMBA-
VILLAFLOR, in her capacity as
Chief of Staff of the Provincial
Government of Cagayan,
Petitioners, Members:
- versus -
Bruselas, Jr., Chairman
Santos, and
MELVIN K. VARGAS, in his Calpatura*, JJ:
capacity as Vice Governor of the
Province of Cagayan, and JUDGE
PABLO M. AGUSTIN, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of
RTC-Branch 10 of Tuguegarao City, Promulgated:
Cagayan, 14 Jun 2021
Respondents. __________________
x==============================================x
DECISION

Bruselas, Jr., J.

The respondent court's Order1 and Resolution2 in Special

Civil Action No. 99 are assailed in the instant petition for
certiorari.3

The Antecedents

Herein respondent Melvin Vargas, Jr., Vice-Governor of the

Province of Cagayan, (Vice-Governor Vargas) hired, through
* Acting Junior Member pursuant to Office Order No. 133-21-RSF dated 25 May 2021.
1 Dated 22 January 2020; Rollo, pp. 26-29.
2 Dated 22 May 2020; Id., at 30.
3 Id., at 4-25.
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contracts of services, several job order employees assigned and
designated to the Office of the Vice-Governor and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan.4 On 06 June 2019, herein
petitioner Manuel N. Mamba, Governor of Cagayan (Governor
Mamba), through his Chief of Staff, herein petitioner Maria
Rosario Mamba-Villaflor (Mamba-Villaflor), issued Memorandum
No. 091, which stated that the Provincial Governor had the sole
authority to sign and execute job order contracts and,
consequently, declared as void all job order contracts signed and
entered into by Vice-Governor Vargas.5 This was reiterated and
further clarified in Memorandum No. 094.6

Vice-Governor Vargas then wrote a letter to the Regional

Director of the Department of Budget Management to clarify the
said memoranda.7 Regional Director Alice R. Trinidad opined that
the authority of the Provincial Governor to appoint employees
does not extend to employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
because such authority belonged to the Vice Governor. 8 Vice-
Governor Vargas also wrote Governor Mamba requesting that
that the salaries of the job order employees whom he hired be
released.9 In his response, Governor Mamba reiterated his
position that the local chief executive has the exclusive authority
to hire job order employees.10

Thus, Vice-Governor Vargas and the affected job order

employees filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus before the respondent court against Governor
Mamba, Mamba-Villaflor, and several other provincial officers. 11
They argued that the Vice-Governor has the authority to appoint
4 Id., at 107-109.
5 Id., at 115.
6 Id., at 116-117.
7 Id., at 119.
8 Id., at 120-121.
9 Id., at 117-118.
10 Id., at 122-123.
11 Id., at 89-106.
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casual and job order employees of the Office of the Vice-Governor
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan as long as the budget was derived
from the appropriation of the said local legislature. Since the
salaries of the therein petitioners, job order employees were to be
sourced from the appropriation for the Office of the Vice-
Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice-Governor
Vargas had the authority to enter into contracts of service with
them. They cite the case of Atienza v. Villarosa12 and several
opinions issued by the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG).

In their answer below, Governor Mamba, Mamba-Villafor,

and the other respondents claimed that the petition was
procedurally infirm as the employees were not impleaded and
that there was no certification against forum shopping. As to the
merit, they argued that the Vice-Governor's authority only
pertained to the appointment of officials and employees of the
Office of the Vice-Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
and did not extend to contracts of service for job order employees,
the authority over which was vested in the Governor. They also
claimed that the authority to contract job orders should be limited
to the implementation of local projects. To support their
arguments, they also cited Atienza v. Villarosa and several
opinions issued by the DILG which contrasted with those
presented by therein petitioners.13

In the assailed Order, the respondent court simply

distinguished between employees whose salaries were derived
from the provincial fund and those whose salaries were derived
from the appropriation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. In the
first case, the Governor was the appointing authority, while in the
second case, the Vice-Governor was the appointing power. Since
the salaries of the therein petitioners, job order employees were
12 G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005.
13 Id., at 134-145.
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chargeable against the fund appropriated to the Office of the Vice-
Governor and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the Vice-Governor had
the authority to hire them. Thus:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Memorandum

No. 091 s. 219 and Memorandum No. 094 s. 2019 are hereby
declared null and void, being violative of existing laws and
jurisprudence. Let a Writ of Prohibition be issued enjoining the
respondents from further implementing these memoranda.

SO ORDERED.”14

Therein respondents moved to reconsider the assailed

Order,15 but the motion was denied by the respondent court via
the assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by two of the

respondents below, Governor Mamba and Mamba-Villaflor. They
present the following issues for resolution:

“I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION DESPITE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DECLARING THAT THE AUTHORITY TO HIRE JOB ORDER
EMPLOYEES OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN,
THRU SIGNING OF JOB ORDER CONTRACTS, IS LODGED
TO THE VICE GOVERNOR.
14 Supra, note 1, at 29.
15 Id., at 146-152.
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IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION AGAINST THE
MEMORANDUM NO. 091 S. 2019 AND MEMORANDUM
NO. 094 S. 2019.”16

The Court's Opinion

Petitioners Governor Mamba and Mamba-Villaflor reiterate

their claim that the power to hire job order employees through
contracts of services, though they be assigned to the Office of the
Vice Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is vested in the
Provincial Governor. Respondent Vice-Governor Vargas, on the
other hand, claims that the respondent court did not gravely
abuse its discretion. He also avers that the instant petition should
be dismissed since there were other adequate remedies to assail
the respondent court's ruling.

Certiorari not a substitute

for appeal; exceptions

A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy which

requires that there be no appeal or other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available to correct the court's error. A party
cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari for the
remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action
of certiorari. Remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and
cannot be a substitute of an appeal, especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss
or lapse.17

16 Supra, note 3, at 11.

17 Butuan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 197358, April 05, 2017.
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Consequently, the failure of a party to timely file an appeal
from an assailed decision or resolution would render the same
final and executory. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or
immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land.18

Thus, the appropriate remedy available to the petitioners is

to file an appeal from the assailed Order and Resolution of the
respondent court, which they failed to avail of. Instead of lodging
an appeal therefrom, they instituted the present petition for
certiorari. The respondent court had already issued a certificate of
finality with regard to the assailed Order and Resolution.19

We have to note, however, that while ordinarily, certiorari is

unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are
exceptions to this general rule. Among them are: (a) when public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when
the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs
issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.20

Similarly, the doctrine of immutability of final judgment

admits of several exceptions, which have been applied in several
cases in order to serve substantial justice, namely: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and
(d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the

18 FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011.
19 Rollo, pp. 164.
20 Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167237, April 23,
2010.
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decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. 21 One
example of a void judgment is when the tribunal's act constitutes
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In such instance, a petition for certiorari provides the
remedy to nullify the void act.22

In the case at bench, the Court finds that the interest of

substantial justice warrants the relaxation of the rules and,
consequently, treats the instant petition for certiorari as an appeal.
For the Court, it is more prudent to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case, rather than dispose of it on
a technicality and give a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases at the expense of justice not just to the parties but especially,
considering the central issue raised herein and its administrative
and governance impact on the efficient functioning of local
government units. The broader interest of justice requires that the
issue presented herein be threshed out to clarify any confusion
that may impede public welfare.

Governor's and the Vice Governor's

appointment powers

The pivotal substantive matter raised in this case is the

power of the local chief executive and the local vice chief
executive to appoint job order employees viz the authority to
enter into a contract of service to hire job order personnel.

The Local Government Code

Pertinent to the issue at bench, the Local Government Code

provides the following provisions in relation to the power of the
provincial chief executive or the Governor:

“Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and

21 FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, at note 18.
22 Imperial v. Ames, G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017.
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Compensation.
xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
provincial governor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all

programs, projects, services, and activities of the
provincial government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx
(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose
salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid
out of provincial funds and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
in this Code, as well as those he may be
authorized by law to appoint;

(vi) Represent the province in all its business

transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds,
contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents upon authority of the
sangguniang panlalawigan or pursuant to law
or ordinance; xxx”

The identical provision which corresponds to the authority

of the municipal chief executive or Mayor is as follows:

“Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and

Compensation. -
xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
municipal mayor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all

programs, projects, services, and activities of the
municipal government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx
(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose
salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid
out of municipal funds and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
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in this Code, as well as those he may be
authorized by law to appoint;

(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang

bayan, represent the municipality in all its
business transactions and sign on its behalf all
bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such
other documents made pursuant to law or
ordinance; xxx””

Meanwhile, for City Mayors:

“Section 455. Chief Executive; Powers, Duties and Compensation.

xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city
mayor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all

programs, projects, services, and activities of the city
government. and in this connection, shall:
xxx
(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose
salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid
out of city funds and whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for in this Code, as
well as those he may be authorized by law to
appoint;

(vi) Represent the city in all its business

transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds,
contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents upon authority of the
sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law
or ordinance; xxx”

These provisions affirm the general principle that the

general responsibility for human resources and development for
the local government unit is with the local chief executive, viz:

“Section 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. -

Every local government unit shall design and implement its own
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organizational structure and staffing pattern taking into
consideration its service requirements and financial capability,
subject to the minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by
the Civil Service Commission.

Section 77. Responsibility for Human Resources and

Development. - The chief executive of every local government unit
shall be responsible for human resources and development in his
unit and shall take all personnel actions in accordance with the
Constitutional provisions on civil service, pertinent laws, and
rules and regulations thereon, including such policies, guidelines
and standards as the Civil Service Commission may establish:
Provided, That the local chief executive may employ emergency
or casual employees or laborers paid on a daily wage or
piecework basis and hired through job orders for local projects
authorized by the sanggunian concerned, without need of
approval or attestation by the Civil Service Commission:
Provided, further, That the period of employment of emergency
or casual laborers as provided in this Section shall not exceed six
(6) months. xxx”

On the other hand, the authority of the Provincial Vice

Governor is laid down as follows:

“Section 466. Powers, Duties, and Compensation.

(a) The vice-governor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the
provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated
for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan;

(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations,

appoint all officials and employees of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose
manner of appointment is specially provided in this
Code; xxx”

The identical provision with regard to the Municipal Vice-

Mayor is as follows:

“Section 445. Powers, Duties and Compensation. -

(a) The vice-mayor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang bayan
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and sign all warrants drawn on the municipal
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the sangguniang bayan;

(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations,

appoint all officials and employees of the
sangguniang bayan, except those whose manner of
appointment is specifically provided in this Code;
xxx”

For the City Vice Mayor:

“Section 456. Powers, Duties and Compensation.

(a) The city vice-mayor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlungsod and sign all warrants drawn on the city
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the sangguniang panlungsod;

(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations,

appoint all officials and employees of the
sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose
manner of appointment is specifically provided in
this Code; xxx”

The case of Atienza v. Villarosa

Both parties rely on the case of Atienza v. Villarosa to

support their interpretation of the provisions of the Local
Government Code, albeit with distinct points of view.

In Atienza, respondent Governor Villarosa issued a

memorandum which mandated the termination of all existing
employment contracts of casual/job order basis personnel and the
rehiring of Vice-Governor Atienza's recommendees under such
contract that he entered into for being unauthorized. In resolving
the issue of whether or not Governor Villarosa may validly issue
the said memorandum, the Supreme Court held:

“We hold that the Governor, with respect to the

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appointment of the officials and employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, has no such authority.

Among the powers granted to the Governor under Section

465 of Rep. Act No. 7160 are: xxx

On the other hand, Section 466 vests on the Vice-Governor

the power to, among others: xxx

Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint

officials and employees whose salaries are paid out of the
provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority
is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the
authority to appoint casual and job order employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor.

The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the officials

and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is anchored on the
fact that the salaries of these employees are derived from the
appropriation specifically for the said local legislative body.
Indeed, the budget source of their salaries is what sets the
employees and officials of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan apart
from the other employees and officials of the province.
Accordingly, the appointing power of the Vice-Governor is
limited to those employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as
well as those of the Office of the Vice-Governor, whose salaries are
paid out of the funds appropriated for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
As a corollary, if the salary of an employee or official is charged
against the provincial funds, even if this employee reports to the
Vice-Governor or is assigned to his office, the Governor retains the
authority to appoint the said employee pursuant to Section 465(b)
(v) of Rep. Act No. 7160.

However, in this case, it does not appear whether the

contractual/job order employees, whose appointments were
terminated or cancelled by the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002
issued by the respondent Governor, were paid out of the
provincial funds or the funds of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Nonetheless, the validity of the said memorandum cannot be
upheld because it absolutely prohibited the respondent Vice-
Governor from exercising his authority to appoint the employees,
whether regular or contractual/job order, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and restricted such authority to one of
recommendatory nature only. This clearly constituted an
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encroachment on the appointment power of the respondent Vice-
Governor under Section 466(a)(2) of Rep. Act No. 7160.

xxx

With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and

executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under
the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either department now
comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities
with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service
and provide a system of check and balance between the two.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of Rep. Act

No. 7160, explained that "the Vice-Governor is now the presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The City Vice-Mayor
presides at meetings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the
Municipal Vice-Mayor at the sessions of the Sangguniang
Bayan. The idea is to distribute powers among elective local officials so
that the legislative, which is the Sanggunian, can properly check the
executive, which is the Governor or the Mayor and vice versa and
exercise their functions without any undue interference from one by the
other."

The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to

vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise
of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor
of the executive functions. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002
and July 1, 2002 of the respondent Governor, which effectively
excluded the petitioner Vice-Governor, the presiding officer of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, from signing the purchase orders
for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment needed
for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as from
appointing its casual and job order employees, constituted undue
interference with the latter's functions. The assailed memoranda
are clearly not in keeping with the intent of Rep. Act No. 7160 and
their implementation should thus be permanently enjoined.”

Thus, in Atienza, the Supreme Court held that the authority

to appoint casual and job order employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan whose salaries are derived from the appropriation
specifically for the said local legislative body belongs to the Vice-
Governor. It consequently revoked Governor Villarosa's
memorandum because it absolutely prohibited Vice-Governor
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Atienza from exercising his authority to appoint employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and restricted such authority to one of a
recommendatory nature only.

The DILG Opinions

After Atienza was promulgated, queries were addressed to

the DILG pertaining to the application of Atienza with regard to
the authority of the local vice chief executive to enter into a
contract of service to hire job order employees.

In DILG Opinion No. 31, S. 2009, cited by Governor Mamba

and Mamba-Villar, the DILG was asked whether “ it [is] the Mayor
or the Vice Mayor who has the authority to sign Job Order contract hiring
JOB ORDER workers that will be assigned to the Sangguniang Bayan if the
funds to pay off the wages are drawn from the budgetary allocations of the
Sangguninag Bayan?” The DILG cited Atienza, but further clarified
the distinction between the power to appoint casual and job order
employees and the power to enter into contracts of service to hire
job order workers. Thus:

“[I]t is imperative to stress that [Atienza] categorically

mentioned the term “appoint” vis-a-vis casual and job order
employees, which jurisprudence has defined as: is applied to the
nomination or designation of an individual to office.”
Parenthetically, “appointment” has been defined in law
equivalent to “filling a vacancy.”

Perforce, the Atienza ruling would necessarily mean

casuals and job order employees whose items/positions are filled
up via the appointment process, which is clearly different when
we speak of hiring through a contract engaging the services of a
job order personnel.

xxx

We wish to point out that the power to appoint is different

from the power to sign a job order contract. Along this line, the
power to appoint a job order employee whose item/position is
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contained in the plantilla for the Sanggunian whose salaries will
be paid out of the Sanggunian funds pertains to the Local Vice
Chief Executive. On the other hand, if a person is to be hired
under the job order contract, his entry is not by appointment but
by the execution of a job order contract. In this regard, the power
to sign the corresponding job order contract remains in the Mayor.
This finds basis in Section 444 (a) in relation to Section 22 of the
LGC of 1991.

Section 444 (a) of the aforesaid Code provides that the

municipal mayor, as the local chief executive of the municipal
government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties
and functions as provided by this Code and other laws. Relative
thereto, Section 22 of the same Code provides that, unless
otherwise provided therein, no contract may be entered into by
the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit
without prior authorization by the Sanggunian concerned. We
find these provisions applicable because there is nothing in the
LGC of 1991 that authorizes the Vice Mayor to sign a contract
involving the hiring of contractual job employees. Moreover, a
contractual job order is a contract between the Local Government
Unit, on one and, and the person sought to be hired by the
contract, on the other.

Thus, in response to your first query, we wish to make it

clear that there are two kinds of job orders, i.e., (1) those that are
provided for in the plantilla of the local government unit
concerned and are filled-up via an appointment, and, (2) those
that are NOT provided for in the plantilla, this necessitating the
execution of job-order contracts, to engage the services of the
contractees. If the situation is in the first kind, then the Vice Mayor
has the authority to appoint job order employees assigned to the
Sanggunian whose salaries will be drawn from the budgetary
allocations of the Sanggunian. However, if the situation falls
within the second kind, then it is the Mayor who signs the job-
order contract.”

This distinction between those appointed to an item in the

plantilla of the Sanggunian on a job order basis and those who are
hired on a job order basis through a contract of service is adapted
and further explained in DILG Opinion No. 17, s. 2010, in this
wise:
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“[I]t must first be recalled in Atienza v. Villarosa, our
Supreme Court ruled that while the Governor has the authority to
appoint officials and employees whose salaries are paid out of the
provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and of the Office of
the Vice Governor whose salaries are paid out of the funds
appropriated for the Sangguninag Panlalawigan because such
authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. Thus, what
determines the authority to appoint officials and employees of the
province is the source of the appointees' salaries. In so ruling, our
Supreme Court applied Section 465(b)(v), in relation to Section
466(2), of the LGC of 1991.

xxx

With respect to the casual and job order employees, we

have to qualify. As also contained in our Opinion No. 32 series of
2005 dated June 8, 2005, we considered job order employees as
among those falling under the second type of casual employees.
Thus, we clarified therein that there are two(2) types of casual
employees, to wit: [a] those provided for in the plantilla of the
local government unit concerned and filled up via “appointment”,
and [b] those not provided for in the plantilla and hired through
job order contracts.

In the first type of casual employees, we were, and are still,

of the view, consistent with our earlier Opinions Nos. 87 and 173,
series of 2002, that the Vice Mayor has the authority to appoint
them. In the second type on the other hand, the Mayor has the
authority to hire them through the execution of job order
contracts. This is because while there is nothing in the LGC of 1991
that confers authority upon the Vice Mayor to sign any contract,
Section 77 of the LGC explicitly confers authority upon the local
executive to hire workers through job order contracts.

To sum up, the authority to appoint employees to fill up

regular and casual positions in a local government unit is
generally lodged with the Mayor. But if the salaries of these
employees are paid out of the funds appropriated for the
sanggunian, the authority to appoint them is lodged with the Vice
Mayor regardless of whether they would be working under the
Office of the Sanggunian itself or its secretariat or under the
Office of the Vice Mayor. To opine otherwise would constitute
undue interference with each other's functions. However, with
respect to casual positions not provided for in the plantilla and are
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hired through job order contracts, the authority to hire them is
lodged with the Mayor regardless of the source of the salaries. To
opine differently would run counter to the explicit provision of
the LGC as aforementioned which confers authority upon the local
chief executives to hire job order employees.”

On the other hand, DILG Opinion No. 25, s. 2016, which

Vice-Governor Vargas cited in the petition before the respondent
court, resolved the query of “[w]hether or not the majority of the
members of the City Council have the power to decide how to disburse the
MOOE budget job orders, thereby setting aside the authority of the Vice
Mayor to appoint officials and employees of the Sanggunian .” The DILG,
citing Atienza, opined that:

“[I]f the salaries of the contractual/job order employees are

derived from the appropriation of the sanggunian, the City/
Municipal Vice-Mayor or Vice-Governor, as the case may be, has
the authority to appoint and accordingly assign them.”

This opinion was likewise adopted in DILG Opinion Nos. 22

and 52, s. 2018. Under this interpretation, the basic test is the
determination of where the salaries of the job order employees are
sourced from. The DILG did not distinguish whether or not the
position of the job order employee is in the regular plantilla of the
Sanggunian. As long as the salaries are derived from the
appropriation specifically for the Sanggunian, the Vice-Governor
or Vice Mayor has the authority to appoint and assign job order
personnel, so Vice-Governor Vargas argued.

At this juncture, it is important to note that DILG opinions

do not constitute law or jurisprudence. They merely state the
opinion or interpretation of the said agency and does not, by itself
bind any parties to a case or controversy. It is well to remember
that, while the interpretation of an administrative agency which is
tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect, this
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the ultimately the courts
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that finally determine what the law means.23

Power to appoint job order employees v.

power to enter into contracts of service

To summarize the current state of the law on the matter: (1)

under the Local Government Code, the local chief executive has
the general power to appoint all the officials and employees of the
local government unit while the local vice chief executive has the
specific authority to appoint all officials and employees of the
Sanggunian; (2) in Atienza, the appointing power of the Vice
Governor is limited to those employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Office of the Vice Governor, whose salaries
are paid out of the funds appropriated for the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and corollarily, if the salary of an employee or
official is charged against the provincial funds, even if this
employee reports to the Vice-Governor or is assigned to his office,
the Governor retains the authority to appoint the said employee.

Under all the foregoing circumstances, the power or

authority consistently referred to is that of appointment. An
appointment is defined as the designation of a person, by the
person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the
duties of some office or trust. Stated otherwise, it is the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. 24 Thus, not all services or
duties rendered for the government are undertaken by a person
who has undergone an appointment process. A consultant, for
instance, may render services to the government, but the
relationship between him and the government is that of a
professional and his client, not that of an employer-employee
relationship. A person is appointed, or undergoes the
appointment process, only if he is hired, or seeking to be hired, to
23 Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95832, August 10, 1992.
24 Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993.
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exercise the functions of a given office. If the services or duties
rendered to the government is not by virtue of a given office,
there is no appointment to speak of.

A person appointed to a given government office for a

specific project or period of time is therefore, to the Court,
different from one who is hired on a job order basis, whether
time-based or project-based, through a contract of service and
who does not occupy a given office, that is, not in the plantilla of
the concerned agency or unit. This distinction is not novel and is a
settled policy in the procurement of services, specifically
delineated by our civil service rules and regulations. In addition
to the provisions of the Local Government Code, appointments
are covered by the 2017 Omnibus Rules on Appointments and
Other Human Resource Actions issued by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Specifically, Rule IV, Section 9, defines the
scope of fixed term, contractual, and casual employees. On the
other hand, the rules on contracts of services and job orders are
supplemented by different rules set forth by the CSC, including
Resolution No. 021480 and the Rules and Regulations Governing
Contract of Service and Job Order Workers in the Government.

A person appointed under the 2017 Omnibus Rules, even if

on a contractual or casual basis, occupies a government office and
his service is considered part of government service, governed by
our civil service laws. An employer-employee relationship exists
between the government and the person appointed. Thus, even
appointed contractual or casual employees are entitled to the
same benefits enjoyed by regular employees. On the other hand, a
person hired through a mere contract of service or job order does
not occupy a government office. The service rendered is not
government service, not covered by civil service rules and
regulations. A person hired under such manner does not enjoy
the benefits enjoyed by regular government employees. Hence,
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considering that a contract of service does not amount to
government service, the procurement of services (hiring of a
person) on this basis does not qualify as an appointment to a
public office.

The Court views the power of the local vice chief executive
as being circumscribed by the foregoing premises. His authority
under the Local Government Code is limited to the appointment
of officials and employees of the Sanggunian. To repeat, an
appointment involves going through the appointment process
mandated by the rules and not just by mere execution of a
contract of service. This is in consonance with the plain meaning
rule or verba legis. When the words or language of a statute is
clear, there is no need to interpret it in a manner different from
what the word plainly implies.25 Since the procurement of
services (hiring of workers) on a contract of service basis is not an
appointment, it follows that the local vice chief executive cannot
hire through the said process and cannot execute the contract of
service on behalf of the local government unit. The local vice chief
executive's authority under the Local Government Code is limited
to the restricted power of appointment and does not extent to
contracting of services.

This interpretation is consistent with the rule in statutory

construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the entire context. Every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. The law must not be
read in truncated parts and its provisions must be read in relation
to the whole law. The whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
produce a harmonious whole.26 A statute must be so construed as
25 Tan v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993, November 8, 2017.
26 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 183517, June 22,
2010.
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to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
possible.27

Under the Local Government Code, the local chief executive

has the general power of supervision and control over the local
government unit. His executive authority is broad and almost all-
encompassing, except only for some rights and duties specifically
vested in some other local government authority, and subject to
check and accountability mechanisms under the Local
Government Code. This includes the power to enter into contracts
that will bind the local government unit as a municipal
corporation under Article 22, in relation to Articles 444, 455, and
465, but subject to the approval of the Sanggunian. On the other
hand, the authority vested in the local vice chief executive is very
specific and limited to those under Articles 445, 456, and 466.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code which gives the
local vice chief executive the specific authority to enter into a
contract that will bind the local government unit. There is
likewise no inherent authority on the part of the local vice chief
executive to enter into contracts in behalf of the local government
unit.28 He may only do so when he is authorized by law, such as
when he acts as an acting local chief executive in case of
temporary vacancy, or when he is so empowered by an
ordinance.

Extending the power of the local vice chief executive

beyond the authority provided under the provisions of the Local
Government Code must not be countenanced. Allowing him to
enter into contracts on behalf of the local government, even if only
for the limited purpose of hiring job order employees, is still
against the clear wording of the law and encroaches upon the
local chief executive's authority. This disharmony must be
avoided at all cost if we are to uphold the very provisions and
27 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
28 Vicencio v. Villar, G.R. No. 182069, July 03, 2012.
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purpose of the Local Government Code.

Allowing the local vice chief executive to enter into

contracts to procure services (hire job order employees) in
representation of the local government unit would introduce a
dangerous precedent that would undermine the system of checks
and balances imbued in the Local Government Code. Under such
a system, the local chief executive is checked by the Sanggunian,
and vice versa. The local chief executive cannot enter into any
contract on behalf of the local government unit without the
authority of the Sanggunian. This includes the power to enter into
contracts of services. The Sanggunian serves as a check to ensure
that the local chief executive does not whimsically employ
contract workers. The theory that concedes to the local vice chief
executive the power to also enter into contracts of services finds
no agreement with the check and balance principle that permeates
the Local Government Code. Such a theory allows more to the
local vice chief executive than is provided by law. Such a theory
departs from the strict distribution of powers between the chief
executive and vice chief executive. It will lead to the mischievous
situation wherein both executives will be out-smarting each other
in hiring job order services in a run-up to an election.

We find more wisdom and consequently agree with the

interpretations by the DILG in its Opinions Nos. 31, s. 2009, and
No. 17, s. 2010. The dichotomy between the two modes of hiring
contractual or casual employees must not be confused.
Appointment is different from the execution of a contract of
service. The power of the local vice chief executive is limited to
that of appointing officials and employees to his office and the
Sanggunian, whose salaries are derived from the appropriation
specifically for the local legislative body. The authority to execute
any contract on behalf of the local government unit, to include the
execution of contracts for the procurement of services (hiring job
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order personnel), remains exclusive to the local chief executive.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Order and Resolution are SET ASIDE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Original Signed
APOLINARIO D. BRUSELAS, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Original Signed
RAFAEL ANTONIO M. SANTOS
Associate Justice

Original Signed
CARLITO B. CALPATURA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the opinion of the Court was written.

Original Signed
APOLINARIO D. BRUSELAS, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairman, Special Sixth Division